Thomas Piketty reviu Marx per al segle XXI. By Daniel Shuchman
Wall Street Journal, Apr 21, 2014
Translated by Un Liberal Recalcitrant from Thomas Piketty Revives Marx for the 21st Century, below.
Thomas Piketty li agrada el capitalisme, ja que assigna eficientment els recursos. Però ell no li agrada com es distribueix la renda. No, pensa que pràcticament és una il·legitimitat moral qualsevol acumulació de riquesa, i és una qüestió de justícia que aquesta desigualtat pot radicar en la nostra economia. La manera de fer això és eliminar les rendes altes i reduir la riquesa existent a través d'impostos.
"El capital al segle XXI" és una densa exploració de Thomas Piketty en la història dels salaris i de la riquesa en els últims tres segles. Presenta un desgavell de dades sobre la distribució dels ingressos en molts països, provant de demostrar que la desigualtat ha augmentat dràsticament en les últimes dècades i que aviat tornarà a ser pitjor. Independentment de si un està convençut per les dades del Sr Piketty -i hi ha raons per a l'escepticisme, donat el cas de les pròpies advertències de l'autor i pel fet que moltes estadístiques es basen en mostres molt limitades dels registres de l'impost sobre béns de dubtosa extrapolació- en última instància aquest és un fet de poca importància. Conseqüentment aquest llibre no és tant un treball d'anàlisi econòmica com el d’una norma ideològica estranya.
Professor de l'Escola d'Economia de París, el Sr Piketty creu que només la productivitat dels treballadors de baixos ingressos pot ser mesurada de forma objectiva. Ell postula que quan un treball és replicable, com el d’un "treballador de la línia de muntatge o el d’un cambrer de menjar ràpid", es pot mesurar de forma relativament fàcil el valor aportat per cada treballador. Per tant, aquests treballadors tenen dret al que guanyen. Ell troba que la productivitat de les persones amb alts ingressos ´rd més difícil de mesurar i creu que els seus salaris es troben en el final de la "gran mesura arbitrària". Són el reflex d'una "construcció ideològica" més del mèrit.
Segons Piketty, els sous altíssims per "supermanagers" corporatius ha estat la major font d'augment de la desigualtat, i aquests executius només poden haver arribat a la seva recompensa gràcies a la sort o falles en el govern corporatiu. Es requereix només una mirada ocasional a aquest diari per confirmar això. No obstant, l'autor creu que cap CEO podria mai justificar el seu salari en funció del rendiment. Ell no diu que qualsevol professional –atletes, metges, professors d'economia, que venen llibres electrònics per 21,99$ de marge amb cost zero per còpia- tingui dret a majors ingressos perquè no vol "gaudir de la construcció d'una jerarquia moral de la riquesa".
Ell admet que els empresaris són "absolutament indispensables" per al desenvolupament econòmic, però el seu èxit, també, està generalment contaminat. Mentre que alguns tenen èxit gràcies al "treball per part del veritable emprenedor," altres tenen senzillament sort o aconsegueixen l’èxit a través del "robatori descarat". Fins i tot seria el cas de les fortunes fetes del treball empresarial que evolucionen ràpidament cap a una "concentració excessiva i duradora del capital". Això és una injustícia d'auto-reforç, perquè "la propietat a vegades comença amb el robatori, i el retorn arbitrari sobre el capital pot perpetuar fàcilment el delicte inicial. "De fet tot el llibre incorpora com a una hostilitat gairebé medieval la idea de que el capital financer tingui un retorn o benefici.
El Sr Piketty creu que com més rica es torna una societat, més gent va a la recerca de la millor posició social relativa, condicionant més desigualtat. Rememora les atemporals autoritats econòmiques com Jane Austen i Honoré de Balzac en la cartografia del nostre futur. Al llarg del llibre es divaga amb les maquinacions inadequades, perseguint de personatges de novel·les com "Sentit i sensibilitat", i obsessivament, amb el calculador "Papà Goriot": Són els fruits del treball dur superiors a les intencions per casar-se i aconseguir una fortuna? Si no és així, "per què treballar, i per què comportar-se moralment bé?"
