Get Ready for Another North Korean Nuke Test. By John Bolton
Iran could soon be following Pyongyang's example.
WSJ, May 20, 2009
The curtain is about to rise again on the long-running nuclear tragicomedy, "North Korea Outwits the United States." Despite Kim Jong Il's explicit threats of another nuclear test, U.S. Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth said last week that the Obama administration is "relatively relaxed" and that "there is not a sense of crisis." They're certainly smiling in Pyongyang.
In October 2006, North Korea witnessed the incredible diplomatic success it could reap from belligerence. Its first nuclear test brought resumption of the six-party talks, which gave Kim Jong Il cover to further advance his nuclear program.
Now, Kim is poised to succeed again by following precisely the same script. In April, Pyongyang launched a Taepodong-2 missile, and National Security Council official Gary Samore recently confirmed that a second nuclear test is likely on the way. The North is set to try two U.S. reporters for "hostile acts." The state-controlled newspaper calls America "a rogue and a gangster." Kim recently expelled international monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex. And Pyongyang threatens to "start" enriching uranium -- a capacity it procured long ago.
A second nuclear test is by no means simply a propaganda ploy. Most experts believe that the 2006 test was flawed, producing an explosive yield well below even what the North's scientists had predicted. The scientific and military imperatives for a second test have been strong for over two years, and the potential data, experience and other advantages of further testing would be tremendous.
What the North has lacked thus far is the political opportunity to test without fatally jeopardizing its access to the six-party talks and the legitimacy they provide. Despite the State Department's seemingly unbreakable second-term hold over President Bush, another test after 2006 just might have ended the talks.
So far, the North faces no such threat from the Obama administration. Despite Pyongyang's aggression, Mr. Bosworth has reiterated that the U.S. is "committed to dialogue" and is "obviously interested in returning to a negotiating table as soon as we can." This is precisely what the North wants: America in a conciliatory mode, eager to bargain, just as Mr. Bush was after the 2006 test.
If the next nuclear explosion doesn't derail the six-party talks, Kim will rightly conclude that he faces no real danger of ever having to dismantle his weapons program. North Korea is a mysterious place, but there is no mystery about its foreign-policy tactics: They work. The real mystery is why our administrations -- Republican and Democratic -- haven't learned that their quasi-religious faith in the six-party talks is misplaced.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently rejected "linkage" in Russia policy as "old thinking." Disagreement in one area, she argued, shouldn't prevent working on "something else that is of overwhelming importance." Whatever the merits of linkage vis-à-vis Russia, de-linking a second North Korean nuclear test from the six-party talks simply hands Pyongyang permission to proceed.
Even worse, Iran and other aspiring nuclear proliferators will draw precisely the same conclusion: Negotiations like the six-party talks are a charade and reflect a continuing collapse of American resolve. U.S. acquiescence in a second North Korean nuclear test will likely mean that Tehran will adopt Pyongyang's successful strategy.
It's time for the Obama administration to finally put down Kim Jong Il's script. If not, we better get ready for Iran -- and others -- to go nuclear.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
Showing posts with label korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label korea. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Saturday, May 2, 2009
Libertarian on dealing with North Korea
With Realism and Restraint, by Doug Bandow
The Korea Times, May 1, 2009
North Korea demonstrates the limits of President Barack Obama's more accommodating diplomacy.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea engages in perpetual brinkmanship. Last winter the tortuous negotiations over the North Korea's nuclear program crashed if not burned over verification procedures for Pyongyang's official nuclear declaration.
The Obama administration hopes to rejuvenate the six-party talks, but the way forward is uncertain after the North's recent missile launch.
In fact, the effort was much ado about nothing. The botched effort suggests that the DPRK poses less than a formidable military threat. Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, snickered: "On the idea of proliferation, would you buy from somebody that had failed three times in a row and never been successful?"
However, as a step designed to win international attention the test was far more successful, creating the usual public frenzy in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. The U.S. denounced the launch as illegal and went to the United Nations for redress.
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon complained that the action was "not conducive to efforts to promote dialogue, regional peace and stability," as if those were North Korea's objectives.
China and Russia exhibited their usual reluctance to crack down on the North. With Beijing's call for "calm" and "restraint," the Security Council approved a resolution insisting on little more than enforcement of previously approved sanctions.
What should Washington do?
The Obama administration needs to realistically assess the conundrum that is North Korea. We should downplay any expectations of changing North Korea.
America should step back and let others take the lead in dealing with Pyongyang. A desperately poor, isolated state with an antiquated military, the DPRK poses far greater problems for its neighbors than for America.
Only South Korea is within reach of the North's army — a good reason for the U.S. to withdraw its troops, since they are not needed to safeguard the Republic of Korea. (Seoul enjoys a vast economic, technological, population, and diplomatic edge over the North.)
Japan along with the ROK is vulnerable to North Korean missiles. China and the South both fear a violent DPRK collapse and refugee flood. Beijing also suffers from the nightmare of spreading nuclear proliferation, which could result in Japan developing nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, Washington and North Korea's neighbors have only bad options. It would be wonderful to create a democratic, humane DPRK. It is more important to avoid a new Korean war and cap any North Korean nuclear arsenal.
Thus, the Obama administration should focus its efforts on halting any further North Korean nuclear developments.
Unfortunately, convincing Pyongyang to yield its small atomic arsenal will require a geopolitical miracle. However, Pyongyang can do little with a small cache of nuclear weapons: attacking the U.S. would be suicidal, and Kim prefers his virgins in the here and now.
In contrast, the North could do enormous damage with a large and growing stockpile of nuclear materiel, including underwriting widespread proliferation.
To the extent the DPRK has been willing to comply with its promises — both in accepting the Clinton-era Agreed Framework and the later accord negotiated with the Bush administration — it has been to freeze its existing program. Future negotiations should focus on the same end.
For the same reason the U.S. must not get sidetracked by the North's missile program. As one American official anonymously declared: "We are not going to … let them distract us from the goal, which is denuclearization."
While the prospect of North Korea possessing advanced missile technology is unsettling, nuclear proliferation is the more important game.
Finally, Washington needs to concentrate on changing the negotiating dynamic with North Korea before negotiating with Pyongyang. For years the DPRK has used brinkmanship to win concessions. The U.S., ROK, and other friendly states need to reverse this reward structure.
First, they should respond to the North's provocations with bored contempt rather than excited fear. Calling an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council sent precisely the wrong message to Pyongyang.
Second, rather than publicly whining about North Korea's actions, friendly nations should quietly inform Pyongyang that they will offer no benefits while it is ratcheting up tensions.
If the DPRK responds positively, however, Washington should offer diplomatic recognition and the end of trade sanctions, small concessions in areas where punitive policies have manifestly failed; South Korea should move back toward the "Sunshine Policy."
The prospect of a peace treaty with America, full normalization of political and economic relations with the U.S., expanded trade with and aid from South Korea and Japan, and full participation in international institutions might beckon Pyongyang forward.
North Korea will long be with us. The Obama administration must recognize that any success will come only slowly, painfully, and incrementally, and as a result of a limited agenda realistically implemented.
The Korea Times, May 1, 2009
North Korea demonstrates the limits of President Barack Obama's more accommodating diplomacy.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea engages in perpetual brinkmanship. Last winter the tortuous negotiations over the North Korea's nuclear program crashed if not burned over verification procedures for Pyongyang's official nuclear declaration.
The Obama administration hopes to rejuvenate the six-party talks, but the way forward is uncertain after the North's recent missile launch.
In fact, the effort was much ado about nothing. The botched effort suggests that the DPRK poses less than a formidable military threat. Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, snickered: "On the idea of proliferation, would you buy from somebody that had failed three times in a row and never been successful?"
However, as a step designed to win international attention the test was far more successful, creating the usual public frenzy in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. The U.S. denounced the launch as illegal and went to the United Nations for redress.
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon complained that the action was "not conducive to efforts to promote dialogue, regional peace and stability," as if those were North Korea's objectives.
China and Russia exhibited their usual reluctance to crack down on the North. With Beijing's call for "calm" and "restraint," the Security Council approved a resolution insisting on little more than enforcement of previously approved sanctions.
What should Washington do?
The Obama administration needs to realistically assess the conundrum that is North Korea. We should downplay any expectations of changing North Korea.
America should step back and let others take the lead in dealing with Pyongyang. A desperately poor, isolated state with an antiquated military, the DPRK poses far greater problems for its neighbors than for America.
Only South Korea is within reach of the North's army — a good reason for the U.S. to withdraw its troops, since they are not needed to safeguard the Republic of Korea. (Seoul enjoys a vast economic, technological, population, and diplomatic edge over the North.)
Japan along with the ROK is vulnerable to North Korean missiles. China and the South both fear a violent DPRK collapse and refugee flood. Beijing also suffers from the nightmare of spreading nuclear proliferation, which could result in Japan developing nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, Washington and North Korea's neighbors have only bad options. It would be wonderful to create a democratic, humane DPRK. It is more important to avoid a new Korean war and cap any North Korean nuclear arsenal.
Thus, the Obama administration should focus its efforts on halting any further North Korean nuclear developments.
Unfortunately, convincing Pyongyang to yield its small atomic arsenal will require a geopolitical miracle. However, Pyongyang can do little with a small cache of nuclear weapons: attacking the U.S. would be suicidal, and Kim prefers his virgins in the here and now.
In contrast, the North could do enormous damage with a large and growing stockpile of nuclear materiel, including underwriting widespread proliferation.
To the extent the DPRK has been willing to comply with its promises — both in accepting the Clinton-era Agreed Framework and the later accord negotiated with the Bush administration — it has been to freeze its existing program. Future negotiations should focus on the same end.
For the same reason the U.S. must not get sidetracked by the North's missile program. As one American official anonymously declared: "We are not going to … let them distract us from the goal, which is denuclearization."
While the prospect of North Korea possessing advanced missile technology is unsettling, nuclear proliferation is the more important game.
Finally, Washington needs to concentrate on changing the negotiating dynamic with North Korea before negotiating with Pyongyang. For years the DPRK has used brinkmanship to win concessions. The U.S., ROK, and other friendly states need to reverse this reward structure.
First, they should respond to the North's provocations with bored contempt rather than excited fear. Calling an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council sent precisely the wrong message to Pyongyang.
Second, rather than publicly whining about North Korea's actions, friendly nations should quietly inform Pyongyang that they will offer no benefits while it is ratcheting up tensions.
If the DPRK responds positively, however, Washington should offer diplomatic recognition and the end of trade sanctions, small concessions in areas where punitive policies have manifestly failed; South Korea should move back toward the "Sunshine Policy."
The prospect of a peace treaty with America, full normalization of political and economic relations with the U.S., expanded trade with and aid from South Korea and Japan, and full participation in international institutions might beckon Pyongyang forward.
North Korea will long be with us. The Obama administration must recognize that any success will come only slowly, painfully, and incrementally, and as a result of a limited agenda realistically implemented.
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
An Economic Retreat from East Asia
An Economic Retreat from East Asia, by Doug Bandow
Cato, April 27, 2009.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is ever more confident, challenging U.S. naval ships in the South China Sea and the U.S. dollar in international forums. China has displaced America as the number one trading partner with leading East Asian states. And Beijing is creating a military capable of deterring if not defeating the U.S. armed forces.
How do the Obama administration and Democratic Congress respond? By retreating economically from the region. Sen. Barack Obama termed the U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement (FTA) "badly flawed" and urged the Bush administration not to even submit it for ratification. At his confirmation hearing U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk called the agreement "unacceptable." Although increased trade with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is "one of the biggest opportunities we have," he affirmed that the administration "will step away from that if we don't get it right." This policy is remarkable for both its economic and geostrategic folly.
Washington instead should be expanding American investment and trade opportunities in East Asia. The starting point should be to ratify the FTA with the ROK.
South Korea possesses one of the world's largest economies and is among the top dozen trading nations. Total U.S.-ROK trade ran more than $80 billion in 2008. The seventh largest merchandise trading partner of the U.S., Seoul is a major importer of aircraft, cereals, chemicals, machinery, and plastics. Even a small expansion of U.S.-ROK trade would offer a significant benefit for America's economy.
The FTA offers unusual potential because South Korea has been a notoriously closed market. Dependent on exports for its stunning economic success, the ROK is far less hospitable to other nation's exports, including from the U.S. The Korea Economic Institute reported: "Korea remains a very difficult place in which to do business."
The FTA responds by helping to open the Korean market. Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics reported: "The U.S.-Korea pact covers more trade than any other U.S. trade agreement except the North American Free Trade Agreement" and "opens up substantial new opportunities for bilateral trade and investment in goods and services."
More specifically, reports the U.S. Trade Representative:
In addition to eliminating South Korea's seven percent average tariff on industrial goods, the KORUS FTA effectively addresses a wide range of discriminatory non-tariff barriers to U.S. goods and services. It will improve regulatory procedures and due process in South Korea through the most advanced transparency obligations in any U.S. FTA to date. In addition, the Agreement contains an unprecedented package of automotive related provisions, including a unique dispute settlement mechanism that will level the playing field for U.S. automakers in this important market.
Obviously, the FTA does not eliminate all economic barriers in the ROK. Sen. Obama was one of many critics to point to continued Korean restrictions on the sale of U.S. autos and agricultural products. But the pact makes important progress. Explained Schott: "The FTA outcome on autos makes both sides better off than they would be in the absence of the bilateral deal" and "the FTA liberalization of farm trade predominantly benefits U.S. agricultural exporters."
Moreover, Seoul is in no mood to make concessions to the Obama administration. ROK President Roh Moo-hyun negotiated the treaty at some political cost. His successor, Lee Myung-bak, already has been attacked for easing restrictions on American beef imports. Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon declared simply: "There are [to be] no renegotiations or additional negotiations."
The U.S., whose share of total Korean imports has been falling, would obviously benefit from the pact. The likely increase in exports, perhaps $20 billion annually, would be particularly helpful in the midst of today's deep recession. Demand for American audiovisual, financial, and telecommunications services also likely would increase substantially. Overall, the U.S. International Trade Commission figures that American exports to South Korea would rise nearly twice as much as imports from the ROK. Since the South's per capita GDP today is well below that of the U.S., South Korean demand is likely to increase even more over the longer-term. Even more so if the two Koreas eventually reunite.
Economics is not the sum total of the issue, however. The Korean FTA is part of East Asia's great geopolitical game. A rising China is bumping up against a less dominant America; strengthening trade ties is one way for Washington to ensure continued American influence in the region.
The U.S. remains the globe's sole superpower, with the ability to project power into every region. But the PRC is engaged in a measured military build-up directed at creating armed forces capable of deterring American intervention in East Asia. Washington will find it increasingly difficult to achieve its objectives with military force.
Despite the Wall Street crash last fall, the U.S. retains the world's largest and most productive economy. And China has not escaped unscathed from the global downturn. However, Washington's economic dominance in East Asia is waning. By some measures the PRC has surpassed Japan as possessing the second largest economy.
Moreover, China's rapid economic growth has naturally led to expanded investment and trade throughout East Asia. American companies have been pushed into second and even third place in South Korea and Japan.
China's expansion is changing East Asia economic patterns. Noted Schott: "The region is the hotbed of regional trading arrangements, with a variety of pacts differing in scope and coverage." Driving this process is China's growing economic role. The impact on the ROK has been particularly significant. Observed Robert Kapp, a long-time president of the United States-China Business Council: "The growth of Korean-Chinese economic action has been even more impressive than China's expanding ties with other trade and investment partners."
Beijing is not content to rely on osmosis. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned: "China has linked its growing economic power with strong diplomatic initiatives throughout Asia. China's softer approach to the region has been dubbed a smile campaign or charm offensive, but it is more than just that -- China has injected new energy into bilateral partnerships and multilateral trade and security arrangements."
In fact, Beijing has been negotiating or discussing free trade agreements with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, among other countries. The economic and political barriers to such arrangements are obvious, but the fact that the PRC is pursuing this strategy -- and that America's three leading military allies in the region as well as another one-time ally and long-term friend, which enjoys an implicit security guarantee from Washington, view FTAs with China as a serious option -- symbolizes the challenge now facing Washington.
South Korea is not waiting for the U.S. The ROK has negotiated FTAs with the ASEAN (Southeast Asian) states and several European countries. Moreover, reports the Korea Economic Institute: "In March, Korea and the EU announced the tentative conclusion of FTA negotiations, while Korea also announced that it will commence FTA negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, and Peru. The EU deal, when completed, will be the world's largest bilateral trade agreement, eclipsing the still unapproved U.S.-Korea FTA."
Yet the U.S.-ROK FTA sits unratified in Washington. Washington's influence in East Asia is slowly ebbing. Rather than retreating quietly, the U.S. should strengthen its economic role by expanding trade and investment ties throughout the region. Washington should pursue FTAs with Japan and Taiwan. But first Congress should ratify the already-negotiated accord with South Korea.
The primary benefit of the agreement is economic. But expanding trade ties offer geopolitical advantages as well. The Bush administration may have overstated the benefits, but only slightly, when it argued: "By boosting economic ties and broadening and modernizing our longstanding alliance, it promises to become the pillar of our alliance for the next 50 years, as the Mutual Defense Treaty has been for the last 50 years." Seoul has a similar objective. Wrote Kozo Kiyota and Robert Stern of the University of Michigan: "Korean officials hope that there will be positive spillover effects from an FTA on the broader bilateral relationship."
Moving forward will require genuine statesmanship backed by political courage from the Obama administration. Failing to ratify the South Korean FTA is likely to result in permanent economic and geopolitical damage. Warned Jeffrey Schott: "The stakes -- in terms of both U.S. economic and security interests in East Asia -- are too great, and the costs too high, to reject the pact or defer a decision."
This would be a high price to pay at any time, but especially when China is rapidly expanding its influence throughout East Asia.
Cato, April 27, 2009.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is ever more confident, challenging U.S. naval ships in the South China Sea and the U.S. dollar in international forums. China has displaced America as the number one trading partner with leading East Asian states. And Beijing is creating a military capable of deterring if not defeating the U.S. armed forces.
How do the Obama administration and Democratic Congress respond? By retreating economically from the region. Sen. Barack Obama termed the U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement (FTA) "badly flawed" and urged the Bush administration not to even submit it for ratification. At his confirmation hearing U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk called the agreement "unacceptable." Although increased trade with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is "one of the biggest opportunities we have," he affirmed that the administration "will step away from that if we don't get it right." This policy is remarkable for both its economic and geostrategic folly.
Washington instead should be expanding American investment and trade opportunities in East Asia. The starting point should be to ratify the FTA with the ROK.
