Tokyo Rising, by Ted Galen Carpenter
Cato, April 7, 2010
One very clear fact emerged from my recent meetings with officials and foreign-policy scholars in Australia and New Zealand: even though both countries have major economic stakes in their relationship with China, they are exceedingly nervous about the possibility of Chinese hegemony in East Asia. Since most of them also are reaching the (reluctant) conclusion that the United States will not be able to afford indefinitely the financial burden and military requirements of remaining the region's security stabilizer, a role the United States has played since the end of World War II, they are looking for other options to blunt China's emerging preeminence.
Increasingly, policy makers and opinion leaders in Australia and New Zealand seem receptive to the prospect of both India and Japan playing more active security roles in the region, thereby acting as strategic counterweights to China. That is a major shift in sentiment from just a decade or two ago. The notion of India as a relevant security player is a recent phenomenon, but there did not appear to be any opposition in Canberra or Wellington to the Indian navy flexing its muscles in the Strait of Malacca in the past few years. That favorable reaction was apparent even in vehemently anti-nuclear New Zealand, despite India's decision in the late 1990s to deploy a nuclear arsenal, which dealt a severe blow to the global nonproliferation cause.
Even more surprising is the reversal of attitudes regarding a more robust military role for Japan. When I was in Australia in the 1990s, scholars and officials were adamantly opposed to any move by Tokyo away from the tepid military posture it had adopted after World War II. The belief that Japan should play only a severely constrained security role—under Washington's strict supervision—was the conventional wisdom not only in Australia, but throughout East Asia.
And U.S. officials shared that view. Major General Henry Stackpole, onetime commander of U.S. Marine forces in Japan, stated bluntly that "no one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan." He added that the United States was "the cap in the bottle" preventing that outcome. The initial draft of the Pentagon's policy planning guidance document, leaked to the New York Times, warned that a larger Japanese security role in East Asia would be destabilizing, and that Washington ought to discourage such a development.
U.S. policy makers appear to have warmed gradually to a more robust Japanese military stance. That was certainly true during the administration of George W. Bush, when officials clearly sought to make the alliance with Japan a far more equal partnership.
Yet some distrust of Japanese intentions lingers, both in the United States and portions of East Asia. The wariness about Japan as a more active military player is strongest in such countries as the Philippines and South Korea. The former endured a brutal occupation during World War II, and the latter still bears severe emotional scars from Tokyo's heavy-handed behavior as Korea's colonial master.
Even in those countries, though, the intensity of the opposition to Japan becoming a normal great power and playing a more serious security role is waning. And in the rest of the region, the response to that prospect ranges from receptive to enthusiastic. That emerging realism is encouraging. The alternative to Japan and India (and possibly other actors, such as Indonesia and Vietnam) becoming strategic counterweights to a rising China ought to be worrisome. Given America's gradually waning hegemony, a failure by other major countries to step up and be significant security players would lead to a troubling power vacuum in the region. A vacuum that China would be well-positioned to fill.
If China does not succumb to internal weaknesses (which are not trivial), it will almost certainly be the most prominent power in East Asia in the coming decades, gradually displacing the United States. But there is a big difference between being the leading power and being a hegemon. The latter is a result that Americans cannot welcome.
The emergence of a multipolar power system in East Asia is the best outcome both for the United States and China's neighbors. It is gratifying that nations in the region seem to be reaching that conclusion. Australia and New Zealand may be a little ahead of the curve in that process, but the attitude in those countries about the desirability of Japan and India adopting more active security roles is not unique. Washington should embrace a similar view.
Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America (2008).
Showing posts with label south asia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label south asia. Show all posts
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Thursday, January 7, 2010
Wahid and the Voice of Moderate Islam - Indonesia's first democratic president espoused a philosophy of religious and ethnic tolerance
Wahid and the Voice of Moderate Islam. By Paul Wolfowitz
Indonesia's first democratic president espoused a philosophy of religious and ethnic tolerance.
WSJ, Jan 07, 2010
Abdurrahman Wahid, who died last week at the age of 69, was the first democratically elected president of Indonesia, the world's fourth largest country and third largest democracy. It has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world. Although he was forced from office after less than two years, he nevertheless helped to set the course of what has been a remarkably successful transition to democracy.
Even more important than his role as a politician, Wahid was the spiritual leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, and probably in the world, with 40 million members. He was a product of Indonesia's traditionally tolerant and humane practice of Islam, and he took that tradition to a higher level and shaped it in ways that will last long after his death.
Wahid recognized that the world's Muslim community is engaged in what he called in a 2005 op-ed for this newspaper "nothing less than a global struggle for the soul of Islam" and he understood the danger for Indonesia, for Islam and for all of us from this "crisis of misunderstanding that threatens to engulf our entire world."
Wahid was one of the most impressive leaders I have known. Although his formal higher education was limited to Islamic studies in Cairo and Arabic literature in Baghdad, his breadth of knowledge was astounding. With a voracious appetite for knowledge and a remarkably retentive memory, he seemed to know all of the important Islamic religious and philosophical texts. He also loved reading a wide range of Western literature (including most of William Faulkner's novels) as well as Arabic poetry. He enjoyed French movies, and cinema in general, and could identify the conductor of a Beethoven symphony simply by listening to a recording. He was an avid soccer fan and once compared the different styles of two German soccer teams to illustrate two alternative strategies for economic development. He loved jokes, particularly political ones. During Suharto's autocratic rule he published a collection of Soviet political humor in Indonesian, with the obvious purpose of teaching his own people how to laugh at their rulers.
Despite all that learning, Wahid had a common touch that enabled him to express his thoughts in down-to-earth language. He thus gained broad legitimacy for a moderate and tolerant vision. He could speak to young Indonesians, grappling with the relationship between religion and science by explaining to them the thoughts of a medieval Arab philosopher like Ibn Rushd (known to Christian philosophers as Averroes). And he was all the more effective because he himself had grappled with controversial ideas.
Wahid had been somewhat attracted in his youth by the writings of Said Qutb and Hasan al Banna, the founders of the Muslim brotherhood, but his deep humanism led him to reject them. When I visited him recently he told me of a long-ago visit to a mosque in Morocco where an Arabic translation of Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics" was on display. Seeing that book had brought tears to his eyes and Wahid explained: "If I hadn't read the 'Nichomachean Ethics' as a young man, I might have joined the Muslim brotherhood."
No doubt, what had so impressed Wahid was that Aristotle could arrive at deep truths about matters of right and wrong without the aid of religion, based simply on the belief that "the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason" (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I). But his tears must have reflected the thought of how close he had come to accepting a cramped and intolerant view of life and humanity.
Throughout his public career, three ideas were central to Wahid's thinking. First was that true belief required religious freedom. "The essence of Islam," he once wrote, is "encapsulated" in the words of the Quran, "For you, your religion; for me, my religion." Indonesia, he believed, needs "to develop a full religious tolerance based on freedom of faith." Second was his belief that the fundamental requirement for democracy—or any form of just government—is equal treatment for all citizens before the law. Third, that respect for minorities is essential for social stability and national unity, particularly for Indonesia with its extraordinary diversity.
Throughout his career Wahid spoke up forcefully for people with unpopular ideas—even ones he disagreed with—and for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. He was admired by the Christian and Chinese minorities for his willingness to do so. One of his first acts as president was to participate in prayers at a Hindu temple in Bali where he had earlier spent several months studying Hindu philosophy. Later he removed a number of restrictions on ethnic Chinese and made Chinese New Year an optional national holiday.
Even after leaving office, Wahid's role as a defender of religious freedom was extremely important. Indonesian voters have rejected extremist politics at the polls—and the leadership of the current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono deserves much credit for that. Nevertheless, extremist views and even violent extremism too often go unchallenged. A recent report from The Wahid Insitute (which he founded in 2004) notes that a minority with extremist views, now in control of the Indonesian Ulama Council, has issued religious rulings against "deviant" groups. An even smaller minority that espouses violence, particularly the Islamic Defender Front, has attacked Christian churches and the mosques of the small Muslim Ahmadiyah sect.
Wahid was one of the few prominent Indonesians to defend the rights of the Ahmadiyah or to speak out forcefully against the Islamic Defender Front. Doing so takes courage. But he was always courageous, whether in defying President Suharto at the height of his power or in his personal struggle against encroaching blindness and failing health.
Although optimistic that "true Islam" will prevail, as he wrote in his 2005 op-ed, Wahid did not underestimate the dangers facing the world from an "extreme . . . ideology in the minds of fanatics" who "pervert Islam into a dogma of intolerance, hatred and bloodshed" and who justify their brutality by declaring "Islam is above everything else." This fundamentalist ideology, he said, "has become a well-financed, multifaceted global movement that operates like a juggernaut in much of the developing world." What begins as a misunderstanding "of Islam by Muslims themselves" becomes a "crisis of misunderstanding" that afflicts "Muslims and non-Muslims alike, with tragic consequences."
No one who knew Abdurrahman Wahid can believe that those fanatics who preach hatred and violence speak for the world's Muslims. Even though the extremist ideology represents a distinct minority of Muslims, it is well-financed and well-organized. To confront it, Muslim leaders like himself need, as he wrote in 2005, "the understanding and support of like-minded individuals, organizations and governments throughout the world . . . to offer a compelling alternate vision of Islam, one that banishes the fanatical ideology of hatred to the darkness from which it emerged."
That support includes material support, but it also includes the moral support that comes from international recognition and attention for Muslim leaders who speak out with the courage that Wahid did.
When Wahid was only 12 he was riding in a car with his father, Wahid Hasyim, himself a prominent Muslim leader at the time of Indonesian independence, when the car slid off a mountain road and his father suffered fatal injuries. What Wahid most remembered from that tragic event was the sight of thousands of people lining the roads as his father's casket traveled the 80 kilometers from Surabaya to his burial at Jombang. Overwhelmed by the affection people had for his father, he wondered "What could one man do that the people would love him so?"
As the funeral procession for Wahid himself traveled the same route on the last day of 2009, thousands of mourners, deeply moved, again lined the road. What had he done that Indonesians so loved him? Perhaps the question is answered by the words that he asked to have on his tomb: "Here lies a humanist." That he was and a great one as well. No one can replace him, but hopefully he has inspired others to follow in his path.
Mr. Wolfowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and assistant secretary of state for East Asia, is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Indonesia's first democratic president espoused a philosophy of religious and ethnic tolerance.
WSJ, Jan 07, 2010
Abdurrahman Wahid, who died last week at the age of 69, was the first democratically elected president of Indonesia, the world's fourth largest country and third largest democracy. It has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world. Although he was forced from office after less than two years, he nevertheless helped to set the course of what has been a remarkably successful transition to democracy.
Even more important than his role as a politician, Wahid was the spiritual leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, and probably in the world, with 40 million members. He was a product of Indonesia's traditionally tolerant and humane practice of Islam, and he took that tradition to a higher level and shaped it in ways that will last long after his death.
Wahid recognized that the world's Muslim community is engaged in what he called in a 2005 op-ed for this newspaper "nothing less than a global struggle for the soul of Islam" and he understood the danger for Indonesia, for Islam and for all of us from this "crisis of misunderstanding that threatens to engulf our entire world."
Wahid was one of the most impressive leaders I have known. Although his formal higher education was limited to Islamic studies in Cairo and Arabic literature in Baghdad, his breadth of knowledge was astounding. With a voracious appetite for knowledge and a remarkably retentive memory, he seemed to know all of the important Islamic religious and philosophical texts. He also loved reading a wide range of Western literature (including most of William Faulkner's novels) as well as Arabic poetry. He enjoyed French movies, and cinema in general, and could identify the conductor of a Beethoven symphony simply by listening to a recording. He was an avid soccer fan and once compared the different styles of two German soccer teams to illustrate two alternative strategies for economic development. He loved jokes, particularly political ones. During Suharto's autocratic rule he published a collection of Soviet political humor in Indonesian, with the obvious purpose of teaching his own people how to laugh at their rulers.
