From 2015... The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template. Chelsea Schein, Kurt Gray. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol 41, Issue 8, June 19, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215591501
Abstract: Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is “no.” Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition—in both liberals and conservatives—is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested—and confirmed—through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes—and overlaps with—diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.
Keywords: moral pluralism, values, culture, moral foundations, political psychology
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The existence of moral disagreement across the political spectrum is uncontroversial. One need only open a news-paper to see that liberals and conservatives are divided on many issues, including abortion, capital punishment, gay rights, women’s rights, gun ownership, environmentalism, euthanasia, and the justifiability of war. What is contro-versial is whether this disagreement reflects deep differ-ences in moral cognition. Do liberals and conservatives have fundamentally different moral minds? One popular theory of moral cognition argues that liberals and conser-vatives rely on different sets of moral mechanisms (or foundations; Haidt, 2012).In contrast, we suggest that liberals and conservatives fundamentally have the same moral mind. Rather than dis-tinct and differentially activated mechanisms, we suggest that moral judgment involves a common template grounded in perceived harm (the moral dyad; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). This template is not only consistent with categorization in non-moral domains but also reconciles modern moral pluralism with historic harm-centric accounts, and provides hope for bridging political differ-ences. In this article, we test six predictions of dyadic morality, which can be summarized as follows: Harm is central in moral cognition for both liberals and conservatives.
Descriptive Diversity
An important first step in science is collecting and cataloging diversity. Biology began with natural history, in which living organisms were collected from around the world and placed into taxonomies. The most famous biological taxonomy is Linnaean classification—proposed by Carl Linnaeus—which divides organisms into five different kingdoms based on their appearance.The new renaissance of moral psychology also began with collecting and taxonomizing moral diversity based on descriptive appearance, akin to Linnaean classification. Anthropological accounts of morality in rural India were divided into three content areas of autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). One later account inspired by American political disagree-ment—Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)—taxonomizes morality into the five content areas of harm, fairness, author-ity, in-group, and purity (Haidt, 2012).Beyond providing a moral taxonomy, MFT also suggests differences in morality across liberals and conservatives, with only conservatives being concerned with authority, in-group, and purity. The idea of differences between liberals and conservatives is not new, as decades of research reveal that conservatives are more tolerant of inequality, are more religious, and believe more in a just world (for review, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In particular, classic research on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) reveals that conservatives are more submissive to authority, more likely to use aggression to protect the in-group, and more conventional in terms of sexuality (Altemeyer, 1988).Given that RWA demonstrates the sensitivity of conserva-tives to authority, in-group, and sexual/religious convention-alism, it is safe for MFT to suggest the same—especially given that MFT questionnaires about authority, in-group, and purity correlate up to r = .70 with the RWA questionnaire (Graham etal., 2011, Table 7, p. 377). Moreover, as RWA fully accounts for liberal-conservative differences revealed by MFT (Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014), one may wonder about the novelty of MFT claims. However, MFT does make one bold, unique claim—that these political dif-ferences arise from deep differences in moral cognition.
Moral Modules
Inspired by theories of basic emotions, MFT suggests that harm, fairness, in-group, authority, and purity each represent a distinct functional moral mechanism or cognitive module(Haidt, 2012). MFT defines cognitive modules as “little switches in the brains of all animals” that are “triggered” by specific moral “inputs” (Haidt, 2012, p. 123). These modules are suggested to be ultimately distinct from each other, involving fundamentally “distinct cognitive computations” (Young & Saxe, 2011, p. 203), such that violations of one content area (e.g., harm) are processed differently from those of another (e.g., purity).This “distinct cognition” prediction is best explained by the MFT analogy of moral foundations as different “taste receptors” (e.g., purity as “saltiness”), such that each moral concern triggers only one specific receptor, which gives rise to a corresponding distinct moral experience. However, recent evidence casts doubt on claims of distinct cognition, as even harm and purity—often discussed as maximally dis-tinct (Haidt, 2012)—are highly correlated (r = .87; Gray & Keeney, 2015). Moreover, the apparent cognitive differ-ences between these two content areas stem from scenario sampling bias: MFT purity violations are weirder and less severe (e.g., necrophilia) than harm violations (e.g., mur-der), and it is these general differences that give the illusion of distinct cognition (Gray & Keeney, 2015).MFT also posits that moral modules are uniquely linked to specific emotions, such that harm is specially linked to anger and purity to disgust. Recent evidence also casts doubt on this claim, as links between moral content and emotion can be explained with broader affective and conceptual con-siderations (Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, in press; Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013). Studies that purport to find a unique effect of disgust on purity fail to control for other high arousal emotions, such as anger or fear, or use statistical pro-cedures that ignore substantial shared variance between anger and disgust (Cameron etal., in press).Despite the lack of evidence for cognitive distinctness, the idea of moral “foundations” is intuitively compelling because it aligns with psychological essentialism—provid-ing a deep mental/biological explanation for important polit-ical differences. However, descriptive differences between liberals and conservatives—whether in personality, music preferences, or the moralization of specific issues—need not reflect cognitive differences. Even incredible diversity can be underlain by a common process.
Common Cognition
If science begins with cataloging diversity, its next step is often developing theories that explain this diversity with a common mechanism. In biology, Linnaeus and his contem-poraries believed that each species was distinct and immu-table, uniquely created by God. However, Darwin discovered that this incredible diversity stemmed from the simple algo-rithm of evolution. Could moral diversity also be underlain by a simple common mechanism? Could liberals and conser-vatives—despite their political disagreements—ultimately have the same moral cognition?Decades of research in cognitive psychology suggest that non-moral categorization decisions (is x a member of y cat-egory?) rely upon the process of template comparison. This template (or prototype) represents the most common, salient or important features across category instances (Murphy, 2004). Categorization decisions are made by comparing potential examples with this template, with closer matches being more robustly categorized as belonging to that cate-gory. For the category of “birds,” the template includes the features of “small,” “flying,” and “seed-eating,” which explains why sparrows are judged as more bird-like than penguins (Rosch, 1978). The same process occurs in social categorization, in which people are compared with cognitive templates called stereotypes (Smith & Zarate, 1990).The principle of parsimony suggests that moral judgments (is x act a member of the category immorality?) should also be made via template comparison. Acts should be compared to a moral template—or prototype—that extracts the most common, salient, and important elements across instances of immorality. Moral psychology suggests many potential can-didates for these elements, such as concerns about intention, causation, and outcome (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Malle, 2006); norm and affect (Nichols, 2002); and mind perception (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). The concept of harm is related to many of these elements, and we suggest it forms the basis of a cognitive moral template.
Dyadic Morality
Harm can manifest itself in different ways, but within moral contexts, it typically involves the intentional action of one person causing suffering to a second person—a perpetrator and a victim. More technically, harm involves the perception of two interacting minds, one mind (an agent) intentionally causing suffering to another mind (a patient)—what we call the moral dyad (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; see also Mikhail, 2007).The complementary roles of agent and patient stem from the two-dimensional nature of mind perception (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011) and the general dyadic structure of language (Brown & Fish, 1983) and action (Aristotle, BC350), in which agents act upon patients (Strickland, Fisher, & Knobe, 2012). The psychological power of a harm-based template stems not only from the presence of inten-tional harm in many canonical acts of immorality (e.g., murder, rape, assault, and abuse) but also from the affective potency of suffering victims (Blair, 1995), the hypersensitiv-ity of agency detection (Barrett, 2004), the early develop-ment of empathy and harm-based concerns (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Govrin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and the obvious evolutionary importance of harm (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013).It is clear that harm plays a key role in morality, helping to separate counter-normative acts into those that are immoral from those that are violations of mere social con-vention (Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Dyadic morality provides a mechanism for the role of harm. We suggest that a norm violation “x” leads people to automatically ask “is x immoral?”—per-haps to the degree that x induces negative affect (Nichols, 2002)—which then activates the dyadic harm-based tem-plate. The more an act is inherently dyadic (i.e., harmful), the better the template matches, and the more robustly it is judged as immoral, explaining why murder is judged as more immoral than masturbation. Importantly, this process of dyadic comparison is intuitive and need not rely on effortful reason, like moral judgment in general (Haidt, 2001).Although a dyadic template should be reliably present during moral judgments, we acknowledge the influence of other domain-general psychological factors, such as misin-terpreting affective arousal (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) or rote learning (i.e., “the bible says abortion is wrong”). However, a dyadic template suggests that such misinterpretation and rote learning are easier with more harmful actions. Just as it is easier to rote-learn that a jerboa (a little desert kangaroo) is a mammal than a platypus (which non-prototypically lays eggs and has a bill), it should also be easier to rote-learn that abortion is immoral than to rote-learn that dropping the Torah is immoral.Importantly, we are not suggesting that moral cognition consists of only one moral module (i.e., a foundation) of harm. Dyadic morality, with its roots in psychological con-structionism (Cameron etal., in press), denies the very exis-tence of moral modules. This template is not an on-or-off “switch” but is instead a domain-general process that allows for gradations of harm. It is also activated no matter the con-tent of the norm violation—that is, even when an act initially seems harmless (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Because harm represents the essence of immorality, it serves as a con-stant backdrop in moral cognition—one that exerts a power-ful cognitive gravity (Schein & Gray, 2014).The Pluralism of Perceived HarmModular theories such as MFT have long argued against such a common template because of the ostensible existence of harmless wrongs. For example, scenarios of consensual incest carefully constructed to be “objectively harmless” are still rated as immoral by participants (Haidt, 2001). However, we argue against the very idea of “objective” harm. Harm, like morality, is in the eye of the beholder. In fact, both harm and morality are rooted in the ambiguous perceptions of other minds. Judgments of immorality require seeing a mind capable of doing evil, and judgments of harm require seeing a mind capable of suffering (i.e., an agent and a patient; Gray & Schein, 2012).The subjective nature of harm means that bizarre “harm-less” scenarios concocted by liberal researchers (e.g., mas-turbating with a dead chicken) may not seem harmless to their more conservative participants. Indeed, many studies document the perception of harm in “harmless” cases of reli-gious blasphemy, anti-patriotism, and aberrant sexuality (DeScioli, Gilbert, & Kurzban, 2012; Kahan, 2007; for a full treatment, see Gray etal., 2014).Consider a case described by anthropologist Richard Shweder (2012): Oriya Hindu Brahmans believe it is extremely immoral for the eldest son to eat chicken immedi-ately after his father’s death. Westerners fail to see this action as wrong—or harmful—viewing it as a mere matter of reli-gious protocol, whereas Hindus consider it the eldest son’s duty to process the father’s “death pollution” through a veg-etarian diet. When the son eats chicken, he “places the father’s spiritual transmigration in deep jeopardy” (Shweder, 2012, p. 96). By understanding the perceived harm in these actions, even Western liberals can understand its perceived immorality.1 Who can deny the immorality of condemning your father to eternal suffering? MFT interprets such perceived harm as mistaken, but dyadic morality sees these perceptions as legitimate. In the language of social anthropology, dyadic morality advocates for not only moral pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of dif-ferent perceptions of morality) but also harm pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of different perceptions of harm). Harm pluralism suggests that different moral content such as purity and loyalty are (less prototypical) varieties of per-ceived harm. In contrast, MFT endorses harm monism, rejecting the legitimacy of harm in anything but direct physi-cal or emotional suffering.Indeed, the very act of separating harm into a specific modular “foundation” denies its perceived existence in moral issues such as treason or sexual impropriety. The harm monism of MFT discounts the harm that conservatives see in matters of religious and sexual propriety (Gray etal., 2014). We suggest that this harm monism stems from the liberal bias in social psychology (Inbar & Lammers, 2012), which also once long denied the legitimacy of moral pluralism. Echoing the cries of moral anthropologists, we suggest that understanding harm requires cultural sensitivity (Shweder, 2012); moral psychol-ogy should prioritize the harm pluralist perceptions of partici-pants over the harm monist theories of researchers.
The Centrality of Harm for Liberals and Conservatives
The diversity of harm provides the possibility for a unify-ing moral template in both liberals and conservatives. Rather than distinct moral mechanisms for each kind of moral content, dyadic morality suggests that immoral acts—even those of “authority” or “purity”—will activate a prototype of harm. Of course, some acts are more harmful than others, and dyadic morality predicts that increased harm (i.e., better template matches) will result in more severe judgments of immorality. Consistent with past research on RWA, we acknowledge political differences between liberals and conservative—and the possibility that these differences may translate to some differences in moral judgment. However, we predict that moral differences between liberals and conservatives have been greatly exag-gerated by MFT (a prediction consistent with Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Morgan, & Wisneski, in press).We suggest that liberals and conservatives share the same dyadic template, rather than categorically different moral minds. A harm-based moral template predicts that harm should be cen-tral in moral cognition across both moral diversity (i.e., many different moral acts) and political orientation (i.e., for both lib-erals and conservatives). Because centrality is a relatively broad concept, we operationalize it through six specific hypotheses:Hypothesis 1 (H1: Accessibility): Harm is most cogni-tively accessible across moral diversity and political ori-entation (Study 1).Hypothesis2(H2: Importance): Harm is most impor-tant across moral diversity and political orientation (Studies 2 and 3).Hypothesis3(H3: Organization): Harm organizes judg-ments of immorality across moral diversity and political orientation (Study 4).Hypothesis4(H4: Overlap): Harm overlaps substan-tially with other moral concerns across political orienta-tion (Study 5).Hypothesis5(H5: Translation): Harm is the best lingua franca for translating across moral diversity and political orientation (Study 6).Hypothesis6 (H6: Association): Harm is more implic-itly associated with moral diversity than descriptively similar concerns, across political orientation (Study 7).
Monday, April 1, 2019
Demonstrate the potential for population structure to create spurious results, especially when using methods that rely on the accumulation of large numbers of small effects
Population Genetics: Why structure matters. Nick Barton, Joachim Hermisson, Magnus Nordborg. eLIFE Sciences, Mar 21 2019. https://elifesciences.org/articles/45380
Abstract: Great care is needed when interpreting claims about the genetic basis of human variation based on data from genome-wide association studies.
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As the name suggests, GWAS scan the genome for variants – typically single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) – that are associated with a particular condition or trait (phenotype). The first GWAS for height found a small number of SNPs that jointly explained only a tiny fraction of the variation. Because this was in contrast with the high heritability seen in twin studies, it was dubbed ‘the missing heritability problem’ (reviewed in Yang et al., 2010). It was suggested that the problem was simply due to a lack of statistical power to detect polymorphisms of small effect. Subsequent studies with larger sample sizes have supported this explanation: more and more loci have been identified although most of the variation remains ‘unmappable’, presumably because sample sizes on the order of a million are still not large enough (Yengo et al., 2018).
One way in which the unmappable component of genetic variation can be included in a statistical measure is via so-called polygenic scores. These scores sum the estimated contributions to the trait across many SNPs, including those whose effects, on their own, are not statistically significant. Polygenic scores thus represent a shift from the goal of identifying major genes to predicting phenotype from genotype. Originally designed for plant and animal breeding purposes, polygenic scores can, in principle, also be used to study the genetic basis of differences between individuals and groups.
This, however, requires accurate and unbiased estimation of the effects of all SNPs included in the score, which is difficult in a structured (non-homogeneous) population when environmental differences cannot be controlled. To see why this is a problem, consider the classic example of chopstick-eating skills (Lander and Schork, 1994). While there surely are genetic variants affecting our ability to handle chopsticks, most of the variation for this trait across the globe is due to environmental differences (cultural background), and a GWAS would mostly identify variants that had nothing to do with chopstick skills, but simply happened to differ in frequency between East Asia and the rest of the world.
Several methods for dealing with this problem have been proposed. When a GWAS is carried out to identify major genes, it is relatively simple to avoid false positives by eliminating associations outside major loci regardless of whether they are due to population structure confounding or an unmappable polygenic background (Vilhjálmsson and Nordborg, 2013). However, if the goal is to make predictions, or to understand differences among populations (such as the latitudinal cline in height), we need accurate and unbiased estimates for all SNPs. Accomplishing this is extremely challenging, and it is also difficult to know whether one has succeeded.
One possibility is to compare the population estimates with estimates taken from sibling data, which should be relatively unbiased by environmental differences. In one of many examples of this, Robinson et al. used data from the GIANT Consortium (Wood et al., 2014) together with sibling data to estimate that genetic variation contributes significantly to height variation across Europe (Robinson et al., 2015). They also argued that selection must have occurred, because the differences were too large to have arisen by chance. Using estimated effect sizes provided by Robinson et al., a more sophisticated analysis by Field et al. found extremely strong evidence for selection for height across Europe (p=10−74; Field et al., 2016). Several other studies reached the same conclusion based on the GIANT data (reviewed in Berg et al., 2019; Sohail et al., 2019).