South Korea possesses one of the world's largest economies and is among the top dozen trading nations. Total U.S.-ROK trade ran more than $80 billion in 2008. The seventh largest merchandise trading partner of the U.S., Seoul is a major importer of aircraft, cereals, chemicals, machinery, and plastics. Even a small expansion of U.S.-ROK trade would offer a significant benefit for America's economy.
The FTA offers unusual potential because South Korea has been a notoriously closed market. Dependent on exports for its stunning economic success, the ROK is far less hospitable to other nation's exports, including from the U.S. The Korea Economic Institute reported: "Korea remains a very difficult place in which to do business."
The FTA responds by helping to open the Korean market. Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics reported: "The U.S.-Korea pact covers more trade than any other U.S. trade agreement except the North American Free Trade Agreement" and "opens up substantial new opportunities for bilateral trade and investment in goods and services."
More specifically, reports the U.S. Trade Representative:
In addition to eliminating South Korea's seven percent average tariff on industrial goods, the KORUS FTA effectively addresses a wide range of discriminatory non-tariff barriers to U.S. goods and services. It will improve regulatory procedures and due process in South Korea through the most advanced transparency obligations in any U.S. FTA to date. In addition, the Agreement contains an unprecedented package of automotive related provisions, including a unique dispute settlement mechanism that will level the playing field for U.S. automakers in this important market.
Obviously, the FTA does not eliminate all economic barriers in the ROK. Sen. Obama was one of many critics to point to continued Korean restrictions on the sale of U.S. autos and agricultural products. But the pact makes important progress. Explained Schott: "The FTA outcome on autos makes both sides better off than they would be in the absence of the bilateral deal" and "the FTA liberalization of farm trade predominantly benefits U.S. agricultural exporters."
Moreover, Seoul is in no mood to make concessions to the Obama administration. ROK President Roh Moo-hyun negotiated the treaty at some political cost. His successor, Lee Myung-bak, already has been attacked for easing restrictions on American beef imports. Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon declared simply: "There are [to be] no renegotiations or additional negotiations."
The U.S., whose share of total Korean imports has been falling, would obviously benefit from the pact. The likely increase in exports, perhaps $20 billion annually, would be particularly helpful in the midst of today's deep recession. Demand for American audiovisual, financial, and telecommunications services also likely would increase substantially. Overall, the U.S. International Trade Commission figures that American exports to South Korea would rise nearly twice as much as imports from the ROK. Since the South's per capita GDP today is well below that of the U.S., South Korean demand is likely to increase even more over the longer-term. Even more so if the two Koreas eventually reunite.
Economics is not the sum total of the issue, however. The Korean FTA is part of East Asia's great geopolitical game. A rising China is bumping up against a less dominant America; strengthening trade ties is one way for Washington to ensure continued American influence in the region.
The U.S. remains the globe's sole superpower, with the ability to project power into every region. But the PRC is engaged in a measured military build-up directed at creating armed forces capable of deterring American intervention in East Asia. Washington will find it increasingly difficult to achieve its objectives with military force.
Despite the Wall Street crash last fall, the U.S. retains the world's largest and most productive economy. And China has not escaped unscathed from the global downturn. However, Washington's economic dominance in East Asia is waning. By some measures the PRC has surpassed Japan as possessing the second largest economy.
Moreover, China's rapid economic growth has naturally led to expanded investment and trade throughout East Asia. American companies have been pushed into second and even third place in South Korea and Japan.
China's expansion is changing East Asia economic patterns. Noted Schott: "The region is the hotbed of regional trading arrangements, with a variety of pacts differing in scope and coverage." Driving this process is China's growing economic role. The impact on the ROK has been particularly significant. Observed Robert Kapp, a long-time president of the United States-China Business Council: "The growth of Korean-Chinese economic action has been even more impressive than China's expanding ties with other trade and investment partners."
Beijing is not content to rely on osmosis. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned: "China has linked its growing economic power with strong diplomatic initiatives throughout Asia. China's softer approach to the region has been dubbed a smile campaign or charm offensive, but it is more than just that -- China has injected new energy into bilateral partnerships and multilateral trade and security arrangements."
In fact, Beijing has been negotiating or discussing free trade agreements with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, among other countries. The economic and political barriers to such arrangements are obvious, but the fact that the PRC is pursuing this strategy -- and that America's three leading military allies in the region as well as another one-time ally and long-term friend, which enjoys an implicit security guarantee from Washington, view FTAs with China as a serious option -- symbolizes the challenge now facing Washington.
South Korea is not waiting for the U.S. The ROK has negotiated FTAs with the ASEAN (Southeast Asian) states and several European countries. Moreover, reports the Korea Economic Institute: "In March, Korea and the EU announced the tentative conclusion of FTA negotiations, while Korea also announced that it will commence FTA negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, and Peru. The EU deal, when completed, will be the world's largest bilateral trade agreement, eclipsing the still unapproved U.S.-Korea FTA."
Yet the U.S.-ROK FTA sits unratified in Washington. Washington's influence in East Asia is slowly ebbing. Rather than retreating quietly, the U.S. should strengthen its economic role by expanding trade and investment ties throughout the region. Washington should pursue FTAs with Japan and Taiwan. But first Congress should ratify the already-negotiated accord with South Korea.
The primary benefit of the agreement is economic. But expanding trade ties offer geopolitical advantages as well. The Bush administration may have overstated the benefits, but only slightly, when it argued: "By boosting economic ties and broadening and modernizing our longstanding alliance, it promises to become the pillar of our alliance for the next 50 years, as the Mutual Defense Treaty has been for the last 50 years." Seoul has a similar objective. Wrote Kozo Kiyota and Robert Stern of the University of Michigan: "Korean officials hope that there will be positive spillover effects from an FTA on the broader bilateral relationship."
Moving forward will require genuine statesmanship backed by political courage from the Obama administration. Failing to ratify the South Korean FTA is likely to result in permanent economic and geopolitical damage. Warned Jeffrey Schott: "The stakes -- in terms of both U.S. economic and security interests in East Asia -- are too great, and the costs too high, to reject the pact or defer a decision."
This would be a high price to pay at any time, but especially when China is rapidly expanding its influence throughout East Asia.
North Korea is once again provoking an American president
No More Bribes. WaPo Editorial
North Korea is once again provoking an American president.
WaPo, Wednesday, April 29, 2009
NORTH KOREA'S campaign to win attention and favors from the Obama administration continues to escalate. Over the weekend the regime announced that it had resumed the reprocessing of plutonium for nuclear weapons at its Yongbyon nuclear facility, having previously ejected U.N. inspectors. Quite possibly the claim was false: Experts estimate that it would take months at least to restart the reprocessing facility, and up to a year to turn on the main reactor. In any case, North Korea's capacity to add to its current arsenal of half a dozen bombs is limited -- perhaps one warhead a year.
Probably that's why the regime further upped the ante by declaring that two American journalists it is holding would be put on trial. The two women, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, were arrested March 17 along North Korea's border with China, most likely on the Chinese side. Working for San Francisco-based Current TV, they were investigating the issue of North Korean refugees in China -- including the underreported scandal of the trafficking of North Korean women. No doubt Pyongyang realizes that live hostages are better than a crumbling nuclear facility; it surely took note when Iran, which has received loads of attention from the new American president, put American journalist Roxana Saberi on trial this month.
While experts endlessly debate Iran's intentions, those of dictator Kim Jong Il aren't hard to figure. He would like the Obama administration to engage his regime in bilateral talks -- excluding South Korea, Japan and other U.S. partners -- and then offer it economic and political bribes in exchange for North Korea releasing the U.S. hostages and shutting down Yongbyon again. Mr. Kim has already succeeded in selling a Yongbyon closure to two U.S. presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush; why not, he must reason, try for a three-peat? Unfortunately, the Obama administration's part-time envoy for North Korea, Stephen W. Bosworth, has already signaled that Pyongyang's crude strategy might work by publicly offering bilateral talks along with "incentives" and by suggesting that the six-party negotiations including U.S. allies will be downgraded.
North Korea is once again provoking an American president.
WaPo, Wednesday, April 29, 2009
NORTH KOREA'S campaign to win attention and favors from the Obama administration continues to escalate. Over the weekend the regime announced that it had resumed the reprocessing of plutonium for nuclear weapons at its Yongbyon nuclear facility, having previously ejected U.N. inspectors. Quite possibly the claim was false: Experts estimate that it would take months at least to restart the reprocessing facility, and up to a year to turn on the main reactor. In any case, North Korea's capacity to add to its current arsenal of half a dozen bombs is limited -- perhaps one warhead a year.
Probably that's why the regime further upped the ante by declaring that two American journalists it is holding would be put on trial. The two women, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, were arrested March 17 along North Korea's border with China, most likely on the Chinese side. Working for San Francisco-based Current TV, they were investigating the issue of North Korean refugees in China -- including the underreported scandal of the trafficking of North Korean women. No doubt Pyongyang realizes that live hostages are better than a crumbling nuclear facility; it surely took note when Iran, which has received loads of attention from the new American president, put American journalist Roxana Saberi on trial this month.
While experts endlessly debate Iran's intentions, those of dictator Kim Jong Il aren't hard to figure. He would like the Obama administration to engage his regime in bilateral talks -- excluding South Korea, Japan and other U.S. partners -- and then offer it economic and political bribes in exchange for North Korea releasing the U.S. hostages and shutting down Yongbyon again. Mr. Kim has already succeeded in selling a Yongbyon closure to two U.S. presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush; why not, he must reason, try for a three-peat? Unfortunately, the Obama administration's part-time envoy for North Korea, Stephen W. Bosworth, has already signaled that Pyongyang's crude strategy might work by publicly offering bilateral talks along with "incentives" and by suggesting that the six-party negotiations including U.S. allies will be downgraded.
Monday, April 20, 2009
WSJ Editorial Page: Susan Rice is confused about international law and North Korea
Spinning a U.N. Failure. WSJ Editorial
Susan Rice is confused about international law and North Korea.
WSJ, Apr 20, 2009
It's strange enough that the Obama Administration is hyping last week's toothless statement by the United Nations Security Council condemning North Korea's recent rocket launch. Even more amazing, it says the U.N. move is "legally binding" on member states.
Those were the words used by Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., and repeated by a State Department spokesman. Ms. Rice is badly misinformed. As she ought to know, a "presidential statement" issued by the Security Council is legally binding on no one.
A presidential statement is agreed to by all 15 members of the Security Council and issued by the rotating president. Invented in 1994, such statements aren't even mentioned in the Security Council's procedural rules and impose zero obligations on members. They are a last resort when the Security Council can't summon the will or agreement to pass a resolution.
That's what happened after North Korea's April 5 missile launch, when neither China nor Russia would agree to the U.S. wish for a resolution. Legal experts -- including the Permanent Five's attorneys in a 2005 memo -- agree that the only U.N. pronouncement that is legally binding is a Security Council resolution issued under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which sets out the Council's powers to maintain peace. Such resolutions can be enforced with sanctions or military action. Resolution 1718, passed in 2006 after North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, falls in this category.
The distinction between "Chapter VII resolutions" and other U.N. utterances is important -- as the example of Israel illustrates. Since the Jewish state has never been subject to a Chapter VII resolution, no Israeli "violation" of a U.N. pronouncement can give rise to sanctions. Even the famous Resolution 242, issued at the end of the 1967 Yom Kippur War, was not issued under Chapter VII. If the Obama Administration considers even U.N. presidential statements "legally binding," it's an invitation to the U.N. to ramp up its attacks on Israel.
Last week's statement on North Korea is binding only in the sense that it calls on member states "to comply fully" with their obligations under Resolution 1718, which bans sales of weapons, weapons parts and luxury goods to North Korea. Resolution 1718 is legally binding, but it has never been enforced. This speaks volumes about the sincerity of promises made at the U.N., and about the failure of the Obama Administration to win Security Council support for a serious response to North Korea's missile launch.
Susan Rice is confused about international law and North Korea.
WSJ, Apr 20, 2009
It's strange enough that the Obama Administration is hyping last week's toothless statement by the United Nations Security Council condemning North Korea's recent rocket launch. Even more amazing, it says the U.N. move is "legally binding" on member states.
Those were the words used by Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., and repeated by a State Department spokesman. Ms. Rice is badly misinformed. As she ought to know, a "presidential statement" issued by the Security Council is legally binding on no one.
A presidential statement is agreed to by all 15 members of the Security Council and issued by the rotating president. Invented in 1994, such statements aren't even mentioned in the Security Council's procedural rules and impose zero obligations on members. They are a last resort when the Security Council can't summon the will or agreement to pass a resolution.
That's what happened after North Korea's April 5 missile launch, when neither China nor Russia would agree to the U.S. wish for a resolution. Legal experts -- including the Permanent Five's attorneys in a 2005 memo -- agree that the only U.N. pronouncement that is legally binding is a Security Council resolution issued under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which sets out the Council's powers to maintain peace. Such resolutions can be enforced with sanctions or military action. Resolution 1718, passed in 2006 after North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, falls in this category.
The distinction between "Chapter VII resolutions" and other U.N. utterances is important -- as the example of Israel illustrates. Since the Jewish state has never been subject to a Chapter VII resolution, no Israeli "violation" of a U.N. pronouncement can give rise to sanctions. Even the famous Resolution 242, issued at the end of the 1967 Yom Kippur War, was not issued under Chapter VII. If the Obama Administration considers even U.N. presidential statements "legally binding," it's an invitation to the U.N. to ramp up its attacks on Israel.
Last week's statement on North Korea is binding only in the sense that it calls on member states "to comply fully" with their obligations under Resolution 1718, which bans sales of weapons, weapons parts and luxury goods to North Korea. Resolution 1718 is legally binding, but it has never been enforced. This speaks volumes about the sincerity of promises made at the U.N., and about the failure of the Obama Administration to win Security Council support for a serious response to North Korea's missile launch.
What happens when the president can no longer blame Bush for international strife?
A World Of Trouble For Obama. By Jackson Diehl
WaPo, Monday, April 20, 2009
New American presidents typically begin by behaving as if most of the world's problems are the fault of their predecessors -- and Barack Obama has been no exception. In his first three months he has quickly taken steps to correct the errors in George W. Bush's foreign policy, as seen by Democrats. He has collected easy dividends from his base, U.S. allies in Europe and a global following for not being "unilateralist" or war-mongering or scornful of dialogue with enemies.
Now comes the interesting part: when it starts to become evident that Bush did not create rogue states, terrorist movements, Middle Eastern blood feuds or Russian belligerence -- and that shake-ups in U.S. diplomacy, however enlightened, might not have much impact on them.
The first wake-up call has come from North Korea -- a state that, according to established Democratic wisdom, would have given up its nuclear weapons years ago if it had not been labeled "evil" by Bush, denied bilateral talks with Washington and punished with sanctions. Stephen Bosworth, the administration's new special envoy, duly tried to head off Pyongyang's latest illegal missile test by promising bilateral negotiations and offering "incentives" for good behavior.
North Korea fired the missile anyway. After a week of U.N. Security Council negotiations by the new, multilateralist U.S. administration produced the same weak statement that the Bush administration would have gotten, the Stalinist regime expelled U.N. inspectors and announced that it was returning to plutonium production.
When the inspectors were ousted in 2002, Democrats blamed Bush. Now Republicans blame Obama -- but North Korea's strategy hasn't changed in 15 years. It provokes a crisis, then demands bribes from the United States and South Korea in exchange for restoring the status quo. The Obama team now faces the same dilemma that bedeviled the past two administrations: It must judge whether to respond to the bad behavior by paying the bribe or by trying to squeeze the regime.
A second cold shower rained down last week on George Mitchell, Obama's special envoy to the Middle East. For eight years Democrats insisted that the absence of progress toward peace between Israel and its neighbors was due to the Bush administration's failure at "engagement." Mitchell embodies the correction. But during last week's tour of the region he encountered a divided Palestinian movement seemingly incapable of agreeing on a stance toward Israel and a new Israeli government that doesn't accept the goal of Palestinian statehood. Neither appeared at all impressed by the new American intervention -- or willing to offer even token concessions.
Those aren't the only signs that the new medicine isn't taking. Europeans commonly blamed Bush for Russia's aggressiveness -- they said he ignored Moscow's interests and pressed too hard for European missile defense and NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. So Hillary Clinton made a show of pushing a "reset" button, and Obama offered the Kremlin a new arms control agreement while putting missile defense and NATO expansion on a back burner. Yet in recent weeks Russia has deployed thousands of additional troops as well as tanks and warplanes to the two breakaway Georgian republics it has recognized, in blatant violation of the cease-fire agreement that ended last year's war. The threat of another Russian attack on Georgia seems to be going up rather than down.
Obama sent a conciliatory public message to Iranians, and the United States joined in a multilateral proposal for new negotiations on its nuclear program. The regime responded by announcing another expansion of its uranium enrichment facility and placing an American journalist on trial for espionage. Obama told Iraqis that he would, as long promised, use troop withdrawals to pressure the government to take over responsibility for the country. Since he made that announcement, violence in Iraq has steadily increased.
Obama is not the first president to discover that facile changes in U.S. policy don't crack long-standing problems. Some of his new strategies may produce results with time. Yet the real test of an administration is what it does once it realizes that the quick fixes aren't working -- that, say, North Korea and Iran have no intention of giving up their nuclear programs, with or without dialogue, while Russia remains determined to restore its dominion over Georgia. In other words, what happens when it's no longer George W. Bush's fault? That's what the next 100 days will tell us.
WaPo, Monday, April 20, 2009
New American presidents typically begin by behaving as if most of the world's problems are the fault of their predecessors -- and Barack Obama has been no exception. In his first three months he has quickly taken steps to correct the errors in George W. Bush's foreign policy, as seen by Democrats. He has collected easy dividends from his base, U.S. allies in Europe and a global following for not being "unilateralist" or war-mongering or scornful of dialogue with enemies.
Now comes the interesting part: when it starts to become evident that Bush did not create rogue states, terrorist movements, Middle Eastern blood feuds or Russian belligerence -- and that shake-ups in U.S. diplomacy, however enlightened, might not have much impact on them.
The first wake-up call has come from North Korea -- a state that, according to established Democratic wisdom, would have given up its nuclear weapons years ago if it had not been labeled "evil" by Bush, denied bilateral talks with Washington and punished with sanctions. Stephen Bosworth, the administration's new special envoy, duly tried to head off Pyongyang's latest illegal missile test by promising bilateral negotiations and offering "incentives" for good behavior.
North Korea fired the missile anyway. After a week of U.N. Security Council negotiations by the new, multilateralist U.S. administration produced the same weak statement that the Bush administration would have gotten, the Stalinist regime expelled U.N. inspectors and announced that it was returning to plutonium production.
