Forgetting in relation to trauma and victimhood can be complicated and controversial, with some victims preferring to retain their painful memories, even at a personal cost

Punishing the Crime of Forgetting. Emily V. Shaw, Elizabeth F. Loftus. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2020, Pages 24-28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2019.11.003

Abstract: Although many people think that forgetting is a problem in life, and it often is, they would do well to appreciate the benefits of forgetting. Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) have marshaled a powerful argument for the adaptive value of forgetting, highlighting the many ways that forgetting is both a common and essential feature of cognition. Their arguments have implications for memory as it plays out in real life, but here we focus on implications in the legal realm. We make two major points. First, within the legal system, forgetting on the part of criminal defendants can transcend mere embarrassment or inconvenience, and can actually implicate defendants in criminal acts. Second, forgetting in relation to trauma and victimhood can be complicated and controversial, with some victims preferring to retain their painful memories, even at a personal cost.

Defendant Alibis: When Forgetting is a Crime

Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) aptly rebuke the notion of forgetting as nothing more than a cognitive “sin,” but the notion of forgetting as bad or blameworthy thrives in the legal system. The courts frequently rely on the sworn testimony of witnesses, who pledge to relay information accurately—“the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” In this domain, accurate memory can be the difference between compensation or liability, freedom or captivity, and even life or death.

One particularly challenging memory-related task within the legal system is providing an alibi. When people are considered potential suspects in a crime, they may be asked to account for their whereabouts at the time of the crime. For innocent suspects, this task may require them to recall mundane details from an earlier time—sometimes days, weeks, or months prior. Inaccuracies that are later discovered have been used against suspects, with suggestions that they were deliberately lying.

It is hard to overstate how challenging the task of providing a flawless alibi can be for the average person. Multiple research studies have examined memory in this setting and found that innocent people struggle to give accurate, consistent alibis. In one study, participants were asked to describe their location and activities during a specific afternoon three weeks prior (Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2015). Participants were then asked to come back a week later, repeat their “alibi,” and provide supporting evidence for their account. Nearly half were inconsistent between their first and second account; many were completely unable to provide any supporting evidence at all. Another study of alibi accuracy found that, when given two days to check their own alibi, 36% of participants had to amend their initial accounts, changing factual details or adjusting the supporting evidence (Olson & Charman, 2012). These studies show that on-the-spot recollections about one's whereabouts at a specific time in the past—in other words, providing an accurate alibi—can be riddled with error.

But why is it hard for many people to provide accurate alibis the first time? Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) provide a helpful explanation through their discussion of the “Clarity” virtue of forgetting. The argument goes like this: When an activity is rather ordinary, like biking to work each day, it is not particularly useful to remember in detail. Unless something occurs to prompt memory retention, it may be most efficient for the memory to be effectively erased (Davis & Zhong, 2017, cited within Fawcett & Hulbert, 2020). In the context of alibi recollection, if the activity that a person is called to account for is ordinary, it may be more likely to be forgotten and subsequently misreported. Moreover, the task of alibi reporting is made even more difficult by the nature of the prompt that produces the alibi (e.g., Leins & Charman, 2016). Many memories are not stored in ways specific to a particular date or time, but this is often what investigators are seeking an account of when they request an alibi.

Unfortunately, the tendency for people to incorrectly recount their own past activities, while harmless in ordinary life, can be disastrous for suspects who need to provide alibis.

[...]

Dampening Traumatic Memories

The “Serenity” virtue of forgetting, as described by Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) illustrates how forgetting can help people overcome the burdens of negative memories and enable people to forgive transgressions. Notably, these benefits can occur with or without conscious intent on the part of the person experiencing troubling memories. But what if a person seeking to forget did not need to actively seek distraction, or wait passively for forgetting to occur, but could instead willfully choose to delete a traumatic experience from memory?

This possibility is not (total) science fiction. Medical researchers have been testing drugs such as propranolol which have the potential to dramatically reduce the formation of traumatic, emotionally-charged long-term memories (and PTSD) when consumed close to the time of a stressful event (Brunet et al., 2008, Pitman et al., 2002; see also Kolber, 2006, Kolber, 2008). Such drugs may eventually become a regular part of post-trauma medical care, and their potential applications for reducing memory of trauma are fascinating and controversial.

Advocates of the use of memory-dampening drugs assert that this is a method of reducing human suffering and an option that victims deserve to have available to them. However, critics argue that victims of crime may have a duty to hold on to these memories for the sake of justice; successful prosecution of perpetrators could be made difficult if victims chose to forget criminal acts committed against them (see Kolber, 2008), potentially leaving those perpetrators free to harm others.

Interestingly, the limited research that has been done on perceptions of these memory-dampening drugs suggests that the public is reluctant to consider using them. For example, one study by Newman, Berkowitz, Nelson, Garry, and Loftus (2011) provided Americans and New Zealanders with a series of hypothetical scenarios where a memory-dampening drug could be used. Participants were asked to imagine they were either a restaurant manager or a soldier on a peace-keeping mission and were the victim of a violent assault. Overwhelmingly, a large majority of participants in both countries and across all scenarios indicated they would not want to take the memory-dampening drug. This was true even when participants were warned that they had a 40% chance of developing PTSD, and it was true even for participants who reported past experience with traumatic events. In fact, participants who reported past traumatic experiences were significantly less likely to want the drug then those who did not report prior traumatic experiences.

This study suggests that victims may be unwilling to dampen their own traumatic memories when given the opportunity to do so, even when warned there is a sizable risk of lasting psychological harm (i.e., developing PTSD). When given the choice to forget a trauma, extending and deliberately controlling the “Guardian” role of forgetting through drugs, it appears many people would prefer not to forget.

Men and Women Differ in Their Perceptions of Sex Robots and Platonic Love Robots

Friends, Lovers or Nothing: Men and Women Differ in Their Perceptions of Sex Robots and Platonic Love Robots. Morten Nordmo, Julie Øverbø Næss, Marte Folkestad Husøy and Mads Nordmo Arnestad. Front. Psychol., March 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00355

Abstract: Physical and emotional intimacy between humans and robots may become commonplace over the next decades, as technology improves at a rapid rate. This development provides new questions pertaining to how people perceive robots designed for different kinds of intimacy, both as companions and potentially as competitors. We performed a randomized experiment where participants read of either a robot that could only perform sexual acts, or only engage in non-sexual platonic love relationships. The results of the current study show that females have less positive views of robots, and especially of sex robots, compared to men. Contrary to the expectation rooted in evolutionary psychology, females expected to feel more jealousy if their partner got a sex robot, rather than a platonic love robot. The results further suggests that people project their own feelings about robots onto their partner, erroneously expecting their partner to react as they would to the thought of ones’ partner having a robot.

Discussion

The results of the analysis confirms previous findings that males are more positive toward the advent of robots than females (Scheutz and Arnold, 2016). Females who had read about the sex robot reported particularly elevated levels of jealousy, less favorable attitudes, more dislike and more predicted partner’s dislike. This pattern was not found in the male sample, whose feelings were largely unaffected by the type of robot they were made to envision.

One possible explanation for the gender difference could be a combination of differences in how males and females frame the concept of human-robot sexual relations, as well as different attitudes toward masturbation and the use of artificial stimulants for masturbatory purposes. Past research has indicated that males masturbate more, have more permissible attitudes toward masturbation, use more pornography, and have more permissive views of pornography consumption (Baumeister et al., 2001; Petersen and Hyde, 2010; Regnerus et al., 2016; Maas et al., 2018). If the males in the present study framed the prospect of having sex with robots as allegorically to masturbation with pornography, while the females considered the act more allegorical to cheating, one would expect the present results to emerge. While we did not include measures of how the participants view sex with robots, past research has suggested that males tend to think of sex with robots as a form of masturbation, not sex (Scheutz and Arnold, 2016). The overall gender difference in attitudes may also be partly due to men expressing their positive views more readily, while women may explicitly or implicitly not want positive attitudes toward robots. Future research should explore the moral and relational framing of human-robot sex in depth, including potential gender differences therein.