Despite all that learning, Wahid had a common touch that enabled him to express his thoughts in down-to-earth language. He thus gained broad legitimacy for a moderate and tolerant vision. He could speak to young Indonesians, grappling with the relationship between religion and science by explaining to them the thoughts of a medieval Arab philosopher like Ibn Rushd (known to Christian philosophers as Averroes). And he was all the more effective because he himself had grappled with controversial ideas.
Wahid had been somewhat attracted in his youth by the writings of Said Qutb and Hasan al Banna, the founders of the Muslim brotherhood, but his deep humanism led him to reject them. When I visited him recently he told me of a long-ago visit to a mosque in Morocco where an Arabic translation of Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics" was on display. Seeing that book had brought tears to his eyes and Wahid explained: "If I hadn't read the 'Nichomachean Ethics' as a young man, I might have joined the Muslim brotherhood."
No doubt, what had so impressed Wahid was that Aristotle could arrive at deep truths about matters of right and wrong without the aid of religion, based simply on the belief that "the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason" (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I). But his tears must have reflected the thought of how close he had come to accepting a cramped and intolerant view of life and humanity.
Throughout his public career, three ideas were central to Wahid's thinking. First was that true belief required religious freedom. "The essence of Islam," he once wrote, is "encapsulated" in the words of the Quran, "For you, your religion; for me, my religion." Indonesia, he believed, needs "to develop a full religious tolerance based on freedom of faith." Second was his belief that the fundamental requirement for democracy—or any form of just government—is equal treatment for all citizens before the law. Third, that respect for minorities is essential for social stability and national unity, particularly for Indonesia with its extraordinary diversity.
Throughout his career Wahid spoke up forcefully for people with unpopular ideas—even ones he disagreed with—and for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. He was admired by the Christian and Chinese minorities for his willingness to do so. One of his first acts as president was to participate in prayers at a Hindu temple in Bali where he had earlier spent several months studying Hindu philosophy. Later he removed a number of restrictions on ethnic Chinese and made Chinese New Year an optional national holiday.
Even after leaving office, Wahid's role as a defender of religious freedom was extremely important. Indonesian voters have rejected extremist politics at the polls—and the leadership of the current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono deserves much credit for that. Nevertheless, extremist views and even violent extremism too often go unchallenged. A recent report from The Wahid Insitute (which he founded in 2004) notes that a minority with extremist views, now in control of the Indonesian Ulama Council, has issued religious rulings against "deviant" groups. An even smaller minority that espouses violence, particularly the Islamic Defender Front, has attacked Christian churches and the mosques of the small Muslim Ahmadiyah sect.
Wahid was one of the few prominent Indonesians to defend the rights of the Ahmadiyah or to speak out forcefully against the Islamic Defender Front. Doing so takes courage. But he was always courageous, whether in defying President Suharto at the height of his power or in his personal struggle against encroaching blindness and failing health.
Although optimistic that "true Islam" will prevail, as he wrote in his 2005 op-ed, Wahid did not underestimate the dangers facing the world from an "extreme . . . ideology in the minds of fanatics" who "pervert Islam into a dogma of intolerance, hatred and bloodshed" and who justify their brutality by declaring "Islam is above everything else." This fundamentalist ideology, he said, "has become a well-financed, multifaceted global movement that operates like a juggernaut in much of the developing world." What begins as a misunderstanding "of Islam by Muslims themselves" becomes a "crisis of misunderstanding" that afflicts "Muslims and non-Muslims alike, with tragic consequences."
No one who knew Abdurrahman Wahid can believe that those fanatics who preach hatred and violence speak for the world's Muslims. Even though the extremist ideology represents a distinct minority of Muslims, it is well-financed and well-organized. To confront it, Muslim leaders like himself need, as he wrote in 2005, "the understanding and support of like-minded individuals, organizations and governments throughout the world . . . to offer a compelling alternate vision of Islam, one that banishes the fanatical ideology of hatred to the darkness from which it emerged."
That support includes material support, but it also includes the moral support that comes from international recognition and attention for Muslim leaders who speak out with the courage that Wahid did.
When Wahid was only 12 he was riding in a car with his father, Wahid Hasyim, himself a prominent Muslim leader at the time of Indonesian independence, when the car slid off a mountain road and his father suffered fatal injuries. What Wahid most remembered from that tragic event was the sight of thousands of people lining the roads as his father's casket traveled the 80 kilometers from Surabaya to his burial at Jombang. Overwhelmed by the affection people had for his father, he wondered "What could one man do that the people would love him so?"
As the funeral procession for Wahid himself traveled the same route on the last day of 2009, thousands of mourners, deeply moved, again lined the road. What had he done that Indonesians so loved him? Perhaps the question is answered by the words that he asked to have on his tomb: "Here lies a humanist." That he was and a great one as well. No one can replace him, but hopefully he has inspired others to follow in his path.
Mr. Wolfowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and assistant secretary of state for East Asia, is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
McNamara and the Liberals' War
McNamara and the Liberals' War. WSJ Editorial
He deserves better from his liberal critics, since his real misfortune was to be the architect of their failed visions.
WSJ, Jul 08, 2009
Robert McNamara died on Monday at age 93 like he lived most of the latter half of his life, scorned and derided by his former liberal allies for refusing to turn against the Vietnam War as early as they did. As the New York Times put it in a page-one obituary headline, McNamara was the "Architect of Futile War."
In historical fact, Vietnam was the liberals' war, begun by JFK, escalated by LBJ, and cheered on for years by giants of the American left before they turned against it. In his 1995 memoir, McNamara apologized for the war. But he probably sealed his reputation on the left by also quoting the New York Times and liberal antiwar reporter David Halberstam for having opposed U.S. withdrawal as late as 1965. "To be fair to Halberstam," McNamara wrote dryly, "the hawkish views he was expressing reflected the opinion of the majority of journalists at the time."
Like JFK and Averell Harriman, Halberstam also supported the 1963 coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, a misguided foray into Vietnamese politics that led to deeper U.S. involvement. Only later as the war dragged on did these liberals lose their nerve, and they never forgave McNamara for fighting on -- even years later after he finally agreed they were right.
As with Vietnam, American liberals also turned against the Iraq war after first supporting it. The crucial difference is that President Bush never lost his nerve. Despite the difficulties after the 2003 invasion and the terrible setbacks of 2006, he replaced his generals, sent more troops and embraced a new counterinsurgency strategy. The insurgency was defeated, and Mr. Bush left office with Iraq as a united, self-governing ally.
Despite the fall of Saigon in 1975, Vietnam was not a "futile" conflict. The U.S. effort bought time for Thailand and other nations in East and Southeast Asia to develop in relative peace. Their prosperity, in turn, showed the world the difference between the fruits of capitalism and the poverty of socialism. Like the Korean War, Vietnam needs to be understood as an honorable battle fought to a draw in America's longer and victorious Cold War.
McNamara was a patriot whose faith in rationalism and bureaucratic planning led him to overconfidence both in the war on poverty during his years at the World Bank and at the Pentagon during Vietnam. But he deserves better from his liberal critics, since his real misfortune was to be the architect of their failed visions.
He deserves better from his liberal critics, since his real misfortune was to be the architect of their failed visions.
WSJ, Jul 08, 2009
Robert McNamara died on Monday at age 93 like he lived most of the latter half of his life, scorned and derided by his former liberal allies for refusing to turn against the Vietnam War as early as they did. As the New York Times put it in a page-one obituary headline, McNamara was the "Architect of Futile War."
In historical fact, Vietnam was the liberals' war, begun by JFK, escalated by LBJ, and cheered on for years by giants of the American left before they turned against it. In his 1995 memoir, McNamara apologized for the war. But he probably sealed his reputation on the left by also quoting the New York Times and liberal antiwar reporter David Halberstam for having opposed U.S. withdrawal as late as 1965. "To be fair to Halberstam," McNamara wrote dryly, "the hawkish views he was expressing reflected the opinion of the majority of journalists at the time."
Like JFK and Averell Harriman, Halberstam also supported the 1963 coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, a misguided foray into Vietnamese politics that led to deeper U.S. involvement. Only later as the war dragged on did these liberals lose their nerve, and they never forgave McNamara for fighting on -- even years later after he finally agreed they were right.
As with Vietnam, American liberals also turned against the Iraq war after first supporting it. The crucial difference is that President Bush never lost his nerve. Despite the difficulties after the 2003 invasion and the terrible setbacks of 2006, he replaced his generals, sent more troops and embraced a new counterinsurgency strategy. The insurgency was defeated, and Mr. Bush left office with Iraq as a united, self-governing ally.
Despite the fall of Saigon in 1975, Vietnam was not a "futile" conflict. The U.S. effort bought time for Thailand and other nations in East and Southeast Asia to develop in relative peace. Their prosperity, in turn, showed the world the difference between the fruits of capitalism and the poverty of socialism. Like the Korean War, Vietnam needs to be understood as an honorable battle fought to a draw in America's longer and victorious Cold War.
McNamara was a patriot whose faith in rationalism and bureaucratic planning led him to overconfidence both in the war on poverty during his years at the World Bank and at the Pentagon during Vietnam. But he deserves better from his liberal critics, since his real misfortune was to be the architect of their failed visions.
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
WSJ Editorial Page: After negotiation failed, Sri Lanka pursued a military solution
A Terrorist Defeat. WSJ Editorial
After negotiation failed, Sri Lanka pursued a military solution.
WSJ, May 20, 2009
The war on terror scored a big victory this weekend with the Sri Lankan army's battlefield defeat of the terrorist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The event vindicates one of the major lessons of September 11: Most of the time, terrorists have to be defeated militarily before political accommodation is possible.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa announced that the army had routed the Tigers from their last redoubt in the island's Northern Province, killing Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and several hundred top militant leaders. Prabhakaran's apparent demise is the Sri Lankan equivalent to killing Osama bin Laden. It's much less likely the cadres will continue a low-level terrorist insurgency.
How Sri Lanka got here is worth recounting. The island's conflict started in 1983. After Sri Lanka's independence from Britain, the ethnic Sinhalese majority pursued many discriminatory policies against the Tamil minority: a Sinhala-only language policy, preferences for Sinhalese in university admissions and government hiring, and the exclusion of Tamils from the police.
The war quickly became more about Prabhakaran's determination to form an independent Tamil state under the exclusive control of his Marxist Tigers than about those Tamil grievances. The Tigers killed many moderate Tamil politicians who would have been willing to cooperate politically with Colombo.
Prabhakaran made extensive use of suicide bombers -- including a teenage girl who blew herself up to assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 -- and relied heavily on child soldiers. Sri Lanka's conflict has claimed 70,000 lives by most counts. It should have been clear early on that government negotiation would go nowhere with such a committed killer.
Mr. Rajapaksa, elected in 2005, put an end to the "peace process" with Prabhakaran and focused on winning the military fight. In 2007, with the help of a Tiger splinter group, the government subdued the Eastern Province; the first elections were held there last year. The fighting then moved to the North. It has not been cheap or easy. Military spending in the 2009 budget is $1.7 billion, 5% of GDP and 20% of the government's budget.
Colombo also learned lessons from its earlier failures. The military improved its training in counterinsurgency tactics, and Colombo invested the resources to enable the army to hold territory it won. Moves by the United States, Britain, Canada and other countries to freeze Tiger fundraising among the Tamil diaspora helped weaken the Tigers. Mr. Rajapaksa wisely ignored international calls for a ceasefire as he got closer to victory, including threats from the Obama Administration to block $1.9 billion in International Monetary Fund aid money.
The government now faces a potential humanitarian crisis in housing, feeding and clothing the more than 200,000 Tamil civilians who have fled the fighting. Sri Lanka has to more fully address the political grievances of moderate Tamils and ensure that there are economic opportunities for all Sri Lankans. After decades of socialism, several rounds of liberalization have since paved the way for 6% to 8% annual growth even amid a civil war.
As Colombo starts to grapple with those post-conflict problems, everyone else can take note: Thanks to a strategy of defeating the insurgency, Sri Lanka is now in a position to talk seriously about peace and economic growth. When negotiating with terrorists doesn't work, Plan B is defeating them.