Berg et al. (who are based at Columbia University, Stanford University, UC Davis and the University of Copenhagen) and Sohail et al. (who are based at Harvard Medical School, the Broad Institute, and other institutes in the US, Finland and Sweden) now re-examine these conclusions using the recently released data from the UK Biobank (Sudlow et al., 2015). Estimating effect sizes from these data allows possible biases due to population structure confounding to be investigated, because the UK Biobank data comes from a (supposedly) more homogenous population than the GIANT data.
Using these new estimates, Berg et al. and Sohail et al. independently found that evidence for selection vanishes – along with evidence for a genetic cline in height across Europe. Instead, they show that the previously published results were due to the cumulative effects of slight biases in the effect-size estimates in the GIANT data. Surprisingly, they also found evidence for confounding in the sibling data used as a control by Robinson et al. and Field et al. This turned out to be due to a technical error in the data distributed by Robinson et al. after they published their paper.
This means we still do not know whether genetics and selection are responsible for the pattern of height differences seen across Europe. That genetics plays a major role in height differences between individuals is not in doubt, and it is also clear that the signal from GWAS is mostly real. The issue is that there is no perfect way to control for complex population structure and environmental heterogeneity. Biases at individual loci may be tiny, but they become highly significant when summed across thousands of loci – as is done in polygenic scores. Standard methods to control for these biases, such as principal component analysis, may work well in simulations but are often insufficient when confronted with real data. Importantly, no natural population is unstructured: indeed, even the data in the UK Biobank seems to contain significant structure (Haworth et al., 2019).
Berg et al. and Sohail et al. demonstrate the potential for population structure to create spurious results, especially when using methods that rely on large numbers of small effects, such as polygenic scores. Caution is clearly needed when interpreting and using the results of such studies. For clinical predictions, risks must be weighed against benefits (Rosenberg et al., 2019). In some cases, such as recommendations for more frequent medical checkups for patients found at higher ‘genetic’ risk of a condition, it may not matter greatly whether predictors are confounded as long as they work. By contrast, the results of behavioral studies of traits such as IQ and educational attainment (Plomin and von Stumm, 2018) must be presented carefully, because while the benefits are far from obvious, the risks of such results being misinterpreted and misused are quite clear. The problem is worsened by the tendency of popular media to ignore caveats and uncertainties of estimates.
Finally, although quantitative genetics has proved highly successful in plant and animal breeding, it should be remembered that this success has been based on large pedigrees, well-controlled environments, and short-term prediction. When these methods have been applied to natural populations, even the most basic predictions fail, in large part due to poorly understood environmental factors (Charmantier et al., 2014). Natural populations are never homogeneous, and it is therefore misleading to imply there is a qualitative difference between ‘within-population’ and ‘between-population’ comparisons – as was recently done in connection with James Watson’s statements about race and IQ (Harmon, 2019). With respect to confounding by population structure, the key qualitative difference is between controlling the environment experimentally, and not doing so. Once we leave an experimental setting, we are effectively skating on thin ice, and whether the ice will hold depends on how far out we skate.
Abstract: Great care is needed when interpreting claims about the genetic basis of human variation based on data from genome-wide association studies.
---
As the name suggests, GWAS scan the genome for variants – typically single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) – that are associated with a particular condition or trait (phenotype). The first GWAS for height found a small number of SNPs that jointly explained only a tiny fraction of the variation. Because this was in contrast with the high heritability seen in twin studies, it was dubbed ‘the missing heritability problem’ (reviewed in Yang et al., 2010). It was suggested that the problem was simply due to a lack of statistical power to detect polymorphisms of small effect. Subsequent studies with larger sample sizes have supported this explanation: more and more loci have been identified although most of the variation remains ‘unmappable’, presumably because sample sizes on the order of a million are still not large enough (Yengo et al., 2018).
One way in which the unmappable component of genetic variation can be included in a statistical measure is via so-called polygenic scores. These scores sum the estimated contributions to the trait across many SNPs, including those whose effects, on their own, are not statistically significant. Polygenic scores thus represent a shift from the goal of identifying major genes to predicting phenotype from genotype. Originally designed for plant and animal breeding purposes, polygenic scores can, in principle, also be used to study the genetic basis of differences between individuals and groups.
This, however, requires accurate and unbiased estimation of the effects of all SNPs included in the score, which is difficult in a structured (non-homogeneous) population when environmental differences cannot be controlled. To see why this is a problem, consider the classic example of chopstick-eating skills (Lander and Schork, 1994). While there surely are genetic variants affecting our ability to handle chopsticks, most of the variation for this trait across the globe is due to environmental differences (cultural background), and a GWAS would mostly identify variants that had nothing to do with chopstick skills, but simply happened to differ in frequency between East Asia and the rest of the world.
Several methods for dealing with this problem have been proposed. When a GWAS is carried out to identify major genes, it is relatively simple to avoid false positives by eliminating associations outside major loci regardless of whether they are due to population structure confounding or an unmappable polygenic background (Vilhjálmsson and Nordborg, 2013). However, if the goal is to make predictions, or to understand differences among populations (such as the latitudinal cline in height), we need accurate and unbiased estimates for all SNPs. Accomplishing this is extremely challenging, and it is also difficult to know whether one has succeeded.
One possibility is to compare the population estimates with estimates taken from sibling data, which should be relatively unbiased by environmental differences. In one of many examples of this, Robinson et al. used data from the GIANT Consortium (Wood et al., 2014) together with sibling data to estimate that genetic variation contributes significantly to height variation across Europe (Robinson et al., 2015). They also argued that selection must have occurred, because the differences were too large to have arisen by chance. Using estimated effect sizes provided by Robinson et al., a more sophisticated analysis by Field et al. found extremely strong evidence for selection for height across Europe (p=10−74; Field et al., 2016). Several other studies reached the same conclusion based on the GIANT data (reviewed in Berg et al., 2019; Sohail et al., 2019).
Berg et al. (who are based at Columbia University, Stanford University, UC Davis and the University of Copenhagen) and Sohail et al. (who are based at Harvard Medical School, the Broad Institute, and other institutes in the US, Finland and Sweden) now re-examine these conclusions using the recently released data from the UK Biobank (Sudlow et al., 2015). Estimating effect sizes from these data allows possible biases due to population structure confounding to be investigated, because the UK Biobank data comes from a (supposedly) more homogenous population than the GIANT data.
Using these new estimates, Berg et al. and Sohail et al. independently found that evidence for selection vanishes – along with evidence for a genetic cline in height across Europe. Instead, they show that the previously published results were due to the cumulative effects of slight biases in the effect-size estimates in the GIANT data. Surprisingly, they also found evidence for confounding in the sibling data used as a control by Robinson et al. and Field et al. This turned out to be due to a technical error in the data distributed by Robinson et al. after they published their paper.
This means we still do not know whether genetics and selection are responsible for the pattern of height differences seen across Europe. That genetics plays a major role in height differences between individuals is not in doubt, and it is also clear that the signal from GWAS is mostly real. The issue is that there is no perfect way to control for complex population structure and environmental heterogeneity. Biases at individual loci may be tiny, but they become highly significant when summed across thousands of loci – as is done in polygenic scores. Standard methods to control for these biases, such as principal component analysis, may work well in simulations but are often insufficient when confronted with real data. Importantly, no natural population is unstructured: indeed, even the data in the UK Biobank seems to contain significant structure (Haworth et al., 2019).
Berg et al. and Sohail et al. demonstrate the potential for population structure to create spurious results, especially when using methods that rely on large numbers of small effects, such as polygenic scores. Caution is clearly needed when interpreting and using the results of such studies. For clinical predictions, risks must be weighed against benefits (Rosenberg et al., 2019). In some cases, such as recommendations for more frequent medical checkups for patients found at higher ‘genetic’ risk of a condition, it may not matter greatly whether predictors are confounded as long as they work. By contrast, the results of behavioral studies of traits such as IQ and educational attainment (Plomin and von Stumm, 2018) must be presented carefully, because while the benefits are far from obvious, the risks of such results being misinterpreted and misused are quite clear. The problem is worsened by the tendency of popular media to ignore caveats and uncertainties of estimates.
Finally, although quantitative genetics has proved highly successful in plant and animal breeding, it should be remembered that this success has been based on large pedigrees, well-controlled environments, and short-term prediction. When these methods have been applied to natural populations, even the most basic predictions fail, in large part due to poorly understood environmental factors (Charmantier et al., 2014). Natural populations are never homogeneous, and it is therefore misleading to imply there is a qualitative difference between ‘within-population’ and ‘between-population’ comparisons – as was recently done in connection with James Watson’s statements about race and IQ (Harmon, 2019). With respect to confounding by population structure, the key qualitative difference is between controlling the environment experimentally, and not doing so. Once we leave an experimental setting, we are effectively skating on thin ice, and whether the ice will hold depends on how far out we skate.
The decline in adolescent substance use across Europe & North America in the early twenty-first century: Associated with declines in face-to-face contact, not with increases in use of electronic media
The decline in adolescent substance use across Europe and North America in the early twenty-first century: A result of the digital revolution? Margaretha De Looze et al. International Journal of Public Health, March 2019, Volume 64, Issue 2, pp 229–240. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00038-018-1182-7
Abstract
Objectives: Increases in electronic media communication (EMC) and decreases in face-to-face peer contact in the evening (FTF) have been thought to explain the recent decline in adolescent substance use (alcohol, tobacco, cannabis). This study addresses this hypothesis, by examining associations between (time trends in) EMC, FTF, and substance use in more than 25 mainly European countries.
Methods: Using 2002–2014 data from the international Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study, we ran multilevel logistic regression analyses to investigate the above associations.
Results: National declines in substance use were associated with declines in FTF, but not with increases in EMC. At the individual level, both EMC and FTF related positively to substance use. For alcohol and cannabis use, the positive association with EMC was stronger in more recent years. Associations between EMC and substance use varied across countries, but this variation could not be explained by the proportion of young people using EMC within countries.
Conclusions: Our research suggests that the decrease in FTF, but not the increase in EMC, plays a role in the recent decrease in adolescent substance use.
Keywords: Adolescence Substance use Tobacco Alcohol Cannabis Electronic media communication Internet Trends over time Europe Time spent with friends
Abstract
Objectives: Increases in electronic media communication (EMC) and decreases in face-to-face peer contact in the evening (FTF) have been thought to explain the recent decline in adolescent substance use (alcohol, tobacco, cannabis). This study addresses this hypothesis, by examining associations between (time trends in) EMC, FTF, and substance use in more than 25 mainly European countries.
Methods: Using 2002–2014 data from the international Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study, we ran multilevel logistic regression analyses to investigate the above associations.
Results: National declines in substance use were associated with declines in FTF, but not with increases in EMC. At the individual level, both EMC and FTF related positively to substance use. For alcohol and cannabis use, the positive association with EMC was stronger in more recent years. Associations between EMC and substance use varied across countries, but this variation could not be explained by the proportion of young people using EMC within countries.
Conclusions: Our research suggests that the decrease in FTF, but not the increase in EMC, plays a role in the recent decrease in adolescent substance use.
Keywords: Adolescence Substance use Tobacco Alcohol Cannabis Electronic media communication Internet Trends over time Europe Time spent with friends
Women in Science preferred spatial toys in childhood more than women in Arts; they scored higher in mental rotation when they had preferred spatial toys; sport practice related with mental rotation performance
Childhood preference for spatial toys. Gender differences and relationships with mental rotation in STEM and non-STEM students. Angelica Moè, Petra Jansen, Stefanie Pietsch. Learning and Individual Differences, Volume 68, December 2018, Pages 108-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2018.10.003
Highlights
• Women in Science preferred spatial toys in childhood more than women in Arts.
• They scored higher in mental rotation when they had preferred spatial toys.
• Sport practice related with mental rotation performance.
Abstract: Women tend not to choose STEM degrees, for a number of reasons associated with aptitudes, motivation and experience with certain spatial tasks such as mental rotation. This study considered an unexplored experiential factor: childhood preference for spatial toys and sports. It was predicted that the higher the preference for spatial activities in childhood, the higher the mental rotation performance and intrinsic motivation, and likewise the greater the probability of choosing a STEM degree. One hundred seventy-six Italian and German students attending the first year of either a STEM (n = 90) or a no STEM (n = 86) degree filled in the Mental Rotation Test, a self-report to assess intrinsic motivation, and two questionnaires to assess their actual practice with spatial sports and their childhood preference for either spatial or non-spatial toys and sports. The results showed that women in STEM degrees preferred spatial toys more than women in non-STEM degrees and performed better in mental rotation when preferred spatial toys in childhood. The discussion focuses on the relationship between childhood toy preferences and the choice of a STEM degree.
Highlights
• Women in Science preferred spatial toys in childhood more than women in Arts.
• They scored higher in mental rotation when they had preferred spatial toys.
• Sport practice related with mental rotation performance.
Abstract: Women tend not to choose STEM degrees, for a number of reasons associated with aptitudes, motivation and experience with certain spatial tasks such as mental rotation. This study considered an unexplored experiential factor: childhood preference for spatial toys and sports. It was predicted that the higher the preference for spatial activities in childhood, the higher the mental rotation performance and intrinsic motivation, and likewise the greater the probability of choosing a STEM degree. One hundred seventy-six Italian and German students attending the first year of either a STEM (n = 90) or a no STEM (n = 86) degree filled in the Mental Rotation Test, a self-report to assess intrinsic motivation, and two questionnaires to assess their actual practice with spatial sports and their childhood preference for either spatial or non-spatial toys and sports. The results showed that women in STEM degrees preferred spatial toys more than women in non-STEM degrees and performed better in mental rotation when preferred spatial toys in childhood. The discussion focuses on the relationship between childhood toy preferences and the choice of a STEM degree.
Girls read more than boys: It also happens with digital devices; cause is much bigger motivation to read
Gender gap in reading digitally? Examining the role of motivation and self-concept. Nele McElvany, Franziska Schwabe. Journal for Educational Research Online, Vol 11, No 1 (2019), http://www.j-e-r-o.com/index.php/jero/article/view/882
Abstract: Reading is a core prerequisite for educational success and participation in society. However, comprehensive empirical research is needed to understand how reading may differ in a digitalized world. The current study addressed the gender gap in reading digitally. It investigated competence scores along with information on (a) reading and (b) digital motivation and self-concept in 588 elementary school students. Results revealed a gender gap in reading digitally, in reading motivation and self-concept, and in motivation and self-concept in respect to working on digital devices. Only reading motivation variables predicted reading digitally, thereby providing important information on the validity of digitally based reading tests. Reading motivation was found to fully mediate the gender effect on reading digitally. Results have important implications for research and practice.
Keywords: Reading; Motivation; Digitalization; Elementary school
.
Abstract: Reading is a core prerequisite for educational success and participation in society. However, comprehensive empirical research is needed to understand how reading may differ in a digitalized world. The current study addressed the gender gap in reading digitally. It investigated competence scores along with information on (a) reading and (b) digital motivation and self-concept in 588 elementary school students. Results revealed a gender gap in reading digitally, in reading motivation and self-concept, and in motivation and self-concept in respect to working on digital devices. Only reading motivation variables predicted reading digitally, thereby providing important information on the validity of digitally based reading tests. Reading motivation was found to fully mediate the gender effect on reading digitally. Results have important implications for research and practice.
Keywords: Reading; Motivation; Digitalization; Elementary school
.
Welfare implications of labor market power: Declining labor market concentration increase labor's share of income by 2.89 pct points 1976-2014, suggesting that labor market concentration is not the reason for a declining labor share
Labor Market Power. David W. Berger, Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey. NBER Working Paper No. 25719. March 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25719
Abstract: What are the welfare implications of labor market power? We provide an answer to this question in two steps: (1) we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market, (2) we estimate key parameters using within-firm-state, across-market differences in wage and employment responses to state corporate tax changes in U.S. Census data. We validate the model against recent evidence on productivity-wage pass-through, and new measurements of the distribution of local market concentration. The model implies welfare losses from labor market power that range from 2.9 to 8.0 percent of lifetime consumption. However, despite large contemporaneous losses, labor market power has not contributed to the declining labor share. Finally, we show that minimum wages can deliver moderate, and limited, welfare gains by reallocating workers from smaller to larger, more productive firms.