A different explanation for the observed results is that sex dolls and sex robots to this day primarily have been marketed toward men (Danaher and McArthur, 2017). This can explain why this idea evokes stronger negative feelings among females. In addition, the men and women might react differently to the lack of strong social cues in the sex-robot. According to the Persuasive robot’s acceptance model (Shazwani binti Ghazali, 2019), social cues and a lack of social cues predict attitudes toward robots. Women may view the sex robot in a more negative way both because they do not observe social cues and do not have an immediate sexual response. The observed gender differences may also be partly due to men and women finding it difficult to visualize forming a romantic bond with a non-human entity. Interestingly, studies have revealed that people seem to assume a more mutual relationship even with completely non-social service robots like vacuum cleaners (Forlizzi and DiSalvo, 2006; Sung et al., 2007). Such findings suggest that people get deeply engaged with robots even without humanoid qualities. However, the current study suggest that this effect may only be present in true interaction, not when anticipating future interaction, as our results indicate relatively small effects.

Findings from evolutionary psychology has generally indicated that females experience more jealousy at the thought of their partner having a romantic bond with another person, while males experience more jealousy at the thought of their female partner having a sexual relationship with another man (Buss et al., 1992, 1996, 1999). This finding has been explained by the different evolutionary imperatives faced by males and females. In a pre-industrial state, males had to compete for reproductive resources, and could know for certain whether the offspring they provide valuable resources to were actually related to them. Males have therefore developed their feelings of jealousy as an adaptive strategy to motivate behaviors that reduce paternity uncertainty and loss of access to reproductive resources. Their jealousy is thus especially attuned to the threat of sexual encounters. Females, on the other hand, faced certainty in their rightful motherhood, but face the risk of their partner abandoning her and their common offspring, which severely compromises the odds of survival. Their jealousy is thus geared less toward purely sexual escapades without any other forms of attachment, and more concerned with emotional bonds that may distract paternal investment in partner and offspring. This adaptation account has been proposed as a the explanation for the observed gender differences across cultures (Buss and Haselton, 2005). One problem facing this account is that it can be difficult for participants to envision their partner in a purely emotional or purely sexual relationship with someone, without envisioning that the relationship can change and evolve over time. A purely romantic attraction can evolve into a sexual one, and vice versa. In this study, however, we offer a more “clean” manipulation of this variable, in that the robots we described were either purely sexual or purely non-sexual. The sex robot was explicitly described as unable to engage in anything more than a sexual relationship, while the platonic love robot was explicitly described as disembodied and unable to satisfy physical sexual urges. Our findings therefore shed new light on how males and females feel about different kinds of infidelity in a setting where sex cannot lead to love and love cannot lead to sex.

Our results further show that males and females varied in how they expected to feel if their partner acquired and used a sex robot or platonic love robot. However, the results demonstrate that both males and females fail to predict how their partner would feel if they themselves got a robot. Males, who report feeling at ease with the thought of their partner having a robot, erroneously expect that their partners will extend the same relaxed attitude toward them. Females on the other hand, who are negative to the prospect of their male partners having a sex robot, and neutral to them having a platonic love robot, erroneously expect their partners to react negatively to them having a sex robot and positively to them having a platonic love robot. These results are in line with a projection account, which suggests that people tend to expect their partners to feel as they would have, especially in emotionally charged situations (Newman et al., 1997; Kawada et al., 2004; Maner et al., 2005).

Limitations

There are two notable limitations to the present study. The first is the recruitment procedure and sample. Participants were recruited primarily via social media (Facebook) and accessible e-mail lists to workplaces. Therefore, our sample is likely to be influenced by a self-selection bias, whereby those who thought human-robotic interaction more interesting presumably were more likely to participate in the study. The sample of participants consisted of a majority of students, and was somewhat restricted in age variation, which limits the generalizability of the findings. In addition, the results cannot be directly generalized to homosexual populations as the sample was almost exclusively heterosexual. The second limitation is the use of novel non-validated measurements. There are few validated measurements of reactions to robots, and to the best of our knowledge, none that capture sentiments regarding sex and love robots. The Negative Attitudes toward Robots Scale (NARS) (Nomura et al., 2006b) is too general for the purposes of our study. In order to gain thorough understanding of how people feel about different types of robots designed for physical and emotional intimacy, improved measurement scales need to be designed and validated.

Mental Health Outcomes of Quarantine and Isolation for Infection Prevention: A Systematic Umbrella Review of the Global Evidence

Hossain, Mahbub, Abida Sultana, and Neetu Purohit. 2020. “Mental Health Outcomes of Quarantine and Isolation for Infection Prevention: A Systematic Umbrella Review of the Global Evidence.” PsyArXiv. March 13. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dz5v2

Abstract
Background: Transmission of infectious diseases is often prevented by quarantine and isolation of the populations at risk. These approaches restrict the mobility, social interactions, and daily activities of the affected individuals. In recent novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, quarantine and isolation is being adopted in many contexts, which necessitates an evaluation of global evidence on how such measures impact the mental health outcomes among populations. This umbrella review aimed to synthesize the available evidence on mental health outcomes of quarantine and isolation for preventing infectious diseases.
Materials and methods: We searched nine major databased and additional sources and included articles if they were systematically conducted reviews, published as peer-reviewed journal articles, and reported mental health outcomes of quarantine or isolation in any population.
Results: Among 1364 citations, only eight reviews met our criteria. Most of the primary studies in those reviews were conducted in high-income nations and in hospital settings. These articles reported a high burden of mental health problems among patients, informal caregivers, and healthcare providers who experienced quarantine or isolation. Prevalent mental health problems among the affected individuals include depression, anxiety, mood disorders, psychological distress, posttraumatic stress disorder, insomnia, fear, stigmatization, low self-esteem, lack of self-control, and other adverse mental health outcomes.
Conclusion: This umbrella review found severe mental health problems among individuals and populations who have undergone quarantine and isolation in different contexts. This evidence necessitates multipronged interventions including policy measures for strengthening mental health services globally and promoting psychosocial wellbeing among high-risk populations.

The Scent of a Good Night’s Sleep: Olfactory Cues of a Romantic Partner Improve Sleep Efficiency

The Scent of a Good Night’s Sleep: Olfactory Cues of a Romantic Partner Improve Sleep Efficiency. Marlise K. Hofer, Frances S. Chen. Psychological Science, March 12, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620905615

Abstract: Almost nothing is known about whether exposure to the scent of loved ones influences sleep. In the current study, 155 participants spent 2 nights with their partner’s scent and 2 nights with a control scent (in random order). Sleep was measured in two ways: sleep efficiency (via actigraphy) and perceived sleep quality (via self-report). Sleep efficiency was higher when participants were exposed to their partner’s scent. This increase occurred regardless of participants’ beliefs about the origin of the scent. Perceived sleep quality was higher when participants believed that they were smelling their partner’s scent. Exposure to a partner’s scent led sleep efficiency to increase by more than 2% on average, an improvement similar in magnitude to the effect of melatonin on sleep. The current work speaks to the critical role of olfaction in communication and reveals that social scents can impact sleep.

