Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts

Sunday, March 22, 2009

How the U.S. can help revitalize economies in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Plowshares for Peace. WaPo Editorial
How the U.S. can help revitalize economies in Pakistan and Afghanistan
WaPo, Sunday, March 22, 2009; page A18

AS THE Obama administration formulates its strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, pretty much everyone agrees that spurring the economy in both countries -- creating jobs -- is key to defusing militancy. The usual prescription is more foreign aid, which is sure to figure in any new plan. But what doesn't always get acknowledged in these discussions is that such aid often doesn't do much good. The United States wasted billions of dollars in Iraqi reconstruction aid, and given the dangerous environment -- which discourages inspection and monitoring -- you can expect a rerun in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A more effective way to boost both economies would be to allow them to export their products tariff-free into the United States. But that idea arouses the enmity of U.S. labor unions, which means that it's not going to get far in a Democratic Congress.

Enter Rep. Chris Van Hollen, Montgomery County Democrat and member of the House leadership, with a practical alternative. Mr. Van Hollen, with co-sponsors, has introduced legislation to create "reconstruction opportunity zones" within both countries. Certain products, including some (not all) textiles, produced within the zones would enjoy duty-free access to the U.S. market for 15 years. This would encourage investment by local businessmen, who best know the terrain, and create jobs. There's no better formula for discouraging Taliban recruitment.

It's not a magic formula, of course. The investment areas have to be drawn widely enough to make the prospect of investment realistic; if you limit them to the most intense battle zones, you're not going to see many jobs created. The bigger they are, though, the likelier the bill will arouse union opposition, so the politics are tricky. Mr. Van Hollen and his co-sponsors -- including Reps. Sander M. Levin (D-Mich), Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.) and Mark Steven Kirk (R-Ill.) -- have tried to find the sweet spot, and their bill also insists that any factories in the zones meet core international standards in their treatment of workers.

Maybe the strongest argument for the opportunity zones is that there is no down side; the worst that could possibly happen is they don't trigger much investment. But they would immediately provide a signal of U.S. commitment -- the governments of both countries strongly support the idea -- and they could have a substantial positive effect reasonably quickly, at almost no cost to the U.S. Treasury. Congress and the administration should get behind this idea.

Monday, March 9, 2009

The Obama administration is already losing control of the narrative: The "good war" is well on its way to becoming another bad war

The Not-So-Great Game. By Thomas Donnelly, Raphael Cohen, Tim Sullivan
The Weekly Standard, March 16, 2009

In between his many appearances touting the stimulus package and the restructuring of the nation's financial institutions, housing markets, and automobile industry, Barack Obama made his first serious decision as America's commander in chief on February 17. He ordered an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. In all likelihood, it's just the first installment of an Afghan "surge"--the U.S. and NATO commander in Kabul, General David McKiernan, has been asking for at least 30,000 more troops--but it raises four important questions.

First and foremost, will Obama rally Americans to support another long-running counterinsurgency effort? Despite his campaign rhetoric about Afghanistan being the "right war," Obama has been remarkably passive in setting the course of Afghan policy since taking office. If there's one lesson of the Bush years that Obama should not ignore it's that you cannot delegate war policy. You can't be just a "decider."

The White House has, moreover, been downplaying military issues at every turn. The troop deployment announcement was made by press release. Obama's Sort-of State of the Union address made only passing reference to war policy--other than the decision to close the Guantánamo detention facility. The president has been entirely diffident about discharging what the press release described as his most "solemn duty as President" in a "situation [that] demands urgent attention and swift action."

The Obama administration is already losing control of the narrative: The "good war" is well on its way to becoming another bad war. The tropes of the Afghanistan-as-the-graveyard-of-empires and Vietnam-revisited are back. In recent months, predictions of quagmire have moved from the Joe Klein fringe to the Evan Thomas mainstream. Newsweek's February 21 cover story, headlined "Could Afghanistan Be Obama's Vietnam?" reflects the emerging establishment consensus. According to a recent Washington Post/ABC News poll, only one third of Americans said U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan should be increased. The same number believe levels should be reduced. Only Obama can reconcile Americans to the realities of the Afghanistan war, explaining that success is hard but not impossible. Even the most insightful counterinsurgency strategy will demand patience--time probably matters much more than troop levels.

Second, the president needs to better control his "Team of Rivals." It is a military truism that strategic clarity depends upon a well-defined decisionmaking process, on a "unity of command." This principle is absent in the present Afghanistan policy. To a certain extent, this is inherent to coalition warfare: General McKiernan as International Security Assistance Force commander reports to both NATO and to U.S. Central Command. Likewise, his subordinate commanders--be they British, German, Canadian--report to at least two bosses.

But Obama is making the muddle worse. Afghanistan policy is the product of a horse-by-committee termed "the Interagency." The president, members of his cabinet, the national security adviser and his staff, generals and viceroys, and a burgeoning number of bureaucrats all take part and bring divergent personal or institutional biases with them. Interagency policy reflects the State Department's desires to do traditional diplomacy, the Pentagon's concerns about force structure and "balancing risk," the intelligence and special operations operatives charged with prosecuting the global war on terrorism, the charter of development agencies to alleviate poverty, and so on. No one in Washington is, as yet, responsible for winning the war.

And these structural problems are hugely exacerbated by the herd of elephantine egos and personalities engaged. There are at least three four-star officers with different agendas: McKiernan, CENTCOM chief General David Petraeus, and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The civilian side is even worse. Aside from the president himself, who has occasionally quipped that he's smarter than any of his advisers, there are the two poles of the new secretary of state and the old the secretary of defense. There's the national security adviser, Jim Jones, a former four-star general himself, who recently sounded like another four-star NSA, Alexander Haig, when he boasted to the Washington Post that he was in charge at the White House (even though Jones was in Munich at the time).

The Obama administration is also keen on ministers plenipotentiary and special envoys, with the new U.S. Special Envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, being the most special of all. He stands outside the traditional bureaucratic structures, and the great danger is that he will have lots of power but not so much responsibility. Foreign governments--Germany and Britain among them--remember the way in which Holbrooke dominated policymaking during the Balkans wars of the 1990s and want their own Holbrooke-equivalents in Afghanistan, if only to keep tabs on what the American is up to.

This multipolar decisionmaking world is a recipe for competition and confusion. There are at least three Afghanistan reviews underway: at the NSC by Bush-holdover "war czar" General Douglas Lute, at CENTCOM by Petraeus and many of the counterinsurgency experts who designed the Iraq surge, and by Mullen and the Joint Chiefs. These reviews, in turn, are to be reviewed by Bruce Riedel, a scholar at the Brookings Institution now working--at least temporarily--for Jones and the NSC. Whether he will bring clarity instead of further confusion is unclear; Riedel has written that he believes that settling the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is a key to success in Afghanistan and the war on terror.

Third, the administration needs to better define or, better yet, drop entirely the idea of "AfPak." This is the neologism for an emerging strain of conventional wisdom suggesting that for the United States to succeed in Afghanistan, it must first address the problems in the Pakistani border regions.

While there is no denying that the flow of weapons, resources, and fighters across the border into Afghanistan has complicated the U.S. mission there, Pakistan itself presents a range of strategic challenges of which the violence and extremism in its volatile tribal regions are only a symptom. As a nuclear-armed state with a weak civilian government, a politically powerful but malfunctioning military, and a population prone to extremism, Pakistan is strategically far more important to the United States than Afghanistan. The administration cannot afford to shape its policy toward Pakistan based simply upon the effects it hopes to achieve in Afghanistan; it must instead tackle Pakistan qua Pakistan, even as it pursues a comprehensive strategy for its neighbor. "AfPak" thinking will be wrongheaded about both countries.

Even if U.S. forces were able to stem entirely the flow of weapons and fighters, we would still have a robust indigenous Afghan insurgency on our hands. In the Pashtun belts of southern Afghanistan, in particular, much of the manpower behind the insurgency comes from local militants. The presence of criminal organizations and tribal militias throughout the country further complicates this volatile brew.

Conversely, the most immediate problems of Pakistan aren't confined to the border areas. The growing violence and extremism in the country's vast lawless territories aren't simply a problem for U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, they are a fundamental threat to Pakistan's survival, as militants move closer to the country's population centers. Thus far, the Pakistani government's responses have been haphazard and appear increasingly desperate. Over the past two years, the Pakistani army has been repeatedly defeated in conventional fights, by Taliban forces. The recent peace deal brokered by local officials and Taliban leaders in the Swat valley is further indication of the government's shrinking writ and testimony to the unpleasant military facts on the ground. The so-called "Malakand Accords" legitimate the rule of sharia law and de facto Taliban government in the region in return for a cease-fire among the roughly 2,000 fighters loyal to Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah.

Much of Pakistan's dysfunction stems from the military's outsize role in governance and civil society. American engagement with the Pakistani army cannot simply be tactical or operational; it must be strategic and institutional. In the near term, the United States must discourage the Pakistani army from its heavy-handed counterinsurgency tactics and preference for conventional firepower. But the reason that the Pakistani army retains its conventional focus is that it remains a force whose structures and existence are justified by the threat of war with India. These problems--fear of India and the distorted societal role of the army--are larger and deeper problems that dwarf the problems of the border areas.

No matter the outcome in Afghanistan, the problems in Pakistan will persist. The United States, therefore, must be careful not to view its interests in the country simply through the lens of the Afghan conflict. Which leads to our fourth question.

Does the Obama administration have a coherent strategy for the whole region of which Afghanistan is just a part? This is an urgent need, reflected in the dangerous state of U.S. and NATO lines of communication. Several weeks ago, insurgents destroyed a key bridge in the Khyber Pass, the most important supply route from Pakistan into Afghanistan. A bombing in Pakistan also destroyed a group of vehicles due to be shipped north. Then the government of -Kyrgyzstan, thanks to a not-so-subtle bribe from the Russians, announced that it will no longer allow the United States to use the critical air base at Manas. The Kyrgyz have long been trying to raise the rent on Manas, but the U.S. government appears to have been neglectful of the issue, allowing the Russians to make mischief.