When the inspectors were ousted in 2002, Democrats blamed Bush. Now Republicans blame Obama -- but North Korea's strategy hasn't changed in 15 years. It provokes a crisis, then demands bribes from the United States and South Korea in exchange for restoring the status quo. The Obama team now faces the same dilemma that bedeviled the past two administrations: It must judge whether to respond to the bad behavior by paying the bribe or by trying to squeeze the regime.
A second cold shower rained down last week on George Mitchell, Obama's special envoy to the Middle East. For eight years Democrats insisted that the absence of progress toward peace between Israel and its neighbors was due to the Bush administration's failure at "engagement." Mitchell embodies the correction. But during last week's tour of the region he encountered a divided Palestinian movement seemingly incapable of agreeing on a stance toward Israel and a new Israeli government that doesn't accept the goal of Palestinian statehood. Neither appeared at all impressed by the new American intervention -- or willing to offer even token concessions.
Those aren't the only signs that the new medicine isn't taking. Europeans commonly blamed Bush for Russia's aggressiveness -- they said he ignored Moscow's interests and pressed too hard for European missile defense and NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. So Hillary Clinton made a show of pushing a "reset" button, and Obama offered the Kremlin a new arms control agreement while putting missile defense and NATO expansion on a back burner. Yet in recent weeks Russia has deployed thousands of additional troops as well as tanks and warplanes to the two breakaway Georgian republics it has recognized, in blatant violation of the cease-fire agreement that ended last year's war. The threat of another Russian attack on Georgia seems to be going up rather than down.
Obama sent a conciliatory public message to Iranians, and the United States joined in a multilateral proposal for new negotiations on its nuclear program. The regime responded by announcing another expansion of its uranium enrichment facility and placing an American journalist on trial for espionage. Obama told Iraqis that he would, as long promised, use troop withdrawals to pressure the government to take over responsibility for the country. Since he made that announcement, violence in Iraq has steadily increased.
Obama is not the first president to discover that facile changes in U.S. policy don't crack long-standing problems. Some of his new strategies may produce results with time. Yet the real test of an administration is what it does once it realizes that the quick fixes aren't working -- that, say, North Korea and Iran have no intention of giving up their nuclear programs, with or without dialogue, while Russia remains determined to restore its dominion over Georgia. In other words, what happens when it's no longer George W. Bush's fault? That's what the next 100 days will tell us.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
Libertarian: A Bold Plan B for North Korea
A Bold Plan B for North Korea, by Ted Galen Carpenter
Cato, April 15, 2009
North Korea's announced withdrawal Tuesday from the six-party talks in response to the UN Security Council's tepid reaction to the April 5 missile test raises a disturbing possibility. The US and the governments of East Asia have proceeded on the assumption that a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear program is feasible. That settlement would entail Pyongyang's renunciation of its nuclear ambitions in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions.
But what if the underlying assumption is wrong?
What if, for six years, Kim Jong Il's regime has been merely stalling for time while building nuclear warheads and perfecting a reliable missile delivery system? It would have been relatively easy for Pyongyang to ignore the UN's condemnation and remain in the six-party talks. The Security Council's action Monday was utterly anemic, since the outcome was not even a binding resolution. It was merely a statement from the council president condemning the missile launch and admonishing member states to more effectively enforce the hardly robust sanctions imposed in 2006 following the North's nuclear test. Yet North Korea used the council's response as an excuse to quit the talks.
It is time to ask what the US and North Korea's neighbors in East Asia plan to do if Pyongyang is not willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In other words, what is "Plan B" if the six-party talks fail? Since military action against North Korea is far too dangerous, there appear to be only three other options, and none is entirely appealing or without risk.
The first option would be to follow the suggestion of former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton and other hard-liners to impose far stronger multilateral economic sanctions. That strategy has a big defect, however. Both Beijing and Moscow are vehemently opposed to enhanced sanctions. China's opposition is crucial because without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have little impact on Pyongyang. And given the dependence on Beijing's willingness to continue funding the soaring US treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions.
The second option would be to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and rely on deterrence to prevent aggressive behavior. There is a credible argument for that approach. After all, the US has deterred other nuclear bad actors in the past, most notably the Soviet Union and Maoist China, and the vast US strategic arsenal probably could deter the likes of Kim Jong Il.
But being able to deter an outright attack still leaves room for dangerous North Korean mischief. Pyongyang's proliferation activities are especially worrisome. North Korea's apparent nuclear assistance to Syria makes one wonder what other countries – or even more troubling, nonstate actors – might also be beneficiaries of such aid. Living with a nuclear-capable North Korea would be, at the least, a nerve-wracking experience.
There is a final option that deserves consideration. It would amount to inducing (bribing) China to remove Kim Jong Il's regime and install a more pragmatic government in Pyongyang, along with the explicit condition of keeping the country nonnuclear. Part of the bargain also ought to be a commitment from Beijing to promote the reunification of the two Koreas within the next generation. During my visit to China last year, policymakers there professed loyalty to Beijing's longtime ally, but there was also a distinct undertone of exasperation with Pyongyang.
If the price were right, Chinese leaders might be bold enough to topple Kim with a palace coup. But the price would certainly not be cheap. At the least, Beijing would want a commitment from the US to end its military presence on the Korean Peninsula and, probably, to phase out its security alliance with South Korea. In all likelihood, Chinese leaders also would want US concessions on the Taiwan issue.
Those steps might not be easy for US policymakers. But American – and East Asian – leaders must ask themselves whether such sacrifices might be a necessary price to end the North Korean nuclear threat.
In any case, US and East Asian officials need to be thinking about a Plan B now. It is not a prudent strategy simply to hope that the six-party talks will produce an enforceable, effective solution. Given North Korea's record, that is merely the triumph of hope over experience.
Cato, April 15, 2009
North Korea's announced withdrawal Tuesday from the six-party talks in response to the UN Security Council's tepid reaction to the April 5 missile test raises a disturbing possibility. The US and the governments of East Asia have proceeded on the assumption that a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear program is feasible. That settlement would entail Pyongyang's renunciation of its nuclear ambitions in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions.
But what if the underlying assumption is wrong?
What if, for six years, Kim Jong Il's regime has been merely stalling for time while building nuclear warheads and perfecting a reliable missile delivery system? It would have been relatively easy for Pyongyang to ignore the UN's condemnation and remain in the six-party talks. The Security Council's action Monday was utterly anemic, since the outcome was not even a binding resolution. It was merely a statement from the council president condemning the missile launch and admonishing member states to more effectively enforce the hardly robust sanctions imposed in 2006 following the North's nuclear test. Yet North Korea used the council's response as an excuse to quit the talks.
It is time to ask what the US and North Korea's neighbors in East Asia plan to do if Pyongyang is not willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In other words, what is "Plan B" if the six-party talks fail? Since military action against North Korea is far too dangerous, there appear to be only three other options, and none is entirely appealing or without risk.
The first option would be to follow the suggestion of former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton and other hard-liners to impose far stronger multilateral economic sanctions. That strategy has a big defect, however. Both Beijing and Moscow are vehemently opposed to enhanced sanctions. China's opposition is crucial because without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have little impact on Pyongyang. And given the dependence on Beijing's willingness to continue funding the soaring US treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions.
The second option would be to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and rely on deterrence to prevent aggressive behavior. There is a credible argument for that approach. After all, the US has deterred other nuclear bad actors in the past, most notably the Soviet Union and Maoist China, and the vast US strategic arsenal probably could deter the likes of Kim Jong Il.
But being able to deter an outright attack still leaves room for dangerous North Korean mischief. Pyongyang's proliferation activities are especially worrisome. North Korea's apparent nuclear assistance to Syria makes one wonder what other countries – or even more troubling, nonstate actors – might also be beneficiaries of such aid. Living with a nuclear-capable North Korea would be, at the least, a nerve-wracking experience.
There is a final option that deserves consideration. It would amount to inducing (bribing) China to remove Kim Jong Il's regime and install a more pragmatic government in Pyongyang, along with the explicit condition of keeping the country nonnuclear. Part of the bargain also ought to be a commitment from Beijing to promote the reunification of the two Koreas within the next generation. During my visit to China last year, policymakers there professed loyalty to Beijing's longtime ally, but there was also a distinct undertone of exasperation with Pyongyang.
If the price were right, Chinese leaders might be bold enough to topple Kim with a palace coup. But the price would certainly not be cheap. At the least, Beijing would want a commitment from the US to end its military presence on the Korean Peninsula and, probably, to phase out its security alliance with South Korea. In all likelihood, Chinese leaders also would want US concessions on the Taiwan issue.
Those steps might not be easy for US policymakers. But American – and East Asian – leaders must ask themselves whether such sacrifices might be a necessary price to end the North Korean nuclear threat.
In any case, US and East Asian officials need to be thinking about a Plan B now. It is not a prudent strategy simply to hope that the six-party talks will produce an enforceable, effective solution. Given North Korea's record, that is merely the triumph of hope over experience.
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
Japan warns against U.N. inaction on N Korea rocket launch
Japan warns against U.N. inaction on N Korea rocket launch
Japan Today, Wednesday 08th April, 06:30 AM JST
TOKYO — Japan’s foreign minister warned Tuesday that the U.N. Security Council must give a strong response to North Korea’s recent rocket launch or risk losing its authority.
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone said a failure to respond to the North’s Sunday launch could hurt multilateral talks aimed at getting the communist nation to halt its nuclear programs.
“If violations are allowed, the U.N. Security Council’s authority would be threatened and trust placed upon it would be impaired,” Nakasone told a news conference. “The U.N. Security Council should respond properly and teach North Korea a lesson that it has to pay for the act of provocation.”
He said the lack of a strong response to the rocket launch—seen by many as a cover for testing long-range missile technology—would send the wrong message to the North.
Security Council diplomats were mired in squabbles over how, or even whether, to punish North Korea for Sunday’s launch. World leaders, including President Barack Obama, called it a provocative act and a violation of previous sanctions, imposed after the North’s underground nuclear test in 2006.
Japan said Monday that while it was trying to lobby China and Russia, which are reluctant to punish the North, it would extend sanctions against North Korea for another year in response to the launch.
Japan imposed tight trade sanctions against the North in 2006 following Pyongyang’s missile and atomic tests that year. The ongoing sanctions, which ban North Korean ships from entering Japan and prohibit imports of North Korean goods, have been renewed every six months since and were to expire on April 13.
Pyongyang continued to claim it put a communications satellite into orbit and is now transmitting data and patriotic songs. But Japan joined the rest of the world in saying that it appeared to be a failure.
Nakasone said Japan has yet to determine whether North Korea launched a satellite or a missile, but either way the launch violated the Security Council ban because it used missile technology.
The international community will allow North Korea to engage in space development “only if the North fulfilled its obligation to abandon all nuclear programs and no longer poses a threat to Japan and the rest of the world,” he said.
Japan Today, Wednesday 08th April, 06:30 AM JST
TOKYO — Japan’s foreign minister warned Tuesday that the U.N. Security Council must give a strong response to North Korea’s recent rocket launch or risk losing its authority.
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone said a failure to respond to the North’s Sunday launch could hurt multilateral talks aimed at getting the communist nation to halt its nuclear programs.
“If violations are allowed, the U.N. Security Council’s authority would be threatened and trust placed upon it would be impaired,” Nakasone told a news conference. “The U.N. Security Council should respond properly and teach North Korea a lesson that it has to pay for the act of provocation.”
He said the lack of a strong response to the rocket launch—seen by many as a cover for testing long-range missile technology—would send the wrong message to the North.
Security Council diplomats were mired in squabbles over how, or even whether, to punish North Korea for Sunday’s launch. World leaders, including President Barack Obama, called it a provocative act and a violation of previous sanctions, imposed after the North’s underground nuclear test in 2006.
Japan said Monday that while it was trying to lobby China and Russia, which are reluctant to punish the North, it would extend sanctions against North Korea for another year in response to the launch.
Japan imposed tight trade sanctions against the North in 2006 following Pyongyang’s missile and atomic tests that year. The ongoing sanctions, which ban North Korean ships from entering Japan and prohibit imports of North Korean goods, have been renewed every six months since and were to expire on April 13.
Pyongyang continued to claim it put a communications satellite into orbit and is now transmitting data and patriotic songs. But Japan joined the rest of the world in saying that it appeared to be a failure.
Nakasone said Japan has yet to determine whether North Korea launched a satellite or a missile, but either way the launch violated the Security Council ban because it used missile technology.
The international community will allow North Korea to engage in space development “only if the North fulfilled its obligation to abandon all nuclear programs and no longer poses a threat to Japan and the rest of the world,” he said.
Monday, April 6, 2009
WSJ Editorial Page on North Korea's Launch: The condemnations will probably soon become concessions
The Song of Kim Jong Il. WSJ Editorial
The condemnations will probably soon become concessions.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
A few hours after the launch Sunday of a long-range multistage rocket, North Korea's state media proclaimed that a communications satellite was in orbit and transmitting "immortal revolutionary paeans" back to Earth. The U.S. military, which apparently had trouble tuning in the "Song of General Kim Il Sung," announced that the satellite had fallen into the Pacific somewhere between Japan and Hawaii.
The technology may have failed to put a satellite into space, but North Korea's launch has succeeded in getting the world's attention. Most of the civilized world spent yesterday denouncing dictator Kim Jong Il's latest provocation, which violated a United Nations Security Council resolution barring the North from testing ballistic missile technology. However, if the international response keeps with past practice, the condemnations will soon give way to concessions. No wonder Kim keeps launching missiles.
The launch was a success, too, as a global advertisement to those in the market for vehicles to deliver weapons of mass destruction. That includes the North's No. 1 customer, Iran, which in February launched a small satellite thanks in part to North Korean missile technology. Iranian observers were reportedly on hand over the weekend at the launch site.
Sunday's fizzle doesn't mean the North didn't learn anything useful for the future of its long-range ballistic missile program. As learning tools, failures can be more instructive than successes, and the Taepodong-2 missile under development has the potential to reach the U.S. West Coast.
Pyongyang's action ought to prompt the Obama Administration to advance the fledgling missile defense system started by President Bush. Instead, the White House reportedly has told the Pentagon to cut spending on missile defense by $2 billion, or about 20%. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is expected to announce these and other budget cuts today.
Programs in jeopardy include the Airborne Laser, a modified 747 designed to take out ballistic missiles seconds after liftoff; expansion of the ground-based interceptor program in Alaska and California; and space-based missile surveillance and tracking. All three are part of the vision for a layered defense, in which the U.S. has several chances to destroy incoming missiles. The Obama Administration has already indicated it wants to go slow in building the "third site," the Europe-based radar and interceptors that would provide another layer of defense from Iranian missiles for the U.S. East Coast.
In 2006, Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice squandered the moment after the North's nuclear test when China was ready to apply serious pressure. Instead, they bought Kim's promise to give up his weapons, then let him delay and renegotiate the terms as he went, including agreeing to Kim's demand to take North Korea off the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring nations. Now he's playing the same brinksmanship with the Obama Administration.
This is Mr. Obama's chance to do better. But based on his comments during the campaign, as well as his statement yesterday urging renewed efforts through the Six Party Talks, the President seems unlikely to change course. Kim has every reason to expect that he will eventually get what he wants -- more recognition, more money and energy supplies from the U.S., China and South Korea, and a high likelihood that he'll get to keep his nukes and missiles too.
The condemnations will probably soon become concessions.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
A few hours after the launch Sunday of a long-range multistage rocket, North Korea's state media proclaimed that a communications satellite was in orbit and transmitting "immortal revolutionary paeans" back to Earth. The U.S. military, which apparently had trouble tuning in the "Song of General Kim Il Sung," announced that the satellite had fallen into the Pacific somewhere between Japan and Hawaii.
The technology may have failed to put a satellite into space, but North Korea's launch has succeeded in getting the world's attention. Most of the civilized world spent yesterday denouncing dictator Kim Jong Il's latest provocation, which violated a United Nations Security Council resolution barring the North from testing ballistic missile technology. However, if the international response keeps with past practice, the condemnations will soon give way to concessions. No wonder Kim keeps launching missiles.
The launch was a success, too, as a global advertisement to those in the market for vehicles to deliver weapons of mass destruction. That includes the North's No. 1 customer, Iran, which in February launched a small satellite thanks in part to North Korean missile technology. Iranian observers were reportedly on hand over the weekend at the launch site.
Sunday's fizzle doesn't mean the North didn't learn anything useful for the future of its long-range ballistic missile program. As learning tools, failures can be more instructive than successes, and the Taepodong-2 missile under development has the potential to reach the U.S. West Coast.
Pyongyang's action ought to prompt the Obama Administration to advance the fledgling missile defense system started by President Bush. Instead, the White House reportedly has told the Pentagon to cut spending on missile defense by $2 billion, or about 20%. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is expected to announce these and other budget cuts today.
Programs in jeopardy include the Airborne Laser, a modified 747 designed to take out ballistic missiles seconds after liftoff; expansion of the ground-based interceptor program in Alaska and California; and space-based missile surveillance and tracking. All three are part of the vision for a layered defense, in which the U.S. has several chances to destroy incoming missiles. The Obama Administration has already indicated it wants to go slow in building the "third site," the Europe-based radar and interceptors that would provide another layer of defense from Iranian missiles for the U.S. East Coast.
In 2006, Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice squandered the moment after the North's nuclear test when China was ready to apply serious pressure. Instead, they bought Kim's promise to give up his weapons, then let him delay and renegotiate the terms as he went, including agreeing to Kim's demand to take North Korea off the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring nations. Now he's playing the same brinksmanship with the Obama Administration.
This is Mr. Obama's chance to do better. But based on his comments during the campaign, as well as his statement yesterday urging renewed efforts through the Six Party Talks, the President seems unlikely to change course. Kim has every reason to expect that he will eventually get what he wants -- more recognition, more money and energy supplies from the U.S., China and South Korea, and a high likelihood that he'll get to keep his nukes and missiles too.
Obama's NK Reaction: More Talks
Obama's NK Reaction: More Talks. By John Bolton
The president sends the wrong messages to Israel and Iran.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
Prior to North Korea's launch yesterday of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, President Barack Obama declared that such an action would be "provocative." This public statement was an attempt to reinforce the administration's private efforts to urge the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) not to fire the missile.
That effort failed, as have countless other attempts to deal softly with Pyongyang. Incredibly, U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Stephen Bosworth revealed -- just a few days before the launch -- that he was ready to visit Pyongyang and resume the six-party talks once the "dust from the missiles settles." It is no wonder the North fired away.
Once the missile shot was complete, the administration's answer was hand-wringing, more rhetoric and, oh yes, the obligatory trip to the U.N. Security Council so that it could scold the defiant DPRK. Beyond whatever happens in the Security Council, Mr. Obama seems to have no plan whatever.