Tyler Cowen summarizing (Some implications of monopsony models, Mar 01 2019, https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/04/some-implications-of-monopsony-models.html):
Abstract: What are the welfare implications of labor market power? We provide an answer to this question in two steps: (1) we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market, (2) we estimate key parameters using within-firm-state, across-market differences in wage and employment responses to state corporate tax changes in U.S. Census data. We validate the model against recent evidence on productivity-wage pass-through, and new measurements of the distribution of local market concentration. The model implies welfare losses from labor market power that range from 2.9 to 8.0 percent of lifetime consumption. However, despite large contemporaneous losses, labor market power has not contributed to the declining labor share. Finally, we show that minimum wages can deliver moderate, and limited, welfare gains by reallocating workers from smaller to larger, more productive firms.
Tyler Cowen summarizing (Some implications of monopsony models, Mar 01 2019, https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/04/some-implications-of-monopsony-models.html):
More workers ought to be in larger firms, as those firms are afraid to hire more, knowing that bids up wages for everyone. Therefore (ceteris paribus) the large firms in the economy ought to be larger.Raising the legal minimum wage also reallocates workers into larger firms, and again makes them larger.Tough stuff if you worry a lot about both monopoly and monopsony at the same time -- choose your poison!I have adapted those points from a recent paper by David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Simon Mongey, "Labor Market Power." On the empirics, they conclude: "Our theory implies that this declining labor market concentration increase labor's share of income by 2.89 percentage points between 1976 and 2014, suggesting that labor market concentration is not the reason for a declining labor share." So the paper makes no one happy (good!): monopsony is significant, but has been declining in import.
Sunday, March 31, 2019
It is possible that in the past, marriage led to increased levels of happiness and better health, but modern, sophisticated research is proving contrary today
Does Marriage Make You Happier in the Long Term? Studies show that marriage loses steam quite quickly. Elyakim Kislev. Psychology Today, Mar 31, 2019, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/happy-singlehood/201903/does-marriage-make-you-happier-in-the-long-term
Marriage has been woven into the fabric of society throughout history. The idea has been: Find your “soulmate,” marry that individual, and you will be infinitely happy. Numerous studies in the 20th and early 21st centuries have glorified and portrayed marriage as benevolent and beneficial to all, and have stigmatized what it means to be single. [...]
However, newer studies are proving that married people are not happier and healthier as was previously believed.
An award-winning study (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.119.9139) on more than 24,000 German adults found that people who got married tended to be a bit happier in the year of the wedding, but eventually their happiness returned to where it was prior. [...]
Another study (http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0055), based on data from a national, 17-year, 5-wave panel sample, finds declines in happiness levels at all marital durations with no support for an upturn in marital happiness in later years. It is striking to see that this finding has a biological basis in the brain chemical phenylethylamine (or PEA), which associates with feelings of well-being. The researchers of the latter study argue that the decline in happiness (and the frequency of sexual activity) may occur either because neurons become habituated to the effects of PEA or because of a decline in the levels of PEA over time.
Yet another study (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/86ad/6cb6604b5ea809f803c37788d97e7dec039a.pdf) of data from the 1984-2004 German Socio-Economic Panel supports the conclusions of the previous studies. In this study, the authors also find no evidence that children affect life satisfaction. The authors state that the typical explanation for the benefits of marriage is the “social support” that people derive from their partner. There is a positive effect of companionship, emotional support, and sustained sexual intimacy. However, these benefits dwindle after time, [...].
Even other studies that show a slight, lasting happiness advantage conferred by marriage admit that this uptick is partly due to the selection effect (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/happy-singlehood/201901/are-married-people-happier-think-again) whereby happier people tend to marry rather than marriage bringing happiness to the ones who were less happy to begin with.
It is therefore possible that in the past, marriage led to increased levels of happiness and better health. But modern, sophisticated research is proving contrary. Society must catch up and begin to dissolve the generations’ long misconception of marriage as the societal ideal. Single people can and do live happy lives. If you are looking to live a fulfilling and happy life, thinking long term shows that marriage should not be the most important factor.
This article was written with Lindsay Workman, UC Berkeley.
Marriage has been woven into the fabric of society throughout history. The idea has been: Find your “soulmate,” marry that individual, and you will be infinitely happy. Numerous studies in the 20th and early 21st centuries have glorified and portrayed marriage as benevolent and beneficial to all, and have stigmatized what it means to be single. [...]
However, newer studies are proving that married people are not happier and healthier as was previously believed.
An award-winning study (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.119.9139) on more than 24,000 German adults found that people who got married tended to be a bit happier in the year of the wedding, but eventually their happiness returned to where it was prior. [...]
Another study (http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0055), based on data from a national, 17-year, 5-wave panel sample, finds declines in happiness levels at all marital durations with no support for an upturn in marital happiness in later years. It is striking to see that this finding has a biological basis in the brain chemical phenylethylamine (or PEA), which associates with feelings of well-being. The researchers of the latter study argue that the decline in happiness (and the frequency of sexual activity) may occur either because neurons become habituated to the effects of PEA or because of a decline in the levels of PEA over time.
Yet another study (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/86ad/6cb6604b5ea809f803c37788d97e7dec039a.pdf) of data from the 1984-2004 German Socio-Economic Panel supports the conclusions of the previous studies. In this study, the authors also find no evidence that children affect life satisfaction. The authors state that the typical explanation for the benefits of marriage is the “social support” that people derive from their partner. There is a positive effect of companionship, emotional support, and sustained sexual intimacy. However, these benefits dwindle after time, [...].
Even other studies that show a slight, lasting happiness advantage conferred by marriage admit that this uptick is partly due to the selection effect (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/happy-singlehood/201901/are-married-people-happier-think-again) whereby happier people tend to marry rather than marriage bringing happiness to the ones who were less happy to begin with.
It is therefore possible that in the past, marriage led to increased levels of happiness and better health. But modern, sophisticated research is proving contrary. Society must catch up and begin to dissolve the generations’ long misconception of marriage as the societal ideal. Single people can and do live happy lives. If you are looking to live a fulfilling and happy life, thinking long term shows that marriage should not be the most important factor.
This article was written with Lindsay Workman, UC Berkeley.
Optimism increased throughout early & middle adulthood before plateauing at age 55; experience of positive events was associated with optimism development across adulthood; negative life events were not associated with development
Optimism Development Across Adulthood and Associations With Positive and Negative Life Events. Ted Schwaba et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, March 21, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619832023
Abstract: Numerous studies have demonstrated long-term benefits of optimism for physical and mental health. However, little research has examined how optimism develops across the life span and how it is shaped by positive and negative life experiences. In this study, we examined the normative trajectory of optimism development from ages 26 to 71 in a longitudinal sample (N = 1,169) of Mexican-origin couples assessed 4 times across 7 years. Latent growth curve analyses indicated that optimism increased throughout early and middle adulthood before plateauing at age 55, with significant individual differences in change. Furthermore, the experience of positive events was associated with optimism development across adulthood, but negative life events were not associated with development. Men and women developed similarly in optimism, while U.S.-born participants developed differently from Mexican-born participants. We discuss how these findings inform our understanding of optimism as a dynamic, adaptive construct.
Keywords: optimism/pessimism, personality development, adult personality development
Abstract: Numerous studies have demonstrated long-term benefits of optimism for physical and mental health. However, little research has examined how optimism develops across the life span and how it is shaped by positive and negative life experiences. In this study, we examined the normative trajectory of optimism development from ages 26 to 71 in a longitudinal sample (N = 1,169) of Mexican-origin couples assessed 4 times across 7 years. Latent growth curve analyses indicated that optimism increased throughout early and middle adulthood before plateauing at age 55, with significant individual differences in change. Furthermore, the experience of positive events was associated with optimism development across adulthood, but negative life events were not associated with development. Men and women developed similarly in optimism, while U.S.-born participants developed differently from Mexican-born participants. We discuss how these findings inform our understanding of optimism as a dynamic, adaptive construct.
Keywords: optimism/pessimism, personality development, adult personality development
Adolescent Norwegian rats show prosocial behavior even when they can escape without helping
Carvalheiro, J., Seara-Cardoso, A., Mesquita, A. R., de Sousa, L., Oliveira, P., Summavielle, T., & Magalhães, A. (2019). Helping behavior in rats (Rattus norvegicus) when an escape alternative is present. Journal of Comparative Psychology, Mar 2019.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000178
Abstract: Prosocial behavior in rats is known to occur in response to a familiar rat’s distress, but the motivations underlying prosocial behavior remain elusive. In this study, we adapted the experimental setting of Ben-Ami Bartal, Decety, and Mason (2011) to explore different motivations behind helping behavior in adolescent rats. In the original setting, a free rat is placed in an arena where a cagemate is trapped inside a restrainer that can only be opened from the outside by the free rat. Here we added a dark compartment to the experimental setting that allowed the free rat to escape the arena and the distress evoked by the trapped cagemate, based on rodents’ aversion to bright areas. As a control, we tested rats in the same arena but with the door to the dark area closed. Our results showed that all free rats, except one in the escape condition, learned to open the restrainer’s door. However, in the escape condition, rats took significantly longer to open the restrainer to the cagemates when compared with rats that could not escape. To further explore the motivations underlying these group differences in door-opening latencies, we measured both rats’ behavior. We found that struggling behavior (i.e., distress) in the trapped rat did not affect door-opening, whereas exploratory behavior (i.e., proactive/positive behavior) in both rats contributed to shorter times. Our results highlight that adolescent rats show prosocial behavior even when they can escape without helping and contribute to demonstrate the role of positive emotional states in prosocial behavior.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000178
Abstract: Prosocial behavior in rats is known to occur in response to a familiar rat’s distress, but the motivations underlying prosocial behavior remain elusive. In this study, we adapted the experimental setting of Ben-Ami Bartal, Decety, and Mason (2011) to explore different motivations behind helping behavior in adolescent rats. In the original setting, a free rat is placed in an arena where a cagemate is trapped inside a restrainer that can only be opened from the outside by the free rat. Here we added a dark compartment to the experimental setting that allowed the free rat to escape the arena and the distress evoked by the trapped cagemate, based on rodents’ aversion to bright areas. As a control, we tested rats in the same arena but with the door to the dark area closed. Our results showed that all free rats, except one in the escape condition, learned to open the restrainer’s door. However, in the escape condition, rats took significantly longer to open the restrainer to the cagemates when compared with rats that could not escape. To further explore the motivations underlying these group differences in door-opening latencies, we measured both rats’ behavior. We found that struggling behavior (i.e., distress) in the trapped rat did not affect door-opening, whereas exploratory behavior (i.e., proactive/positive behavior) in both rats contributed to shorter times. Our results highlight that adolescent rats show prosocial behavior even when they can escape without helping and contribute to demonstrate the role of positive emotional states in prosocial behavior.
Callous-unemotional traits: Heritability likely lies at 36–67%; candidate gene studies implicate the serotonin & oxytocin systems in CU traits; no genome-wide loci for CU traits have yet been reported
The genetic underpinnings of callous-unemotional traits: A systematic research review. Ashlee A. Moore et al. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Volume 100, May 2019, Pages 85-97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.02.018
Highlights
• Callous-unemotional (CU) traits represent the affective features of psychopathy.
• The heritability of CU traits likely lies between 36–67%.
• Candidate gene studies implicate the serotonin and oxytocin systems in CU traits.
• Epigenetic changes to serotonin and oxytocin genes are associated with CU traits.
• No genome-wide loci for CU traits have yet been reported.
Abstract
Background: Callous-unemotional (CU) traits represent the affective features of psychopathy used to delineate youth at high risk for externalizing pathology. The genetic etiology CU traits is not currently well-understood.
Methods: The current review surveyed the literature for studies on the genetic underpinnings of CU traits and integrated information from 39 genetic studies.
Results: The results from 24 studies with quantitative data suggest that the heritability for CU traits is likely between 36–67%. A majority of the 16 molecular genetic studies focused on candidate genes in the serotonin and oxytocin systems with results that have not been well replicated. Although two genome-wide association studies have been conducted, no genome-wide significant loci have been discovered.
Discussion: There is some evidence to suggest that the serotonin and oxytocin systems may play a role in CU traits; however, there is currently not enough evidence to implicate specific genetic mechanisms. The authors encourage researchers to continue to apply the most up-to-date and relevant methodology, specifically collaborations and consortiums using genome-wide and polygenic methods.
Highlights
• Callous-unemotional (CU) traits represent the affective features of psychopathy.
• The heritability of CU traits likely lies between 36–67%.
• Candidate gene studies implicate the serotonin and oxytocin systems in CU traits.
• Epigenetic changes to serotonin and oxytocin genes are associated with CU traits.
• No genome-wide loci for CU traits have yet been reported.
Abstract
Background: Callous-unemotional (CU) traits represent the affective features of psychopathy used to delineate youth at high risk for externalizing pathology. The genetic etiology CU traits is not currently well-understood.
Methods: The current review surveyed the literature for studies on the genetic underpinnings of CU traits and integrated information from 39 genetic studies.
Results: The results from 24 studies with quantitative data suggest that the heritability for CU traits is likely between 36–67%. A majority of the 16 molecular genetic studies focused on candidate genes in the serotonin and oxytocin systems with results that have not been well replicated. Although two genome-wide association studies have been conducted, no genome-wide significant loci have been discovered.
Discussion: There is some evidence to suggest that the serotonin and oxytocin systems may play a role in CU traits; however, there is currently not enough evidence to implicate specific genetic mechanisms. The authors encourage researchers to continue to apply the most up-to-date and relevant methodology, specifically collaborations and consortiums using genome-wide and polygenic methods.
The cognitive neuroscience of lucid dreaming: EEG studies of lucid dreaming are mostly underpowered and show mixed results
The cognitive neuroscience of lucid dreaming. Benjamin Baird, Sergio A. Mota-Rolim, Martin Dresler. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Volume 100, May 2019, Pages 305-323. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.03.008
Highlights
• EEG studies of lucid dreaming are mostly underpowered and show mixed results.
• Preliminary neuroimaging data implicates frontoparietal cortices in lucid dreaming.
• Cholinergic stimulation with mental set shows promise for inducing lucid dreams.
• We present best-practice procedures to investigate lucid dreaming in the laboratory.
Abstract: Lucid dreaming refers to the phenomenon of becoming aware of the fact that one is dreaming during ongoing sleep. Despite having been physiologically validated for decades, the neurobiology of lucid dreaming is still incompletely characterized. Here we review the neuroscientific literature on lucid dreaming, including electroencephalographic, neuroimaging, brain lesion, pharmacological and brain stimulation studies. Electroencephalographic studies of lucid dreaming are mostly underpowered and show mixed results. Neuroimaging data is scant but preliminary results suggest that prefrontal and parietal regions are involved in lucid dreaming. A focus of research is also to develop methods to induce lucid dreams. Combining training in mental set with cholinergic stimulation has shown promising results, while it remains unclear whether electrical brain stimulation could be used to induce lucid dreams. Finally, we discuss strategies to measure lucid dreaming, including best-practice procedures for the sleep laboratory. Lucid dreaming has clinical and scientific applications, and shows emerging potential as a methodology in the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. Further research with larger sample sizes and refined methodology is needed.
Highlights
• EEG studies of lucid dreaming are mostly underpowered and show mixed results.
• Preliminary neuroimaging data implicates frontoparietal cortices in lucid dreaming.
• Cholinergic stimulation with mental set shows promise for inducing lucid dreams.
• We present best-practice procedures to investigate lucid dreaming in the laboratory.
Abstract: Lucid dreaming refers to the phenomenon of becoming aware of the fact that one is dreaming during ongoing sleep. Despite having been physiologically validated for decades, the neurobiology of lucid dreaming is still incompletely characterized. Here we review the neuroscientific literature on lucid dreaming, including electroencephalographic, neuroimaging, brain lesion, pharmacological and brain stimulation studies. Electroencephalographic studies of lucid dreaming are mostly underpowered and show mixed results. Neuroimaging data is scant but preliminary results suggest that prefrontal and parietal regions are involved in lucid dreaming. A focus of research is also to develop methods to induce lucid dreams. Combining training in mental set with cholinergic stimulation has shown promising results, while it remains unclear whether electrical brain stimulation could be used to induce lucid dreams. Finally, we discuss strategies to measure lucid dreaming, including best-practice procedures for the sleep laboratory. Lucid dreaming has clinical and scientific applications, and shows emerging potential as a methodology in the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. Further research with larger sample sizes and refined methodology is needed.
