Tuesday, August 25, 2020

Cultural pressure and biased responding in free will attitudes

Cultural pressure and biased responding in free will attitudes. Emiel Cracco, Carlos González-García, Ian Hussey, Senne Braem and David Wisniewski. Royal Society Open Science, August 26 2020. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.191824

Abstract: Whether you believe free will exists has profound effects on your behaviour, across different levels of processing, from simple motor action to social cognition. It is therefore important to understand which specific lay theories are held in the general public and why. Past research largely focused on investigating free will beliefs (FWB, ‘Do you think free will exists?’), but largely ignored a second key aspect: free will attitudes (FWA, ‘Do you like/value will?’). Attitudes are often independently predictive of behaviour, relative to beliefs, yet we currently know very little about FWAs in the general public. One key issue is whether such attitudes are subject to biased, socially desirable responding. The vast majority of the general public strongly believes in the existence of free will, which might create cultural pressure to value free will positively as well. In this registered report, we used a very large (N = 1100), open available dataset measuring implicit and explicit attitudes towards free will and determinism to address this issue. Our results indicate that both explicit and implicit attitudes towards free will are more positive than attitudes towards determinism. We also show that people experience cultural pressure to value free will, and to devalue determinism. Yet, we found no strong evidence that this cultural pressure affected either implicit or explicit attitudes in this dataset.


4. Discussion

In this registered report, we investigated attitudes towards free will and determinism in a large lay sample for the first time. Using data from the AIID project, we analysed both explicit and implicit attitudes towards free will and determinism. Attitudes towards free will were generally positive, while attitudes towards determinism were generally negative. This finding was robust to changes in how explicit and implicit attitudes were computed from the data. We further showed that people experience cultural pressure to value free will, and to devalue determinism. Contrary to our hypotheses, this pressure did not seem to affect free will attitudes.

4.1. Mapping free will attitudes in the general public

There is much prior research demonstrating that free will beliefs are dynamic, i.e. that they can be manipulated experimentally [7,16,21,37]. Such experimental manipulations often lead only to small effects, and there is little research directly addressing why changing free will beliefs is so difficult. Furthermore, free will belief manipulations probably affect different people to a varying degree, and we currently do not know which variables make a person susceptible to such manipulations. One factor that might partly explain these open questions is people's attitudes towards free will. A person with highly positive attitudes towards free will is likely to be less affected by FWB manipulations than a person with more negative attitudes towards free will. In order to test this hypothesis, we first need to map out and understand FWAs in the general public, which has not been done to date, however.
Our results show that both implicit and explicit attitudes towards free will are strongly positive in the general public. Only 11.39% of the participants explicitly valued free will negatively, while 34% chose the most positive available attitude rating on the scale, which mirrors similar findings for FWBs [4,5]. Furthermore, a lower proportion of participants explicitly valued determinism positively (35.96%), which again mirrors weaker belief in determinism in previous studies [5]. Interestingly, the mode of the explicit attitude distribution was nevertheless 0, indicating that many participants indicated to value free will and determinism to an equal degree. The same was not true for the implicit attitude distribution, which had a clearly positive mode instead. Thus, although many people indicated that they valued free will and determinism to an equal degree, implicit measures suggested that they in fact valued free will more strongly.
Additionally, our data demonstrate that there is considerable variance in FWAs (both explicit and implicit). Taken together, these results suggest that FWAs are a potential mediator for FWB manipulations, and might help explain why such manipulations are generally weak. Of course, these conclusions are tentative at the moment and will have to be confirmed empirically. Specifically, further research will need to directly assess the relation of FWBs and FWAs, and whether FWAs act as a mediator for FWB manipulations.

4.2. Cultural pressure and free will attitudes

One untested assumption in the free will belief literature is that responses to free will questionnaires are unbiased by cultural pressure. Here, we showed that in the domain of free will attitudes, participants indeed report cultural pressure to value free will, as well as a cultural pressure to devalue determinism. We further show that cultural pressure is stronger on free will than it is on determinism. Given this fact, one might expect that this cultural pressure affects attitudes in some measurable way. To investigate this possibility, we tested if more self-reported pressure to value free will led to more positive FWAs and whether more self-reported pressure led to more diverging explicit and implicit FWAs, since we expected cultural pressure to affect explicit attitudes more strongly than implicit ones. Both of these analyses yielded no significant results, however, leading us to conclude that cultural pressure did not affect FWA measures in our sample.
Although unexpected, there are some potential explanations for this finding. One option is that the cultural pressure measure did not fully capture the desired construct (biased/pressured responding). In order to assess cultural pressure, we only used two items that were rather blunt (e.g. ‘There is cultural pressure to think positive things about free will.’). Biased responding is clearly a wider concept than just self-rated cultural pressure, and is often measured using whole scales like the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) [38], a 40-item scale that measures both ‘impression management’ and ‘self-deceptive enhancement’. Such measures are more nuanced and of higher psychometric quality than the two cultural pressure items used in our main analysis.
While the BIDR was also part of the AIID dataset, we chose to use the cultural pressure items because the available sample size (214 < n < 233) was much higher than for the BIDR (13 < n < 55), and because these items were directly related to free will and determinism, while the BIDR is a much more general trait measure. However, the BIDR impression management and self-deceptive enhancement scales were included in the exploratory analysis correlating FWAs with personality traits, and we assessed BIDR scores in additional non-preregistered analyses. Impression management, which is arguably closer to the cultural pressure items used in the main analysis, did not correlate with either explicit (r = 0.09, p = 0.77, n = 13) or implicit (r = 0.06, p = 0.69, n = 43) attitudes. Thus, even this alternative measure of ‘cultural pressure’ showed no significant results. In contrast, self-deceptive enhancement did correlate with explicit attitudes (r = 0.63, p = 0.02, n = 13), but not with implicit attitudes (r = −0.02, p = 0.86, n = 55). Thus, it might be that people who tend to hold exaggerated positive self-descriptions report more positive feelings towards free will, relative to determinism. This exploratory finding is based on a very small sample size though and should be interpreted with caution until is it replicated in an independent, larger sample. Clearly, more research on this is needed, but this already demonstrates that free will attitudes might still be biased, just not by self-rated cultural pressure.

4.3. Exploratory analyses

In additional registered exploratory analyses, we found that age was positively related to free will attitudes. Interestingly, this finding is not consistent with a recent report that free will beliefs do not change with age [5]. This points to an interesting dissociation between free will beliefs and free will attitudes with increasing age that should be addressed in the future.