We may be able to offer a larger bribe and reclaim Manas, although General Petraeus also recently visited Uzbekistan, where we first had basing rights until we were thrown out for calling attention to the brutalities of the Uzbek regime toward its own people. Add in Iran's desire to create a sphere of influence for itself in western Afghanistan and India's growing concerns about attacks from terror groups based in Pakistan, and the need for a more comprehensive U.S. strategy becomes even more apparent.

It's time for the president to provide political leadership and the strategic clarity for his "right war" and for this dangerous region. Thus far, he's been absent without leave.

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI.

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Obama Should Reconsider Militaristic Approach in Afghanistan

Obama Should Reconsider Militaristic Approach in Afghanistan. By Amitabh Pal
The Progressive, February 19, 2009

President Obama seems to have opted for a military strategy to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. He needs to reconsider.

With his announcement this week that he is sending 17,000 more U.S. troops to that country, he seems for the moment to have committed himself to a force-based approach, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he’s “absolutely convinced that you cannot solve the problem of Afghanistan, the Taliban, the spread of extremism in that region solely through military means.” The Obama Administration has apparently given up on bringing about development and democracy in Afghanistan, as evidenced by two recent pronouncements. Defense Secretary Bob Gates told Congress, “If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose,” while Obama himself opined that, “We are not going to be able to rebuild Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian democracy.”

But the United States hasn’t even truly tried. As the New Internationalist points out, Afghanistan has received just a fraction of the aid per capita that countries like Bosnia and East Timor obtained in the aftermath of their destruction, and military spending in the country is many times the amount disbursed as developmental assistance.

By opting for a military-first approach, Obama has troubled many of his allies and indeed some within his own party. Among them is a person who previously held Obama’s job, and another who narrowly missed in his bid to be Obama’s predecessor.

“I would disagree with Obama as far as a surge that would lead to a more intense bombing of Afghan villages and centers and a heavy dependence on military,” Jimmy Carter told Amy Goodman. “I would like to see us reach out more, to be accommodating, and negotiate with all of the factions in Afghanistan.”

“Our military commitment must be matched with realistic goals, beginning with a comprehensive new bottom-up strategy acknowledging Afghanistan's history of decentralized governance and recognizing the capabilities of our NATO and Afghan allies,” writes John Kerry in the Washington Post.

A number of progressive organizations are also disagreeing with Obama, and not just in the United States. When Professor Lisa Schirch of Eastern Mennonite University contacted Afghan civil society leaders, they told her that “a troop surge alone will result in more civilian casualties, more village raids, further alienation of the local population and growing local resistance to foreign troops,” and that “the Taliban could use a troop surge as an opportunity to recruit local people to their cause.”

The dangers of an approach dependent so heavily on the military are very readily apparent. A U.N. report released earlier this week provides solid evidence. Last year set a record for civilian deaths in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. While the Taliban were responsible for more than half of the casualties, pro-government forces (U.S., NATO and Afghan troops) were responsible for two-fifths. The most infamous incident was last August, when an American air attack killed perhaps 90 civilians, leading to a harsh denunciation by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, a supposed American ally.

“Civilian deaths have become a political flash point in Afghanistan, eroding public support for the war and inflaming tensions with President Hamid Karzai, who has bitterly condemned the American-led coalition for the rising toll,” a New York Times piece reports. “President Obama’s decision to deploy more troops to Afghanistan raises the prospect of even more casualties.”

The funny thing is that a man as smart as Obama should know that the Taliban resurgence is in good part due to two reasons that no amount of additional troops can solve: the malfeasance of the Karzai government, and the shelter given to the Taliban leadership by the Pakistani security apparatus.

U.S. officials have apparently linked Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali, to the drug trade. And U.S. exasperation at the corruption in the Afghan government is so intense that Senator Joe Biden last February walked out of a dinner with Karzai when the latter kept professing innocence.

Besides, much of the Taliban leadership is out of reach of U.S. forces, safely holed up as it is in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. You see, many in the Pakistani intelligence network still regard the Taliban as a bulwark against Indian influence, since Karzai is friendly with India. Among the Taliban menagerie ensconced in the provincial capital is reportedly the organization’s dreaded leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.

“Taliban leader Mullah Omar is living in Pakistan under the protection of its ISI intelligence agency, a captured Taliban spokesman has said,” the BBC reported in January of 2007.

A much better strategy for Afghanistan, it seems, would be for Obama to heavily lean on his buddies in Kabul and Islamabad, plus to apply a heavy dollop of nation-building to the country. But for now, alas, Obama seems to be going in a different direction.

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

WSJ Editorial Page: The left is already doubting Obama's Afghan surge

Barack of Afpakia. WSJ Editorial
The left is already doubting Obama's Afghan surge.
WSJ, Feb 17, 2009

The regents are on the ground and commanders are crafting new battle plans: President Obama is girding for a war surge in Afghanistan. Let's hope he's willing to see it through when his most stalwart supporters start to doubt the effort and rue the cost.

As a statement of principle, the new Administration's preoccupation with Afghanistan signals a welcome commitment to what has been known by that out-of-favor phrase "global war on terror." The Taliban claimed responsibility last week for coordinated suicide attacks in Kabul, which killed 28 people and reinforced perceptions that security is eroding. America's recent success in Iraq showed that the key to victory lies in shifting those perceptions. That means improving security.

More U.S. troops will likely be needed, and Central Command General David Petraeus is undertaking a review of goals and the resources to meet them. Mr. Obama has talked about doubling forces by another 30,000, and we hope he's willing to give his Afghan commander, General David McKiernan, the number he needs to clear and hold areas and protect the population. However, size of force matters less than having the proper counterinsurgency strategy for a conflict that is different than Iraq.

Among other useful things, Mr. Obama's surge may help to educate his friends on the political left about Islamist terror. The National Security Network, an outfit that never missed an opportunity to bash President Bush, has quickly come into line behind the new President. The group says Mr. Obama's strategy must be focused "first and foremost on preventing the Afghanistan-Pakistan region from becoming a staging ground for terrorist attacks against the U.S. and other nations or a source for instability that could throw Pakistan into chaos."

Sounds good to us -- and sounds a lot like the Bush strategy. America's goal isn't to turn a backward Central Asian country into the next Switzerland, but to keep al Qaeda and its Taliban allies from using it as a safe haven. Toward that end, the U.S. and its allies can help build Afghanistan's institutions and army and help a weak Pakistan government flush out the terrorists in its wild west.

No doubt the strategy can be tweaked. That started well before Mr. Obama's election, as America took back ownership of the Afghan mission from an unwieldy NATO command. Though Britain and Canada pull their weight, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has learned that Americans can't count on Europe to fill the troop and equipment gaps, so the U.S. did.

Also like the Bush Administration, Team Obama recognizes the Pakistan dimension to the Afghan problem -- even calling the place "Afpak." The Taliban came back in the past three years only after finding sanctuary around Quetta, in southern Pakistan, and in the country's northwest tribal regions. The U.S. has also won Islamabad's sotto voce cooperation to strike terror leaders, though more should be done around Quetta.

Mr. Obama's special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, has been in Afpak for a week's fact-finding. Before arriving, he said, "In my view it's going to be much tougher than Iraq." Even by Holbrookeian standards, that's hyperbole. The government in Kabul isn't in danger of collapsing, the Taliban isn't popular where it has ruled, and the insurgents are no match for the U.S.-led force on the battlefield.

Ultimately, as in Iraq, the Afghans will need to stand up more for themselves. That may take a while. But start with expanding the increasingly able Afghan army, a bright spot. The force of 80,000 is too small for a country the size of Texas and bordered by enemies. The police are a shambles, alas. Corruption, narco-trafficking, a weak central government: Afghanistan shares vices with other Western protectorates like Bosnia, and could improve on all counts.

However, notwithstanding President Obama's swipe last Monday that "the national government seems very detached from what's going on in the surrounding community," the rulers in Kabul are legitimate. Hamid Karzai has tolerated too much corruption, but any change of leadership should come from an Afghan challenge, not a U.S. desire to play kingmaker. Mr. Obama and Vice President Joe Biden -- who stormed out of a meeting with Mr. Karzai last year -- need to avoid JFK's mistake of toppling South Vietnam ally Ngo Dinh Diem.

The Obama team wants to play up Afghanistan's troubles so it can look good by comparison a year from now. But soon enough Mr. Obama will own those troubles, and talking down Afghanistan carries risks. Our allies and the American people may come to doubt that the conflict is winnable, or worth the cost.

Already, canaries on the left are asking a la columnist Richard Reeves, "Why are we in Afghanistan?" The President's friends at Newsweek are helpfully referring to "Obama's Vietnam." Mr. Obama may find himself relying on some surprising people for wartime support -- to wit, Bush Republicans and neocons.

Saturday, February 14, 2009

Don't Dumb Down Afghanistan. Lower expectations would lead to lesser results

Don't Dumb Down Afghanistan, by Gary Schmitt & Daniel Twining
Lower expectations would lead to lesser results.
The Weekly Standard, Feb 23, 2009, Volume 014, Issue 22

Reading tea leaves is a dangerous business when it comes to a new administration. There is always a fair amount of floundering around that comes from having too few senior people in place, unsettled -policymaking processes, and indecision over which campaign promises to keep and which to toss overboard.