Keywords: olfaction, social communication, social support, nonverbal communication, health behaviors, open data, open materials, preregistered

Unattractive people are unaware of their (un)attractiveness

Unattractive people are unaware of their (un)attractiveness. Tobias Greitemeyer. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, March 11 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjop.12631

Abstract: Past research has shown that how people rate their physical attractiveness is only moderately correlated with how they are rated by others, suggesting that at least some people have little insight into their true level of attractiveness. The present research tests the hypothesis that unattractive people are not aware of their unattractiveness. In fact, six studies (overall N = 1,180) showed that unattractive participants considerably overestimated their attractiveness compared to ratings by strangers. In contrast, attractive participants were more accurate. If anything, they underestimated their attractiveness. It was also examined why unattractive people overestimate their attractiveness. As expected, unattractive participants differentiated less between attractive and unattractive stimulus persons than did attractive participants. They were also more likely than attractive participants to select unattractive stimulus persons to compare themselves to. However, these tendencies did not account for why unattractive participants overestimated their attractiveness, nor did affirming participant’s self‐worth. Limitations and avenues for future research are discussed.

Discussion

Study 6 replicated Study 5 that unattractive people differentiate less than attractive people between unattractive and attractive stimulus persons. In particular, unattractive participants were more favorable toward unattractive stimulus persons. Study 6 further showed that unattractive participants were more likely than attractive participants to select an unattractive stimulus person with whom they would compare their attractiveness to. However, neither of these tendencies could explain why unattractive participants overestimated their attractiveness compared to the ratings by the other participants.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present set of studies addressed the relationship between self‐ratings of attractiveness and ratings by others. As in previous research (for meta‐analyses, Feingold, 1992; Langlois et al., 2000), the experimenters (Studies 1, 3–5), raters of the participant’s photographs (Study 2), and other participants (Study 6) showed high agreement about whether a person is attractive or not. In contrast, the relationship between the participant’s subjective and objective attractiveness ratings was relatively small. That is, whereas the interrater agreement of ratings of a target’s attractiveness was high, some of the targets had a different perception of how attractive they are.
All six studies provide compelling evidence that self‐ratings of unattractive people mostly differ from how others perceive their attractiveness. In fact, relative to ratings by strangers, all studies showed that unattractive participants considerably overestimated their attractiveness. It is remarkable that across all studies, unattractive participants reported to be above‐average (relative to the scale midpoint) and their self‐rated attractiveness was similar to how the objectively attractive participants rated their attractiveness. Moreover, unattractive participants were mostly unaware of how others rate their attractiveness. The objective attractiveness was much lower than how the unattractive participants believed to be perceived by strangers. Overall, unattractive participants judged themselves to be of about average attractiveness and they showed very little awareness that strangers do not share this view. In contrast, attractive participants had more insights into how attractive they actually are. If anything, they underestimated their attractiveness. It thus appears that unattractive people maintain illusory self‐perceptions of their attractiveness, whereas attractive people’s self‐views are more grounded in reality.
Whereas the effect that unattractive people overestimate their attractiveness compared to ratings by strangers could be firmly established, elucidating the exact underlying mechanisms awaits future research. The present studies tested some possible mechanisms but these appeared not to be the driving forces. Based on self‐affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), it was reasoned that if the overestimation effect has motivational roots, then affirming other aspects of the self should reduce defensive processes so that more accurate self‐perceptions result. However, both Studies 3 and 4 showed that a self‐affirmation manipulation that had successfully reduced defensive processing in previous research (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998) did not affect how unattractive participants rated their attractiveness. Hence, it appears that the wish to perceive oneself in a favorable way is not the main mechanism why unattractive people overestimate their attractiveness.
However, meta‐cognitive capacity and the comparison target approach also did not explain why the unattractive participants overestimated their attractiveness. Kruger and Dunning (1999) argued that incompetent people lack metacognitive skills that are needed to discern that one’s performance is poor. In line with their theorizing, they found that relatively incompetent participants were less able to gauge the competence of their peers than were relatively competent participants. We found a similar effect, in that unattractive participants differentiated less between attractive and unattractive stimulus persons than did attractive participants. In particular, they gave unattractive stimulus persons higher ratings than did attractive participants, whereas attractive stimulus persons were rated similarly. It thus appears that unattractive people not only perceive themselves as relatively attractive, they also rate other unattractive individuals relatively favorably. However, that unattractive people have particular beauty ideals (or have less meta‐cognitive skills to differentiate between attractive and unattractive stimulus persons) did not have an impact on how they perceive themselves. That is, that unattractive participants overestimated their attractiveness compared to ratings by strangers is not due to them rating all unattractive people (including themselves) relatively favorably.
Likewise, we did find the predicted effects that unattractive participants selected unattractive stimulus persons and attractive participants selected attractive stimulus persons with whom they would compare their attractiveness to. Hence, it would have been possible that both attractive and unattractive people believe that their attractiveness level is similar to most others, which could have explained the findings that attractive participants underestimated their attractiveness and that unattractive participants overestimated it. However, whether participants selected an attractive or unattractive stimulus person had no impact on how they rated their own attractiveness and thus could not explain why the self‐rated attractiveness of attractive and unattractive people hardly differed.
Although comparison choice did not have an impact on how unattractive participants rated their own attractiveness, the finding that unattractive participants selected unattractive stimulus persons with whom they would compare their attractiveness to suggests that they may have an inkling that they are less attractive than they want it to be. Given that people tend to compare themselves with those who they feel are similar (Wood, 1989), it appears that the unattractive participants realized that they had more in common with the unattractive rather than the attractive stimulus persons. Even though the self‐ratings of the unattractive participants suggest otherwise and that the unattractive participants reported to perceive themselves to be less attractive than they actually are, they seem to realize that they are less attractive than others.

Limitations and future research

Whereas the finding that unattractive people overestimate their attractiveness is extremely robust and can be considered a fact (in all studies, the effect sizes were large and relatively consistent in their magnitude), the underlying mechanisms are unclear so far. Theoretical explanations are available and were tested in the present research, but although some promising effects were found (e.g., attractive and unattractive participants differed in their ratings of unattractive stimulus persons), the mechanism why unattractive people overestimate their attractiveness is still unknown and needs further work.
In this regard, it might be important that the present research compared self‐ratings of attractiveness with attractiveness ratings by strangers. Previous research has shown that self‐ratings are typically higher than ratings by strangers (a finding that was consistently replicated in the present research), but self‐ratings tend to be lower than ratings by spouses (e.g., Murstein & Christy, 1976). More generally, it has repeatedly been shown that not only objectively visible traits but also contextual variables can influence how people’s physical attractiveness is rated by others (e.g., Faust, Chatterjee & Christopoulos, 2018; Kniffin & Wilson, 2004). For example, factors unrelated to physical features such as membership in a common social group (Escasa, Gray & Patton, 2010) or feelings toward other people (Kniffin, Wansink, Griskevicius & Wilson, 2014) have been shown to have an impact on the perception of others' attractiveness. In sum, there is the strong tendency that people rate a familiar individual that they also like as more attractive than would someone who is unfamiliar with that individual. As a consequence, it may well be that there is more concordance between how unattractive people perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others with whom they have social ties.
Moreover, whereas there is generally high agreement about who is attractive and who is not, beauty is still to some extent in the eye of the beholder. For example, in one study (Cross & Cross, 1971), 300 judges rated the attractiveness of stimulus persons in groups of six. The most attractive person was picked as best of its group by 207 judges, but even the least attractive person was chosen as best of its group by four judges. Interestingly, whereas there is relatively high agreement about the attractiveness of very attractive, attractive, about average, and unattractive individuals, there is rather disagreement about who is very unattractive (Kanazawa, Hu & Larere, 2018), meaning that very unattractive individuals are attractive to some (as in the Cross & Cross, 1971, study).
It thus may be that unattractive people take the positive feedback from their loved ones and those (few) that are attracted to them and use these as anchors for their self‐ratings and for how they believe they are rated by strangers. In fact, people selectively forget (Sedikides, Green, Saunders, Skowronksi & Zengel, 2016) and denigrate (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Shepperd, 1993) negative feedback about themselves and they preferentially want to receive self‐enhancing feedback (Gaertner, Sedikides & Cai, 2012). Future research would be thus welcome that assesses the objective attractiveness of a target by raters that know the attractiveness target and examines to what extent people integrate these ratings into their self‐perceived attractiveness.
There is a further reason why a comparison between self‐ratings and ratings by people who are familiar with the target person would be worthwhile. As the present studies suggest, the unattractive participants deceived themselves in that they perceived themselves as more attractive than is actually warranted. Evolutionary theorizing (e.g., von Hippel & Trivers, 2011) argues that such an instance of overconfidence may have social advantages. For example, people may hold inflated self‐views as a means of persuading others to adopt these overly positive perceptions of them. That is, self‐deception evolved because it facilitates the deception of others. In line with these ideas, recent research (Murphy, von Hippel, Dubbs et al., 2015) tested whether overconfidence is associated with desirableness as a dating partner. In fact, overconfident authors’ of dating profiles were perceived as more desirable and this effect was mediated by how confident raters perceived the authors to be. Therefore, it might be that people who learn that an objectively unattractive individual perceives him/herself in a positive way may assume that this person has some physical qualities that warrant the confidence and, in turn, perceive the person more favorably. Future research may examine whether self‐ratings of attractiveness indeed have an impact on how an individual is perceived by others after the raters learned about the self‐ratings.
Another avenue for future research would be to examine why attractive participants underestimated how attractive they were rated by strangers. Part of the reason could be due to regression‐to‐the‐mean (if participants are rated very highly by others, there is little room left for overestimation). However, the unattractive participants’ overestimation was much more pronounced than was the attractive participants’ underestimation so the finding that attractive people underestimate their attractiveness is likely to have psychological roots as well.
Finally, a limitation of the present studies is that the raters in all studies could only see the faces and clothed bodies of the participants. It is rather likely that the participants considered not only their faces and dressed appearance but also their naked bodies to estimate their level of attractiveness. Hence, part of the reason why the self‐ratings of unattractive participants differed from the experimenter ratings could be that different criteria were used as indicators of the overall attractiveness (cf., Dunning et al., 1989).