In 2006, when Pyongyang last lit off a volley of missiles and then exploded a nuclear device, the Security Council responded unanimously with Resolutions 1695 and 1718, which imposed extensive military and some economic sanctions. Unfortunately, the impact of these resolutions was dramatically undercut by subsequent Bush administration diplomacy, which effectively let North Korea off the hook. By re-engaging Pyongyang diplomatically rather than increasing the external pressure, George W. Bush relegitimized the North and gave it yet more time to bargain.
Yesterday's launch is attributable to prior failures, but the global consequences now unfolding are Mr. Obama's responsibility. In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is expected to announce today deep cuts in the U.S. missile defense program, an extraordinarily ill-advised step.
The initial draft Security Council resolution responding to yesterday's missile launch, written by Japan and the U.S., is weak. It essentially only reaffirms Resolutions 1695 and 1718, and minimally tightens existing enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, China and Russia made it plain before the launch they had no interest in stricter sanctions -- even arguing with a straight face that Pyongyang was only interested in peaceful satellite communications.
What the Security Council will ultimately produce is of course uncertain -- but resolutions almost never get tougher as the drafting and negotiations proceed. Even worse than a weak resolution would be a "presidential statement," a toothless gesture of the Council's opinion. Either way, North Korea has again defied the Security Council, gotten away with its launch with the support of Russia and China, and now will likely confront only pleas by Mr. Obama and others to return to the six-party talks.
Those talks are exactly where North Korea wants to be. From them ever greater material and political benefits will flow to Pyongyang, in exchange for ever more hollow promises to dismantle its nuclear program.
So far, therefore, the missile launch is an unambiguous win for North Korea. (Although not orbiting a satellite, all three rocket stages apparently fired, achieving Pyongyang's longest missile flight yet.) But the negative repercussions will extend far beyond Northeast Asia.
Iran has carefully scrutinized the Obama administration's every action, and Tehran's only conclusion can be: It is past time to torque up the pressure on this new crowd in Washington. Not only is Iran's back now covered by its friends Russia, China and others on the U.N. Security Council, but it sees an American president so ready to bend his knee for public favor in Europe that the mullahs' wish list for U.S. concessions will grow by the minute.
Israel must also be carefully considering how the U.S. watched North Korea rip through "the international community." The most important lesson the new government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should draw is: Look out for No. 1. If Israel isn't prepared to protect itself, including using military force, against Iran's nuclear weapons program, it certainly shouldn't be holding its breath for Mr. Obama to do anything.
Russia and China must also be relishing this outcome. They will have faced down Mr. Obama in his first real crisis, having provided Security Council cover for a criminal regime, and emerged unscathed. They will conclude that achieving their large agendas with the new administration can't be too hard. That conclusion may be unfair to the new American president; but it will surely color how Moscow and Beijing structure their policies and their diplomacy until proven otherwise. That alone is bad news for Washington and its allies.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
The president sends the wrong messages to Israel and Iran.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
Prior to North Korea's launch yesterday of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, President Barack Obama declared that such an action would be "provocative." This public statement was an attempt to reinforce the administration's private efforts to urge the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) not to fire the missile.
That effort failed, as have countless other attempts to deal softly with Pyongyang. Incredibly, U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Stephen Bosworth revealed -- just a few days before the launch -- that he was ready to visit Pyongyang and resume the six-party talks once the "dust from the missiles settles." It is no wonder the North fired away.
Once the missile shot was complete, the administration's answer was hand-wringing, more rhetoric and, oh yes, the obligatory trip to the U.N. Security Council so that it could scold the defiant DPRK. Beyond whatever happens in the Security Council, Mr. Obama seems to have no plan whatever.
In 2006, when Pyongyang last lit off a volley of missiles and then exploded a nuclear device, the Security Council responded unanimously with Resolutions 1695 and 1718, which imposed extensive military and some economic sanctions. Unfortunately, the impact of these resolutions was dramatically undercut by subsequent Bush administration diplomacy, which effectively let North Korea off the hook. By re-engaging Pyongyang diplomatically rather than increasing the external pressure, George W. Bush relegitimized the North and gave it yet more time to bargain.
Yesterday's launch is attributable to prior failures, but the global consequences now unfolding are Mr. Obama's responsibility. In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is expected to announce today deep cuts in the U.S. missile defense program, an extraordinarily ill-advised step.
The initial draft Security Council resolution responding to yesterday's missile launch, written by Japan and the U.S., is weak. It essentially only reaffirms Resolutions 1695 and 1718, and minimally tightens existing enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, China and Russia made it plain before the launch they had no interest in stricter sanctions -- even arguing with a straight face that Pyongyang was only interested in peaceful satellite communications.
What the Security Council will ultimately produce is of course uncertain -- but resolutions almost never get tougher as the drafting and negotiations proceed. Even worse than a weak resolution would be a "presidential statement," a toothless gesture of the Council's opinion. Either way, North Korea has again defied the Security Council, gotten away with its launch with the support of Russia and China, and now will likely confront only pleas by Mr. Obama and others to return to the six-party talks.
Those talks are exactly where North Korea wants to be. From them ever greater material and political benefits will flow to Pyongyang, in exchange for ever more hollow promises to dismantle its nuclear program.
So far, therefore, the missile launch is an unambiguous win for North Korea. (Although not orbiting a satellite, all three rocket stages apparently fired, achieving Pyongyang's longest missile flight yet.) But the negative repercussions will extend far beyond Northeast Asia.
Iran has carefully scrutinized the Obama administration's every action, and Tehran's only conclusion can be: It is past time to torque up the pressure on this new crowd in Washington. Not only is Iran's back now covered by its friends Russia, China and others on the U.N. Security Council, but it sees an American president so ready to bend his knee for public favor in Europe that the mullahs' wish list for U.S. concessions will grow by the minute.
Israel must also be carefully considering how the U.S. watched North Korea rip through "the international community." The most important lesson the new government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should draw is: Look out for No. 1. If Israel isn't prepared to protect itself, including using military force, against Iran's nuclear weapons program, it certainly shouldn't be holding its breath for Mr. Obama to do anything.
Russia and China must also be relishing this outcome. They will have faced down Mr. Obama in his first real crisis, having provided Security Council cover for a criminal regime, and emerged unscathed. They will conclude that achieving their large agendas with the new administration can't be too hard. That conclusion may be unfair to the new American president; but it will surely color how Moscow and Beijing structure their policies and their diplomacy until proven otherwise. That alone is bad news for Washington and its allies.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
Saturday, April 4, 2009
North Korea in International Limelight over its Space Development Programme
North Korea in International Limelight over its Space Development Programme. By Rajaram Panda and Pranamita Baruah
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, April 2, 2009
North East Asia’s fragile peace is being threatened by North Korea’s planned launch between 4 and 8 April over Japanese territory of a communication satellite. The US and its allies suspect the planned satellite launch to be a long-range ballistic missile test. The prevailing uneasy peace is accentuated by the fact that both a ballistic missile and a satellite launcher operate on very similar technology. According to Dennis Blair, Director of US National Intelligence, the technology for a space launch “is indistinguishable from an intercontinental ballistic missile.” If the “three stage space-launch vehicle works,” it could technically reach the US mainland. Consequently, the reactions from the US and its allies have been strong.
There has remained a lurking suspicion that North Korea and Iran have joined together to build missiles. That Iran has made rapid strides in missile technology is an established fact. But whether the collaboration between the two countries includes warheads or other nuclear work remains shrouded in mystery. But given the behaviour of the two countries over the years, it is difficult to disbelieve that both Iran and North Korea are not cooperating in such activity.
North Korea already possesses the Taepo Dong-2 with ICBM potential (striking range of 5500 kilometres or greater). It may be recalled that Pyongyang’s August 1998 test firing of a Taepo Dong-2 into the Sea of Japan had panicked American friends and allies in East Asia. It is a different matter that the test failed 40 seconds into its launch. However, it propelled North Korean engineers to make substantial modifications in the missile’s design. The advanced version of Taepo Dong-2 is supposed to have a minimum striking range of 6,700 kilometres (4100 miles), capable of striking the US west coast.
Despite its precarious economic problems, Pyongyang has never felt shy of demonstrating its defence capabilities by upgrading its missile development systems continuously. It has built a ballistic missile arsenal capable of hitting not only Japan and South Korea but also the west coast of the US. In total, North Korea deploys around 750 ballistic missiles, including between 600-800 SCUDs, 150-200 No Dongs, 10-20 Taepo Dong-1, and a few Taepo Dong-2s.
Pyongyang has not halted its nuclear programme despite the denuclearisation deal that it struck at the Six Party talks in February 2007. It is suspected that Pyongyang is aiming to produce nuclear payloads for its ballistic missiles. It is also feared that Pyongyang’s missile development programme is projected towards developing a nuclear warhead sophisticated enough for delivery aboard a space-bound rocket. In the event of Pyongyang achieving that capability, it would be in a position to detonate a nuclear warhead in space. The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanating from such a detonation would have frightening repercussions, especially for unhardened satellites. A space launch would advance Pyongyang’s missile programme, enabling it to produce more accurate and powerful ballistic missiles capable of terrorizing not only Seoul and Tokyo but also Los Angeles and San Francisco.
With a view to deterring and intercepting missiles from the North, South Korea has announced its own plans to complete a missile defence system by 2012. Japan too has affirmed its commitment to acquire a multi-layered system after the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002 and North Korea left the NPT regime in 2003. If North Korea does not retract from its ballistic missiles test programme, the US, Japan and South Korea are likely like to keep their missile defence options open.
There already exist the necessary mechanisms through international legal instruments to deter North Korea from upgrading its missile development capability. United Nations Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) prohibits Pyongyang from conducting any ballistic missile activity. North Korea is a signatory to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, in the moon or elsewhere in space. However, it has asserted its right to engage in a peaceful space programme. The state-run Korean Central New Agency said “preparations for launching experimental communications satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 by means of delivery rocket Unha-2 are now making brisk headway” at a launch site in Hwadae Country in the northeast. The statement called the upcoming launch “a giant stride forward” for the country’s space programme.
North Korea finds fault with the US and Japan, claiming that these two countries have already launched their own satellites and therefore have no moral right to prevent it from doing the same. It further warns Washington and Tokyo that if they deny Pyongyang the right to use space for peaceful purposes, it would not only be discriminatory but also not in keeping with ‘spirit of mutual respect and equality’ of the 2005 disarmament pact. Pyongyang further warns that any sanctions that the UN, US and its allies might impose on it would “deprive the Six-Party talks of any ground to exist or their meaning.” Meanwhile, North Korea has asserted that it would regard any attempt to shoot down its rocket as an unprovoked Act of War and retaliate with prompt strikes on the US mainland, Japan and South Korea.
The international community is aghast at Pyongyang’s obduracy. Japan has decided to call for an emergency meeting of the UNSC if the launch takes place. In the event of the North’s missile firing, Japan will urge the UNSC to take immediate action regardless of how other UN members would react, as it would be directly exposed to an immediate missile threat. Japan has warned that it will shoot down a missile or any debris if it threatens to hit Japanese territory.
Japan debated between two possible options in response to a missile launch by North Korea: to ask the cabinet to take an instant decision after a missile launch or to give military approval in advance to shoot it down, and finally decided to exercise the second option by issuing an advanced order to the Self Defence Forces on March 27 to use the Patriot missile defence system to destroy any missile or debris that shows signs of falling toward Japan. Japan, however, does not want to strike a North Korean rocket unless it appears to pose a direct threat, in the event of a mishap that could send an errant missile or debris flying toward the country.
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso has already obtained the support of British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Both Japan and Britain have agreed to take the issue to the UNSC to discuss possible punitive action if Pyongyang goes ahead with the launch. As a pre-emptive measure, Japan has deployed three Aegis destroyers, two of which are fitted with anti-missile missiles, around Japan and Patriot guided-missile units at select locations in Japan. The US Seventh Fleet has been deployed around Japan. US cruisers and destroyers based at Yokosuka also reportedly have the capability to launch guided missiles against ballistic missiles. Five Aegis destroyers of the US Navy modified for ballistic missile defence have already left Yokosuka and other Japanese ports on March 30. They are expected to detect and track the North Korean rocket passing over northeastern Japan if the launch goes according to plan.
South Korea is worried over the heightened tensions on the Peninsula and President Lee Dang-hee has appealed for restraint. Seoul has also alleged that Pyongyang’s long-range rocket launch clearly violates UNSC resolution 1718. It has described Pyongyang’s planned rocket launch as a ‘serious challenge and provocation’ to regional security. North Korea, however, has ramped up its anti-Lee rhetoric, warning that the Koreas are headed for a military clash.
Russia too has joined the chorus of nations expressing concern over the upcoming launch. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin said that the launch would lead to increased tensions in the region and urged Pyongyang to refrain from it. As regards China, a traditional ally and a major donor for impoverished North Korea and UNSC permanent member, it has not publicly urged Pyongyang to halt the launch. However, both China and Russia have notified the Obama administration that North Korea has a legitimate right to launch a satellite. The perceived tacit support from China and Russia might embolden North Korea not to rethink its planned space satellite launch.
It appears that the uneasy peace in the North East Asian region stemming from Pyongyang’s intransigence is likely to continue for some more time to come. If North Korea is to be trusted about its intentions for the communication satellite launch programme, it would serve the interests of the country. If, however, Pyongyang has other covert intentions, it will have to face the reactions from its neighbours and the US.
Dr. Rajaram Panda is Senior Fellow, and Pranamita Baruah is Research Assistant, at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, April 2, 2009
North East Asia’s fragile peace is being threatened by North Korea’s planned launch between 4 and 8 April over Japanese territory of a communication satellite. The US and its allies suspect the planned satellite launch to be a long-range ballistic missile test. The prevailing uneasy peace is accentuated by the fact that both a ballistic missile and a satellite launcher operate on very similar technology. According to Dennis Blair, Director of US National Intelligence, the technology for a space launch “is indistinguishable from an intercontinental ballistic missile.” If the “three stage space-launch vehicle works,” it could technically reach the US mainland. Consequently, the reactions from the US and its allies have been strong.
There has remained a lurking suspicion that North Korea and Iran have joined together to build missiles. That Iran has made rapid strides in missile technology is an established fact. But whether the collaboration between the two countries includes warheads or other nuclear work remains shrouded in mystery. But given the behaviour of the two countries over the years, it is difficult to disbelieve that both Iran and North Korea are not cooperating in such activity.
North Korea already possesses the Taepo Dong-2 with ICBM potential (striking range of 5500 kilometres or greater). It may be recalled that Pyongyang’s August 1998 test firing of a Taepo Dong-2 into the Sea of Japan had panicked American friends and allies in East Asia. It is a different matter that the test failed 40 seconds into its launch. However, it propelled North Korean engineers to make substantial modifications in the missile’s design. The advanced version of Taepo Dong-2 is supposed to have a minimum striking range of 6,700 kilometres (4100 miles), capable of striking the US west coast.
Despite its precarious economic problems, Pyongyang has never felt shy of demonstrating its defence capabilities by upgrading its missile development systems continuously. It has built a ballistic missile arsenal capable of hitting not only Japan and South Korea but also the west coast of the US. In total, North Korea deploys around 750 ballistic missiles, including between 600-800 SCUDs, 150-200 No Dongs, 10-20 Taepo Dong-1, and a few Taepo Dong-2s.
Pyongyang has not halted its nuclear programme despite the denuclearisation deal that it struck at the Six Party talks in February 2007. It is suspected that Pyongyang is aiming to produce nuclear payloads for its ballistic missiles. It is also feared that Pyongyang’s missile development programme is projected towards developing a nuclear warhead sophisticated enough for delivery aboard a space-bound rocket. In the event of Pyongyang achieving that capability, it would be in a position to detonate a nuclear warhead in space. The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanating from such a detonation would have frightening repercussions, especially for unhardened satellites. A space launch would advance Pyongyang’s missile programme, enabling it to produce more accurate and powerful ballistic missiles capable of terrorizing not only Seoul and Tokyo but also Los Angeles and San Francisco.
With a view to deterring and intercepting missiles from the North, South Korea has announced its own plans to complete a missile defence system by 2012. Japan too has affirmed its commitment to acquire a multi-layered system after the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002 and North Korea left the NPT regime in 2003. If North Korea does not retract from its ballistic missiles test programme, the US, Japan and South Korea are likely like to keep their missile defence options open.
There already exist the necessary mechanisms through international legal instruments to deter North Korea from upgrading its missile development capability. United Nations Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) prohibits Pyongyang from conducting any ballistic missile activity. North Korea is a signatory to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, in the moon or elsewhere in space. However, it has asserted its right to engage in a peaceful space programme. The state-run Korean Central New Agency said “preparations for launching experimental communications satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 by means of delivery rocket Unha-2 are now making brisk headway” at a launch site in Hwadae Country in the northeast. The statement called the upcoming launch “a giant stride forward” for the country’s space programme.
North Korea finds fault with the US and Japan, claiming that these two countries have already launched their own satellites and therefore have no moral right to prevent it from doing the same. It further warns Washington and Tokyo that if they deny Pyongyang the right to use space for peaceful purposes, it would not only be discriminatory but also not in keeping with ‘spirit of mutual respect and equality’ of the 2005 disarmament pact. Pyongyang further warns that any sanctions that the UN, US and its allies might impose on it would “deprive the Six-Party talks of any ground to exist or their meaning.” Meanwhile, North Korea has asserted that it would regard any attempt to shoot down its rocket as an unprovoked Act of War and retaliate with prompt strikes on the US mainland, Japan and South Korea.
The international community is aghast at Pyongyang’s obduracy. Japan has decided to call for an emergency meeting of the UNSC if the launch takes place. In the event of the North’s missile firing, Japan will urge the UNSC to take immediate action regardless of how other UN members would react, as it would be directly exposed to an immediate missile threat. Japan has warned that it will shoot down a missile or any debris if it threatens to hit Japanese territory.
Japan debated between two possible options in response to a missile launch by North Korea: to ask the cabinet to take an instant decision after a missile launch or to give military approval in advance to shoot it down, and finally decided to exercise the second option by issuing an advanced order to the Self Defence Forces on March 27 to use the Patriot missile defence system to destroy any missile or debris that shows signs of falling toward Japan. Japan, however, does not want to strike a North Korean rocket unless it appears to pose a direct threat, in the event of a mishap that could send an errant missile or debris flying toward the country.
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso has already obtained the support of British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Both Japan and Britain have agreed to take the issue to the UNSC to discuss possible punitive action if Pyongyang goes ahead with the launch. As a pre-emptive measure, Japan has deployed three Aegis destroyers, two of which are fitted with anti-missile missiles, around Japan and Patriot guided-missile units at select locations in Japan. The US Seventh Fleet has been deployed around Japan. US cruisers and destroyers based at Yokosuka also reportedly have the capability to launch guided missiles against ballistic missiles. Five Aegis destroyers of the US Navy modified for ballistic missile defence have already left Yokosuka and other Japanese ports on March 30. They are expected to detect and track the North Korean rocket passing over northeastern Japan if the launch goes according to plan.