Take, for example, the Obama administration's policy toward Afghanistan. While running for president, Barack Obama promised that help was on its way in the form of thousands of additional troops; now President Obama appears to have put his own promised surge on hold.
The ostensible reason is that the new administration wants to have a thorough review of Afghan policy before making that decision. On its face, reasonable enough-although America's civilian and military agencies spent much of last year undertaking such reviews in order to recommend policy options to the new administration.

Nonetheless, comments from senior administration officials in recent days suggest that "the review" might already have its conclusion in hand: U.S. goals for Afghanistan will be trimmed and the size of our commitment limited. The new buzz words being tossed around by administration strategists and military advisers are realism, attainable, end game, and even "How do we get out?"

The crux of the matter is that while candidate Obama could claim the Bush administration had taken its eye off the 9/11 ball when it went to war with Iraq, once Obama's own eye turned to Afghanistan, he discovered a difficult conflict that will require a generational commitment and sustained investment in building civilian and military institutions. Faced with that fact, it appears President Obama might blink, not wanting to own a war that could possibly eat up his administration's time and energy and which liberals in his own party are losing the stomach to prosecute.

This is ironic. Opponents of invading Iraq portrayed Afghanistan as "the good war," and the necessary one. And there is no question that Saddam Hussein's armies were more formidable military opponents than its cave-dwelling Taliban counterparts. Now, however, as in Alice's Wonderland, everything is upside down: Iraq has become the winnable war, and Afghanistan the quagmire.

But is lowering the bar in Afghanistan a workable strategy? Does de-emphasizing the building of a capable, democratic Afghan state, moving away from a full-scale counterinsurgency effort, and focusing instead on keeping the Taliban and al Qaeda at bay lead, in Vice President Biden's words, to "a stable Afghanistan that is not a haven for terrorists"? More likely it results in an Afghanistan that is unstable, balkanized, and home to more, not fewer, terrorists. The real, on-the-ground choice is between a democratic Afghanistan whose governance extends throughout the whole country or no legitimate government at all, with every man, family, tribe, and ethnic group looking out for its own.

In a balkanized Afghanistan, cooperation between U.S. and Afghan security forces will be uncertain and make the job of rooting out radical Taliban and al Qaeda elements more difficult. In such an Afghanistan, the Taliban, with access to millions upon millions in drug money and willing to be as ruthless as necessary, will have the upper hand when it comes to securing the "cooperation" of the Afghan population.

Perhaps a stratagem of lowered expectations might work if the United States were willing to act as Britain did when it was the colonial power. But how likely is that? Would either the American public or its military support trying to establish a balance of power within Afghanistan by playing off one warlord or tribe against another? It seems doubtful. And, lest we forget, in the end it didn't work for the British either.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is right to say that "if we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla [in Afghanistan], we will lose." But that is a straw man: No one expects Afghanistan to become, as the phrase was often used by critics in Iraq, some sort of "Jeffersonian democracy." Nevertheless, failing to establish a functioning and accountable Afghan state, as difficult as that may be, is a recipe for losing the war.

A minimalist military surge, as some within the administration are advocating, cannot succeed in securing our strategic goal of an Afghanistan able to deny safe haven to terrorists. A pseudo-surge of this sort, followed by trimming our commitment, will send exactly the wrong signals to (1) the Taliban, who know they only have to wait us out, (2) our allies, many of whom are already looking for ways to edge away from the mission, (3) Afghanistan's neighbors, including Iran and Pakistan, who will intensify their support for the Taliban or other tribal factions so as to secure their interests, and (4) the Afghan people, who will find it increasingly risky to cooperate with the Afghan government and international forces if it appears that the Taliban will outlast both.

At the recent Munich Security Conference, General David Petraeus, former commanding general in Iraq and now Central Command's lead officer, laid out a sensible strategy. In his words, the Afghan people are the decisive "terrain" in this struggle-implying that a focus on finding and fighting Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents is viewing the problem from the wrong end of the telescope. Our strategy, instead, must focus on protecting the population and connecting them with the Afghan state. Giving short shrift to that mission-by failing to put sufficient boots on the ground, provide the level of assistance needed, implement a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan, tackle pervasive corruption, or invest in building Afghan governing capacity-will only make it more likely that we will face a resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan.

As difficult as all this might be, the particular irony in the administration's possibly emerging verdict that building a democratic state in Afghanistan is too hard is that Afghans themselves disagree. Recent polling by the Asia Foundation shows that, despite insecurity and misgovernance, 78 percent of Afghans still believe democracy is the best form of government, and 65 percent believe free and fair elections can deliver a better future. But only 38 percent of Afghans believe their country is moving in the right direction-because of the pervasive insecurity and corruption that characterize life there today. Afghans have not given up on democracy; it would be a sad and self-defeating commentary if we did.

Gary Schmitt is director of the program on advanced strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute and Daniel Twining is senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Monday, February 9, 2009

David Petraeus' Remarks at the Munich Security Conference

David Petraeus' Remarks at the Munich Security Conference
February 8, 2009

Thank you very much Chairman, and it’s great to be with you all and if I could start off by just applauding as a soldier what I just heard the minister of defence of the UK tell us, I thought that was a terrific message.

It’s great to be on the stage with my diplomatic partner, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. You know it’s every commander’s dream to have as his ambassadorial wingman someone journalists describe with nicknames like the bulldozer.

In all seriousness I want to publically salute this gifted diplomat for taking on his new position, an appointment that conveys how significant the focus is in the United States on Afghanistan and Pakistan and the south and central Asian regions more broadly

Secretary of Defense Gates recently described Afghanistan to the US congress as posing our greatest military challenge right now.

As he noted, our fundamental objective in Afghanistan is to ensure that transnational terrorists are not able to reestablish the sanctuaries they enjoyed prior to 9/11.

It was to eliminate such sanctuaries that we took action in Afghanistan in 2001 and preventing their reestablishment remains an imperative today, noting to be sure that achievement of that objective inevitably requires accomplishment of other interrelated tasks as well.

As has been explained, President Obama has directed a strategy review that sharpen the clarity of these tasks.

Afghanistan has been a very tough endeavor. Certainly there have been important achievements there over the past seven years as Minister Young and President Karzai noted in the earlier session. Many important ones.

But in recent years the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda has led to an increase in violence, especially in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

Numerous other challenges have emerged as well, difficulties in the development of governmental institutions that achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people; corruption, expansion of poppy production and the illegal narcotics industry, though that was reversed last year, and difficulties in the establishment of the Afghan police.

In fact there has been nothing easy about Afghanistan. And as Senator Lieberman observed recently in a speech to the Brookings Institution, reversing Afghanistan’s slide into insecurity will not come quickly, easily or cheaply. Similarly Secretary Gates told Congress this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight. I agree.

In fact I think it’s important to be clear-eyed about the challenges that lie ahead while also remembering the importance of our objectives in Afghanistan and the importance of the opportunity that exists as we all intensify our efforts and work together to achieve those objectives.

Many observers have noted that there are no purely military solutions in Afghanistan and that is correct. Nonetheless military action while not sufficient by itself is absolutely necessary, for security provides the essential foundation for the achievement of progress in all the other so-called lines of operation. Recognizing of course that progress in other areas made possible by security improvements typically contributes to further progress in the security arena creating an upward spiral in which improvements in one area reinforce progress in another.

Arresting and then reversing the downward spiral in security in Afghanistan thus will require not just additional military forces as we have been reminded again today but also more civilian contributions, greater unity of effort between civilian and military elements and with our Afghan partners, and a comprehensive approach as well as sustained commitment and a strategy that addresses the situations in neighboring countries.

This morning I’d like to describe briefly and in general terms the resource requirements under discussion in Washington and various other national capitols.

Then I’ll describe a few of the ideas that helped us in Iraq and that properly adapted for Afghanistan can help General McKiernan and ISAF.

In recent months our president and many others have highlighted the need for additional forces in Afghanistan to reverse the downward spiral in security, help Afghan forces provide security for the elections on August 20th, and enable progress in the tasks essential to achieving our objectives.

As has been announced in recent months more US forces are entering operations as part of ISAF and Afghanistan. Now more have been ordered to deploy and the deployment of others is under consideration.

Beyond that the number of Afghan soldiers to be trained and equipped has been increased. And many of the other troop contributing nations will deploy additional forces as well, with a number of commitments under discussion, and I would be remiss if I did not ask individual countries to examine very closely what forces and other contributions they can provide as ISAF intensifies its efforts in preparation for the elections in August.

It is of course not just additional combat forces that are required. ISAF also needs more so called “enablers” to support the effort in Afghanistan: More intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. More military police, engineers and logistics elements, additional special operations forces and civil affairs units. More lift and attack helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, additional air medivac assets, increases in information operations capabilities and so on.

Also required are more embedded training teams, operational mentoring and liaison teams and police mentoring teams, all elements that are essential to building the all important capability of the Afghan national security forces and I applaud the German defense minister’s announcement of additional police and army trainers this morning. As with combat forces, some additional enabler elements are already flowing to Afghanistan, commitments have been made to provide others and again others are under discussion. As Senator Lieberman also highlighted in his Brookings speech, a surge in civilian capacity is needed to match the increase in military forces in order to field adequate numbers of provincial reconstruction teams and other civilian elements.

These teams and other personnel are essential to help our afghan partners expand their capabilities in key governmental areas, to support basic economic development, and to assist in development of various important aspects of the rule of law.

It is also essential of course that sufficient financial resources be provided for the effort in Afghanistan. It’s hugely important that nations deliver on their pledges of economic development assistance, that the Afghan National Army and law and order trust funds be fully financed, that support be maintained for the afghan reconstruction trust fund, and that resources continue to be provided for the projects conducted by our military units and PRTs at local levels, and again I applaud the German defense minister’s announcement of additional development aid this morning as well.

Of course just more troops, civilians, dollars, and even Euros won’t be enough.