Hot-crazy matrix: Borderline personality traits in attractive women and wealthy low attractive men are relatively favoured by the opposite sex

Testing the hot-crazy matrix: Borderline personality traits in attractive women and wealthy low attractive men are relatively favoured by the opposite sex. Alyson E Blanchard, Thomas J Dunn, Alex Sumich. Personality and Individual Differences, March 12 2020, 109964. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109964

Abstract: Men and women reliably differ on the importance of certain criteria when considering romantic relationships. From an evolutionary perspective that explains sex differences in mating effort and parental investment, men should prioritise attractiveness and women, wealth. Personality traits also signal important information about relationship potential with those of the dark triad facilitating short-term relationships. However, how the vulnerable dark triad traits of borderline personality disorder (BPD) and secondary psychopathyfunction in relationships remains relatively unexplored. Even though interpersonally tempestuous, individuals high in these traits might be alluring in that they offer a thrilling relationship for the short-term, so long as they are also physically appealing. Across two studies, we examined sex differences in partner preference judged on attractiveness in relation to BPD and secondary psychopathy across short- and long-term relationship contexts. Men were willing to engage in relationships with attractive women high in BPD traits, while women compensated low attractiveness for wealth in long-term dating, and did not desire secondary psychopathy in any relationship. Results show that women are more astute in mate preference, avoiding troublesome or financially challenged men who are time and economically costly, and men more readily engage in potentially turbulent relationships.

Keywords: Borderline personality disorderSecondary psychopathyMate preferencesVulnerable dark triadEvolutionLife history theoryPace of life syndrome

Mechanisms for the Cognitive Processing of Attractiveness in Adult and Infant Faces: From the Evolutionary Perspective

Mechanisms for the Cognitive Processing of Attractiveness in Adult and Infant Faces: From the Evolutionary Perspective. Hui Kou, Qinhong Xie and Taiyong Bi. Front. Psychol., March 11 2020. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00436

Abstract: Research on the cognitive processing of facial attractiveness has mainly focused on adult faces. Recent studies have revealed that the cognitive processing of facial attractiveness in infant faces is not the same as that in adult faces. Therefore, it is necessary to summarize the evidence on the processing of facial attractiveness in each kind of face and compare their underlying mechanisms. In this paper, we first reviewed studies on the cognitive processing of facial attractiveness in adult faces, including attentional and mnemonic processing, and then discussed the underlying mechanisms. Afterward, studies on facial attractiveness in infant faces were reviewed, and the underlying mechanisms were also discussed. Direct comparisons between the two kinds of cognitive processing were subsequently made. The results showed that the mechanisms for the processing of attractiveness in adult faces and infant faces are mainly motivated by the perspectives of mate selection and raising offspring, respectively, in evolutionary psychology. Finally, directions for future research are proposed.

Prevention of Psychosis—Advances in Detection, Prognosis, & Intervention; but evidence that favored any particular preventive intervention over another is currently of great uncertainty

Prevention of Psychosis—Advances in Detection, Prognosis, and Intervention. Paolo Fusar-Poli et al. JAMA Psychiatry, March 11, 2020. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2019.4779

Key Points
Question  What is the status of current clinical knowledge in the detection, prognosis, and interventions for individuals at risk of psychosis?

Findings  In this review of 42 meta-analyses encompassing 81 outcomes, detecting individuals at risk for psychosis required knowledge of their specific sociodemographic, clinical, functional, cognitive, and neurobiological characteristics, and predicting outcomes was achieved with good accuracy provided that assessment tools were used in clinical samples. Evidence for specific effective interventions for this patient population is currently insufficient.

Meaning  Findings of this review suggest that, although clinical research knowledge for psychosis prevention is substantial and detecting and formulating a prognosis in individuals at risk for psychosis are possible, further research is needed to identify specific effective interventions in individuals with sufficient risk enrichment.


Abstract
Importance  Detection, prognosis, and indicated interventions in individuals at clinical high risk for psychosis (CHR-P) are key components of preventive psychiatry.

Objective  To provide a comprehensive, evidence-based systematic appraisal of the advancements and limitations of detection, prognosis, and interventions for CHR-P individuals and to formulate updated recommendations.

Evidence Review  Web of Science, Cochrane Central Register of Reviews, and Ovid/PsychINFO were searched for articles published from January 1, 2013, to June 30, 2019, to identify meta-analyses conducted in CHR-P individuals. MEDLINE was used to search the reference lists of retrieved articles. Data obtained from each article included first author, year of publication, topic investigated, type of publication, study design and number, sample size of CHR-P population and comparison group, type of comparison group, age and sex of CHR-P individuals, type of prognostic assessment, interventions, quality assessment (using AMSTAR [Assessing the Methodological Quality of Systematic Reviews]), and key findings with their effect sizes.

Findings  In total, 42 meta-analyses published in the past 6 years and encompassing 81 outcomes were included. For the detection component, CHR-P individuals were young (mean [SD] age, 20.6 [3.2] years), were more frequently male (58%), and predominantly presented with attenuated psychotic symptoms lasting for more than 1 year before their presentation at specialized services. CHR-P individuals accumulated several sociodemographic risk factors compared with control participants. Substance use (33% tobacco use and 27% cannabis use), comorbid mental disorders (41% with depressive disorders and 15% with anxiety disorders), suicidal ideation (66%), and self-harm (49%) were also frequently seen in CHR-P individuals. CHR-P individuals showed impairments in work (Cohen d = 0.57) or educational functioning (Cohen d = 0.21), social functioning (Cohen d = 1.25), and quality of life (Cohen d = 1.75). Several neurobiological and neurocognitive alterations were confirmed in this study. For the prognosis component, the prognostic accuracy of CHR-P instruments was good, provided they were used in clinical samples. Overall, risk of psychosis was 22% at 3 years, and the risk was the highest in the brief and limited intermittent psychotic symptoms subgroup (38%). Baseline severity of attenuated psychotic (Cohen d = 0.35) and negative symptoms (Cohen d = 0.39) as well as low functioning (Cohen d = 0.29) were associated with an increased risk of psychosis. Controlling risk enrichment and implementing sequential risk assessments can optimize prognostic accuracy. For the intervention component, no robust evidence yet exists to favor any indicated intervention over another (including needs-based interventions and control conditions) for preventing psychosis or ameliorating any other outcome in CHR-P individuals. However, because the uncertainty of this evidence is high, needs-based and psychological interventions should still be offered.