South Korea is worried over the heightened tensions on the Peninsula and President Lee Dang-hee has appealed for restraint. Seoul has also alleged that Pyongyang’s long-range rocket launch clearly violates UNSC resolution 1718. It has described Pyongyang’s planned rocket launch as a ‘serious challenge and provocation’ to regional security. North Korea, however, has ramped up its anti-Lee rhetoric, warning that the Koreas are headed for a military clash.
Russia too has joined the chorus of nations expressing concern over the upcoming launch. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin said that the launch would lead to increased tensions in the region and urged Pyongyang to refrain from it. As regards China, a traditional ally and a major donor for impoverished North Korea and UNSC permanent member, it has not publicly urged Pyongyang to halt the launch. However, both China and Russia have notified the Obama administration that North Korea has a legitimate right to launch a satellite. The perceived tacit support from China and Russia might embolden North Korea not to rethink its planned space satellite launch.
It appears that the uneasy peace in the North East Asian region stemming from Pyongyang’s intransigence is likely to continue for some more time to come. If North Korea is to be trusted about its intentions for the communication satellite launch programme, it would serve the interests of the country. If, however, Pyongyang has other covert intentions, it will have to face the reactions from its neighbours and the US.
Dr. Rajaram Panda is Senior Fellow, and Pranamita Baruah is Research Assistant, at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
North Korea places Taepodong-2 missile on launch pad
North Korea places Taepodong-2 missile on launch pad
Japan Today, Thursday 26th March, 03:22 AM JST
TOKYO —
North Korea has positioned what is believed to be a Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile on the launch pad at a facility in Musudanri, sources close to Japan-U.S. relations said Wednesday night. North Korea has said it plans to send a satellite into orbit from the facility between April 4 and 8. But Japan, the United States and South Korea suspect the planned launch may actually be a test-firing of a ballistic missile.
NBC television, quoting U.S. officials, said in its online edition Wednesday that while two stages of the missile can be seen on the launch pad, the top is covered with a shroud supported by a crane. But now that the missile is on the pad, the launch itself could come within a matter of days, NBC said.
North Korea has informed the International Maritime Organization of the plan and warned that the first stage of the rocket will fall into the Sea of Japan while the second stage will fall into the northern Pacific Ocean. The Japanese government also received the information from Pyongyang.
Japan is expected to issue an order for the destruction of debris from the missile in case its planned launch fails.
North Korea launched a Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998, part of which flew over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.
A Taepodong-2 missile is believed to have a range of more than 6,000 kilometers. Its test launch in July 2006 apparently ended in failure.
Japan Today, Thursday 26th March, 03:22 AM JST
TOKYO —
North Korea has positioned what is believed to be a Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile on the launch pad at a facility in Musudanri, sources close to Japan-U.S. relations said Wednesday night. North Korea has said it plans to send a satellite into orbit from the facility between April 4 and 8. But Japan, the United States and South Korea suspect the planned launch may actually be a test-firing of a ballistic missile.
NBC television, quoting U.S. officials, said in its online edition Wednesday that while two stages of the missile can be seen on the launch pad, the top is covered with a shroud supported by a crane. But now that the missile is on the pad, the launch itself could come within a matter of days, NBC said.
North Korea has informed the International Maritime Organization of the plan and warned that the first stage of the rocket will fall into the Sea of Japan while the second stage will fall into the northern Pacific Ocean. The Japanese government also received the information from Pyongyang.
Japan is expected to issue an order for the destruction of debris from the missile in case its planned launch fails.
North Korea launched a Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998, part of which flew over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.
A Taepodong-2 missile is believed to have a range of more than 6,000 kilometers. Its test launch in July 2006 apparently ended in failure.
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Japan, China differ over how to deal with North Korea
Japan, China differ over how to deal with North Korea
Saturday March 21, 2009, 06:50 AM JST
BEIJING —
Japanese and Chinese defense ministers agreed Friday it would be best if North Korea refrains from a planned rocket launch, but made demands to each other over ways to deal with the issue. While Japan asked China, North Korea’s traditional ally, to urge Pyongyang’s restraint, Beijing asked Tokyo to handle the issue ‘‘in a calm manner,’’ Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada and a Japanese government official said.
North Korea’s planned rocket launch was a topic in Hamada’s meetings with his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie as well as Wu Bangguo, chairman of China’s legislature. Liang said ‘‘it would be best if North Korea did not fire’’ the rocket, Hamada said. But he added that countries such as Japan ‘‘should take a cool-headed attitude’’ on the issue, he said.
The Chinese official was believed to be reacting to recent discussions in Japan about intercepting the rocket, which North Korea has said will be launched in early April to put a satellite into orbit.
Countries such as Japan suspect the plan to be a cover for testing a long-range ballistic missile, given the similarities between the technology involved.
Japan has said that even if it is a satellite launch, North Korea would be violating existing U.N. Security Council resolutions that prohibit it from engaging in ballistic missile activities.
China has taken a more nuanced approach. Although it has indicated its desire for North Korea to refrain from the launch, it has not said whether it would view the act as a violation of the resolutions.
Hamada said that Chinese officials did not clarify what Beijing plans to do if the launch takes place.
A Japanese government official said that while Hamada urged China to urge North Korea’s restraint in his meeting with Wu, there was no direct response from the Chinese official.
In their talks, the two defense ministers agreed that the two countries will seek ways to cooperate in antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia, according to the Japanese government official. Both countries have committed naval vessels to the operations.
Hamada also conveyed Japan’s concern over China’s growing military spending, which will mark the 21st year of double-digit growth in 2009, the official said.
Liang replied that there is no need for concern because Beijing’s policy is defensive, according to the official.
Liang also touched on China’s intention to build an aircraft carrier, telling Hamada that China is the only major nation in the world not to have one, the official said.
‘‘China has a vast sea area and the Chinese Navy needs to develop,’’ the official quoted Liang as saying.
Saturday March 21, 2009, 06:50 AM JST
BEIJING —
Japanese and Chinese defense ministers agreed Friday it would be best if North Korea refrains from a planned rocket launch, but made demands to each other over ways to deal with the issue. While Japan asked China, North Korea’s traditional ally, to urge Pyongyang’s restraint, Beijing asked Tokyo to handle the issue ‘‘in a calm manner,’’ Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada and a Japanese government official said.
North Korea’s planned rocket launch was a topic in Hamada’s meetings with his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie as well as Wu Bangguo, chairman of China’s legislature. Liang said ‘‘it would be best if North Korea did not fire’’ the rocket, Hamada said. But he added that countries such as Japan ‘‘should take a cool-headed attitude’’ on the issue, he said.
The Chinese official was believed to be reacting to recent discussions in Japan about intercepting the rocket, which North Korea has said will be launched in early April to put a satellite into orbit.
Countries such as Japan suspect the plan to be a cover for testing a long-range ballistic missile, given the similarities between the technology involved.
Japan has said that even if it is a satellite launch, North Korea would be violating existing U.N. Security Council resolutions that prohibit it from engaging in ballistic missile activities.
China has taken a more nuanced approach. Although it has indicated its desire for North Korea to refrain from the launch, it has not said whether it would view the act as a violation of the resolutions.
Hamada said that Chinese officials did not clarify what Beijing plans to do if the launch takes place.
A Japanese government official said that while Hamada urged China to urge North Korea’s restraint in his meeting with Wu, there was no direct response from the Chinese official.
In their talks, the two defense ministers agreed that the two countries will seek ways to cooperate in antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia, according to the Japanese government official. Both countries have committed naval vessels to the operations.
Hamada also conveyed Japan’s concern over China’s growing military spending, which will mark the 21st year of double-digit growth in 2009, the official said.
Liang replied that there is no need for concern because Beijing’s policy is defensive, according to the official.
Liang also touched on China’s intention to build an aircraft carrier, telling Hamada that China is the only major nation in the world not to have one, the official said.
‘‘China has a vast sea area and the Chinese Navy needs to develop,’’ the official quoted Liang as saying.
Friday, March 13, 2009
Ban: Satellite lunch by DPR Korea will threaten regional stability
SATELLITE LAUNCH BY DPR KOREA WILL THREATEN REGIONAL STABILITY, BAN WARNS
UN, New York, Mar 12 2009 6:10PM
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today voiced concern about plans by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to launch a satellite, warning that it could jeopardize stability in the region.
The DPRK authorities have reportedly announced that they plan to launch a satellite sometime between 4 and 8 April.
“I’m concerned about DPRK’s recent moves to launch a satellite or long-range missiles,” Mr. Ban told a news conference in New York. “This will threaten the peace and stability in the region.”
He encouraged Pyongyang to comply with Security Council resolution 1718, which demanded that the country “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile,” following its claims to have conducted a nuclear test in October 2006.
“I hope they will abide by the relevant Security Council resolution and return to the Six-Party Talks,” he said, referring to the discussions involving DPRK, Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the United States.
Mr. Ban also said he hoped for improved bilateral relations between DPRK and the Republic of Korea.
Mar 12 2009 6:10PM
UN, New York, Mar 12 2009 6:10PM
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today voiced concern about plans by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to launch a satellite, warning that it could jeopardize stability in the region.
The DPRK authorities have reportedly announced that they plan to launch a satellite sometime between 4 and 8 April.
“I’m concerned about DPRK’s recent moves to launch a satellite or long-range missiles,” Mr. Ban told a news conference in New York. “This will threaten the peace and stability in the region.”
He encouraged Pyongyang to comply with Security Council resolution 1718, which demanded that the country “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile,” following its claims to have conducted a nuclear test in October 2006.
“I hope they will abide by the relevant Security Council resolution and return to the Six-Party Talks,” he said, referring to the discussions involving DPRK, Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the United States.
Mr. Ban also said he hoped for improved bilateral relations between DPRK and the Republic of Korea.
Mar 12 2009 6:10PM
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
North Korea's Missile Gambit
North Korea's Missile Gambit, by Bruce Klingner
Heritage, February 17, 2009
Full article w/references here.
North Korea may be preparing to test-launch a long-range Taepo Dong-2 missile from its eastern coast. A missile launch, or even observable preparations for such a launch, would be the next step in Pyongyang's escalating efforts to pressure the U.S. and South Korea to soften their policies toward the North Korean dictatorship. Needless to say, it would be deeply embarrassing to the Obama Administration, which, prior to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Asia trip, seemed to be climbing down from some of the firmer positions President Obama held during the campaign.
Pyongyang is sending a signal to the Obama Administration that, despite the change in U.S. leadership, North Korea will not adopt a more accommodating stance in nuclear negotiations. Pyongyang's increasingly bellicose campaign is also directed--perhaps primarily--at forcing South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to abandon his requirements for conditionality, reciprocity, and transparency in South Korean engagement with the North.
Target: North America
Scientists remain uncertain over the range and payload capabilities of the long-range Taepo Dong-1 and -2 missiles as well as of potential variants. A 2001 National Intelligence Estimate by the U.S. intelligence community assessed a two-stage Taepo Dong 2 "could deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload up to 10,000 km--sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United States." The report projected that including a third stage could increase the range to 15,000 km, which would allow the missile to reach all of North America with a payload sufficiently large to accommodate a nuclear warhead. [1]
North Korea may not intend to actually launch a missile--that is, if Pyongyang seeks to achieve its diplomatic objectives without escalating tension beyond a counter-productive level. Its launch of a Taepo Dong-2 missile in 2006 angered ally China to such a degree that Beijing acquiesced to a U.S.-sponsored UN resolution against North Korea. Knowing that any activity at its missile test facility would be observed by satellites and interpreted as launch preparations, Pyongyang might hope that concerns over escalating tensions would cause South Korea and the U.S. to weaken negotiating positions. After all, the Bush Administration softened its position when North Korea threatened to reprocess plutonium in late 2008.
North Korea's actions may also be an attempt to trigger a resumption of bilateral negotiations which stalled at the end of the Clinton Administration. At that time, Pyongyang demanded $1 billion annually in return for a cessation of its missile exports. The U.S. rejected the demand and sought a more comprehensive agreement. But North Korea's demand for a presidential summit and refusal to discuss details of an agreement during Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's October 2000 trip to Pyongyang and November 2000 bilateral meetings in Kuala Lumpur doomed the initiative.
A High Risk Gambit
A launch would be a high-risk gambit. If North Korea were to successfully launch a Taepo Dong missile, it would significantly alter the threat potential to the U.S. and its Asian allies. Pyongyang's previous Taepo Dong missile launches in 1998 and 2006 failed and its nuclear test in 2006 was only partially successful. A successful launch of a missile theoretically capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear warhead would reverse perceptions of a diminishing North Korean military threat. Pyongyang calculates that international concerns over rising tensions would soften demands for North Korea to fully comply with its denuclearization commitments. Pyongyang would seek to defuse international anger by claiming, as it did with its 1998 launch, that it was simply launching a civilian space satellite.
On the other hand, another North Korean long-range missile failure would not only once again provide fodder for late night comedians; it would also further reduce the perception of North Korea as a military threat, thereby undermining its negotiating leverage. Such failure could reduce any sense of urgency for making progress either in missile negotiations or the Six Party Talks. Pyongyang could compensate by increasing tensions elsewhere, perhaps by initiating a naval confrontation with South Korea in the West Sea as occurred in 1999 and 2002.
A missile launch would be the Obama Administration's first foreign policy test. During the presidential campaign, Barack Obama declared that "if the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we should move quickly to re-impose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions going forward." [2]How will the President react to a North Korean missile launch? Will the strong words of the campaign and Secretary of State Clinton's confirmation hearing be matched by resolute action?
What the U.S. Should Do
Emphasize that North Korea's actions are provocative, counterproductive, and call into question Pyongyang's viability as a negotiating partner. Highlight that North Korea's threatening belligerence, not U.S. "hostile policy" as Pyongyang claims, has hindered negotiations.
Affirm U.S. commitment to defend our allies against any North Korean provocation, including missile launches or naval confrontation in the West Sea.
Underscore Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' pledge to shoot down the North Korean missile if it approaches U.S. territory.
Emphasize that North Korea's missile threat demonstrates the continuing need for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to develop and deploy missile defense systems. It is ironic that President Obama's Secretary of Defense has suggested using missile defenses that Obama would likely not have funded had he been in office during their development.
Declare that the U.S. is willing to resume negotiations to eliminate North Korea's missile threats to its neighbors. Such negotiations, however, must comprehensively constrain missile development, deployment, and proliferation rather than simply seeking a quid pro quo agreement--cash payments in exchange for not exporting missile technology. Nor should such negotiations deflect attention from Pyongyang's denuclearization requirements in the Six Party Talks.
Demand that all UN member nations fully implement their existing requirements. A North Korean launch would be a clear violation of UN Resolutions 1695 and 1718. In response, the U.S. should Washington should insist that the UN Security Council adopt a follow-on resolution that includes chapter VII, article 42 of the UN charter which makes sanctions mandatory and allows for enforcement by military means.
Initiate a multilateral effort--comprised of financial, military, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations--to sanction North Korean and other foreign companies and government entities that are involved in North Korean missile and WMD development and proliferation.
Adhering to the above-noted recommendations will ensure that the U.S. sends a clear message to Pyongyang, America's Asian allies, and the rest of the world: A nuclear North Korea will not be tolerated.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
Heritage, February 17, 2009
Full article w/references here.
North Korea may be preparing to test-launch a long-range Taepo Dong-2 missile from its eastern coast. A missile launch, or even observable preparations for such a launch, would be the next step in Pyongyang's escalating efforts to pressure the U.S. and South Korea to soften their policies toward the North Korean dictatorship. Needless to say, it would be deeply embarrassing to the Obama Administration, which, prior to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Asia trip, seemed to be climbing down from some of the firmer positions President Obama held during the campaign.
Pyongyang is sending a signal to the Obama Administration that, despite the change in U.S. leadership, North Korea will not adopt a more accommodating stance in nuclear negotiations. Pyongyang's increasingly bellicose campaign is also directed--perhaps primarily--at forcing South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to abandon his requirements for conditionality, reciprocity, and transparency in South Korean engagement with the North.
Target: North America
Scientists remain uncertain over the range and payload capabilities of the long-range Taepo Dong-1 and -2 missiles as well as of potential variants. A 2001 National Intelligence Estimate by the U.S. intelligence community assessed a two-stage Taepo Dong 2 "could deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload up to 10,000 km--sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United States." The report projected that including a third stage could increase the range to 15,000 km, which would allow the missile to reach all of North America with a payload sufficiently large to accommodate a nuclear warhead. [1]
North Korea may not intend to actually launch a missile--that is, if Pyongyang seeks to achieve its diplomatic objectives without escalating tension beyond a counter-productive level. Its launch of a Taepo Dong-2 missile in 2006 angered ally China to such a degree that Beijing acquiesced to a U.S.-sponsored UN resolution against North Korea. Knowing that any activity at its missile test facility would be observed by satellites and interpreted as launch preparations, Pyongyang might hope that concerns over escalating tensions would cause South Korea and the U.S. to weaken negotiating positions. After all, the Bush Administration softened its position when North Korea threatened to reprocess plutonium in late 2008.
North Korea's actions may also be an attempt to trigger a resumption of bilateral negotiations which stalled at the end of the Clinton Administration. At that time, Pyongyang demanded $1 billion annually in return for a cessation of its missile exports. The U.S. rejected the demand and sought a more comprehensive agreement. But North Korea's demand for a presidential summit and refusal to discuss details of an agreement during Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's October 2000 trip to Pyongyang and November 2000 bilateral meetings in Kuala Lumpur doomed the initiative.
A High Risk Gambit
A launch would be a high-risk gambit. If North Korea were to successfully launch a Taepo Dong missile, it would significantly alter the threat potential to the U.S. and its Asian allies. Pyongyang's previous Taepo Dong missile launches in 1998 and 2006 failed and its nuclear test in 2006 was only partially successful. A successful launch of a missile theoretically capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear warhead would reverse perceptions of a diminishing North Korean military threat. Pyongyang calculates that international concerns over rising tensions would soften demands for North Korea to fully comply with its denuclearization commitments. Pyongyang would seek to defuse international anger by claiming, as it did with its 1998 launch, that it was simply launching a civilian space satellite.
On the other hand, another North Korean long-range missile failure would not only once again provide fodder for late night comedians; it would also further reduce the perception of North Korea as a military threat, thereby undermining its negotiating leverage. Such failure could reduce any sense of urgency for making progress either in missile negotiations or the Six Party Talks. Pyongyang could compensate by increasing tensions elsewhere, perhaps by initiating a naval confrontation with South Korea in the West Sea as occurred in 1999 and 2002.