After negotiation failed, Sri Lanka pursued a military solution.
WSJ, May 20, 2009
The war on terror scored a big victory this weekend with the Sri Lankan army's battlefield defeat of the terrorist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The event vindicates one of the major lessons of September 11: Most of the time, terrorists have to be defeated militarily before political accommodation is possible.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa announced that the army had routed the Tigers from their last redoubt in the island's Northern Province, killing Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and several hundred top militant leaders. Prabhakaran's apparent demise is the Sri Lankan equivalent to killing Osama bin Laden. It's much less likely the cadres will continue a low-level terrorist insurgency.
How Sri Lanka got here is worth recounting. The island's conflict started in 1983. After Sri Lanka's independence from Britain, the ethnic Sinhalese majority pursued many discriminatory policies against the Tamil minority: a Sinhala-only language policy, preferences for Sinhalese in university admissions and government hiring, and the exclusion of Tamils from the police.
The war quickly became more about Prabhakaran's determination to form an independent Tamil state under the exclusive control of his Marxist Tigers than about those Tamil grievances. The Tigers killed many moderate Tamil politicians who would have been willing to cooperate politically with Colombo.
Prabhakaran made extensive use of suicide bombers -- including a teenage girl who blew herself up to assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 -- and relied heavily on child soldiers. Sri Lanka's conflict has claimed 70,000 lives by most counts. It should have been clear early on that government negotiation would go nowhere with such a committed killer.
Mr. Rajapaksa, elected in 2005, put an end to the "peace process" with Prabhakaran and focused on winning the military fight. In 2007, with the help of a Tiger splinter group, the government subdued the Eastern Province; the first elections were held there last year. The fighting then moved to the North. It has not been cheap or easy. Military spending in the 2009 budget is $1.7 billion, 5% of GDP and 20% of the government's budget.
Colombo also learned lessons from its earlier failures. The military improved its training in counterinsurgency tactics, and Colombo invested the resources to enable the army to hold territory it won. Moves by the United States, Britain, Canada and other countries to freeze Tiger fundraising among the Tamil diaspora helped weaken the Tigers. Mr. Rajapaksa wisely ignored international calls for a ceasefire as he got closer to victory, including threats from the Obama Administration to block $1.9 billion in International Monetary Fund aid money.
The government now faces a potential humanitarian crisis in housing, feeding and clothing the more than 200,000 Tamil civilians who have fled the fighting. Sri Lanka has to more fully address the political grievances of moderate Tamils and ensure that there are economic opportunities for all Sri Lankans. After decades of socialism, several rounds of liberalization have since paved the way for 6% to 8% annual growth even amid a civil war.
As Colombo starts to grapple with those post-conflict problems, everyone else can take note: Thanks to a strategy of defeating the insurgency, Sri Lanka is now in a position to talk seriously about peace and economic growth. When negotiating with terrorists doesn't work, Plan B is defeating them.
Monday, May 11, 2009
Aung San Suu Kyi's Health
Aung San Suu Kyi's Health. By Ian Kelly
Department Spokesman, Office of the Spokesman
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, May 11, 2009
The United States Government is concerned about reports that Aung San Suu Kyi needs medical care and that Burmese authorities have detained her primary personal physician, Dr. Tin Myo Win. We urge the Burmese regime to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to receive immediate medical care from Dr. Tin Myo Win. We further call on the regime to permit Aung San Suu Kyi to meet with her personal attorney immediately.
As the anniversary of her detention approaches, we are reminded that the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi is unjust. We join with the calls of the international community and urge her immediate release, along with the release of all the more than 2100 political prisoners the Burmese regime currently holds.
PRN: 2009/442
Department Spokesman, Office of the Spokesman
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, May 11, 2009
The United States Government is concerned about reports that Aung San Suu Kyi needs medical care and that Burmese authorities have detained her primary personal physician, Dr. Tin Myo Win. We urge the Burmese regime to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to receive immediate medical care from Dr. Tin Myo Win. We further call on the regime to permit Aung San Suu Kyi to meet with her personal attorney immediately.
As the anniversary of her detention approaches, we are reminded that the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi is unjust. We join with the calls of the international community and urge her immediate release, along with the release of all the more than 2100 political prisoners the Burmese regime currently holds.
PRN: 2009/442
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Vietnam is buying six Russian Kilo class submarines
A Six Pack For Vietnam
Strategy Page, April 29, 2009
Vietnam is buying six Russian Kilo class submarines, for $300 million each. The Kilos weigh 2,300 tons (surface displacement), have six torpedo tubes and a crew of 57. They are quiet, and can travel about 700 kilometers under water at a quiet speed of about five kilometers an hour. Kilos carry 18 torpedoes or SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles (with a range of 300 kilometers and launched underwater from the torpedo tubes.) The combination of quietness and cruise missiles makes Kilo very dangerous to surface ships. North Korea, China and Iran have also bought Kilos. Considering the low price, it appears that the Vietnamese boats do not have AIP (Air Independent Propulsion), which allows non-nuclear boats to stay underwater for weeks at a time.
Strategy Page, April 29, 2009
Vietnam is buying six Russian Kilo class submarines, for $300 million each. The Kilos weigh 2,300 tons (surface displacement), have six torpedo tubes and a crew of 57. They are quiet, and can travel about 700 kilometers under water at a quiet speed of about five kilometers an hour. Kilos carry 18 torpedoes or SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles (with a range of 300 kilometers and launched underwater from the torpedo tubes.) The combination of quietness and cruise missiles makes Kilo very dangerous to surface ships. North Korea, China and Iran have also bought Kilos. Considering the low price, it appears that the Vietnamese boats do not have AIP (Air Independent Propulsion), which allows non-nuclear boats to stay underwater for weeks at a time.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
A weaker U.S. military will undermine stability in Asia
Coming to Asia's Defense. By Dan Blumenthal
A weaker U.S. military will undermine stability in the region.
WSJ, Apr 16, 2009
Former President George W. Bush's critics liked to say that during his term America was "getting its derriere kicked" by China. By this the critics presumably meant that the war in Iraq was a big distraction and that the United States was not attending enough Asian multilateral conferences and showing off its "soft power."
While the case was never overwhelming, it contained a kernel of truth. Beijing did gain regional influence at Washington's expense under former President Bush's watch. Now President Barack Obama is doing his predecessor one better: By imposing draconian defense cuts, heavily targeted on high-technology weapons systems and "power-projection" platforms essential to preserving U.S. military superiority in the Pacific, America may not have much of a derriere left in Asia at all.
Though "soft power" and "smart power" are all the rage in foreign-policy circles, Asia remains a dangerous place where good, old-fashioned "hard power" still matters. Certainly China and North Korea think so. Pyongyang poses a major conventional threat to South Korea and is inching closer to obtaining delivery systems for nuclear weapons that can pose a threat both to Japan and the continental U.S. Pyongyang's ballistic missile launch this month is only the latest sign of its growing threat to regional security.
China has built up its military across the board. Its submarine fleet has grown faster than any other in the world, it now has a large and lethal arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, and it has announced plans to deploy aircraft carriers. Worrying about China is far from a case of what Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls "next war-itis." The U.S. isn't in a war with China -- mercifully -- but there is a military competition. China has already changed the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region to the great consternation of America's key allies, such as Japan and India.
The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea and China. To the contrary, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region.
That is why the Obama administration's defense cuts are so detrimental to American strategy. The day after North Korea's long-range missile test, the U.S. announced deep cuts to missile defense and satellite programs. The Airborne Laser program that Mr. Obama axed is not only the most promising and immediate method for intercepting ballistic missiles in the early "boost" phase, shortly after launch, but also the first significant use of directed energy, a technology that may prove to be yet another revolutionary change in warfare sparked by American ingenuity.
There are further implications for Asia in the Obama defense cuts: The decision to reduce production of stealthy F-22s ends any hope that Japan can buy this air supremacy aircraft and add to its own deterrent. Nor can American dominance of the skies, historically the cornerstone of U.S. military superiority, be assured.
Also missing from the defense budget is any increase in the submarine or surface fleet. The Navy set a goal of a 313-ship fleet only a few years ago, up from around 280 today (roughly half of the total at the end of the Cold War), yet the Obama plan falls well short of that number.
Indeed, the yin of American cuts is almost perfectly reflected in the yang of China's skyrocketing investments in its own fleet. This will inevitably chip away at America's ability to track the Chinese deployment of submarines throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Just last month China demonstrated its newfound military muscle when its warships harassed an American surveillance vessel conducting lawful missions in the South China Sea.
Worse still, growing Chinese dominance of Pacific waterways will begin to affect maritime commerce and will soon become a factor in America's strategic calculus in the region. Chinese military attack boats and ballistic missile submarines that carry the means for nuclear attack cannot be easily dismissed if the U.S. is to maintain its status as keeper of the peace in the Pacific. And regional commanders, presented with the reality of this growing imbalance between the U.S. and China, will be forced to give up important regional missions, from presence and security cooperation in South East Asia to deterring aggression and defending allies in North Asia.
In announcing his defense cuts, Mr. Gates stated that he was making "a virtue of necessity," conceding that the Obama plan was an exercise in budget cutting to pay for favored domestic programs. Mr. Gates promises that he will explain his judgments about "balancing risks" sometime soon, but a risk assessment is no substitute for a strategy. If Mr. Obama wants to continue America's strategy of guaranteeing Asia's security, his defense plan will not give him the means.
In the near future, Mr. Obama will announce his policies toward China and North Korea and they will, in some way, continue those of his predecessors. He will undoubtedly want to "engage" China and "hedge" against a downturn in relations. He will pronounce a nuclear North Korea unacceptable to the U.S. The problem is that without the military power to back up America's diplomatic goals, these policy proclamations ring increasingly hollow. America's allies know it. And, even worse, China and North Korea know it. The question is, can Congress find the political will to stop these cuts and the blow they strike to U.S. objectives in Asia?
Mr. Blumenthal is a resident fellow in Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.
A weaker U.S. military will undermine stability in the region.
WSJ, Apr 16, 2009
Former President George W. Bush's critics liked to say that during his term America was "getting its derriere kicked" by China. By this the critics presumably meant that the war in Iraq was a big distraction and that the United States was not attending enough Asian multilateral conferences and showing off its "soft power."
While the case was never overwhelming, it contained a kernel of truth. Beijing did gain regional influence at Washington's expense under former President Bush's watch. Now President Barack Obama is doing his predecessor one better: By imposing draconian defense cuts, heavily targeted on high-technology weapons systems and "power-projection" platforms essential to preserving U.S. military superiority in the Pacific, America may not have much of a derriere left in Asia at all.
Though "soft power" and "smart power" are all the rage in foreign-policy circles, Asia remains a dangerous place where good, old-fashioned "hard power" still matters. Certainly China and North Korea think so. Pyongyang poses a major conventional threat to South Korea and is inching closer to obtaining delivery systems for nuclear weapons that can pose a threat both to Japan and the continental U.S. Pyongyang's ballistic missile launch this month is only the latest sign of its growing threat to regional security.
China has built up its military across the board. Its submarine fleet has grown faster than any other in the world, it now has a large and lethal arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, and it has announced plans to deploy aircraft carriers. Worrying about China is far from a case of what Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls "next war-itis." The U.S. isn't in a war with China -- mercifully -- but there is a military competition. China has already changed the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region to the great consternation of America's key allies, such as Japan and India.
The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea and China. To the contrary, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region.
That is why the Obama administration's defense cuts are so detrimental to American strategy. The day after North Korea's long-range missile test, the U.S. announced deep cuts to missile defense and satellite programs. The Airborne Laser program that Mr. Obama axed is not only the most promising and immediate method for intercepting ballistic missiles in the early "boost" phase, shortly after launch, but also the first significant use of directed energy, a technology that may prove to be yet another revolutionary change in warfare sparked by American ingenuity.
