Ideological differences in attitudes characterized by threat, complexity, morality, political ideology, religious ideology, or harm: The political domain was the only significant predictor of ideological differences

Identifying the domains of ideological similarities and differences in attitudes. Emily Kubin & Mark J. Brandt. Comprehensive Results in Social Psychology, Volume 4, 2020 - Issue 1. Pages 53-77. May 4 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/23743603.2020.1756242

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311634367517732866

ABSTRACT: Liberals and conservatives disagree, but are there some domains where we are more or less likely to observe ideological differences? To map the types of attitudes where we may be more or less likely to observe ideological differences, we draw on two approaches, the elective affinities approach, which suggests individual differences explains differences between liberals and conservatives, and the divergent content approach, which posits the key distinction between ideologues are their value orientations. The goal of the current research was to explore when and why liberals and conservatives disagree. We tested whether ideological differences are more likely to emerge in attitudes characterized by threat, complexity, morality, political ideology, religious ideology, or harm (as compared to objects not characterized by these domains) using both explicit and implicit measures of 190 attitude objects. While all domains predicted ideological differences, the political domain was the only significant predictor of ideological differences when controlling for the other domains. This study provides insight into which attitudes we are most and least likely to find ideological differences.

KEYWORDS: Ideological differences, attitudes, ideology, threat, complexity

Discussion

We have two key findings. First, we find support for both the elective affinities and divergent content approaches; topics associated with threat, complexity, morality, politics, religion, and harm are also characterized by greater ideological disagreement than topics not associated with these domains. Second, we found that the political domain was the strongest predictor of ideological disagreement.

The current research attempted to map the types of attitudes where we are most and least likely to observe ideological differences. We used two approaches, the elective affinities approach, and the divergent content approach to explore which domains characterize attitudes when there is disagreement between liberals and conservatives. The elective affinities approach, which suggests people prefer views that match their dispositions (Hirsh et al., 2010; Jost et al., 2009), posits that attitude objects characterized by threat (i.e., threat hypothesis) or complexity (i.e., complexity hypothesis) are more likely to be associated with liberal-conservative differences, compared to attitude objects not associated with threat or complexity. The divergent content approach, which suggests that they key difference between groups are underlying values (Haidt & Graham, 2007), posited that attitude objects characterized by morality (i.e., moral hypothesis), politics (i.e., political hypothesis), religion (i.e., religion hypothesis), or harm (i.e., harm hypothesis) are more likely to be associated with liberal-conservative disagreement, compared to attitude objects not associated with morality, politics, religion, or harm.

We tested these hypotheses by estimating ideological differences on implicit (IAT) and explicit (preference and evaluation) measures of attitudes and analyzed the extent to which attitude objects characterized by the proposed domains are more likely to be associated with ideological disagreement. When focusing on each domain individually, we found support for both the elective affinities and divergent content approaches. Results suggested attitudes associated with threat, complexity, morality, politics, religion, and harm were also attitude objects liberals and conservatives tended to disagree on. This was the case for both reaction time (IAT) and self-report (preference or evaluations) measures and for both joint (IAT or preference) and individual judgment (evaluation) contexts. Further, these findings were consistent when controlling for attitude object category, in nearly all cases was not affected by domain rater ideology, and was consistent across robust regression analyses.

Analyses also indicated that the political domain was the most robust predictor of ideological disagreement. When controlling for the other domains, the political domain was the only domain that still predicted the size of ideological differences – suggesting that ideological differences are substantially reduced outside of the political realm. For example, below the midpoint of political ratings the maximum ideological difference is never larger than a small effect (in r, maximum difference on IAT = .20, preference = .22, evaluations = .18) and the means are quite small (in r, mean difference on IAT = .02, preference = .03, evaluations = .03). 10 This is most consistent with the political hypothesis from the divergent content approach (e.g., Brandt & Crawford, in press; Graham et al., 2011).

Primacy of politics?

There are multiple ways to interpret the primacy of politics result. First, this result might suggest that the results supporting the elective affinities approach, as well as the harm, religion, and morality hypotheses of the divergent content approach are not good evidence because domains such as threat and complexity, as well as morality and religion are conflated with political differences. This is consistent with arguments that suggest that links between political ideology, personality, and motivations may be due to content overlap rather than personality or motivational differences per se (Malka et al., 2017). This possibility is represented in the causal structure in Figure S1 (in supplemental materials). 11 All of the domains have the possibility of directly causing ideological differences, but due to shared variance with politics, the political variable is the only significant predictor of ideological differences.

A second possibility is that factors like threat and complexity are the very topics that humans are likely to make into political, moral, or religious issues. When times are threatening or particularly complex, turning issues into political, moral, or religious issues may give people a sense of certainty or a method for interpreting the world that they otherwise would not have. If this is the case, then politics may act more like a mediator of the effects of threat and complexity. This possibility is represented in the causal structure in Figure S2 (in supplemental materials). Notably, in exploratory analyses where we excluded politics as a predictor, threat and complexity were still not significant predictors. Instead either no domain was a significant predictor, or morality was a significant predictor. This hints that morality may also be more proximal than threat and complexity.

The distinction between these two possibilities is theoretically important. The first possibility, represented in Figure S1, would suggest that the elective affinities approach, at least for our research questions, is not viable. The findings that seem to support it are merely due to the confounds between threat, complexity, and politics. The same conclusion could also be drawn from the moral, religious, and harm-related versions of the divergent content approach. However, the second possibility, represented in Figure S2, would suggest that the elective affinities approach, at least for our research questions, is viable. These findings show the disagreements over the political domain is the strongest predictor of ideological disagreement; however, the other domains are potentially still casually potent as precursors to the political domain. Unfortunately, it is not possible to tease apart these possibilities with the current data as the data are cross-sectional. Teasing apart these two possibilities is a necessary task for future research. Ideally, tests might include tracking ideological differences in large numbers across a great diversity of attitudes over time to study changes and stability in ideological differences.

Strength, limitations, and future directions

These findings are just one-step in mapping which attitudes we are most and least likely to anticipate ideological differences. We studied the 190 attitude objects from the AIID study. However, we expect that our findings will likely generalize to other attitudes, especially in the American context. We also would expect a similar pattern of results in other countries with polarized political systems (cf. Pew Research Center, 2017; Vachudova, 2019; Wendler, 2014). We are less certain that these results would replicate in political systems with less polarization and where political differences are, presumably, less important.

In contrast to many studies of ideological differences that focus on differences in one particular attitude, the attitudes in the AIID study cover many topics. These topics range from abstract principles (e.g., realism vs. idealism) to people (e.g., celebrities such as Denzel Washington vs. Tom Cruise) and regions of the world (e.g., Japan vs. the United States). The diversity of attitude objects should make our findings more comparable to the large swath of attitudes in the everyday world. Thus, these findings improve our ability to predict the locations of ideological differences and similarities in untested fields. One challenge with using a large number of attitudes is that not every attitude conforms to the model. As one example, some of the attitudes that scored highly in the political domain nonetheless had low levels of ideological differences. One reason for this is that there were attitudes that were political (e.g., preferences for Bill Clinton vs. Hillary Clinton; evaluations of politicians), but which did not map onto differences between liberals and conservatives. This suggests that more precise predictions can be made by considering the political dimension the attitude maps on to.