A missile launch would be the Obama Administration's first foreign policy test. During the presidential campaign, Barack Obama declared that "if the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we should move quickly to re-impose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions going forward." [2]How will the President react to a North Korean missile launch? Will the strong words of the campaign and Secretary of State Clinton's confirmation hearing be matched by resolute action?
What the U.S. Should Do
Emphasize that North Korea's actions are provocative, counterproductive, and call into question Pyongyang's viability as a negotiating partner. Highlight that North Korea's threatening belligerence, not U.S. "hostile policy" as Pyongyang claims, has hindered negotiations.
Affirm U.S. commitment to defend our allies against any North Korean provocation, including missile launches or naval confrontation in the West Sea.
Underscore Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' pledge to shoot down the North Korean missile if it approaches U.S. territory.
Emphasize that North Korea's missile threat demonstrates the continuing need for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to develop and deploy missile defense systems. It is ironic that President Obama's Secretary of Defense has suggested using missile defenses that Obama would likely not have funded had he been in office during their development.
Declare that the U.S. is willing to resume negotiations to eliminate North Korea's missile threats to its neighbors. Such negotiations, however, must comprehensively constrain missile development, deployment, and proliferation rather than simply seeking a quid pro quo agreement--cash payments in exchange for not exporting missile technology. Nor should such negotiations deflect attention from Pyongyang's denuclearization requirements in the Six Party Talks.
Demand that all UN member nations fully implement their existing requirements. A North Korean launch would be a clear violation of UN Resolutions 1695 and 1718. In response, the U.S. should Washington should insist that the UN Security Council adopt a follow-on resolution that includes chapter VII, article 42 of the UN charter which makes sanctions mandatory and allows for enforcement by military means.
Initiate a multilateral effort--comprised of financial, military, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations--to sanction North Korean and other foreign companies and government entities that are involved in North Korean missile and WMD development and proliferation.
Adhering to the above-noted recommendations will ensure that the U.S. sends a clear message to Pyongyang, America's Asian allies, and the rest of the world: A nuclear North Korea will not be tolerated.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
The Seoul Solution to the Banking Crisis: no need to sell off toxic assets immediately
The Seoul Solution to the Banking Crisis, by Weijian Shan
Geithner doesn't need to sell off toxic assets immediately.
WSJ, Feb 12, 2009
Let's face it: the American financial system is basically insolvent. To date, the U.S. government has committed, on behalf of taxpayers, more than $7 trillion of capital injections and guarantees to financial institutions. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Tuesday the government will pour up to $1 trillion more into a "Public-Private Investment Fund," which will be tasked to buy up banks' bad assets -- the real blockage in the credit pipeline. The trouble isn't, however, that banks don't want to sell loans. They just don't know what a fair price is in a now-illiquid loan market because there are no buyers.
How should the government price toxic assets? If the government overpays, current shareholders will be unjustly enriched at the expense of taxpayers. Rewarding reckless behavior would only encourage more of it. If the government underpays for assets, it will amount to an expropriation of private properties without just compensation, and make the banks' capital positions even weaker than they are now. There's another complicating factor, too: Since most bank deposits are government-guaranteed, the government has the ultimate responsibility to save failing banks. That means Washington must take over the failed bank before selling it off. The government will own the assets and sell them when private capital is brought in to recapitalize the bank.
How should the government price these assets? Mr. Geithner's plan suggests that the determination of the prices will be left to private investors. But what if the government is the seller? How does the government get it right? How do private investors get it right? It seems to be an impossible task, because currently there is simply no market for toxic assets, and if there is, the market will deeply discount them, either bankrupting the bank or costing taxpayers dearly. It is a major dilemma which needs to be resolved. But there is a proven way to solve the problem, and it should be used again.
During the latter part of 1998, the financial system of South Korea -- at that time, the 10th largest economy in the world -- was basically insolvent. Many banks failed as bad loans mounted. Capital flight reduced Korea's foreign exchange reserves so much that the country teetered on the verge of sovereign debt default. Korea had to request emergency funding from the International Monetary Fund, which, working closely with the U.S. Federal Reserve, eventually provided the country with a $58 billion rescue package.
The package came with strings attached, one of which was for the Korean government to sell off to foreign investors a clutch of failed and nationalized big banks including Korea First Bank. The Fund reasoned that the failure of Korea's banking system was due to a total lack of a "credit culture," as lending had typically been done on the basis of either government policies or collateral without much regard to the creditworthiness of the borrowers. Seoul thought foreign investors could help inculcate this culture into the banking system.
U.S.-based private equity firm Newbridge Capital was one of the only two bidders -- among more than 40 invited -- to attend the government-mandated auctions. I represented Newbridge at these meetings. After weeks of negotiations, we reached a preliminary agreement with the Korean government to give us the exclusive right to acquire Korea First Bank. The key part of the deal was that all the assets be priced at fair market value. The memorandum of understanding specifically called for all assets to be "marked to market" on a loan-by-loan basis, after which Newbridge and the government would jointly invest into the bank to recapitalize it.
"Mark to market" accounting, however, turned out to be completely inoperative in a financial crisis because then, as now, there was no market for bad loans. Sellers thought that assets would be worth more when the economy eventually recovered. Buyers worried they might be worth less if the economy continued to deteriorate. Both were right because there was a significant probability for either to happen, but their divergent expectations made it impossible for them to agree to the right price.
Then the parties discovered a simple methodology that resolved the dilemma -- and could resolve America's dilemma, too.
Since the market was illiquid, we realized that it was impossible to determine the "fair value" in the near term. We thus agreed to a so-called future "buy or sell" arrangement. Over the following three years, on the anniversary of our agreement, the bank would name the price for any existing loan on its books, and the government would have the option to "buy" or "sell" that loan at that price.
The goal was for the government to minimize the amount of money it would have to inject to make up the difference between the market and face values of bad loans, and for us not to have to bear the losses from the bad loans we had inherited when we bought the failed bank from the government. This arrangement gave us the time to work out or to improve the value of these loans, and perhaps for the loan value to recover over time. If it didn't fully recover, and on one of the anniversaries we valued a problem loan at 70 cents on the dollar and the government agreed, we would receive an injection of 30 cents to make us whole. But if the government thought we were lowballing it, the government could buy the loan from us at full face value -- $1 -- and sell it to other investors at a higher price, say 80 cents. This would leave taxpayers with a loss of only 20 cents, as opposed to 30.
The beauty of this methodology is severalfold. First, the government did not have to sell bank assets to private investors at deeply distressed value in the depth of a financial crisis -- a move which would have incurred huge losses for taxpayers. Over time, as the economy recovers, the loan value is likely to improve.
Second, the bank was no longer crippled by the burden of bad assets because it knew they were ultimately protected by the government. The new investors could concentrate on fixing the operations of the bank and making new loans.
Third, the plan removed any incentive for the privatized bank to cheat the government. To a bank, an interest-yielding asset is more valuable than cash. Therefore a bank would want to hold on to an asset, and more importantly to a customer, as long as the loan is safe. In our buy-sell arrangement, if the bank mistakenly underpriced a loan or tried to lowball its value, the government would buy it with cash and the bank would lose the loan and the customer. If the bank overpriced the asset, the bank would risk losses as it would get stuck with a loan for less than its book value. Therefore, the bank was incentivized to work out the loan to the best of its abilities and to price it as accurately as possible.
This methodology worked so well for the Korean government that, three years later, after the program ended, the government had spent a fraction of its original budget to rescue the bank. Under the new owners, many of the nonperforming loans were worked out and recovered, along with the recovery of the Korean economy.
In retrospect, the methodology was the best deal for taxpayers. It did not give investors as much gain as government-assisted bank deals elsewhere at that time, which allowed new investors to buy assets at substantially marked down values and capture significant windfall gains when the market and asset value recovered. We earned our upside from revitalizing and building up the bank, not from gains on legacy assets at taxpayer expense. Both the Korean government and Newbridge eventually realized many times their investments when the banks recovered and were sold off five years later.
Like Korea a decade ago, the U.S. government is left with little choice but to nationalize insolvent banks. Mr. Geithner now needs to flesh out the methodology through which he's going to relieve these banks of their bad loans. There is no lack of capital in America today, or in the world beyond it. Mr. Geithner can make it flow again, if he only looks to Seoul's example for how to do it.
Mr. Shan is a partner at TPG Capital. The views expressed in this article are strictly his own.
Geithner doesn't need to sell off toxic assets immediately.
WSJ, Feb 12, 2009
Let's face it: the American financial system is basically insolvent. To date, the U.S. government has committed, on behalf of taxpayers, more than $7 trillion of capital injections and guarantees to financial institutions. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Tuesday the government will pour up to $1 trillion more into a "Public-Private Investment Fund," which will be tasked to buy up banks' bad assets -- the real blockage in the credit pipeline. The trouble isn't, however, that banks don't want to sell loans. They just don't know what a fair price is in a now-illiquid loan market because there are no buyers.
How should the government price toxic assets? If the government overpays, current shareholders will be unjustly enriched at the expense of taxpayers. Rewarding reckless behavior would only encourage more of it. If the government underpays for assets, it will amount to an expropriation of private properties without just compensation, and make the banks' capital positions even weaker than they are now. There's another complicating factor, too: Since most bank deposits are government-guaranteed, the government has the ultimate responsibility to save failing banks. That means Washington must take over the failed bank before selling it off. The government will own the assets and sell them when private capital is brought in to recapitalize the bank.
How should the government price these assets? Mr. Geithner's plan suggests that the determination of the prices will be left to private investors. But what if the government is the seller? How does the government get it right? How do private investors get it right? It seems to be an impossible task, because currently there is simply no market for toxic assets, and if there is, the market will deeply discount them, either bankrupting the bank or costing taxpayers dearly. It is a major dilemma which needs to be resolved. But there is a proven way to solve the problem, and it should be used again.
During the latter part of 1998, the financial system of South Korea -- at that time, the 10th largest economy in the world -- was basically insolvent. Many banks failed as bad loans mounted. Capital flight reduced Korea's foreign exchange reserves so much that the country teetered on the verge of sovereign debt default. Korea had to request emergency funding from the International Monetary Fund, which, working closely with the U.S. Federal Reserve, eventually provided the country with a $58 billion rescue package.
The package came with strings attached, one of which was for the Korean government to sell off to foreign investors a clutch of failed and nationalized big banks including Korea First Bank. The Fund reasoned that the failure of Korea's banking system was due to a total lack of a "credit culture," as lending had typically been done on the basis of either government policies or collateral without much regard to the creditworthiness of the borrowers. Seoul thought foreign investors could help inculcate this culture into the banking system.
U.S.-based private equity firm Newbridge Capital was one of the only two bidders -- among more than 40 invited -- to attend the government-mandated auctions. I represented Newbridge at these meetings. After weeks of negotiations, we reached a preliminary agreement with the Korean government to give us the exclusive right to acquire Korea First Bank. The key part of the deal was that all the assets be priced at fair market value. The memorandum of understanding specifically called for all assets to be "marked to market" on a loan-by-loan basis, after which Newbridge and the government would jointly invest into the bank to recapitalize it.
"Mark to market" accounting, however, turned out to be completely inoperative in a financial crisis because then, as now, there was no market for bad loans. Sellers thought that assets would be worth more when the economy eventually recovered. Buyers worried they might be worth less if the economy continued to deteriorate. Both were right because there was a significant probability for either to happen, but their divergent expectations made it impossible for them to agree to the right price.
Then the parties discovered a simple methodology that resolved the dilemma -- and could resolve America's dilemma, too.
Since the market was illiquid, we realized that it was impossible to determine the "fair value" in the near term. We thus agreed to a so-called future "buy or sell" arrangement. Over the following three years, on the anniversary of our agreement, the bank would name the price for any existing loan on its books, and the government would have the option to "buy" or "sell" that loan at that price.
The goal was for the government to minimize the amount of money it would have to inject to make up the difference between the market and face values of bad loans, and for us not to have to bear the losses from the bad loans we had inherited when we bought the failed bank from the government. This arrangement gave us the time to work out or to improve the value of these loans, and perhaps for the loan value to recover over time. If it didn't fully recover, and on one of the anniversaries we valued a problem loan at 70 cents on the dollar and the government agreed, we would receive an injection of 30 cents to make us whole. But if the government thought we were lowballing it, the government could buy the loan from us at full face value -- $1 -- and sell it to other investors at a higher price, say 80 cents. This would leave taxpayers with a loss of only 20 cents, as opposed to 30.
The beauty of this methodology is severalfold. First, the government did not have to sell bank assets to private investors at deeply distressed value in the depth of a financial crisis -- a move which would have incurred huge losses for taxpayers. Over time, as the economy recovers, the loan value is likely to improve.
Second, the bank was no longer crippled by the burden of bad assets because it knew they were ultimately protected by the government. The new investors could concentrate on fixing the operations of the bank and making new loans.
Third, the plan removed any incentive for the privatized bank to cheat the government. To a bank, an interest-yielding asset is more valuable than cash. Therefore a bank would want to hold on to an asset, and more importantly to a customer, as long as the loan is safe. In our buy-sell arrangement, if the bank mistakenly underpriced a loan or tried to lowball its value, the government would buy it with cash and the bank would lose the loan and the customer. If the bank overpriced the asset, the bank would risk losses as it would get stuck with a loan for less than its book value. Therefore, the bank was incentivized to work out the loan to the best of its abilities and to price it as accurately as possible.
This methodology worked so well for the Korean government that, three years later, after the program ended, the government had spent a fraction of its original budget to rescue the bank. Under the new owners, many of the nonperforming loans were worked out and recovered, along with the recovery of the Korean economy.
In retrospect, the methodology was the best deal for taxpayers. It did not give investors as much gain as government-assisted bank deals elsewhere at that time, which allowed new investors to buy assets at substantially marked down values and capture significant windfall gains when the market and asset value recovered. We earned our upside from revitalizing and building up the bank, not from gains on legacy assets at taxpayer expense. Both the Korean government and Newbridge eventually realized many times their investments when the banks recovered and were sold off five years later.
Like Korea a decade ago, the U.S. government is left with little choice but to nationalize insolvent banks. Mr. Geithner now needs to flesh out the methodology through which he's going to relieve these banks of their bad loans. There is no lack of capital in America today, or in the world beyond it. Mr. Geithner can make it flow again, if he only looks to Seoul's example for how to do it.
Mr. Shan is a partner at TPG Capital. The views expressed in this article are strictly his own.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
PPI: Asia Spends More on Research than Europe
Asia Spends More on Research than Europe
Progressive Policy Institute, January 21, 2009
The Numbers:
Spending on scientific research & development, 2007:
- North America: ~ $393 billion
- Europe: ~ $290 billion
- Asia: ~ $320 billion
What They Mean:
India's medieval mathematicians invented the zero and modern numerals around 500 AD. Engineers in neighboring China dreamed up paper, explosives, the compass, and movable type. But the 17th-century Scientific Revolution came not in Asia but the west, and so did the 20th century's medicines, airplanes, radio, computers, spacecraft, TV sets, and telecom gear.
Why? Albert Einstein, wondering about the issue in 1922, blamed Asia's high populations and low labor costs for slowing invention. ("In both India and China the low price of labor has stood in the way of the development of machinery.") A half-century later, British history-of-Chinese-science master Joseph Needham speculated that Europe had jumped ahead by inventing capitalism, which meant competition among businesses for customers and therefore innovation. The question remains interesting -- but only in an historical sense, because Asian science has roared back to life.
Asia's most sophisticated economies have been among the world's heaviest researchers for years. Japan's $130 billion in R&D spending amounted to 3.2 percent of Japanese GDP, far above the rich world's 2.1 percent average and topped only by Israel and Sweden. (The United States was at 2.7 percent, Australia 2.2 percent, Canada 2.0 percent, and Europe 1.7 percent.) Korea's $38 billion in research spending outstripped Britain's $35 billion, and made up 3.0 percent of GDP. Taiwan and Singapore are also well above the world's rich-country average.
Science is reviving in the two giants as well. Chinese research spending, relative to GDP, has doubled in a decade from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent. In dollar terms, China's $85 billion spending ranks third or fourth in the world (depending on exchange rates), roughly at par with Germany. India's science spending is about $24 billion and about 0.8 percent of GDP. And within the last three or four years -- likely for the first time in four centuries -- Asia's research spending topped Europe's. The United States still tops the world, at $370 billion to Asia's $320 billion and Europe's $290 billion ... but for how long?
Further Reading:
Is Asia inventing, or just spending? In 1980, according to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, European researchers filed twice as many U.S. patent applications as Asians. By 2007, Japan's 79,000 applications alone outnumbered the 69,000 from all European countries combined, and Asia's total nearly doubled Europe. Korea's 23,000 applications were barely behind Germany's second-place 23,600; Taiwan, with 18,500, was above both Britain and France. India and China still file fewer patents than the top-tier Asian technological economies and the big European states, but are rising fast. Chinese and Indian researchers accounted for 30 patent applications in 1980, 900 in 2000, and 5,300 in 2007. The PTO patent records: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.pdf
Science in Asia links:
Tokyo-based Asia Science and Technology Seminar trains young Asian scientists:http://www.jistec.or.jp/ASTS/asts_e.html
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh speaks to the Science Congress in Shillong on India's high-tech future:http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=46369
The Robotic Association of Japan insists that soft, weak, vulnerable humans have nothing to fear from its metallic, computerized and remorseless creations:http://www.rsj.or.jp/index_e.html
Korea's Ministry of Knowledge Economy (until last year the Min. of Commerce & Industry), perhaps missing the real threat, proposes an ethics charter meant to prevent human abuse of androids:http://www.korea.net/news/news/newsView.asp?part=100&serial_no=20080228018
China's Science and Technology Ministry:http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/
Taiwan's National Science Council announces bio-tech parks, cryptography, license-plate recognition, and more:http://web1.nsc.gov.tw/mp.aspx?mp=7 ASEAN's Science and Technology Network:http://www.astnet.org/
And San Diego's school system instructs America's youth on classical Chinese technology:
www.sdcoe.k12.ca.us/score/chinin/chinintg.htm
R&D around the world:
High end -- Israel is the world's most science-intensive economy, devoting 4.7 percent of GDP to R&D. Sweden is next at 3.7 percent, followed by Japan and Finland at 3.4 percent. South Korea ranks fifth 3.2 percent, with Switzerland sixth. Japan's commitment has risen from 2.0 percent in 1980, and 2.7 percent in the mid-1990s. America's 2.7 percent remains high on international rankings, but -- in contrast to Asian economies -- has not grown since the mid-1980s. American businesses spend heavily on R&D, and U.S. government investment in life sciences and medicine is high. The lag comes from low public funding for research on physics, aerospace, chemistry, and other hard sciences. The National Science Foundation has data on American research spending and other science matters over time:http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf08317/
And the OECD counts research totals by country for its members plus Argentina, China, Israel, the EU, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Romania, Russia, and Taiwan:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/44/41850733.pdf
Can do better -- The luminaries of European science would not be pleased. Galileo would blush to see Italy's low 1.1 percent of GDP; Archimedes would likewise fume to see Greece spending only 0.6 percent. Newton would be startled to learn that Korea spends more on research than Britain. (The U.K. government research budget is high, but British companies apparently do less research than some of their rivals.) Copernicus might feel worst of all, with Poland the only advanced country to have cut its R&D budgets in this decade. The highest research commitments are in Scandinavia and Germany. The European Science Agency:
http://sci.esa.int/science-e/www/area/index.cfm?fareaid=1
Developing world -- Latin America, the Middle East apart from Israel, Africa, and Southeast Asia are well behind East Asia as research powers. The World Bank's 2008 Development Indicators book finds the Latin average at 0.6 percent, led by Brazil's 0.9 percent. Tunisia is the Muslim world's most research-intensive state at 1.0 percent of GDP, followed by Malaysia, Morocco, and Turkey at 0.7 percent; Uganda's 0.8 percent and South Africa 0.9 percent are Africa's highest rates. Singapore tops Southeast Asia at a rich-world 2.3 percent, but larger ASEAN members could be doing more: the Philippines and Indonesia are at 0.1 percent, Thailand 0.3 percent and Vietnam 0.2 percent. Brazil's 0.9 percent is Latin America's highest rate, with Chile, Argentina, and Mexico next at 0.5 percent.
