Friday, November 20, 2020

Neither non-algorithmic nor algorithmically determined news contribute to higher levels of partisan polarization; & getting news from sites of algorithms-generated content corresponds with more political participation

Exploring the Effects of Algorithm-Driven News Sources on Political Behavior and Polarization. Jessica T. Feezell, John K. Wagner, Meredith Conroy. Computers in Human Behavior, Nov 19 2020, 106626, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106626.

Abstract: Do algorithm-driven news sources have different effects on political behavior when compared to non-algorithmic news sources? Media companies compete for our scarce time and attention; one way they do this is by leveraging algorithms to select the most appealing content for each user. While algorithm-driven sites are increasingly popular sources of information, we know very little about the effects of algorithmically determined news at the individual level. The objective of this paper is to define and measure the effects of algorithmically generated news. We begin by developing a taxonomy of news delivery by distinguishing between two types of algorithmically generated news, socially driven and user-driven, and contrasting these with non-algorithmic news. We follow with an exploratory analysis of the effects of these news delivery modes on political behavior, specifically political participation and polarization. Using two nationally representative surveys, one of young adults and one of the general population, we find that getting news from sites that use socially driven or user-driven algorithms to generate content corresponds with higher levels of political participation, but that getting news from non-algorithmic sources does not. We also find that neither non-algorithmic nor algorithmically determined news contribute to higher levels of partisan polarization. This research helps identify important variation in the consequences of news consumption contingent on the mode of delivery.

Keywords: Algorithms; YouTube; Social Media; Political Behavior; Polarization



Individuals are largely incapable of distinguishing between AI- and human-generated text; partisanship affects the perceived credibility of the story; and exposure to the text does little to change individuals’ policy views

All the News That’s Fit to Fabricate: AI-Generated Text as a Tool of Media Misinformation. Sarah Kreps, R. Miles McCain and Miles Brundage. Journal of Experimental Political Science, Nov 20 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.37

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329736218721050624

Abstract: Online misinformation has become a constant; only the way actors create and distribute that information is changing. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) such as GPT-2 mean that actors can now synthetically generate text in ways that mimic the style and substance of human-created news stories. We carried out three original experiments to study whether these AI-generated texts are credible and can influence opinions on foreign policy. The first evaluated human perceptions of AI-generated text relative to an original story. The second investigated the interaction between partisanship and AI-generated news. The third examined the distributions of perceived credibility across different AI model sizes. We find that individuals are largely incapable of distinguishing between AI- and human-generated text; partisanship affects the perceived credibility of the story; and exposure to the text does little to change individuals’ policy views. The findings have important implications in understanding AI in online misinformation campaigns.


Note:

The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available at the Journal of Experimental Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: doi:10.7910/DVN/1XVYU3. This research was conducted using Sarah Kreps’ personal research funds. Early access to GPT-2 was provided in-kind by OpenAI under a non-disclosure agreement. Sarah Kreps and Miles McCain otherwise have no relationships with interested parties. Miles Brundage is employed by OpenAI.

Men in same-sex couples are 12% points less likely to have completed a bachelor’s degree in a STEM field compared to men in different sex couples, a bigger gap than the STEM degree gap between all white & black men

Turing’s children: Representation of sexual minorities in STEM. Dario Sansone, Christopher S. Carpenter. PLoS One, Nov 18 2020. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/comments?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0241596

Abstract: We provide nationally representative estimates of sexual minority representation in STEM fields by studying 142,641 men and women in same-sex couples from the 2009-2018 American Community Surveys. These data indicate that men in same-sex couples are 12 percentage points less likely to have completed a bachelor’s degree in a STEM field compared to men in different sex couples. On the other hand, there is no gap observed for women in same-sex couples compared to women in different-sex couples. The STEM degree gap between men in same-sex and different sex couples is larger than the STEM degree gap between all white and black men but is smaller than the gender gap in STEM degrees. We also document a smaller but statistically significant gap in STEM occupations between men in same-sex and different-sex couples, and we replicate this finding by comparing heterosexual and gay men using independently drawn data from the 2013-2018 National Health Interview Surveys. These differences persist after controlling for demographic characteristics, location, and fertility. Finally, we document that gay male representation in STEM fields (measured using either degrees or occupations) is systematically and positively associated with female representation in those same STEM fields. 

Keywords: sexual minorities; representation; LGBTQ; STEM


Thursday, November 19, 2020

Scale usage correction procedures to enhance the cross-cultural comparability of Likert scale data: Scores were least affected for females who did not repeat a grade and students with higher math achievement

An Examination of Different Scale Usage Correction Procedures to Enhance Cross-Cultural Data Comparability. Jia He, Joanne M. Chung, Fons J. R. van de Vijver. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, October 13, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022120960815

Abstract: This study aims to examine different scale usage correction procedures that are meant to enhance the cross-cultural comparability of Likert scale data. Specifically, we examined a priori study design (i.e., anchoring vignettes and overclaiming) and post hoc statistical procedures (i.e., ipsatization and extreme response style correction) in data from the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment across 64 countries. We analyzed both original item responses and corrected item scores from two targeted scales in an integrative fashion by using multilevel confirmatory factor analysis and multilevel regressions. Results indicate that mean levels and structural relations varied across the correction procedures, although the psychological meaning of the constructs examined did not change. Furthermore, scores were least affected by these procedures for females who did not repeat a grade and students with higher math achievement. We discuss the implications of our findings and offer recommendations for researchers who are considering scale usage correction procedures.

Keywords: anchoring vignettes, overclaiming, response styles, score standardization, cross-cultural comparisons


Do Links Between Personality and Life Outcomes Generalize? Testing the Robustness of Trait–Outcome Associations Across Gender, Age, Ethnicity, and Analytic Approaches

Do Links Between Personality and Life Outcomes Generalize? Testing the Robustness of Trait–Outcome Associations Across Gender, Age, Ethnicity, and Analytic Approaches. Christopher J Soto. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 2020, 10.1177/1948550619900572

Abstract: The Big Five personality traits have been linked with a broad range of consequential life outcomes. The present research systematically tested whether such trait-outcome associations generalize across gender, age, ethnicity, and analytic approaches that control for demographic and personality covariates. Analyses of nationally representative samples from the Life Outcomes of Personality Replication project (N = 6,126) indicated that (a) most trait-outcome associations do generalize across gender, age, and ethnicity, (b) controlling for overlap between personality traits substantially reduces the strength of many associations, and (c) several dozen trait-outcome associations proved highly generalizable across all analyses. These findings have important implications for evaluating the robustness of the personality-outcome literature, updating the canon of established trait-outcome associations, and conducting future research.