There are further implications for Asia in the Obama defense cuts: The decision to reduce production of stealthy F-22s ends any hope that Japan can buy this air supremacy aircraft and add to its own deterrent. Nor can American dominance of the skies, historically the cornerstone of U.S. military superiority, be assured.
Also missing from the defense budget is any increase in the submarine or surface fleet. The Navy set a goal of a 313-ship fleet only a few years ago, up from around 280 today (roughly half of the total at the end of the Cold War), yet the Obama plan falls well short of that number.
Indeed, the yin of American cuts is almost perfectly reflected in the yang of China's skyrocketing investments in its own fleet. This will inevitably chip away at America's ability to track the Chinese deployment of submarines throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Just last month China demonstrated its newfound military muscle when its warships harassed an American surveillance vessel conducting lawful missions in the South China Sea.
Worse still, growing Chinese dominance of Pacific waterways will begin to affect maritime commerce and will soon become a factor in America's strategic calculus in the region. Chinese military attack boats and ballistic missile submarines that carry the means for nuclear attack cannot be easily dismissed if the U.S. is to maintain its status as keeper of the peace in the Pacific. And regional commanders, presented with the reality of this growing imbalance between the U.S. and China, will be forced to give up important regional missions, from presence and security cooperation in South East Asia to deterring aggression and defending allies in North Asia.
In announcing his defense cuts, Mr. Gates stated that he was making "a virtue of necessity," conceding that the Obama plan was an exercise in budget cutting to pay for favored domestic programs. Mr. Gates promises that he will explain his judgments about "balancing risks" sometime soon, but a risk assessment is no substitute for a strategy. If Mr. Obama wants to continue America's strategy of guaranteeing Asia's security, his defense plan will not give him the means.
In the near future, Mr. Obama will announce his policies toward China and North Korea and they will, in some way, continue those of his predecessors. He will undoubtedly want to "engage" China and "hedge" against a downturn in relations. He will pronounce a nuclear North Korea unacceptable to the U.S. The problem is that without the military power to back up America's diplomatic goals, these policy proclamations ring increasingly hollow. America's allies know it. And, even worse, China and North Korea know it. The question is, can Congress find the political will to stop these cuts and the blow they strike to U.S. objectives in Asia?
Mr. Blumenthal is a resident fellow in Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.
Sunday, April 12, 2009
Thursday, April 9, 2009
US Diplomats Discuss Humanitarian Situation in Sri Lanka with Tamil Diaspora Groups
Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake Discuss Humanitarian Situation in Sri Lanka with Tamil Diaspora Groups
US State Dept, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC, April 8, 2009
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka Robert Blake met with several U.S.-based organizations representing members of the Tamil diaspora to discuss the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka.
Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake welcomed the opportunity to listen to the concerns and perspectives of the American Tamil diaspora community and to share the steps the United States is taking to address the humanitarian crisis. Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake emphasized U.S. concern about the plight of the civilians trapped in the “no fire zone” in northern Sri Lanka. They called on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to release the civilians. They reiterated that both the Tamil Tigers and the Government of Sri Lanka should stop firing into and from the no fire zone. They outlined the steps the U.S. has taken to support the civilians in the no fire zone.
The United States has provided $23.6 million towards International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regional activities, which includes ICRC activities in Sri Lanka, and $8.3 million to UNHCR for its South Asia appeal and its portion of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for Sri Lanka. In 2008, the United States also provided $5.9 million in non-food support to the UN and international NGOs operating in Sri Lanka.
Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake emphasized the urgent need for the Government of Sri Lanka to engage Tamils, including diaspora communities around the world, to find a political end of the conflict. Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake concluded by saying that they would like to continue the dialogue with the diaspora community and urged participants to continue to share feedback.
The discussion took place at the State Department with Ambassador Blake speaking through via a digital video conference at the U.S. Embassy in Colombo.
US State Dept, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC, April 8, 2009
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka Robert Blake met with several U.S.-based organizations representing members of the Tamil diaspora to discuss the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka.
Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake welcomed the opportunity to listen to the concerns and perspectives of the American Tamil diaspora community and to share the steps the United States is taking to address the humanitarian crisis. Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake emphasized U.S. concern about the plight of the civilians trapped in the “no fire zone” in northern Sri Lanka. They called on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to release the civilians. They reiterated that both the Tamil Tigers and the Government of Sri Lanka should stop firing into and from the no fire zone. They outlined the steps the U.S. has taken to support the civilians in the no fire zone.
The United States has provided $23.6 million towards International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regional activities, which includes ICRC activities in Sri Lanka, and $8.3 million to UNHCR for its South Asia appeal and its portion of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for Sri Lanka. In 2008, the United States also provided $5.9 million in non-food support to the UN and international NGOs operating in Sri Lanka.
Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake emphasized the urgent need for the Government of Sri Lanka to engage Tamils, including diaspora communities around the world, to find a political end of the conflict. Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Blake concluded by saying that they would like to continue the dialogue with the diaspora community and urged participants to continue to share feedback.
The discussion took place at the State Department with Ambassador Blake speaking through via a digital video conference at the U.S. Embassy in Colombo.
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
US State Dept Calls for Release of Political Prisoners in Burma
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Calls for Release of Political Prisoners in Burma. By Robert Wood, Acting Department Spokesman, Office of the Spokesman
US State Dept, Washington, DC, March 24, 2009
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued opinions today affirming that the continued detentions of Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung Myin, Ko Jimmy, Paw Oo Tun, and Mtay Win Aung are arbitrary and unjustified and that the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi is in contravention of Burma’s own law. The U.N. working group urged the Burmese government to release these individuals immediately.
We are disappointed that the regime continues to ignore the calls of the international community, including the UN Security Council, to release the more than 2,100 political prisoners immediately and unconditionally. We once again urge the Burmese authorities to release all political prisoners and initiate a genuine dialogue that can help move the country forward.
# # #
PRN: 2009/254
US State Dept, Washington, DC, March 24, 2009
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued opinions today affirming that the continued detentions of Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung Myin, Ko Jimmy, Paw Oo Tun, and Mtay Win Aung are arbitrary and unjustified and that the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi is in contravention of Burma’s own law. The U.N. working group urged the Burmese government to release these individuals immediately.
We are disappointed that the regime continues to ignore the calls of the international community, including the UN Security Council, to release the more than 2,100 political prisoners immediately and unconditionally. We once again urge the Burmese authorities to release all political prisoners and initiate a genuine dialogue that can help move the country forward.
# # #
PRN: 2009/254
Sunday, March 15, 2009
WaPo: Burma's bullies are always ready with fresh examples of ruthlessness. U.S. engagement must be conditional
Burma's Bullies. WaPo Editorial
They're always ready with fresh examples of ruthlessness. U.S. engagement must be conditional.
WaPo, Sunday, March 15, 2009; A18
THE CRUELEST dictatorships, like the most ruthless criminal gangs, always have understood that the most effective way to deter opposition is to go after the innocent loved ones of potential enemies. Thus it was not enough for Gen. Than Shwe and his junta in the Southeast Asian nation of Burma (also known as Myanmar) to sentence the Buddhist monk U Gambira to prison for 68 years last fall. It was learned last week that his brother, his brother-in-law and four cousins have been sentenced to five years in Burma's gloomy prisons. We hope that this small piece of data is fed into the review of U.S. policy on Burma that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has promised.
U Gambira, 28 at the time, was a leader of the nonviolent protests that broke out in Burma in September 2007. Thousands of Burmese followed him and other monks in peaceful protest against one of the world's most brutal dictatorships, despite understanding the possible consequences. U Gambira himself, in an op-ed published in The Post on Nov. 4, 2007 -- the day, as it happened, of his arrest after weeks on the run -- said that he understood the risks he was taking. "It matters little if my life or the lives of colleagues should be sacrificed on this journey," he wrote. "Others will fill our sandals, and more will join and follow." We can only guess whether he understood that even his uninvolved relatives would be victimized.
The United States has been frustrated in its efforts to promote democratization in Burma, a nation of about 50 million, so Ms. Clinton's policy review is well timed. No doubt her team will talk to academics and humanitarian aid workers who favor more engagement with the regime and the country. (Those who tout Burma's recent cooperation with relief agencies might, however, want to take note of another prison sentence handed down last week: 17 years to Min Thein Tun, who was arrested last July for distributing relief supplies to the victims of Cyclone Nargis in the Irrawaddy delta.) They should talk with officials in neighboring countries, who have been pursuing a policy of engagement for years; in addition to its impact on the wealth of the regime and its trading partners in countries such as Thailand and Singapore, U.S. officials might ask, what effect has this policy had?
It may be that the U.S. review can lead to smarter and more targeted sanctions, with better coordination among allies and neighbors. Certainly, we hope that Ms. Clinton will make clear to Burma's government that the United States could never ease sanctions without first conducting full and free consultations with Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's rightful ruler. Aung San Suu Kyi's party overwhelmingly won an election in 1990, but the junta ignored the results and has kept her isolated and under house arrest for most of the time since. Her release, and that of thousands of other political prisoners -- and their families -- remains essential.
They're always ready with fresh examples of ruthlessness. U.S. engagement must be conditional.
WaPo, Sunday, March 15, 2009; A18
THE CRUELEST dictatorships, like the most ruthless criminal gangs, always have understood that the most effective way to deter opposition is to go after the innocent loved ones of potential enemies. Thus it was not enough for Gen. Than Shwe and his junta in the Southeast Asian nation of Burma (also known as Myanmar) to sentence the Buddhist monk U Gambira to prison for 68 years last fall. It was learned last week that his brother, his brother-in-law and four cousins have been sentenced to five years in Burma's gloomy prisons. We hope that this small piece of data is fed into the review of U.S. policy on Burma that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has promised.
U Gambira, 28 at the time, was a leader of the nonviolent protests that broke out in Burma in September 2007. Thousands of Burmese followed him and other monks in peaceful protest against one of the world's most brutal dictatorships, despite understanding the possible consequences. U Gambira himself, in an op-ed published in The Post on Nov. 4, 2007 -- the day, as it happened, of his arrest after weeks on the run -- said that he understood the risks he was taking. "It matters little if my life or the lives of colleagues should be sacrificed on this journey," he wrote. "Others will fill our sandals, and more will join and follow." We can only guess whether he understood that even his uninvolved relatives would be victimized.
The United States has been frustrated in its efforts to promote democratization in Burma, a nation of about 50 million, so Ms. Clinton's policy review is well timed. No doubt her team will talk to academics and humanitarian aid workers who favor more engagement with the regime and the country. (Those who tout Burma's recent cooperation with relief agencies might, however, want to take note of another prison sentence handed down last week: 17 years to Min Thein Tun, who was arrested last July for distributing relief supplies to the victims of Cyclone Nargis in the Irrawaddy delta.) They should talk with officials in neighboring countries, who have been pursuing a policy of engagement for years; in addition to its impact on the wealth of the regime and its trading partners in countries such as Thailand and Singapore, U.S. officials might ask, what effect has this policy had?
It may be that the U.S. review can lead to smarter and more targeted sanctions, with better coordination among allies and neighbors. Certainly, we hope that Ms. Clinton will make clear to Burma's government that the United States could never ease sanctions without first conducting full and free consultations with Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's rightful ruler. Aung San Suu Kyi's party overwhelmingly won an election in 1990, but the junta ignored the results and has kept her isolated and under house arrest for most of the time since. Her release, and that of thousands of other political prisoners -- and their families -- remains essential.
Monday, March 9, 2009
Bangladesh: Consequences of the BDR Mutiny
Consequences of the BDR Mutiny, by Arvind Gupta
IDSA, March 09, 2009
The mutiny by the troops of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) on 26 February 26 was extraordinarily brutal. The mutiny toll was about 81 with 72 still missing. Many of these were officers of the Bangladesh army. Three mass graves were discovered. Many bodies were thrown into the sewer pipelines. Many of those killed were stripped, mutilated, bayoneted and shot. The Director General of the BDR, Major General Shakil Ahmed was killed in cold blood. Even his wife was not spared. Her dead body was discovered in one of the mass graves. The whole nation has been numbed by the sheer scale of brutality of the mutiny which has been condemned internationally.