Mentre que els executius corporatius dels Estats Units són la seva “bèstia especial”, el Sr Piketty també està profundament preocupat per les desenes de milions de persones treballadores -un grup que ell anomena despectivament "petits rendistes"- que els seus ingressos els col·loca molt lluny de l’u per cent, però que encara tenen estalvis, comptes de jubilació i altres actius. Considera que aquest gran grup demogràfic es farà més gran i que el seu creixement de riquesa es transmetrà mitjançant les herències, essent això "una forma bastant preocupant de desigualtat". Es lamenta del difícil que és "corregir" tot això perquè es tracta d'un ampli segment de la població, no una petita elit, més fàcilment “satanitzable” .
Llavors, què cal fer ? El Sr Piketty insta a constituir una taxa impositiva del 80 % en els ingressos a partir del 500.000$ o 1 milió. "Això no és per recaptar diners per a l'educació o per augmentar les prestacions d'atur. Contràriament, no ho espera d’un impost d'aquest tipus perquè el seu propòsit és, simplement, "posar fi a aquest tipus d'ingressos”. També serà necessari imposar una taxa -del 50/60%- sobre els ingressos més baixos, com els de 200.000$. Afegeix també ha ha d'haver un impost a la riquesa anual de fins el 10 % sobre les fortunes més grans i una càrrega fiscal, d'una sola vegada, de fins el 20% sobre els nivells de riquesa més baixos. Ell, alegrement, ens assegura que res d'això reduiria el creixement econòmic, la productivitat, l'emprenedoria o la innovació.
No és que el creixement i la millora no estigui en la ment del senyor Piketty, sin´ó que es tracta com un assumpte econòmic i com un mitjà per a una major justícia distributiva. S'assumeix que l'economia és estàtica i de suma zero; si l'ingrés d'un grup de població augmenta, un altre necessàriament ha d’empobrir-se. Ell veu la igualtat de resultats com la finalitat última i exclusivament per al seu propi bé. Objectius -tals alternatives com la maximització de la riquesa general de la societat o l'augment de la llibertat econòmica o la recerca de la major igualtat possible d'oportunitats o fins i tot, com en la filosofia de John Rawls, el que garanteix que el benestar dels més desfavorits es maximitza -són ni mínimament esmentats.
No hi ha dubte que la pobresa, la desocupació i la desigualtat d'oportunitats són els principals reptes per a les societats capitalistes, i els diversos graus de la sort, el treball dur, la mandra i el mèrit són inherents a la humanitat. El Sr Piketty no és el primer visionari utòpic. Cita, per exemple, "l’experiment soviètic" que va permetre a l'home llançar "les seves cadenes juntament amb el jou de la riquesa acumulada." En el seu relat, només va portar el desastre humà perquè les societats necessiten mercats i propietat privada per tenir una economia que funcioni. Ell diu que les seves solucions ofereixen una "resposta menys violenta i més eficient per l'etern problema del capital privat i del seu benefici. En lloc d'Austen i Balzac, el professor hauria de llegir "Rebel·lió a la Granja” i "Darkness at Noon".
Shuchman és un gestor de fons de Nova York que escriu sovint sobre el dret i l'economia.
Thomas Piketty Revives Marx for the 21st Century. By Daniel Schuman
An 80% tax rate on incomes above $500,000 is not meant to bring in money for education or benefits, but 'to put an end to such incomes.'
Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2014 7:18 p.m. ET
Thomas Piketty likes capitalism because it efficiently allocates resources. But he does not like how it allocates income. There is, he thinks, a moral illegitimacy to virtually any accumulation of wealth, and it is a matter of justice that such inequality be eradicated in our economy. The way to do this is to eliminate high incomes and to reduce existing wealth through taxation.
"Capital in the Twenty-First Century" is Mr. Piketty's dense exploration of the history of wages and wealth over the past three centuries. He presents a blizzard of data about income distribution in many countries, claiming to show that inequality has widened dramatically in recent decades and will soon get dangerously worse. Whether or not one is convinced by Mr. Piketty's data—and there are reasons for skepticism, given the author's own caveats and the fact that many early statistics are based on extremely limited samples of estate tax records and dubious extrapolation—is ultimately of little consequence. For this book is less a work of economic analysis than a bizarre ideological screed.