4.4. Directions for future research

Despite the many interesting findings in the current dataset, there remain several key open questions that should be addressed. First, the methods for measuring implicit attitudes towards free will need to be further refined. While the IAT is a much used and well validated instrument, its design only allows the assessment of two concepts in direct opposition. The IAT treats free will and determinism as two endpoints on a single attitude scale: the more you value free will, the less you value determinism, and vice versa. We know from free will belief research, however, that believing in free will does not automatically translate into disbelieving determinism [5], in fact one can believe in both at the same time (compatibilism, [1]). Thus, it might be that people also value both free will and determinism positively, yet the IAT is ill-suited to detect this pattern of free will related attitudes. Additionally, we found IAT scores to be more strongly related to deliberate thoughts on free will, than they are to gut feelings on free will, a pattern of results that we did not expect. Lastly, the words used to describe free will (intention, freedom, choice), and determinism (fixed, destined, arranged) have many uses that have little to do with the philosophical concepts of either free will or determinism, and might not precisely capture them. For instance, ‘arranged’ is often used to describe arranging a meeting, which has little to do with physical determinism. Taken together, this suggests that future research should invest effort into developing alternative measures of implicit attitudes towards free will.
Second, methods for measuring explicit attitudes towards free will and determinism should also be refined, and the precise wording of the attitude items might need to be revised. Additional effort should be invested into the precise wording of the attitude items. The AIID project used a wide range of different explicit attitude items, and here we focused on valence items (‘How positive or negative do you feel towards free will/determinism?’). For research specifically focusing on free will, it might be that other items (e.g. ‘Having free will is important to me’) are better suited to capture free will attitudes. Additionally, in order to make explicit and implicit attitude measures comparable here, we computed a difference score from free will and determinism valence ratings (val_diff). While this is useful from a methodological perspective, this procedure suffers from some of the same issues as the free will IAT. Just as the IAT cannot detect people who value both free will and determinism positively, as some compatibilists might do, the val_diff items cannot do so either. In the future, explicit attitude items for free will and determinism should be investigated separately, to more easily identify compatibilist participants.
Third, future work should focus on investigating free will beliefs and attitudes simultaneously, in order to describe and explain their interactions. Here, we focused on attitudes only, but in order to understand belief attitude interaction, e.g. whether free will attitudes mediate effects of free will belief manipulations on behaviour, we need to assess beliefs and attitudes within the same participants. This would also allow us to test whether free will attitudes are conditional on specific free will beliefs (e.g. ‘I can only value free will if I believe in it’), or vice versa. Relatedly, data reported here have been acquired between 2005 and 2007, while much of the work on free will beliefs has been performed about a decade later [4,5]. Attitudes can change across time, which further emphasizes the necessity to acquire beliefs and attitudes simultaneously if we are to understand how these two aspects of lay views on free will interact.

Quiet Fires Fail to Impress: Introverted Expressions of Passion Receive Less Social Worth, so those who express their passion extravertedly are more likely to reach higher organizational echelons

Cormier, Grace, and Jon Jachimowicz. 2020. “Quiet Fires Fail to Impress: Introverted Expressions of Passion Receive Less Social Worth.” PsyArXiv. August 26. doi:10.31234/osf.io/3zg4c

Abstract: Thinking of passionate people typically brings to mind their vivacious expressions. Prior research has shown that such outward manifestations of passion are often met with increased admiration and support by others. But not everyone may express their passion so animatedly. Drawing on personality research, we argue that vivacious expressions of passion capture only a narrow set of passion expressions: those characteristic of extraversion. We suggest that passion is also expressed in ways more aligned with introversion. Based on emerging sociological perspectives, we subsequently propose that introverted expressions of passion are rewarded less social worth than extraverted expressions of passion. We provide empirical support across four studies with full-time employees (N=1,060), including a study of subordinate-supervisor pairs. Our theory and results highlight that interpersonal effects of passion depend on how passion is expressed, whereby those who express their passion extravertedly—but not introvertedly—are more likely to reach higher organizational echelons.


I find support for pure altruism because individuals who received additional Social Security benefits passed on 15.4 percent to children via inter vivos transfers without receiving any additional care in return

Intergenerational Altruism and Retirement Transfers: Evidence from the Social Security Notch. Anita Mukherjee. J. Human Resources August 6, 2020 0419-10140R3. http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2020/08/11/jhr.58.1.0419-10140R3.abstract

Abstract: I contribute new evidence on altruistic preferences in intergenerational transfers using variation in Social Security benefits induced by an inflation-indexing mistake. The instrument is most relevant for those with low education, so I focus on this group. I find support for pure altruism because individuals who received additional Social Security benefits passed on 15.4 percent to children via inter vivos transfers without receiving any additional care in return. On the contrary, children reduce caregiving monotonically with increases in parental Social Security benefits. Adult female children appear to be the most affected as they both receive monetary transfers and reduce caregiving.


Adoptees: Parents’ over‐reactive and hostile parenting at 27 months were partially due to heritable (bio-mother internalizing problems and substance use) & prenatal factors (bio-mother illicit drug use during pregnancy)

Child Effects on Parental Negativity: The Role of Heritable and Prenatal Factors. Chang Liu et al. Child Development, Aug 1 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13404

Abstract: This study examined two possible mechanisms, evocative gene-environment correlation and prenatal factors, in accounting for child effects on parental negativity. Participants included 561 children adopted at birth, and their adoptive parents and birth parents within a prospective longitudinal adoption study. Findings indicated child effects on parental negativity, such that toddlers’ negative reactivity at 18 months was positively associated with adoptive parents’ over‐reactive and hostile parenting at 27 months. Furthermore, we found that child effects on parental negativity were partially due to heritable (e.g., birth mother [BM] internalizing problems and substance use) and prenatal factors (e.g., BM illicit drug use during pregnancy) that influence children’s negative reactivity at 18 months. This study provides critical evidence for “child on parent” effects.



From 2019... They used the spin precession of the Rb atoms as a clock to measure the time it takes them to cross the classically forbidden region; traversal time was 0.61(7) ms

Measurement of the time spent by a tunnelling atom within the barrier region. Ramón Ramos, David Spierings, Isabelle Racicot & Aephraim M. Steinberg. Nature volume 583, pages529–532(2020). Jul 22, 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2490-7

Abstract: Tunnelling is one of the most characteristic phenomena of quantum physics, underlying processes such as photosynthesis and nuclear fusion, as well as devices ranging from superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) magnetometers to superconducting qubits for quantum computers. The question of how long a particle takes to tunnel through a barrier, however, has remained contentious since the first attempts to calculate it1. It is now well understood that the group delay2—the arrival time of the peak of the transmitted wavepacket at the far side of the barrier—can be smaller than the barrier thickness divided by the speed of light, without violating causality. This has been confirmed by many experiments3,4,5,6, and a recent work even claims that tunnelling may take no time at all7. There have also been efforts to identify a different timescale that would better describe how long a given particle spends in the barrier region8,9,10. Here we directly measure such a time by studying Bose-condensed 87Rb atoms tunnelling through a 1.3-micrometre-thick optical barrier. By localizing a pseudo-magnetic field inside the barrier, we use the spin precession of the atoms as a clock to measure the time that they require to cross the classically forbidden region. We study the dependence of the traversal time on the incident energy, finding a value of 0.61(7) milliseconds at the lowest energy for which tunnelling is observable. This experiment lays the groundwork for addressing fundamental questions about history in quantum mechanics: for instance, what we can learn about where a particle was at earlier times by observing where it is now11,12,13.