As students of history we are keenly aware that Afghanistan has over the years been known as the graveyard of empires. It is after all a country that has never taken kindly to outsiders bent on conquering it. We cannot take that history lightly. And our awareness of it should caution us to recognize that while additional forces are essential, their effectiveness will depend on how they are employed, as that in turn will determine how they are seen by the Afghan population. And what I’d like to discuss next then are some of the concepts that our commanders have in mind as plans are refined to employ additional forces.

I base this on discussions with General McKiernan and others who have served in Afghanistan as well as on lessons learned in recent years. I do so with awareness that a number of the elements on the ground are operating along the lines of these ideas, and that their ability to do so will be enhanced by the increased density on the ground of ISAF and Afghan forces as additional elements deploy to the most challenging areas. Counterinsurgency operations are, after all, troop intensive. Finally I want to underscore the fact that commanders on the ground will as always operationalize the so called “big ideas” I talk about in ways that are appropriate to their specific situations on the ground.

So here are some of those ideas.

First and foremost our forces and those of our Afghan partners have to strive to secure and serve the population. We have to recognize that the Afghan people are the decisive terrain. And together with our Afghan partners we have to work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support and to facilitate the provision of basic services, the development of the Afghan security forces in the area, the promotion of local economic development, and the establishment of government that includes links to the traditional leaders in society and is viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the people.

Securing and serving the people requires that our forces be good neighbors. While it may be less culturally acceptable to live among the people in certain parts of Afghanistan than it was in Iraq, it is necessary to locate Afghan and ISAF forces where they can establish a persistent security presence

You can’t commute to work in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Positioning outposts and control bases then requires careful thought, consultation with local leaders, and the establishment of good local relationships, to be effective.

Positioning near those we and our Afghan partners are helping to secure also enables us to understand the neighborhood. A nuanced appreciation of local situations is essential. Leaders and troopers have to understand the tribal structures, the power brokers, the good guys and the bad guys, local cultures and history and how systems are supposed to work and how they do work.

This requires listening, and being respectful of local elders and mullahs, of farmers and shopkeepers, and it also requires of course, many cups of tea.

It is also essential that we achieve unity of effort. That we coordinate and synchronize the actions of all ISAF and Afghan forces and those of our Pakistani partners across the border, and that we do the same with the actions of our embassy and international partners, our afghan counterparts, local governmental leaders, and international and nongovernmental organizations.

Working to a common purpose is essential in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. We also, in support of and in coordination with our Afghan partners, need to help promote local reconciliation, although this has to be done very carefully, and in accordance with the established principles in the Afghan constitution.

In concert with and in support of our Afghan partners we need to identify and separate the irreconcilables from the reconcilables, striving to create the conditions that can make the reconcilables part of the solution, instead of a continuing part of the problem, even as we kill, capture or run off the irreconcilables.

In fact, programs already exist in this area and careful application of them will be essential in the effort to fracture and break off elements of the insurgency, in order to get various groups to put down their weapons and support the legitimate government and constitution of Afghanistan.

Having said that, we must pursue the enemy tenaciously. True irreconcibles again must be killed captured or driven out of the area, And we cannot shrink from that any more than we can shrink from being willing to support Afghan reconciliation with those elements that show a willingness to reject the insurgents and help Afghan and ISAF forces.

To ensure that the gains achieved can endure, ISAF and Afghan forces have to hold areas that have been cleared. Once we fight to clear and secure an area, we must ensure that it is retained.

The people and local security forces need to know that we will not abandon them. Additionally we should look for ways to give local citizens a stake in the success of the local security effort, and in the success of the new Afghanistan more broadly as well.

To this end a reformed, capable Afghan national police force, with the necessary support from the international community and the alliance is imperative to ensuring the ability to protect the population.

And the new Afghan population protection program announced by Minister of Interior Atmar holds considerable promise and deserves our support as well.

On a related note, to help increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government, we need to help our Afghan partners give the people a reason to support the government and their local authorities.

This includes helping to enable Afghan solutions to Afghan problems.

And on a related note, given the importance of Afghan solutions and governance being viewed as legitimate by the people, and in view of allegations of corruption, such efforts likely should feature support for what might be called an Afghan accountability offensive as well. That will be an important effort.

In all that we do as we perform various missions, we need to live our values. While our forces should not hesitate to engage and destroy an enemy, our troopers must also stay true to the values we hold dear.

This is, after all , an important element that distinguishes us from the enemy. And it manifests itself in many ways, including making determined efforts to reduce to the absolute minimum civilian casualties, an effort furthered significantly by the recent tactical direction and partnering initiatives developed by General McKiernan with our Afghan counterparts.

We must also strive to be first with the truth. We need to beat the insurgents and extremists to the headlines and to preempt rumors. We can only do that by getting accurate information to the chain of command, to our Afghan partners and to the press as soon as is possible. Integrity is critical to this fight.

Thus when situations are bad we should freely acknowledge that fact and avoid temptations to spin. Rather we should describe the setbacks and failures we suffer and then state what we’ve learned from them and how we’ll adjust to reduce the chances of similar events in the future.

Finally, we must always strive to learn and adapt. The situation in Afghanistan has changed significantly in the past several years and it continues to evolve. This makes it incumbent on us to assess the situation continually and to adjust our plans, operations, and tactics as required. We should share ideas and best practices but we should also never forget that what works in one area today may not work there tomorrow, and that what works in an area may not work in another area either.

In conclusion allow me to reiterate the key points I have sought to make. We have a hugely important interest in ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists. Achieving that core objective in turn requires the accomplishment of several other significant tasks.

Although there have been impressive achievements in Afghanistan since 2001, the security situation has deteriorated markedly in certain areas in the past two years.

Reversing that trend is necessary to improve security for the population, to permit the conduct of free and fair elections in August, and to enable progress in other important areas.

Achieving security improvements will require more ISAF and Afghan security forces of all types. Combat, combat support, logistics trainers and advisers, special operations and so on.

Some additional forces are already deploying, further increases have been ordered or pledged, and more are under discussion. To be effective the additional military forces will need to be employed in accordance with counterinsurgency concepts applied by leaders who have a nuanced understanding of their areas of operation.

And to complement and capitalize on the increased military resources, more civilian assets, adequate financial resources, close civil-military cooperation, and a comprehensive approach that encompasses regional states will be necessary.

None of this will be easy. Indeed, as Vice President Biden observed recently after a trip to Afghanistan, Afghanistan likely will get harder before it gets easier, and sustained progress will require sustained commitment.

But our objectives are of enormous importance. A significant opportunity is at hand and we all need to summon the will and the resources necessary to make the most of it.

Thank you.

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

NATO in Afghanistan: Lazy Allies

Lazy Allies, by Ted Galen Carpenter
The National Interest, February 2, 2009

Media reports indicate that President Obama may abandon his plan to ask America’s NATO partners to provide more combat troops for the mission in Afghanistan. Given how militarily useless many of the existing European deployments have been, that may not prove to be a big loss. But the feckless conduct of some of the European members of NATO in Afghanistan is indicative of a larger problem. The reality is that Washington’s much-touted alliances now involve more symbolism and tokenism than any meaningful addition to America’s military power. Immediately following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, NATO governments invoked Article V—which states that an attack on one member is an attack on all—for the first time in the alliance’s history. American leaders welcomed the European pledges of support, and the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan soon had a significant NATO component.

But early on, doubts arose about how serious the European allies were about their military commitments. Indeed, most of the NATO governments seemed to view their troop deployments as personnel for humanitarian relief and nation-building tasks rather than for combat operations. The military heavy lifting was by and large left to U.S. forces and those of a few other countries, primarily Canada, Britain and the Netherlands.

Most NATO members have placed various caveats on the use of their military personnel. Some are prohibited from night operations (which are inherently more dangerous). Others are prohibited from being deployed in certain areas of the country—specifically, those areas where significant combat is occurring and additional troops might actually prove useful.

Germany is one of the worst offenders in that regard. Berlin has restricted its troops to the northern regions of Afghanistan, where virtually no fighting is taking place. Despite Washington’s repeated requests, the German government has refused to lift that restriction. That might be just as well. A December 2008 German parliamentary report concluded that the country’s troops in Afghanistan spent most of their time lounging around and drinking beer, and that many were now too fat and out of condition to be of any use in combat operations.

The desire of U.S. allies to keep their troops out of harm’s way is not confined to the Afghanistan theater—or for that matter to the NATO allies. A similar pattern emerged with the deployments of both South Korean and Japanese forces in Iraq. Seoul insisted that its troops be stationed only in Iraqi Kurdistan, by far the safest area of the country. But the South Korean government was a profile in courage compared to the Japanese government. Although Tokyo sent units of its Self-Defense Force (SDF) to Iraq, it insisted that those forces must be confined to noncombat roles. Indeed, the SDF units had to be protected by the troops of other coalition countries. Thus, from a military standpoint, the Japanese contribution was not an asset to the occupation effort—it was a liability.

Such episodes indicate that many of America’s supposed military partners are more interested in engaging in tokenism and security symbolism than they are with playing a meaningful military role. The governments of those countries want to show that they are good allies and willing participants in U.S.-led missions, while incurring few, if any, battlefield risks. That sort of conduct may salve the consciences of political leaders in allied capitals, and it may appeal to U.S. policymakers for whom symbolism is more important than substance. It may even gull an otherwise suspicious American public. But it provides little useful addition to America’s own military power.

One wonders at times if U.S. leaders believe that this country should have allies for the sake of having allies, even if those military partners bring little of value to the table. Why else would American officials tolerate the tokenism evident with the allied contributions in both Iraq and Afghanistan? And why would those same officials be so enthusiastic about the addition of tiny, militarily insignificant members to the NATO alliance?