How could the mutineers indulge in such senseless killing over matters of pay and allowances and conditions of service? In brutality, the present mutiny compares with the 1975 murder of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman by some army officers.
The mutiny which was totally unexpected came at a time when the newly elected government, enjoying overwhelming majority in the parliament, was getting ready for the task of governance. Was the mutiny aimed at destabilising the government? Could the fundamentalist elements have been behind the rebellion?
The Prime Minister herself hinted at the possibility of a conspiracy. Several op-ed pieces in Bangladeshi media also spoke in a similar vein. There was nothing spontaneous about the mutiny. A spontaneous shoot-out would not kill so many people in so brutal a manner. A few of the suspected mutineers have been arrested. Only a thorough investigation would reveal the truth but there is growing suspicion that the incident may have been well planned and coordinated. If so, who were the perpetrators? What was their motive? Who was behind them? Was there an intelligence failure? Was DG, BDR the real target or someone else? Who were the real targets? These are some of the troubling questions for which answers will have to be found to set speculation to rest.
What will be the consequences of this tragic event? Firstly, the BDR may have to be restructured; the broken chain of command will have to be restored. The government has appointed Brig Gen Moinul Hossain as the new chief of BDR. His job will be to restore the confidence of the troops. This will be a tough task. The task at hand goes beyond redressing the grievances over pay and the conditions of service. If the anti-army sentiment in the BDR is deep and widespread, its disbanding may not be too extreme a step to contemplate.
Secondly, the relations between BDR and the Bangladesh army will be strained. The army has acted with great restraint and responsibility. It has lost a number of officers and soldiers at the hands of the mutineers. The trust that has been lost cannot be rebuilt overnight. Indeed it may never be restored. This is a dangerous precedent which will have long term implications for the country.
Thirdly, the government’s attention will necessarily be focussed on attending to the urgent matter of restructuring the BDR. This will detract its attention from the pressing problems of socio-economic development at a time when the global economic slowdown is having a negative impact on all countries including Bangladesh. The army has come out in support of the government’s handling of the situation. But one cannot ignore the fact that the army in Bangladesh has in the past been politicised. This time the army has suffered at the hands of the misguided soldiers of a sister force. The army’s response has been mature but the incident has introduced an element of uncertainty in civil-military relations in the country.
Fourthly, BDR was doing the important task of guarding the borders. It had close interaction with the Indian Border Security Force (BSF). Many units of BDR on the India-Bangladesh border were headed by the officers on deputation from the Bangladesh army. Some of these officers, according to reports, fled as the news of mutiny spread. India has reacted with restraint, describing the situation as Bangladesh’s “internal affair”. Nevertheless, the BSF would be hoping for an early return to normalcy as far as BDR is concerned so that the border guarding resumes on both sides. This will be in the interest of both countries.
Fortunately, Sheikh Hasina has overwhelming support in the country. This should help her deal with the problem in a confident manner. She will require the continuous support of the army. She has been praised for the “mature” handling of the situation but her decision to grant amnesty to the mutineers was controversial. The government had to clarify that those who committed murder will not be spared despite the amnesty. The long term effect of the amnesty on the morale and the functioning of the security forces may not be entirely positive. The situation in the country is fragile and can take an unexpected turn. South Asia is seeing signs of instability.
Dr. Arvind Gupta holds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.
IDSA, March 09, 2009
The mutiny by the troops of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) on 26 February 26 was extraordinarily brutal. The mutiny toll was about 81 with 72 still missing. Many of these were officers of the Bangladesh army. Three mass graves were discovered. Many bodies were thrown into the sewer pipelines. Many of those killed were stripped, mutilated, bayoneted and shot. The Director General of the BDR, Major General Shakil Ahmed was killed in cold blood. Even his wife was not spared. Her dead body was discovered in one of the mass graves. The whole nation has been numbed by the sheer scale of brutality of the mutiny which has been condemned internationally.
How could the mutineers indulge in such senseless killing over matters of pay and allowances and conditions of service? In brutality, the present mutiny compares with the 1975 murder of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman by some army officers.
The mutiny which was totally unexpected came at a time when the newly elected government, enjoying overwhelming majority in the parliament, was getting ready for the task of governance. Was the mutiny aimed at destabilising the government? Could the fundamentalist elements have been behind the rebellion?
The Prime Minister herself hinted at the possibility of a conspiracy. Several op-ed pieces in Bangladeshi media also spoke in a similar vein. There was nothing spontaneous about the mutiny. A spontaneous shoot-out would not kill so many people in so brutal a manner. A few of the suspected mutineers have been arrested. Only a thorough investigation would reveal the truth but there is growing suspicion that the incident may have been well planned and coordinated. If so, who were the perpetrators? What was their motive? Who was behind them? Was there an intelligence failure? Was DG, BDR the real target or someone else? Who were the real targets? These are some of the troubling questions for which answers will have to be found to set speculation to rest.
What will be the consequences of this tragic event? Firstly, the BDR may have to be restructured; the broken chain of command will have to be restored. The government has appointed Brig Gen Moinul Hossain as the new chief of BDR. His job will be to restore the confidence of the troops. This will be a tough task. The task at hand goes beyond redressing the grievances over pay and the conditions of service. If the anti-army sentiment in the BDR is deep and widespread, its disbanding may not be too extreme a step to contemplate.
Secondly, the relations between BDR and the Bangladesh army will be strained. The army has acted with great restraint and responsibility. It has lost a number of officers and soldiers at the hands of the mutineers. The trust that has been lost cannot be rebuilt overnight. Indeed it may never be restored. This is a dangerous precedent which will have long term implications for the country.
Thirdly, the government’s attention will necessarily be focussed on attending to the urgent matter of restructuring the BDR. This will detract its attention from the pressing problems of socio-economic development at a time when the global economic slowdown is having a negative impact on all countries including Bangladesh. The army has come out in support of the government’s handling of the situation. But one cannot ignore the fact that the army in Bangladesh has in the past been politicised. This time the army has suffered at the hands of the misguided soldiers of a sister force. The army’s response has been mature but the incident has introduced an element of uncertainty in civil-military relations in the country.
Fourthly, BDR was doing the important task of guarding the borders. It had close interaction with the Indian Border Security Force (BSF). Many units of BDR on the India-Bangladesh border were headed by the officers on deputation from the Bangladesh army. Some of these officers, according to reports, fled as the news of mutiny spread. India has reacted with restraint, describing the situation as Bangladesh’s “internal affair”. Nevertheless, the BSF would be hoping for an early return to normalcy as far as BDR is concerned so that the border guarding resumes on both sides. This will be in the interest of both countries.
Fortunately, Sheikh Hasina has overwhelming support in the country. This should help her deal with the problem in a confident manner. She will require the continuous support of the army. She has been praised for the “mature” handling of the situation but her decision to grant amnesty to the mutineers was controversial. The government had to clarify that those who committed murder will not be spared despite the amnesty. The long term effect of the amnesty on the morale and the functioning of the security forces may not be entirely positive. The situation in the country is fragile and can take an unexpected turn. South Asia is seeing signs of instability.
Dr. Arvind Gupta holds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.
Friday, February 27, 2009
Spratly Islands: The Challenge to U.S. Leadership in the South China Sea
Spratly Islands: The Challenge to U.S. Leadership in the South China Sea. By Walter Lohman
Heritage, Feb 26, 2009
WebMemo #2313
On the eve of the annual Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit this week, an old issue has resurfaced: conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands. The issue is back in the news for good reason; it never really went away.
According to press reports, last week the Chinese vice foreign minister summoned the charge d' affaires from the Philippines embassy to register a "stern protest" over a new Philippines' law formally staking claim to what it calls the "Kalayaan Islands." The Chinese, of course, contend that they hold, in the words of the foreign ministry, "indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent waters."
China's Unreasonable Claim
There is nothing simple about this dispute. Taiwan and Vietnam claim all of the Spratly Islands. And the specific Bruneian and Malaysian claims overlap those of the Philippines. But it is the Chinese claim--because of its aggressive scope, the history behind it, and China's growing military capacity to back it up--that pose the real problem to regional stability.
The Chinese claim is expansive, to say the least. The Kalayaan Islands are 1,000 nautical miles away from China. By contrast, the Philippines' province of Palawan is roughly 230 miles away. (Incidentally, the Kalayaans are a municipality of Palawan.) Yet China also claims territory even closer to Palawan Island: Mischief Reef, the source of so much diplomatic scuffling 10 years ago, is only 135 miles away.
The distance between China and the territory it is claiming is apparently of no concern to Beijing. Indeed, the Chinese claim not only the Spratlys but 80 percent of the South China Sea. In support of such a massive claim, the Chinese reference 2,000-year-old maps and an imaginative reading of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Critically, the claim is passively supported by China's growing military prowess (double-digit annual growth in military spending and an expanding fleet of sophisticated warships and submarines) and what increasingly appears to be deliberate ambiguity about the intentions behind this buildup.
Highlighting Chinese Ambitions
The Philippines has done the world a great favor by reminding it of Chinese ambitions. The dispute over the South China Sea flared in the mid-to-late 1990s as a result of Chinese efforts to physically fortify their claim to Mischief Reef. Although initially alarmed by China's moves, by 2002 ASEAN was heralding a new era that would essentially set sovereign disputes aside and focus instead on mutual development. This is ASEAN's comfort zone; they were pleased to paper over the problem. But the excessive Chinese claim on the territory of their member states was never withdrawn. And neither were the structures on Mischief Reef that precipitated the crisis.
The Congress and President of the Philippines are staking their claim to the Spratly Islands without apology. They appear prepared to weather Chinese protests. Indeed, there is no cause for them to capitulate. As is, choosing among several draft bills asserting their claim and political pressure to be aggressive, the Philippines settled on a course that was the least objectionable to their neighbors.
This is a diplomatic problem. The possibility that this dispute could escalate to a point where the U.S. could be called to invoke its treaty obligations to the Philippines is remote. It did not reach that point in the mid-1990s--a much more contentious environment than today. But the risk of serious conflict only increases with time.
American Support Needed
One of the greatest values of American security treaties in peacetime, in this case the U.S.-Philippines 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, is that they clearly show where American loyalties lie.
The United States should unequivocally support the right of the Philippines to stake its claims in the South China Sea. It should also bring attention to the responsible, deliberative, legal nature of its claims. And although it cannot support any party's particular claim, the U.S. can certainly point out the aggressive, unreasonable nature of the Chinese claim. All legalities aside, at some level, any claim to territory should have to pass a common sense test. Claiming sovereignty over 648,000 square miles of sea bordering on eight countries is absolutely untenable. And the U.S. ought to say so.
Ultimately, the U.S. cannot remain neutral in a dispute between an ally and its competition for regional influence--China. If an alliance does not at least mean dispensing with neutrality in choosing your friends, then what does it mean? Playing on the ambiguities in the American position and on weaknesses plaguing perceptions of its commitment to the region, the Chinese are content to slowly turn up the heat on the South China Sea. Silence abets their aspirations.
The Spratly Islands dispute is not just the Philippines' problem. It is an even bigger problem for the United States and all who rely on American leadership in the Asia Pacific. Left unchallenged, the Chinese claim to the South China Sea could one day leave the American Pacific Fleet asking Chinese permission to conduct routine operations. If the Chinese claims calcify at a pace similar to the development of their navy, in another 10 years, the U.S. will have a real crisis on its hands.
Walter Lohman is Director of The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.
Heritage, Feb 26, 2009
WebMemo #2313
On the eve of the annual Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit this week, an old issue has resurfaced: conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands. The issue is back in the news for good reason; it never really went away.
According to press reports, last week the Chinese vice foreign minister summoned the charge d' affaires from the Philippines embassy to register a "stern protest" over a new Philippines' law formally staking claim to what it calls the "Kalayaan Islands." The Chinese, of course, contend that they hold, in the words of the foreign ministry, "indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent waters."