Popular version: Female Extraverts Differ from Male Extraverts in Two Ways. Mark Travers. Psychology Today, Nov 18, 2020. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/social-instincts/202011/female-extraverts-differ-male-extraverts-in-two-ways


Consumers higher in motivations to make sense of their environments tend to detect persuasion where there is none; manipulation beliefs are related, inter alia, to conspiracy ideation & desbelief of free will

Khon, Zarema, Samuel G. B. Johnson, and Haiming Hang. 2020. “Lay Theories of Manipulation: Do Consumers Believe They Are Susceptible to Marketers’ Trickery?.” PsyArXiv. November 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8x63c

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329471182253514752

Abstract: Marketers know that persuasion is very hard. So, why are consumers determined that marketers can manipulate them? Across five studies, we show that the beliefs about marketing manipulation have deep psychological roots: Consumers higher in motivations to make sense of their environments tend to not only detect persuasion where it exists, but also where there is none. Such beliefs can be weakened when consumers think of themselves (vs. other consumers) in persuasion situations (study 3) and read concrete (vs. abstract) descriptions of these situations (study 4), but only in consumers with low sense-making drives. Whereas higher sense-making motives manifest in greater false-positive manipulation detection, corresponding abilities negatively affect false-positives and result in more accurate persuasion detection (study 5). The studies also revealed how manipulation beliefs are related to conspiracy ideation, personality traits, beliefs about free will, gender, and age. Implications for marketing segmentation and strategies for attenuating false-positive manipulation detection are discussed.




Extreme Speakers on Campus: Contrary to earlier studies of political tolerance, this study finds that Republicans (and ideological conservatives) are slightly more tolerant of extreme speech than are Democrats and liberals

The Limits of Tolerance: Extreme Speakers on Campus. Anna Boch. Social Problems, spaa019, June 18 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spaa019

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329437116019986436

Abstract: Recently, colleges and universities across the United States have had to choose whether to allow controversial speakers on campus. This study uses a factorial experiment to investigate individual features of controversial speaker events, including student opinion, security risk, and actual event-based descriptions of extreme left and extreme right speakers. Contrary to earlier studies of political tolerance, this study finds that Republicans (and ideological conservatives) are slightly more tolerant of extreme speech than are Democrats and liberals. However, this difference is attenuated by three factors. The first is order effects: if Democrats are first asked about an extreme left speaker, they are then more tolerant of an extreme right speaker. Second, concerns about the possibility of harm resulting from the speech partially explain Democrats’ intolerance of the extreme right speaker. Third, asymmetric polarization has resulted in extreme right ideas entering the mainstream more than ideas from the far left; thus Democrats face a more arduous test of the classic liberal commitment to tolerance. Finally, this study contributes to the political tolerance literature by testing tolerance of new, extreme speaker targets on both the ideological left and right than what has previously been studied.

Keywords: political tolerance, civil liberties, public opinion, political parties, higher education




Trends in US Income and Wealth Inequality: David Splinter's Reply To Saez And Zucman (2020)

Trends in US Income and Wealth Inequality: Revising After the Revisionists. David Splinter. November 17, 2020. http://www.davidsplinter.com/Splinter2020-SaezZucmanReply.pdf

Abstract: When estimating income inequality with tax data, accounting for missing income presents many challenges. Researchers have adopted different approaches to address these challenges. Saez and Zucman (2020) discuss differences between the national income distributions of Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (PSZ, 2018) and Auten and Splinter (AS, 2019a). Saez and Zucman also make updates to their estimates for retirement income, partially responding to one of the concerns raised in AS. In this reply, I explain that SZ only partly correct this problem and do not address other issues raised by AS. For the allocation of underreported income—the most consequential difference between AS and PSZ—I show that the AS approach conforms with special audit studies in five ways, while the PSZ approach is inconsistent with them. I also provide historical background on the two projects, respond to technical points raised, and discuss estimates of tax progressivity.


I. Historical Background

Tax data provide an important view of how incomes have changed over time, particularly among those with high incomes. Tax data, however, have many limitations. More than one third of national income is missing and the reporting of income on tax returns has changed dramatically over time. For example, the Piketty and Saez (2003) estimates show a 40 percent jump in top one percent income shares in the two years following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. These estimates also included a long-run bias due to decreasing marriage rates. In addition, Piketty and Saez (2003) only estimated pre-tax/pre-transfer income and therefore did not account for increases in tax progressivity due to refundable credits or increases in government transfers. To develop a more consistent series, PSZ and AS distribute all national income, control for falling marriage rates, and estimate after-tax/after-transfer incomes. Despite these similarities, the results diverge because of methodological differences. Between 1979 and 2014, PSZ estimated that the top one percent after-tax/after-transfer income share increased by 6.5 percentage points, while the AS increase was 1.4 percentage points.

In a recent paper revising their prior estimates, SZ (2020) disputed our methods. This reply focuses on the key methodological differences, showing why the AS approaches are correct and explaining shortcomings of the PSZ approaches. The key differences are the treatment of underreported and retirement income. These account for about 60 percent of the difference in recent top one percent pre-tax income shares (AS Table 4). I then discuss differences regarding corporate taxes, ranking of tax units, and the allocation of government consumption. Finally, I discuss implications for tax progressivity and show that AS estimates resemble other studies, while PSZ estimates diverge from them. The appendix reviews prior discussions between AS and PSZ. 


Appendix

Prior Discussions

Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2019) previously commented on the AS estimates. However, their analysis did not directly compare differences in approaches, and instead relied on new “simplified” estimates. These were based on Piketty and Saez (2003) fiscal income shares augmented using two distributions—taxable capital and non-capital income—to allocate missing amounts and target national income. This overly simplistic methodology had significant issues. For example, the 2014 “simplified” estimates allocated about 16% of employer-sponsored insurance and payroll taxes to the top one percent, instead of what should have been about 2% and 4%, respectively. The “simplified” estimates also allocated owner-occupied imputed rent like taxable capital income, meaning 53% of imputed rent went to the top one percent, instead of what should have been about 9%. See our full response in the appendix of Auten and Splinter (2019b). In Auten and Splinter (2020), we summarized differences between AS and PSZ. In addition to the issues already discussed in this paper, we explained how we accounted for changes in the treatment of business losses. SZ’s updates still do not account for these changes. We also discussed the allocation of deficits. PSZ allocated half of deficits by transfers received, which removes transfers that were actually received that year. In addition, while PSZ only report the final effects of their assumptions (with select income sources shown), AS sequentially added income sources to provide a more transparent analysis

People in lockdown thought significantly less often about missing their freedom than did first-time prisoners, were significantly less engaged in a range of daily activities, & reported feeling more hopeless than them

Are People Experiencing the ‘Pains of Imprisonment’ During the COVID-19 Lockdown? Mandeep K. Dhami, Leonardo Weiss-Cohen and Peter Ayton. Front. Psychol., 19 November 2020 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.578430

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329296379857006592

Abstract

Background: By the end of March 2020, more than a fifth of the world’s population was in various degrees of “lockdown” in order to slow the spread of COVID-19. This enforced confinement led some to liken lockdown to imprisonment. We directly compared individual’s experiences of lockdown with prisoners’ experiences of imprisonment in order to determine whether psychological parallels can be drawn between these two forms of confinement.