Conclusions and Relevance  This review confirmed recent substantial advancements in the detection and prognosis of CHR-P individuals while suggesting that effective indicated interventions need to be identified. This evidence suggests a need for specialized services to detect CHR-P individuals in primary and secondary care settings, to formulate a prognosis with validated psychometric instruments, and to offer needs-based and psychological interventions.



Introduction

Detection, assessment, and intervention before the onset of a first episode of the disorder in individuals at clinical high risk for psychosis (CHR-P) have the potential to maximize the benefits of early interventions in psychosis.1,2 The CHR-P paradigm originated in Australia 25 years ago3 and has since gained enough traction to stimulate hundreds of research publications. These published studies have been summarized in evidence synthesis studies spanning different topics and have influenced several national4 and international5 clinical guidelines and diagnostic manuals (eg, DSM-56,7). Overall, CHR-P represents the most established preventive approach in clinical psychiatry; therefore, periodically reviewing its progress and limitations is essential.

The rapid developments of detection, prognostic, and intervention-focused knowledge in the CHR-P field have not yet been integrated into a comprehensive, evidence-based summary since a 2013 publication in JAMA Psychiatry.8 Produced by the European College of Neuropsychopharmacology Network on the Prevention of Mental Disorders and Mental Health Promotion,9 the present study aimed to provide the first umbrella review summarizing the most recent evidence in the CHR-P field. An additional objective was to provide evidence-based recommendations for the 3 core components that are necessary to implement the CHR-P paradigm in clinical practice: detection, prognosis, and intervention.10

Methods
The protocol of this study was registered in PROSPERO (registration No. CRD42019135880). This study was conducted in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis Protocols (PRISMA) reporting guideline11 and the Reporting Items for Practice Guidelines in Healthcare (RIGHT) statement12 (eTable 1 in the Supplement).

Search Strategy and Selection Criteria
A multistep literature search was performed for articles published between January 1, 2013, and June 30, 2019 (eMethods 1 in the Supplement). Web of Science, Cochrane Central Register of Reviews, and Ovid/PsychINFO were searched for meta-analyses conducted in CHR-P individuals, and MEDLINE was used to search the reference lists of retrieved articles. The literature search, study selection, and data extraction were conducted independently by 2 of us (G.S.d.P., P.F.-P.), and consensus was reached through discussion.

Studies included were (1) meta-analyses (pairwise or network; aggregate or individual participant data) published as original investigations, reviews, research letters, or gray literature without restriction on the topic investigated13; (2) conducted in CHR-P individuals (ie, individuals meeting ultra-high-risk and/or basic symptoms criteria) as established by validated psychometric instruments8 (eMethods 2 in the Supplement) without restriction on the type of comparison group; and (3) published in the past 6 years.

Studies excluded (1) were original studies, study protocols, systematic reviews without quantitative analyses, and other non-meta-analytical studies; (2) did not formally assess and selected participants with established CHR-P instruments; or (3) were abstracts and conference proceedings. Data obtained from each article included first author, year of publication, topic investigated, type of publication, study design and number, sample size of CHR-P population and comparison group, type of comparison group, age and sex of CHR-P individuals, type of prognostic assessment, interventions, quality assessment (using AMSTAR [Assessing the Methodological Quality of Systematic Reviews]), and key findings with their effect sizes.

To respect the hierarchy of the evidence (eMethods 3 in the Supplement), if 2 or more meta-analyses addressing the same topic were found, we gave preference to individual participant data meta-analyses over aggregate network meta-analyses and to network meta-analyses over pairwise meta-analyses. The most recent study was selected when the previous criteria did not apply. If, after applying the hierarchical criteria, 2 studies were similar, both were included.

Outcome Measures, Data Extraction, and Timing and Effect Measures
From each study, a predetermined set of outcome measures (eMethods 4 in the Supplement) was extracted. The results were then narratively reported in tables, clustered around 3 core domains: detection, prognosis, and intervention.

When feasible, effect size measures were estimated through Cohen d. Other effect size measures were converted to Cohen d.13 In case of meta-analyses reporting time-dependent risks or rates or descriptive data only, proportions (95% CIs) or means (SDs) were summarized.

Quality Assessment
The quality of the included meta-analyses was assessed with the AMSTAR tool.14 Details of the meta-analyses and items evaluated are found in eMethods 5 in the Supplement.

Standards for Guidelines Development
To develop the recommendations, we followed the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) grading system15 (eTable 2 in the Supplement), which is suited explicitly for preventive approaches and has received extensive validation in articles published in several journals, including JAMA.16-21 Guideline development followed the JAMA Clinical Guidelines Synopsis, reaching consensus across the multidisciplinary European College of Neuropsychopharmacology Network on the Prevention of Mental Disorders and Mental Health Promotion.9 The rationale for the recommendations was provided. Conflicts of interest were fully detailed.

Results
The literature search yielded 886 citations, which were screened for eligibility, and 55 of them were considered. After checking the inclusion and exclusion criteria, we included 42 meta-analyses encompassing 81 outcomes in the final analysis (Figure 1; eTables 3 to 11 in the Supplement).

Detection

Characteristics
No meta-analysis focused on the basic symptoms criteria. Overall, 85% (95% CI, 79%-90%) of CHR-P individuals met the attenuated psychosis symptoms (APS) criteria,22 10% (95% CI, 6%-14%) met the brief limited intermittent psychotic symptoms (BLIPS) criteria,22 and 5% (95% CI, 3%-7%) met the genetic risk and deterioration (GRD) syndrome criteria.22 The mean (SD) age of CHR-P individuals across the included studies was 20.6 (3.2) years, with a range of 12 to 49 years.5,22-52 These individuals were predominantly male (58%)22-29,31,33,35-43,46-50,53,54 and had attenuated psychotic symptoms lasting for more than 1 year before their presentation to specialized services. Several studies included underage patients.5,22-30,32-35,39-50,52,55,56 No differences were observed across the APS, BLIPS, and GRD subgroups.22 However, the mean (SD) duration of untreated attenuated psychotic symptoms tended to be shorter in the BLIPS group (435.8 [456.4] days) compared with the GRD group (783.5 [798.6] days) and APS group (709.5 [518.5] days) (eTable 3 in the Supplement).

Genetic and Environmental Risk and Protective Factors
Individuals who met CHR-P criteria, compared with those who did not, were more likely to have olfactory dysfunction (Cohen d = 0.71),57 be physically inactive (Cohen d = 0.7), have obstetric complications (Cohen d = 0.62), be unemployed (Cohen d = 0.57), be single (Cohen d = 0.27), have a low educational level (Cohen d = 0.21), and be male (Cohen d = 0.18).55 Trauma, which encompassed childhood emotional abuse (Cohen d = 0.98),55 high perceived stress (Cohen d = 0.85),55 childhood physical neglect (Cohen d = 0.62),55 and being bullied (Cohen d = 0.62)56 (eTable 4 in the Supplement; Figure 2), was also more frequent (87% for overall trauma)23 and severe (Cohen d = 1.38)56 in CHR-P individuals compared with the control groups. No meta-analysis addressed the association between genetic factors and the CHR-P state.

