In English there are few words for smell qualities, smell talk is infrequent, and people find it difficult to name odors in the laboratory; however, there are many languages across the globe that have large smell lexicons

Human Olfaction at the Intersection of Language, Culture, and Biology. Asifa Majid. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, December 18 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.11.005

Highlights

*  The human sense of smell is far more acute than previously thought, yet it is still commonly believed that there is no language of smell.

*  In English there are, indeed, few words for smell qualities, smell talk is infrequent, and people find it difficult to name odors in the laboratory. However, the cross-cultural data show a different picture.

*  There are many languages across the globe that have large smell lexicons (smell can even appear in grammar) in which smell talk is also more frequent and naming odors is easy.

*  In different cultural and ecological niches odors play a significant role in everyday life.

*  These differences in smell language can have consequences for how people think about odors.

Abstract: The human sense of smell can accomplish astonishing feats, yet there remains a prevailing belief that olfactory language is deficient. Numerous studies with English speakers support this view: there are few terms for odors, odor talk is infrequent, and naming odors is difficult. However, this is not true across the world. Many languages have sizeable smell lexicons — smell is even grammaticalized. In addition, for some cultures smell talk is more frequent and odor naming easier. This linguistic variation is as yet unexplained but could be the result of ecological, cultural, or genetic factors or a combination thereof. Different ways of talking about smells may shape aspects of olfactory cognition too. Critically, this variation sheds new light on this important sensory modality.

Keywords olfactionlanguageculturecognitionolfactory expertspsycholinguistics

Do Different Ways of Talking About Smell Affect How We Think About Smell?

What, if any, cognitive consequences are there as a result of these diverse smell vocabularies? The realization of differential linguistic coding of olfaction has only recently been taken seriously by the cognitive science community, so studies of the cognitive consequences are nascent (see also Box 3). The studies to date suggest a mixed picture.

Box 3

Hunter-Gatherers and Wine Experts: Everyday versus Institutional Language and Cognition

The fact that some cultures have smell lexicons has been interpreted by some as a type of ‘expertise’ affecting language and thought [28] (Figure I). While lay English speakers show a lack of regard for smell, wine experts, perfumers, and the gourmand have cultivated their noses. So, are the wine experts’ and hunter-gatherers’ smell knowledge equivalent? The answer appears to be no. Although expertise certainly has relevance for understanding the relationship between olfaction and language, there are important differences between everyday cultural knowledge and institutional expertise.

The trajectory of learning is critically different between everyday and expert knowledge: people acquire cultural categories effortlessly in childhood, via language, and with little explicit instruction; experts, by contrast, acquire categories from institutions effortfully, usually later in life through explicit instruction, and knowledge has to be mapped onto language. In addition, I propose three specific properties that differ between everyday and institutional olfactory language and cognition.

Experts Individuate, Cultures Categorize

Everyday categories generalize over exemplars to capture broad similarities. Jahai, for example, distinguishes plʔeŋ smells (characteristic of blood, raw meat, fish, etc.) from cŋɛs smells (e.g., bat dropping, smoke, petrol, etc.) and haʔɛ̃t smells (e.g., shrimp paste, sap of rubber tree, rotten meat, etc.), all of which are simply stinky in English. By contrast, experts are trained to distinguish very closely related entities, for example, distinguishing fake jasmine from the real thing. This is why when experts develop lexicons, they tend to focus on specifying and identifying an exact odor [121,122].

Specialist Knowledge Is Subdomain Specific, but Cultural Knowledge Is Domain General

The hunter-gatherer Jahai name odors with higher consensus than their Western counterparts and apply their basic smell terms to novel odors they have never previously encountered [39]. Wine experts, too, show high consensus when describing the smell of wine [123., 124., 125., 126.], but this ability does not generalize beyond their domain of expertise: they are no better than laypeople at describing the smell of coffee or naming other everyday odors [123,125]. Similarly, wine experts have better memory [123] and imagery [127] only for odors in their domain of expertise (see also [122]).

Specialist Olfactory Cognition Is Language Independent, but Cultural Cognition Is Language Dependent

There is a strong link between language and memory for odors in everyday cognition: odors named correctly are remembered more accurately [128,129]. However, specialists do not show this relationship between odor naming and odor memory for their domain of expertise and inhibiting the use of language during encoding does not impair odor memory [123]. In sum, the evidence to date suggests that everyday but not specialist olfactory memory relies on language in the moment.