Despite the large sample of people and attitudes, and replication across multiple measures, this study also had several limitations. The domains used were based on previously discussed perspectives; however, other domains that we did not include may also play a key role. For example, we did not test the domain of disgust, but attitude objects associated with disgust may be associated with ideological differences, as previous research highlights ideological differences in what is viewed as disgusting (Elad-Strenger et al., 2019; Inbar et al., 2012). Moreover, as previously mentioned, the findings are cross-sectional. Although we discussed the results in causal terms for illustrative purposes, the current data is consistent with a number of different causal models. One way to test this will be to examine if and how ideological differences emerge as an attitude is imbued with different properties. Things that were once not moralized, politicized, threatening, etc., can become linked to our moral or political sensibilities, or be viewed as highly threatening. For example, at one point attitudes about the NFL may have not seemed overly political, however once NFL athletes began kneeling during the national anthem, and President Trump began commenting about these actions (Klein, 2018), the league may have become more politicized. We would expect ideological differences in opinions on the NFL to track this politicization.

Finally, this study is primarily based on self-reports and survey methodology. In the AIID study participants reported which attitude objects they prefer and the extent to which they positively evaluate attitude objects. In Rating Samples 1 and 2, collected many years after the original AIID study, participants self-reported the extent to which they think each domain could explain other people’s disagreement about the attitude objects. Thus, Rating Samples 1 and 2 focus on measuring what people think could cause others to disagree about attitude objects, rather than measuring what actually causes people to disagree about attitude objects. This may limit the validity of the study as participants in Rating Samples 1 and 2 may not be aware of the true factors that drive disagreement over attitude objects.

Furthermore, while implicit associations are assessed, and similar results are found across results, some of our findings are based on self-reports. Tracking ideological disagreement in terms of preference and evaluation can only occur in contexts where individuals are able and willing to report their true political attitudes – meaning further exploration into mapping ideological differences using these self-report methodologies relies on participants willingness to disclose their attitudes.

Behavioral manipulations could also be included in future work, such as having participants actually choose between helping one group (e.g., gay people) vs. another (e.g., straight people). This would help map attitudes where ideological disagreement is (or is not) present to aid in our understanding of the behavioral consequences of differences between liberals and conservatives. However, the consistency in results between the reaction time and self-report measures gives us some confidence that these findings are robust to measurement type.

The current research attempted to map where we are most and least likely to see ideological disagreement. In this paper, we have two key findings. First, we find support for both the elective affinities and divergent content approaches; topics associated with threat, complexity, morality, politics, religion, and harm are also characterized by greater ideological disagreement than topics not associated with these domains. Second, we found that the political domain was the strongest predictor of ideological disagreement. These findings provide evidence for a systematic explanation for when and why liberals and conservatives disagree, and can aid in predicting whether future events will be heavily contested or will be similarly perceived by liberals and conservatives.

The major genetic risk factor for severe COVID-19 is inherited from Neanderthals

The major genetic risk factor for severe COVID-19 is inherited from Neanderthals. Hugo Zeberg & Svante Pääbo. Nature, Sep 30 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2818-3

Abstract: A recent genetic association study1 identified a gene cluster on chromosome 3 as a risk locus for respiratory failure upon SARS-CoV-2 infection. A new study2 comprising 3,199 hospitalized COVID-19 patients and controls finds that this is the major genetic risk factor for severe SARS-CoV-2 infection and hospitalization (COVID-19 Host Genetics Initiative). Here, we show that the risk is conferred by a genomic segment of ~50 kb that is inherited from Neanderthals and is carried by ~50% of people in South Asia and ~16% of people in Europe today.

Popular version: https://www.cathlabdigest.com/content/neandertal-gene-variant-increases-risk-severe-covid-19

The Persistence of Outcomes for Descendants of the Age of Mass Migration

The Not-So-Hot Melting Pot: The Persistence of Outcomes for Descendants of the Age of Mass Migration. Zachary Ward. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. Oct 2020, Vol. 12, No. 4: Pages 73-102. https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/app.20170382

Abstract: How persistent are economic gaps across ethnicities? The convergence of ethnic gaps through the third generation of immigrants is difficult to measure because few datasets include grandparental birthplace. I overcome this limitation with a new three-generational dataset that links immigrant grandfathers in 1880 to their grandsons in 1940. I find that the persistence of ethnic gaps in occupational income is 2.5 times stronger than predicted by a standard grandfather-grandson elasticity. While part of the discrepancy is due to measurement error attenuating the grandfather-grandson elasticity, mechanisms related to geography also partially explain the stronger persistence of ethnic occupational differentials.

JEL J15, J22, J31, J51

 

No significant unique relation between deontological inclinations & compassion (sympathy, empathic concern)—or any other emotion-infused trait—as predicted by emotion-centered views of deontological moral judgment

Smillie, Luke D., Milena Katic, and Simon Laham. 2020. “Personality and Moral Judgment: Curious Consequentialists and Polite Deontologists (journal of Personality).” PsyArXiv. October 1. doi:10.31234/osf.io/73bfv

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311542323139031040

Abstract

Objective: How does our personality relate to the ways in which we judge right from wrong? Drawing on influential theories of moral judgment, we identify candidate traits that may be linked with inclinations toward (a) consequentialist judgments (i.e., those based on the outcomes of an action) and (b) deontological judgments (i.e., those based on the alignment of an action with particular moral rules).

Method: Across two studies (total N = 843), we examined domains and aspects of the Big Five in relation to inclinations toward consequentialist and deontological judgments.

Results: In both studies, we found a unique association between intellect (curiosity, cognitive engagement) and consequentialist inclinations, in line with the view that deliberative cognitive processes drive such inclinations. We also found a consistent unique association between politeness (respectfulness, etiquette) and deontological inclinations, in line with the view that norm-adherence drives such inclinations. Neither study yielded a significant unique relation between deontological inclinations and compassion (sympathy, empathic concern)—or any other emotion-infused trait (e.g., neuroticism)—as would be expected based on emotion- centered views of deontological moral judgment.

Conclusions: These findings have implications for theories of moral judgment, and reveal how our personality guides our approach to questions of ethics and morality.