The last round of NATO expansion brought on board such military powerhouses as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. According to the 2008 edition of the widely respected publication The Military Balance, Estonia’s annual defense budget is $386 million, and the country fields 4,100 active-duty troops. The figures for Latvia are $471 million and 5,996 troops; Lithuania, $470 million and 13,850 troops; and Slovenia, $750 million and 5,973 troops. At NATO’s summit last year in Bucharest, alliance leaders gave the green light to membership for Croatia and Albania. Croatia’s accession would add $875 million and 17,660 troops, while Albania’s would add $208 million and 11,020 military personnel.

Collectively, such members spend less on their militaries in a year than the United States spends in Iraq in two weeks. How adding such military pygmies to NATO is supposed to enhance the security of the United States is a mystery. Indeed, since several of those countries have serious tensions with their neighbors, they are not just militarily irrelevant, but are outright security liabilities that could drag the United States into needless conflicts.

U.S. policymakers ought to be far more realistic about the utility of alliances. Allies are neither good nor bad, per se. But American officials should not pretend that allies are making meaningful military contributions when the evidence indicates otherwise. Security symbolism and tokenism is of little practical use, yet that is the level of assistance that has become all too common from America’s alliance partners.

Sunday, February 1, 2009

Afghanistan: major reduction in poppy cultivation in is now in reach

UN Secretary-General''s Special Representative for Afghanistan: major reduction in poppy cultivation in is now in reach
UN, New York, Feb 1 2009 11:10AM

Opium cultivation in Afghanistan is set to shrink this year, which could deal a major blow to the illicit drug industry, the top United Nations official to the war-torn country said today.

Since 2002, poppy production had increased every year until a small reduction last year, but a major reduction in is now in reach, the Secretary-General''s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, told journalists in Kabul.

At a press conference announcing the release of a new UN report, the Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, Mr. Eide said, "This year could be a turning point."

"There could be a reduction in each and every province in the country, and the number of poppy-free provinces could grow beyond 20 [of the country''s 34 provinces]," he added.

Similar to previous years, opium cultivation this year is expected to be virtually confined to the seven most unstable provinces in the south and south west of Afghanistan, where production has also been significantly reduced.

"Since this industry is so intimately linked to crime, corruption, and food insecurity, the effects could be wide-ranging, and very positive," said Mr. Eide.

In the south and south-west, the drop-off in opium cultivation is explained by high wheat prices, low opium prices and a lack of water in the face of severe drought, according to the report produced by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

In other parts of the country, the report attributes pressure from government authorities, food scarcity and effective pre-planting information campaigns for the decline in poppy cultivation.

Mr. Eide warned that "we could face a backlash instead of further progress" if the Government and donors do not take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by this year''s decrease in production.

"Governors need additional resources to enable them to demonstrate that reduction in poppy production leads to development today. They have huge responsibilities, but few resources," he said.

Highlighting the contribution made by the United States and the United Kingdom to the Good Performance Initiative, Mr. Eide urged other donors to support the effort.

The Special Representative called for other measures to break the country''s dependency on the illegal crop, including an increase in direct agricultural assistance to farmers and involving local community and religious leaders in the fight against poppy production.

"The survey shows that where such assistance was given, the communities tend to stoppoppy production.

As you are aware, agriculture has been a neglected sector. Both the government and donors must make sure that agriculture becomes a priority not only in rhetoric but in the allocation of resources.

How to Export an Awakening: Afghanistan, viewed from Iraq

How to Export an Awakening, by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Joshua D. Goodman
Afghanistan, viewed from Iraq.
The Weekly Standard, Feb 09, 2009, Volume 014, Issue 19

The United States needs a new military strategy in Afghanistan. In 2008, NATO casualties rose to an all-time annual high of 294, 155 of them U.S. soldiers. Roadside bombs and kidnappings doubled last year. Underscoring the gravity of the situation, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, warned the House Armed Services Committee in September, "I'm not convinced we're winning in Afghanistan."

In October, General David Petraeus--best known for revamping American strategy in Iraq--inherited responsibility for Afghanistan when he assumed command of CENTCOM (whose purview stretches from Egypt and the Horn of Africa all the way through Central Asia). None knows better than he that U.S. progress in Iraq over the past two years owes much to the rise of the "Awakening" movement, an alliance of Sunni tribesmen, Iraqi nationalists, ex-Baathists, and others united by the goal of driving al Qaeda from their country. Petraeus oversaw U.S. forces' work in partnering with, protecting, and spreading the Iraqi Awakening. Now he has presented a plan to U.S. allies to spur a similar movement among Afghans.

Despite some objections (notably from Canadian defense minister Peter MacKay), the United States will almost certainly try to replicate the Iraqi Awakening's achievements in Afghanistan in the coming year. How? In considering this question, there is no better place to start than a 47-page memorandum written by Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha, the leader of Iraq's Awakening movement, and submitted to the American embassy in Kabul last spring.

Abu Risha prepared his memo at the request of Christopher Dell, the U.S. deputy chief of mission in Afghanistan. Though it is not publicly available (we obtained a copy from U.S. military sources) and has received little media attention beyond an account by Eli Lake in the now-defunct New York Sun, the plan it outlines is likely to take on greater importance over the coming year. The memo provides a cogent analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, as well as pertinent suggestions for replicating the Awakening's success there.

Abu Risha reviews several challenges in Afghanistan. The country is beset by warlords and their followers, who "are accustomed to living freely without the rule of law." There is great distrust of Hamid Karzai's government, which some Afghans believe is conspiring with the United States in "Americanizing and changing the identity of the Afghan people." This distrust is magnified by the country's living conditions: The economy is poor, with wages low and unemployment high. Despite improvements, the government has been unable to provide adequate education and health care.

These internal factors are compounded, in Abu Risha's view, by a military picture unfavorable to the United States. He argues that "military attacks by air against Taliban locations will cause the loss of many civilian lives," and so are likely to generate hostility to U.S. and NATO forces.

Abu Risha argues, nevertheless, that there are parallels between Afghanistan today and Iraq's Anbar Province in 2006 and 2007. Most important, al Qaeda and affiliated groups in Afghanistan have created a "climate of terror" similar to what they created in Anbar, where "they murdered anyone who opposed or criticized their actions and behavior." As in Anbar, he believes, an Awakening could help Afghanistan reverse its present deadly course.

Abu Risha outlines some preconditions for success. First and foremost is the need for a strong leader. In Anbar, this was the late Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, Abu Risha's brother, assassinated in late 2007. Such a figure must have "charisma, outstanding leadership elements and courage," he should be "a man of honor, tolerant and persistent," and he should be "a center of trust" with "a political family background." Abu Risha emphasizes, however, that NATO should not try to establish new leadership in Afghanistan, but should work within the tribes' existing hierarchies. "This is a nation," he writes, "that does not accept changes or give up control easily without a fight."

Sterling Jensen, who participated as an Army contract linguist in the U.S. government's engagement with the Iraqi tribes as the Anbar Awakening was taking shape in the fall of 2006, agrees that Abdul Sattar's leadership was critical. "The Americans didn't make the Awakening," Jensen says. "They didn't make Sheikh Ahmed or Sheikh Abdul Sattar. You can influence some [local leaders'] thinking, but it's going to be the Americans recognizing these kinds of leaders, and supporting them."

Militarily, Abu Risha recommends giving Afghan leaders "the flexibility to develop and build military forces" similar to the Awakening and Sons of Iraq militias in Iraq. (The Sons of Iraq program, initiated and paid for by the U.S. military, consisted of the formation of paramilitary organizations in an effort to spread the Awakening beyond Anbar.) In his view, this can help Afghan fighters take the lead against religious militants, while NATO forces scale back their own activities. "Keep U.S. forces' and NATO forces' movement in Afghan cities limited," Abu Risha writes, "to only fight when needed, and control the Taliban insurgency and their expanded activities." He suggests that scaling back U.S. and NATO activity will diminish public hostility to their mission.

Abu Risha sees Pakistan as a second front as long as al Qaeda's senior leadership is ensconced in Pakistan's tribal areas. Islamic militants now routinely launch their attacks on Afghanistan from these tribal areas. Abu Risha encourages the United States to "help and support Pakistan in the fight against terrorism," and argues that an Afghan Awakening will depend in part on "strong and influential figures in Pakistan."

There are not only military but also political dimensions to Abu Risha's strategy. He recognizes Afghanistan's predominantly conservative religious practice and argues that "it is important not to infuriate influential public leaders, particularly the community religious leaders, mosques' preachers, mosques' imams, . . . and Islamic leaders in the tribal areas." Abu Risha favors active dialogue with religious leadership and institutions. He believes the influence religious figures and institutions have on Afghan tribal leaders warrants engagement with them.

Indeed, Abu Risha believes that an Afghan Awakening should be as politically inclusive as possible. He argues that, as a general rule, to do battle against Afghan parties "will cost the military more money than to include these political parties in the process." He recognizes, however, that there are limits to inclusion and writes that NATO forces should combat parties that "fight the American project."

To facilitate an Afghan Awakening, Abu Risha makes a concrete offer to U.S. and NATO forces. In his memorandum, he proposes sending a delegation of three to five Iraqi Awakening leaders to Afghanistan "to explain and clarify the essential requirements to implement and succeed in the experiment." He suggests having these Iraqis "participate in organizing different conferences in Afghanistan to share the ideology and the success" of Iraq's Awakening.

It will be interesting to see which of these ideas the United States pursues. While there are no guarantees that an Awakening strategy will work in Afghanistan, there are precious few alternatives.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is director, and Joshua D. Goodman is deputy director, of the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Thursday, January 29, 2009

WaPo on Afghanistan: Democrats have long called it 'the central front.' Will they retreat from it?