Methods: Online surveys of adults in lockdown in the UK (N = 300) and California (N = 450) were conducted 4 and 5 weeks into lockdown in each region, respectively. The UK data was then compared to Souza and Dhami’s (2010) sample of 267 medium security prisoners in England, and the Californian data was compared to Dhami et al.’s (2007) sample of 307 medium security Federal prisoners in California. We measured the effects of Group (Lockdown v. Prison) on five categories of dependent variables (i.e., activity, social contact, thoughts, feelings, and rule-breaking), controlling for demographic differences between the groups.

Results: In both regions, people in lockdown thought significantly less often about missing their freedom, as well as missing their family and friends living elsewhere than did first-time prisoners. However, people in lockdown in both regions were also significantly less engaged in a range of daily activities than were first-time prisoners. Additionally, in both regions, people in lockdown reported feeling more hopeless than first-time prisoners.

Conclusion: Although Governments introducing lockdown policies do not intend to punish their citizens as courts do when sending convicted offenders to prison, such policies can have unintended adverse consequences. Psychological parallels can be drawn between the two forms of confinement.

Discussion

The COVID-19 lockdown resulted in the removal of individual freedoms and restrictions on movement and physical contact with family and friends who live elsewhere, as well as reduced access to potential sexual relations, some previously enjoyed goods and services, and, for some people, a sense of threat to personal safety. These are the sorts of deprivations suffered by prisoners that have been long identified in the literature on imprisonment (e.g., Sykes, 1958Sykes and Messinger, 1960Goffman, 1961). It is perhaps no surprise therefore, that some have likened the lockdown to imprisonment (e.g., Ali et al., 2020O’Donnell, 2020Toon, 2020Wheatcroft, 2020).

In the present research, we directly compared individuals’ experiences of the COVID-19 lockdown with first-time prisoners’ experiences of imprisonment on a range of measures. We found that although people in lockdown (who had never been in prison before) did not necessarily liken lockdown to imprisonment, their subjective experiences of lockdown were comparable to those of first-time prisoners. The pattern of findings was generally consistent when comparing first-time male prisoners with males in lockdown and with females in lockdown. In addition, the findings were fairly similar across the two regions studied (i.e., UK and California). Below, we discuss the main findings, and highlight the strengths and limitations of our approach to understanding psychological experiences of the COVID-19 lockdown, before identifying potential directions for future research.

Are Experiences of the COVID-19 Lockdown Comparable to Imprisonment?

In some respects, individuals in lockdown demonstrated more positive adjustments to their confinement compared to first-time prisoners, although most of these findings do not necessarily paint a positive psychological picture of lockdown. For instance, it is unsurprising that, unlike prisoners who share a living space with unknown others, some groups in lockdown had more interaction with those they live with (i.e., their family and/or friends). Similarly, although some groups in lockdown felt less unhappy relative to before lockdown than did first-time prisoners before they entered prison, both groups were, nevertheless, less happy than before. Finally, although we found that people in lockdown thought less often about missing their family/friends than did first-time prisoners, some groups in lockdown had a similar frequency of contact with family/friends living elsewhere as did first-time prisoners. Other studies have similarly noted a disruption to social ties during lockdown (e.g., Roy et al., 2020Sharma and Subramanyam, 2020).

Perhaps the only indicator we found of the COVID-19 lockdown being psychologically better than imprisonment is that, compared to first-time prisoners, people in lockdown thought less often about missing their freedom and some groups in lockdown also thought less often about needing control over their life. Aymerich-Franch (2020) reported that 70.2% of adults in lockdown in Spain felt less free, but did not use a comparison group. The present findings suggest that even if people in lockdown do feel less free, the sense of freedom is still greater than that enjoyed by prisoners. Unlike prisoners, people in lockdown can, for the most part, plan their own daily regime and venture outside their properties for limited exercise and/or essential purposes.

In other respects, however, the experience of lockdown was either similar to, or even worse than, being in prison for the first-time. Females in lockdown in both the UK and California thought about being attacked/beaten up as equally often as did first-time prisoners. Prisons are notoriously violent places (e.g., Blevins et al., 2010), and the COVID-19 lockdown has not only shone a light on the violence that occurs within the home, but also on the rise of such domestic abuse during lockdown (e.g., ABC News, 2020BBC News, 2020).

We also found that people in lockdown participated in a lesser variety of daily activities than did first-time prisoners. A closer examination of the data showed that whereas over half of first-time prisoners in both regions worked, studied, exercised regularly, and attended a self-help program, the main activities performed by more than half of those in lockdown in these regions were work and exercise. Although we cannot say here whether people in lockdown simply did not engage in other activities such as household chores (Aymerich-Franch, 2020Chirombe et al., 2020), it is clear that the sorts of activities believed to enrich prisoners’ lives and help them cope with their confinement (e.g., education and self-help programs) were less prevalent in lockdown. The psychological effects of limited engagement in activities during lockdown remain to be seen, although other evidence of people in quarantine has documented feelings of boredom (Brooks et al., 2020).

Finally, and perhaps most concerning, is the finding that people in lockdown felt more hopeless relative to before lockdown compared to first-time prisoners before they went to prison. This supports Ali et al.’s (2020) finding as well as that of Sibley et al. (2020), and is compatible with the growing body of research reporting the mental distress suffered by people in lockdown (Aymerich-Franch, 2020Odriozola-Gonzalez et al., 2020Rossi et al., 2020Srilakshmidevi and Suseela, 2020White and Van der Boor, 2020). Feelings of hopelessness are predictive of suicide ideation, attempted suicide, and death by suicide (Ribeiro et al., 2018). Calderon-Anyosa and Kaufman (2020) recently found evidence of increased suicides among men in Peru during lockdown, and Caballero-Domínguez et al. (2020) reported increased suicide risk for people in lockdown in Columbia. Others have similarly forecasted increased suicides worldwide (e.g., Sher, 2020Weems et al., 2020). Thus, the COVID-19 lockdown may have had potentially psychologically devastating effects during the first wave of the pandemic.