Paper finds no support for the idea that casual sexual relationships & experiences are inherently negative and emotionally harmful experiences

Emotional Outcomes of Casual Sexual Relationships and Experiences: A Systematic Review. Rose Wesche, Shannon E. Claxton & Emily A. Waterman. The Journal of Sex Research, Sep 29 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2020.1821163

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311520122276917248

ABSTRACT: Casual sexual relationships and experiences (CSREs) are common and emotionally significant occurrences. Given the uncommitted, often emotionally complicated nature of CSREs, researchers have asked whether these experiences may have positive and/or negative emotional consequences. We reviewed 71 quantitative articles examining emotional outcomes of CSREs, including subjective emotional reactions (e.g., excitement, regret) and emotional health (e.g., depression, self-esteem). Overall, people evaluated their CSREs more positively than negatively. In contrast, CSREs were associated with short-term declines in emotional health in most studies examining changes in emotional health within a year of CSRE involvement. Emotional outcomes of CSREs differed across people and situations. Women and individuals with less permissive attitudes toward CSREs experienced worse emotional outcomes of CSREs. Alcohol use prior to CSREs, not being sexually satisfied, and not knowing a partner well were also associated with worse emotional outcomes. These findings suggest directions for prevention/intervention related to CSREs. For example, skill-building related to sexual decision-making may help individuals decide whether, and under what circumstances, CSREs are likely to result in positive or negative emotional outcomes. In addition, the limitations of extant research suggest directions for future inquiry (e.g., examining whether verbal and nonverbal consent practices predict emotional outcomes of CSREs).

Effectiveness of titles of psychology papers: Participants significantly preferred long over short titles, titles containing colons over the absence of a colon, and titles phrased as questions

I’ll Read That!: What Title Elements Attract Readers to an Article? Robert M. Hallock, Tara N. Bennett. Teaching of Psychology, September 29, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0098628320959948

Abstract: The title of an article is the first chance at catching a reader’s attention. We set to develop a list of title attributes that lead to attractive titles in psychology papers, which could then be used to help instruct undergraduate students on how to write good titles for their papers and projects. Currently, research into successful elements that comprise an effective title is generally limited to publication metrics (the number of hits and citations an article has). Here, we created and administered a survey to 99 undergraduate students to rate the effectiveness of titles of psychology papers that varied in length, use of colons, acronyms, clichés, being results-oriented, and phrased the title as a question. We then reworded these titles as the opposite choice (e.g., we made a longer title shorter or took the colon out of a title without changing the meaning or length). We found that participants significantly preferred long over short titles, titles containing colons over the absence of a colon, and titles phrased as questions. We hope our results aid in the instruction of writing in the discipline, and that undergraduate psychology students and authors alike can develop more effective and attractive titles to attract attention from scholars and invite broader audiences to read their work.

Keywords article titles, effective titles, colon, title length, publication metrics, writing style

Intelligence Can Be Detected but Is Not Found Attractive in Videos and Live Interactions

Driebe, Julie C., Morgan Sidari, Michael Dufner, Juliane M. von der Heiden, Paul - Christian Bürkner, Lars Penke, Brendan P. Zietsch, et al. 2020. “Intelligence Can Be Detected but Is Not Found Attractive in Videos and Live Interactions.” PsyArXiv. September 30. doi:10.31234/osf.io/qv3eh

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311337058196127748

Abstract: Humans’ extraordinary intelligence seems to extend beyond the needs for survival. One theory to explain this surplus intelligence is that it evolved via sexual selection as a fitness indicator to advertise genetic quality to prospective mates. Consistent with this idea, self-reported mate preferences suggest intelligence is valued across cultures. Yet, as the validity of these self-reports has been questioned, it remains unclear whether objectively assessed intelligence is indeed attractive. We analysed data from two studies to test this key premise of the sexual selection theory of intelligence. In Study 1, 88 target men had their intelligence measured and based on short video clips were rated on intelligence, funniness, physical attractiveness and mate appeal by 179 women. In Study 2 (N = 729), participants took part in 2 to 5 speed-dating sessions in which their intelligence was measured and they rated each other’s intelligence, funniness, and mate appeal. Measured intelligence did not predict increased mate appeal in either study, whereas perceived intelligence and funniness did. More intelligent people were perceived as more intelligent, but not as funnier. Results suggest that intelligence is not important for initial attraction, which raises doubts concerning the sexual selection theory of intelligence.

Central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation; central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract

Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research. Brian Fabo, Martina Jančoková, Elisabeth Kempf, Ľuboš Pástor. NBER Working Paper No. 27849, September 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w27849

Abstract: Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, we compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). We find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.

People are often reluctant to talk to strangers, despite the fact that they are happier when they do so, because of overblown fears of not enjoying the conversation, not liking one’s partner, or lacking conversational skills

Why do people avoid talking to strangers? A mini meta-analysis of predicted fears and actual experiences talking to a stranger. Gillian M. Sandstrom & Erica J. Boothby. Sep 29 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2020.1816568

ABSTRACT: People are often reluctant to talk to strangers, despite the fact that they are happier when they do so. We investigate this apparent paradox, meta-analyzing pre-conversation predictions and post-conversation experiences across seven studies (N = 2304). We examine: fears of not enjoying the conversation, not liking one’s partner, and lacking conversational skills; fears of the partner not enjoying the conversation, not liking oneself, and lacking conversational skills. We examine the relative strength of these fears, and show that the fears are related to talking behavior. We report evidence that people’s fears are overblown. Finally, we report two interventions designed to reduce fears: conversation tips, and the experience of a pleasant conversation. Ultimately, this research shows that conversations go better than expected.

KEYWORDS: Social interaction, conversation, intervention, meta-analysis

Why People Forgive Their Intimate Partners’ Infidelity: Having children, followed by own infidelity, reduced likelihood of future infidelity and dependency on partner

Why People Forgive Their Intimate Partners’ Infidelity: a Taxonomy of Reasons. Menelaos Apostolou & Andriana Demosthenous. Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, Sep 29 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40750-020-00153-1

Abstract

Objectives: Infidelity is a widespread phenomenon, with perpetrators being frequently caught by their partners. Yet, not all instances of revealed infidelity lead to the termination of the relationship, and the current research aimed to study the reasons which lead individuals to forgive their partners.

Methods: Study 1 employed a combination of qualitative research methods in a sample of Greek-speaking participants (N = 164) in order to identify the reasons that motivate people to forgive their partners’ infidelity. Studies 2 and 3 employed quantitative research methods in two independent Greek-speaking samples (N = 1,243) in order to classify these reasons in broader factors.

Results: We identified 32 reasons, which are likely to motivate people to forgive their partners’ infidelity. By using principal components analysis, we classified these reasons in four broader factors. The most important one was having children, followed by own infidelity, reduced likelihood of future infidelity and dependency on partner. In the presence of assurances that they will be unlikely to cheat again in the future, women and older participants were more likely than men and younger participants to forgive their partners. Furthermore, participants who scored high in agreeableness were more likely than those who scored low to forgive their partners’ infidelity.

Conclusions: There are at least four main reasons why people forgive their partners’ infidelity, which are predicted by the former’s sex, age and personality.