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Figure I. Everyday Olfactory Cognition Differs in Key Ways from Olfactory Cognition in Specialist Expert Contexts.

American woman at a wine tasting (left); ritual healing of Seri infant by shaman using desert lavender (right).

Olfactory Language and Emotion

Within a language, the same odor is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant depending on the label it is given [100,101], raising the question of whether cross-cultural differences in naming strategies may likewise affect the perceived pleasantness of an odor. It appears they do not. Jahai and Dutch speakers use different strategies to talk about odors (abstract basic smell terms vs concrete source-based descriptions) and this may therefore lead to differences in the perceived pleasantness of odors, with some accounts predicting that abstract concepts are more valenced whereas others suggest they are more detached from sensory experience. By comparing facial expressions elicited by monomolecular odors while participants were engaged in an odor-naming task, Majid and colleagues found that both groups had the same initial affective responses to odors, regardless of the odor language they used [39]. These results suggest that the pleasantness of an odor is experienced swiftly and universally, whereas odor identification is slower and cross-culturally diverse. Critically, the role of language in odor perception may differ in important ways depending on whether it is recruited during production or comprehension (Box 2).

Olfactory Language and Cross-Modal Associations

Olfactory and visual information are intimately tied, with connectivity analyses showing that integration happens as early as the primary olfactory cortex [102], and when people are asked to associate odors with colors they do so in systematic ways [58,103., 104., 105., 106.]. This could happen in at least two ways: odor perceptual representations could link directly to color due to statistical co-occurrences in the environment or the association between odors and colors could be mediated by language. According to the language-mediated account of odor–color associations, if people use basic smell words to name abstract odor qualities (e.g., musty) they should show weaker odor–color associations than those who refer to their source (e.g., smells like banana). To test this, one study compared urban-dwelling Thai and hunter-gatherer Maniq (who both have basic smell vocabulary) with urban-dwelling Dutch participants (who overwhelmingly use source-based odor naming) and found that odor–color associations were mediated by language [103]. People had weaker odor–color associations when they used basic smell vocabulary, but when source-based vocabulary was used, color choices more accurately reflected their source. By the time a child is 6 years old, odor–color associations are culture specific, and odor naming plays an important role in their development [104].

Concluding Remarks

Human olfaction serves diverse functions some of which are shared across species. But humans also uniquely use olfaction deliberatively for religious, medicinal, and aesthetic purposes — and language plays a critical role in coordinating these activities. Despite the prevailing view that there is no olfactory language, this review highlights diverse communities worldwide that have basic smell vocabularies and where smell talk is more frequent. Rather than focusing on constrained experimental tasks, olfactory researchers could benefit from considering human olfaction in all of its contexts to study how people across the globe use, manipulate, and talk about odors in their day-to-day contexts (see Outstanding Questions).

Outstanding Questions

Are smell words more likely to lexicalize some odors than others? Is there a predictable order of lexicalization or is each odor vocabulary uniquely fitted to its ecological and cultural niche?

Do languages with basic smell terms also have more smell-associated words? Modality exclusivity norms from English reveal a set of smell-associated words, although these are fewer in number than for the other senses. Studies have confirmed the same trend in several European languages (Dutch [130], Italian [131,132], Russian [133], Serbian [134]) and in Mandarin [135]. Critically, no norms have yet been collected from languages with attested smell vocabularies.

Non-literal metaphorical use of smell language appears in some languages (e.g., Seri [80]) but not others (e.g., Jahai). What smell metaphors are used across languages and how common are they?

Before abandoning the deodorization hypothesis, it is worth considering some complications. Words and meanings change over time: words currently with a smell meaning may not have had that meaning in the past and vice versa. Historical comparison is reliant on text written in a standardized, formal register. Smell may be less frequent there because of taboos surrounding smelliness [136]; conversely, smell may be more evident in slang. Intriguingly, there is a large slang lexicon for the ‘nose’ [137], but no systematic study of smell itself.

Language plays a critical role in odor–color associations but perhaps not in odor–temperature [138] or odor–music [139] associations. Which cross-modal odor associations are mediated by language and culture?