Beyond the aforementioned comparison between those in the COVID-19 lockdown and those in prison for the first-time, the present research also found a significant independent effect of age among those in confinement in the UK. On the one hand, older individuals participated in fewer activities and had less social contact with family and friends living elsewhere than their younger counterparts. On the other hand, older individuals were less likely to have negative thoughts pertaining to needing control over their life and missing sex, and were less likely to be accused of (or be charged with) rule-breaking than younger individuals. These latter findings are compatible with studies of adults in lockdown in Italy, India, and Spain which also report that younger people demonstrate more adverse or negative psychological outcomes (Aymerich-Franch, 2020Rossi et al., 2020Singhal and Vijayaraghavan, 2020). Later, we consider the psychological trajectory that older people in lockdown may find themselves on.

Strengths and Limitations

There have been calls for research on the psychological impact of the Covid-19 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic (e.g., Verger et al., 2020). By directly comparing individuals in lockdown with first-time prisoners on a wide variety of responses (including behavioral, social, thoughts and emotions), and after controlling for demographic differences between the two groups, the present research provides a way of contextualizing and interpreting a range of psychological effects of lockdown. It is reasonable to assume that, as a form of confinement, imprisonment is (and should be) worse than lockdown, thus demonstrating that people in lockdown feel the same or worse than first-time prisoners is insightful. The fact that these findings were observed in two different regions emphasizes their generalizability and robustness.

Nonetheless, there are some potential limitations of our approach. First, there is a large time gap between the two sources of data (i.e., prison and lockdown). In order to avoid the confounding effect of the COVID-19 outbreak in the prison system, we opted to use data that had been collected from prisoners before the pandemic. Our search for such data focused on studies that included a range of quantitative measures of prisoner adaptation. There is mixed evidence as to whether prison environments have improved or deteriorated over the intervening years (see Prison Reform Trust, 2020), and it is unclear if, and how, such changes would affect first-time prisoners’ subjective experiences.

Second, we compared females in lockdown to first-time, male prisoners. It is therefore, unclear if females in lockdown fare better or worse than first-time, female prisoners. According to Kruttschnitt and Gartner’s (2003) review of research on women’s imprisonment, female responses to imprisonment are similar to those found in male prisoners, although women tend to be more active in choosing their patterns of adjustment.

Third, we found that whereas people in lockdown thought less often about missing sex than did first-time prisoners, who are deprived of heterosexual relations, our study does not capture the longing for homosexual relations that have been identified in some recent research on the COVID-19 lockdown (Sharma and Subramanyam, 2020).

Fourth, at the time of data collection, the lockdown sample had spent considerably less time in confinement than the prison sample, and so they may not have had sufficient time to adapt to their situation. However, Dhami et al.’s (2007) survey of 712 adult, male US federally sentenced prisoners in three prisons (high, medium and low security), found that after controlling for sentence length and prison security level, time spent in prison was only predictive of some of the variables measured in the present research. Specifically, time spent in prison was negatively associated with disciplinary infractions and positively associated with feelings of hopelessness and thoughts about needing control over one’s life. This suggests that over time, people in lockdown may continue to feel more hopeless than before, and their frequency of thoughts about needing control over their life (which are currently less than first-time prisoners) may increase.

Directions for Future Research

Since conducting the present research, most Governments, including those in the UK and US have begun to ease lockdown restrictions. However, it is widely believed that there will be other waves of COVID-19 (Wise, 2020). If strict lockdown policies are re-imposed, then future research could explore whether people are better able to cope with lockdown. This could be done by comparing their responses to those of prisoners who have prior prison experience. Recurrent prisoners differ in their adjustment to confinement compared to first-time prisoners. For instance, whereas recurrent prisoners may demonstrate some positive adjustments such as greater psychological wellbeing and more participation in self-help programs (e.g., Souza and Dhami, 2010), they may also demonstrate some negative behaviors such as rule-breaking (e.g., Bosma et al., 2020). In the present study, people in lockdown were either more or equally compliant with the rules of lockdown as were first-time prisoners with the rules of prison, however, there may be less compliance during future lockdowns.

The fact that the isolation or shielding of those particularly vulnerable to the more severe consequences of COVID-19 such as the elderly is likely continue after any lockdown ends and perhaps until a vaccine is available, makes it imperative to understand the psychological trajectory that such individuals may find themselves on. Future research could examine if older people respond to lockdown in the same ways as older prisoners do. For instance, Maschi et al. (2015) reported that a lack of social contact can be a major source of stress and trauma for prisoners over the age of 50. In the present study, older individuals had less social contact with family and friends living elsewhere than their younger counterparts, and over time, this could serve to reduce their psychological well-being.

Finally, future research on the COVID-19 lockdown could explore factors that may predict individual’s patterns of adjustment. Prison researchers have examined the independent, relative and interactive effects of a range of pre-prison and in-prison factors in predicting adaptations to imprisonment (e.g., Dhami et al., 2007Dye, 2010DeLisi et al., 2011). In the context of the COVID-19 lockdown, this would mean, for example, measuring the extent to which factors such as quality of life before and current living conditions predict adjustment to lockdown. Patterns of adjustment can have implications for how well individuals readjust to life after lockdown restrictions end, and so the findings of such research can identify those who may require support to help them readjust.

You’ve Lost That Loving Feeling: Using the 1980 to 2016 American National Election Studies, we find that women are more affectively polarized than men, working indirectly through political identities and issue positions

You’ve Lost That Loving Feeling: How Gender Shapes Affective Polarization. Heather Louise Ondercin, Mary Kate Lizotte. American Politics Research, November 18, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X20972103

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329315564041494530

Abstract: We examine variation in levels of affective polarization for men and women. Using the 1980 to 2016 American National Election Studies, we find that women are more affectively polarized than men. The effect of sex partially works indirectly through political identities and issue positions. Moreover, sex acts as a moderator, with political identities and issues positions have different effects on men’s and women’s level of affective polarization. Three factors create women’s higher levels of affective polarization: women are more likely to be partisans, strength in abortion attitudes, and partisanship has a more substantial influence on women’s attitudes compared to men’s attitudes. Breaking the analysis apart into three time periods: (1) gender gap emergence 1980 to 1988, (2) elite polarization 1990 to 1998, and (3) hyper-partisanship 2000 to 2016 reinforces that partisan strength is central to understanding affective polarization. Additionally, during the 1990s when elite polarization is intensifying the strength of issue attitudes and ideology.