Check also Reactions to and Forgiveness of Infidelity: Exploring Severity, Length of Relationship, Sex, and Previous Experience Effects. Menelaos Apostolou, Anna Aristidou, Christina Eraclide. Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, November 26 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/reactions-to-and-forgiveness-of.html

We are all chimeric beings

We are all chimeric beings. Inspired by Rolf Degen, https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311007544081633287: Remaining cells from a previous fetus can lead to spooky actions in the mother's body

From the book he referenced to, David Linden's Unique: The New Science of Human Individuality > Fetomaternal cell trafficking: a story that begins with prenatal diagnosis and may end with stem cell therapy. Diana W. Bianchi. Journal of Pediatric Surgery (2007) 42, 12 – 18. https://nexthumanproject.com/references/Fetomaternal_Cell_Trafficking_JPS.pdf

Conclusive evidence that cells from a terminated fetus can persist in the mother and differentiate into cells in the mature organ came from the following study by Johnson et al [31], published in the journal Hepatology in 2002. In this study we received liver biopsy material from a woman with hepatitis C. She was a control subject for a study in which we were analyzing the association between fetal cell microchimerism and primary biliary cirrhosis. This woman had a history of having had one son, who was then 18 years old. Using X and Y chromosome–specific probes, we demonstrated that part of her liver contained entirely female (XX) cells, yet another part of her liver contained thousands of cells that were male (XY). We were able to obtain enough cells to isolate DNA and perform PCR amplification of short tandem repeat (STR) sequences. The DNA in the male part of the liver and the female part of the liver appeared related to each other, in that they each shared an allele at each locus tested. However, the STRs in the woman’s son’s DNA did not match the STRs in the male DNA in the liver. We were disappointed to conclude that the male cells in her liver could not originate from her son. However, after requesting and receiving a more detailed reproductive history, we realized that this woman had had 4 additional pregnancies, including 2 elective terminations and 2 miscarriages. We were subsequently able to obtain genomic DNA from 2 of the fathers of her noncompleted pregnancies. One of the fathers appeared to be a biological match for the male cells in the liver. We hypothesized, but can never prove, that these fetal cells originated from an elective termination of pregnancy that had been fathered by the man whose DNA we tested. Thus, in one woman, cells from a fetus that was terminated 17 to 19 years earlier remained for a long time in her body. We hypothesize that these fetal cells survived, migrated to her liver, which was a clinically diseased organ, and repopulated a significant portion of her liver. Interestingly, she did well clinically despite not taking her medications and not complying with medical care [31].

Algorithms consistently learn to charge supracompetitive prices, without communicating with one another; the high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation

Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò, and Sergio Pastorello. American Economic Review. Oct 2020, Vol. 110, No. 10: Pages 3267-3297. https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20190623

Abstract: Increasingly, algorithms are supplanting human decision-makers in pricing goods and services. To analyze the possible consequences, we study experimentally the behavior of algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (Q-learning) in a workhorse oligopoly model of repeated price competition. We find that the algorithms consistently learn to charge supracompetitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand, changes in the number of players, and various forms of uncertainty.

JEL D21, D43, D83, L12, L13

Declining trends in the formation of romantic relationships, alcohol consumption, and earnings, and increasing computer gaming explain a substantial portion of the decline in young adult sexual activity

Explaining the Decline in Young Adult Sexual Activity in the United States. Lei Lei  Scott J. South. Journal of Marriage and Family, September 28 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12723

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310958118919077890

Abstract

Objective: The main goal of this study is to identify the causes of the decline in sexual activity among young adults in the United States.

Background:The frequency with which young adults have sexual intercourse has declined over recent decades, but the sources of this trend are not well understood. Trends in economic insecurity, relationship formation, parental coresidence, use of electronic media, psychological distress, and alcohol consumption have all been suggested as possible causes.

Method: Logistic regression models of recent sexual activity were estimated using longitudinal data from the Transition to Adulthood Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for respondents ages 18 to 23 (n = 3,213) spanning 2007 to 2017. Mediation analysis was performed to identify the explanatory factors that account for the decline in sexual activity. Fixed‐effect logistic regression models were estimated for a subset of respondents (n = 655) to help identify causal effects.

Results: Of the possible explanations considered, the decline in the formation of romantic relationships and decreasing alcohol consumption are the most important, but declining earnings and increasing use of computer games also play important roles. Overall, the measured explanations explain three‐quarters of the decline in young adult sexual activity. Within individuals, forming a romantic relationship, going to college, and alcohol consumption likely have causal effects on the probability of engaging in sexual intercourse.

Conclusion: Trends in the formation of romantic relationships, alcohol consumption, computer gaming, and earnings explain a substantial portion of the decline in young adult sexual activity.

Differences among students in beliefs in free will and dualism may lead some students to endorse a greater number of common psychological misconceptions

Psychological Misconceptions and Their Relation to Students’ Lay Beliefs of Mind. Mark Sibicky, Christopher L. Klein, Emily Embrescia. Teaching of Psychology, September 28, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0098628320959925

Abstract: Psychological misconceptions are common among students taking psychology courses. In this study, we show an association between student endorsement of misconceptions and two prevalent and well-researched lay beliefs about the human mind, specifically the belief in free will and dualism. This study also revisits and builds upon past research investigating the relationship between believing in psychological misconceptions and other student beliefs such as opinions about psychology as science and beliefs in extrasensory perception, and student characteristics such as critical thinking ability, number of psychology courses taken, and grade point average. The findings are discussed in the context that differences among students in beliefs in free will and dualism may lead some students to endorse a greater number of common psychological misconceptions. We discuss the implications of these findings for instruction and for research on techniques to correct student misconceptions.

Keywords: psychological misconceptions, lay beliefs of mind, free will, dualism

Physical Harm Reduction in Domestic Violence: Does Marijuana Make Assaults Safer?

Physical Harm Reduction in Domestic Violence: Does Marijuana Make Assaults Safer? Jacob Kaplan, Li Sian Goh. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, September 25, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520961876

Abstract: Studies on the effect of marijuana on domestic violence often suffer from endogeneity issues. To examine the effect of marijuana decriminalization and medical marijuana legalization on serious domestic assaults, we conducted a difference-in-differences analysis on a panel dataset on NIBRS-reported assaults in 24 states over the 12 years between 2005 and 2016. Assaults disaggregated according to situation and extent of injury were employed as dependent variables. We found that while the total number of assaults did not change, decriminalization reduced domestic assaults involving serious injuries by 18%. From a harm reduction perspective, these results suggest that while the extensive margin of violence did not change, the intensive margin measured by the seriousness of assaults were substantially affected by decriminalization. This result may be partially explained by reductions in offender alcohol intoxication and weapon-involved assault.

Keywords: marijuana, domestic violence, harm reduction

Understanding heterosexual women’s erotic flexibility: Sexual orientation may be maintained by differences in attentional processing that cannot be voluntarily altered

Understanding heterosexual women’s erotic flexibility: the role of attention in sexual evaluations and neural responses to sexual stimuli. Janna A Dickenson, Lisa Diamond, Jace B King, Kay Jenson, Jeffrey S Anderson. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, Volume 15, Issue 4, April 2020, Pages 447–465, https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsaa058

Abstract: Many women experience desires, arousal and behavior that run counter to their sexual orientation (orientation inconsistent, ‘OI’). Are such OI sexual experiences cognitively and neurobiologically distinct from those that are consistent with one’s sexual orientation (orientation consistent, ‘OC’)? To address this question, we employed a mindful attention intervention—aimed at reducing judgment and enhancing somatosensory attention—to examine the underlying attentional and neurobiological processes of OC and OI sexual stimuli among predominantly heterosexual women. Women exhibited greater neural activity in response to OC, compared to OI, sexual stimuli in regions associated with implicit visual processing, volitional appraisal and attention. In contrast, women exhibited greater neural activity to OI, relative to OC, sexual stimuli in regions associated with complex visual processing and attentional shifting. Mindfully attending to OC sexual stimuli reduced distraction, amplified women’s evaluations of OC stimuli as sexually arousing and deactivated the superior cerebellum. In contrast, mindfully attending to OI sexual stimuli amplified distraction, decreased women’s evaluations of OI stimuli as sexually arousing and augmented parietal and temporo-occipital activity. Results of the current study constrain hypotheses of female erotic flexibility, suggesting that sexual orientation may be maintained by differences in attentional processing that cannot be voluntarily altered.