Free version from 2019... Measuring the time a tunnelling atom spends in the barrier. Ramón Ramos, David Spierings, Isabelle Racicot, Aephraim M. Steinberg. arXiv:1907.13523. Jul 31 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.13523

Abstract: Tunnelling is one of the most paradigmatic and evocative phenomena of quantum physics, underlying processes such as photosynthesis and nuclear fusion, as well as devices ranging from SQUID magnetometers to superconducting qubits for quantum computers. The question of how long a particle takes to tunnel, however, has remained controversial since the first attempts to calculate it, which relied on the group delay. It is now well understood that this delay (the arrival time of the transmitted wave packet peak at the far side of the barrier) can be smaller than the barrier thickness divided by the speed of light, without violating causality. There have been a number of experiments confirming this, and even a recent one claiming that tunnelling may take no time at all. There have also been efforts to identify another timescale, which would better describe how long a given particle spends in the barrier region. Here we present a direct measurement of such a time, studying Bose-condensed 87Rb atoms tunnelling through a 1.3-μm thick optical barrier. By localizing a pseudo-magnetic field inside the barrier, we use the spin precession of the atoms as a clock to measure the time it takes them to cross the classically forbidden region. We find a traversal time of 0.62(7) ms and study its dependence on incident energy. In addition to finally shedding light on the fundamental question of the tunnelling time, this experiment lays the groundwork for addressing deep foundational questions about history in quantum mechanics: for instance, what can we learn about where a particle was at earlier times by observing where it is now?



In the American and Dutch samples, we found that optimism increased across younger adulthood, plateaued in midlife, and then decreased in older adulthood

Changes in optimism and pessimism in response to life events: Evidence from three large panel studies. William J. Chopik et al. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 88, October 2020, 103985. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103985

Abstract: Although individuals vary in how optimistic they are about the future, one assumption that researchers make is that optimism is sensitive to changes in life events and circumstances. We examined how optimism and pessimism changed across the lifespan and in response to life events in three large panel studies (combined N = 74,886). In the American and Dutch samples, we found that optimism increased across younger adulthood, plateaued in midlife, and then decreased in older adulthood. In the German sample, there were inconsistent results with respect to age differences and mean level changes in optimism. Associations between life events and changes in optimism/pessimism were inconsistent across samples. We discuss our results in the context of life events and lifespan development.

Keywords: OptimismLifespan developmentLife eventsAgingTime perspectiveAdult personality development


Check also Optimism increased throughout early & middle adulthood before plateauing at age 55; experience of positive events was associated with optimism development across adulthood; negative life events were not associated with development:
Optimism Development Across Adulthood and Associations With Positive and Negative Life Events. Ted Schwaba et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, March 21, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/03/optimism-increased-throughout-early.html

Honesty-Humility (HH) is negatively linked to dishonest behavior; the HH-dishonesty link is unaffected by the utility of incentives (irrespective of incentive size or a gain-vs-loss framing)

On the robustness of the association between Honesty-Humility and dishonest behavior for varying incentives. Sina A. Klein et al. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 88, October 2020, 104006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104006

Highlights
• Honesty-Humility (HH) is negatively linked to dishonest behavior.
• The HH-dishonesty link is unaffected by the utility of incentives.
• This finding replicates for incentive size and different framing of incentives.

Abstract: Previous research consistently showed a negative link between Honesty-Humility (HH) and dishonest behavior. However, most prior research neglected the influence of situational factors and their potential interaction with HH. In two incentivized experiments (N = 322, N = 552), we thus tested whether the (subjective) utility of incentives moderates the HH-dishonesty link. Replicating prior evidence, HH showed a consistent negative link to dishonesty. However, the utility of incentives did not moderate this association, neither when manipulated through incentive size (BF01 = 5.7) nor when manipulated through gain versus loss framing (BF01 = 20.4). These results demonstrate the robustness of the HH-dishonesty link.

Keywords: HEXACO Honesty-HumilityCoin-toss taskCheatingIncentivesFraming



Desired personality traits in politicians: The ideal politician is more stable, extravert, conscientious, open, honest than voter

Desired personality traits in politicians: Similar to me but more of a leader. ulian Aichholzer, Johanna Willmann. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 88, October 2020, 103990. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103990

Highlights
• Provides insights into citizens’ personality trait preferences for politicians.
• Ideal politician is more stable, extravert, conscientious, open, honest than voter.
• Citizens seek personality similarity in basic value-related traits.
• Personality similarity is mediated by core ideological views.
• Similarity may ensure affective closeness and ideological representation.

Abstract: What makes voters prefer a certain type of politician? First, we argue that voters’ trait preferences follow a “desired leadership” principle. We show that citizens want the ideal-type politician to be more emotionally stable, extravert-assertive, more deliberate-conscientious and open, more honest, but also somewhat more disagreeable than the average citizen. Second, we argue that voters prefer a model candidate with similar basic value-related personality traits. Importantly, we show that trait congruence is partly mediated by core ideological preferences and thus ensures democratic representation. The study’s findings have implications for personalization of politics and democratic representation, because personality traits can be vital cues for voters deciding whether candidates will act in their interest and represent them well.

Keywords: Congruency modelAssumed similarityLeader personalityIdeological attitudesPolitician


6. Summary and conclusion

If candidates are taking over as figureheads in electoral campaigns, the question naturally arises, what makes voters prefer a certain type of politician? We start from the assumption that a politician’s personality is a powerful anchoring cue and heuristic in that regard. Such a heuristic might become even more decisive in a world where candidates use personalized communication and campaigning through various social media channels. In doing so, candidates themselves serve as the faces of their parties, which allows and forces candidates to constantly create images of themselves. From such images, voters can infer the personality traits of candidates that are—in analogy to parties’ ideological leanings—relatively stable individual differences in behaviors that allow voters to extrapolate the what and how of politicians’ likely future behavior.
This leads us to develop two principles that guide voters’ preferences for personality traits in politicians. First, we contend that voters expect politicians to be more capable or “better” than themselves on traits associated with leadership (the “desired leadership traits” principle). Our results show that, when compared to the general population, voters want politicians to be more emotionally stableextravert-assertive, more deliberate-conscientious and open, more honest, but also somewhat more disagreeable—many of the traits associated with leadership, political ambition, and higher media visibility.
Second, we contend that voters seek representation by candidates who exhibit personality congruence with their own personality (the “voter-politician congruence” principle). This is partly due to the sheer emotional liking of likeness that allows for identification with the candidate. However, as we were able to show, to some degree, homophily is also due to ideological reasons and permits voters to determine what candidates would do once they are in office. We have demonstrated that greater SDO partly explains (mediates) a preference for politicians who score low on agreeableness, while greater RWA partly explains a preference for politicians low on openness and high on conscientiousness.