Is the relationship between language and olfaction symmetrical or asymmetrical? Evidence from Western languages suggests it may be symmetrical (Box 2); is the same true for languages with basic smell terms?

Does the trajectory of learning olfactory language differ between children and adults (Box 3)? What conditions give rise to domain-general versus domain-specific olfactory abilities?

Comparing the levels of pro-attitudinal media exposure between partisan groups revealed that liberals’ selective exposure was statistically higher than that of conservatives’ selective exposure

How Do Partisans Consume News on Social Media? A Comparison of Self-Reports With Digital Trace Measures Among Twitter Users. Jieun Shin. Social Media + Society, December 18, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120981039

Abstract: There are growing concerns that social media exacerbates the selective exposure of audience members to content that supports their political views. However, despite the hype, the existing literature does not fully address the extent to which social media users selectively consume like-minded news stories, in part due to different methodologies. In an attempt to move toward a common framework, this study examined the partisan selective exposure of a representative sample of Twitter users by combining survey data with digital trace data. Specifically, the study linked survey responses (n = 558) from Twitter users with their media following and exposure to news via their friends. The study found that selectivity bias was present in all types of data, including self-reported media consumption (survey), media following (Twitter), and indirect exposure to media (Twitter). However, the study found some differences between self-reports and digital measures such that the overlaps in media diets between partisan groups were much larger based on the digital trace data than the self-reported data. In addition, the study observed an asymmetric pattern of selective exposure between conservatives and liberals in the digital trace data, but not in the self-reported data. The implications of these findings are discussed with reference to the contemporary news environment, hostile media effects, and normative assumptions of selective exposure.

Keywords selective exposure, social media, asymmetric politics, news diets, partisanship

Discussion

This study investigated whether Twitter users selectively consumed ideological news media by linking survey responses from US Twitter users with their behavioral data. First, the study found that an individual’s political ideology was significantly associated with ideological bias in news consumption in all types of data, which included self-reported media consumption on Twitter (survey), media following (digital trace), and indirect exposure to media via friends (digital trace). Conservatives were significantly more likely to use right-wing media sources, whereas liberals were more likely to use left-wing media sources. In fact, of all variables that were included in the three tested models, an individual’s political identity was by far the strongest predictor of ideological media use. A partisan’s preference for congenial media consumption has been extensively shown in previous studies (Garrett, 2009; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Peterson et al., 2019; Stroud, 2008). However, this study demonstrated that this pattern holds for various types of media measures when drawing on a representative sample of Twitter users.

However, despite the significant association between political ideology and media diet at the individual level, the distribution of media slants between two partisan groups overlapped much more in the digital trace data than in the self-reported data. The OVL coefficients in the trace data, which included both following and exposure through friends, were almost two times larger than those of the self-reported data. This finding may be due to the possibility that self-reported media consumption is biased in a direction that mirrors the political identity of the individual (Brenner & DeLamater, 2016). On the contrary, actual media following and exposure via friends on Twitter may be influenced by other factors (e.g., media popularity, reputation, and trending topics) that deviate from the partisan motivation of the individual. Such a finding is consistent with previous studies that observed a moderate level of cross-cutting media exposure on social media (Bakshy et al., 2015; Eady et al., 2019). Similarly, a line of research using a network approach to audience overlap (Mukerjee et al., 2018; Nelson & Webster, 2017) showed a strong common set of media repertoires among individuals across the spectrum.

Focusing on the overall convergence or divergence in media diets between partisans can shed additional light on the selective exposure phenomenon. Traditionally, studies investigating selective exposure (e.g., Iyengar & Hahn, 2009) primarily focused on the directional relationship between partisanship and ideological media choices. That is, Democrats are more likely to select liberal media, whereas Republicans are more likely to select conservative media. However, as Guess (2020) pointed out, “the literature on partisan selective exposure is largely silent on the question of how much of a preference for congenial content is acceptable or desirable” (p. 15). Although there is currently no consensus on this issue, accumulating references over time and across different platforms may be a starting point for more discussion around this topic.