The Afghan Challenge. WaPo Editorial
Democrats have long called it 'the central front.' Will they retreat from it?
Washington Post, Thursday, January 29, 2009; page A18

FOR YEARS, Democrats excoriated the Bush administration for not devoting sufficient resources to Afghanistan. But now that Barack Obama has taken office, some seem to be having second thoughts. "Our original goal was to go in there and take on al-Qaeda. . . . It was not to adopt the 51st state of the United States," said Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.), the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Kerry pioneered the Democratic argument to send more troops during his own presidential campaign in 2004. Now he says "the parallels" to Vietnam "just really keep leaping out in so many different ways."

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates seconded that skepticism at a congressional hearing on Tuesday. "If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose," he said, "because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience and money, to be honest."

We're happy to agree that Afghanistan should not become the 51st state, or Valhalla -- but we're not sure who or what Mr. Kerry and Mr. Gates have in mind. So far as we know, the American objective in Afghanistan since 2002 has been pretty much what Mr. Gates says it should be: "an Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for al-Qaeda, who reject the rule of the Taliban and support the legitimate government they have elected and in which they have a stake."

The problem, as Mr. Gates acknowledged, is that meeting that aim necessitates such tasks as stabilizing western Pakistan, rooting out the opium trade, vastly expanding the Afghan army and constructing a workable legal system. That, in turn, will require more money, more troops, many more years of commitment -- and higher American casualties.

"Bottom line is, it's going to be tough, it's going to be difficult, in many ways harder than Iraq," Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) put it to Mr. Gates. "Do you agree with that?" "Yes," the secretary responded.

So why make it sound as if the Obama administration is scaling back U.S. ambitions? Part of this may be pure politics, to assure the antiwar left -- not to mention other Americans -- that the United States is not about to follow Russia and Britain into an Afghan quagmire. Yet the new administration, and supporters such as Mr. Kerry, ought to recognize a greater political need, which is to make clear to the country that the war against terrorism -- whatever it is now called -- did not end on Jan. 20 and that Afghanistan in particular will require years more patience and sacrifice to get right.

The way to avoid a quagmire is not to hold back on U.S. military reinforcements or development aid but to assemble a national civil-military plan that integrates war-fighting with reconstruction and political reconciliation. As Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.) points out, such a plan was the foundation of the U.S. recovery in Iraq, but the model has never been applied in Afghanistan. That's largely because the United States must share authority with some 40 allies, many of which place strict limits on what their troops may do, insist on managing their own development programs, or both. The Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai, mired in corruption and increasingly at odds with U.S. commanders, is also not on board.

Afghanistan doesn't need to become the 51st state, but it does need a single, coherent, integrated plan to become a state strong enough to resist the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Creating one will require some aggressive diplomacy and maybe a little political china-breaking. That's something for which the State Department's new envoy to the region, Richard C. Holbrooke, is known. But low-balling the scale of the challenge, or the costs it may incur, won't help.

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

State Sec Hillary Clinton Meets Afghan Women Lawyers

Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton Meets Afghan Women Lawyers
Media Note (Revised), Office of the Spokesman, US State Dept
Washington, DC, Jan 28, 2009

Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton met today at the State Department with fourteen prominent Afghan women judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. These jurists were in Washington to participate in a training program arranged by the Department’s Public-Private Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan. Secretary Clinton told them: "Your American friends greatly admire your bravery and courage. It is your work in the tough environment of Afghanistan for women lawyers that will bring real reform and the rule of law to the Afghan people. As President Obama made clear yesterday in his first foreign policy announcement, we are committed to supporting your efforts to bring security and stability to your country."

Under the leadership of the former Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, Dr. Kerry Healey, and United States District Judge Stephen G. Larson of the Central District of California, the women participated in two weeks of intensive legal seminars, roundtable events, and consultations with senior officials from the State of California and the U.S. government, including former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The women explored current topics in the Afghan and American legal systems, legal decision-making and mediation, domestic violence, family and mental health, and narcotics law, while gaining hands-on exposure to the American judicial system.

The Public-Private Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan is a joint effort between the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the American legal community to strengthen the rule of law in Afghanistan. The goal of the Partnership is to help the Afghan people establish a fair and transparent justice system that protects the rights of women, children, and minorities and that is equally accessible to all citizens.

Electronic Access via InternetMore information about the Public-Private Partnership is available for download from the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/partnership/index.htm.

Monday, January 26, 2009

U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction Program in Afghanistan

U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction Program in Afghanistan. Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
US State Dept, Washington, DC, Jan xx, 2009

The U.S. conventional weapons destruction program in Afghanistan aims to protect victims of conflict, provide life-saving humanitarian assistance and help provide security and safety for the Afghan people. Since 1993, the Department of State has provided more than $95,000,000 in conventional weapons destruction and humanitarian mine action assistance to Afghanistan. Direct funding to five Afghan non-governmental organizations has sustained clearance operations, developed host nation management and technical capacity and provided vocational training when a reduction in mine clearance activities increased the number of unemployed deminers.


The Conventional Weapons Problem

The widespread and indiscriminate use of mines, small arms/light weapons, ordnance and munitions since the Soviet invasion of 1979 has left Afghanistan heavily contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW). The United Nations Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) estimates that 720 square kilometers of suspected hazardous areas exist, with more than 4 million Afghans living in 2,229 ERW-contaminated communities. Mines and ERW killed or injured more than 445 Afghans in 2008, an average of 37 victims per month. Additional conventional weapons and munitions hazards are reported daily. Although MAPA has cleared almost two-thirds of all suspected hazards discovered to date, vast amounts of areas remain contaminated due to on-going conflict and inaccessibility because of difficult terrain and deteriorating infrastructure.

The majority of ERW-contaminated areas are agricultural fields, irrigation canals, and grazing areas as well as roads and residential and commercial areas. Security belts of landmines also exist around major cities, airports, government installations, and power stations. An equally significant problem is the existence of large amounts of unexploded ordnance, which inflicted extensive injuries and destruction even prior to the on-going conflict. Still, mines and ERW and loosely secured or illicit conventional weapons and munitions persistently restrict access to valuable resources and important infrastructure, effectively making social and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan extremely difficult.


United States Assistance

In FY 2008, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in the Department of State provided $18,000,000 for the Conventional Weapons Destruction Program in Afghanistan. These funds enabled Afghan non-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private and public sector partners to clear ERW-contaminated areas as well as to destroy or secure abandoned or otherwise at-risk munitions and explosive ordnance that might be used by insurgent elements to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices that target coalition forces, Afghan civilians, and international aid organizations. Slight increases in programmatic funding for FY 2009 will be used to increase national capacity development and conventional weapons destruction activities throughout Afghanistan.


Accomplishments

Since January, 2006, PM/WRA-funded projects have destroyed or secured more than 9,000 metric tons of unexploded, abandoned, or otherwise at- risk munitions and small arms/light weapons, and provided explosive ordnance safety training to more than 65,000 Afghan nationals. This assistance removes explosive hazards that threaten civilian populations, and enables critical reconstruction and development projects central to economic growth, stability, and security. Department of State funds also play a vital role in the capacity development of MAPA, which consists of 20 Afghan implementing partners and international non-governmental organizations, and the UN’s Mine Action Center in Afghanistan, the coordinating body for MAPA management and operations.

To learn more about the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement's humanitarian mine action and conventional weapons destruction programs, visit www.state.gov/t/pm/

Thursday, January 22, 2009

Redefining France’s Role in Afghanistan: Need for better Strategy

Redefining France’s Role in Afghanistan: Need for better Strategy, by Guillem Monsonis
IDSA, Jan 22, 2009

In a recent poll for the newspaper Le Parisien, 55 per cent of the French public expressed their disagreement with the presence of the French military in Afghanistan. A number of political and strategic mistakes contributed to this difficult situation being faced by Sarkozy’s government regarding the war in Afghanistan. The situation is also exacerbated by the fact that 10 soldiers of the 8th RPIMA lost their lives in the Uzbin sector in late August after a brilliantly orchestrated ambush by elements of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami which shocked the country.

France is involved in the Afghan theatre in both the US led Enduring Freedom operation and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since 2002. Their main mission has been to secure and monitor the Kabul region and to train the Afghan National Army (ANA). However, very little is known about the missions performed by the Special Forces between 2003 and 2007 in the eastern region close to the Pakistan border. The French Navy led the operation Heracles with the Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier battle group in which Super Etendard Modernises (SEM) aircraft performed strikes, intelligence gathering and show of force in support of the US troops on the ground.

Islamist strategists perfectly understand what the Achilles’ heel of democratic societies is and use a deadly efficient strategy using all the available non-conventional assets, especially the media, in their asymmetric war against western hi-tech armies. The pictures published by the weekly magazine Paris Match showing the Taliban holding several belongings of the killed French troops gave a severe blow to the already weak French popular support to the war. Recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that Western public opinion is now extremely reluctant to pay the price of blood for their government’s wars. The sequel to the idealistic theory of ‘zero dead war’, which was popularized during the Gulf War (1991) and NATO’s campaign in Kosovo (1999), seems to have survived in post-modern European countries’ perception of war. The sacrosanct ‘right to life’ promoted in developed democratic countries is hardly compatible with long term asymmetric wars against well trained and motivated fighters. In this respect, democracies suffer a relative disadvantage when fighting against fundamentalist militants or authoritarian regimes. In a recent interview, the French Chief of the Defense Staff, General Jean Louis Gergolin, complained that “war has deserted our minds". This apathy towards war is doubled by a negative perception of defence expenditures which is seen as a big waste of public money. But as the famous French writer Pierre Corneille wrote, to win without risk is to triumph without glory: France has to accept that the price for defeating international terrorism and stabilizing Afghanistan will be high, and will need a strong involvement on the ground. How should the French government solve the dilemma of rallying public opinion which is ‘proud of its army but worried for its children’?