6.1. Implications

Our research has several important implications. First, one could be tempted to conclude that political campaign content is taking a backseat as individual personalities are increasingly superseding parties as cues and targets in political elections. We argue that, on the contrary, people’s vote choice is not necessarily becoming less political when voters shift from choosing between parties to choosing between candidates, since personality is not void of ideologically relevant content. As we have shown, ideological leanings shape preferences for politicians’ personalities.
Second, we put forward an explanation for why the general public will demand certain traits from their leaders, who are expected to accomplish certain tasks and navigate the country into a stable and prosperous future.
Third, we further develop the theory on personality trait matching and provide a bridge between the two—at times mutually exclusive—concepts, namely, desired similarity (representation) between the targets and desired exceptionality (need for a leader). In the literature on personal relationships and mating, for instance, there exist two approaches: people look for partners who are similar to themselves (assortative mating), and there are absolute preferences (aspirational assortative preference), i.e., traits that are more generally endorsed (Liu et al., 2018). We argue that even in an asymmetrical relationship like the one between voters and politicians, similarity plays an important role and limits aspirational considerations. Voters generally want to be represented by their politicians, i.e., seek similarity, but on traits that are conventionally associated with good leadership, they expect politicians to be more capable than themselves.
Fourth, and of crucial importance, we provide for an account of why voters might seek trait similarity with politicians. The congruency model, as outlined by Caprara and Zimbardo (2004), demonstrates voter-politician similarity in traits but leaves room for speculation about the mechanism and the function of the similarity principle (see Caprara et al., 2007). We try to close this gap and suggest that similarity serves two functions. First, a preference for similarity might stem from a mere liking of likeness, which allows for affective closeness to the politician in question. Second, however, we introduce a new way of looking at personality trait similarity and argue that it also serves a political function, namely, ideological representation. We demonstrate that similarity on opennessconscientiousness, and agreeableness is partially explained—and thus partially mediated—by ideological beliefs (SDO, RWA). This lends support to several theories arguing that our personality is an organizing system that translates into motivational goals or values, including SDO and RWA, which eventually guide ideological orientations and political behavior (Caprara and Vecchione, 2017Duckitt and Sibley, 2010Jost et al., 2009).

6.2. Limitations and future avenues

Finally, we want to discuss some limitations of the current study and propose avenues for future research. Our studies lack a standardized personality inventory tailored to the job of politicians. This is because we used a personality inventory that would lend itself to a bipolar rating scale format without creating (huge) social desirability. A contextualized measure with item content applicable to the job of politicians is, however, missing thus far. A suitable and more extensive measurement of personality would also allow for delving deeper into personality facets or “dark” or “socially malevolent” traits, such as narcissism and machiavellianism. Hence, future studies might investigate whether and which of the more specific traits and socially malevolent traits are preferred/accepted by voters, who does so, and under what circumstances (context).
Further, we asked respondents to rate what their ideal politician would look like (see also Kinder et al., 1980Roets and Van Hiel, 2009), although with somewhat different question framing (“lead the country and ensure that the population is doing well”/”which of the following character traits make a good politician”). However, with this format, we cannot assess whether respondents thought of one or several abstract model politicians or whether they had a concrete man or a concrete woman in mind (see Kinder et al., 1980). Nevertheless, we think that this does not interfere with our conclusions about an idealized picture of aspired traits and the congruence with them. We did not ask respondents whether they would indeed vote for particular politicians that exhibit these traits (and that carry other confounding variables such as a party). Future research might want to address this and examine more closely whether desired traits by voters are indeed decisive as vote determinants.
The two samples investigated in the present work are, of course, limited in their generalizability. While Study 1 allowed us to make inferences about expectations regarding more specific personality facets, Study 2 does only measure perceptions about broad personality domains. In addition, although the Austrian sample (Study 2) was based on a random population sample, the German sample (Study 1) was not representative of the general population. It thus remains to be determined to what extent the reported findings can be generalized to other samples, for instance, outside Europe.
Another avenue to follow up on the present research is the homophily (or similarity) principle between voters and politicians more generally and its significance for political representation. In the political science literature, the homophily principle is not at all new. For example, it is well established that voters tend to support candidates with similar sociodemographic characteristics (Campbell et al., 1960Cutler, 2002). Additionally, similarity in physical traits, such as facial similarity between voters and candidates, seems to create liking (e.g., Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2008). More recently, Bankert (2016) found that even nonpolitical social similarity with the party prototype (e.g., hobbies, lifestyle) intensifies feelings of partisan identity. With candidates becoming more important voting cues, future research might want to further investigate voter-politician similarity as well as which specific traits make the “ideal” politician.

Feeling emotions for others that they don’t feel: Agency appraisals and vicarious anger

Feeling emotions for others that they don’t feel: Agency appraisals and vicarious anger. Joshua Daniel Wondra. PsyArXiv, Aug 24, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/M4BXZ

Abstract: How do people feel emotions for someone else? This has been studied as empathy—feeling the same emotion that someone else feels. But people also feel emotions for someone else that the other person doesn’t feel, such as feeling angry for someone who is sad. We use appraisal theories to predict that people feel an emotion for someone else when they appraise that person’s situation differently. According to appraisal theories, people react to misfortunes with anger if they are caused by another person, but not if the cause is impersonal, and we predicted that this would also be true in feeling emotions for another person, regardless of what the other person feels. In two studies, subjects learned about a disadvantaged high school student who applied to college and was rejected from every school. Subjects felt angrier when they learned that the student’s friend caused the bad outcome than when the student made a well-intentioned mistake, but they did not think the student felt angry. The difference in subjects’ anger was mediated by changes in appraisals of agency. The student believed the rejections were caused by bad circumstances and felt sad in both conditions. The results extend research on empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences by supporting appraisal as a process that is involved in feeling emotions for other people.