Keywords: affective polarization, gender gap


Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Disinformation can covertly modify the unconscious behavior of individuals; fake news can target implicit attitudes and emotions; current mitigation methods do not prevent behavior modification

Would you notice if fake news changed your behavior? An experiment on the unconscious effects of disinformation. Zach Bastick. Computers in Human Behavior, November 18 2020, 106633. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106633

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329088264184086534

Highlights

• Disinformation can covertly modify the behavior of individuals.

• Fake news can target implicit attitudes and emotions.

• Current mitigation methods do not prevent behavior modification.

• Wider, normative definitions are needed as disinformation is inherently evasive.

• Democracy and individual autonomy require urgent investigation of this threat.

Abstract: A growing literature is emerging on the believability and spread of disinformation, such as fake news, over social networks. However, little is known about the degree to which malicious actors can use social media to covertly affect behavior with disinformation. A lab-based randomized controlled experiment was conducted with 233 undergraduate students to investigate the behavioral effects of fake news. It was found that even short (under 5-minute) exposure to fake news was able to significantly modify the unconscious behavior of individuals. This paper provides initial evidence that fake news can be used to covertly modify behavior, it argues that current approaches to mitigating fake news, and disinformation in general, are insufficient to protect social media users from this threat, and it highlights the implications of this for democracy. It raises the need for an urgent cross-sectoral effort to investigate, protect against, and mitigate the risks of covert, widespread and decentralized behavior modification over online social networks.

Keywords: Fake newsdisinformationmisinformationbehaviorfinger tappingemotions


Behavior when matches are held on closed doors: Decisions of fouls, yellow cards, red cards & penalties that tend to favor home teams in normal matches, are much more balanced without the crowd pressing on referees

Social Pressure in the Stadiums: Do Agents Change Behavior without Crowd Support? Vincenzo Scoppa. Journal of Economic Psychology, November 18 2020, 102344, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2020.102344

Abstract: Social pressure may have relevant consequences in many contexts but it is hard to evaluate it empirically. In this paper we exploit a natural experiment in soccer to provide clear evidence of its effects. We aim to study how social pressure from the crowd in a stadium affects both players and referees. While in normal matches crowd support may be correlated to a host of variables affecting the outcome of interest, we exploit the fact that after the health emergency for the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, soccer matches in top European Leagues have been allowed only behind closed doors, that is, without spectators in the stadiums. We use data of first and second division of five major European Leagues (Germany, Spain, England, Italy and Portugal) for the last 10 seasons and compare – using a differences-in-differences analysis – several outcomes (determined by players’ performance and referees’ decisions) of matches played with crowd support to the same outcomes when matches were played without crowd. We find considerable effects of the pressure from the crowd: while with the support of the crowd a considerable home advantage emerges in various measures of performance (points, goals, shots, etc.), this advantage is almost halved when matches are played behind closed doors. Similar effects are found for the behavior of referees: decisions of fouls, yellow cards, red cards and penalties that tend to favor home teams in normal matches, are much more balanced without the crowd pressing on referees. The evidence we provide strongly supports the idea that social pressure has intense effects on agents’ behavior.

Keywords: Social PressureCrowd SupportEmotional FactorsSocial ApprovalHome AdvantageReferee’s Favoritism

JEL: D91M50L83Z2


Randomized Controlled Trial of Bt Eggplant in Bangla: Bt brinjal raises yields by 51%, reduces pesticide costs by 37.5%, increases 128% net revenues, reduces pesticides toxicity above 70%

The Impacts of GM Foods: Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial of Bt Eggplant in Bangladesh. Akhter U. Ahmed  John Hoddinott  Naveen Abedin  Nusrat Hossain. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12162

Abstract: We implemented a cluster randomized controlled trial to assess the impact of genetically modified eggplant (Bt brinjal) in Bangladesh. Our two primary outcomes were changes in yield and in pesticide costs. Cultivation of Bt brinjal raises yields by 3,564 kg/ha. This statistically significant impact is equivalent to a 51% increase relative to the control group. There is a statistically significant fall in pesticide costs, 7,175 Taka per hectare (85 USD per ha), a 37.5% reduction. Yield increases arise because Bt farmers harvest more eggplant and because fewer fruits are discarded because they are damaged. Bt brinjal farmers sell more eggplant and receive a higher price for the output they sell while incurring lower input costs, resulting in a 128% increase in net revenues. Bt brinjal farmers used smaller quantities of pesticides and sprayed less frequently. Bt brinjal reduced the toxicity of pesticides as much as 76%. Farmers growing Bt brinjal and who had pre‐existing chronic conditions consistent with pesticide poisoning were 11.5% points less likely to report a symptom of pesticide poisoning and were less likely to incur cash medical expenses to treat these symptoms. Our results are robust to changes in model specification and adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing. We did not find evidence of heterogeneous effects by farmer age, schooling, or land cultivated. Bt brinjal is a publicly developed genetically modified organism that conveys significant productivity and income benefits while reducing the use of pesticides damaging to human and ecological health.

Limitations

We note three limitations associated with our analysis. First, our intervention consisted of a package of activities (most notably, training and a stipend) as well as the provision of seedlings, the latter randomized to be either Bt brinjal or the control variety, ISD‐006. Specifically, we note that farmers growing Bt brinjal received extensive training and support; the increase in yield relative to the control group might have been smaller in the absence of this support. That said, both the treatment and control groups received training on IPM; absent that training, the control group might have experienced even greater production losses due to pest infestations and might have spent even more money on pesticides. If this the case, our results underestimate the impact of Bt brinjal. Second, data on production, sales, and inputs as well as symptoms relating to pesticide poisoning are self‐reported. If respondents in the treatment group felt some social desirability bias to exaggerate their production success, or reductions in illness, this would upwardly bias our impact estimates. Third, we do not have direct measures of pesticide residues in soils; such information would provide a useful complement to our findings about the environmental benefits of Bt brinjal.

Summary and Conclusions

In Bangladesh, we implemented a cluster randomized controlled trial to assess the impact of Bt brinjal. Households in both treatment and control villages received a bundle of interventions including training, extension, an input package, and seedlings. Control villages received a conventional variety, ISD‐006. Treatment villages received Bt brinjal‐4, a variety that was genetically identical to ISD‐006 except for the addition of one gene (cry1Ac) that conveyed protection against the fruit and shoot borer pest.