China's Unreasonable Claim
There is nothing simple about this dispute. Taiwan and Vietnam claim all of the Spratly Islands. And the specific Bruneian and Malaysian claims overlap those of the Philippines. But it is the Chinese claim--because of its aggressive scope, the history behind it, and China's growing military capacity to back it up--that pose the real problem to regional stability.
The Chinese claim is expansive, to say the least. The Kalayaan Islands are 1,000 nautical miles away from China. By contrast, the Philippines' province of Palawan is roughly 230 miles away. (Incidentally, the Kalayaans are a municipality of Palawan.) Yet China also claims territory even closer to Palawan Island: Mischief Reef, the source of so much diplomatic scuffling 10 years ago, is only 135 miles away.
The distance between China and the territory it is claiming is apparently of no concern to Beijing. Indeed, the Chinese claim not only the Spratlys but 80 percent of the South China Sea. In support of such a massive claim, the Chinese reference 2,000-year-old maps and an imaginative reading of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Critically, the claim is passively supported by China's growing military prowess (double-digit annual growth in military spending and an expanding fleet of sophisticated warships and submarines) and what increasingly appears to be deliberate ambiguity about the intentions behind this buildup.
Highlighting Chinese Ambitions
The Philippines has done the world a great favor by reminding it of Chinese ambitions. The dispute over the South China Sea flared in the mid-to-late 1990s as a result of Chinese efforts to physically fortify their claim to Mischief Reef. Although initially alarmed by China's moves, by 2002 ASEAN was heralding a new era that would essentially set sovereign disputes aside and focus instead on mutual development. This is ASEAN's comfort zone; they were pleased to paper over the problem. But the excessive Chinese claim on the territory of their member states was never withdrawn. And neither were the structures on Mischief Reef that precipitated the crisis.
The Congress and President of the Philippines are staking their claim to the Spratly Islands without apology. They appear prepared to weather Chinese protests. Indeed, there is no cause for them to capitulate. As is, choosing among several draft bills asserting their claim and political pressure to be aggressive, the Philippines settled on a course that was the least objectionable to their neighbors.
This is a diplomatic problem. The possibility that this dispute could escalate to a point where the U.S. could be called to invoke its treaty obligations to the Philippines is remote. It did not reach that point in the mid-1990s--a much more contentious environment than today. But the risk of serious conflict only increases with time.
American Support Needed
One of the greatest values of American security treaties in peacetime, in this case the U.S.-Philippines 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, is that they clearly show where American loyalties lie.
The United States should unequivocally support the right of the Philippines to stake its claims in the South China Sea. It should also bring attention to the responsible, deliberative, legal nature of its claims. And although it cannot support any party's particular claim, the U.S. can certainly point out the aggressive, unreasonable nature of the Chinese claim. All legalities aside, at some level, any claim to territory should have to pass a common sense test. Claiming sovereignty over 648,000 square miles of sea bordering on eight countries is absolutely untenable. And the U.S. ought to say so.
Ultimately, the U.S. cannot remain neutral in a dispute between an ally and its competition for regional influence--China. If an alliance does not at least mean dispensing with neutrality in choosing your friends, then what does it mean? Playing on the ambiguities in the American position and on weaknesses plaguing perceptions of its commitment to the region, the Chinese are content to slowly turn up the heat on the South China Sea. Silence abets their aspirations.
The Spratly Islands dispute is not just the Philippines' problem. It is an even bigger problem for the United States and all who rely on American leadership in the Asia Pacific. Left unchallenged, the Chinese claim to the South China Sea could one day leave the American Pacific Fleet asking Chinese permission to conduct routine operations. If the Chinese claims calcify at a pace similar to the development of their navy, in another 10 years, the U.S. will have a real crisis on its hands.
Walter Lohman is Director of The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.
Sunday, February 8, 2009
In Defense of Thailand's Democracy
In Defense of Thailand's Democracy, by Walter Lohman
Heritage, February 6, 2009
Over the last couple of months, one of America's two treaty allies in Southeast Asia turned the page on a period of intense political instability. And it did so democratically. Americans should take a moment to acknowledge Thailand as a member in good standing of the democratic club that is America's system of alliances in East Asia and the Pacific.
Reminders of an Undemocratic, Unstable Past
The most recent chapter of Thai political history began a little more than two years ago. On September 19, 2006, the military staged a coup to unseat and essentially exile Thailand's elected prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. Despite 14 years of uninterrupted democratic governance, global perceptions of a Thailand beset with chronic political instability quickly returned.
The unelected military-backed government exacerbated negative perceptions by mangling the Thai economy. And where the new government was widely expected to outperform the previous administration--dealing with the southern Islamist insurgency--it failed.
Then, at the end of 2007, after absorbing a coup, suffering under a year of inept government, and approving a new constitution designed to deflate the powers of the prime minister, new elections returned to government proxies for Thaksin and his disbanded Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT). Thailand appeared to pick up right where it left off in September 2006: Political strife dominated 2008; two prime ministers were forced from power; protests escalated to the point of shutting down Bangkok's airports; and the economy dragged through the year.
A Welcome Turn of Events
As 2008 drew to a close, pressure for another coup grew. But then something positive happened: Democracy provided a channel for government to change hands. Was the transfer of power pretty? No. Did it involve political trade-offs? Certainly. But expediency--as well as opacity--in democratic politics is a matter of degree, not kind.
In a parliamentary system, legitimate change in government is possible without proximate appeal to general elections. The Democrat party pulled enough sitting MPs away from the latest iteration of a Thaksin-based party and its coalition partners to form a new government under the leadership of opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva.
Critics point to the messiness of the process and nefarious connections among Thai royalty, military, politicians, bureaucrats, and judges. Political intrigue makes for good copy. But in an environment as prone to rumor as Bangkok, and with so much at stake, it is important to separate out the facts.
First, it is a matter of public record that army commander General Anupong Paochinda urged the prime minister to resign. Second, it is a fact that in October, the queen attended the funeral of a protester killed in a clash with police. Both were very powerful gestures in Thai politics. But they do not amount to a coup. Nor do they explain the formation of the new Democrat government, or the Democrats' victories in subsequent by-elections. Disillusionment with the Thaksin-proxies in the electorate and factional cracks in his party base were already present and growing; pulling them apart did not require a mastermind general.
In 2006, the United States was right to insist that Thailand return to democratic rule as quickly as possible. Even when some argued that the United States's geopolitical position in the region would suffer as a result of the pressure--China being all the willing to step into the gap--the Bush Administration remained focused on the longer term. It suspended more than $29 million in assistance to Thailand, including financing for military hardware and training for Thai officers. At the same time, however, the Administration maintained regular diplomatic contact with the Thais and preserved some of the most critical areas of the relationship, including military exercises and vital counterterrorism cooperation.
In 2006, the Thai military unwisely aborted a political process that would have eventually resolved the crisis without intervention. There are a great many variables involved in comparing September 2006 with December 2008: Thaksin's role, the bungling of his military appointed successors, a new constitution, a changing electorate, and civil society fatigue. But, essentially, the events of the last few months in Thailand prove that coup is not an inevitable feature of Thai politics and that democracy is stability's partner, not its enemy.
The Road Ahead
The Thai Democrat Party has a considerable amount of work to do. The new prime minister must find a way to reach across the political spectrum in Bangkok and elsewhere to heal the yawning divide. The perception that his ascension to power is purely the product of political maneuvering is refutable, but it will prove corrosive over time. There is also a significant element of anti-democratic class exceptionalism among the forces that brought him to power. And there is resistance outside of Bangkok to his Oxford-educated persona. He will have to take both issues head-on. But ultimately these are matters for Thais to resolve.
Indeed, Americans have their own work to do. Thailand was a key ally of the United States during the Cold War. Thais by the thousands fought side by side with Americans in Korea and in Vietnam. Thailand also contributed non-combat troops to the American-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan and has served as a critical logistics node in the movement of American forces around the globe.
But the Thais, as much as any power in the region, pay close attention to geopolitical trends. During World War II, Thai Prime Minister and strongman Phibunsongkhram famously asked one of his commanders, "Which side do you think will lose this war? That side is our enemy." And he began to hedge his early bets on the Japanese.
Today it is China's rise that is the most striking fact of life in East Asia. And its rise is not unwelcome in Thailand. This is not necessarily a bad thing: China is an important economic partner for both the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies. America cannot ask our allies to recuse themselves from the opportunity China offers any more than it can refrain from reaping the benefits itself.
What the United States can do, however, is be absolutely clear about its long-term commitment to the region. It should intensify its economic engagement, not retreat from it. This means embracing free trade agreements. The proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific now has a core around which to develop--the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership (TPP)--free trade negotiations underway between eight Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation member economies. A bilateral U.S.-Thai free-trade agreement was left on the table in 2006. America should dust it off and get negotiations moving again with an eye toward not only completing a first-rate agreement but including the Thais in the broader TPP.
On the diplomatic, military side, the U.S. should make clear that it has no intention of compromising its predominance in Asia. Such clarity demands a level of defense spending that will belie Asian suspicions of an American superpower in decline. It also means participating in the region's diplomatic life. This year's Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum is being held in Thailand. Prior to the last few years, the U.S. secretary of state's attendance was a given. Once again becoming a reliable ASEAN participant in the year America's Thai allies host will be well-noted in the region. President Obama should also resurrect plans for a full-fledged U.S.-ASEAN leaders' summit, an idea abruptly cancelled by President Bush in 2007, and schedule it in Thailand during this year's ASEAN leaders' meetings.
Reinforcing the Alliance
America's allies are the foundation of its commitment to Asia. These allies make policy formulation easier when they stay true to their democratic values. When one of the allies strays, the U.S. should help bring it back to its senses, as President Bush sought to do with Thailand. By the same token, when one demonstrates a commitment to the alliance's mutual values, America should use the occasion to reinforce the relationship. It is good to have Thailand in the club.
Walter Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
Heritage, February 6, 2009
Over the last couple of months, one of America's two treaty allies in Southeast Asia turned the page on a period of intense political instability. And it did so democratically. Americans should take a moment to acknowledge Thailand as a member in good standing of the democratic club that is America's system of alliances in East Asia and the Pacific.
Reminders of an Undemocratic, Unstable Past
The most recent chapter of Thai political history began a little more than two years ago. On September 19, 2006, the military staged a coup to unseat and essentially exile Thailand's elected prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. Despite 14 years of uninterrupted democratic governance, global perceptions of a Thailand beset with chronic political instability quickly returned.
The unelected military-backed government exacerbated negative perceptions by mangling the Thai economy. And where the new government was widely expected to outperform the previous administration--dealing with the southern Islamist insurgency--it failed.
Then, at the end of 2007, after absorbing a coup, suffering under a year of inept government, and approving a new constitution designed to deflate the powers of the prime minister, new elections returned to government proxies for Thaksin and his disbanded Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT). Thailand appeared to pick up right where it left off in September 2006: Political strife dominated 2008; two prime ministers were forced from power; protests escalated to the point of shutting down Bangkok's airports; and the economy dragged through the year.
A Welcome Turn of Events
As 2008 drew to a close, pressure for another coup grew. But then something positive happened: Democracy provided a channel for government to change hands. Was the transfer of power pretty? No. Did it involve political trade-offs? Certainly. But expediency--as well as opacity--in democratic politics is a matter of degree, not kind.
In a parliamentary system, legitimate change in government is possible without proximate appeal to general elections. The Democrat party pulled enough sitting MPs away from the latest iteration of a Thaksin-based party and its coalition partners to form a new government under the leadership of opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva.
Critics point to the messiness of the process and nefarious connections among Thai royalty, military, politicians, bureaucrats, and judges. Political intrigue makes for good copy. But in an environment as prone to rumor as Bangkok, and with so much at stake, it is important to separate out the facts.
First, it is a matter of public record that army commander General Anupong Paochinda urged the prime minister to resign. Second, it is a fact that in October, the queen attended the funeral of a protester killed in a clash with police. Both were very powerful gestures in Thai politics. But they do not amount to a coup. Nor do they explain the formation of the new Democrat government, or the Democrats' victories in subsequent by-elections. Disillusionment with the Thaksin-proxies in the electorate and factional cracks in his party base were already present and growing; pulling them apart did not require a mastermind general.