Substance Use
A statistically significant association was found between the CHR-P state and tobacco use (Cohen d = 0.61).55 Altogether, 33% of CHR-P individuals smoked tobacco compared with 14% in the control groups.58 Those in the CHR-P group were also more likely to be current cannabis users than control participants (27% vs 17%).53 Current cannabis use disorder was associated with an increased risk of psychosis (Cohen d = 0.31), whereas lifetime cannabis use was not.24 Higher levels of unusual thought content (Cohen d = 0.27) and suspiciousness (Cohen d = 0.21) were found in CHR-P individuals who were cannabis users compared with non–cannabis users,53 but attenuated positive or negative psychotic symptoms did not differ between these 2 groups53 (eTable 5 in the Supplement).

Clinical Comorbidity
Depressive (41%) and anxiety (15%) disorders were frequent in the CHR-P state.25 Most CHR-P individuals presented with suicidal ideation (66%).26 The prevalence of self-harm was 49% and of suicide attempts was 18% in CHR-P individuals26 (eTable 6 in the Supplement).

Functioning and Quality of Life
CHR-P individuals had lower levels of adolescence (Cohen d = 0.96-1.03) and childhood (Cohen d = 1.0) functioning compared with control participants.55 Functional impairments in CHR-P individuals were as severe as impairments in other mental disorders and were more severe than in control participants (Cohen d = 3.01)27 but were less severe than in established psychosis (Cohen d = 0.34). The CHR-P status was also associated with significant social deficits (Cohen d = 1.25).55 Quality of life was worse in CHR-P individuals than in control individuals (Cohen d = 1.75),27 whereas no differences from individuals with psychosis27 were reported (eTable 7 in the Supplement).

Cognition
Visual learning (Cohen d = 0.27), processing speed (Cohen d = 0.42), and verbal learning (Cohen d = 0.42)54 were impaired in CHR-P individuals compared with control participants. CHR-P individuals who later developed psychosis showed poorer cognitive functioning (Cohen d = 0.24-0.54)54 compared with those who did not develop psychosis. However, no evidence of cognitive decline was found from baseline to follow-up in CHR-P individuals at any time.28 Although social cognition was impaired in CHR-P individuals compared with control individuals (Cohen d = 0.48),30 theory of mind was less impaired than in participants with first-episode psychosis (Cohen d = 0.45).31 CHR-P individuals showed more metacognitive dysfunctions (Cohen d = 0.57-1.09) than control participants but were similar to those with established psychosis29 (eTable 8 in the Supplement).

Neuroimaging and Biochemistry
CHR-P individuals had decreased blood interleukin 1β (IL-1β) levels33 (Cohen d = 0.66), increased salivary cortisol levels (Cohen d = 0.59),32 and increased blood IL-633 (Cohen d = 0.31) compared with control groups. The thalamus was smaller in CHR-P individuals than in control participants (Cohen d = 0.60),36 whereas no significant differences in the pituitary volume were found.37 The right hippocampal volume (unlike the left one) was also significantly smaller in CHR-P individuals38 compared with control participants (Cohen d = 0.24).38 Levels of glutamate and glutamine (measured together) were higher in the medial frontal cortex of CHR-P individuals than in control participants (Cohen d = 0.26).34

Compared with control individuals, CHR-P individuals showed decreased activations in the right inferior parietal lobule and left medial frontal gyrus and increased activations in the left superior temporal gyrus and right superior frontal gyrus35 (eTable 9 in the Supplement). As for neurophysiological processes, the mismatch negativity amplitude was reduced in CHR-P individuals compared with control participants (Cohen d = 0.4)39 and in CHR-P individuals who developed psychosis compared with those who did not (Cohen d = 0.71).59 A theoretical neurobiological model of the CHR-P state, which integrates these findings, is reported in Figure 3.60

Prognosis
Overall Prognostic Performance
Currently used semistructured interviews for psychosis prediction have an excellent overall prognostic performance (area under the curve [AUC] = 0.9).42 However, their sensitivity is high (96%) and specificity is low (47%),42 and they are not valid outside clinical samples that have undergone risk enrichment (ie, screening the general population is not useful)42 (Figure 2). The CAARMS (Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States) instrument has an acceptable (AUC = 0.79) accuracy for predicting psychosis,43 and it has no substantial differences in prognostic accuracy from other CHR-P instruments,42 although the Structured Interview of Psychosis-Risk Syndromes has a slightly higher sensitivity (95%) than the CAARMS (86%).43 The reason for this lack of difference in prognostic accuracy is that most of the risk for psychosis (posttest risk) is accounted for by the way these individuals are recruited and sampled (pretest risk, independent from clinically verified CHR-P status) before the CHR-P test is administered.41 Pretest risk for psychosis is 15% at 3 years and is heterogeneous, ranging from 9% to 24%. Variability in pretest risk for psychosis is modulated by the type of sampling strategies,41 increasing if samples are recruited from secondary care and decreasing if samples are recruited from the community41 (Figure 2; eTable 10 in the Supplement).

The proportion of CHR-P individuals who developed a psychotic disorder (positive posttest risk, updated in 2016) was 22% at 3 years (Figure 4).40 The speed of transition to psychosis was greatest in the first months after CHR-P individuals presented to clinical services (median time to psychosis = 8 months).61 Transition to schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses was more than 6 times more frequent (73%) than transition to affective psychoses (11%), whereas transition to other psychoses was 16%.40 The transition risk to psychosis was higher in the BLIPS subgroup (38%) than in the APS (24%) and GRD (8%) subgroups at the 48-month follow-up or later,22 whereas the GRD subgroup was not at higher risk compared with the help-seeking control participants (which represents the standard comparative group during CHR-P interviews).22 No prognostic difference in the risk of psychotic recurrence was found across different operationalizations of short-lived psychotic episodes, including acute and transient psychotic disorders and brief psychotic disorders, but this risk was lower than in patients with remitted first-episode schizophrenia62 (eTable 10 in the Supplement). In the BLIPS group, the 2-year risk of developing schizophrenia was 23% and affective psychoses was null.62 Conversely, the remission rate of the baseline CHR-P symptoms was 35% at 1.94 years’ follow-up.45 No data were available on the remission rates across the BLIPS, APS, and GRD subgroups.

Prediction of Outcomes
Among CHR-P individuals, transition to psychosis was associated with severity of negative symptoms (Cohen d = 0.39), right-handedness (Cohen d = 0.26), severity of attenuated positive psychotic symptoms (Cohen d = 0.35), disorganized and cognitive symptoms (Cohen d = 0.32), unemployment (Cohen d = 0.32), severity of total symptoms (Cohen d = 0.31), low functioning (Cohen d = 0.29), severity of general symptoms (Cohen d = 0.23), living alone (Cohen d = 0.16), male sex (Cohen d = 0.10), and lifetime stress or trauma (Cohen d = 0.08) (eTable 11 in the Supplement; Figure 2).63 However, only severity of attenuated psychotic symptoms and low functioning (highly suggestive level of evidence13) and negative symptoms (suggestive level of evidence13) were associated with psychosis onset after controlling for several biases.63 Comorbid anxiety and depressive disorders were not significantly associated with transition to psychosis.25 No data were available on the predictors of outcomes other than psychosis onset.

Prognostic accuracy may be optimized by controlling pretest risk enrichment55 and using sequential assessments that include a staged assessment based on clinical information, electroencephalogram, neuroimaging, and blood markers44 (eTable 11 in the Supplement).

Interventions
No evidence was found that favored any indicated intervention over another (including needs-based interventions or control conditions) for preventing the transition to psychosis.46 Likewise, no evidence supported the superior efficacy of any intervention over another for reducing attenuated positive psychotic symptoms47,48 (2 meta-analyses on the same topic were retained after the hierarchical criteria were applied) or negative symptoms,49 improving overall functioning5 or social functioning,50 alleviating depression,52 improving symptom-related distress or quality of life,51 or affecting acceptability46 in CHR-P individuals (eTable 12 in the Supplement).