A professor at the Paris School of Economics, Mr. Piketty believes that only the productivity of low-wage workers can be measured objectively. He posits that when a job is replicable, like an "assembly line worker or fast-food server," it is relatively easy to measure the value contributed by each worker. These workers are therefore entitled to what they earn. He finds the productivity of high-income earners harder to measure and believes their wages are in the end "largely arbitrary." They reflect an "ideological construct" more than merit.
Soaring pay for corporate "supermanagers" has been the largest source of increased inequality, according to Mr. Piketty, and these executives can only have attained their rewards through luck or flaws in corporate governance. It requires only an occasional glance at this newspaper to confirm that this can be the case. But the author believes that no CEO could ever justify his or her pay based on performance. He doesn't say whether any occupation—athletes? physicians? economics professors who sell zero-marginal-cost e-books for $21.99 a copy?—is entitled to higher earnings because he does not wish to "indulge in constructing a moral hierarchy of wealth."
He does admit that entrepreneurs are "absolutely indispensable" for economic development, but their success, too, is usually tainted. While some succeed thanks to "true entrepreneurial labor," some are simply lucky or succeed through "outright theft." Even the fortunes made from entrepreneurial labor, moreover, quickly evolve into an "excessive and lasting concentration of capital." This is a self-reinforcing injustice because "property sometimes begins with theft, and the arbitrary return on capital can easily perpetuate the initial crime." Indeed laced throughout the book is an almost medieval hostility to the notion that financial capital earns a return.
Mr. Piketty believes that the wealthier a society becomes, the more people will claw for the best relative social station and the more inequality will ensue. He turns to those timeless economic authorities Jane Austen and Honoré de Balzac in mapping our future. Throughout the book, he importunately digresses with the dowry-chasing machinations of characters in novels like "Sense and Sensibility" and " Père Goriot. " He is obsessed with the following calculus: Are the fruits of working hard greater than those attainable by marrying into a top fortune? If not, "why work? And why behave morally at all?"
While America's corporate executives are his special bête noire, Mr. Piketty is also deeply troubled by the tens of millions of working people—a group he disparagingly calls "petits rentiers"—whose income puts them nowhere near the "one percent" but who still have savings, retirement accounts and other assets. That this very large demographic group will get larger, grow wealthier and pass on assets via inheritance is "a fairly disturbing form of inequality." He laments that it is difficult to "correct" because it involves a broad segment of the population, not a small elite that is easily demonized.
So what is to be done? Mr. Piketty urges an 80% tax rate on incomes starting at "$500,000 or $1 million." This is not to raise money for education or to increase unemployment benefits. Quite the contrary, he does not expect such a tax to bring in much revenue, because its purpose is simply "to put an end to such incomes." It will also be necessary to impose a 50%-60% tax rate on incomes as low as $200,000 to develop "the meager US social state." There must be an annual wealth tax as high as 10% on the largest fortunes and a one-time assessment as high as 20% on much lower levels of existing wealth. He breezily assures us that none of this would reduce economic growth, productivity, entrepreneurship or innovation.
Not that enhancing growth is much on Mr. Piketty's mind, either as an economic matter or as a means to greater distributive justice. He assumes that the economy is static and zero-sum; if the income of one population group increases, another one must necessarily have been impoverished. He views equality of outcome as the ultimate end and solely for its own sake. Alternative objectives—such as maximizing the overall wealth of society or increasing economic liberty or seeking the greatest possible equality of opportunity or even, as in the philosophy of John Rawls, ensuring that the welfare of the least well-off is maximized—are scarcely mentioned.
There is no doubt that poverty, unemployment and unequal opportunity are major challenges for capitalist societies, and varying degrees of luck, hard work, sloth and merit are inherent in human affairs. Mr. Piketty is not the first utopian visionary. He cites, for instance, the "Soviet experiment" that allowed man to throw "off his chains along with the yoke of accumulated wealth." In his telling, it only led to human disaster because societies need markets and private property to have a functioning economy. He says that his solutions provide a "less violent and more efficient response to the eternal problem of private capital and its return." Instead of Austen and Balzac, the professor ought to read "Animal Farm" and "Darkness at Noon."
Mr. Shuchman is a New York fund manager who often writes on law and economics.