Our two primary outcomes were changes in yield and in pesticide costs. We find that cultivation of Bt brinjal raises yields by 51% relative to the control group while reducing pesticide costs by 37.5%. These results are consistent with observational studies of yield and pesticide use summarized in Klümper and Qaim (2014), Zilberman, Holland, and Trilnick (2018), and other reviews noted in our introduction. Yield increases arise because Bt farmers harvest more eggplant and because less fruit is discarded post harvest. Compared to control farmers, Bt brinjal farmers both sell more eggplant and receive a higher price for the output. They incur lower input costs, resulting in a 128% increase in net revenues. Bt brinjal farmers used smaller quantities of pesticides and sprayed less frequently, and Bt brinjal reduced the toxicity of pesticides that were applied. Farmers growing Bt brinjal and who had pre‐existing chronic conditions were 11.5% points less likely to report a symptom of pesticide poisoning. Our results are robust to changes in model specification and adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing. We did not find evidence of heterogeneous effects by farmer age, schooling, or land cultivated.

We note three policy implications that follow from these results. They support the view that GMOs can contribute to the goal of increasing yields while reducing environmental stressors. They provide further justification for releasing Bt brinjal in countries such as India and the Philippines, where these varieties have been developed but not approved for cultivation due to public reservations about GMO foods. They point to the valuable role that public agencies can play in the dissemination of GMOs. The involvement of BARI and the Bangladesh Department of Agriculture in the development and support of Bt brinjal cultivation alleviates concerns raised by anti‐GMO activists regarding farmer sovereignty.

We have noted several limitations to our study. The most significant is the fact that Bt brinjal was provided as part of a package. Doing so allows us to better isolate the impact of Bt brinjal but raises concerns regarding external validity. Additional RCTs with a slimmer package would make it possible to assess whether this is a concern. Clinical measures of health and chemical measures of pesticide residues would strengthen our ability to assess impacts on health and the environment. Finally, our finding that consumers are willing to pay more for a GM crop is striking; further work understanding why would be of value. Such future work would further strengthen the results found here—that Bt brinjal, a publicly developed GMO, conveys significant productivity and income benefits to farmers while reducing the use of pesticides damaging to human and ecological health.

Overall, Democrats perceived more risk associated with COVID-19 than Republicans, including for getting infected, being hospitalized and dying if infected, as well as running out of money

Political polarization in US residents’ COVID-19 risk perceptions, policy preferences, and protective behaviors. Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Htay-Wah Saw & Dana P. Goldman. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Nov 18 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11166-020-09336-3

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328978916397240321

Abstract: When the novel coronavirus entered the US, most US states implemented lockdown measures. In April–May 2020, state governments started political discussions about whether it would be worth the risk to reduce protective measures. In a highly politicized environment, risk perceptions and preferences for risk mitigation may vary by political inclinations. In April–May 2020, we surveyed a nationally representative sample of 5517 members of the University of Southern California’s Understanding America Study. Of those, 37% identified as Democrats, 32% as Republican, and 31% as Third Party/Independent. Overall, Democrats perceived more risk associated with COVID-19 than Republicans, including for getting infected, being hospitalized and dying if infected, as well as running out of money as a result of the pandemic. Democrats were also more likely than Republicans to express concerns that states would lift economic restrictions too quickly, and to report mask use and social distancing. Generally, participants who identified as Third Party/Independent fell in between. Democrats were more likely to report watching MSNBC or CNN (vs. not), while Republicans were more likely to report watching Fox News (vs. not), and Third Party/Independents tended to watch neither. However, political inclinations predicted reported policy preferences, mask use, and social distancing, in analyses that accounted for differences in use of media sources, risk perceptions, and demographic background. In these analyses, participants’ reported media use added to the partisan divide in preferences for the timing of lifting economic restrictions and reported protective behaviors. Implications for risk communication are discussed.


Discussion

In an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19 in the United States, school closures and bans of large gatherings were announced in March 2020 (Yeung et al. 2020), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020a) recommended protective behaviors such as practicing hand hygiene and social distancing, as well as wearing face masks. However, Republican politicians started calling for re-opening of the US economy as early as April–May 2020 (New York Times 2020a). In a highly politicized environment, individuals who differ in political inclinations may disagree about the risks, policy support, and need for protective behaviors (van Bavel et al. 2020). Moreover, such political polarization may be exacerbated by the different news sources being used by individuals with different political inclinations (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009).

Indeed, in a nationally representative survey with US residents conducted in April–May 2020, we found political polarization on every question about risk perception and risk mitigation that we assessed. Although mean risk perceptions were relatively high for both Democrats and Republicans, Democrats tended to perceive greater risks than Republicans, for getting infected with COVID-19 in the next three months, getting hospitalized or dying if infected, and running out of money in the next three months. These differences in risk perceptions held after accounting for differences in media use and demographic characteristics, suggesting that other political disagreements may have informed the political divide in risk perceptions. Possibly, the political discourse about COVID-19 in the United States, and Republicans’ initial comparisons of COVID-19 risk to seasonal flu risk (National Public Radio 2020) may have played a role.

Democrats were also more likely than Republicans to express concern that their own state and states in general would lift restrictions too quickly. Political differences in the policy preferences remained after controlling for risk perceptions, media use, and demographic differences. These differences may reflect other important political disagreements. For example, even before COVID-19, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to support collective strategies (as opposed to individual efforts) for societal change to promote better health outcomes (Gollust et al. 2009; Robert and Booske 2011).

Compared to preferences for opening the US economy, political differences were less pronounced for protective behaviors, suggesting that Democrats and Republicans were somewhat less divided about their own individual initiatives to protect personal health than about government policies. Although the majority of Democrats and Republicans indicated engaging in each protective behavior, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to report using masks and avoiding public spaces or crowds. This difference remained significant after acounting for differences in risk perceptions, media use and demographics. These two behaviors, mask use and social distancing, may be the most politicized, because their requirement by states may go against Republicans’ preferences (Gollust et al. 2009; Robert and Booske 2011).

Differences by political inclinations tended to be more pronounced than differences by media preferences. Yet, participants’ reported media use did seem to add to the partisan divide in policy preferences and protective behaviors. Watching Fox News (vs. not) was associated with being less likely to express concern about states opening too quickly, while watching MSNBC or CNN (vs. not) was associated with being more likely to do so—even when political inclinations and other characteristics were accounted for. Watching MSNBC or CNN was also systematically associated with increased likelihood of implementing protective behaviors before and after accounting for political inclinations, while watching Fox News was not.

Like any study, ours had limitations. Because we reported on a cross-sectional survey, causal conclusions are unwarranted. Moreover, April–May 2020 may have been a time of particular political polarization, because information about the risks associated with COVID-19 was still uncertain and rapidly changing—perhaps leaving more room for (political) interpretation.