Keywords: sexual arousal, sexual orientation, fMRI, women, mindfulness, attention

Discussion

We found that OC, relative to OI, sexual stimuli elicited greater activity in brain regions involved in automatic visual processing, executive attention and appraisal whereas OI, relative to OC, sexual stimuli elicited greater activity in brain regions involved in complex visual processing and shifting attention. In contrast to our hypothesis that mindful attention would enhance the sexual processing of OI stimuli, results suggest that mindful attention augments women’s natural-occurring responses—increasing sexual evaluations of OC sexual stimuli but decreasing sexual evaluation of OI sexual stimuli.

Consistent with prior neuroimaging research on men’s processing of sexual stimuli (see Table 1), women’s neural responses to sexual, relative to neutral, stimuli activated regions associated with autonomic processing (midbrain, periaqueductal gray, posterior insula), attention (frontoparietal network, thalamus, anterior cingulate cortex, middle prefrontal cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex), appraisal (OFC, hippocampus), somatosensory awareness (anterior insula), motor imagery (cerebellum, premotor cortex) and deactivated areas involved in inhibition and devaluation (lateral temporal cortex, amygdala). These findings provide neurobiological support for the information processing model of the sexual response (e.g. see also Janssen et al., 2000; Chivers, 2017) and corroborate existing neurobiological models of sexual arousal (see Stoléru et al., 2012).

Differences across women’s OC and OI sexual processing

Importantly, women showed greater neural activity in the primary and secondary visual cortices and the thalamus. Primary and secondary visual areas are the first areas to receive visual input and the thalamus serves as a relay station to transmit relevant motor and sensory information to the cortex necessary for conscious awareness. These areas have been implicated in preconscious attention, precipitate male erectile responses, and are related to perceptions of arousal (see Table 1). Together, these findings suggest that women process OC stimuli on a more implicit level, marked by basic visual processing and implicit attention.

According to the IPM, preconscious visual attention serves to draw one’s attention to the sexual properties of the stimuli and trigger autonomic arousal and implicit appraisal. Although women showed greater neural activity associated with autonomic arousal in response to sexual, compared to neutral stimuli, these regions responded similarly to OC and OI sexual stimuli. On a neural level, women hold similar representations of autonomic or visceral responses across OC and OI sexual stimuli. This pattern of results indicates that women’s sexual orientation is more likely constrained by early implicit attention than by autonomic arousal or visceral sensations.

Predominantly heterosexual women showed greater processing in the explicit pathway. Women evaluated OC stimuli as more sexual and less distracting and women’s self-report mirrored the pattern of neural activity. When women viewed OC sexual stimuli, their brain showed greater activity in regions associated with volitional attention (e.g. dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) and explicit appraisal (orbitofrontal areas, which evaluates and encodes reward value of punishers and integrates reward with emotional arousal), but not somatosensory awareness. Situating these findings in the context of the IPM suggests that women explicitly appraise OC stimuli as more sexual and more rewarding and better sustain volitional attention to OC, compared to OI, sexual stimuli, but are not any less aware of their sexual sensations toward OI sexual stimuli than they are for OC sexual stimuli. Hence, women may be just as aware of their somatosensory response to OI stimuli as they are to OC stimuli, suggesting that women’s erotic flexibility is not related to differences in or a lack of somatosensory awareness. Rather, differences between OC and OI sexual stimuli appear to be driven by attentional processing.

Additionally, OC stimuli elicited heightened activity in regions associated with sexual imagery and, unexpectedly, speech production and language processing. One possibility is that OC stimuli elicited self-referential mentalizing in the default mode network and Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas represent associated ‘self-talk’ (Raichle et al., 2001). Alternatively, the angular gyrus, premotor cortex, Broca’s area, somatosensory cortex and inferior temporal areas comprise the extended mirror neuron system (Caspers et al., 2010). The greater self-relevance of OC stimuli may facilitate the linkage between women’s observations of male masturbation and their own experience in response to this behavior. Future research should investigate how mentalizing, sexual imagery and self-referential processes contribute to OC sexual responses.

OI sexuality is not related to inhibition or judgment

In contrast to the hypothesis that women would be more likely to judge and negatively evaluate OI sexual stimuli, neural responses to OI, relative to OC, sexual stimuli showed no neural differences associated with judgment or negative evaluation. Rather, women responded to OI sexual stimuli with greater activity in higher order visual association areas, such as the fusiform gyri, involved in body and face perception, modulation of volitional attention and responses to genitalia and attractive faces, regardless of sexual orientation (see Table 1). As well, women showed greater activity in the superior parietal lobe (which acts in orienting attention, responding to distractors, and rearranging information to modify perspectives; Van Assche et al., 2014) and the posterior angular gyrus (involved in decoding symbolism and serves as a linking hub to transform visual input into associations; Caspers et al., 2012). Whereas predominantly heterosexual women visually process OC stimuli implicitly and automatically, OI visual processing is more elaborative, emphasizing face and bodily perception and modulating shifts in attention, meaning and perspective. Hence, OI stimuli might require more active symbolic interpretation that prompts predominantly heterosexual women to shift their perspective. This attentional and perspective shifting corroborates the very nature of OI stimuli—an inconsistency with women’s orientation.

The relative impact of mindful attention

Mindfully attending to OC stimuli enhanced women’s evaluations of OC stimuli as more sexually arousing and suppressed neural activity. Specifically, deactivation in superior cerebellum/lingual gyrus (involved in the visual processing of faces and complex visual processing) suggests that mindful attention operates by suppressing complex visual or facial processing. This is consistent with prior research demonstrating that mindfulness may operate by acting as an enhanced recovery phase that suppresses, rather than activates, neurobiological activity associated with general arousal (Dickenson et al., 2019).

Mindfully attending to OI sexual stimuli reduced women’s evaluations of OI stimuli as sexually arousing, but heightened activation in regions associated with complex visual processing and attention. The angular gyrus and superior parietal lobule work together to detect novel stimuli, distractions and to shift attention (Corbetta et al., 2008). These results extend findings concerning the role of distraction in inhibiting sexual responses (e.g. De Jong, 2009). Specifically, neural responses to OI stimuli are marked by attentional shifting, which is further enhanced by mindful attention, and ultimately weakens subjective sexual attention and evaluation. Importantly, these results indicate that the direction of one’s subjective sexual processing cannot be changed by volitionally altering attention or appraisal. Hence, the underlying mechanism that guides sexual orientation and deviations in sexual responses is distinct from explicit attentional and appraisal processes.