The crisis is Cyprus is still unfolding and the final resolution might still have some way to go, but the events in Nicosia and Brussels already offer some first lessons. And these lessons look certainly familiar to those who have studied previous crises. Bets are that Cyprus will not be the Troika’s last patient, with one South European finance minister already dreading the moment where he might be in a situation like his Cypriot colleague. Even more important, thus to analyze the on-going Cyprus crisis resolution for insights into where the resolution of the Eurozone crisis might be headed and what needs to be done.
1. A deposit insurance scheme is only as good as the sovereign backing it
One of the main objectives of deposit insurance is to prevent bank
runs. That was also the idea behind the increase of deposit insurance
limits across the Eurozone to 100,000 Euro after the Global Financial
Crisis. However, deposit insurance is typically designed for
idiosyncratic bank failures, not for systemic crises. In the latter
case, it is important that public back stop funding is available.
Obviously, the credibility of the latter depends on a solvent sovereign.
As Cyprus has shown, if the solvency of the sovereign is itself in
question, this will undermine the confidence of depositors in a deposit
insurance scheme. In the case of Cyprus, this confidence has been
further undermined by the initial idea of imposing a tax on insured
deposits, effectively an insurance co-payment, contradicting maybe not
in legal terms but definitely in spirit the promise of deposit insurance
of up to 100,000 Euros. The confidence that has been destroyed with the
protracted resolution process and the back-and-forth over loss
distribution will be hard to re-establish. A banking system without the
necessary trust, in turn, will be hard pressed to fulfill its basic
functions of facilitating payment services and intermediating savings.
Ultimately, this lack of confidence can only be overcome by a Eurozone
wide deposit insurance scheme with public back-stop funding by ESM and a
regulatory and supervisory framework that depositors can trust.
2. A large financial system is not necessarily growth enhancing
An extensive literature has documented the positive relationship
between financial deepening and economic growth, even though the recent
crisis has shed doubts on this relationship (Levine, 2005, Beck, 2012).
However, both theoretical and empirical literature focus on the
intermediation function of the financial system, not on the size of the
financial system per se. Very different from this financial facilitator view is the financial center view, which
sees the financial sector as an export sector, i.e. one that seeks to
build a nationally centered financial center stronghold based on
relative comparative advantages such as skill base, favorable regulatory
and tax policies, (financial safety net) subsidies, etc. Economic
benefits of such a financial center might also include important
spin-offs coming from professional services (legal, accounting,
consulting, etc.) that tend to cluster around the financial sector.
In recent work with Hans Degryse and Christiane Kneer (2013) and
using pre-2007 data, we have shown that a large financial system might
stimulate growth in the short-term, but comes at the expense of higher
volatility. It is the financial intermediation function of finance that
helps improve growth prospects not a large financial center, a lesson
that Cyprus could have learned from Iceland.
3. Crisis resolution as political distribution fight
Resolution processes are basically distributional fights about who
has to bear losses. The week-long negotiations about loss allocation
in Cyprus are telling in this respect. While it was initially Eurozone
authorities that were blamed for imposing losses on insured depositors,
there is an increasingly clear picture that it was maybe the Cypriot
government itself that pushed for such a solution in order to avoid
imposing losses on large, (and thus most likely) richer and more
While the Cypriot case might be the most egregious recent example for
the entanglement of politics and crisis resolution, the recent crises
offer ample examples of how politically sensitive the financial system
is. Just two more examples here: First, even during and after the
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and 2009, there was still open political
pressure across Europe to maintain or build up national champions in
the respective banking systems, even at the risk of creating more
too-big-to-fail banks. Second, the push by the German government to
exempt German small savings and cooperative banks from ECB supervision
and thus the banking union can be explained only on political basis and
not with economic terms, as the "too-many-to-fail" is as serious as the
4. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose
European authorities and many observers have pointed to the special
character of each of the patients of the Eurozone crisis and their
special circumstances. Ireland and Spain suffered from housing booms and
subsequent busts, Portugal from high current account deficits stemming
from lack of competitiveness and mis-allocation of capital inflows,
Greece from high government deficit and debt and now Cyprus from an
oversized banking system. So, seemingly different causes, which call for
But there is one common thread across all crisis countries, and that
is the close ties between government and bank solvency. In the case of
Ireland, this tie was established when the ECB pushed the Irish
authorities to assume the liabilities of several failed Irish banks. In
the case of Greece, it was the other way around, with Greek banks having
to be recapitalized once sovereign debt was restructured. In all
crisis countries, this link is deepened as their economies go into
recession, worsening government’s fiscal balance, thus increasing
sovereign risk, which in turn puts balance sheets of banks under
pressure that hold these bonds but also depend on the same government
for possible recapitalization. This tie is exacerbated by the tendency
of banks to invest heavily in their home country’s sovereign bonds, a
tendency even stronger in the Eurozone’s periphery (Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2012).