Progressive Policy Institute, January 21, 2009
The Numbers:
Spending on scientific research & development, 2007:
- North America: ~ $393 billion
- Europe: ~ $290 billion
- Asia: ~ $320 billion
What They Mean:
India's medieval mathematicians invented the zero and modern numerals around 500 AD. Engineers in neighboring China dreamed up paper, explosives, the compass, and movable type. But the 17th-century Scientific Revolution came not in Asia but the west, and so did the 20th century's medicines, airplanes, radio, computers, spacecraft, TV sets, and telecom gear.
Why? Albert Einstein, wondering about the issue in 1922, blamed Asia's high populations and low labor costs for slowing invention. ("In both India and China the low price of labor has stood in the way of the development of machinery.") A half-century later, British history-of-Chinese-science master Joseph Needham speculated that Europe had jumped ahead by inventing capitalism, which meant competition among businesses for customers and therefore innovation. The question remains interesting -- but only in an historical sense, because Asian science has roared back to life.
Asia's most sophisticated economies have been among the world's heaviest researchers for years. Japan's $130 billion in R&D spending amounted to 3.2 percent of Japanese GDP, far above the rich world's 2.1 percent average and topped only by Israel and Sweden. (The United States was at 2.7 percent, Australia 2.2 percent, Canada 2.0 percent, and Europe 1.7 percent.) Korea's $38 billion in research spending outstripped Britain's $35 billion, and made up 3.0 percent of GDP. Taiwan and Singapore are also well above the world's rich-country average.
Science is reviving in the two giants as well. Chinese research spending, relative to GDP, has doubled in a decade from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent. In dollar terms, China's $85 billion spending ranks third or fourth in the world (depending on exchange rates), roughly at par with Germany. India's science spending is about $24 billion and about 0.8 percent of GDP. And within the last three or four years -- likely for the first time in four centuries -- Asia's research spending topped Europe's. The United States still tops the world, at $370 billion to Asia's $320 billion and Europe's $290 billion ... but for how long?
Further Reading:
Is Asia inventing, or just spending? In 1980, according to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, European researchers filed twice as many U.S. patent applications as Asians. By 2007, Japan's 79,000 applications alone outnumbered the 69,000 from all European countries combined, and Asia's total nearly doubled Europe. Korea's 23,000 applications were barely behind Germany's second-place 23,600; Taiwan, with 18,500, was above both Britain and France. India and China still file fewer patents than the top-tier Asian technological economies and the big European states, but are rising fast. Chinese and Indian researchers accounted for 30 patent applications in 1980, 900 in 2000, and 5,300 in 2007. The PTO patent records: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.pdf
Science in Asia links:
Tokyo-based Asia Science and Technology Seminar trains young Asian scientists:http://www.jistec.or.jp/ASTS/asts_e.html
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh speaks to the Science Congress in Shillong on India's high-tech future:http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=46369
The Robotic Association of Japan insists that soft, weak, vulnerable humans have nothing to fear from its metallic, computerized and remorseless creations:http://www.rsj.or.jp/index_e.html
Korea's Ministry of Knowledge Economy (until last year the Min. of Commerce & Industry), perhaps missing the real threat, proposes an ethics charter meant to prevent human abuse of androids:http://www.korea.net/news/news/newsView.asp?part=100&serial_no=20080228018
China's Science and Technology Ministry:http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/
Taiwan's National Science Council announces bio-tech parks, cryptography, license-plate recognition, and more:http://web1.nsc.gov.tw/mp.aspx?mp=7 ASEAN's Science and Technology Network:http://www.astnet.org/
And San Diego's school system instructs America's youth on classical Chinese technology:
www.sdcoe.k12.ca.us/score/chinin/chinintg.htm
R&D around the world:
High end -- Israel is the world's most science-intensive economy, devoting 4.7 percent of GDP to R&D. Sweden is next at 3.7 percent, followed by Japan and Finland at 3.4 percent. South Korea ranks fifth 3.2 percent, with Switzerland sixth. Japan's commitment has risen from 2.0 percent in 1980, and 2.7 percent in the mid-1990s. America's 2.7 percent remains high on international rankings, but -- in contrast to Asian economies -- has not grown since the mid-1980s. American businesses spend heavily on R&D, and U.S. government investment in life sciences and medicine is high. The lag comes from low public funding for research on physics, aerospace, chemistry, and other hard sciences. The National Science Foundation has data on American research spending and other science matters over time:http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf08317/
And the OECD counts research totals by country for its members plus Argentina, China, Israel, the EU, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Romania, Russia, and Taiwan:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/44/41850733.pdf
Can do better -- The luminaries of European science would not be pleased. Galileo would blush to see Italy's low 1.1 percent of GDP; Archimedes would likewise fume to see Greece spending only 0.6 percent. Newton would be startled to learn that Korea spends more on research than Britain. (The U.K. government research budget is high, but British companies apparently do less research than some of their rivals.) Copernicus might feel worst of all, with Poland the only advanced country to have cut its R&D budgets in this decade. The highest research commitments are in Scandinavia and Germany. The European Science Agency:
http://sci.esa.int/science-e/www/area/index.cfm?fareaid=1
Developing world -- Latin America, the Middle East apart from Israel, Africa, and Southeast Asia are well behind East Asia as research powers. The World Bank's 2008 Development Indicators book finds the Latin average at 0.6 percent, led by Brazil's 0.9 percent. Tunisia is the Muslim world's most research-intensive state at 1.0 percent of GDP, followed by Malaysia, Morocco, and Turkey at 0.7 percent; Uganda's 0.8 percent and South Africa 0.9 percent are Africa's highest rates. Singapore tops Southeast Asia at a rich-world 2.3 percent, but larger ASEAN members could be doing more: the Philippines and Indonesia are at 0.1 percent, Thailand 0.3 percent and Vietnam 0.2 percent. Brazil's 0.9 percent is Latin America's highest rate, with Chile, Argentina, and Mexico next at 0.5 percent.
Monday, January 19, 2009
Engaging North Korea Didn't Work for Japan
Engaging North Korea Didn't Work for Japan. By Melanie Kirkpatrick
WSJ, Jan 19, 2008
Excerpts:
In her confirmation hearing this week, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton said the Obama administration would use the six-party talks with China, South Korea, Japan and Russia to press North Korea to give up its nuclear program. With U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill reportedly staying on at State, it looks like déjà vu for U.S. policy.
Somewhere in Pyongyang, a little man in a boiler suit must be must be smiling -- and marveling at how often Washington falls for his negotiating legerdemain. Dictator Kim Jong Il's latest diplomatic coup came in October when he got the U.S. to take North Korea off the State Department's list of terror-sponsoring countries. What did Pyongyang do in return? The six-party talks collapsed last month when the North said it wouldn't abide by the verbal commitments it had made on verification of its nuclear program. Thus ended Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's attempt at engagement with the North.
Since Mrs. Clinton is promising to pursue much the same policy, perhaps it's a good moment to review an even longer-running negotiation with dictator Kim Jong Il that has also faltered: Japan's attempt to get information about its citizens who were abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. Most of the victims, including a 13-year-old girl, were grabbed by North Korean agents on the streets or beaches near their homes in western Japan, hidden in ships bound for North Korea, and pressed into service training the North's spies to pass as Japanese nationals. The North also kidnapped South Koreans; several hundred are still missing.
The fate of their countrymen is understandably an emotional issue for the Japanese. The names of the 12 people on the official list of the still-missing are well known throughout the country. Prime Minister Taro Aso is often spotted wearing a blue-ribbon pin in their honor. Virtually every political leader supports Japan's longstanding policy: No aid for North Korea unless it releases information on the abductees.
Kyoko Nakayama, special adviser to the prime minister on the abduction issue, was in the U.S. last week to gain support for Tokyo's stance. "The abductions are a state-sponsored crime," she says. "One of the keys to resolving the abduction issue is for the U.S. and Japan to work together." She uses the word "disappointed" -- Japanese understatement for "outraged" -- in reference to President Bush's decision to take North Korea off the terror list.
Tokyo first raised the issue of the abductions with Pyongyang in 1991, Ms. Nakayama says. "We had had our suspicions for years but we couldn't prove [them]." In 2002, when then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was in Pyongyang, "Kim Jong Il acknowledged they [the abductees] existed, and apologized." Kim's admission "opened a door and we could really start negotiating."
Later that year "we were able to get five people back." Of the remaining 12 kidnap victims on Japan's list, Ms. Nakayama says, "the North Koreans told us that eight had passed away and four had never entered the country." Pyongyang sent a funeral urn containing what it said were the remains of one: Megumi Yokota, the 13-year-old girl. DNA sampling showed the remains not to be Megumi's, Ms. Nakayama says. When Tokyo confronted Pyongyang on the deception, "first of all they said they wanted the bones back. . . . Then they said the DNA test had been trumped up." Since that time "there has been no progress."
Given that background, what is Ms. Nakayama's view of dealing with Pyongyang? "Our experience with negotiating with the North Koreans is that they denied [that they had] abducted citizens for years, and they were very comfortable doing so," she says. "Our experience with agreements with the North Koreans is that they'll make excuses for not fulfilling them."
If that sounds familiar, consider the North's denials and obfuscations on its uranium-enrichment program, which it trumpeted in 2002 and subsequently denied. In 2007, the Bush administration backed off its claims about the North's uranium program. Now, in a valedictory speech this month, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley warned of "increasing concerns" in the U.S. intelligence community that the North has "an ongoing, covert uranium-enrichment program."
[...]
Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.
WSJ, Jan 19, 2008
Excerpts:
In her confirmation hearing this week, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton said the Obama administration would use the six-party talks with China, South Korea, Japan and Russia to press North Korea to give up its nuclear program. With U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill reportedly staying on at State, it looks like déjà vu for U.S. policy.
Somewhere in Pyongyang, a little man in a boiler suit must be must be smiling -- and marveling at how often Washington falls for his negotiating legerdemain. Dictator Kim Jong Il's latest diplomatic coup came in October when he got the U.S. to take North Korea off the State Department's list of terror-sponsoring countries. What did Pyongyang do in return? The six-party talks collapsed last month when the North said it wouldn't abide by the verbal commitments it had made on verification of its nuclear program. Thus ended Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's attempt at engagement with the North.
Since Mrs. Clinton is promising to pursue much the same policy, perhaps it's a good moment to review an even longer-running negotiation with dictator Kim Jong Il that has also faltered: Japan's attempt to get information about its citizens who were abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. Most of the victims, including a 13-year-old girl, were grabbed by North Korean agents on the streets or beaches near their homes in western Japan, hidden in ships bound for North Korea, and pressed into service training the North's spies to pass as Japanese nationals. The North also kidnapped South Koreans; several hundred are still missing.
The fate of their countrymen is understandably an emotional issue for the Japanese. The names of the 12 people on the official list of the still-missing are well known throughout the country. Prime Minister Taro Aso is often spotted wearing a blue-ribbon pin in their honor. Virtually every political leader supports Japan's longstanding policy: No aid for North Korea unless it releases information on the abductees.
Kyoko Nakayama, special adviser to the prime minister on the abduction issue, was in the U.S. last week to gain support for Tokyo's stance. "The abductions are a state-sponsored crime," she says. "One of the keys to resolving the abduction issue is for the U.S. and Japan to work together." She uses the word "disappointed" -- Japanese understatement for "outraged" -- in reference to President Bush's decision to take North Korea off the terror list.
Tokyo first raised the issue of the abductions with Pyongyang in 1991, Ms. Nakayama says. "We had had our suspicions for years but we couldn't prove [them]." In 2002, when then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was in Pyongyang, "Kim Jong Il acknowledged they [the abductees] existed, and apologized." Kim's admission "opened a door and we could really start negotiating."
Later that year "we were able to get five people back." Of the remaining 12 kidnap victims on Japan's list, Ms. Nakayama says, "the North Koreans told us that eight had passed away and four had never entered the country." Pyongyang sent a funeral urn containing what it said were the remains of one: Megumi Yokota, the 13-year-old girl. DNA sampling showed the remains not to be Megumi's, Ms. Nakayama says. When Tokyo confronted Pyongyang on the deception, "first of all they said they wanted the bones back. . . . Then they said the DNA test had been trumped up." Since that time "there has been no progress."
Given that background, what is Ms. Nakayama's view of dealing with Pyongyang? "Our experience with negotiating with the North Koreans is that they denied [that they had] abducted citizens for years, and they were very comfortable doing so," she says. "Our experience with agreements with the North Koreans is that they'll make excuses for not fulfilling them."
If that sounds familiar, consider the North's denials and obfuscations on its uranium-enrichment program, which it trumpeted in 2002 and subsequently denied. In 2007, the Bush administration backed off its claims about the North's uranium program. Now, in a valedictory speech this month, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley warned of "increasing concerns" in the U.S. intelligence community that the North has "an ongoing, covert uranium-enrichment program."
[...]
Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.
Saturday, January 17, 2009
North Korea Says It Has ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium
North Korea Says It Has ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium, by Choe Sang-Hun
TNYT, January 18, 2009
SEOUL, South Korea — The North Korean military declared an “all-out confrontational posture” against South Korea on Saturday as an American scholar said he had been told by North Korean officials that the North had “weaponized” 30.8 kilograms of plutonium, enough for four to six nuclear bombs.
That claim would confirm American intelligence estimates, which suggest that the North has harvested the fuel for six or more bombs.
South Korea ordered its military to heighten vigilance along the heavily fortified border with North Korea, said a spokesman of the South Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
North Korea’s saber-rattling rhetoric against the South has increased in intensity since President Lee Myung-bak came to office in Seoul a year ago, vowing to take a tougher stance on North Korea, reversing 10 years of his liberal predecessors’ efforts to engage the North with economic aid. But what made the threat on Saturday unusual — and more worrisome to some South Korean analysts — was the way it was delivered: in a statement read on North Korean television by a uniformed spokesman for the North Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
“Strong military measures will follow from our revolutionary armed force,” the spokesman, a colonel, said, according to Yonhap, South Korea’s national news agency, which monitors North Korean broadcasts.
Usually the North Korean government issues written statements that are delivered by North Korean media; sometimes the statements are read by press officers, not by a uniformed member of the military.
The spokesman he warned of a clash along a disputed western sea border between the Koreas. The two navies fought skirmishes there in 1999 and 2002. It is always difficult to decipher the messages that North Korea’s reclusive government is trying to send with its often bombastic missives. In times of crucial bargaining, North Korea often tries to drive a wedge between Washington and South Korea to sow discord between the allies, and raises the stakes by increasing demands and issuing dire threats.
With President-elect Barack Obama about to take office in the United States and negotiations over the North’s nuclear program expected to resume, it is possible that the North is merely setting up its negotiating position. But analysts said it could also be an indication that North Korea was intending to hold on to its arms despite an agreement it signed with five countries, including the United States, in 2005, in which it committed to eventually giving up those weapons. The exact conditions under which it would do so were unclear.
Questions over the health of the country’s quixotic leader, Kim Jong-il, also complicate any attempts to understand the country, where few Westerners have access. In August, there were reports that Mr. Kim suffered a stroke, and since then rumors have swirled about who might succeed him.
The news about the possible weaponization of North Korea’s stores of plutonium were delivered Saturday by the American scholar, Selig S. Harrison, the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy, who was in Beijing after returning from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.
Mr. Harrison, said that when pressed, the North Korean officials did not explicitly say what “weaponization” of the plutonium meant, but that the implication was that North Korea had created nuclear bombs with the plutonium.
Mr. Harrison, a former journalist, often travels to North Korea to meet with senior officials there.
“They’ve raised the bar and said, ‘We are a nuclear weapons state and deal with us on that basis,’ ” said Mr. Harrison at a news conference in the St. Regis Hotel in Beijing.
Mr. Harrison acknowledged that North Korea could be bluffing in order to use the claim of having nuclear weapons as a negotiating tactic.
He added that all the officials he met with seemed eager to open discussions with the incoming Obama administration. “All the statements about Obama were very helpful, very respectful,” he said.
Thirty kilograms of plutonium, about 66 pounds, which would account for most of the 37 kilograms North Korea declared that it possessed to the United States last year, is enough for it to make four to six bombs, according to nuclear experts.
South Korea had no immediate reaction to Mr. Harrison’s report.
Earlier Saturday, North Korea also toughened its stance toward Washington, saying that reopening diplomatic ties would not be enough to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons. It said it would maintain its “status as a nuclear weapons state” as long as there was a nuclear threat from the United States.
“We can live without normalizing ties with the United States, but we cannot live without a nuclear deterrent,” a spokesman for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry told its official news agency, KCNA.
In the past, the North had said it would not dismantle the weapons until the United States changed what it termed its “hostile attitude.”
In the spokesman’s comments, and his similar statement last Tuesday, North Korea laid out its demands as it prepared for a new series of negotiations with Mr. Obama, who will be inaugurated on Tuesday.
Its stance posed the hard question to the new Obama administration of what it would take to remove North Korea’s nuclear weapons assets.
In its Tuesday statement, North Korea indicated that the removal of an American nuclear threat meant the removal of South Korea from the American nuclear umbrella, the introduction of a verification mechanism to ensure that no American atomic weapons are deployed in or pass through South Korea, and even simultaneous nuclear disarmament talks among “all nuclear states,” including itself.