Greater loneliness is associated with dense, less modular, brain connections; greater sense of life meaning is associated with increased, more modular, connectivity between default & limbic networks
Loneliness and meaning in life are reflected in the intrinsic network architecture of the brain. Mwilambwe-Tshilobo et al. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci., Mar 29 2019, nsz021. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsz021
Abstract: Social relationships imbue life with meaning, whereas loneliness diminishes the sense of meaning in life. Yet the extent of interdependence between these psychological constructs remains poorly understood. Loneliness and meaning are associated with different patterns of functional connectivity; however, no studies have investigated this directly. We took a multivariate network approach to examine resting-state fMRI functional connectivity's association with loneliness and meaning in a large cohort of adults (N=942). Loneliness and meaning in life were negatively correlated with one another. In their relationship with individually parcelled whole-brain measures of functional connectivity, a significant and reliable pattern was observed. Greater loneliness was associated with dense, and less modular, connections between default, frontoparietal and externally-directed attention and perceptual networks. A greater sense of life meaning was associated with increased, and more modular, connectivity between default and limbic networks. Low loneliness was associated with more modular brain connectivity, and lower life meaning was associated with higher between-network connectivity. These findings advance our understanding of loneliness and life meaning as distinct, yet interdependent, features of sociality. The results highlight a potential role of the default network as a central hub, providing a putative neural mechanism for shifting between feelings of isolation and purpose.
KEYWORDS: individual differences; partial least squares; personality; resting-state functional connectivity
---
Introduction
Loneliness and life meaning are psychologically-bound constructs closely tied to sociality
(Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman et al., 2009; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003). As a social
species, humans typically seek out social bonds and search for meaning and purpose throughout
the life-course. Indeed, both loneliness and a reduced sense of meaning are closely associated
with declines in functional capacity (Perissinotto et al., 2012), dementia onset (Holwerda et al.,
2014; Boyle et al., 2012), and mortality in later life (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015; Boyle et al., 2009;
Hill and Turiano, 2014). Despite these psychological and functional relationships, loneliness and
meaning in life (MIL) are considered to be distinct constructs and their degree of
interdependence remains poorly understood. Loneliness reduces the perception of a meaningful
existence (Stillman et al., 2009)—the sense that life has purpose, significance, and coherence
(Martela & Steger, 2016). This association appears to be reciprocal as MIL is strongly associated
with the presence of close relationships (Ebersole, 1998; Klinger, 1977), and previous reports
show that the subjective perception of a meaningful life promotes social engagement and helps
sustain close social bonds (Steptoe & Fancourt, 2019; Stillman & Lambert, 2013). Loneliness
arises due to deficiencies in the quality or quantity of social ties and the absence of social
connectedness, in turn, diminishes MIL, suggesting that this relationship may also be reinforcing
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). But are these constructs opposite sides of the same coin, or are they
emergent from distinct mechanisms?
Loneliness is characterized by implicit hyper-vigilance for social threats (Cacioppo et al.,
2016). While this can facilitate the identification of viable social partners and prevent rejection,
prolonged loneliness shifts exogenous attentional processes towards perceived social threats
(Bangee et al. 2014; Cacioppo, Balogh, & Cacioppo, 2015). Altered attention to external stimuli
may affect how individuals internalize perceived information and make endogenous judgments
about MIL (Hicks, Schlegel, & King, 2010). Externally-and internally-guided cognitive
processes are mediated by different neural networks and their interactions (Corbetta & Shulman,
2002; Spreng et al., 2010). This raises the possibility that loneliness and MIL are dissociable at
the level of the brain, and subserved by distinct brain networks. Investigating how individual
differences in loneliness and MIL are reflected within these neurocognitive systems may advance
our understanding of their interdependence, and how they interact to guide adaptive and
maladaptive behaviors.
A growing body of neuroimaging studies have provided important insights into the neural
correlates of loneliness, reflecting changes in brain regions associated with processing of social
information. In a task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, lonely
individuals showed increased bilateral activation in the visual cortex in response to unpleasant
social images compared to unpleasant non-social images. Regions implicated in reward
processing (e.g. ventral striatum, amygdala) and perspective-taking (e.g. temporoparietal
junction) showed lower activation when positive social images were presented, suggesting that
lonely individuals may derive less pleasure from rewarding social stimuli (Cacioppo et al.,
2009). Furthermore, other studies have linked loneliness to changes in brain morphology within
the default network (DN), a neural system involved in social and self-related processes
(Andrews‐Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). Loneliness is negatively correlated with grey
matter volume (Kanai et al., 2012) and white matter density (Nakagawa et al., 2015) in the left
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). These findings indicate that loneliness may
compromise the structural and functional integrity of multiple brain regions.
Resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) has been an invaluable analytic approach
for investigating the functional interactions between anatomically separate brain regions and
their relationship with behavior (Stevens & Spreng, 2014). Unlike task-based fMRI paradigms,
resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs–fMRI) is task-free and can be used to
simultaneously identify multiple functional networks correlated with behavior. Furthermore,
previous analyses of rs-fMRI data from healthy adult populations have consistently shown strong
congruence between brain networks derived from resting-state and those from task-based studies
(Cole et al., 2014; Stevens & Spreng, 2014; Tavor et al., 2016). In fact, task-based connectivity
estimates have been demonstrated to introduce potentially spurious functional relationships (Fox
& Raichle, 2007).
Prior studies have used rs-fMRI to characterize intrinsic functional brain networks related
to loneliness and MIL. Greater feelings of loneliness have been associated with less integrated
connectivity between attention networks (Tian et al., 2017), as well as increased RSFC within
the cingulo-opercular network, which is implicated in cognitive control (Layden et al., 2017).
These intrinsic changes are consistent with behavioral reports of associations between hyper
vigilance and loneliness (Cacioppo et al., 2016). An investigation of the neural basis of meaning
(Waytz et al., 2015) reported increased connectivity among regions of the medial temporal lobe
subsystem of the DN, implicated in autobiographical remembering and mental simulation (Andrews‐Hanna et al., 2014). While loneliness and MIL are correlated at the level of behavior, the analytical approaches used to characterize the neural representation of each construct have
focused on functional connectivity of select brain regions or networks of interest, thus precluding
inferences on a whole-brain level of integrated networks that can provide insight regarding the
relationship between loneliness and MIL. Here, we investigate individual differences in the
neural representation of loneliness and MIL within a single analytical framework.
The goal of the present study was to assess how whole-brain RSFC is associated with
individual differences in loneliness and MIL. We characterized the intrinsic architecture of brain
connectivity within a large population of healthy young adults using RSFC and individually
parcellated brain regions (Chong et al., 2017), respecting that the localized topology varies
across individuals in the cortex (e.g. Stevens et al., 2015) in order to identify the pattern of
functional connectivity within and between large-scale networks. Using multivariate partial least
squares (PLS), we characterized how patterns of RSFC relate to individual differences in
perceived loneliness and MIL. This approach permits both replication of previous RSFC
patterns, and exploratory examination of behavioral associations outside previously examined
networks.
By examining the intrinsic functional connectivity underlying individual differences in
loneliness and MIL, we test two hypotheses: First, loneliness would be associated with greater
connectivity between regions that support attention, including the FPN, dorsal attention (DAN),
and the ventral attention networks (VAN; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). In contrast, MIL would
be associated with greater connectivity within the DN. Our second hypothesis was that these
patterns of RSFC would be inversely related (i.e. individuals with high levels of loneliness will
share the same pattern of brain connectivity as those with a low sense of MIL and vice-versa). If
confirmed, this would provide support for theoretical models of sociality suggesting that
loneliness and MIL are distinct yet interdependent constructs (Lambert et al., 2013).
Discussion
Loneliness and meaning in life are important for guiding everyday behavior and
sustaining mental health and well-being over the life course and into advanced age. Yet their
neural signatures remain poorly understood. Here we used a multivariate analytical model to
examine patterns of intrinsic functional connectivity associated with individual variability in
loneliness and MIL in a large sample of healthy adults. There were three primary findings. First,
we identified reliable patterns dissociating whole-brain RSFC related to individual differences in
loneliness and MIL. Second, we observed a core role for default network connectivity in
differentiating loneliness and meaning in life. While default and frontoparietal interactions,
among others, were associated with higher levels of loneliness, this pattern differed for MIL
where connectivity between default and limbic brain regions was associated with a greater sense
of meaning. Finally, greater feelings of loneliness were associated with lower modularity, or
increased integration, between the default and frontoparietal networks and more externally
oriented networks including somatosensory and visual brain regions. In contrast, a stronger sense
of life meaning was associated with greater modularity among more internally-oriented systems
including the limbic and default networks.
Current theoretical models of sociality suggest that loneliness and MIL are discrete yet
interdependent, and potentially reinforcing (Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman et al., 2009; Twenge
et al., 2003). However, only a few studies have investigated the relationship between the loss of
social functioning (i.e. loneliness) and MIL, and these have primarily employed behavioral
methods (Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman & Lambert, 2013). More recently, investigations into the
intrinsic functional architecture of the brain at rest (i.e. in the absence of explicit task demands)
have demonstrated that these durable features of brain organization can enhance our
understanding of enduring features of mental function (Smith et al., 2015; Stevens and Spreng,
2014). Here we leveraged this idea to explore patterns of functional connectivity associated with
individual differences in loneliness and MIL.
We predicted that the DN, through its role in mediating internally directed cognition,
would be associated with MIL. A greater sense of life meaning has previously been associated
with increased connectivity within the medial temporal lobe subsystem of the DN (Waytz,
Hershfield, & Tamir, 2015). Our data complements this finding by showing increased
connectivity within nodes of the DN associated with higher MIL. Additionally, we observed a
robust, albeit unpredicted, pattern of connectivity within and between networks typically
implicated in internally-directed cognitive processes associated with higher MIL, including the
limbic and default networks, as well cognitive control regions of the FPN. The limbic network is
involved in emotional processing, which involves monitoring, evaluating, and adjusting
emotional reaction to align with current goals. Thus the ability to internally reflect upon one’s
affective state, may be important for a sense of meaning, particularly when experiencing
negative emotions (Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Consistent with this idea, individuals with a clear
sense of purpose in life report lower levels of negative affect and less emotional reactivity to
stressors in daily life (Hill, Sin, Turiano, Burrow, & Almeida, 2018).
The evolutionary theory of loneliness posits that feeling lonely is an aversive biological
signal that motivates the individual to repair or seek new social relationships, and leads to neural
changes that impact attention and processing of social information (Cacioppo & Cacioppo,
2018). While our findings are in accordance with previous studies linking loneliness with altered
RSFC in networks related to attention and executive control (Layden et al., 2017), the results
point to broader changes in brain connectivity across multiple networks. As with MIL, the most
robust associations were observed for between network interactions, and specifically between the
DN and FPN as well as networks implicated in more externally-directed cognition including
attentional (e.g. VAN) or perceptual (e.g. SOM and visual networks) processing. While the
breadth of these associations was not predicted, the VAN is associated with bottom-up or
externally monitoring for behaviorally salient features of the environment (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002), presumably detected through connections with these perceptual systems. While
we are unable to directly confirm this with the current data, this is consistent with behavioral
accounts of hyper-vigilance for external social threat associated with loneliness. Further, the DN
has been implicated in low mood and ruminative thoughts (DuPre & Spreng, 2018), which may
be elevated by a sense of loneliness. However, several methodological considerations may
account for differences between Layden et al. (2017) and the current findings. While a whole
brain analytic approach was used in both, we examined connectivity strength using individually
parcellated neurocognitive networks—thereby accounting for inter-subject functional
connectivity variability—rather than focusing on standardized network parcellation schemes.
Further, we used multivariate, data-driven analytical methods and a single model approach,
including MIL whereas the earlier study focused on attention networks to test their hypotheses.
Further, PLS methods allow for identification of both within and between network connectivity
strengths in a single analytical model (McIntosh & Mišić, 2013; McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004).
Here, the between network associations were among the most robust, and most discriminating,
patterns observed for loneliness and life meaning.
Our second hypothesis was based in part on recent findings that individual differences in
both positive and negative behavioral traits have been associated with a unique configuration of
intrinsic functional connectivity (Smith et al., 2015). Specifically, increased connectivity within
regions encompassing the DN was linked to positive behavioral traits such as life satisfaction,
and inversely related to negative behavioral traits such as perceived stress (Smith et al., 2015).
Similarly, by including both loneliness and MIL in a single model, here we were able to identify
a single pattern of functional connectivity implicating the DN that was associated with these
positive and negative constructs. Connectivity within the DN, and its connections to the limbic
network, were associated with a higher sense of life meaning and lower feelings of loneliness. In
contrast, DN connectivity to externally-oriented attentional systems and cognitive control
networks was associated with a higher sense of loneliness, and lower life meaning.
We further examined the features of whole-brain RSFC organization related to loneliness
and MIL by interrogating the modular intrinsic network architecture. Increased modularity has
been associated with more efficient processing operations and is generally considered to be a
marker of brain health (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Wig et al., 2017). The intrinsic network
organization of brain networks associated with loneliness was less modular as the DN and FPN
were less differentiated from externally-directed attention and perceptual networks. As suggested
above, this pattern of network dedifferentiation may reflect increased vigilance for social threat.
Consistent with this idea, less modular brain network architecture has been associated with
negative affect including depression, as well as normal and pathological aging (Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2014).
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whole-brain patterns of RSFC
associated with loneliness and MIL. Both MIL and loneliness are predictors of successful aging
and an important future direction would be to examine how these patterns of intrinsic brain
networks change in normal and pathological aging. Future examinations will also be necessary to
explore how the connectivity patterns identified in the present study are dynamically shaped in
response to task demands that require judgments of belonging and/or existential meaning.
Further, MIL is distinct from meaning-seeking and meaning maintenance, and these differences
will need to be explored with respect to loneliness and patterns of RSFC. This question is
particularly relevant in light of past work demonstrating a distinction between the presence of
meaning and the search for meaning (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Steger, 2012), and may have
important implications for the interpretation of our results for loneliness given that the lack of
belonging could both motivate or discourage an individual’s search for meaning.
By investigating associations between brain function, loneliness and MIL within a
common analytical framework, we were able to identify a pattern of intrinsic functional
connectivity that differentiated brain networks associated with higher MIL and lower loneliness
from those associated with lower MIL and higher loneliness. Critically, between network
interactions, particularly those involving the DN, were among the most robust and discriminating
intrinsic network markers of loneliness and MIL. Behaviorally, these findings advance our
understanding of these two constructs as distinct, yet interdependent, features of sociality
(Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman et al., 2009; Stillman & Lambert, 2013). While speculative, the
data also implicate the DN as a candidate network hub, suggesting that these brain regions may
provide a neural conduit for shifting between feelings of isolation and purpose. If confirmed,
these findings may inform future research to design behavioral and neural intervention strategies
targeted at disrupting the reinforcing cycle of loneliness and life meaning.
Abstract: Social relationships imbue life with meaning, whereas loneliness diminishes the sense of meaning in life. Yet the extent of interdependence between these psychological constructs remains poorly understood. Loneliness and meaning are associated with different patterns of functional connectivity; however, no studies have investigated this directly. We took a multivariate network approach to examine resting-state fMRI functional connectivity's association with loneliness and meaning in a large cohort of adults (N=942). Loneliness and meaning in life were negatively correlated with one another. In their relationship with individually parcelled whole-brain measures of functional connectivity, a significant and reliable pattern was observed. Greater loneliness was associated with dense, and less modular, connections between default, frontoparietal and externally-directed attention and perceptual networks. A greater sense of life meaning was associated with increased, and more modular, connectivity between default and limbic networks. Low loneliness was associated with more modular brain connectivity, and lower life meaning was associated with higher between-network connectivity. These findings advance our understanding of loneliness and life meaning as distinct, yet interdependent, features of sociality. The results highlight a potential role of the default network as a central hub, providing a putative neural mechanism for shifting between feelings of isolation and purpose.