Furthermore, this study observed an asymmetric pattern of selective exposure between conservatives and liberals in actual media consumption. Based on the self-reported data, both groups of partisan respondents similarly indicated their congenial media bias. However, comparing the levels of pro-attitudinal media exposure between partisan groups revealed that liberals’ selective exposure was statistically higher than that of conservatives’ selective exposure. That is, whereas the self-reported data showed a mirroring pattern between partisan groups departing from the neutral point, conservatives’ actual media following and exposure were shifted toward the liberal side of the spectrum. In addition, the study found that for conservatives, although the most influential media outlet was Fox News both in terms of following and indirect exposure, the top 10 most-followed and most-encountered news sources included liberal-leaning outlets such as CNN, the NYT, and the Washington Post. By contrast, the top 10 news sources for liberals did not include any conservative sources, even Fox News.

However, this finding does not necessarily suggest that conservatives have a higher tolerance toward a different point of view. A large body of literature has generally found that conservatives tend to be less tolerant of ideological outgroups (Ganzach & Schul, 2020) and ambiguity than liberals (Jost, 2017). Then, how can we explain this seemingly inconsistent finding? Several possible explanations exist. First, the current media echo-system is characterized by few prominent conservative news sources, with the exception of Fox News (Faris et al., 2017; Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). Previous studies (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2014) have shown that whereas liberals trust a wide array of news sources, such as CNN, MSNBC, NYT, and WP, which are relatively long-standing and mainstream media sources, conservatives name only a single news source (Fox News) as their trusted media outlet. Due to such limited options, conservatives may consume news media that seems to be ideologically inconsistent. Alternatively, the Twitter environment itself may be a contributing factor. As this study and a Pew Research study (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019) have found, more Twitter users seem to be liberals (i.e., Democrats) than conservatives (i.e., Republicans). This imbalance may promote the visibility of liberal-leaning media through user media sharing compared with conservative-leaning media.

The findings of this study have implications for the effects of media on partisans and offer an opportunity to debate whether selective exposure to diverse opinion is normatively positive. Using field experiments, Bail et al. (2018) observed that when social media users are exposed to opposing political views, they become even more extreme in their views. This backfire effect was stronger for Republicans. Such a finding seems to be related to a stronger hostile media effect among Republicans than Democrats (Lin et al., 2016; Shin & Thorson, 2017). Similarly, numerous surveys have shown that conservatives place less trust in mainstream news media than liberals (Gallup, 2018; Jurkowitz et al., 2020). This stronger hostile media perception among conservatives could potentially result in them resorting to unsubstantiated information sources such as disinformation campaigns (Hjorth, Adler-Nissen, 2019).

Methodologically, this study advances our understanding of selective exposure on social media by linking self-reported estimates of media consumption with digital trace data. Media scholars (Garrett, 2013; Prior, 2013) have called for objective measures of selective exposure via tracking data due to biases observed in self-reported responses. For this reason, digital trace data are increasingly being used as an alternative to surveys. However, tracking data alone have drawbacks, such as a lack of accurate demographic information (e.g., even a simple task as to whether the account is a bot or a human). In addition, there are ethical challenges associated with the use of digital trace data such as obtaining consent from the users (Williams et al., 2017). Therefore, a combination of both approaches can make an important contribution to the literature. Consistency or inconsistencies arising from different measures are real opportunities to enhance our understanding of selective exposure, rather than rejecting one form in favor of another (Garrett, 2013).

In this study, some incongruencies between self-reports and digital trace were documented. In particular, conservatives’ shift toward the left in their news consumption in the digital trace data compared with the self-reported data deserves more attention. This suggests a gap between what survey respondents report and what they actually do on social media. Ascertaining a source of the gap could help us better understand ideological selective exposure.

This study has several limitations. First, the study used a predefined set of news outlets to measure the slant in media diets for news following and exposure via friends, whereas respondents were asked to self-report their ideological news consumption using approximate proportions. When answering this survey question, respondents may have considered other outlets that were not included in the predefined set. In particular, a retrospective assessment of ideological media consumption can be susceptible to biased responses. Future research is needed to compare other self-reported measures of media consumption, such as name listing or open-ended survey prompts, to improve the accuracy of the results. In addition, the findings were drawn from a relatively small sample of Twitter users (maximum 558 users in the full sample, 255 users in the overlapping sample) who opted to provide their account information. Future studies are needed to expand the sample size to more accurately assess the demographics and media behaviors of Twitter users.