Discussion
To our knowledge, this study is the first comprehensive review (42 meta-analyses with 81 outcomes) focusing on detection, prognosis, and intervention of CHR-P individuals. No meta-analyses had reported consistent results from well-designed, well-conducted studies related to detection, prognosis, or interventions in representative primary care populations (USPSTF criteria for high level of certainty).

The detection of CHR-P individuals has a moderate level of certainty (grade B; Table). Research in the past 6 years has revealed that detection of truly at-risk individuals may be the key rate-limiting step toward a successful implementation of the CHR-P paradigm at scale. Although the CHR-P group is heterogeneous, its baseline sociodemographic characteristics are now clearer; typically, these individuals were young (mean [SD] age, 20.6 [3.2] years) men (58%) who presented with APS and had associated impairments in global functioning (Cohen d = 3.01), social functioning (Cohen d = 1.25),55 and quality of life (Cohen d = 1.75)27; suicidal ideation (66%26); self-harm (49%26); and suicide attempts (18%26). Because of these problems, these individuals sought help at specialized clinics; however, typically, these problems remained undetected (and untreated) for 1 year or more.

Currently, detection of CHR-P individuals is entirely based on their referral on suspicion of psychosis risk and on the promotion of help-seeking behaviors. These detection strategies appear inefficient: only about 5%64 to 12%65 of first-episode cases were detected at the time of their CHR-P stage through stand-alone or youth mental health services. A further caveat is that approximately one-third of first-episode cases may not lead to the development of psychosis through a CHR-P stage.66,67 Furthermore, at presentation, CHR-P individuals often had comorbid nonpsychotic mental disorders (41% depressive disorders and 15% anxiety disorders25) and substance use (33% tobacco use58 and 27% cannabis use53). Because of these limitations, the chain of evidence lacked coherence (per USPSTF grading system; eTable 2 in the Supplement). These issues could be addressed by integrated detection programs that leverage automatic detection tools for screening large clinical10,64,68 and nonclinical69 samples in a transdiagnostic70 fashion, encompassing primary and secondary care, the community,71 and youth mental health services.72 In addition, the detection of CHR-P individuals is currently based on the assessment of symptoms, but symptoms may be only the epiphenomena of underlying pathophysiological processes. CHR-P individuals often have several established sociodemographic, environmental, and other types of risk factors for psychosis,73 including male sex, unemployment, single status, low educational and functional level, obstetric complications, physical inactivity, olfactory dysfunction, and childhood trauma (Figure 2; eDiscussion 1 in the Supplement). Incorporating the assessment of these multiple factors with CHR-P symptoms, resulting in a Psychosis Polyrisk Score, may produce refined detection approaches74 that better map the etiopathological path of psychosis onset.

The prognosis of CHR-P individuals has a moderate level of certainty (grade B; Table).47,75 Converging evidence has demonstrated that CHR-P assessment instruments have good prognostic accuracy (AUC = 0.9)42 for the prediction of psychosis, comparable to the accuracy of clinical tools used in other areas of medicine.42 However, alternative instruments are needed to predict other nonpsychotic outcomes (eg, bipolar onset in those at risk76,77). No substantial prognostic accuracy differences were found across different CHR-P tools.42 The current CHR-P prediction instruments have high sensitivity (96%) but low specificity (47%) and are valid only if applied to clinical samples that have accumulated the above risk factors and have therefore already undergone substantial risk enrichment (Figure 2). In fact, it is not only CHR-P criteria that determine the probability of transition to psychosis but also the recruitment and selection of samples, which modulate enrichment in risk.47,78 The next generation of research should better deconstruct and control risk enrichment79 to maximize the scalability of the use of the CHR-P prediction instruments.71 The 3-year meta-analytic risk of psychosis onset in the entire CHR-P group has declined from 31.5% (estimated in 201280) to the current 22% (Figure 4), although not globally.81

Transition risk has decreased when recruitment strategies focused on the community as opposed to primary or secondary care (eDiscussion 2 in the Supplement). Risk was the highest in the BLIPS subgroup (38% at 4 years; 89% at 5 years if there were “seriously disorganising or dangerous”82 features), intermediate in the APS subgroup (24% at 4 years), and lowest in the GRD subgroup (8% at 4 years).22 Those in the GRD subgroup were not at higher risk than the help-seeking control individuals at up to 4 years of follow-up.22 A revised version of the CHR-P paradigm, which includes stratification across these 3 subgroups, has therefore been proposed.2,83 The BLIPS group also overlapped substantially with the acute and transient psychotic disorders in the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision.82 Therefore, current CHR-P instruments can allow only subgroup-level (ie, BLIPS>APS>GRD) but not participant-level prognosis (inconsistent evidence, USPSTF grading; eTable 2 in the Supplement).

To refine prognosis at the individual participant level, future research may consider specific risk factors (eg, sex, stress and trauma, employment, and living status63), biomarkers (eg, hippocampal volume38), or cognitive markers (eg, processing speed, verbal and visual memory, and attention84) in addition to the CHR-P subgroups22 and clinical symptoms (only severity of attenuated positive and negative symptoms and level of functioning are robust risk factors for psychosis63). The potential of this approach has been supported by the development and validation of individualized clinical prediction models that leverage multimodal risk profiling,64,85,86 including dynamic87 risk prediction models.88 Because these models tend to be more complex compared with standard symptomatic CHR-P assessments, they are more likely to enter clinical routine through a sequential testing framework44 (eDiscussion 3 in the Supplement). Good outcomes in CHR-P individuals have not been fully operationalized,89 and information is lacking on prediction of relevant clinical outcomes (USPSTF; eTable 2 in the Supplement), such as functional level and quality of life, with only approximately one-third of individuals remitting from their initial CHR-P state.45

The available evidence is insufficient (grade C/I; Table) to assess the effects of preventive interventions on health outcomes in CHR-P groups. Although earlier meta-analyses found advantages to cognitive behavioral therapy,90 which is currently recommended by clinical guidelines,4 the inclusion of new trials in recent meta-analyses has indicated no clear benefits to favor any available intervention over another intervention or any control condition, such as needs-based interventions. An independent pairwise meta-analysis published by the Cochrane Group after completion of the present study concluded that no convincing, unbiased, high-quality evidence exists that favors any type of intervention.91 Evidence is insufficient because these studies tended to report large CIs and therefore high uncertainty (USPSTF; eTable 2 in the Supplement) in the meta-analytic estimates, and significant implications of the interventions for specific subgroups may not have been detected. For example, the needs-based interventions that are typically used as control conditions may have diluted the comparative efficacy of experimental interventions. This nondifferential outcome could also be an effect of the sampling biases leading to too few CHR-P individuals in the intervention studies who were at true risk for psychosis, diluting the statistical power of current trials that may have not been able to detect small to modest effect sizes (USPSTF; eTable 2 in the Supplement).92 This lack of demonstrable advantages of specific interventions could also be the consequence of one-size-fits-all approaches in treating CHR-P individuals that go against the clinical, neurobiological, and prognostic heterogeneity of this group and against the recent calls for precision medicine. For example, CHR-P interventions to date have been developed largely for individuals with APS at the expense of those with BLIPS, who are often unwilling to receive the recommended interventions. Another explanation for the lack of comparative efficacy of preventive interventions is that they have largely targeted symptoms, as opposed to key neurobiological processes associated with the onset of psychosis (gaps in the chain of evidence, USPSTF; eTable 2 in the Supplement; Figure 3) or risk factors that could be modified (eg, physical inactivity; Figure 2). We believe that future experimental interventions should also better target relevant outcomes (USPSTF; eTable 2 in the Supplement) other than psychosis onset, including functioning, given the poor remission rates and low functioning of this population.93 As acknowledged by the USPSTF criteria (eTable 2 in the Supplement), in the case of uncertainty, new trials published in the near future may allow a more accurate estimation of the preventive implications for health outcomes.