KEYWORDS: individual differences; partial least squares; personality; resting-state functional connectivity
---
Introduction
Loneliness and life meaning are psychologically-bound constructs closely tied to sociality
(Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman et al., 2009; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003). As a social
species, humans typically seek out social bonds and search for meaning and purpose throughout
the life-course. Indeed, both loneliness and a reduced sense of meaning are closely associated
with declines in functional capacity (Perissinotto et al., 2012), dementia onset (Holwerda et al.,
2014; Boyle et al., 2012), and mortality in later life (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015; Boyle et al., 2009;
Hill and Turiano, 2014). Despite these psychological and functional relationships, loneliness and
meaning in life (MIL) are considered to be distinct constructs and their degree of
interdependence remains poorly understood. Loneliness reduces the perception of a meaningful
existence (Stillman et al., 2009)—the sense that life has purpose, significance, and coherence
(Martela & Steger, 2016). This association appears to be reciprocal as MIL is strongly associated
with the presence of close relationships (Ebersole, 1998; Klinger, 1977), and previous reports
show that the subjective perception of a meaningful life promotes social engagement and helps
sustain close social bonds (Steptoe & Fancourt, 2019; Stillman & Lambert, 2013). Loneliness
arises due to deficiencies in the quality or quantity of social ties and the absence of social
connectedness, in turn, diminishes MIL, suggesting that this relationship may also be reinforcing
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). But are these constructs opposite sides of the same coin, or are they
emergent from distinct mechanisms?
Loneliness is characterized by implicit hyper-vigilance for social threats (Cacioppo et al.,
2016). While this can facilitate the identification of viable social partners and prevent rejection,
prolonged loneliness shifts exogenous attentional processes towards perceived social threats
(Bangee et al. 2014; Cacioppo, Balogh, & Cacioppo, 2015). Altered attention to external stimuli
may affect how individuals internalize perceived information and make endogenous judgments
about MIL (Hicks, Schlegel, & King, 2010). Externally-and internally-guided cognitive
processes are mediated by different neural networks and their interactions (Corbetta & Shulman,
2002; Spreng et al., 2010). This raises the possibility that loneliness and MIL are dissociable at
the level of the brain, and subserved by distinct brain networks. Investigating how individual
differences in loneliness and MIL are reflected within these neurocognitive systems may advance
our understanding of their interdependence, and how they interact to guide adaptive and
maladaptive behaviors.
A growing body of neuroimaging studies have provided important insights into the neural
correlates of loneliness, reflecting changes in brain regions associated with processing of social
information. In a task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, lonely
individuals showed increased bilateral activation in the visual cortex in response to unpleasant
social images compared to unpleasant non-social images. Regions implicated in reward
processing (e.g. ventral striatum, amygdala) and perspective-taking (e.g. temporoparietal
junction) showed lower activation when positive social images were presented, suggesting that
lonely individuals may derive less pleasure from rewarding social stimuli (Cacioppo et al.,
2009). Furthermore, other studies have linked loneliness to changes in brain morphology within
the default network (DN), a neural system involved in social and self-related processes
(Andrews‐Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). Loneliness is negatively correlated with grey
matter volume (Kanai et al., 2012) and white matter density (Nakagawa et al., 2015) in the left
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). These findings indicate that loneliness may
compromise the structural and functional integrity of multiple brain regions.
Resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) has been an invaluable analytic approach
for investigating the functional interactions between anatomically separate brain regions and
their relationship with behavior (Stevens & Spreng, 2014). Unlike task-based fMRI paradigms,
resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs–fMRI) is task-free and can be used to
simultaneously identify multiple functional networks correlated with behavior. Furthermore,
previous analyses of rs-fMRI data from healthy adult populations have consistently shown strong
congruence between brain networks derived from resting-state and those from task-based studies
(Cole et al., 2014; Stevens & Spreng, 2014; Tavor et al., 2016). In fact, task-based connectivity
estimates have been demonstrated to introduce potentially spurious functional relationships (Fox
& Raichle, 2007).
Prior studies have used rs-fMRI to characterize intrinsic functional brain networks related
to loneliness and MIL. Greater feelings of loneliness have been associated with less integrated
connectivity between attention networks (Tian et al., 2017), as well as increased RSFC within
the cingulo-opercular network, which is implicated in cognitive control (Layden et al., 2017).
These intrinsic changes are consistent with behavioral reports of associations between hyper
vigilance and loneliness (Cacioppo et al., 2016). An investigation of the neural basis of meaning
(Waytz et al., 2015) reported increased connectivity among regions of the medial temporal lobe
subsystem of the DN, implicated in autobiographical remembering and mental simulation (Andrews‐Hanna et al., 2014). While loneliness and MIL are correlated at the level of behavior, the analytical approaches used to characterize the neural representation of each construct have
focused on functional connectivity of select brain regions or networks of interest, thus precluding
inferences on a whole-brain level of integrated networks that can provide insight regarding the
relationship between loneliness and MIL. Here, we investigate individual differences in the
neural representation of loneliness and MIL within a single analytical framework.
The goal of the present study was to assess how whole-brain RSFC is associated with
individual differences in loneliness and MIL. We characterized the intrinsic architecture of brain
connectivity within a large population of healthy young adults using RSFC and individually
parcellated brain regions (Chong et al., 2017), respecting that the localized topology varies
across individuals in the cortex (e.g. Stevens et al., 2015) in order to identify the pattern of
functional connectivity within and between large-scale networks. Using multivariate partial least
squares (PLS), we characterized how patterns of RSFC relate to individual differences in
perceived loneliness and MIL. This approach permits both replication of previous RSFC
patterns, and exploratory examination of behavioral associations outside previously examined
networks.
By examining the intrinsic functional connectivity underlying individual differences in
loneliness and MIL, we test two hypotheses: First, loneliness would be associated with greater
connectivity between regions that support attention, including the FPN, dorsal attention (DAN),
and the ventral attention networks (VAN; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). In contrast, MIL would
be associated with greater connectivity within the DN. Our second hypothesis was that these
patterns of RSFC would be inversely related (i.e. individuals with high levels of loneliness will
share the same pattern of brain connectivity as those with a low sense of MIL and vice-versa). If
confirmed, this would provide support for theoretical models of sociality suggesting that
loneliness and MIL are distinct yet interdependent constructs (Lambert et al., 2013).
Discussion
Loneliness and meaning in life are important for guiding everyday behavior and
sustaining mental health and well-being over the life course and into advanced age. Yet their
neural signatures remain poorly understood. Here we used a multivariate analytical model to
examine patterns of intrinsic functional connectivity associated with individual variability in
loneliness and MIL in a large sample of healthy adults. There were three primary findings. First,
we identified reliable patterns dissociating whole-brain RSFC related to individual differences in
loneliness and MIL. Second, we observed a core role for default network connectivity in
differentiating loneliness and meaning in life. While default and frontoparietal interactions,
among others, were associated with higher levels of loneliness, this pattern differed for MIL
where connectivity between default and limbic brain regions was associated with a greater sense
of meaning. Finally, greater feelings of loneliness were associated with lower modularity, or
increased integration, between the default and frontoparietal networks and more externally
oriented networks including somatosensory and visual brain regions. In contrast, a stronger sense
of life meaning was associated with greater modularity among more internally-oriented systems
including the limbic and default networks.
Current theoretical models of sociality suggest that loneliness and MIL are discrete yet
interdependent, and potentially reinforcing (Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman et al., 2009; Twenge
et al., 2003). However, only a few studies have investigated the relationship between the loss of
social functioning (i.e. loneliness) and MIL, and these have primarily employed behavioral
methods (Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman & Lambert, 2013). More recently, investigations into the
intrinsic functional architecture of the brain at rest (i.e. in the absence of explicit task demands)
have demonstrated that these durable features of brain organization can enhance our
understanding of enduring features of mental function (Smith et al., 2015; Stevens and Spreng,
2014). Here we leveraged this idea to explore patterns of functional connectivity associated with
individual differences in loneliness and MIL.
We predicted that the DN, through its role in mediating internally directed cognition,
would be associated with MIL. A greater sense of life meaning has previously been associated
with increased connectivity within the medial temporal lobe subsystem of the DN (Waytz,
Hershfield, & Tamir, 2015). Our data complements this finding by showing increased
connectivity within nodes of the DN associated with higher MIL. Additionally, we observed a
robust, albeit unpredicted, pattern of connectivity within and between networks typically
implicated in internally-directed cognitive processes associated with higher MIL, including the
limbic and default networks, as well cognitive control regions of the FPN. The limbic network is
involved in emotional processing, which involves monitoring, evaluating, and adjusting
emotional reaction to align with current goals. Thus the ability to internally reflect upon one’s
affective state, may be important for a sense of meaning, particularly when experiencing
negative emotions (Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Consistent with this idea, individuals with a clear
sense of purpose in life report lower levels of negative affect and less emotional reactivity to
stressors in daily life (Hill, Sin, Turiano, Burrow, & Almeida, 2018).
The evolutionary theory of loneliness posits that feeling lonely is an aversive biological
signal that motivates the individual to repair or seek new social relationships, and leads to neural
changes that impact attention and processing of social information (Cacioppo & Cacioppo,
2018). While our findings are in accordance with previous studies linking loneliness with altered
RSFC in networks related to attention and executive control (Layden et al., 2017), the results
point to broader changes in brain connectivity across multiple networks. As with MIL, the most
robust associations were observed for between network interactions, and specifically between the
DN and FPN as well as networks implicated in more externally-directed cognition including
attentional (e.g. VAN) or perceptual (e.g. SOM and visual networks) processing. While the
breadth of these associations was not predicted, the VAN is associated with bottom-up or
externally monitoring for behaviorally salient features of the environment (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002), presumably detected through connections with these perceptual systems. While
we are unable to directly confirm this with the current data, this is consistent with behavioral
accounts of hyper-vigilance for external social threat associated with loneliness. Further, the DN
has been implicated in low mood and ruminative thoughts (DuPre & Spreng, 2018), which may
be elevated by a sense of loneliness. However, several methodological considerations may
account for differences between Layden et al. (2017) and the current findings. While a whole
brain analytic approach was used in both, we examined connectivity strength using individually
parcellated neurocognitive networks—thereby accounting for inter-subject functional
connectivity variability—rather than focusing on standardized network parcellation schemes.
Further, we used multivariate, data-driven analytical methods and a single model approach,
including MIL whereas the earlier study focused on attention networks to test their hypotheses.
Further, PLS methods allow for identification of both within and between network connectivity
strengths in a single analytical model (McIntosh & Mišić, 2013; McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004).
Here, the between network associations were among the most robust, and most discriminating,
patterns observed for loneliness and life meaning.
Our second hypothesis was based in part on recent findings that individual differences in
both positive and negative behavioral traits have been associated with a unique configuration of
intrinsic functional connectivity (Smith et al., 2015). Specifically, increased connectivity within
regions encompassing the DN was linked to positive behavioral traits such as life satisfaction,
and inversely related to negative behavioral traits such as perceived stress (Smith et al., 2015).
Similarly, by including both loneliness and MIL in a single model, here we were able to identify
a single pattern of functional connectivity implicating the DN that was associated with these
positive and negative constructs. Connectivity within the DN, and its connections to the limbic
network, were associated with a higher sense of life meaning and lower feelings of loneliness. In
contrast, DN connectivity to externally-oriented attentional systems and cognitive control
networks was associated with a higher sense of loneliness, and lower life meaning.
We further examined the features of whole-brain RSFC organization related to loneliness
and MIL by interrogating the modular intrinsic network architecture. Increased modularity has
been associated with more efficient processing operations and is generally considered to be a
marker of brain health (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Wig et al., 2017). The intrinsic network
organization of brain networks associated with loneliness was less modular as the DN and FPN
were less differentiated from externally-directed attention and perceptual networks. As suggested
above, this pattern of network dedifferentiation may reflect increased vigilance for social threat.
Consistent with this idea, less modular brain network architecture has been associated with
negative affect including depression, as well as normal and pathological aging (Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2014).
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whole-brain patterns of RSFC
associated with loneliness and MIL. Both MIL and loneliness are predictors of successful aging
and an important future direction would be to examine how these patterns of intrinsic brain
networks change in normal and pathological aging. Future examinations will also be necessary to
explore how the connectivity patterns identified in the present study are dynamically shaped in
response to task demands that require judgments of belonging and/or existential meaning.
Further, MIL is distinct from meaning-seeking and meaning maintenance, and these differences
will need to be explored with respect to loneliness and patterns of RSFC. This question is
particularly relevant in light of past work demonstrating a distinction between the presence of
meaning and the search for meaning (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Steger, 2012), and may have
important implications for the interpretation of our results for loneliness given that the lack of
belonging could both motivate or discourage an individual’s search for meaning.
By investigating associations between brain function, loneliness and MIL within a
common analytical framework, we were able to identify a pattern of intrinsic functional
connectivity that differentiated brain networks associated with higher MIL and lower loneliness
from those associated with lower MIL and higher loneliness. Critically, between network
interactions, particularly those involving the DN, were among the most robust and discriminating
intrinsic network markers of loneliness and MIL. Behaviorally, these findings advance our
understanding of these two constructs as distinct, yet interdependent, features of sociality
(Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman et al., 2009; Stillman & Lambert, 2013). While speculative, the
data also implicate the DN as a candidate network hub, suggesting that these brain regions may
provide a neural conduit for shifting between feelings of isolation and purpose. If confirmed,
these findings may inform future research to design behavioral and neural intervention strategies
targeted at disrupting the reinforcing cycle of loneliness and life meaning.
Saturday, March 30, 2019
Disclosing racial preferences in sexual attraction (whether preference for some race, or disinterest in others) is considered racist even by people who overtly claim that holding such preference is not racism
The “preference” paradox: Disclosing racial preferences in attraction is considered racist even by people who overtly claim it is not. Michael Thai, Matthew J. Stainer, Fiona Kate Barlow. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 83, July 2019, Pages 70-77.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.03.004
Highlights
• It is considered more racist to have racial preference in attraction than not.
• Effect emerges even for people who claim it is not racist to have preferences.
• Effect emerges if preferences are communicated disinterest in certain races.
• Effect emerges if preferences are communicated as a preference for a certain race.
• Effect emerges whether preferences are communicated as absolute or soft.
Abstract: There is contention about whether having racial preferences in the domain of sexual attraction constitutes racism, or simply reflects benign partiality. Using a person perception paradigm, we investigated gay men's ratings of targets who disclosed racial preferences in a mock online dating profile. Across three experiments, we found that participants generally rated the target as more racist, less attractive, less dateable, and were less personally willing to have relations with him if he disclosed racial preferences than if he did not. Even participants who believed that having racial preferences is not racist consistently rated a target disclosing racial preferences as more racist, largely less dateable, and were less personally willing to have relations with him. For these participants, however, racial preference disclosure had no reliable effect on how physically attractive they found the target. Findings suggest that disclosing racial preferences in the domain of attraction is interpreted as reflecting racism, even by those who ostensibly believe that people can have non-racist racial preferences.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.03.004
Highlights
• It is considered more racist to have racial preference in attraction than not.
• Effect emerges even for people who claim it is not racist to have preferences.
• Effect emerges if preferences are communicated disinterest in certain races.
• Effect emerges if preferences are communicated as a preference for a certain race.
• Effect emerges whether preferences are communicated as absolute or soft.
Abstract: There is contention about whether having racial preferences in the domain of sexual attraction constitutes racism, or simply reflects benign partiality. Using a person perception paradigm, we investigated gay men's ratings of targets who disclosed racial preferences in a mock online dating profile. Across three experiments, we found that participants generally rated the target as more racist, less attractive, less dateable, and were less personally willing to have relations with him if he disclosed racial preferences than if he did not. Even participants who believed that having racial preferences is not racist consistently rated a target disclosing racial preferences as more racist, largely less dateable, and were less personally willing to have relations with him. For these participants, however, racial preference disclosure had no reliable effect on how physically attractive they found the target. Findings suggest that disclosing racial preferences in the domain of attraction is interpreted as reflecting racism, even by those who ostensibly believe that people can have non-racist racial preferences.
CEOs imbue their organizations with the ability to feel & ability to suffer, which makes organizational punishments more satisfying, & apologies more effective
CEOs imbue organizations with feelings, increasing punishment satisfaction and apology effectiveness. Simone Tang. KurtGray. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 79, November 2018, Pages 115-125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.06.002
Abstract: Organizations are easy to blame for wrongdoing because they seem capable of intention and planning (i.e., they possess perceived agency). However, punishing organizations for wrongdoing is often unsatisfying, perhaps because organizations seem incapable of feeling pain (i.e., they lack perceived experience). Without the ability to suffer, corporations and organizations cannot slake people's thirst for retribution, even with large fines and other penalties. CEOs may provide a potential solution to this “organization experience deficiency.” As feeling humans who embody the organizations they lead, CEOs provide a possible source of suffering and therefore organizational redemption. Across five experiments and one pre-registered experiment, we found that CEOs imbue their organizations with the ability to feel (Experiments 1–4b) and ability to suffer (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3), which makes organizational punishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3), and apologies more effective (Experiments 4a and 4b). Implications for justice and mind perception in organizations are discussed.