Zero capital requirements for government bond holdings under the Basel
regime, based on the illusion that such bonds in OECD countries are safe
from default, have not helped either.
5. If you kick the can down the road, you will run out of road eventually
The multiple rounds of support packages for Greece by Troika, built
on assumptions and data, often outdated by the time agreements were
signed, has clearly shown that you can delay the day of reckoning only
so long. By kicking the can down the road, however, you risk
deteriorating the situation even further. In the case of Greece that led
eventually to restructuring of sovereign debt. Delaying crisis
resolution of Cyprus for months if not years has most likely also
increased losses in the banking system. A lesson familiar from many
emerging market crises (World Bank. 2001)!
On a first look, the Troika seemed eager to avoid this mistake in the
case of Cyprus, forcing recognition and allocation of losses in the
banking system early on without overburdening the sovereign debt
position. However, the recession if not depression that is sure to
follow in the next few years in Cyprus will certainly increase the
already high debt-to-GDP ratio and might ultimately lead to the need for
sovereign debt restructuring.
6. The Eurozone crisis — a tragedy of commons
The protracted resolution process of Cyprus has shown yet again, that
in addition to a banking, sovereign, macroeconomic and currency crisis,
the Eurozone faces a governance crisis. Decisions are taken jointly by
national authorities who each represent the interest of their respective
country (and taxpayers), without taking into account the externalities
of national decisions arising on the Eurozone level. It is in the
interest of every member government with fragile banks to "share the
burden" with the other members, be it through the ECB’s liquidity
support or the Target 2 payment system. Rather than coming up with
crisis resolution on the political level, the ECB and the Eurosystem are
being used to apply short-term (liquidity) palliatives that deepen
distributional problems and make the crisis resolution more difficult.
What is ultimately missing is a democratically legitimized authority
that represents Eurozone interests.
7. Learning from the Vikings
In 2008, Iceland took a very different approach from the Eurozone
when faced with the failure of their oversized banking system. It
allowed its banks to fail, transferred domestic deposits into good banks
and left foreign deposits and other claims and bad assets in the
original banks, to be resolved over time. While the banking crisis and
its resolution has been a traumatic experience for the Icelandic economy
and society, with repercussions even for diplomatic relations between
Iceland and several European countries, it avoided a loss and thus
insolvency transfer from the banking sector to the sovereign. Iceland's
government has kept its investment rating throughout the crisis. And
while mistakes might have been made in the resolution process (Danielsson, 2011),
Iceland’s banking sector does not drag down Iceland’s growth any longer
and might eventually even make a positive contribution.
The resolution approach in Cyprus seems to follow the Icelandic
approach. While the Cypriot case might be a special one (as part of the
losses fall outside the Eurozone and Cypriot banks are less connected
with the rest of the Eurozone than previous crisis cases), there are
suggestions that future resolution cases might impose losses not just on
junior and maybe senior creditors of banks, but even on depositors to
thus reduce pressure on government’s balance sheets. A move towards
market discipline, for certain; whether this is due to learning from
experience, tighter government budgets across Europe or for political
reasons remains to be seen.
8. Banking union with just supervision does not work
The move towards a Single Supervisory Mechanism has been hailed as
major progress towards a banking union and stronger currency union. As
the case of Cyprus shows, this is certainly not enough. The holes in
the balance sheets of Cypriot banks became obvious in 2011 when Greek
sovereign debt was restructured, but given political circumstances, the
absence of a bank resolution framework in Cyprus and — most importantly —
the absence of resources to undertake such a restructuring, the
problems have not been addressed until now. Even once the ECB has
supervisory power over the Eurozone banking system, without a
Eurozone-wide resolution authority with the necessary powers and
resources, it will find itself forced to inject more and more liquidity
and keep the zombies alive, if national authorities are unwilling to
resolve a failing bank.
