Officials who aspire to higher office signal decisiveness by accelerating decisions, since voters prefer leaders with low costs of delay and little uncertainty

A Theory of Decisive Leadership. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron Bodoh-Creed. Stanford Working Paper, July 2017. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/acreed/Indecision.htm

Abstract: We present a theory that rationalizes voters' preferences for decisive leaders. Greater decisiveness entails an inclination to reach decisions more quickly conditional on fixed information. Although speed can be good or bad, agency problems between voters and politicians create preferences among voters for leaders who perceive low costs of delay and have little uncertainty about idiosyncratic concerns, and hence who make decisions more rapidly than typical voters. Officials who aspire to higher office therefore signal decisiveness by accelerating decisions. In elections, candidates with reputations for greater decisiveness prevail despite making smaller compromises, and therefore earn larger rents from office holding.