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1. Introduction
In 2014, car manufacturer Toyota was fined $1.2 billion for knowingly selling cars with defective accelerators. Despite the size of the fine—the largest at the time—people seemed dissatisfied and de-manded tougher sanctions (Douglas & Fletcher, 2014). Conversely,when the pharmaceutical company Valeant was fined the equivalent of$143.1 million for price gouging desperate patients—about 10% of the Toyota fine—people appeared more satisfied (Rapoport & Lublin,2016). Why the differences in reaction? Although reactions to any legal case are multiply determined (Demleitner, Berman, Miller, & Wright,2015; Erez & Rogers, 1999;Myers & Greene, 2004), Valeant's punishment might have been more satisfying because its CEO was fired, providing a tangible source of suffering. When wrongdoing occurs, people thirst for retribution, demanding an eye for an eye (Darley, 2009). Given that most immoral deeds end up harming a victim (even if only in perception; Haslam, 2016;Schein,Goranson, & Gray, 2015), people often want the perpetrator of misdeeds to suffer in kind. As most individuals possess the capacity forpain, this thirst for suffering is easily slaked when wrongdoers are punished, whether through prison time, social censure, or personal financial loss.
1.1. Organizations are deficient in experience
In contrast to individuals, organized group agents like corporations seem to lack the ability to suffer. Research in mind perception reveals that while organizations are seen as equally capable of agency (e.g.,planning and acting) compared to individuals, they are seen as muchless capable of experience (e.g., feeling and sensing, Knobe & Prinz,2008; Rai & Diermeier, 2015). This mind perception profile means that organizations are seen as moral agents (morally capable of perpetrating and being responsible for wrongdoing), but not moral experiencers (or“moral patients,”deserving of moral rights;Gray & Wegner, 2009;Opotow, 1990). In other words, companies are seen as capable of being villains perpetrating harm, but not as victims experiencing harm (Gray&Wegner, 2011;Rai & Diermeier, 2015). Consistent with this idea, society is often willing to paint corporations as evil masterminds ratherthan as deserving of compassion (Litowitz, 2003). This lack of perceived experience may be especially problematic fororganizations after they perpetrate harm because people are retributivists (Darley, 2009), and punishments are most satisfying whenthey cause the wrongdoer clear suffering (e.g.,Fitness & Peterson,2008). Of course, not all transgressions result in punishment—sometimes they are addressed through apologies to preemptpunishment (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). Even here, however,successful apologies require sincere expressions of remorse and concern (Davis & Gold, 2011; Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). As organizations seem to lack the capacity to feel remorse and suffer, their apologies may beperceived as less sincere or heartfelt. Despite these apparent deficits ofmind, there may be one way to overcome them: through their CEO.
1.2. The benefits of a CEO
Although an organization may be represented by its logo, aspokesperson, or even its iconic headquarters, the CEO is often seen asthe human embodiment of the entire organization (Forrest, 2011;Woods, 2011; YaleInsights, 2014), such as Bill Gates for Microsoft andMark Zuckerberg for Facebook. CEOs not only provide a human face foran often opaque organizational structure, but may also provide humanfeelings and emotions. Although organizations are generally seen to lackfeelings, CEOs—as human beings—possess both agency and experience,and may be able to confer (at least perceptually) feeling to the orga-nizations they personify.
More specifically, after an organization commits a moral transgression, people may use the CEO's ability to feel as a proxy for theorganization's perceived ability to feel. Although experience is a rela-tively broad construct (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), we suggest onespecific capacity within experience will be of special importance—thecapacity to suffer. Feeling pain is essential to retribution (Darley, 2009),and so we suggest that the benefits of CEO-conferred-experience willhinge upon increased perceptions of suffering in organizations. Of course, there may be other reasons beyond perceived experience as towhy punishments are more satisfying and apologies are more effectivewhen CEOs are emphasized. People often hold leaders responsible fororganizational transgressions (Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006),firmperformance (Crossland & Chen, 2013), and new initiatives (Menon,Sim, Fu, Chiu, & Hong, 2010), but we suggest that another possible,though overlooked, reason for increased punishment satisfaction is the CEO's ability to imbue the organization with perceived experience,especially the ability to suffer.
Here we explore whether CEOs are not only Chief ExecutiveOfficers, but also Chief Experiencing Officers, imbuing their organizations with the capacity to feel and providing their organizations po-tential benefits after organizational malfeasance.1.3. The current researchSix experiments investigate whether CEOs confer experience to organizations. We first test whether an organization represented by its CEO is ascribed relatively more experience than one that is not (Experiment 1). We then examine whether such imbued experi-ence—especially the ability to suffer—makespunishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) and apologies more effective(Experiments 4a and 4b). In our experiments, we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. All data were analyzed after all datacollection was complete, except for preregistered Experiment 2 (be-cause of an issue by the Qualtrics platform that led some participants inthe initial sample to experience error messages during the study), andExperiment 4b (because the effect size was smaller than expected, leaving us with insufficient power from our initial sample).
8. General discussion
Across six experiments and one preregistered replication, we found that an organization's CEO can imbue it with experience (Experiments 1-4b), which makes punishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) and apologies more effective (Experiments 4a and 4b). The more capable the CEO is seen of experience, the more effectively they imbue their organization with experience (Experiment 3). Experiment 3 also revealed that, despite thegeneral importance ofimbued experience, the perceived ability to suffer is especially important in generating positive organizational outcomes—likely because of the strong motivation for just deserts (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). These findings are important because they highlight a way for organizations to regain the approval of consumers after wrongdoing. Trust in big businesses is at an all-time low—only 6% of Americans report having a “great deal” of confidence in them (Gallup, 2016)—and such trust is essential for a functioning society (Putnam, 2000; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Our set of studies suggests one path towards rebuilding trust—the apparent suffering or remorse of CEOs.
8.1. Caveats
We note that the role of CEOs is not limited to imbuing experience, as CEOs are generally viewed as the source of an organization's behaviors (Crossland & Chen, 2013; Menon et al., 2010; Zemba et al., 2006). We further note that the presence or absence of an experiential CEO is not the only—or perhaps even most important—determinant of reactions to corporate malfeasance. Researchers have examined the factors that affect attributions of responsibility and blame across crises, including accidents and malfeasance. Consistent with current models of moral judgment (Schein & Gray, 2018), people assign less blame to harmful agents when the harm is seen as unintentional (Alicke, 2000), when they lack clear victims (Alicke & Davis, 1989), when the causation of harm is unclear (Paharia, Kassam, Greene, & Bazerman, 2009), and when they involve gradual degradation rather than abrupt drops in ethical conduct (Fincham & Shultz, 1981; Gino & Bazerman, 2009). We also acknowledge that the results may be different if people are the victims of the wrongdoing, rather than when making third-party judgments (as examined here). However, we suggest that the effects could be even stronger, as wrongdoing is more relevant for and more impactful on victims compared to observers, and related past research on motivated cognition suggests that motivated attitudes and behaviors are stronger when the event is increasingly relevant to the self (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010).
8.2. Implications
More broadly, our experiments replicate past work on mind perception revealing that people ascribe more experience to humans than to organizations (Rai & Diermeier, 2015). However, they also provide an important qualification: when an organization is represented by its CEO, the organization's experience is increased. This effect is not only practically important for organizations seeking to manage their impressions, but also has theoretical implications for how we understand groups in general and organizations in particular. Groups are often seen as the combined collection of their individual members, but this work highlights how they are also identified via their leader, who lends his or her characteristics to the collective. Just as the King or Queen of England is the human symbol of the English Commonwealth—and has the capacity to redirect resentment away from the government to him or herself (Ayling, 1972)—the CEO is the human incarnation of the organization. This helps us understand why some organizations, like Apple (prominently represented by former Steve Jobs), appear to be more capable of experience than other organizations, like Chevron (whose CEO is not as prominent)—and why (among other reasons) organizations do not want a CEO who seems like an unfeeling psychopath. A feeling CEO translates to a feeling organization, as Experiment 3 demonstrates. However, there could be a dark side to the satisfaction that people feel from the CEO's suffering. Although punishing an organization through its CEO may be more satisfying, it is often less effective and more costly than implementing systemic change, such as changes to legal policies (Cohen, 2015). That is, people's satisfaction from retribution may come at the expense of more important change, such as changing the underlying system to prevent future wrongdoing (Tufekci, 2018). This may explain why the government, the news media, and the public relish in seeing CEOs lambasted in court (e.g., The New York Times Editorial Board, 2016) and are often unwilling to let corporations off the hook until senior executives leave in disgrace (Thompson & Liakos, 2015). Given people's desire to satisfy short-term desires over long-term goals (e.g., Baumeister, 2002) and that people punish for retributive reasons (Carlsmith et al., 2002), they may end up extracting suffering from a series of CEOs at the expense of dedicating the limited amount of resources to fixing the underlying problem. An important implication of our findings for scholars and practitioners is the significance of perceiving minds in organizations when it comes to justice and punishment. People care not just about ways to rectify wrongdoing andpunish, butalsoabout whether theycan makea mind suffer in the process—and in organizations, this is often the mind of the CEO. An interesting twist, as we have shown, is that if the CEO is perceived as incapable of feeling or experience, they are less able to confer the benefits of punishment satisfaction (and presumably apology effectiveness). The inability of both the CEO and organization to experience may even lead to less punishment satisfaction and apology effectiveness than only an organization that does not experience.
Finally, although speculative, this research hints at a new understanding of extreme pay packages of CEOs. CEOs receive substantially more compensation than other employees, often making millions more than the next closest executive. Explanations for this pay gap include their background (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001), their talent (Gabaix&Landier,2006), their managerial skills (Combs&Skill,2003), their willingness to weather business volatility (Dow & Raposo, 2005), andtheirpower to influence compensation packages (Bebchuk, Fried,& Walker, 2002), but our results suggest that such a disparity can also inadvertently serve a purposeful function. After wrongdoing, CEOs who make much more money have further to fall, and so sanctions and terminations seem to cause them more suffering. Being high above the rest of the company also draws more attention to them, allowing them to act as a lightning rod to protect the rest of the company. CEOs may therefore be understood not only as powerful leaders, but also as sacrificial lambs, whose disgrace and termination after wrongdoing allows the broader organization to achieve redemption.
Abstract: Organizations are easy to blame for wrongdoing because they seem capable of intention and planning (i.e., they possess perceived agency). However, punishing organizations for wrongdoing is often unsatisfying, perhaps because organizations seem incapable of feeling pain (i.e., they lack perceived experience). Without the ability to suffer, corporations and organizations cannot slake people's thirst for retribution, even with large fines and other penalties. CEOs may provide a potential solution to this “organization experience deficiency.” As feeling humans who embody the organizations they lead, CEOs provide a possible source of suffering and therefore organizational redemption. Across five experiments and one pre-registered experiment, we found that CEOs imbue their organizations with the ability to feel (Experiments 1–4b) and ability to suffer (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3), which makes organizational punishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3), and apologies more effective (Experiments 4a and 4b). Implications for justice and mind perception in organizations are discussed.
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1. Introduction
In 2014, car manufacturer Toyota was fined $1.2 billion for knowingly selling cars with defective accelerators. Despite the size of the fine—the largest at the time—people seemed dissatisfied and de-manded tougher sanctions (Douglas & Fletcher, 2014). Conversely,when the pharmaceutical company Valeant was fined the equivalent of$143.1 million for price gouging desperate patients—about 10% of the Toyota fine—people appeared more satisfied (Rapoport & Lublin,2016). Why the differences in reaction? Although reactions to any legal case are multiply determined (Demleitner, Berman, Miller, & Wright,2015; Erez & Rogers, 1999;Myers & Greene, 2004), Valeant's punishment might have been more satisfying because its CEO was fired, providing a tangible source of suffering. When wrongdoing occurs, people thirst for retribution, demanding an eye for an eye (Darley, 2009). Given that most immoral deeds end up harming a victim (even if only in perception; Haslam, 2016;Schein,Goranson, & Gray, 2015), people often want the perpetrator of misdeeds to suffer in kind. As most individuals possess the capacity forpain, this thirst for suffering is easily slaked when wrongdoers are punished, whether through prison time, social censure, or personal financial loss.
1.1. Organizations are deficient in experience
In contrast to individuals, organized group agents like corporations seem to lack the ability to suffer. Research in mind perception reveals that while organizations are seen as equally capable of agency (e.g.,planning and acting) compared to individuals, they are seen as muchless capable of experience (e.g., feeling and sensing, Knobe & Prinz,2008; Rai & Diermeier, 2015). This mind perception profile means that organizations are seen as moral agents (morally capable of perpetrating and being responsible for wrongdoing), but not moral experiencers (or“moral patients,”deserving of moral rights;Gray & Wegner, 2009;Opotow, 1990). In other words, companies are seen as capable of being villains perpetrating harm, but not as victims experiencing harm (Gray&Wegner, 2011;Rai & Diermeier, 2015). Consistent with this idea, society is often willing to paint corporations as evil masterminds ratherthan as deserving of compassion (Litowitz, 2003). This lack of perceived experience may be especially problematic fororganizations after they perpetrate harm because people are retributivists (Darley, 2009), and punishments are most satisfying whenthey cause the wrongdoer clear suffering (e.g.,Fitness & Peterson,2008). Of course, not all transgressions result in punishment—sometimes they are addressed through apologies to preemptpunishment (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). Even here, however,successful apologies require sincere expressions of remorse and concern (Davis & Gold, 2011; Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). As organizations seem to lack the capacity to feel remorse and suffer, their apologies may beperceived as less sincere or heartfelt. Despite these apparent deficits ofmind, there may be one way to overcome them: through their CEO.
1.2. The benefits of a CEO
Although an organization may be represented by its logo, aspokesperson, or even its iconic headquarters, the CEO is often seen asthe human embodiment of the entire organization (Forrest, 2011;Woods, 2011; YaleInsights, 2014), such as Bill Gates for Microsoft andMark Zuckerberg for Facebook. CEOs not only provide a human face foran often opaque organizational structure, but may also provide humanfeelings and emotions. Although organizations are generally seen to lackfeelings, CEOs—as human beings—possess both agency and experience,and may be able to confer (at least perceptually) feeling to the orga-nizations they personify.
More specifically, after an organization commits a moral transgression, people may use the CEO's ability to feel as a proxy for theorganization's perceived ability to feel. Although experience is a rela-tively broad construct (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), we suggest onespecific capacity within experience will be of special importance—thecapacity to suffer. Feeling pain is essential to retribution (Darley, 2009),and so we suggest that the benefits of CEO-conferred-experience willhinge upon increased perceptions of suffering in organizations. Of course, there may be other reasons beyond perceived experience as towhy punishments are more satisfying and apologies are more effectivewhen CEOs are emphasized. People often hold leaders responsible fororganizational transgressions (Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006),firmperformance (Crossland & Chen, 2013), and new initiatives (Menon,Sim, Fu, Chiu, & Hong, 2010), but we suggest that another possible,though overlooked, reason for increased punishment satisfaction is the CEO's ability to imbue the organization with perceived experience,especially the ability to suffer.
Here we explore whether CEOs are not only Chief ExecutiveOfficers, but also Chief Experiencing Officers, imbuing their organizations with the capacity to feel and providing their organizations po-tential benefits after organizational malfeasance.1.3. The current researchSix experiments investigate whether CEOs confer experience to organizations. We first test whether an organization represented by its CEO is ascribed relatively more experience than one that is not (Experiment 1). We then examine whether such imbued experi-ence—especially the ability to suffer—makespunishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) and apologies more effective(Experiments 4a and 4b). In our experiments, we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. All data were analyzed after all datacollection was complete, except for preregistered Experiment 2 (be-cause of an issue by the Qualtrics platform that led some participants inthe initial sample to experience error messages during the study), andExperiment 4b (because the effect size was smaller than expected, leaving us with insufficient power from our initial sample).