Grading the recent meta-analytic evidence described in this review, the European College of Neuropsychopharmacology Network on the Prevention of Mental Disorders and Mental Health Promotion has recommended (Table) implementing specialized services to detect CHR-P individuals in primary and secondary care settings and to formulate a prognosis with the validated psychometric instruments.9 Owing to insufficient evidence that favored any particular preventive intervention over another (including control conditions) and considering the uncertainty of the current evidence, no firm conclusions can be made,91 and a cautious approach is required. This approach should involve offering the least onerous feasible primary indicated prevention based on needs-based interventions and psychotherapy (cognitive behavioral therapy or integrated psychological interventions), titrated in accordance with the patient characteristics and risk profile (CHR-P subgroup levels BLIPS>APS>GRD, severity of attenuated positive and negative symptoms, and level of functioning), values, and preferences of the individual.94,95 In addition, other comorbid psychiatric conditions should be treated according to available guidelines, aiming for improving recovery, functional status, and quality of life beyond preventive aims.

Limitations
The main limitations of this study were that the meta-analyses had heterogeneous quality (eResults in the Supplement) and that the literature search approach may have favored the selection of more commonly and readily studied domains that are more likely to be included in a meta-analysis. We cannot exclude the possibility that some promising advancements in the CHR-P field, despite having sufficient data, do not (yet) have a corresponding eligible meta-analysis, such as polygenic risk scores.96 However, in the current era, this possibility is becoming increasingly less likely, with meta-analyses being performed frequently, to the point that multiple meta-analyses are available for the same topic.97-99 In any case, for most putative domains that are difficult to study (or uncommonly studied), the current grade of evidence is unlikely to be remarkable, given the limited data.

Conclusions
Over recent years, substantial advancements in the detection and prognosis of CHR-P individuals have been confirmed in several meta-analyses. However, further research is needed to optimize risk enrichment and stratification and to identify effective interventions that target quantitative individualized risk signatures for both poor and good outcomes.

Longer Religious Fasting Increases Support for Islamist Parties: Evidence from Ramadan

Aksoy, Ozan, and Diego Gambetta. 2020. “Longer Religious Fasting Increases Support for Islamist Parties: Evidence from Ramadan.” SocArXiv. March 10. doi:10.31235/osf.io/n3s8a

Abstract: Much scientific research shows that the sacrifices imposed by religious practices are positively associated with the success of religious organizations. We present the first evidence that this association is causal. We employ a natural experiment that rests on a peculiar time-shifting feature of Ramadan that makes the length of fasting time vary from year-to-year and by latitude. We find that an hour increase in fasting during the median Ramadan day increases the vote shares of Islamist political parties by about 6.5 percentage-points in Turkey’s parliamentary elections between 1973 and 2018. This effect is weaker in provinces where the proportion of non-orthodox Muslims is higher, but stronger in provinces where the number of per capita mosques and of religious personnel is higher. Further analyses suggest that the main mechanism underlying our findings is an increased commitment to religion induced by costlier practice. By showing that the success of religious organizations is causally related to the sacrifice demanded by religious practices, these results strengthen a key finding of the science of religion.

Check also Witnessing fewer credible cultural cues of religious commitment is the most potent predictor of religious disbelief, β=0.28, followed distantly by reflective cognitive style:

Gervais, Will M., Maxine B. Najle, Sarah R. Schiavone, and Nava Caluori. 2019. “The Origins of Religious Disbelief: A Dual Inheritance Approach.” PsyArXiv. December 8. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/12/witnessing-fewer-credible-cultural-cues.html

Bullshitting frequency was negatively associated with sincerity, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard and positively related to overclaiming

Littrell, Shane, Evan F. Risko, and Jonathan A. Fugelsang. 2019. “The Bullshitting Frequency Scale: Development and Psychometric Properties.” PsyArXiv. September 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dxzqh

Abstract: Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit, which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo-profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act). Here, we present results from four studies focusing on the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in two types of bullshitting (persuasive and evasive) in everyday situations. Overall, bullshitting frequency was negatively associated with sincerity, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard and positively related to overclaiming. Additionally, the Bullshitting Frequency Scale was found to reliably measure constructs distinct from lying. These results represent an important step forward by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in everyday bullshitting

Does Honesty Require Time? Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) may have overestimated the true effect of time pressure on cheating and the generality of the effect beyond the original context

Does Honesty Require Time? Two Preregistered Direct Replications of Experiment 2 of Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012). Ine Van der Cruyssen et al. Psychological Science, March 10, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620903716

Abstract: Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) found across two studies (N = 72 for each) that time pressure increased cheating. These findings suggest that dishonesty comes naturally, whereas honesty requires overcoming the initial tendency to cheat. Although the study’s results were statistically significant, a Bayesian reanalysis indicates that they had low evidential strength. In a direct replication attempt of Shalvi et al.’s Experiment 2, we found that time pressure did not increase cheating, N = 428, point biserial correlation (rpb) = .05, Bayes factor (BF)01 = 16.06. One important deviation from the original procedure, however, was the use of mass testing. In a second direct replication with small groups of participants, we found that time pressure also did not increase cheating, N = 297, rpb = .03, BF01 = 9.59. These findings indicate that the original study may have overestimated the true effect of time pressure on cheating and the generality of the effect beyond the original context.

Keywords: intuition, cheating, lying, honesty, replication, moral decision making, time pressure, open data, open materials, preregistered

General Discussion

What is people’s automatic tendency in a tempting situation? Shalvi et al. (2012) found that time pressure, a straightforward manipulation to spark “thinking fast” over “thinking slow,” provoked more cheating, and they concluded that people’s initial response is to serve their self-interest and cheat. We found no evidence that time pressure increased cheating in the die-roll paradigm. There are three possible reasons why replication studies do not produce the same results as the original study: (a) methodological problems in the replication study, (b) overestimation of the true effect size in the original study, or (c) differences between the studies that moderate the effect (Wicherts, 2018).
The first possibility is that methodological limitations in the replication study produced different results. In our first replication study, participants may not have fully appreciated the financial benefits of cheating. In our second replication study, relying on two test sites and offering the task in two languages may have increased error variance. But even for participants who performed the task in their native language, there was anecdotal support for the absence of a time-pressure effect (BF₀₁ = 2.90).
The second possible explanation is that the original study overestimated the true effect size. The use of between-session rather than within-session randomization in the original study makes the experimenter aware of condition assignment and raises the possibility that the experimenter influenced the results (Rosenthal et al., 1963). Also, a single observation (in this case, a single reported die-roll outcome) per participant is likely to provide for a noisy measure. With low reliability, the results are more likely to vary per sample.
The third possible explanation is that the time-pressure effect on cheating is influenced by the context and that differences between the studies explain the different results. Our replications differed in several ways from the original, the most prominent being the country where the study was run, namely Israel in the original versus The Netherlands in the replications. The difference in test site raises the possibility of cross-cultural differences in intuitive dishonesty. Perceived country corruption, for instance, is related to the amount of cheating in the die-under-the-cup game (Gächter & Schulz, 2016). Then again, the large meta-analysis by Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond (2019) found that cheating behavior varies little by country. Still, it seems worthwhile to explore whether the automatic tendency to cheat may vary with culture.
In both our PDRs, people were predominantly honest, and we in fact found no evidence of cheating.⁴ Whereas Shalvi et al. (2012) originally reasoned that “time pressure evokes lying even in settings in which people typically refrain from lying” (p. 1268), our findings point to the possibility that the time-pressure effect is bound to settings that produce more pronounced cheating (e.g., when providing justifications for cheating).
In sum, our findings indicate that the original study by Shalvi et al. (2012) may have overestimated the true effect of time pressure on cheating or the generality of the effect beyond the original context. The vast majority of our participants were honest—even under time pressure. This finding casts doubt on whether people’s intuitive tendency is to cheat and fits better with a preference for honest behavior.