Better communication may be the key. Hervé Morin, the controversial French Minister of Defence, refused to use the word ‘war’ to qualify Afghanistan’s operations during a debate in the National Assembly. The French government seems to be exactly reproducing the same mistakes made at the height of the storm in Algeria 40 years ago when the word ‘war’ was replaced by ‘events’. Therefore, Government’s communication on the role of Armed Forces used to emphasise mostly on their humanitarian and developmental duties. The concept of the ‘reconstruction of Afghanistan’ is often used to explain to the general public what the French troops are doing there. This overemphasis on non-combatant activities hides the ground realities the troops are facing in their everyday missions. It was predictable that with the decision to deploy troops in the eastern part of Afghanistan (before this, France was mostly operating in the Kabul region), the exposure of the troops to militant attacks would increase. The government must clearly explain the reasons for the war effort and insist on its long term benefits, as most of the French just don’t see any relation between France’s homeland security and the operations being conducted in Afghanistan, despite Sarkozy’s recent efforts to link both aspects. Explaining that the calm witnessed for a few years in France may not last, as demonstrated by the recent attempt by the terrorists to place an explosive device in a store in Paris, it needs to be emphasized that the success of the war may be crucial in securing the country and therefore it should be a priority.

In order to achieve this objective, France needs to face another harsh reality: the sustained reduction in French military capabilities. Means simply do not match ambitions. The recent publication of the White Book (Livre Blanc) on defence and national security generated a stormy debate on French military capabilities and objectives. The reduction of 54,000 positions in the armed forces and the resizing of the expeditionary force strength (from 50,000 to 30,000 troops) have been heavily criticized. The lack of intelligence gathering capabilities, especially helicopters and UAVs, is especially problematic in Afghan operations. Without the support of those means, the rigid and predictable convoys of APCs are especially vulnerable to heavily armed attacks by guerrillas with a good knowledge of the terrain. The lack of such capabilities was recently raised by the armed forces who complained about the poor political support Sarkozy has displayed towards the French military establishment. The White Book on defence tries to overcome those gaps and suggest the acquisition of a strong UAV and satellite force by doubling the expenditure in the space military sector.

While facing an economic slowdown generated by the global economic crisis, France would also need more aerial assets to support land forces. But Paris only deployed 3 multi-role fighter/bombers Rafale F2, 3 Mirage 2000D bombers and aerial tankers. If the deployment of the 4+ generation Rafale was good news in May 2007 (it can carry 6 GBU-12 bombs versus 2 for the Mirage 2000D), the latest French fighters need to be assisted by the Mirage for targeting because they are not suited with a Damocles laser targeting pod. This capability will be acquired in 2012, with the new standard F3. There is also a lack of transport helicopters deployed in the theatre of operations, and Paris is planning to deploy 3 additional helicopters (1 EC-725 Caracal, 2 Gazelles SA-342 and probably some Tiger combat helicopters). This capability gap contributed, along with poor co-ordination between the different units on the ground, to the disastrous patrol mission in Uzbin, where no reinforcements were available for more than one hour.

For France, the stakes are high. It is not only about defeating the nebula of international terrorism; it is also a question of international status. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France faces strong pressure from several European Members of Parliament who want to replace the French seat by a European one. Paris has to show its capability to deal with international issues like a great power and justify its political primacy in Europe. While France is close to reintegrating with NATO’s integrated command structure, its achievements in the Afghan theatre and the means Paris is able to mobilize will be a strong determinant of its future capacity for influence inside the alliance structures and will also determine the promotion of a still embryonic European defence. The results of this policy will not only be crucial for France’s Grandeur, but will also be indicative of the future role for middle sized powers in the post-cold war international system.

Guillem Monsonis, Researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics, is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Monday, January 19, 2009

UN: Don't change Afghan strategy

UN to Obama: Don't change Afghan strategy. By Fisnik Abrashi
USAToday, Jan 16, 2009

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The top U.N. official in Afghanistan said U.S. President-elect Barack Obama should resist calls to change strategy in Afghanistan, urging him instead to focus on implementing the one already being pursued.

Kai Eide said that the incoming U.S. administration "has a unique opportunity to gather strength, gather energy ... and build on the trends we have seen" toward building the Afghan security forces and propping up the country's economy.

"My appeal is not grand strategy discussion, my appeal is concrete implementation effort," Eide told The Associated Press in an interview Thursday inside the U.N. compound in Kabul.

Obama has pledged to withdraw American troops from Iraq and deploy more to Afghanistan, where Taliban and al-Qaida linked militants have made a comeback in recent years.

U.S. Vice President-elect Joe Biden, who toured the region earlier this month, said that "things are going to get tougher in Afghanistan before they're going to get better."

Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan increased in 2008 over the previous year and some 6,400 people — mostly militants — died last year as a result of the insurgency.

The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan has forced the U.S. to plan to rush as many as 30,000 more troops to the central Asian country this year.

They will be joining some 32,000 U.S. troops already there who serve alongside 32,000 other NATO-led and coalition troops — the highest number since the U.S.-led invasion that ousted the Taliban from power in 2001.

Obama has said Afghanistan is one of his top priorities, but his incoming team have not yet disclosed a concrete plan.

Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who has been heading the U.N. mission in Afghanistan for the last nine months, warned against any major change in direction.

"Our problem is not that we need a new strategy. ... What happens very often is that we agree on something, we do not implement it and we say something must therefore be wrong with the strategy," Eide said. "That is not the case. The problem is in the implementation."

Eide said that there have been major improvements in two important sectors — building of local security forces and the economy.

"Every month we are getting better at handling the security situation," he said. "There is a greater momentum in building the key parts of the economy."
Staying the course and implementing the priorities set up at an international conference over six months ago must remain the goal, Eide said.

[...]

Brit SecDef Derides 'Freeloading' on US/Brit FM criticizes 'George Bush's war on terror'

Weakness Seeks a Friend In Obama Presidency, by Steve Schippert
The Tank/NRO, Jan 16, 2009

Earlier today, I remarked briefly about President Bush's statement in his farewell address to the American people that "If America does not lead the cause of freedom, that cause will not be led." I also noted, in criticizing our NATO allies' military timidity in the face of darkness, that there are a few exceptions. Britain has clearly been one of those exceptions, and the British defense secretary, John Hutton, demonstrates this.

Hutton offered up a scathing rebuke of the timidity of some fellow European NATO allies, who have often committed forces to Afghanistan but deployed them with orders and requirements that they avoid actual combat. He point-blank accused them of "freeloading on the back of U.S. military security." That'll leave a mark. And the Washington Post left that pointed quote for the final paragraph of their story.

"The campaign in Afghanistan is evidence of the limited appetite amongst some European member states for supporting the most active operation NATO has ever been tasked with," he added. "It isn't good enough to always look to the U.S. for political, financial and military cover. . . . Freeloading on the back of U.S. military security is not an option if we wish to be equal partners in this trans-Atlantic alliance."

Meanwhile, typical of the standard fare between our own Departments of Defense and State, Britian's foreign minister, David Miliband, is visiting Pakistan and speaking an altogether different and damaging language, criticizing "George Bush's 'war on terror'" to a receptive and sensitive foreign audience at the heart of a conflict we neither sought nor welcomed. That, too, will leave a mark.

To demonstrate the value of timidity, Pakistan rounded up over one hundred members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa in the hours before his arrival. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is the name assumed by Lashkar-e-Taiba after it was 'banned' by Pakistan and is the group behind the recent Mumbai terrorist attacks in India. When Miliband departs Pakistan, they will be freed from their cells. We've seen this before.

That's not the half of it. From this morning's DailyBriefing, it is clear that the overall condition is rife with weakness; a weakness hoping to find a friend in Barack Obama.

3. New Gates-Petraeus strategy for Afghanistan is meeting stiff resistance from outside Washington, and the UN is pleading with President-elect Obama not to change the current strategy, one which has been roundly criticized in the past for being ineffective.

The march on Washington — and away from our enemies — has already begun. Consider the related stories for context.

AFGHANISTAN
NATO Nations Scolded by Brit SecDef for Shirking Duties In Afghanistan - Washington Post
UN to Obama: Don't change Afghan strategy - AP
Resistance to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan - Washington Post
Top Afghan general dies in helicopter crash - Los Angeles Times
Separate Incident: US: Helicopter crashed in Afghanistan, all survive - AP

PAKISTAN
Pakistan cracks down on Jamaat ud-Dawa in Mumbai probe? - Los Angeles Times
Pakistan crackdown on eve of UK Foreign Minister's visit - The Independent (UK)

UNITED KINGDOM
British FM David Miliband criticizes 'George Bush's war on terror' while in Pakistan - Telegraph

We must hope that such weakness finds no friend in our new president, because President Bush was unfortunately on the mark last night.

In the 21st century, security and prosperity at home depend on the expansion of liberty abroad. If America does not lead the cause of freedom, that cause will not be led.

This much can hardly be disputed. It's right before your eyes.

Sunday, January 11, 2009

Conservative views on Hillary Clinton nomination

Key Questions for Senator Hillary Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State, by Steven Groves
Heritage, January 12, 2009WebMemo #2201

Excerpts:

On January 20, the incoming Administration will confront a multitude of international issues. The challenges facing the new secretary of state include intractable regional problems such as Iran, Pakistan, and the status of Taiwan; challenges to U.S. sovereignty posed by multilateral treaties and international organizations; and important national security issues such as NATO expansion and missile defense.

In order to determine where the next secretary of state stands on these crucial issues, the following questions should be put to the nominee during her confirmation hearing:

Question #1: American Sovereignty and International Organizations

What is your view regarding the status within the international system of the independent, sovereign state in general, and the importance of preserving and protecting American sovereignty in particular? Do you ascribe to traditional views of national sovereignty or to the theory of "global governance"?