The political divide in COVID-19 risk perceptions, policy preferences, and preferences for protective behaviors pose a potential challenge for practitioners and policy makers tasked with reducing the spread of COVID-19. However, actionable steps have been suggested for reducing political polarization (van Bavel et al. 2020). First, highlighting shared challenges could provide a sense of shared identity (van Bavel et al. 2020). Second, providing consistent and accurate messages should reduce partisan-motivated reasoning and inaccurate beliefs (Ahler and Sood 2018). Finally, political polarization in people’s beliefs may be reduced when there is bipartisan support for COVID-19-related measures (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook 2014). Indeed, research about risk and crisis communication has indicated that prevention efforts are more effective when different sources provide consistent and accurate messaging (Glik 2007; Reynolds 2006). Thus, effectively combating health crises such as COVID-19 requires political leadership that aims to unite rather than divide, and to reach across the aisles.

Matriliny reverses gender disparities in inflammation and hypertension among the Mosuo of China

Matriliny reverses gender disparities in inflammation and hypertension among the Mosuo of China. Adam Z. Reynolds et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, November 16, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014403117

Significance: Greater autonomy afforded to women in matrilineal societies has been hypothesized to benefit women’s health. Among the Mosuo, a society with both matrilineal and patrilineal subpopulations, we found that gender disparities in chronic disease are not only ameliorated but reversed in matriliny compared with patriliny. Gender disparities in health and chronic disease can thus be tied directly to cultural influences on health, including inequalities in autonomy and resource access between men and women.

Abstract: Women experience higher morbidity than men, despite living longer. This is often attributed to biological differences between the sexes; however, the majority of societies in which these disparities are observed exhibit gender norms that favor men. We tested the hypothesis that female-biased gender norms ameliorate gender disparities in health by comparing gender differences in inflammation and hypertension among the matrilineal and patrilineal Mosuo of China. Widely reported gender disparities in health were reversed among matrilineal Mosuo compared with patrilineal Mosuo, due to substantial improvements in women’s health, with no concomitant detrimental effects on men. These findings offer evidence that gender norms limiting women’s autonomy and biasing inheritance toward men adversely affect the health of women, increasing women’s risk for chronic diseases with tremendous global health impact.

Keywords: gender normshealthchronic diseasematrilineal societies


Examining 60 measures of sociopolitical attitudes: Sexual minorities are significantly more liberal than their heterosexual counterparts across both sexual & non-sexual (civil liberties, environmentalism) domains

Grollman, Eric. 2020. “Does Sexuality Matter? A Comparison of Heterosexuals’ and Sexual Minorities’ Sociopolitical Attitudes.” SocArXiv. November 17. doi:10.31235/osf.io/atnxb

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328939984271921155

Abstract: Few researchers have examined the influence of sexuality on individuals’ sociopolitical attitudes. Using data from the 1991-2012 General Social Surveys (GSS) and 2008 American National Election Survey (ANES), I compare the social and political attitudes of heterosexuals and sexual minorities across a wide array of domains. Examining sixty measures of sociopolitical attitudes in the GSS, I find evidence that sexual minorities are significantly more liberal than their heterosexual counterparts across both sexual (e.g., sexual morality) and non-sexual (e.g., civil liberties, environmentalism) domains. In comparing the effect of sexuality on attitudes to the effects of gender, race, and education, I find that the influence of sexuality is comparable to these other well-documented sociodemographic predictors of attitudes. However, unlike these other sociodemographic characteristics, sexuality consistently predicts more liberal attitudes among sexual minorities compared to heterosexuals. Expanded analyses using 278 attitudinal items in the GSS and 64 in the ANES yield similar results. My findings provide evidence for the necessity to incorporate sexuality in future assessments of sociodemographic predictors of sociopolitical attitudes.


Not Why, But How... "Why We Learn Less from Observing Outgroups"

Why We Learn Less from Observing Outgroups. Pyungwon Kang, Christopher J. Burke, Philippe N. Tobler and Grit Hein. Journal of Neuroscience November 17 2020, JN-RM-0926-20. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0926-20.2020

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328936960497479682

Abstract: Humans are less likely to learn from individuals belonging to a different group (outgroup) than from individuals of their own group (ingroup), yet the source of this societally relevant deficit has remained unclear. Here we used neuroimaging and computational modeling to investigate how people learn from observing the actions and outcomes of ingroup and outgroup demonstrators. Politically left-wing male and female participants performed worse when observing computer-simulated actions they believed were from a right-wing outgroup member compared with those from a left-wing ingroup member. A control experiment in which participants observed choices from a nonhuman agent confirmed that this performance difference reflected an outgroup deficit, rather than an ingroup gain. Accounting for the outgroup deficit, a computational model showed that participants relied less on information from outgroup actions compared with ingroup actions, while learning from outgroup outcomes was not impaired. At the neural level, the differences in observational ingroup versus outgroup learning were reflected in lateral prefrontal activity. The stronger the activity in this region, the more strongly participants weighed ingroup compared with outgroup learning signals (action prediction errors), which formally captured deficits in outgroup learning. Together, our work provides a computational and neural account of why people learn less from observing outgroups.


SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

Learning from observing others is an efficient way to acquire knowledge. In our globalized world, “the others” often are people from a different social group (outgroup). There is evidence that people learn less from observing outgroup individuals compared with individuals from their own group (ingroup). However, the source of this outgroup deficit in observational learning remained unknown, which limits our chances to improve intergroup learning. Our results showed that participants rely less on observed outgroup actions compared with ingroup actions, while learning from outgroup outcomes is not impaired. On the neural level, this outgroup deficit was reflected in the activation of the inferior frontal gyrus. These findings imply that intergroup learning should rely on observing outcomes, rather than actions.


Check also The tribal nature of the human mind leads people to value party dogma over truth; those with political sophistication, science literacy, numeracy abilities, and cognitive reflection are more affected

The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Feb 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004


Tuesday, November 17, 2020

Straight men showed significantly stronger preferences for feminized female faces than did gay men; gay men showed significantly stronger preferences for masculinized versions of male faces than did straight men

Shiramizu V, Docherty C, DeBruine LM, Jones BC (2020) Sexual orientation predicts men’s preferences for sexually dimorphic face-shape characteristics: A replication study. PLoS ONE 15(11): e0242262. No 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0242262

Abstract: Many researchers have proposed that straight men prefer women’s faces displaying feminine shape characteristics at least partly because mating with such women will produce healthier offspring. Although a prediction of this adaptation-for-mate-choice hypothesis is that straight men will show stronger preferences for feminized versus masculinized versions of women’s faces than will gay men, only one previous study has directly tested this prediction. Here we directly replicated that study by comparing 623 gay and 3163 straight men’s preferences for feminized versus masculinized versions of faces. Consistent with the adaptation-for-mate-choice hypothesis of straight men’s femininity preferences, we found that straight men showed significantly stronger preferences for feminized female faces than did gay men. Consistent with previous research suggesting that gay men place a premium on masculinity in potential romantic partners, we also found that gay men showed significantly stronger preferences for masculinized versions of male faces than did straight men. Together, these findings indicate the sexual orientation contributes to individual differences in men’s face preferences.