Conclusion

Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the literature of selective exposure by examining various measures of media consumption among social media users. The findings of this study provide overall support for the principle of selective exposure at the individual level. However, it was also found that the average media diets of the left and the right overlap considerably. This finding offers important implications for current debates about the prevalence of selective exposure on social media. These findings warrant more research on the various factors (e.g., Messing & Westwood, 2014) influencing the news choices of social media users in conjunction with political motivation.

Furthermore, this study provided some evidence of asymmetric media behavior between the left and the right. This suggests that the extent of cross-cutting media exposure could be different between conservatives and liberals. Selective exposure and partisan polarization have traditionally been treated as symmetrical concepts. This asymmetric pattern requires further investigation regarding the causes as well as the consequences. In particular, the consequences of frequently consuming challenging information deserve more attention, including a hostile perception of the media and lack of trust in journalism.

The aim of this study was to see if masculine traits, which are dependent on androgen levels in foetal and pubertal stages of development, are related to the immune quality in healthy men; it seems they are not

Masculinity and immune system efficacy in men. Judyta Nowak-Kornicka,Barbara Borkowska,Bogusław Pawłowski. PLoS One, December 14, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0243777

Abstract: Masculinity-related morphological traits are supposed to be honest indicators of a man's biological quality. While some studies showed that sexually dimorphic traits are related to various aspects of biological condition such as general health, immunity or fertility, still little is known about the relationship between masculine traits and the effectiveness of innate and adaptive immunity in humans. The aim of this study was to see if masculine traits, which are dependent on androgen levels in foetal and pubertal stages of development, are related to the immune quality in healthy men. The immune quality was evaluated for 91 healthy men aged 19–36 years. Immunity measurements included innate and adaptive parameters. General health status, age, testosterone level, BMI, physical activity, and smoking were controlled. The shoulder-to-hip ratio (SHR), 2D:4D digit ratio and hand-grip strength (HGS) were used as markers of masculinization. The regressions showed that when controlling for confounds, masculinity-related traits were in general not related to innate and adaptive immunity. Only a weak association was observed for right 2D:4D ratio and T-lymphocyte counts (but it becomes non-significant after adjustment for multiple comparisons). Our results do not support the premise that masculinity is a cue for immunological quality in men. However, the positive association between right 2D:4D and T lymphocytes might suggest that further studies are needed to verify if androgen stimulation in prenatal development might be related to immunity in adulthood.

The relationship between masculinity traits and controlled factors

Because HGS was associated with such controlled factors as a participant's age, BMI and body height (see section "IV" in S1 File, the correlation between body height and BMI was weak (R = -0.22)), we also conducted the analyses adjusted for these. The separate models were carried out for each immune function. These analyses also revealed that HGS is not related to any of the analysed immune parameters.

According to the evolutionary hypothesis concerning the biological implications of sexually selected traits which are commonly perceived as attractive (good genes hypothesis), and are also involved in intra-sexual competition and costly to produce (handicap hypothesis), we assumed that masculinity in men aged 19–36 might serve as a signal reflecting an individual's biological quality. The aim of this study was to check if body masculinity of healthy men is related to immune function, which is one of the most important fitness-related characteristics of an organism, determining risk of morbidity and mortality in all life stages. In general, we found no association between masculinization markers and either innate or adaptive immune responses, even when controlling for a participant's age, BMI, free-testosterone levels, smoking status or sport activity.

The finding in the current study of no associations between SHR or HGS and any of the studied immune parameters, indicates that these indirect markers of pubertal or current testosterone do not reflect immune functioning. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study linking SHR with any of the immune-associated biomarkers, and there have only been limited studies testing the relationship between muscle mass and immunity [45], with only one study directly testing CD4+ count and muscle functions itself as measured by strength [65]. This was, however, only in patients with an HIV-associated immune injury. Raso et al. (2013) [65] showed that disease-associated decreases in HGS are associated with a lower CD4+ count. There are also several studies only indirectly linking HGS with immunity-related characteristics, showing that inflammation-associated diseases [66, 67] or autoimmune disorders [68] are related to lower HGS. Our study is the first to demonstrate that a V-shaped upper body, reflected in SHR and muscle function and measured by HGS, is not associated with immunity in healthy men.