8. General discussion
Across six experiments and one preregistered replication, we found that an organization's CEO can imbue it with experience (Experiments 1-4b), which makes punishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) and apologies more effective (Experiments 4a and 4b). The more capable the CEO is seen of experience, the more effectively they imbue their organization with experience (Experiment 3). Experiment 3 also revealed that, despite thegeneral importance ofimbued experience, the perceived ability to suffer is especially important in generating positive organizational outcomes—likely because of the strong motivation for just deserts (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). These findings are important because they highlight a way for organizations to regain the approval of consumers after wrongdoing. Trust in big businesses is at an all-time low—only 6% of Americans report having a “great deal” of confidence in them (Gallup, 2016)—and such trust is essential for a functioning society (Putnam, 2000; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Our set of studies suggests one path towards rebuilding trust—the apparent suffering or remorse of CEOs.
8.1. Caveats
We note that the role of CEOs is not limited to imbuing experience, as CEOs are generally viewed as the source of an organization's behaviors (Crossland & Chen, 2013; Menon et al., 2010; Zemba et al., 2006). We further note that the presence or absence of an experiential CEO is not the only—or perhaps even most important—determinant of reactions to corporate malfeasance. Researchers have examined the factors that affect attributions of responsibility and blame across crises, including accidents and malfeasance. Consistent with current models of moral judgment (Schein & Gray, 2018), people assign less blame to harmful agents when the harm is seen as unintentional (Alicke, 2000), when they lack clear victims (Alicke & Davis, 1989), when the causation of harm is unclear (Paharia, Kassam, Greene, & Bazerman, 2009), and when they involve gradual degradation rather than abrupt drops in ethical conduct (Fincham & Shultz, 1981; Gino & Bazerman, 2009). We also acknowledge that the results may be different if people are the victims of the wrongdoing, rather than when making third-party judgments (as examined here). However, we suggest that the effects could be even stronger, as wrongdoing is more relevant for and more impactful on victims compared to observers, and related past research on motivated cognition suggests that motivated attitudes and behaviors are stronger when the event is increasingly relevant to the self (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010).
8.2. Implications
More broadly, our experiments replicate past work on mind perception revealing that people ascribe more experience to humans than to organizations (Rai & Diermeier, 2015). However, they also provide an important qualification: when an organization is represented by its CEO, the organization's experience is increased. This effect is not only practically important for organizations seeking to manage their impressions, but also has theoretical implications for how we understand groups in general and organizations in particular. Groups are often seen as the combined collection of their individual members, but this work highlights how they are also identified via their leader, who lends his or her characteristics to the collective. Just as the King or Queen of England is the human symbol of the English Commonwealth—and has the capacity to redirect resentment away from the government to him or herself (Ayling, 1972)—the CEO is the human incarnation of the organization. This helps us understand why some organizations, like Apple (prominently represented by former Steve Jobs), appear to be more capable of experience than other organizations, like Chevron (whose CEO is not as prominent)—and why (among other reasons) organizations do not want a CEO who seems like an unfeeling psychopath. A feeling CEO translates to a feeling organization, as Experiment 3 demonstrates. However, there could be a dark side to the satisfaction that people feel from the CEO's suffering. Although punishing an organization through its CEO may be more satisfying, it is often less effective and more costly than implementing systemic change, such as changes to legal policies (Cohen, 2015). That is, people's satisfaction from retribution may come at the expense of more important change, such as changing the underlying system to prevent future wrongdoing (Tufekci, 2018). This may explain why the government, the news media, and the public relish in seeing CEOs lambasted in court (e.g., The New York Times Editorial Board, 2016) and are often unwilling to let corporations off the hook until senior executives leave in disgrace (Thompson & Liakos, 2015). Given people's desire to satisfy short-term desires over long-term goals (e.g., Baumeister, 2002) and that people punish for retributive reasons (Carlsmith et al., 2002), they may end up extracting suffering from a series of CEOs at the expense of dedicating the limited amount of resources to fixing the underlying problem. An important implication of our findings for scholars and practitioners is the significance of perceiving minds in organizations when it comes to justice and punishment. People care not just about ways to rectify wrongdoing andpunish, butalsoabout whether theycan makea mind suffer in the process—and in organizations, this is often the mind of the CEO. An interesting twist, as we have shown, is that if the CEO is perceived as incapable of feeling or experience, they are less able to confer the benefits of punishment satisfaction (and presumably apology effectiveness). The inability of both the CEO and organization to experience may even lead to less punishment satisfaction and apology effectiveness than only an organization that does not experience.
Finally, although speculative, this research hints at a new understanding of extreme pay packages of CEOs. CEOs receive substantially more compensation than other employees, often making millions more than the next closest executive. Explanations for this pay gap include their background (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001), their talent (Gabaix&Landier,2006), their managerial skills (Combs&Skill,2003), their willingness to weather business volatility (Dow & Raposo, 2005), andtheirpower to influence compensation packages (Bebchuk, Fried,& Walker, 2002), but our results suggest that such a disparity can also inadvertently serve a purposeful function. After wrongdoing, CEOs who make much more money have further to fall, and so sanctions and terminations seem to cause them more suffering. Being high above the rest of the company also draws more attention to them, allowing them to act as a lightning rod to protect the rest of the company. CEOs may therefore be understood not only as powerful leaders, but also as sacrificial lambs, whose disgrace and termination after wrongdoing allows the broader organization to achieve redemption.
Survey: All hospital pharmacists suffered drug shortages in the preceding year & 69.2% had more than 50 shortages; 92.4% had about 1 month from notice to shortage
Prevalence and Severity of Rationing During Drug Shortages: A National Survey of Health System Pharmacists. Andrew Hantel et al. JAMA Intern Med. March 25, 2019. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2018.8251
Abstract: Hospital medication shortages in the United States are associated with decreased quality and/or quantity of life.1,2 In severe cases, shortages require clinicians to decide which patients receive needed medications and which do not (ie, rationing drugs between patients).3 Previous studies have proposed ethical allocation frameworks and assessed the associations of specific shortages.2,4,5 We conducted a national survey of hospital pharmacy managers to investigate current drug allocation and rationing practices of US hospitals during shortages.
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Results
The study’s 719 respondents (response rate, 65.0%,based on unique listserv activity during the time of survey availability) comprised 5.7% of total PPM membership. The question completion rate was 95.4%. Respondents were demographically similar to the overall American Society of Health-System Pharmacists PPM membership. The median age was 44 years (interquartile range, 35-57 years), with 311 (43.2%) self-reporting as women and 381 (53.0%) as men; the median years in practice was 10 (interquartile range, 10-32 years). A total of 453 (63.0%) reported practicing in community hospitals,whereas 143 (19.9%) and 123 (17.1%) reported practicing in academic or academically affiliated hospitals, respectively. Respondents were from hospitals with fewer than 100 (109 [15.2%]), 100 to 199 (139 [19.3%]), 200 to 299 (111 [15.4%]), 300 to 399 (115 [15.9%]), or more than 400 beds (245 [34.0%]). All respondents reported experiencing drug shortages in the preceding year and 498 respondents (69.2%) reported more than 50 shortages. Most respondents (664 [92.4%]) reportedan average of less than 1 month from notification to active shortage, 250 (34.9%) described having no administrative mechanism to respond to shortages, 96 (13.3%) reported a standing committee that included physicians, and 20 (2.8%)included an ethicist. The Table describes the frequency of medication shortages and the strategies used to mitigate and manage them. Notably, medication hoarding was reported by 584 respondents (81.3%). More than one-third of respondents (247 [34.4%]) reportedan episode of rationing within the past year. Rationing occurred more frequently at academic hospitals (47.7% vs 25.5%;P= .01) and academically affiliated hospitals (45.4% vs 25.5%;P=.02) compared with community hospitals and in hospitals with more than 300 beds compared with those with fewer beds (46.1% vs19.7%;P< .01). During rationing, 128 respondents (51.8%) reported that the treating team alone decided on allocation meth-ods, whereas 119(48.2%) used committees, 12 (4.9%) of which included an ethicist. Only 89 patients(36.0%) were informed that their care included rationing.
Discussion
Pharmacy practice managers reported frequent medication shortages with variation in allocation and rationing methods during shortages. Many respondents described little forewarning of upcoming shortages and a lack of administrative mechanisms with which to guide medication conser-vation, and although discouraged, hoarding was widespread.3,4 Rationing was prevalent, particularly in large hospitals and academic or academically affiliated hospitals. Most respondents noted that rationing decisions were generally made by the care team without the involvement of hospital committees or ethicists. Disclosing rationing to patients was not common. This survey of PPMs suggests that more systematic approaches areneeded to address the common problem of drug shortages and consequent drug rationing. Progress in this area would be furthered by research to better understand patient and physician preferences for disclosure and the association of different management strategies with the outcomes of high-risk groups.
Abstract: Hospital medication shortages in the United States are associated with decreased quality and/or quantity of life.1,2 In severe cases, shortages require clinicians to decide which patients receive needed medications and which do not (ie, rationing drugs between patients).3 Previous studies have proposed ethical allocation frameworks and assessed the associations of specific shortages.2,4,5 We conducted a national survey of hospital pharmacy managers to investigate current drug allocation and rationing practices of US hospitals during shortages.
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Results
The study’s 719 respondents (response rate, 65.0%,based on unique listserv activity during the time of survey availability) comprised 5.7% of total PPM membership. The question completion rate was 95.4%. Respondents were demographically similar to the overall American Society of Health-System Pharmacists PPM membership. The median age was 44 years (interquartile range, 35-57 years), with 311 (43.2%) self-reporting as women and 381 (53.0%) as men; the median years in practice was 10 (interquartile range, 10-32 years). A total of 453 (63.0%) reported practicing in community hospitals,whereas 143 (19.9%) and 123 (17.1%) reported practicing in academic or academically affiliated hospitals, respectively. Respondents were from hospitals with fewer than 100 (109 [15.2%]), 100 to 199 (139 [19.3%]), 200 to 299 (111 [15.4%]), 300 to 399 (115 [15.9%]), or more than 400 beds (245 [34.0%]). All respondents reported experiencing drug shortages in the preceding year and 498 respondents (69.2%) reported more than 50 shortages. Most respondents (664 [92.4%]) reportedan average of less than 1 month from notification to active shortage, 250 (34.9%) described having no administrative mechanism to respond to shortages, 96 (13.3%) reported a standing committee that included physicians, and 20 (2.8%)included an ethicist. The Table describes the frequency of medication shortages and the strategies used to mitigate and manage them. Notably, medication hoarding was reported by 584 respondents (81.3%). More than one-third of respondents (247 [34.4%]) reportedan episode of rationing within the past year. Rationing occurred more frequently at academic hospitals (47.7% vs 25.5%;P= .01) and academically affiliated hospitals (45.4% vs 25.5%;P=.02) compared with community hospitals and in hospitals with more than 300 beds compared with those with fewer beds (46.1% vs19.7%;P< .01). During rationing, 128 respondents (51.8%) reported that the treating team alone decided on allocation meth-ods, whereas 119(48.2%) used committees, 12 (4.9%) of which included an ethicist. Only 89 patients(36.0%) were informed that their care included rationing.
Discussion
Pharmacy practice managers reported frequent medication shortages with variation in allocation and rationing methods during shortages. Many respondents described little forewarning of upcoming shortages and a lack of administrative mechanisms with which to guide medication conser-vation, and although discouraged, hoarding was widespread.3,4 Rationing was prevalent, particularly in large hospitals and academic or academically affiliated hospitals. Most respondents noted that rationing decisions were generally made by the care team without the involvement of hospital committees or ethicists. Disclosing rationing to patients was not common. This survey of PPMs suggests that more systematic approaches areneeded to address the common problem of drug shortages and consequent drug rationing. Progress in this area would be furthered by research to better understand patient and physician preferences for disclosure and the association of different management strategies with the outcomes of high-risk groups.
Hadza Hunter-gatherers Disagree on Perceptions of Moral Character
Smith, Kristopher M., and Coren L. Apicella. 2019. “Hadza Hunter-gatherers Disagree on Perceptions of Moral Character.” PsyArXiv. March 29. doi:10.31234/osf.io/er4jb
Abstract: To the extent that moral character is grounded in stable and observable truths, there should exist agreement between people in their judgements of others’ character. In Western populations, this agreement is found. We examine whether this is universal in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-four judges ranked their campmates on global character and relevant character traits for a total of 824 observations. Judges disagreed on rankings of global character, generosity, and honesty, but agreed more on hard work and hunting ability. Individual rankings on specific traits predicted character evaluations. There was agreement between judges on the extent to which generosity and hard work related to character. These findings suggest that Hadza have shared beliefs about what traits constitute character, but disagree on which of their campmates exhibit these traits. We discuss these findings in light of other research suggesting that stable moral dispositions may not be universal.
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Evaluation of moral character is an important component of person perception (Goodwin,
2015; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). When learning about a new person, we seek
information about whether they are trustworthy (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini,
2011). When identifying features and traits most relevant to identity, people consider morality to
be an essential component (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). And when considering what
attributes a partner should have in different types of relationships, morally relevant features, such
as trustworthiness, are most important (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). This makes sense because
a person’s character is used to infer their intentions toward us and whether they would help or
hinder our goals (Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016). Indeed, people use information about moral
character to decide who to interact and cooperate with (Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett,
2018; Martin & Cushman, 2015; van der Lee, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Rutjens, 2017).
Despite the importance of moral character in person perception, some have argued that
character does not exist and that people do not have stable moral dispositions (Doris, 2002;
Harman, 2003). Social psychologists and philosophers have used classic findings from social
psychology, such as the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 1968) or the
good Samaritan experiment (Darley & Batson, 1973), to argue against the existence of moral
character and that moral behavior is determined wholly by the situation (Doris, 2002; Harman,
2003). One way to determine whether people behave similarly across situations is to examine
agreement between independent observers. Because different observers are likely to interact with
the target in different situations, if they agree in their evaluations, it then suggests there is a
stable disposition that is being observed (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). So, if independent observers
have similar perceptions of targets’ moral character, then it provides some evidence for the
existence of moral character.
People generally agree on who does, and does not, have moral character. Self-report and
informant ratings of morally-relevant traits, such as honesty or guilt-proneness, moderately
correlate (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2013). Independent observers also agree on
global evaluations of moral character, as well as specific moral traits and trait profiles. (Helzer et
al., 2014). And people agree on morally relevant traits displayed by respected cultural figures,
even across the US political divide (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013). Again, this
agreement is used as evidence that moral character exists.
Like much of behavioral and social science research, samples in studies of moral
psychology have largely been drawn from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic—or WEIRD—societies (Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 2019;
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Despite this, the importance of moral character in identity
and person perception is theorized to be universal (Strohminger, Knobe, & Newman, 2017).
Most often, when moral psychology is examined in other cultures, the emphasis is on the content
of moral norms and the shared or unique prescriptions and prohibitions across cultures (Curry,
Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Purzycki et al., 2018). Yet, when
research has looked at processes in moral judgments, important differences have been found. For
example, whether a wrong is done intentionally is an important distinction in moral judgments
among Western populations, presumably because it reveals information about moral character
(Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). However, unintentional violations are judged as wrong as intentional
violations in some cultures, including the Hadza and South Pacific islanders (Barrett et al., 2016;
McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2019). To our knowledge, no research has been
conducted on perceptions of moral character in small-scale societies.
There are reasons to suspect important differences in moral character and its perception
in small-scale societies. First, there is some evidence for less personality variation in non
WEIRD societies. For example, personality traits in the Tsimané forager-horticulturalists of
Bolivia do not cluster into five distinct factors, but rather two, and there is less variation within
those factors compared to Western samples (Gurven, von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Vie,
2013). And in fact, across 55 nations, populations with fewer economic opportunities to
specialize have less variation in personality traits (Lukaszewski, Gurven, von Rueden, &
Schmitt, 2017). To the extent that there is a relationship between personality traits and moral
character (Thalmayer, Saucier, Srivastava, Flournoy, & Costello, 2019), we might then similarly
expect less variation in morally-relevant character traits. Second, there is no evidence for
generous dispositions in small-scale societies. In longitudinal data among the Hadza,
contributions to a public good game were not predicted by previous contributions, but rather the
contributions of an individual’s campmates (Smith, Larroucau, Mabulla, & Apicella, 2018).
Here, strong, local norms governing generosity may be reducing individual variation in morally
relevant behavior leading to a lack of agreement on perceptions of moral character.