Within the specific direction of one’s sexual processing, mindful attention can impact the magnitude of evaluating sexual stimuli as arousing. That is, mindful attention facilitates sexual evaluations of genders that women typically find arousing (OC) and impedes sexual evaluations of genders that women find less arousing (OI). Women felt less distracted when viewing OI in a sexual, relative to a neutral, context and mindful attention improved women’s attentional focus toward OI neutral stimuli. However, mindful attention exacerbated women’s distraction toward OI sexual stimuli. This pattern of results suggests that women were not feeling distracted by OI stimuli until they were asked to attend their bodies in a sexual context. Such pattern of findings also suggests that women were similarly subjectively responsive to the sexual content in the absence of mindful attention to their bodily sensations. Perhaps results were due to the specific attentional processes altered, such that greater explicit monitoring (e.g. monitoring non-judgment and bodily sensations) may have overridden women’s implicit enjoyment of OI sexual stimuli. An important avenue for future research is to investigate the pathways by which specific forms of attention may impede or enhance compassion and sexual pleasure.

Specifically, mindful attention can shift attention either by heightening a detached, observational stance, attending to a stimulus as a third-party observer, or by heighten one’s ability to fully immerse oneself within an activity. Previous research has found that immersive attention increases subjective arousal, whereas more observational forms of attention reduce women’s subjective arousal (Both et al., 2011). Women are more likely to employ immersive attention to OC stimuli and employ detached, observation to OI stimuli (Bossio et al., 2013). Moreover, immersive participation has been associated with a lack of frontal lobe activation (Dietrich, 2003). Hence, mindful attention may have reduced effortful attention, through suppressing complex visual processing in OC stimuli. In contrast, mindful attention may increase detached observation to OI stimuli, which should then increase effortful attentional shifts, thereby decreasing arousal. Although we did not measure immersive or observatory attention, results suggest that sexual processing may be enhanced or attenuated based on the specific form of attention mindfulness augments. Investigating the pathways by which specific forms of attention account for the ways in which mindful attending to OC and OI stimuli impact sexual responses could explain the diversity of effects across mindfulness-based therapies for sexual desire and arousal concerns (Brotto et al., 2012). Our findings suggest that sexual orientation, rather than erotic flexibility, guides women’s sexual processing and attempting to change attentional processing only magnifies the effect of sexual orientation on women’s sexual processing.

Limitations and future directions

Inferring function from brain activation cannot serve as a proof of function. Nonetheless, identifying relevant brain regions helps to narrow the range of processes potentially involved. Additionally, our single-item measure of sexual response was limited to evaluating the stimulus as sexually arousing and does not reflect a specific aspect of sexual response. These limitations are also strengths, in that we were able to test our specific hypotheses because we engaged in careful inference of brain function and because our measure of sexual evaluation was not limited to a specific aspect of sexual response.

Although prior research indicates that one training session is sufficient to induce emotional regulation benefits (Arch and Craske, 2006), we know little about how many instances of mindful attention training are required to elicit changes in the processing of sexual stimuli. Although we were unable to determine how effectively participants were able to toggle between mindful attention and control tasks within the short epochs or assess for demand characteristics related to OC and OI stimuli, women’s self-reported level of distraction did, in fact, decrease as a result of the mindful attention task for OC and OI neutral stimuli. Future research should explore how these factors influence the degree to which participants are able to direct their attention to present-moment sensations to OC and OI desires, attractions, and arousal with compassion and non-judgment.

The current sample included predominantly heterosexual cisgender women who were willing to undergo brain scans while watching erotic films. Moreover, the sample mirrored the racial demographics of the state in which this study was conducted (mostly white). Among these women, we found that attempting to change attentional processing only magnified the effect of sexual orientation on women’s sexual processing. A critical direction for future research is to investigate subjective and neurobiological differences between OC and OI desires among women of various orientations, genders (including transgender and gender non-binary individuals) and ethnicities/races. A particularly intriguing direction is to examine differences between the same and other gender(s) desires of bisexual women (who rarely report that their desires for all genders are absolutely equivalent in frequency and intensity) and pansexual women (who report attraction toward a person, rather than a specific sex/gender).

Rolf Degen summarizing... Having children does increase happiness, unless it is associated with financial difficulties

Children, unhappiness and family finances. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew E. Clark. Journal of Population Economics (2020). September 29 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00148-020-00798-y

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310827907334504448

Abstract: The common finding of a zero or negative correlation between the presence of children and parental well-being continues to generate research interest. We consider international data, including well over one million observations on Europeans from 11 years of Eurobarometer surveys. We first replicate this negative finding, both in the overall data and then for most different marital statuses. Children are expensive: controlling for financial difficulties turns our estimated child coefficients positive. We argue that difficulties paying the bills explain the pattern of existing results by parental education and income and by country income and social support. Last, we underline that not all children are the same, with stepchildren commonly having a more negative correlation with well-being than children from the current relationship.

Do people who claim to be dispositionally open-minded, in fact, demonstrate such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with political opinions that run counter to their own? Seems they don't.

 On Staying Open While Seeing Red: Predicting Open-Mindedness and Affect in Politics. Emily J. Hanson. Ph D Thesis, Psychological and Brain Sciences. Washington University in St. Louis, 2020. https://search.proquest.com/openview/abe8cf853b03f6f6f5f3377a20bfd498/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310798907291639808

Abstract: This dissertation examines whether people who claim to be dispositionally open-minded, do in fact, demonstrate such open-mindedness when they are actually presented with political opinions that run counter to their own. In Study 1, participants rated their partisan identity and dispositional open-mindedness prior to reacting to a series of fictional Facebook posts that varied in both their political ideology and political extremity. The results of this study demonstrated that the most consistent predictor of “open” reactions (operationalized in terms of both cognitive judgements and affective reactions) to each type of Facebook post was whether it was congruent with the participants’ partisan identity. Importantly, this effect was never moderated by dispositional open-mindedness. Thus, the degree to which a participant was high (vs. low) in open-mindedness did not significantly attenuate partisan bias or act to increase the likelihood of “open” reactions to outgroup political views. Study 2 utilized a similar design, except in this case participants were asked to predict how open they thought they would be to the same set of political issues used in Study 1. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that participants predicted they would be most open to attitudinally consistent political views. As in Study 1, these predictions were not moderated by dispositional open-mindedness. This means that participants who rated themselves as highly open-minded were not any more likely to predict they would be open to outgroup political opinions than those participants who scored themselves low in openmindedness. This research both builds upon and significantly extends prior work in both the psychological and political science literatures. The implications of these results and future directions are discussed.