Our results investigating the relationship between masculinity, post-vaccination and lymphocyte-proliferation responses are in contrast to the limited human studies testing ICHH in facial masculinity and the strength of antibody or cytokine response after immune stimulation [e.g. 15, 19]. It is worth underlining, however, that in these two studies the authors analysed only facial (and not body) perception and they did not use anthropometry. Furthermore, Rantala et al. (2012) [15] measured immune response against the hepatitis B virus i.e. conservative antigens, whereas we studied immune response to the influenza virus i.e. a fast evolving/mutating antigen. The lack of association between analyzed markers of masculinization and immune reactivity in response to potentially harmful factors may therefore indicate that the immune response can differ depending on the antigen in question. It is also possible that some vaccine-contained antigens and/or in vitro lymphocyte stimulation may be inadequate to reflect general immune quality. Our results also contradict studies that have indirectly measured immunity (e.g. frequency of infection) and its relationship with facial masculinity (rated and/or morphometric) finding that men with more masculine faces (rated and measured) reported a lower frequency of colds and flu [16, 62]. It is therefore possible that facial dimorphism has more signalling significance than body masculinity (or the traits studied in this paper). On the other hand, Foo et al. (2017a) [63] did not find the relationship between rated facial masculinity and various immune functions measured in saliva. Therefore in the future it will be important for studies to include both facial and body traits related to masculinity in order to address this discrepancy in the literature.

Due to the mixed findings in humans, we should also consider that the immunosuppressive role of androgens (the basis of ICHH) is still controversial. It has been suggested that androgens have immunomodulatory rather than immunosupressive properties [18, 21] and this was also observed in a group of participants included in this study (see S3 Table in S1 File). It may also be the case that in contrast to experimental or in-vitro studies which, in accordance to ICHH, expect a negative relationship between immunity and masculinity, in correlational studies (such as ours) the lack of associations might also be interpreted in the framework of the ICHH and good genes hypothesis. This is because testosterone-induced immune suppression in highly masculine men may suppress immunity to a level similar to that observed in men with a lower immune quality. Consequently, more masculine males might only be a little healthier than average [69], and there may be no noticeable difference in immune quality between those with high and low-masculinity observed in correlational studies. In other words, if, in accordance with ICHH, only individuals with a well-functioning immune response bear a cost associated with testosterone-derived immunosuppression, we should expect that men with a higher expression of masculine traits only have a marginally better, or perhaps a very similar level, of immune quality as men with a lower masculinization level.

Our results are also consistent with recent reports showing that physically attractive traits such as male body height [64] or components of men’s facial attractiveness [63] are not related to immune effectiveness–at least in Western, well-fed societies. The Immune Priority Hypothesis (IPH) [64] is another explanation proposed to answer why immune quality might not be reflected by sexually dimorphic traits. IPH suggests that a well-functioning body defence is so crucial for long-lived species, like human beings, who are exposed to many ubiquitous pathogens that immunity cannot be traded for the traits that are not directly related to survival (e.g. body height, SHR or HGS). According to IPH, energy resources should be invested in development of costly morphological signals only when the right amount of energy in creating an optimal immune defence is assured. In this instance, masculine traits instead signal a lack of immune related disorders, and an organism’s ability for sparing additional energy for “luxury” sexual dimorphism. This would mean that despite there being no relationship between immune functions themselves and masculine traits, higher masculinization might still provide information about the biological quality of an organism.

The weak positive association between right 2D:4D (which is a better indicator of prenatal androgenisation than left 2D:4D [70] and lymphocyte T count, might suggest that higher prenatal exposure to androgens is related to lymphocyte count in adults. This result can be partially explained by the organizational action of androgens on the immune system. It was shown that exposure to androgens in early life might permanently affect immunity both in primates [71] and rodents [27], whereas gonadectomy in mature animals does not abolish sex-differences in immune response [72]. This does not mean, however, that testosterone level in adults is not related to immunity. There are several experimental and correlational studies showing that testosterone has a negative impact on lymphocyte T count and/or function [10, 73], and that androgens may increase apoptosis of T cells [74]. It is surprising, however, that our observations concern only the lymphocyte count but not lymphocyte function (the proliferative response). It is also worth noting that our result becomes non-significant after adjusting for multiple comparisons and therefore the obtained relationship between the 2D:4D digit ratio and lymphocyte count should be treated with great caution and further studies are warranted. In general, the lack of associations between masculinity markers and immunity in our study is consistent with the results of a recent meta-analysis that provides no support for immunosuppressive testosterone properties in correlational human studies [18].