9. A banking union is needed for the Eurozone, but won't help for the current crisis!
While the Eurozone will not be sustainable as currency union without a
banking union, a banking union cannot help solve the current crisis.
First, building up the necessary structures for a Eurozone or European
regulatory and bank resolution framework cannot be done overnight, while
the crisis needs immediate attention. Second, the current discussion on
banking union is overshadowed by distributional discussions, as the
bank fragility is heavily concentrated in the peripheral countries, and
using a Eurozone-wide deposit insurance and supervision mechanism to
solve legacy problems is like introducing insurance after the insurance
case has occurred. The current crisis has to be solved before banking
union is in place. Ideally, this would be done through the establishment
of an asset management company or European Recapitalization Agency,
which would sort out fragile bank across Europe, and also be able to
take an equity stake in restructured banks to thus benefit from possible
upsides (Beck, Gros and Schoenmaker, 2012).
This would help disentangle government and bank ties, discussed above,
and might make for a more expedient and less politicized resolution
process than if done on the national level.
10. A currency union with capital controls?
The protracted resolution process of the Cypriot banking crisis has
increased the likelihood of a systemic bank run in Cyprus once the banks
open, though even if the current solution would have been arrived at in
the first attempt, little confidence in Cypriot banks might have been
left. As in other crises (Argentina and Iceland) that perspective has
led authorities to impose capital controls, an unprecedented step within
the Eurozone. Effectively, however, this implies that a Cypriot Euro is
not the same as a German or Dutch Euro, as they cannot be freely
exchanged via the banking system, thus a contradiction to the idea of a
common currency (Wolff, 2013).
However, these controls only formalize and legalize what has been
developing over the past few years: a rapidly disintegrating Eurozone
capital market. National supervisors increasingly focus on safeguarding
their home financial system, trying to keep capital and liquidity
within their home country (Gros, 2012). Anecdotal evidence suggests
that this does not only affect the inter-bank market but even
intra-group transaction between, let’s say, Italian parent banks and
their Austrian and German subsidiaries. Another example of the tragedy
of commons, discussed above.
11. Finally, there is no free lunch
This might sound like a broken disk, but the Global Financial Crisis
and subsequent Eurozone crisis has offered multiple incidences to remind
us that you cannot have the cake and eat it. This applies as much to
Dutch savers attracted by high interests in Icesave and then
disappointed by the failure of Iceland to assume the obligations of its
banks as to Cypriot banks piling up on Greek government bonds promising
high returns even in 2010 when it had become all but obvious that Greece
would require sovereign debt restructuring. On a broader level, the
idea that a joint currency only brings advantages for everyone involved,
but no additional responsibilities in term of reduced sovereignty and
burden-sharing and insurance arrangements also resembles the free lunch
On a positive note, the Cyprus bail-out has shown that Eurozone
authorities have learnt from previous failures by forcing an early
recognition of losses in Cyprus and by moving towards a banking union,
even if very slowly. As discussed above, however, there are still
considerable political constraints and barriers to overcome, so that it
is ultimately left to each observer to decide whether the glass is half
full or half empty.
Acharya, Viral, Itamar Drechsler and Philipp Schnabl. 2012. A tale of two overhangs: the nexus of financial sector and sovereign credit risks. Vox 15 April 2012
Beck, Thorsten. 2012. Finance and growth: lessons from the literature and the recent crisis. Paper prepared for the LSE growth commission.
Beck, Thorsten, Hans Degryse and Christiane Kneer. 2012. Is more finance better?
Disentangling intermediation and size effects of financial systems. Journal of Financial Stability, forthcoming.
Beck, Thorsten, Daniel Gros, Dirk Schoenmaker (2012): Banking union instead of Eurobonds — disentangling sovereign and banking crises, Vox 24 June 2012.
Danielsson, Jon. 2011. How not to resolve a banking crisis: Learning from Iceland’s mistakes Vox, 26 November 2011
Gros. Daniel. 2012. The Single European Market in Banking in decline — ECB to the rescue? Vox , 16 Ocotber 2012
Levine, Ross. 2005. Finance and growth: theory and evidence. In Handbook of Economic
Growth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, 865–934. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Wolff, Guntram. 2013. Capital controls are a grave risk to the eurozone. Financial Times 26 March 2013.
World Bank. 2001. Finance For Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World. Policy Research Report