Is it obligatory to donate effectively? Judgments about the wrongness of donating ineffectively

Is it obligatory to donate effectively? Judgments about the wrongness of donating ineffectively. Lucius Caviola, Stefan Schubert. PsyArXiv, Aug 24, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/J2H4R

Abstract: Most donations end up with relatively ineffective charities. In this paper, we present five preliminary studies on the hypothesis that people don’t find it obligatory to donate effectively. We find that people typically do not find it obligatory to donate to highly effective charities. We explore the conditions under which people ​do ​consider it obligatory to help effectively. For example, we find that people consider effectiveness more important when they are the only person who can help, or when the ineffective option is Pareto dominated by a more effective option. We also find that judgments of how obligatory it is to donate effectively are correlated with judgments of how obligatory it is to donate in the first place.

Check also Donors vastly underestimate differences in charities’ effectiveness. Lucius Caviola et al. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 4, July 2020, pp. 509–516. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/07/some-charities-are-much-more-cost.html


Comparing the morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten by Americans (pig) & one that is not (dog) shifted participants’ moral beliefs about eating meat

Horne, Zachary, Josh Rottman, and Caroline Lawrence. 2018. “Can Coherence-based Interventions Change Dogged Moral Beliefs?.” PsyArXiv. December 31. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jx6fd

Abstract: Coherence-based interventions can change people’s moral beliefs about abstract moral principles, but it is unclear whether these interventions would be similarly effective for everyday moral beliefs that can impact routine behavior. In the present research, we examined whether coherence-based “memes” highlighting the moral similarities of pigs and dogs can likewise shift moral beliefs about consuming meat. Across three experiments, we found beliefs about the permissibility of eating some animals can be subtly shifted by brief coherence-based interventions which highlight moral similarity. Comparing the morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten by Americans (pig) and an animal that is typically considered forbidden to eat by Americans (dog) shifted participants’ moral beliefs. We discuss the implications of these findings for psychological and ethical theory.



Charter schools increase quality of available teachers: Educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs

Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools. Jesse Bruhn, Scott Imberman & Marcus Winters. NBER Working Paper 27607, July 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w27607

Abstract: We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers.



Supporting previous evidence, it was found that individuals were more prosocial when gossip (both positive and negative) was possible, compared to when their behavior was completely anonymous

Imada, H., Hopthrow, T., & Abrams, D. (2020). The role of positive and negative gossip in promoting prosocial behavior. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Aug 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000218

Abstract: Gossip can promote cooperation via reputational concern. However, the relative effectiveness of positive and negative gossip in fostering prosociality has not been examined. The present study explored the influence of positive and negative gossip on prosocial behavior, using an economic game. Supporting previous evidence, it was found that individuals were more prosocial when gossip of any kind was possible, compared to when their behavior was completely anonymous. However, there was no significant difference in the efficiency in promoting cooperation between positive and negative gossip, suggesting that it is reputational concern elicited by gossip per se, rather than its valence, that stimulates prosociality



While partisanship influenced the extent to which participants relied on the misinformation overall, retractions were equally effective across all conditions; no impact of political worldview on retraction effectiveness

Ecker, Ullrich K. H., Brandon Sze, and Matthew Andreotta. 2020. “No Effect of Partisan Worldview on Corrections of Political Misinformation.” PsyArXiv. August 20. doi:10.31234/osf.io/bszm4

Abstract: Misinformation often has a continuing effect on people’s reasoning despite clear correction. One factor assumed to affect post-correction reliance on misinformation is worldview-driven motivated reasoning. For example, a recent study with an Australian undergraduate sample found that when politically-situated misinformation was retracted, political partisanship influenced the effectiveness of the retraction. This worldview effect was asymmetrical, that is, particularly pronounced in politically-conservative participants. However, the evidence regarding such worldview effects (and their symmetry) has been inconsistent. Thus, the present study aimed to extend previous findings by examining a sample of 429 pre-screened U.S. participants supporting either the Democratic or Republican Party. Participants received misinformation suggesting that politicians of either party were more likely to commit embezzlement; this was or was not subsequently retracted, and participants’ inferential reasoning was measured. While political worldview (i.e., partisanship) influenced the extent to which participants relied on the misinformation overall, retractions were equally effective across all conditions. There was no impact of political worldview on retraction effectiveness, let alone evidence of a backfire effect, and thus we did not replicate the asymmetry observed in the Australian-based study. This pattern emerged despite some evidence that Republicans showed a stronger emotional response than Democrats to worldview-incongruent misinformation.

---
In sum, our results are in line with the notion that potentially-irrational rejection of
evidence is equally likely on both ends of the political-worldview spectrum, and that part of
the reason that evidence rejection has been predominantly demonstrated in conservatives is
that researchers have predominantly looked at rejection of evidence that is consistent with
conservative worldviews. However, this presents future research with a conundrum, because
a number of studies have now aimed but failed to find rejection of scientific evidence on the
left (e.g., Baumgaertner, Carlisle, & Justwan, 2018; Hamilton, Hartter, & Saito, 2015;
Lewandowsky, Woike, & Oberauer, 2020). For example, Lewandowsky et al. (2020)
reported that vaccine-hesitancy and endorsement of alternative medicine—both anecdotally
associated with a liberal worldview—were in fact more prevalent in right-wing libertarians
and conservatives. Based on additional evidence from a task that required reasoning about
scientific evidence “dilemmas” that featured both worldview-consistent and inconsistent
aspects, Lewandowsky et al. concluded that partisans on both ends of the spectrum show
biased processing of evidence, but that science denial was nevertheless a mainstay of the
political right. Future research therefore needs to shed light on the catalysts that turn
omnipresent information-processing biases into actual evidence rejection and science denial.


Monday, August 24, 2020

The Dark Triad Predicted by Belief in Determinism, which may be a belief that allows some to abrogate moral responsibility, which may facilitate other antisocial tendencies like objectification

Boros, Rachel, "The Dark Triad Predicted by Belief in Determinism and Objectification" (2020). Theses and Dissertations. 1239. Apr 2020. https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/1239

Abstract: While philosophers and psychologists continue to debate the existence of free will without reaching any consensus, recent attention has shifted to the matter of the consequences of belief in free will, or belief in the alternative, determinism. Proponents of the latter position argue that human behavior is the result of causal forces, which implies a lack of autonomy in decision-making and inevitability (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Recent research has found consequences of belief in determinism that include the promotion of undesirable behavior and undermining of moral behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), impulsive and selfish responses demonstrated through aggression (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009), and a diminished ability to learn from negative emotions (Stillman & Baumeister, 2010). Belief in determinism may be a belief that allows some to abrogate moral responsibility, which may facilitate other antisocial tendencies. Objectification (i.e., seeing and ultimately treating a person as an object in a manner that dismisses that persons’ humanity) may be one such tendency. To my knowledge, no research has examined the association between belief in determinism, interpersonal objectification, and the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). In the present research, four questionnaires measured participants’ belief in free will, determinism, propensity to objectify others, narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. Results indicated a statistically significant link between belief in determinism, interpersonal objectification, and the Dark Triad personality traits. A general mediation model demonstrated that interpersonal objectification mediated the relation between belief in determinism and the Dark Triad personality traits. These findings suggest that maladaptive ideologies and maladaptive personality traits share a common theme of objectifying others. Implications, limitations, and future directions are discussed.