Answer: There are two competing viewpoints regarding national sovereignty: The traditional view is that the sovereign state has been and should remain the basic operating entity within the international system[1] and that while states participate in international coalitions or organizations (such as the United Nations) in pursuit of goals that transcend their borders, those organizations are restricted to serving the goals of states, not governing them.[2] The competing view advocates "global governance," a system in which sovereignty is a passé notion in an increasingly interconnected world and where international organizations have the same, if not greater, authority to determine the policies of sovereign states. In fact, former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott once predicted that some day "nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single global authority."[3]

The United States should continue to act in concert with its allies to pursue ends of an international nature such as multilateral efforts to combat piracy on the high seas, stabilizing Afghanistan with our partners in NATO, maintaining open global markets, and interdicting banned weapons and technology through the Proliferation Security Initiative. The U.S. should not, however, cede to any nation, group of nations, or international organization the authority to bind the U.S. on matters relating to its national interests, including (but not limited to) nuclear arms,[4] humanitarian intervention,[5] "climate change,"[6] interpretation of the U.S. Constitution,[7] or any other matter that would erode American sovereignty.


Question #2: Pending and Proposed Multilateral Treaties

What are your views regarding several controversial multilateral treaties and efforts by the United Nations that, if supported or ratified by the United States, would erode American sovereignty?

Answer: The "international community," usually acting through the U.N. system, often seeks to influence U.S. foreign policy and constrain American power by enmeshing the U.S. in multilateral conventions such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposed U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. Similarly, international organizations and U.N. treaty committees often seek to impose upon America their collective views on controversial and personal matters such as the care and education of children, the death penalty, abortion rights, gun control, and any number of issues traditionally left to Congress, the President, and the American people.

Efforts by international organizations to shape U.S. domestic policy should be opposed, including attempts to modify U.S. law regarding the rights of women and children,[8] the criminal justice system,[9] free speech,[10] and other matters traditionally determined by domestic democratic processes. Moreover, the U.S. must reject attempts by the international community that would limit its options to navigate the high seas and explore the deep seabed,[11] as well as its ability to arm resistance movements against tyrannical regimes.


Question #3: Afghanistan and Pakistan

How will you deal with the threat from a resurgent Taliban that is undermining coalition efforts in Afghanistan and destabilizing parts of northwest Pakistan? How will you martial U.S. diplomatic resources and assistance programs to build up Afghan institutions and convince the Pakistani leadership to stiffen its resolve against the Taliban and other violent extremist groups finding refuge within its borders?

Answer:Sending new U.S. troops to Afghanistan is a welcome step that signals continuing U.S. commitment to the region. However, Washington must also convince its NATO allies to pull their weight in overcoming the terrorist challenge in Afghanistan, which threatens all civilized nations.[12]The U.S. also needs to be cautious in attempting to engage with Taliban elements. Political reconciliation is indeed necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal border areas. But Washington must avoid making statements that could embolden the Taliban leadership and dishearten the Afghan population, who do not support Taliban policies but are intimidated by their violent tactics. While the idea of peeling off lower-level Taliban who are not ideologically committed to the cause may be worthwhile, the U.S. should not overestimate the willingness of senior Taliban leaders to break ranks with their al-Qaeda allies.[13]

The U.S. should also better integrate its strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, focusing more attention on regional diplomacy and building bridges between the two nations.[14]It is essential that Pakistan and Afghanistan work together to combat terrorism, which constitutes an existential threat to both their countries. Washington needs to recalibrate its relationship with Pakistan in a way that draws the country back from the brink of political and financial collapse and convinces the military establishment that Pakistan's national security interests are no longer served by supporting extremists, whether they operate in Afghanistan or India.[15] This should be done through both a calibrated carrot-and-stick policy that targets the military's interests and through increased regional diplomacy.

The Obama Administration, however, should avoid falling into the trap of trying to "resolve" Kashmir. Any effort to inject a direct U.S. role in the Indo-Pakistani bilateral peace process risks encouraging both Pakistani adventurism and unrealistic expectations for a settlement in its favor.[16] Moreover, the Indians would be unreceptive to attempts at direct U.S. mediation and would assume that Washington is reverting back to policies that view India only through the South Asia lens, rather than as the emerging global power it has become.


Question #4: A Nuclear Iran

What is your view on how the United States can best take action to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program?

Answer: The U.S. should mobilize an international coalition to significantly boost the diplomatic, economic, domestic political, and potential military costs to Tehran of continuing on its present path toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. This coalition should seek to isolate Iran's radical theocratic regime, weaken it through targeted economic sanctions, explain to the Iranian people why their government's nuclear policies will impose growing economic costs and military risks on them, cooperate to contain and deter Iran's military power, encourage democratic change within Iran, and prepare for the use of military force as a last resort.[17]

Unfortunately, the U.N. Security Council is a diplomatic dead end whose actions will likely continue to be insufficient to stop Iran's drive for nuclear weapons.[18] Past U.S. and European efforts to ratchet up sanctions against Iran in the council have been blocked by Russia and China, which have lucrative trade relationships with, and strategic ties to, Tehran. Britain, Germany, and France have entered a diplomatic dialogue with Tehran to dissuade it from continuing its nuclear program by offering substantial economic and political incentives. But diplomatic carrots alone will not work because for Tehran, attaining a nuclear weapon is the biggest carrot of all.

Therefore, tougher disincentives for Iran's suspected nuclear efforts are needed. When Tehran perceives the costs of a continued nuclear program to be very high, as it did after the overthrow of regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be more likely to make concessions and freeze its uranium enrichment program. The Obama Administration should press its European allies--particularly Germany, which is Iran's biggest trading partner--to increase economic sanctions outside the U.N. framework.[19] To give diplomacy a chance, the U.S. and its allies must credibly threaten to impose rising costs on Tehran, particularly in ways that endanger the regime's highest priority--its hold on power.


Question #5: The Visa Waiver Program

Please describe your views regarding the Visa Waiver Program's role in America's overall public diplomacy strategy, including ongoing efforts to strengthen the program. What opportunities and challenges do you see to its continuance in the next Administration?

[...]


Question #6: China and Taiwan

While you are secretary of state, will the Administration reaffirm that Taiwan's status remains unsettled and that the U.S. therefore does not accept the sovereign right of any third country to use force of any kind against Taiwan?

Answer: While current U.S. relations with China make it impossible to declare that Taiwan is a state, nothing can justify the assertion that Taiwan is not a state. Under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, Taiwan possesses all the attributes of a state, and under any interpretation the U.S. tacitly accepts that Taiwan functions in the international community as a sovereign state. All treaties in force between the U.S. and Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979, remain in force, and the U.S. continues to conduct defense and security affairs, including arms sales, with Taiwan as an entity wholly autonomous from the People's Republic of China.[30]

The U.S. must reaffirm that Taiwan's future rests on the assent of the Taiwanese people. While current U.S. diplomatic formulas include assertions that the Taiwan issue is a matter for "the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait" to resolve, the context of such positions must be clarified. As President Ronald Reagan pledged, the U.S. "will not ... prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan" about their future. As a reflection of America's democratic values, the U.S. must give preferential weight to the people of Taiwan in determining their own future.[31]


Question #7: Missile Defense

The NATO Alliance recently recognized in its Bucharest communiqué "the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets." Will you stand with our NATO allies and reaffirm the importance of missile defense?

Answer: At NATO's April 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders endorsed U.S. plans to install 10 long-range, ground-based missile defense interceptors in Poland and a mid-course radar in the Czech Republic--the "third site."[32] At NATO's December 2008 foreign ministerial summit in Brussels, all 26 members of the alliance re-endorsed the third site deployment. These endorsements represent a major success both for American diplomacy and transatlantic security.[33] If the United States abandons its Central and Eastern European allies as well as its obligations to NATO, it will not only make itself vulnerable to rogue nations and non-state actors seeking ballistic missile capabilities, but it will also reduce America's influence within the transatlantic alliance.

The threat of ballistic missile attack has grown exponentially, with 27 nations now possessing such capabilities, nearly double that of 15 years ago.[34] It is incumbent upon the United States to consider these growing threats seriously by taking steps to protect itself, its forward-deployed troops, and its friends and allies. As a purely defensive capability, U.S. missile defense plans for Europe will also act as a deterrent to bad actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the first place.

It is further incumbent upon the United States to stand by its existing commitments to Warsaw and Prague, as well as to the NATO alliance as a whole. Mr. Obama should begin his presidency by reaffirming the Bucharest communiqué, as well as his vow to rebuild a strong NATO.


Question #8: NATO Expansion

Do you support President-elect Barack Obama's statement that "Ukraine and Georgia ... have declared their readiness to advance a NATO Membership Action Plan. ... They should receive our help and encouragement as they continue to develop ties to Atlantic and European institutions"?[35]

[...]


Question #9: Public Diplomacy

How do you intend to improve the effectiveness of the United States's public diplomacy and strategic communication, and would you support the creation of a new government agency to take the lead on these issues?

[...]


Question #10: Durban II and the U.N. Human Rights Council

In its first few months, the Obama Administration will decide whether to change existing U.S. policy to attend the Durban Review Conference (Durban II) and fully participate in the United Nations Human Rights Council by seeking a seat in the upcoming May election. Would you recommend that the President continue current policy or reverse it?

[...]


[References can be seen at the original link]

Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The following Heritage Foundation analysts contributed to this report: Daniella Markheim, Lisa Curtis, James Phillips, Jena Baker McNeill, James Dean, John J. Tkacik, Jr., Sally McNamara, Helle C. Dale, Baker Spring, and Brett D. Schaefer.