In 1979 marriage was associated with lower earnings among women; by 2018 it was associated with higher earnings, suggesting greater positive selection of women with high earnings potential into marriage

The Declining Earnings Gap Between Young Women and Men in the United States, 1979-2018. John Iceland, Ilana Redstone. Social Science Research, September 28 2020, 102479, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102479

Abstract: We examine the dynamics of the gender earnings gap over the 1979 to 2018 period among full-time workers aged 25-29, focusing on the role of marital status and the presence of children. Using data from multiple years of the Current Population Survey, we find that the earnings gap declined among all groups of men and women, and by 2018 there was earnings parity among the those who were not married and without children. The share of people in this group also grew over the period, and comprised a majority of both men and women by 2018. We also find that while marriage was associated with lower earnings among women in 1979, by 2018 it was associated with higher earnings, suggesting greater positive selection of women with high earnings potential into marriage. The positive association between marriage and earnings among men remained stable. While we found a persistent earnings penalty for having children among women over the period, we found an emerging dampening effect of having children over time among men, which suggests that greater participation in childcare among men has led to lower earnings than in the past (i.e., a causal connection) and/or an emerging selection effect of young men more interested in childrearing over time, perhaps reflecting a cultural shift.

Key words: Gender InequalityEarningsMarriageChildren

Can nations be ranked on the quality of their elites? Elites are dominant coalitions possessing the strongest coordination capacity over a country’s key resources, creating value or extracting it

Casas, Tomas and Cozzi, Guido, Elite Quality Report 2020: 32 Country Scores and Global Rank (August 18, 2020). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3676776

Abstract: Can nations be ranked on the quality of their elites? Elites are dominant coalitions possessing the strongest coordination capacity over a country’s key resources. They run the highest impact business models, which can be value creating or value extracting. We aim to produce a political economy index and present the first ever comparative measurement of Elite Quality (EQ), that is, a country’s elites’ propensity – on aggregate – to create value, rather than to rent seek with extractive business models. Using data on 72 Indicators, the Elite Quality Index (EQx) ranks 32 countries. Based on its multi-layered index architecture, we quantify a country’s overall EQ, as well as offer an in-depth analysis of specific dimensions of EQ, such as the role of power (Power Sub-Index I) and current value creation activities (Value Sub-Index II) in the political and economic realm. On a more granular level, the Index consists of 12 Pillars, including Creative Destruction, State Capture and Capital Rent. We reveal substantial differences in the overall state of Elite Quality around the world and hence divergent mid- and long-term economic growth and human development prospects. In-depth analysis of regional dynamics (North East Asia), specific EQ dimensions as well as various country portraits (incl. the United States, China, German, Japan, Russia, Portugal and others) by experts and academics illustrate the varied use of the EQx as a new analytical tool to explain the political economy of countries. This global Index and country ranking is an innovative heuristic and approach that might help interpret – and possibly transform – the state of the world and its future.

Keywords: index, elite quality, institutions, value creation, rent seeking, crony capitalism, political economy, global ranking, international business

JEL Classification: D72, F50, P16, P48

Our unique capability: Once one appreciates that one’s thoughts about the future are just representations, one is in a position to evaluate them, to discount them, or to try to compensate for their shortcomings

From 2019... The future-directed functions of the imagination: From prediction to metaforesight. Adam Bulley, Jonathan Redshaw, Thomas Suddendorf. In book: The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination, Apr 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332154143

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310592701960777728

Abstract: One of the fundamental roles of human imagination is to enable the representation of possible future events. Here, we survey some of the most critical abilities that this foresight supports: anticipating future emotions, setting and pursuing goals, preparing for threats, deliberately acquiring skills and knowledge, and intentionally shaping the future environment. Furthermore, we outline how metacognition bolsters human capacities even further by enabling people to reflect on and compensate for the natural limits of their foresight. For example, humans make contingency plans because they appreciate that their initial predictions may turn out to be wrong. We suggest that the processes involved in monitoring, controlling, and ultimately augmenting future-oriented imagination represent an important and understudied parallel of "metamemory" that should be called "metaforesight".

2. Compensating for anticipated limits: introducing “metaforesight”

Humans, perhaps uniquely, are capable of meta-representational insight into

the relationship between their imagination and reality. In other words, people can

evaluate how imagined scenarios link in with the external world, and thus assess

whether what is imagined is likely to actually occur in the future, and whether it is

biased, pessimistic, or hopeful and so forth. In the broad sense, meta-representation

involves representing the relation between (i) a representation and (ii) what that

representation is about (Pylyshyn, 1978). The development of such a capacity in

childhood is widely considered as critical to the emergence of an understanding of

other people’s minds (e.g., Perner, 1991). In the domain of foresight, this form of

metacognition has long been given a central role (Suddendorf, 1999). Once one

appreciates that one’s thoughts about the future are just representations, one is in a

position to evaluate them, to modify them, to discount them, to discuss them, and to

try to compensate for their shortcomings (Redshaw, 2014; Redshaw & Bulley, 2018).

Indeed, this capacity may be crucial to children acquiring a mature sense of future

time itself – as a series of possible chains of events of which only one will actually

happen (see Hoerl & McCormack, 2018).

Involuntary Mental Time Travel into the Episodic Future, Episodic Past, and Episodic Counterfactual Past in Everyday Life

Branch, Jared. 2020. “Involuntary Mental Time Travel into the Episodic Future, Episodic Past, and Episodic Counterfactual Past in Everyday Life.” PsyArXiv. January 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jbkfg

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310584704555507717

Abstract: To date, studies exploring episodic counterfactual thoughts have employed laboratory studies to discern the subjective qualities of voluntary mental time travel (Branch & Anderson, 2018; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; Özbek, Bohn, & Berntsen, 2017). Here, we offer the first diary study of episodic counterfactual thinking, and therefore we report the subjective qualities of involuntary mental time travel into the counterfactual past. We find that such thoughts do occur, although to a much lesser extent than mental time travel into the future or past (i.e. episodic future thinking or episodic memory). The major purpose that episodic counterfactual thinking serves is mood regulation: to daydream and to feel better. We observed that the majority of episodic counterfactual thoughts are experienced in the recent past and decrease as a function of time. We also report on the phenomenological aspects of episodic counterfactual thoughts as they relate to future thinking and memories.

Compared to others of same age & gender, they believed they were unlikely to experience a range of controllable (eg accidentally infect/ be infected) & uncontrollable (eg need hospitalization/ intensive care treatment) COVID‐19‐related risks in the short term

Comparative optimism about infection and recovery from COVID‐19; Implications for adherence with lockdown advice. Koula Asimakopoulou  et al. Health Expectations, September 27 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13134

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310560848943906820

Abstract

Background: Comparative optimism, the belief that negative events are more likely to happen to others rather than to oneself, is well established in health risk research. It is unknown, however, whether comparative optimism also permeates people’s health expectations and potentially behaviour during the COVID‐19 pandemic.

Objectives: Data were collected through an international survey (N = 6485) exploring people’s thoughts and psychosocial behaviours relating to COVID‐19. This paper reports UK data on comparative optimism. In particular, we examine the belief that negative events surrounding risk and recovery from COVID‐19 are perceived as more likely to happen to others rather than to oneself.