There are a few limitations of our study. Since we have studied men from a well-nourished Western population (not a common state in our evolutionary past), one needs to be very cautious with generalizing our results to all ecological conditions humans might have lived in. It is also very likely that a well-nourished urbanized population is not ideal for measuring the masculinity-immune associations due to a relatively low cost associated with immune challenges. Improved living conditions, including hygiene practices, infection prevention (vaccines), and increased access to medications and antimicrobial drugs, have all contributed to the reduction of pathogen exposure and shortening the duration of an infection in these populations. Consequently, the physiological cost associated with the immune system functioning in such a population might be much lower in comparison to a population with a greater pathogen load and a higher risk of infection. Furthermore, the effect size (calculated as a Cohen's f2) showed that the magnitude of associations is small or moderate (see Tables 2 and 3), which is also true for a significant relationship between 2D:4D and T cell (f2 = 0.31). This indicates that in well-nourished western populations the relationship between immune parameters and masculine traits is relatively low. In other words, the results suggest that the difference in immune functioning between men with more and less masculine traits might be too low to have functional immunological consequences.

The final problem to consider is that of the complicated structure of immunity and the interdependencies between immunity and other physiological aspects. It is likely that the measurements of baseline immune functions in men who declared no health problems, had no chronic diseases or ongoing infections and had a normal level of inflammatory markers (both CRP and WBC) are still inadequate for measuring immune quality. It is possible that, to assess an individual's immune quality, the analysis of many immune parameters, activated in response to real/natural pathogen-inducing infection, should be taken into account. The measurement of an immunological response to pathogen stimulation might be more informative than baseline immune parameters (in a "healthy state", without antigen stimulation) or only vaccine-induced antibody production or mitogen-induced proliferation.

A Comprehensive Meta‐analysis of the the most commonly used forensic polygraph test, the Comparison Question Test: It can be accurate, experimental studies are generalizable, and no publication bias was detected

A Comprehensive Meta‐analysis of the Comparison Question Polygraph Test. Charles R. Honts  Steven Thurber  Mark Handler. Applied Cognitive Psychology, December 18 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3779

Abstract: We conducted a meta‐analysis on the most commonly used forensic polygraph test, the Comparison Question Test. We captured as many studies as possible by using broad inclusion criteria. Data and potential moderators were coded from 138 datasets. The meta‐analytic effect size including inconclusive outcomes was 0.69 [0.66, 0.79]. We found significant moderator effects. Notably, level of motivation had a positive linear relationship with our outcome measures. Information Gain analysis of CQT outcomes representing the median accuracy showed a significant information increase over interpersonal deception detection across almost the complete range of base rates. Our results suggest that the CQT can be accurate, that experimental studies are generalizable, and no publication bias was detected. We discussed the limitations of the field research literature and problems within polygraph profession that lower field accuracy. We suggest some possible solutions.

Science Communication Training: Assessment by Audiences Shows Little Effect, no difference from untrained controls

Assessment by Audiences Shows Little Effect of Science Communication Training. Margaret A. Rubega et al. Science Communication, December 17, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547020971639

Abstract: As the science community has recognized the vital role of communicating to the public, science communication training has proliferated. The development of rigorous, comparable approaches to assessment of training has not kept pace. We conducted a fully controlled experiment using a semester-long science communication course, and audience assessment of communicator performance. Evaluators scored the communication competence of trainees and their matched, untrained controls, before and after training. Bayesian analysis of the data showed very small gains in communication skills of trainees, and no difference from untrained controls. High variance in scores suggests little agreement on what constitutes “good” communication.