The results confirmed an exaggeration of eye width and height, lip width, and pupil width in artistic profiles, and the eyes shape was “frontalized”; theory links supernormal stimuli to aesthetic perception

Costa, M., & Bonetti, L. (2020). Eye and lips in artistic profiles. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, Nov 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000360


Abstract: Distortions related to eye and lip morphometry were investigated in two studies comparing photographic versus artistic profiles. In the first study, 298 artistic profiles encompassing the whole art history were compared to 300 photographic profiles. The 2 groups were compared for shape with Procrustes analysis and for size by using 8 indexes. Estimated age was inserted as covariate. The results showed that artists exaggerated eye height and width, pupil width, lip height, and width. The triangular shape of the eye view from side perspective was modified toward a more ellipsoidal shape, depicting the eye from a three-quarter and more frontal perspective. In Study 2, 13 students from the College of the Arts–School of Art were requested to draw a profile portrait of a male or female model. The eye and lip morphometric indexes of the model were compared with those extrapolated from the drawings. The results confirmed an exaggeration of eye width and height, lip width, and pupil width in artistic profiles. Additionally, the eyes shape was “frontalized.” The exaggeration of eye and lip size and the distortion in shape are interpreted and discussed according to the theory linking supernormal stimuli to aesthetic perception.


Quantifying Economic Reasoning in Court: I find that judge economics sophistication is positively correlated with a higher frequency of pro-business decisions even after controlling for political ideology & a rich set of other covariates

Quantifying Economic Reasoning in Court: Judge Economics Sophistication and Pro-business Orientation. Siying Cao. November 13, 2020. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U5tFHXqrcmNbCWOw5t7MqAcZ8BDMlMIN/view

Abstract: By applying computational linguistics tools to the analysis of US federal district courts’ decisions from 1932 to 2016, this paper quantifies the rise of economic reasoning in court cases that range from securities regulation to antitrust law. I then relate judges’ level of economic reasoning to their training. I find that significant judge heterogeneity in economics sophistication can be explained by attendance at law schools that have a large presence of the law and economics faculty. Finally, for all regulatory cases from 1970 to 2016, I hand code whether the judge ruled in favor of the business or the government. I find that judge economics sophistication is positively correlated with a higher frequency of pro-business decisions even after controlling for political ideology and a rich set of other judge covariates.

Keywords: law and economics, judicial decision making, text as data

JEL Classification: K0, L5, Z1


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This research can be extended in several ways. First, we can look at whether economically sophisticated judges tend to rule in a certain direction along an issue66 in tort, property, and commercial contracts. These are subject areas that have been significantly influenced by the law and economics approach. Second, the hypothesis proposed and analysis conducted in this paper can also be applied to circuit court judges. There we expect to find an even greater impact of economics knowledge because the ideological stakes are typically higher than in lower courts. Furthermore, my results suggest that economics sophistication as a shifter of decision outcome during the first stage can be used as an instrumental variable to investigate the causal effect of such decision on subsequent individual/household/firm outcomes. Finally, I hope my measure of judge economics sophistication will spur future efforts to causally identify the effects of judge knowledge through exogenously generated variation in it. 

This chapter outlines how Robert Trivers’ Parental Investment Theory has progressed from its original publication in Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man through its expansive application to research in evolutionary psychology

Parental Investment Theory. Justin K Mogilski. In The Sage Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. SAGE, November 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345346708_Parental_Investment_Theory

Abstract: This chapter outlines how Robert Trivers’ Parental Investment Theory (PIT) has progressed from its original publication in Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man through its expansive application to research in the evolutionary psychological sciences. I begin with an abridged redux of the theory’s claims and predictions as they appeared within the original 1972 publication. After, I review groundbreaking research inspired by PIT and evaluate how well the theory has been empirically supported in the past 50 or so years. I then note several major theoretical advancements and address conflicts with other prominent theories of mating and parenting behavior. The chapter closes with several future directions that may help PIT remain a robust and relevant framework for studying human psychology within an increasingly technologically and socially complex world.



Economically successful participants overweight the role of effort in their success, perceiving high income as more deserved than unsuccessful participants; successful liberals are as meritocratic as conservatives are

Misperceiving Economic Success: Experimental Evidence on Meritocratic Beliefs and Inequality Acceptance. Fehr, Dietmar; Vollmann, Martin. Working paper, Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Volume 695. Nov 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00029071

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328579040144449536

Abstract: Most people tend to equate success with merit, a tendency that is particularly pronounced among conservatives. However, in practice it is exceedingly difficult to discern the relative impact of luck and effort to economic success. Based on a large-scale online study that samples the general US population, we investigate whether individuals misperceive the importance of luck for success, and how this mediates their meritocratic beliefs and acceptance of inequality. We randomly assign participants in pairs to compete in an easy or hard work assignment. The tasks are structured such that working on the easy work assignment almost certainly results in better performance and economic success. We show that economically successful participants overweight the role of effort in their success, perceiving high income as more deserved than unsuccessful participants. Subsequently, they demand less redistributive taxation, and they also show little interest in receiving information about the true determinants of their success. These general findings hold true regardless of political orientation. Successful liberals are as meritocratic as conservatives are, sharing the same beliefs in deservingness and preferences for low redistributive taxes.

Keywords: inequality, deservedness, political views, cognitive dissonance


Monday, November 16, 2020

Austria's 60 years of policy experimentation: Our results show that the enormous expansions of parental leave and child care subsidies have had virtually no impact on gender convergence

Do Family Policies Reduce Gender Inequality? Evidence from 60 Years of Policy Experimentation. Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, Johanna Posch, Andreas Steinhauer & Josef Zweimüller. NBER WP 28082, November 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w28082

Abstract: Do family policies reduce gender inequality in the labor market? We contribute to this debate by investigating the joint impact of parental leave and child care, using administrative data covering the labor market and birth histories of Austrian workers over more than half a century. We start by quasi-experimentally identifying the causal effects of all family policy reforms since the 1950s on the full dynamics of male and female earnings. We then map these causal estimates into a decomposition framework a la Kleven, Landais and Søgaard (2019) to compute counterfactual gender gaps. Our results show that the enormous expansions of parental leave and child care subsidies have had virtually no impact on gender convergence.