Ideological Responses to the Breaking of COVID-19 Social Distancing Recommendations: Both liberals and conservatives condemn outgroup guidance flouting more than ingroup flouting

Harper, Craig A., and Darren Rhodes. 2020. “Ideological Responses to the Breaking of COVID-19 Social Distancing Recommendations.” PsyArXiv. August 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dkqj6

Abstract: COVID-19 has plagued the globe since January 2020, infecting millions and claiming the lives of several hundreds of thousands (at the time of writing). Despite this, many individuals have ignored public health guidance and continued to socialize in groups. Emergent work has highlighted the potential role that ideology plays in such behavior, and judgements of it. In response to this contemporary cultural phenomenon, we tested whether judgements of those allegedly flouting the guidance on social distancing were influenced by an interaction between the ideologies of those providing judgements, and those allegedly breaking the rules. Our data suggest that judgements of those flouting social distancing guidance are influenced by ideology in a symmetrical way. That is, both liberals and conservatives condemn outgroup flouting more than ingroup flouting. We discuss this finding in the context of theoretical work into ideological symmetries, and the implications of growing ideological polarization in contemporary Western democracies.


Moral grandstanding is related to endorsing more extreme ideological positions; motivation by a desire to seek prestige is related to ideological extremism

Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Joshua B. Grubbs et al. Journal of Research in Personality, August 24 2020, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009

Highlights
• Americans are increasingly polarized in their political ideology and reactions to political others.
• Moral grandstanding is related to endorsing more extreme ideological positions.
• Moral grandstanding motivated by a desire to seek prestige is related to ideological extremism.
• Moral grandstanding motivated by a desire to seek prestige is related to more polarized emotional reactions to political others.
• Moral grandstanding motivated by a desire to seek dominance is generally unrelated to extreme ideology or affect.

Abstract: The present work posits that social motives, particularly status seeking in the form of moral grandstanding, are likely at least partially to blame for elevated levels of affective polarization and ideological extremism in the U.S. In Study 1, results from both undergraduates (N=981; Mean age =19.4; SD=2.1; 69.7% women) and a cross-section of U.S. adults matched to 2010 census norms (N=1,063; Mean age =48.20, SD=16.38; 49.8% women) indicated that prestige-motived grandstanding was consistently and robustly related to more extreme ideological views on a variety of issues. In Study 2, results from a weighted, nationally-representative cross-section of U.S. adults (N=2,519; Mean age =47.5, SD=17.8; 51.4% women) found that prestige motivated grandstanding was reliably related to both ideological extremism and affective polarization.

Does the Dark Triad predict self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners both in men and women?

Does the Dark Triad predict self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners both in men and women? Javier I. Borráz-León, Markus J. Rantala. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 168, January 1 2021, 110341. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110341

Highlights
• Narcissism and psychopathy were positively correlated to number of sexual partners.
• Narcissism was positively correlated to self-perceived attractiveness and mate value.
• Higher self-perceived attractiveness and mate value were predicted by narcissism.

Abstract: Previous literature has shown associations between the Dark Triad (i.e., narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy), other-perceived attractiveness, and personality. Nevertheless, the study of the Dark Triad as predictor of traits related to sociosexual dynamics (i.e., self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners) still remain unknown. Hence, we aimed to fill this gap by assessing the relationship between these variables in a mixed-sex sample of young-adults. The results showed that: 1) narcissism and psychopathy, but not Machiavellianism, were positively correlated to number of sexual partners for the group of men and the group of women separately. 2) only narcissism was positively correlated to self-perceived attractiveness and mate value in both sexes. 3) narcissism successfully predicted higher self-perceived attractiveness and mate value both in men and women; whereas narcissism, psychopathy, and sex significantly contributed to the prediction of number of sexual partners. We discuss our results in the light of the interaction between evolutionary thinking and socioenvironmental factors.

Keywords: The dark triadAttractivenessMate valueSexual partnersNarcissismMachiavellianismPsychopathy