Six-nation talks on ending North Korea’s nuclear programs, which include the United States, stalled in the last months of the Bush administration as the United States and North Korea bickered over how much nuclear inspection the North should accept.
Edward Wong contributed reporting from Beijing.
TNYT, January 18, 2009
SEOUL, South Korea — The North Korean military declared an “all-out confrontational posture” against South Korea on Saturday as an American scholar said he had been told by North Korean officials that the North had “weaponized” 30.8 kilograms of plutonium, enough for four to six nuclear bombs.
That claim would confirm American intelligence estimates, which suggest that the North has harvested the fuel for six or more bombs.
South Korea ordered its military to heighten vigilance along the heavily fortified border with North Korea, said a spokesman of the South Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
North Korea’s saber-rattling rhetoric against the South has increased in intensity since President Lee Myung-bak came to office in Seoul a year ago, vowing to take a tougher stance on North Korea, reversing 10 years of his liberal predecessors’ efforts to engage the North with economic aid. But what made the threat on Saturday unusual — and more worrisome to some South Korean analysts — was the way it was delivered: in a statement read on North Korean television by a uniformed spokesman for the North Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
“Strong military measures will follow from our revolutionary armed force,” the spokesman, a colonel, said, according to Yonhap, South Korea’s national news agency, which monitors North Korean broadcasts.
Usually the North Korean government issues written statements that are delivered by North Korean media; sometimes the statements are read by press officers, not by a uniformed member of the military.
The spokesman he warned of a clash along a disputed western sea border between the Koreas. The two navies fought skirmishes there in 1999 and 2002. It is always difficult to decipher the messages that North Korea’s reclusive government is trying to send with its often bombastic missives. In times of crucial bargaining, North Korea often tries to drive a wedge between Washington and South Korea to sow discord between the allies, and raises the stakes by increasing demands and issuing dire threats.
With President-elect Barack Obama about to take office in the United States and negotiations over the North’s nuclear program expected to resume, it is possible that the North is merely setting up its negotiating position. But analysts said it could also be an indication that North Korea was intending to hold on to its arms despite an agreement it signed with five countries, including the United States, in 2005, in which it committed to eventually giving up those weapons. The exact conditions under which it would do so were unclear.
Questions over the health of the country’s quixotic leader, Kim Jong-il, also complicate any attempts to understand the country, where few Westerners have access. In August, there were reports that Mr. Kim suffered a stroke, and since then rumors have swirled about who might succeed him.
The news about the possible weaponization of North Korea’s stores of plutonium were delivered Saturday by the American scholar, Selig S. Harrison, the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy, who was in Beijing after returning from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.
Mr. Harrison, said that when pressed, the North Korean officials did not explicitly say what “weaponization” of the plutonium meant, but that the implication was that North Korea had created nuclear bombs with the plutonium.
Mr. Harrison, a former journalist, often travels to North Korea to meet with senior officials there.
“They’ve raised the bar and said, ‘We are a nuclear weapons state and deal with us on that basis,’ ” said Mr. Harrison at a news conference in the St. Regis Hotel in Beijing.
Mr. Harrison acknowledged that North Korea could be bluffing in order to use the claim of having nuclear weapons as a negotiating tactic.
He added that all the officials he met with seemed eager to open discussions with the incoming Obama administration. “All the statements about Obama were very helpful, very respectful,” he said.
Thirty kilograms of plutonium, about 66 pounds, which would account for most of the 37 kilograms North Korea declared that it possessed to the United States last year, is enough for it to make four to six bombs, according to nuclear experts.
South Korea had no immediate reaction to Mr. Harrison’s report.
Earlier Saturday, North Korea also toughened its stance toward Washington, saying that reopening diplomatic ties would not be enough to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons. It said it would maintain its “status as a nuclear weapons state” as long as there was a nuclear threat from the United States.
“We can live without normalizing ties with the United States, but we cannot live without a nuclear deterrent,” a spokesman for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry told its official news agency, KCNA.
In the past, the North had said it would not dismantle the weapons until the United States changed what it termed its “hostile attitude.”
In the spokesman’s comments, and his similar statement last Tuesday, North Korea laid out its demands as it prepared for a new series of negotiations with Mr. Obama, who will be inaugurated on Tuesday.
Its stance posed the hard question to the new Obama administration of what it would take to remove North Korea’s nuclear weapons assets.
In its Tuesday statement, North Korea indicated that the removal of an American nuclear threat meant the removal of South Korea from the American nuclear umbrella, the introduction of a verification mechanism to ensure that no American atomic weapons are deployed in or pass through South Korea, and even simultaneous nuclear disarmament talks among “all nuclear states,” including itself.
Six-nation talks on ending North Korea’s nuclear programs, which include the United States, stalled in the last months of the Bush administration as the United States and North Korea bickered over how much nuclear inspection the North should accept.
Edward Wong contributed reporting from Beijing.
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
Securing U.S. Objectives in North Korea: A Memo to President-elect Obama
Securing U.S. Objectives in North Korea: A Memo to President-elect Obama. By Bruce Klingner and Walter Lohman
Heritage, January 6, 2009Special Report #37
I have no illusions about North Korea, and we must be firm and unyielding in our commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.
--Barack Obama, Chosun Ilbo, February 15, 2008[1]
President-elect Obama, during the campaign you stressed the need for "sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy" with North Korea in order to achieve "the complete and verifiable elimination of all of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, as well as its past proliferation activities, including with Syria."[2] When North Korea provided data on its nuclear weapons programs, you stated that:
[S]anctions are a critical part of our leverage to pressure North Korea to act. They should only be lifted based on performance. If the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we should move quickly to re-impose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions going forward.[3]
Yet, after National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley admitted that North Korea's data declaration "was not the complete and correct declaration that we had hoped,"[4] you did not advocate re-imposing any sanctions on North Korea.
You also stated that a strict verification protocol was an absolute prerequisite for removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, as well as for making further progress in the nuclear negotiations. You called for "a clear understanding that if North Korea fails to follow through there will be immediate consequences." Specifically, "If North Korea refuses to permit robust verification, we should lead all members of the Six Party talks in suspending energy assistance, re-imposing sanctions that have recently been waived, and considering new restrictions."[5]
It has become evident that the verification protocol has significant shortcomings and does not apply to Pyongyang's uranium-based weapons program or proliferation activities. North Korea declared on November 12 that no scientific sampling of Pyongyang's nuclear programs will be allowed, that inspections will be confined to the Yongbyon facility, and that divergence "even by one word, [would] lead inevitably to war."[6] Yet you have not altered your description of North Korea's removal from the terrorism list as a "modest step forward" and have not called for any slowdown in negotiations.
You have blamed the Bush Administration's initial hard-line policy for allowing "North Korea to expand its nuclear arsenal as it resumed reprocessing of plutonium and tested a nuclear device."[7] But this ignores North Korea's role in instigating the crisis. Pyongyang began violating its international denuclearization commitments in the benign threat environment of the 1990s during the administrations of U.S. President William J. Clinton and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. At the time, both presidents were intent on engaging North Korea and providing diplomatic and economic benefits in return for non-threatening behavior by Pyongyang.
During the past two years, the Bush Administration has engaged in the direct bilateral diplomacy with Pyongyang that you advocate, but North Korea's intransigence, noncompliance, and brinksmanship have continued. Nor--three years after Pyongyang agreed to do so--have diplomats yet begun the real negotiations to discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons. This strategy has resulted in the abandonment of important principles, including enforcement of international law and attaining sufficient verification measures.
North Korean denuclearization is a critically important goal, but how it is attained is equally important. Being excessively eager to compromise not only rewards abhorrent behavior, but also undermines the negotiating leverage that is necessary to get Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons. An engagement policy toward North Korea should be based on several key negotiating precepts:
Insist that North Korea fulfill its existing requirements. Pyongyang should provide full disclosure of its plutonium-based and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs before receiving the entirety of Phase Two benefits. Required information includes all nuclear production, weaponization, and test facilities; the number of nuclear weapons produced; and the export (proliferation) of nuclear technology, materials, and equipment to Syria, Iran, and any other countries. Until North Korea fully complies, the Six-Party-Talks nations should not provide all of the Phase Two benefits.
Implement a rigorous and intrusive verification mechanism. The U.S. should insist on verification requirements as called for under U.N. Resolution 1718; North Korea's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards, as Pyongyang promised to do at an early date in September 2005; and observance of the precedence of previous U.S. arms control treaties. The verification protocol should include short-notice challenge inspections of non-declared facilities for the duration of the agreement to redress any questions about North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.
Require more detailed follow-on joint statements. North Korea has used the vagaries of existing Six-Party-Talks agreements to exploit loopholes and defer full compliance. The U.S. should insist that follow-on agreements explicitly define the linkages between North Korean steps toward denuclearization and the economic and diplomatic benefits to be provided.
Use all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a coordinated, integrated strategy. While it is important to continue negotiations to seek a diplomatic resolution to the North Korean nuclear problem, the U.S. and its allies should simultaneously use outside pressure to influence North Korea's negotiating behavior.
Realize that talking is not progress. The U.S. should favor resolving issues rather than repeatedly lowering the bar simply to maintain the negotiating process. North Korea should not be treated differently from every other country in the world. You should insist that North Korea abide by international standards of behavior and not be allowed to carve out another "special status" within the NPT and IAEA Safeguards.
Define redlines and their consequences. The Bush Administration's abandonment of its stated resolve to impose costs on North Korea for proliferating nuclear technology to Syria undermined U.S. credibility and sent a dangerous signal to other potential proliferators.
Establish deadlines with consequences for failure to meet them. North Korea must not be allowed to drag out the Six-Party Talks indefinitely in order to achieve de facto international acceptance as a nuclear weapons state. Repeatedly deferring difficult issues in response to Pyongyang's intransigence is not an effective way to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
In addition to these heightened standards for negotiating with North Korea, the U.S. should deepen its relations with South Korea to retain its influence in the region and ensure that U.S. security interests are safeguarded. The first step should be to extend the current relationship from a primarily military one to one that includes bilateral economic ties. Government and independent studies overwhelmingly conclude that the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) will provide clear economic benefits to the United States, but it will also strengthen ties on the Korean peninsula and ensure that the U.S. maintains a strategic ally in dealing with North Korea.
Conclusion
You have stated the need for an aggressive policy toward North Korea and recognize the threat that it poses. But while denuclearization is critical, the measures used to achieve it are just as critical. You must pursue a policy that does not reward blatant disobedience and disregard for agreed-to measures and that does not compromise on something that is so fundamental to U.S. security.
Specifically, you should abide by strict negotiation standards and not reward North Korea when it breaks them. Additionally, you should deepen ties with South Korea, our key ally on the peninsula. The KORUS agreement will bolster this critically important alliance and continue to build the strategic relationship that is crucial to protecting U.S. security interests and ensuring continued U.S. influence in the region.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in, and Walter Lohman is Director of, the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
References
[1] "Obama Has Misgivings About Korea-US FTA," Chosun Ilbo, February 15, 2008.
[2] "Barack Obama and Joe Biden's Plan to Renew U.S. Leadership in Asia," at http://obama.3cdn.net/ef3d1c1c34cf996edf_s3w2mv24t.pdf (December 8, 2008).
[3] Jonathan Ellis, "McCain and Obama on North Korea," The New York Times, political blog, June 26, 2008, at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/mccain-and-obama-on-north-korea (December 8, 2008).
[4] Press release, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on the Upcoming United Nations General Assembly," The White House, September 20, 2008, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080920-2.html (December 8, 2008).
[5] "Candidate Statements on North Korea," RealClearPolitics, at http://realclearpolitics.blogs.time.com/2008/10/11/candidate_statements_on_north (December 8, 2008).
[6] Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea to Bar Taking of Nuclear Samples," International Herald Tribune, November 12, 2008.
[7] "Obama Has Misgivings About Korea-US FTA."
Heritage, January 6, 2009Special Report #37
I have no illusions about North Korea, and we must be firm and unyielding in our commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.
--Barack Obama, Chosun Ilbo, February 15, 2008[1]
President-elect Obama, during the campaign you stressed the need for "sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy" with North Korea in order to achieve "the complete and verifiable elimination of all of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, as well as its past proliferation activities, including with Syria."[2] When North Korea provided data on its nuclear weapons programs, you stated that:
[S]anctions are a critical part of our leverage to pressure North Korea to act. They should only be lifted based on performance. If the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we should move quickly to re-impose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions going forward.[3]
Yet, after National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley admitted that North Korea's data declaration "was not the complete and correct declaration that we had hoped,"[4] you did not advocate re-imposing any sanctions on North Korea.
You also stated that a strict verification protocol was an absolute prerequisite for removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, as well as for making further progress in the nuclear negotiations. You called for "a clear understanding that if North Korea fails to follow through there will be immediate consequences." Specifically, "If North Korea refuses to permit robust verification, we should lead all members of the Six Party talks in suspending energy assistance, re-imposing sanctions that have recently been waived, and considering new restrictions."[5]
It has become evident that the verification protocol has significant shortcomings and does not apply to Pyongyang's uranium-based weapons program or proliferation activities. North Korea declared on November 12 that no scientific sampling of Pyongyang's nuclear programs will be allowed, that inspections will be confined to the Yongbyon facility, and that divergence "even by one word, [would] lead inevitably to war."[6] Yet you have not altered your description of North Korea's removal from the terrorism list as a "modest step forward" and have not called for any slowdown in negotiations.
You have blamed the Bush Administration's initial hard-line policy for allowing "North Korea to expand its nuclear arsenal as it resumed reprocessing of plutonium and tested a nuclear device."[7] But this ignores North Korea's role in instigating the crisis. Pyongyang began violating its international denuclearization commitments in the benign threat environment of the 1990s during the administrations of U.S. President William J. Clinton and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. At the time, both presidents were intent on engaging North Korea and providing diplomatic and economic benefits in return for non-threatening behavior by Pyongyang.
During the past two years, the Bush Administration has engaged in the direct bilateral diplomacy with Pyongyang that you advocate, but North Korea's intransigence, noncompliance, and brinksmanship have continued. Nor--three years after Pyongyang agreed to do so--have diplomats yet begun the real negotiations to discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons. This strategy has resulted in the abandonment of important principles, including enforcement of international law and attaining sufficient verification measures.
North Korean denuclearization is a critically important goal, but how it is attained is equally important. Being excessively eager to compromise not only rewards abhorrent behavior, but also undermines the negotiating leverage that is necessary to get Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons. An engagement policy toward North Korea should be based on several key negotiating precepts:
Insist that North Korea fulfill its existing requirements. Pyongyang should provide full disclosure of its plutonium-based and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs before receiving the entirety of Phase Two benefits. Required information includes all nuclear production, weaponization, and test facilities; the number of nuclear weapons produced; and the export (proliferation) of nuclear technology, materials, and equipment to Syria, Iran, and any other countries. Until North Korea fully complies, the Six-Party-Talks nations should not provide all of the Phase Two benefits.
Implement a rigorous and intrusive verification mechanism. The U.S. should insist on verification requirements as called for under U.N. Resolution 1718; North Korea's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards, as Pyongyang promised to do at an early date in September 2005; and observance of the precedence of previous U.S. arms control treaties. The verification protocol should include short-notice challenge inspections of non-declared facilities for the duration of the agreement to redress any questions about North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.
Require more detailed follow-on joint statements. North Korea has used the vagaries of existing Six-Party-Talks agreements to exploit loopholes and defer full compliance. The U.S. should insist that follow-on agreements explicitly define the linkages between North Korean steps toward denuclearization and the economic and diplomatic benefits to be provided.
Use all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a coordinated, integrated strategy. While it is important to continue negotiations to seek a diplomatic resolution to the North Korean nuclear problem, the U.S. and its allies should simultaneously use outside pressure to influence North Korea's negotiating behavior.
Realize that talking is not progress. The U.S. should favor resolving issues rather than repeatedly lowering the bar simply to maintain the negotiating process. North Korea should not be treated differently from every other country in the world. You should insist that North Korea abide by international standards of behavior and not be allowed to carve out another "special status" within the NPT and IAEA Safeguards.
Define redlines and their consequences. The Bush Administration's abandonment of its stated resolve to impose costs on North Korea for proliferating nuclear technology to Syria undermined U.S. credibility and sent a dangerous signal to other potential proliferators.
Establish deadlines with consequences for failure to meet them. North Korea must not be allowed to drag out the Six-Party Talks indefinitely in order to achieve de facto international acceptance as a nuclear weapons state. Repeatedly deferring difficult issues in response to Pyongyang's intransigence is not an effective way to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
In addition to these heightened standards for negotiating with North Korea, the U.S. should deepen its relations with South Korea to retain its influence in the region and ensure that U.S. security interests are safeguarded. The first step should be to extend the current relationship from a primarily military one to one that includes bilateral economic ties. Government and independent studies overwhelmingly conclude that the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) will provide clear economic benefits to the United States, but it will also strengthen ties on the Korean peninsula and ensure that the U.S. maintains a strategic ally in dealing with North Korea.
Conclusion
You have stated the need for an aggressive policy toward North Korea and recognize the threat that it poses. But while denuclearization is critical, the measures used to achieve it are just as critical. You must pursue a policy that does not reward blatant disobedience and disregard for agreed-to measures and that does not compromise on something that is so fundamental to U.S. security.
Specifically, you should abide by strict negotiation standards and not reward North Korea when it breaks them. Additionally, you should deepen ties with South Korea, our key ally on the peninsula. The KORUS agreement will bolster this critically important alliance and continue to build the strategic relationship that is crucial to protecting U.S. security interests and ensuring continued U.S. influence in the region.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in, and Walter Lohman is Director of, the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
References
[1] "Obama Has Misgivings About Korea-US FTA," Chosun Ilbo, February 15, 2008.
[2] "Barack Obama and Joe Biden's Plan to Renew U.S. Leadership in Asia," at http://obama.3cdn.net/ef3d1c1c34cf996edf_s3w2mv24t.pdf (December 8, 2008).
[3] Jonathan Ellis, "McCain and Obama on North Korea," The New York Times, political blog, June 26, 2008, at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/mccain-and-obama-on-north-korea (December 8, 2008).
[4] Press release, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on the Upcoming United Nations General Assembly," The White House, September 20, 2008, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080920-2.html (December 8, 2008).
[5] "Candidate Statements on North Korea," RealClearPolitics, at http://realclearpolitics.blogs.time.com/2008/10/11/candidate_statements_on_north (December 8, 2008).
[6] Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea to Bar Taking of Nuclear Samples," International Herald Tribune, November 12, 2008.
[7] "Obama Has Misgivings About Korea-US FTA."
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