In 2006, the United States was right to insist that Thailand return to democratic rule as quickly as possible. Even when some argued that the United States's geopolitical position in the region would suffer as a result of the pressure--China being all the willing to step into the gap--the Bush Administration remained focused on the longer term. It suspended more than $29 million in assistance to Thailand, including financing for military hardware and training for Thai officers. At the same time, however, the Administration maintained regular diplomatic contact with the Thais and preserved some of the most critical areas of the relationship, including military exercises and vital counterterrorism cooperation.
In 2006, the Thai military unwisely aborted a political process that would have eventually resolved the crisis without intervention. There are a great many variables involved in comparing September 2006 with December 2008: Thaksin's role, the bungling of his military appointed successors, a new constitution, a changing electorate, and civil society fatigue. But, essentially, the events of the last few months in Thailand prove that coup is not an inevitable feature of Thai politics and that democracy is stability's partner, not its enemy.
The Road Ahead
The Thai Democrat Party has a considerable amount of work to do. The new prime minister must find a way to reach across the political spectrum in Bangkok and elsewhere to heal the yawning divide. The perception that his ascension to power is purely the product of political maneuvering is refutable, but it will prove corrosive over time. There is also a significant element of anti-democratic class exceptionalism among the forces that brought him to power. And there is resistance outside of Bangkok to his Oxford-educated persona. He will have to take both issues head-on. But ultimately these are matters for Thais to resolve.
Indeed, Americans have their own work to do. Thailand was a key ally of the United States during the Cold War. Thais by the thousands fought side by side with Americans in Korea and in Vietnam. Thailand also contributed non-combat troops to the American-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan and has served as a critical logistics node in the movement of American forces around the globe.
But the Thais, as much as any power in the region, pay close attention to geopolitical trends. During World War II, Thai Prime Minister and strongman Phibunsongkhram famously asked one of his commanders, "Which side do you think will lose this war? That side is our enemy." And he began to hedge his early bets on the Japanese.
Today it is China's rise that is the most striking fact of life in East Asia. And its rise is not unwelcome in Thailand. This is not necessarily a bad thing: China is an important economic partner for both the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies. America cannot ask our allies to recuse themselves from the opportunity China offers any more than it can refrain from reaping the benefits itself.
What the United States can do, however, is be absolutely clear about its long-term commitment to the region. It should intensify its economic engagement, not retreat from it. This means embracing free trade agreements. The proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific now has a core around which to develop--the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership (TPP)--free trade negotiations underway between eight Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation member economies. A bilateral U.S.-Thai free-trade agreement was left on the table in 2006. America should dust it off and get negotiations moving again with an eye toward not only completing a first-rate agreement but including the Thais in the broader TPP.
On the diplomatic, military side, the U.S. should make clear that it has no intention of compromising its predominance in Asia. Such clarity demands a level of defense spending that will belie Asian suspicions of an American superpower in decline. It also means participating in the region's diplomatic life. This year's Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum is being held in Thailand. Prior to the last few years, the U.S. secretary of state's attendance was a given. Once again becoming a reliable ASEAN participant in the year America's Thai allies host will be well-noted in the region. President Obama should also resurrect plans for a full-fledged U.S.-ASEAN leaders' summit, an idea abruptly cancelled by President Bush in 2007, and schedule it in Thailand during this year's ASEAN leaders' meetings.
Reinforcing the Alliance
America's allies are the foundation of its commitment to Asia. These allies make policy formulation easier when they stay true to their democratic values. When one of the allies strays, the U.S. should help bring it back to its senses, as President Bush sought to do with Thailand. By the same token, when one demonstrates a commitment to the alliance's mutual values, America should use the occasion to reinforce the relationship. It is good to have Thailand in the club.
Walter Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
PPI: Asia Spends More on Research than Europe
Asia Spends More on Research than Europe
Progressive Policy Institute, January 21, 2009
The Numbers:
Spending on scientific research & development, 2007:
- North America: ~ $393 billion
- Europe: ~ $290 billion
- Asia: ~ $320 billion
What They Mean:
India's medieval mathematicians invented the zero and modern numerals around 500 AD. Engineers in neighboring China dreamed up paper, explosives, the compass, and movable type. But the 17th-century Scientific Revolution came not in Asia but the west, and so did the 20th century's medicines, airplanes, radio, computers, spacecraft, TV sets, and telecom gear.
Why? Albert Einstein, wondering about the issue in 1922, blamed Asia's high populations and low labor costs for slowing invention. ("In both India and China the low price of labor has stood in the way of the development of machinery.") A half-century later, British history-of-Chinese-science master Joseph Needham speculated that Europe had jumped ahead by inventing capitalism, which meant competition among businesses for customers and therefore innovation. The question remains interesting -- but only in an historical sense, because Asian science has roared back to life.
Asia's most sophisticated economies have been among the world's heaviest researchers for years. Japan's $130 billion in R&D spending amounted to 3.2 percent of Japanese GDP, far above the rich world's 2.1 percent average and topped only by Israel and Sweden. (The United States was at 2.7 percent, Australia 2.2 percent, Canada 2.0 percent, and Europe 1.7 percent.) Korea's $38 billion in research spending outstripped Britain's $35 billion, and made up 3.0 percent of GDP. Taiwan and Singapore are also well above the world's rich-country average.
Science is reviving in the two giants as well. Chinese research spending, relative to GDP, has doubled in a decade from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent. In dollar terms, China's $85 billion spending ranks third or fourth in the world (depending on exchange rates), roughly at par with Germany. India's science spending is about $24 billion and about 0.8 percent of GDP. And within the last three or four years -- likely for the first time in four centuries -- Asia's research spending topped Europe's. The United States still tops the world, at $370 billion to Asia's $320 billion and Europe's $290 billion ... but for how long?
Further Reading:
Is Asia inventing, or just spending? In 1980, according to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, European researchers filed twice as many U.S. patent applications as Asians. By 2007, Japan's 79,000 applications alone outnumbered the 69,000 from all European countries combined, and Asia's total nearly doubled Europe. Korea's 23,000 applications were barely behind Germany's second-place 23,600; Taiwan, with 18,500, was above both Britain and France. India and China still file fewer patents than the top-tier Asian technological economies and the big European states, but are rising fast. Chinese and Indian researchers accounted for 30 patent applications in 1980, 900 in 2000, and 5,300 in 2007. The PTO patent records: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.pdf
Science in Asia links:
Tokyo-based Asia Science and Technology Seminar trains young Asian scientists:http://www.jistec.or.jp/ASTS/asts_e.html
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh speaks to the Science Congress in Shillong on India's high-tech future:http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=46369
The Robotic Association of Japan insists that soft, weak, vulnerable humans have nothing to fear from its metallic, computerized and remorseless creations:http://www.rsj.or.jp/index_e.html
Korea's Ministry of Knowledge Economy (until last year the Min. of Commerce & Industry), perhaps missing the real threat, proposes an ethics charter meant to prevent human abuse of androids:http://www.korea.net/news/news/newsView.asp?part=100&serial_no=20080228018
China's Science and Technology Ministry:http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/
Taiwan's National Science Council announces bio-tech parks, cryptography, license-plate recognition, and more:http://web1.nsc.gov.tw/mp.aspx?mp=7 ASEAN's Science and Technology Network:http://www.astnet.org/
And San Diego's school system instructs America's youth on classical Chinese technology:
www.sdcoe.k12.ca.us/score/chinin/chinintg.htm
R&D around the world:
High end -- Israel is the world's most science-intensive economy, devoting 4.7 percent of GDP to R&D. Sweden is next at 3.7 percent, followed by Japan and Finland at 3.4 percent. South Korea ranks fifth 3.2 percent, with Switzerland sixth. Japan's commitment has risen from 2.0 percent in 1980, and 2.7 percent in the mid-1990s. America's 2.7 percent remains high on international rankings, but -- in contrast to Asian economies -- has not grown since the mid-1980s. American businesses spend heavily on R&D, and U.S. government investment in life sciences and medicine is high. The lag comes from low public funding for research on physics, aerospace, chemistry, and other hard sciences. The National Science Foundation has data on American research spending and other science matters over time:http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf08317/
And the OECD counts research totals by country for its members plus Argentina, China, Israel, the EU, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Romania, Russia, and Taiwan:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/44/41850733.pdf
Can do better -- The luminaries of European science would not be pleased. Galileo would blush to see Italy's low 1.1 percent of GDP; Archimedes would likewise fume to see Greece spending only 0.6 percent. Newton would be startled to learn that Korea spends more on research than Britain. (The U.K. government research budget is high, but British companies apparently do less research than some of their rivals.) Copernicus might feel worst of all, with Poland the only advanced country to have cut its R&D budgets in this decade. The highest research commitments are in Scandinavia and Germany. The European Science Agency:
http://sci.esa.int/science-e/www/area/index.cfm?fareaid=1
Developing world -- Latin America, the Middle East apart from Israel, Africa, and Southeast Asia are well behind East Asia as research powers. The World Bank's 2008 Development Indicators book finds the Latin average at 0.6 percent, led by Brazil's 0.9 percent. Tunisia is the Muslim world's most research-intensive state at 1.0 percent of GDP, followed by Malaysia, Morocco, and Turkey at 0.7 percent; Uganda's 0.8 percent and South Africa 0.9 percent are Africa's highest rates. Singapore tops Southeast Asia at a rich-world 2.3 percent, but larger ASEAN members could be doing more: the Philippines and Indonesia are at 0.1 percent, Thailand 0.3 percent and Vietnam 0.2 percent. Brazil's 0.9 percent is Latin America's highest rate, with Chile, Argentina, and Mexico next at 0.5 percent.
Progressive Policy Institute, January 21, 2009
The Numbers:
Spending on scientific research & development, 2007:
- North America: ~ $393 billion
- Europe: ~ $290 billion
- Asia: ~ $320 billion
What They Mean:
India's medieval mathematicians invented the zero and modern numerals around 500 AD. Engineers in neighboring China dreamed up paper, explosives, the compass, and movable type. But the 17th-century Scientific Revolution came not in Asia but the west, and so did the 20th century's medicines, airplanes, radio, computers, spacecraft, TV sets, and telecom gear.
Why? Albert Einstein, wondering about the issue in 1922, blamed Asia's high populations and low labor costs for slowing invention. ("In both India and China the low price of labor has stood in the way of the development of machinery.") A half-century later, British history-of-Chinese-science master Joseph Needham speculated that Europe had jumped ahead by inventing capitalism, which meant competition among businesses for customers and therefore innovation. The question remains interesting -- but only in an historical sense, because Asian science has roared back to life.
Asia's most sophisticated economies have been among the world's heaviest researchers for years. Japan's $130 billion in R&D spending amounted to 3.2 percent of Japanese GDP, far above the rich world's 2.1 percent average and topped only by Israel and Sweden. (The United States was at 2.7 percent, Australia 2.2 percent, Canada 2.0 percent, and Europe 1.7 percent.) Korea's $38 billion in research spending outstripped Britain's $35 billion, and made up 3.0 percent of GDP. Taiwan and Singapore are also well above the world's rich-country average.
Science is reviving in the two giants as well. Chinese research spending, relative to GDP, has doubled in a decade from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent. In dollar terms, China's $85 billion spending ranks third or fourth in the world (depending on exchange rates), roughly at par with Germany. India's science spending is about $24 billion and about 0.8 percent of GDP. And within the last three or four years -- likely for the first time in four centuries -- Asia's research spending topped Europe's. The United States still tops the world, at $370 billion to Asia's $320 billion and Europe's $290 billion ... but for how long?