Methods: Using online snowball sampling through social media, anonymous UK survey data were collected from N = 645 adults during weeks 5‐8 of the UK COVID‐19 lockdown. The sample was normally distributed in terms of age and reflected the UK ethnic and disability profile.

Findings: Respondents demonstrated comparative optimism where they believed that as compared to others of the same age and gender, they were unlikely to experience a range of controllable (eg accidentally infect/ be infected) and uncontrollable (eg need hospitalization/ intensive care treatment if infected) COVID‐19‐related risks in the short term (P < .001). They were comparatively pessimistic (ie thinking they were more at risk than others for developing COVID‐19‐related infection or symptoms) when thinking about the next year.

Discussion: This is the first ever study to report compelling comparative biases in UK adults’ thinking about COVID‐19 We discuss ways in which such thinking may influence adherence with lockdown regimes as these are being relaxed in the UK.

4 DISCUSSION

On the basis of these data, we suggest that UK adults who meet the demographic characteristics of our sample display comparative optimism concerning many aspects of COVID‐19. Where participants showed comparative optimism its pattern was consistent with earlier findings showing that comparative optimism is stronger for controllable than for uncontrollable events.6, 7 Our participants overwhelmingly believed that as compared to people of their age and gender, they were somewhat or extremely unlikely to have accidentally infected people with COVID‐19 in the past and to infect others or get infected themselves in the next month. They were also comparatively optimistic, but to a lesser extent, about their likelihood of getting hospitalized due to COVID‐19, finding themselves in an ICU, being ventilated, and making a full recovery.

In contrast, participants showed comparative pessimism about COVID‐19 infections in the more distant future. As compared to the average person of their age and gender they felt likely to get infected by COVID‐19 in the next year and to develop COVID‐19‐related symptoms. This pattern is inconsistent with earlier findings showing greater comparative optimism for events that are further in the future than for nearer events.21, 22 However, such a finding supports earlier research that shows that people who have experienced some ill health tend to unduly exaggerate their future risk of experiencing further ill health.23 One important difference between COVID‐19 and other risks is that controlling the pandemic was very much placed in the hands of individuals restricting their lives in the UK—as seen in the slogan urging people to ‘Stay at home’. It is reasonable that participants would reason that in the long term, staying at home would be less possible, plausible or practical.11 Feeling that compliance with social distancing rules cannot be maintained indefinitely may thus explain these perceptions, in line with research showing that high prevalence negative events may engender comparative pessimism.24

We have thus established the presence of comparative optimism in relation to both controllable and uncontrollable aspects of COVID‐19. We have also found comparative pessimism concerning future infection and symptom development. Both comparative optimism and comparative pessimism may have important consequences for people’s psychological well‐being and their likelihood of engaging in risk behaviours or responding to further lockdown measures.

If people believe COVID‐19 ‘will not happen to me any time now’ or that they are unlikely to have infected others in the past or to do so in future, they may be more relaxed about lockdown advice. In an effort to make people look beyond their own risk (which for some age and gender groups may be lower than for other groups), most governments, including the UK government, have focused their communication about social distancing rules on how much these protect against infecting others. Unfortunately, having infected others and infecting others in the future are precisely the aspects of COVID‐19 on which we found the strongest comparative optimism—people think it is unlikely these will happen to them.

Equally, for people reporting comparative optimism for present and past COVID‐19 infection, these beliefs could fuel resistance to give up on lockdown—because to do so will place them amongst the very same ‘average others’ who—like them—have been unsuccessful in controlling the pandemic. Given that we have now established comparative optimism in relation to COVID‐19, future work should systematically explore how this thinking may influence behavioural outcomes such as returning to school, work and normal life.

There are limitations of this study which, although do not detract from the generalizability of the findings, should be noted. Firstly, the sample was predominantly White. Although this pattern is typical of wider online survey taking behaviour,20 it may well not represent the views of other ethnic groups. Our sample was also predominantly female, although that may be less of a limitation; our findings showed no gender differences in two subscales, entirely in line with previously reported work.3 The sole difference we observed involved men showing less comparative pessimism and thus being relatively more optimistic than women concerning their long term risk. If anything, then, our study may have underestimated comparative optimism by sampling fewer men. A further limitation of our study is that our participants have self‐selected to participate and that we have no means of estimating the participation rate. This is a methodological issue in all surveys conducted on‐line that use a sampling approach similar to ours. We are therefore confident that our results are no less robust and valid than other appropriately powered surveys in the field; the pattern of comparative optimism and pessimism that we have found is very much in line with patterns reported in previous work in the field of comparative optimism, and which used a range of recruitment strategies, response rates and methods of inquiry.2, 3

On the basis of the above, we conclude that UK adults may be comparatively optimistic about the chances of coming to harm due to COVID‐19 at the moment or having caused harm themselves previously. Future research is needed on the implications of comparatively optimistic thinking for future compliance with government guidelines on managing COVID‐19.

Participants believed they would be less likely to find a compatible partner through online dating than either through friends or in everyday activities; age & shyness were negatively associated with optimism of finding a partner

Beliefs About Finding a Compatible Partner in Three Settings. Susan Sprecher. Interpersona, Vol. 13 No. 2 (2019), Jan 6 2020. https://interpersona.psychopen.eu/index.php/interpersona/article/view/3609

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310519708643479554

Abstract: Single adults often exert considerable energy searching for a compatible partner. Until recently, people met partners primarily through everyday activities (work, school) and through friends. These ways of meeting partners are still common, although Internet dating sites have also become a main way for couples to meet. The current study was conducted to examine people’s attitudes about finding a compatible partner in three different settings: online dating, the social network (e.g., friends of friends), and everyday activities. A sample of 702 single (unpartnered) adults (ages 18 to 40) completed a survey that included items that measured their attitudes about finding a compatible partner in the three different ways. Participants believed they would be less likely to find a compatible partner through online dating than either through friends or in everyday activities. Age and shyness were negatively associated with optimism of finding a partner, particularly in the traditional settings of everyday activities and through one’s social network.

Almost total lack of empirical analyses of the psychological characteristics or behavioral implications of doll ownership; existing arguments appear to represent the philosophical positions of those scholars expressing them

Harper, Craig A., and Rebecca Lievesley. 2020. “Sex Doll Ownership: An Agenda for Research.” PsyArXiv. May 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/2uqkf

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1310476219775934464

Abstract

Purpose of review: The topic of sex doll ownership is becoming an increasingly discussed issue from both a social and legal perspective. This review aims to examine the veracity of the existing psychological, sexological, and legal literature in relation to doll ownership.

Recent findings: Strong views exist across the spectrum of potential socio-legal positions on sex doll ownership. However, there is an almost total lack of empirical analyses of the psychological characteristics or behavioral implications of doll ownership. As such, existing arguments appear to represent the philosophical positions of those scholars expressing them, rather than being rooted in any objective evidence base.

Summary: Despite an absence of empirical data on the characteristics and subsequent effects of doll ownership, discussions about the ethical and legal status of doll ownership continue. This highlights a real and urgent need for a coherent research agenda to be advanced in this area of work.