4. Discussion

During the last decade, the study about the evolutionary meaning of the relationships between the DT of personality and traits associated with human mate choice has increased (e.g., Carter et al., 2014Lyons et al., 2015Lyons & Simeonov, 2016Marcinkowska et al., 2015). However, very little is known about the predictive power of the DT and sex on these traits. Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the relationships between each component of the DT of personality, self-perceptions of attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners in a sample of young men and women. The results of this study are in line with previous literature and with our predictions (with the exception of sex as a strong predictor).
First, as expected, we found that number of sexual partners was positively related to every component of the DT (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) for the whole sample, whereas only narcissism and psychopathy were positively correlated to every DT trait when men and women were analyzed separately. These results support previous literature about the exploitative nature of the DT; for example, Visser et al. (2010) observed that men with higher scores of psychopathy reported higher number of sexual partners; similar results have been also found for men with higher scores of Machiavellianism (McHoskey, 2001). Even though it has not been previously reported, there is evidence that suggests that narcissists also could have higher number of sexual partners (e.g., McNulty & Widman, 2014). To our knowledge, the present study is the first one in reporting positive associations between the number of sexual partners and each component of the DT in a sample of men and women.
Secondly, we found that narcissism, but not Machiavellianism or psychopathy, was positively related to self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners in both sexes. This result supports previous studies where it has been stated that narcissistic people are characterized by inflated self-concepts associated with grandiosity, intelligence, social power, and physical attractiveness (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004Campbell et al., 2002) which probably increases the mating success of narcissists. Even though these relationships have been mainly reported for men, our study suggests that this could be also true for women. In this context, the socioecological environment of our population might explain this result. For example, the literature has proposed that narcissism is positively associated with preferences for exploitative short-term relationships and that this effect is stronger for men than for women (Jonason et al., 2012) due to the lower fitness costs paid by men (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). However, Finnish society is characterized by having a high educational level, high life quality, and very high equality between men and women (Borchorst et al., 2012Miettinen et al., 2011Salmi, 2006). Thus, it could be possible that the sex-differences previously reported in other studies regarding the number of sexual partners, could be less strong in societies where women do not have to pay very high costs related to short-term relationships. In support of this hypothesis, there is evidence showing variability in personality traits and mate preferences according to several indicators of the condition of a society (e.g., Borras-Guevara et al., 2017DeBruine et al., 2010Marcinkowska et al., 2019). For example, in the study of Marcinkowska et al. (2019), the authors found that women's preferences for masculine looking men (a trait associated with some components of the DT, Lyons et al., 2015), are stronger in countries with higher sociosexuality –Finland included– and where national health indices and development indices are higher. Thus, since masculinity is associated with promiscuousness and a preference for short-term relationships, this could explain the similar pattern regarding the positive relationships between narcissism, psychopathy, and number of sexual partners in our sample of Finnish men and women.
Regarding the predictive power of the DT traits, we found that narcissism predicted self-perceived attractiveness and mate value in both sexes; whereas narcissism, psychopathy and sex had significant effects on the prediction of number sexual partners. In this sense, it has been suggested that narcissism (more than Machiavellianism or psychopathy) can be successfully explained in terms of evolutionary adaptations. For example, Holtzman & Strube (2010) suggested that narcissism could have emerged to solve problems related to sexual selection processes, allowing men to adopt short-term mating strategies. However, our results suggest that narcissism might work in a similar way for women as well, but it may depend on several socioenvironmental factors. Further studies are needed in order to give ecological validity to this hypothesis.
But why narcissism more than Machiavellianism or psychopathy? according to Holtzman & Donnellan (2015), narcissism can be distinguished from Machiavellianism because Machiavellians are less extroverted and prefer to act “behind the scenes” whereas narcissists prefer to be histrionic and get social attention. Likewise, psychopathy differs from narcissism because psychopaths tend to be violent and antisocial whereas narcissists tend to be assertive and to use non-violent dominance. Thus, it is possible that individuals do not like manipulative, cynical, manipulative, aggressive, remorseless, and duplicitous people such as Machiavellians and psychopaths (Rauthmann & Kolar, 2013). However, it is important to notice that whereas narcissism is positively correlated to the number of sexual partners both in men and women, narcissism, psychopathy, and sex play a significant role in the prediction of higher number of sexual partners. In this case, based on the differences in the average number of sexual partners and psychopathy scores between men and women, the effect would be stronger for men than for women. As it has been previously suggested, it is possible that this sex difference might be still associated with the social costs imposed to women (e.g., bad reputation, lower attractiveness as a long-term mate) (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Nevertheless, in the vast majority of our results, sex did not play a significant role.
Overall, the literature regarding narcissism have agreed on the possible benefits associated with this personality trait. For example, narcissists tend to increase their social status by displaying wealth and material goods (Piff, 2014), and pursuing leadership positions (Grijalva et al., 2015). Moreover, it has been observed that narcissists from both sexes have lower facial fluctuating asymmetry -an honest indicator of developmental stability and genetic quality- probably making them more desirable sexual partners by increasing their mate value (Borráz-León et al., 2019). Therefore, it is feasible to suggest that from the three components of the DT of personality, narcissism, more than Machiavellianism or psychopathy, is strongly associated with self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and the acquisition of sexual partners both in men and women, which probably is regulating social and sexual selection processes. Further studies will have to take into account socioenvironmental factors related to the condition of the society where the study is being done, in order to investigate how the condition of a society could affect perceptions of mate value, mating success, and personality dynamics both in men and women.

4.1. Limitation of the study

A limitation emerged from this study since the high homogeneity of our sample limits generalizability. Therefore, the results of this research might not be representative of other populations. This limitation will be taken into account for future research.

We find that the relationship between racial resentment and opposition to redistribution is weaker for lower income whites than for whites with higher incomes

The color of class politics: Economic position, racial resentment, and attitudes about redistribution. Andrew Bloeser & Tarah Williams. Politics, Groups, and Identities, Jun 17 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2020.1773279

Abstract: Racial resentment has been linked to opposition towards welfare programs for the poor and other redistributive policies. Theoretical work implies that because redistributive polices have been rhetorically linked to negative racial stereotypes, racially resentful whites will oppose redistributive policies, even when they might benefit from them. However, this proposition has not been empirically tested. Using the 2016 American National Election Study, we examine whether the relationship between racial resentment and a variety of economic policy attitudes is conditional by individuals' income level. We find that the relationship between racial resentment and opposition to redistribution is weaker for lower income whites than for whites with higher incomes. When it comes to redistributive preferences, economic self-interest tempers the influence of racial resentment for lower income whites. For whites with higher incomes, however, the influence of racial resentment on redistributive preferences is significantly larger. This indicates that in the absence of directly benefiting from a redistributive policy, whites will oppose it if they harbor racial antipathy. We exploit the time series design of the ANES to demonstrate that these patterns hold across multiple election cycles (2004-2016).

KEYWORDS: Racial resentment, redistribution, social welfare, economic self-interest, principled conservatism



As economic inequality grows, more people stand to benefit from wealth redistribution; yet in many countries, increasing inequality has not produced growing support for redistribution

Cognitive Barriers to Reducing Income Inequality. Joshua Conrad Jackson, Keith Payne. Social Psychological and Personality Science, June 26, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620934597

Abstract: As economic inequality grows, more people stand to benefit from wealth redistribution. Yet in many countries, increasing inequality has not produced growing support for redistribution, and people often appear to vote against their economic interest. Here we suggest that two cognitive tendencies contribute to these paradoxical voting patterns. First, people gauge their income through social comparison, and those comparisons are usually made to similar others. Second, people are insensitive to large numbers, which leads them to underestimate the gap between themselves and the very wealthy. These two tendencies can help explain why subjective income is normally distributed (therefore most people think they are middle class) and partly explain why many people who would benefit from redistribution oppose it. We support our model’s assumptions using survey data, a controlled experiment, and agent-based modeling. Our model sheds light on the cognitive barriers to reducing inequality.

Keywords: behavioral economics, decision making, social comparison


Check also Women’s demand for redistribution is higher; the gender difference appears only when the source of inequality is based on relative abilities, but not when it is based on luck; men are more overconfident on their abilities:
Overconfidence and gender gaps in redistributive preferences: Cross-Country experimental evidence. Thomas Buser et al. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 178, October 2020, Pages 267-286. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/08/womens-demand-for-redistribution-is.html

And Due to patriotic indoctrination, the Chinese self-sacrifice for national interest and demand less redistribution:
Why is welfare provision unpopular in China? Alex C. H. Chang. Democratization, Jul 22 2020. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/08/why-is-welfare-provision-unpopular-in.html


Individuals with higher status were more motivated to have high status than were individuals with low status; this in part happens because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) such status

The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive. Cameron Anderson, John Angus Hildreth & Daron Sharps. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Jul 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220937544

Abstract: The current research tested whether the possession of high status, compared with the possession of low status, makes individuals desire having high status even more. Five studies (total N = 6,426), four of which were preregistered, supported this hypothesis. Individuals with higher status in their social groups or who were randomly assigned to a high-status condition were more motivated to have high status than were individuals with low status. Furthermore, upper-class individuals had a stronger status motive than working-class individuals, in part, due to their high status. High-status individuals had a stronger status motive, in part, because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) high status, but not because of other possible mechanisms (e.g., task self-efficacy). These findings provide a possible explanation for why status hierarchies are so stable and why inequality rises in social collectives over time.