In the current study, we examine perceptions of moral character among the Hadza of
Tanzania, one of the last remaining hunter-gatherer groups in the world. The Hadza are an ideal
population because they live in small groups of known individuals where behavior is observable,
and because of their harsh environment, knowing who is moral would be seemingly important.
We examine agreement on these perceptions in two ways. First, do Hadza agree on who has
moral character? And second, do Hadza agree on what traits contribute to global moral
character? To answer these questions, we ask the Hadza to rank their campmates on moral
character, as well as specific traits of hard work, generosity, and honesty. We examine the
consensus within each camp on rank orderings for each trait to answer the first question. We
examine the relationship between the specific traits and global character rankings and the
variation between Hadza on the importance of the specific traits in determining global character
to answer the second question.
Discussion
In WEIRD societies, people evaluate the moral character of others and use those
perceptions to decide with whom to interact. Underscoring the importance of character in these
populations, independent observers agree on how moral others are (Helzer et al., 2014). But is
this universal? To answer this, we asked if Hadza hunter-gatherers agree on who is moral and
what traits make someone moral. The Hadza disagree on which of their campmates have a good
heart, are generous, and are honest, and agree more on which campmates are hard working
(effort) and produce the most food (hunting ability). At the level of the population, hard work,
generosity, and honesty contribute to global character; however, there is variation between
Hadza judges on how much honesty contributes to global character, though judges agree more on
how much hard work and generosity contribute to character. Overall, these results suggest that
Hadza use some of the same criteria—hard work and generosity—for evaluating moral character,
but disagree on who displays those traits, leading to disagreement on global character
perceptions.
Agreement between independent observers on ratings about a trait is taken as evidence
for that trait existing because raters are likely observing the same behaviors despite being in
different situations (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). The disagreement between Hadza judges on
character traits suggests that Hadza do not have moral dispositions. However, disagreement does
not definitively rule out the existence of moral character. For example, the Hadza may have been
unwilling to make assessments about their campmates’ character, though notably we do see
agreement on hunting ability, which is highly valued in the Hadza. Or there could be
disagreement because there are not many opportunities to display moral behavior; however, it
should be easy to observe moral behavior because they live together in small groups and depend
on each other for survival.
One alternative interpretation of the data is that the Hadza can agree on moral character,
and in fact they do have moral dispositions, but that our measure is unreliable and cannot detect
agreement. A good measure measuring a phenomenon that does not exist and a bad measure
measuring a phenomenon that does exist will produce the same result: noise. However, we argue
there are two reasons to suspect that our measure would be reliable enough to detect agreement
on moral character if it existed. First, we were able to detect moderate relationships between the
specific character traits and moral character, indicating reliability was not so low as to be unable
to detect any effects. Second, we did find moderate agreement on hard work and hunting ability.
And in fact, given what we know about the noisy relationship between hunting returns and
hunting reputation (Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018), the fact that we were able to detect agreement
suggests low reliability can not fully explain the disagreement in perceptions of moral character.
It may seem that hunting ability would be easily observable, but in the anthropological
literature, this is notoriously difficult to measure, and because of this hunting reputation is
criticized as a measure of hunting success (Hill & Kintigh, 2009). First, hunting ability is rarely
directly observed, as most hunting happens alone. And second, there is high variance in hunting
returns, in which men return to camp with nothing on most days, but occasionally (about 3% of
days) bring in large game (Hawkes, O’Connell, & Blurton-Jones, 1991). In fact, for
anthropologists to reliably estimate hunting ability using hunting returns, they need 200 to 600
days of observations (Hill & Kintigh, 2009). Despite this, in our study and others (Stibbard
Hawkes et al., 2018), the Hadza are able to agree on who the best hunters are, and hunting
reputation does relate to proxies of actual hunting ability, such as strength, accuracy, and
ecological knowledge (Apicella, 2014; Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018). This suggests that if there
are moral dispositions among the Hadza, the signal is much weaker than that of hunting ability,
which is itself a noisy signal (Stibbard-Hawkes, 2019). And in fact, if it is this hard to detect
moral dispositions, it then raises the question of whether the Hadza can reliably determine
character enough to provide useful social information.
Data measuring morally-relevant behavior, such as generosity, further suggest a lack of
moral dispositions in the Hadza and other non-WEIRD populations. In a longitudinal study, a
Hadza’s previous generosity in an economic game did not predict their subsequent contributions,
and instead the only significant predictor was how much his or her campmates contribute (Smith
et al., 2018). And in a small study (n = 12) of the Tsimané of Bolivia, generosity in a dictator
game in one year did not predict generosity in a later year (Gurven, 2014).
These results further support recent research finding that character and moral reputation
do not play a role in Hadza campmate preferences. When asked who they prefer to live with,
Hadza do not choose the most generous people, whether generosity is measured using an
economic game (Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler, & Christakis, 2012) or via reputation (Smith &
Apicella, 2019). Rather, Hadza prefer to live with better hunters (Smith & Apicella, 2019; Wood,
2006). If moral behavior changes across time and situations as our results here suggest, then
choosing campmates based on their current behavior is useless. Instead, traits related to
productivity, such as being a hard worker or a good hunter, may become more important in
campmate preferences (Barclay, 2016); if everyone is expected to share because of strong norms,
such as in the Hadza, then choosing productive campmates is more important. And in fact, a
preference for productive partners may influence friendships in Western societies. People prefer
partners in economic games and are more generous to partners who are perceived to be more
productive, even though it is irrelevant to the game (Eisenbruch, Grillot, Maestripieri, & Roney,
2016; Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017). The effect of a productivity preference in various
relationships may be a fruitful area for future research.
Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the situationist paradigm in social
psychology casted doubt on the existence of moral character. However, more recent research in
moral psychology has argued that moral character does in fact exist (Fleeson, Furr,
Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014). In Western societies, people agree on who is moral
(Helzer et al., 2014), and perceptions of moral character play an important role in social
cognition (Goodwin, 2015; Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). Our results here question the universality
of moral character and its centrality in social life, and highlights the importance of cross-cultural
research using underrepresented samples. By conducting research with populations in a variety
of socio-ecologies, we can better understand the variation in our moral psychology.
Abstract: To the extent that moral character is grounded in stable and observable truths, there should exist agreement between people in their judgements of others’ character. In Western populations, this agreement is found. We examine whether this is universal in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-four judges ranked their campmates on global character and relevant character traits for a total of 824 observations. Judges disagreed on rankings of global character, generosity, and honesty, but agreed more on hard work and hunting ability. Individual rankings on specific traits predicted character evaluations. There was agreement between judges on the extent to which generosity and hard work related to character. These findings suggest that Hadza have shared beliefs about what traits constitute character, but disagree on which of their campmates exhibit these traits. We discuss these findings in light of other research suggesting that stable moral dispositions may not be universal.
---
Evaluation of moral character is an important component of person perception (Goodwin,
2015; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). When learning about a new person, we seek
information about whether they are trustworthy (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini,
2011). When identifying features and traits most relevant to identity, people consider morality to
be an essential component (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). And when considering what
attributes a partner should have in different types of relationships, morally relevant features, such
as trustworthiness, are most important (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). This makes sense because
a person’s character is used to infer their intentions toward us and whether they would help or
hinder our goals (Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016). Indeed, people use information about moral
character to decide who to interact and cooperate with (Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett,
2018; Martin & Cushman, 2015; van der Lee, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Rutjens, 2017).
Despite the importance of moral character in person perception, some have argued that
character does not exist and that people do not have stable moral dispositions (Doris, 2002;
Harman, 2003). Social psychologists and philosophers have used classic findings from social
psychology, such as the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 1968) or the
good Samaritan experiment (Darley & Batson, 1973), to argue against the existence of moral
character and that moral behavior is determined wholly by the situation (Doris, 2002; Harman,
2003). One way to determine whether people behave similarly across situations is to examine
agreement between independent observers. Because different observers are likely to interact with
the target in different situations, if they agree in their evaluations, it then suggests there is a
stable disposition that is being observed (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). So, if independent observers
have similar perceptions of targets’ moral character, then it provides some evidence for the
existence of moral character.
People generally agree on who does, and does not, have moral character. Self-report and
informant ratings of morally-relevant traits, such as honesty or guilt-proneness, moderately
correlate (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2013). Independent observers also agree on
global evaluations of moral character, as well as specific moral traits and trait profiles. (Helzer et
al., 2014). And people agree on morally relevant traits displayed by respected cultural figures,
even across the US political divide (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013). Again, this
agreement is used as evidence that moral character exists.
Like much of behavioral and social science research, samples in studies of moral
psychology have largely been drawn from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic—or WEIRD—societies (Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 2019;
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Despite this, the importance of moral character in identity
and person perception is theorized to be universal (Strohminger, Knobe, & Newman, 2017).
Most often, when moral psychology is examined in other cultures, the emphasis is on the content
of moral norms and the shared or unique prescriptions and prohibitions across cultures (Curry,
Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Purzycki et al., 2018). Yet, when
research has looked at processes in moral judgments, important differences have been found. For
example, whether a wrong is done intentionally is an important distinction in moral judgments
among Western populations, presumably because it reveals information about moral character
(Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). However, unintentional violations are judged as wrong as intentional
violations in some cultures, including the Hadza and South Pacific islanders (Barrett et al., 2016;
McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2019). To our knowledge, no research has been
conducted on perceptions of moral character in small-scale societies.
There are reasons to suspect important differences in moral character and its perception
in small-scale societies. First, there is some evidence for less personality variation in non
WEIRD societies. For example, personality traits in the Tsimané forager-horticulturalists of
Bolivia do not cluster into five distinct factors, but rather two, and there is less variation within
those factors compared to Western samples (Gurven, von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Vie,
2013). And in fact, across 55 nations, populations with fewer economic opportunities to
specialize have less variation in personality traits (Lukaszewski, Gurven, von Rueden, &
Schmitt, 2017). To the extent that there is a relationship between personality traits and moral
character (Thalmayer, Saucier, Srivastava, Flournoy, & Costello, 2019), we might then similarly
expect less variation in morally-relevant character traits. Second, there is no evidence for
generous dispositions in small-scale societies. In longitudinal data among the Hadza,
contributions to a public good game were not predicted by previous contributions, but rather the
contributions of an individual’s campmates (Smith, Larroucau, Mabulla, & Apicella, 2018).
Here, strong, local norms governing generosity may be reducing individual variation in morally
relevant behavior leading to a lack of agreement on perceptions of moral character.
In the current study, we examine perceptions of moral character among the Hadza of
Tanzania, one of the last remaining hunter-gatherer groups in the world. The Hadza are an ideal
population because they live in small groups of known individuals where behavior is observable,
and because of their harsh environment, knowing who is moral would be seemingly important.
We examine agreement on these perceptions in two ways. First, do Hadza agree on who has
moral character? And second, do Hadza agree on what traits contribute to global moral
character? To answer these questions, we ask the Hadza to rank their campmates on moral
character, as well as specific traits of hard work, generosity, and honesty. We examine the
consensus within each camp on rank orderings for each trait to answer the first question. We
examine the relationship between the specific traits and global character rankings and the
variation between Hadza on the importance of the specific traits in determining global character
to answer the second question.
Discussion
In WEIRD societies, people evaluate the moral character of others and use those
perceptions to decide with whom to interact. Underscoring the importance of character in these
populations, independent observers agree on how moral others are (Helzer et al., 2014). But is
this universal? To answer this, we asked if Hadza hunter-gatherers agree on who is moral and
what traits make someone moral. The Hadza disagree on which of their campmates have a good
heart, are generous, and are honest, and agree more on which campmates are hard working
(effort) and produce the most food (hunting ability). At the level of the population, hard work,
generosity, and honesty contribute to global character; however, there is variation between
Hadza judges on how much honesty contributes to global character, though judges agree more on
how much hard work and generosity contribute to character. Overall, these results suggest that
Hadza use some of the same criteria—hard work and generosity—for evaluating moral character,
but disagree on who displays those traits, leading to disagreement on global character
perceptions.
Agreement between independent observers on ratings about a trait is taken as evidence
for that trait existing because raters are likely observing the same behaviors despite being in
different situations (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). The disagreement between Hadza judges on
character traits suggests that Hadza do not have moral dispositions. However, disagreement does
not definitively rule out the existence of moral character. For example, the Hadza may have been
unwilling to make assessments about their campmates’ character, though notably we do see
agreement on hunting ability, which is highly valued in the Hadza. Or there could be
disagreement because there are not many opportunities to display moral behavior; however, it
should be easy to observe moral behavior because they live together in small groups and depend
on each other for survival.
One alternative interpretation of the data is that the Hadza can agree on moral character,
and in fact they do have moral dispositions, but that our measure is unreliable and cannot detect
agreement. A good measure measuring a phenomenon that does not exist and a bad measure
measuring a phenomenon that does exist will produce the same result: noise. However, we argue
there are two reasons to suspect that our measure would be reliable enough to detect agreement
on moral character if it existed. First, we were able to detect moderate relationships between the
specific character traits and moral character, indicating reliability was not so low as to be unable
to detect any effects. Second, we did find moderate agreement on hard work and hunting ability.
And in fact, given what we know about the noisy relationship between hunting returns and
hunting reputation (Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018), the fact that we were able to detect agreement
suggests low reliability can not fully explain the disagreement in perceptions of moral character.
It may seem that hunting ability would be easily observable, but in the anthropological
literature, this is notoriously difficult to measure, and because of this hunting reputation is
criticized as a measure of hunting success (Hill & Kintigh, 2009). First, hunting ability is rarely
directly observed, as most hunting happens alone. And second, there is high variance in hunting
returns, in which men return to camp with nothing on most days, but occasionally (about 3% of
days) bring in large game (Hawkes, O’Connell, & Blurton-Jones, 1991). In fact, for
anthropologists to reliably estimate hunting ability using hunting returns, they need 200 to 600
days of observations (Hill & Kintigh, 2009). Despite this, in our study and others (Stibbard
Hawkes et al., 2018), the Hadza are able to agree on who the best hunters are, and hunting
reputation does relate to proxies of actual hunting ability, such as strength, accuracy, and
ecological knowledge (Apicella, 2014; Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018). This suggests that if there
are moral dispositions among the Hadza, the signal is much weaker than that of hunting ability,
which is itself a noisy signal (Stibbard-Hawkes, 2019). And in fact, if it is this hard to detect
moral dispositions, it then raises the question of whether the Hadza can reliably determine
character enough to provide useful social information.
Data measuring morally-relevant behavior, such as generosity, further suggest a lack of
moral dispositions in the Hadza and other non-WEIRD populations. In a longitudinal study, a
Hadza’s previous generosity in an economic game did not predict their subsequent contributions,
and instead the only significant predictor was how much his or her campmates contribute (Smith
et al., 2018). And in a small study (n = 12) of the Tsimané of Bolivia, generosity in a dictator
game in one year did not predict generosity in a later year (Gurven, 2014).
These results further support recent research finding that character and moral reputation
do not play a role in Hadza campmate preferences. When asked who they prefer to live with,
Hadza do not choose the most generous people, whether generosity is measured using an
economic game (Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler, & Christakis, 2012) or via reputation (Smith &
Apicella, 2019). Rather, Hadza prefer to live with better hunters (Smith & Apicella, 2019; Wood,
2006). If moral behavior changes across time and situations as our results here suggest, then
choosing campmates based on their current behavior is useless. Instead, traits related to
productivity, such as being a hard worker or a good hunter, may become more important in
campmate preferences (Barclay, 2016); if everyone is expected to share because of strong norms,
such as in the Hadza, then choosing productive campmates is more important. And in fact, a
preference for productive partners may influence friendships in Western societies. People prefer
partners in economic games and are more generous to partners who are perceived to be more
productive, even though it is irrelevant to the game (Eisenbruch, Grillot, Maestripieri, & Roney,
2016; Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017). The effect of a productivity preference in various
relationships may be a fruitful area for future research.
Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the situationist paradigm in social
psychology casted doubt on the existence of moral character. However, more recent research in
moral psychology has argued that moral character does in fact exist (Fleeson, Furr,
Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014). In Western societies, people agree on who is moral
(Helzer et al., 2014), and perceptions of moral character play an important role in social
cognition (Goodwin, 2015; Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). Our results here question the universality
of moral character and its centrality in social life, and highlights the importance of cross-cultural
research using underrepresented samples. By conducting research with populations in a variety
of socio-ecologies, we can better understand the variation in our moral psychology.
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