Further Reading:
Is Asia inventing, or just spending? In 1980, according to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, European researchers filed twice as many U.S. patent applications as Asians. By 2007, Japan's 79,000 applications alone outnumbered the 69,000 from all European countries combined, and Asia's total nearly doubled Europe. Korea's 23,000 applications were barely behind Germany's second-place 23,600; Taiwan, with 18,500, was above both Britain and France. India and China still file fewer patents than the top-tier Asian technological economies and the big European states, but are rising fast. Chinese and Indian researchers accounted for 30 patent applications in 1980, 900 in 2000, and 5,300 in 2007. The PTO patent records: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.pdf
Science in Asia links:
Tokyo-based Asia Science and Technology Seminar trains young Asian scientists:http://www.jistec.or.jp/ASTS/asts_e.html
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh speaks to the Science Congress in Shillong on India's high-tech future:http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=46369
The Robotic Association of Japan insists that soft, weak, vulnerable humans have nothing to fear from its metallic, computerized and remorseless creations:http://www.rsj.or.jp/index_e.html
Korea's Ministry of Knowledge Economy (until last year the Min. of Commerce & Industry), perhaps missing the real threat, proposes an ethics charter meant to prevent human abuse of androids:http://www.korea.net/news/news/newsView.asp?part=100&serial_no=20080228018
China's Science and Technology Ministry:http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/
Taiwan's National Science Council announces bio-tech parks, cryptography, license-plate recognition, and more:http://web1.nsc.gov.tw/mp.aspx?mp=7 ASEAN's Science and Technology Network:http://www.astnet.org/
And San Diego's school system instructs America's youth on classical Chinese technology:
www.sdcoe.k12.ca.us/score/chinin/chinintg.htm
R&D around the world:
High end -- Israel is the world's most science-intensive economy, devoting 4.7 percent of GDP to R&D. Sweden is next at 3.7 percent, followed by Japan and Finland at 3.4 percent. South Korea ranks fifth 3.2 percent, with Switzerland sixth. Japan's commitment has risen from 2.0 percent in 1980, and 2.7 percent in the mid-1990s. America's 2.7 percent remains high on international rankings, but -- in contrast to Asian economies -- has not grown since the mid-1980s. American businesses spend heavily on R&D, and U.S. government investment in life sciences and medicine is high. The lag comes from low public funding for research on physics, aerospace, chemistry, and other hard sciences. The National Science Foundation has data on American research spending and other science matters over time:http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf08317/
And the OECD counts research totals by country for its members plus Argentina, China, Israel, the EU, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Romania, Russia, and Taiwan:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/44/41850733.pdf
Can do better -- The luminaries of European science would not be pleased. Galileo would blush to see Italy's low 1.1 percent of GDP; Archimedes would likewise fume to see Greece spending only 0.6 percent. Newton would be startled to learn that Korea spends more on research than Britain. (The U.K. government research budget is high, but British companies apparently do less research than some of their rivals.) Copernicus might feel worst of all, with Poland the only advanced country to have cut its R&D budgets in this decade. The highest research commitments are in Scandinavia and Germany. The European Science Agency:
http://sci.esa.int/science-e/www/area/index.cfm?fareaid=1
Developing world -- Latin America, the Middle East apart from Israel, Africa, and Southeast Asia are well behind East Asia as research powers. The World Bank's 2008 Development Indicators book finds the Latin average at 0.6 percent, led by Brazil's 0.9 percent. Tunisia is the Muslim world's most research-intensive state at 1.0 percent of GDP, followed by Malaysia, Morocco, and Turkey at 0.7 percent; Uganda's 0.8 percent and South Africa 0.9 percent are Africa's highest rates. Singapore tops Southeast Asia at a rich-world 2.3 percent, but larger ASEAN members could be doing more: the Philippines and Indonesia are at 0.1 percent, Thailand 0.3 percent and Vietnam 0.2 percent. Brazil's 0.9 percent is Latin America's highest rate, with Chile, Argentina, and Mexico next at 0.5 percent.
Thursday, January 1, 2009
Indonesian President's Praise of Natsir
Indonesian President's Praise of Natsir Raises Questions, by Walter Lohman
Heritage WebMemo #2181
December 31, 2008
These are perilous times for those in the idea business. Whether you're a think tanker or a politician, it is easier than ever to be misunderstood. Words reach the four corners of the world at the speed of light; it is impossible to segregate audiences.
Indonesian President Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono seemed to be aiming at a very specific audience a couple weeks ago when he capped a long-standing push to designate M. Natsir a national hero with a speech in the Indonesian province of West Sumatra. His host, West Sumatra's Governor Gamawan Fauzi, used the occasion to note that history will forever remember President Yudhoyono's leadership in making the determination. Indeed. But what did the president intend by conferring essentially favored son status on this very learned--and by all accounts polite and unassuming--Islamist?
A Suitable Role Model?
The president sought to explain. He lauded Natsir for his anti-colonialism and his fundamental contribution to Indonesia's unity. Natsir's anti-colonialism credentials are best judged by Indonesians; but they seem to be beyond question. With regard to his impact on Indonesian unity, the debate will continue. Some will surely fault the president's logic in praising someone so closely identified with rebellion.
But the seriously perplexing part of the speech came when the president praised Natsir as a model for addressing misunderstandings about Islam and serving as a bridge between cultures and religions.
Natsir is associated with a political ideology that informed people do not generally associate with Indonesia. His founding of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) alone would make him an inappropriate role model for the nation. Theodore Friend, a highly regarded historian, describes DDII as "extreme," "intolerant," and yes, "Islamist." Among its targets, he counts "Muslim liberalism," "the economic dominance of the Chinese," and a "conspiracy to Christianize Indonesia." The DDII's problem with Christians in particular makes it strikingly odd to commend its founder for an ability to bridge understanding between religions.
Natsir's precise views on and personal history with Pancasila (Indonesia's founding non-sectarian state philosophy) were no doubt complex. But when all is said and done, history remembers him as Indonesia's foremost advocate for the direct role of Islam in government and the ideal of the Islamic state.
Perplexing Politics
So what's a friend of Indonesia to do? He could tell himself that it's pure politics. The presence of the Islamist PKS minister of agriculture in the entourage to West Sumatra is good evidence of that. But to the president's Islamist political allies, this is about much more than politics. And so, given the stakes, that is not a satisfactory answer. One could say that it's an anomaly, but there are too many similar developments in Indonesia to consider it an anomaly. This year there was the violent Islamist attacks at Indonesia's national monument, the fatwa on Ahmadiyya, and the media circus over the execution of the Bali bombers. Last year's enormous Hizbut Tahrir rally in Jakarta and near victory of an Islamist candidate for governor of Jakarta also jolted observers of Indonesian politics.
A friend of Indonesia would definitely tell his colleagues that all of this must be kept in perspective. Despite a 2004 electoral surge for Islamist standard-bearer PKS, considerable success at the local and provincial levels since, and high hopes for 2009, the fundamentalists are further from taking control than they were in the 1950s. He would cite the centuries-old ebb and flow of fundamentalism that has always left the Islamists on the losing end of Indonesian history. He would also note Indonesia's extraordinary well-springs of cultural and religious tolerance.
But the Islamists are savvy. They understand better than anyone that ideas can transform a political environment without ever owning it. From Natsir until today, they have sought to prepare the grassroots for Islamization of the state. So even while national politics may register only an occasional flare of radicalism, underneath, the coals glow bright. This friend of Indonesia worries that Indonesia's mainstream political leaders will wake up too late to find that Indonesia's house is on fire and that not only did they not prevent it, but they unwittingly fanned it.
Only Time Will Tell
For a politician, sometimes the only way to deal with different audiences is to just say what he has to and accept that he may be misunderstood by those on the outside. To make that call, however, the political need should far outweigh the risk of alienating his other audiences.
In the case of President Yudhoyono's praise of Natsir, one can only conclude that either the need to accommodate Islamist sentiment is much greater than Indonesia's friends abroad appreciate or that he is miscalculating the strength of the Islamists and unnecessarily appropriating beliefs he doesn't himself hold.
Neither is a particularly comforting conclusion, but at least one friend of Indonesia hopes it is the latter.
Walter Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. A version of this article first appeared in the December 31, 2008, edition of The Jakarta Globe.
Heritage WebMemo #2181
December 31, 2008
These are perilous times for those in the idea business. Whether you're a think tanker or a politician, it is easier than ever to be misunderstood. Words reach the four corners of the world at the speed of light; it is impossible to segregate audiences.
Indonesian President Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono seemed to be aiming at a very specific audience a couple weeks ago when he capped a long-standing push to designate M. Natsir a national hero with a speech in the Indonesian province of West Sumatra. His host, West Sumatra's Governor Gamawan Fauzi, used the occasion to note that history will forever remember President Yudhoyono's leadership in making the determination. Indeed. But what did the president intend by conferring essentially favored son status on this very learned--and by all accounts polite and unassuming--Islamist?
A Suitable Role Model?
The president sought to explain. He lauded Natsir for his anti-colonialism and his fundamental contribution to Indonesia's unity. Natsir's anti-colonialism credentials are best judged by Indonesians; but they seem to be beyond question. With regard to his impact on Indonesian unity, the debate will continue. Some will surely fault the president's logic in praising someone so closely identified with rebellion.
But the seriously perplexing part of the speech came when the president praised Natsir as a model for addressing misunderstandings about Islam and serving as a bridge between cultures and religions.
Natsir is associated with a political ideology that informed people do not generally associate with Indonesia. His founding of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) alone would make him an inappropriate role model for the nation. Theodore Friend, a highly regarded historian, describes DDII as "extreme," "intolerant," and yes, "Islamist." Among its targets, he counts "Muslim liberalism," "the economic dominance of the Chinese," and a "conspiracy to Christianize Indonesia." The DDII's problem with Christians in particular makes it strikingly odd to commend its founder for an ability to bridge understanding between religions.
Natsir's precise views on and personal history with Pancasila (Indonesia's founding non-sectarian state philosophy) were no doubt complex. But when all is said and done, history remembers him as Indonesia's foremost advocate for the direct role of Islam in government and the ideal of the Islamic state.
Perplexing Politics
So what's a friend of Indonesia to do? He could tell himself that it's pure politics. The presence of the Islamist PKS minister of agriculture in the entourage to West Sumatra is good evidence of that. But to the president's Islamist political allies, this is about much more than politics. And so, given the stakes, that is not a satisfactory answer. One could say that it's an anomaly, but there are too many similar developments in Indonesia to consider it an anomaly. This year there was the violent Islamist attacks at Indonesia's national monument, the fatwa on Ahmadiyya, and the media circus over the execution of the Bali bombers. Last year's enormous Hizbut Tahrir rally in Jakarta and near victory of an Islamist candidate for governor of Jakarta also jolted observers of Indonesian politics.
A friend of Indonesia would definitely tell his colleagues that all of this must be kept in perspective. Despite a 2004 electoral surge for Islamist standard-bearer PKS, considerable success at the local and provincial levels since, and high hopes for 2009, the fundamentalists are further from taking control than they were in the 1950s. He would cite the centuries-old ebb and flow of fundamentalism that has always left the Islamists on the losing end of Indonesian history. He would also note Indonesia's extraordinary well-springs of cultural and religious tolerance.
But the Islamists are savvy. They understand better than anyone that ideas can transform a political environment without ever owning it. From Natsir until today, they have sought to prepare the grassroots for Islamization of the state. So even while national politics may register only an occasional flare of radicalism, underneath, the coals glow bright. This friend of Indonesia worries that Indonesia's mainstream political leaders will wake up too late to find that Indonesia's house is on fire and that not only did they not prevent it, but they unwittingly fanned it.
Only Time Will Tell
For a politician, sometimes the only way to deal with different audiences is to just say what he has to and accept that he may be misunderstood by those on the outside. To make that call, however, the political need should far outweigh the risk of alienating his other audiences.
In the case of President Yudhoyono's praise of Natsir, one can only conclude that either the need to accommodate Islamist sentiment is much greater than Indonesia's friends abroad appreciate or that he is miscalculating the strength of the Islamists and unnecessarily appropriating beliefs he doesn't himself hold.
Neither is a particularly comforting conclusion, but at least one friend of Indonesia hopes it is the latter.
Walter Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. A version of this article first appeared in the December 31, 2008, edition of The Jakarta Globe.
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