Learning of the others' success in investing leads to a significant increase in risk taking of subjects; even more true with copy trading (getting info on the other agents in financial markets and to directly copy their trades)

Copy Trading. Jose Apesteguia, Jörg Oechssler, Simon Weidenholzer. Management Science, Jul 14 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3508

Abstract: Copy trading allows traders in social networks to receive information on the success of other agents in financial markets and to directly copy their trades. Internet platforms like eToro, ZuluTrade, and Tradeo have attracted millions of users in recent years. The present paper studies the implications of copy trading for the risk taking of investors. Implementing a novel experimental financial asset market, we show that providing information on the success of others leads to a significant increase in risk taking of subjects. This increase in risk taking is even larger when subjects are provided with the option to directly copy others. We conclude that copy trading leads to excessive risk taking.


7  Discussion
In this paper we have experimentally shown that providing investors with information on previous investment decisions and the success of other traders may lead to an increase in risk taking. This effect may be further exacerbated when investors are allowed to directly copy other traders. Imitation through either of these channels may lead to a reduction of investors’ welfare, as judged from the elicitation of risk preferences and as manifested in counterfactual investment decisions where imitation is not possible. Our results, thus, suggest that social trading (with or without the option to directly copy others) may be detrimental to consumer welfare. Moreover, even outside of the domain of copy trading, information on the success of others may lead to excessive risk taking and reduced welfare.
We hope this paper will trigger more research in the near future in order to better understand behavior in copy trading platforms. For example, future research should be conducted in order to understand what are the reasons that lead to copy trading, or to more risk taking behavior in the INFO and COPY treatments. One possibility is that copiers attribute higher skills to copied investors. Although the design of our experiment made the role of luck very salient, future work should systematically study this possibility. Also, it has been shown that cognitive abilities or personality traits are related to risk taking behavior (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2010; Eisenbach and Schmalz, 2016; Harbaugh, 2006). In this respect it seems relevant to explore whether these characteristics may prompt some subjects to copy others, or to be more affected by the performance of others. Moreover, while we have recruited our participants from a student subject pool, investors on copy trading platforms likely join these platforms with the explicit intent to engage in copy trading. Whether the welfare consequences of investors on copy trading platforms are larger or lower than in the student population is another open question that should be addressed in future research.
One should of course be very cautious at extrapolating conclusions from the lab to the field, in particular before a good deal of lab and field research has been conducted on the subject matter. However, there are reason to believe that the implications of copy trading on risk taking may be even stronger on real world copy trading platforms. For example, in the real world, investors’ beliefs on the skills and information of leaders might be even more optimistic than in our laboratory setting. In addition, whereas our experimental setup, by way of the simulator, allowed subjects to easily assess how risky previous investments of other investors were, such an assessment is much more difficult in the real world. Finally, from a social perspective, imitation encourages traders to follow similar investment strategies and could, thus, lead to financial risk through resulting herding and contribute to the formation of financial bubbles.

The depressive realism hypothesis states that mild forms of depression improve judgment tasks because of higher attention to detail and slower information processing

Depressive Realism and Analyst Forecast Accuracy. Sima Jannati, Sarah Khalaf & Du Nguyen
University of Missouri Working Paper, July 1 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3640794

Abstract: Whether a bad mood enhances or hinders problem-solving and financial decision making is an open question. Using the Gallup Analytics survey, we test the depressive realism hypothesis in the earnings forecasts provided by Estimize users. The depressive realism hypothesis states that mild forms of depression improve judgment tasks because of higher attention to detail and slower information processing. We find that a 1-standard-deviation increase in the segment of the U.S. population with depression leads to a 0.25% increase in future forecast accuracy, supporting the hypothesis. This influence is comparable to other determinants of Estimize users' accuracy, like the geographic proximity of users to firms, users' experience, and their professional status. Our result is robust to using an IV analysis, different measures of forecast accuracy and mood, as well as alternative explanations.


We show that molecular variation in DNA related to cognition, personality, health, & body shape, predicts an individual’s equity market participation & risk aversion; also predict individuals’ return perceptions (which are mostly biased)

Molecular Genetics, Risk Aversion, Return Perceptions, and Stock Market Participation. Richard Sias, Laura Starks & Harry Turtle. NBER Working Paper #27638, August 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w27638

Abstract: We show that molecular variation in DNA related to cognition, personality, health, and body shape, predicts an individual’s equity market participation and risk aversion. Moreover, the molecular genetic endowments predict individuals’ return perceptions, most of which we find to be strikingly biased. The genetic endowments also strongly associate with many of the investor characteristics (e.g., trust, sociability, wealth) shown to explain heterogeneity in equity market participation. Our analysis helps elucidate why financial choices are heritable and how genetic endowments can help explain the links between financial choices, risk aversion, beliefs, and other variables known to explain stock market participation.


Physicians actively sort along political lines: A Democratic physician in a predominantly Republican area is twice as likely to relocate as a Republican counterpart living there; same for Republicans in Democratic areas

Ideological Sorting of Physicians in Both Geography and the Workplace. Adam Bonica; Howard Rosenthal; Kristy Blackwood; David J. Rothman. J Health Polit Policy Law 8641555. May 28 2020. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-8641555

Abstract
Context: The distribution of physicians across geography and employers has important implications for the delivery of medical services. This study examines how the political beliefs of physicians influence their decisions about where to live and work.

Methods: Physician relocation and employment patterns are analyzed using a panel constructed from the National Provider Information (NPI) directory. Data on political donations are used to measure the political preferences of physicians.

Findings: The “ideological fit” between a physician and his or her community is a key predictor of both relocation and employment decisions. A Democratic physician in a predominantly Republican area is twice as likely to relocate as a Republican counterpart living there; the reverse is also true for Republicans living in Democratic areas. Physicians who do not share the political orientation of their colleagues are more likely to change workplaces within the same geographic area.

Conclusions: Physicians are actively sorting along political lines. Younger physicians have trended sharply to the left and are increasingly drawn to urban areas with physician surpluses and away from rural areas suffering from physician shortages. The findings also help explain why physician shortages are more prevalent among left-leaning specialties, such as psychiatry.

Keywords: Physician politics, partisan sorting, geography, labor market, health care access