Keywords science communication, graduate training, assessment, evaluation, evidence

As expected by some, information critical of President Trump’s policy decisions produced a backlash causing people to show less concern about the virus’s death toll & rate the president’s performance even more highly

How Bad Is It? Elite Influence and the Perceived Seriousness of the Coronavirus Pandemic. Philip Moniz. Journal of Experimental Political Science, Dec 18 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.45

Abstract: In spite of its immense global impact, Republicans and Democrats disagree on how serious a problem the coronavirus pandemic is. One likely reason is the political elites to whom partisans listen. As a means of shoring up support, President Trump has largely downplayed and but sometimes hyped the severity of the virus’s toll on American lives. Do these messages influence the perceived seriousness of the virus, how the president is evaluated as well as support for and compliance with social distancing guidelines? Results suggest that Republican identifiers had already crystallized their views on the virus’s seriousness, the president’s performance, and social distancing policies and behaviors. Unexpectedly, information critical of President Trump’s policy decisions produced a backlash causing people to show less concern about the virus’s death toll and rate the president’s performance even more highly.

Why are Bats a Reservoir of Virulent Zoonotic Diseases? Inter alia, colonies can reach densities of 3000 bats/sq.m., in populations of up to a million individuals per roost

On the Evolution of Virulent Zoonotic Viruses in Bats. Frans L. Roes. Biological Theory volume 15, pages223–225(2020). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13752-020-00363-6

Abstract: Ideas formulated by Paul Ewald about the “evolution of virulence” are used to explain why bats, more often than other mammals, are a reservoir of virulent viruses, and why many of these viruses severely affect other mammals, including humans, but are apparently less pathogenic for bats. Potential factors contributing to bat viruses often being zoonotic are briefly discussed.

Why are Bats, More Than Other Mammals, a Reservoir of Virulent Zoonotic Diseases?

Bats harbor a significantly higher proportion of zoonotic viruses than all other mammalian orders (Olival et al. 2017, p. 646; disputed by Mollentze and Streicker 2020; see also Watson 2020). This is remarkable because, for instance, there are about twice as many species of rodents as there are species of bats, and rodents are more closely related to humans than bats are. Why are bats a reservoir of virulent viruses?

Many bat species are gregarious, some living in dense aggregations. Colonies can reach densities of 3000 bats per square meter, in populations of up to a million individuals per roost (Luis et al. 2013, p. 2). The theory of virulence implicates the close quarters of bats as a factor favoring increased virulence because bats roost so closely to each other that they can transmit infections to other bats even if they are immobilized by illness. A more virulent variant, making more copies of itself, will therefore spread. Note that it is not closeness per se that favors virulent diseases, but closeness favors transmission from animals that are not mobile.

To summarize: the extreme closeness of bats in many roosting sites allows the transmission of viruses from very sick hosts, favoring the more virulent variants in the population.

Why are many bat viruses also zoonotic? Several characteristics of bats seem to facilitate transmission to other host species. Bats are the only mammals with the capability of powered flight. This enables them to have a longer radius of action compared to terrestrial mammals and to have more direct or indirect contact with other animal species at different geographical locations. The mobility of bats probably allows bat viruses to be dispersed to humans and other mammals.

Whereas rodent species typically do not share communal nesting sites, roosting sites of bats can house diverse assemblages of multiple bat species (Luis et al. 2013, p. 3). This also may favor zoonosis. In the words of Ewald (pers. comm.): “The important point here is that multispecies populations may favor infection mechanisms that are not species specific and may thus allow for more frequent transmission across species including zoonotic transmission to humans.”

Finally, bats enjoy remarkable longevity for their body size. Some insectivorous bats can live up to 35 years (Wang et al. 2011, p. 650). Persistent infections may allow for prolonged release of viruses and thus greater exposure of humans (or other species) to the viruses.

Sixteen facial expressions occur in similar contexts worldwide

Sixteen facial expressions occur in similar contexts worldwide. Alan S. Cowen, Dacher Keltner, Florian Schroff, Brendan Jou, Hartwig Adam & Gautam Prasad. Nature, Dec 16 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-3037-7

Abstract: Understanding the degree to which human facial expressions co-vary with specific social contexts across cultures is central to the theory that emotions enable adaptive responses to important challenges and opportunities1,2,3,4,5,6. Concrete evidence linking social context to specific facial expressions is sparse and is largely based on survey-based approaches, which are often constrained by language and small sample sizes7,8,9,10,11,12,13. Here, by applying machine-learning methods to real-world, dynamic behaviour, we ascertain whether naturalistic social contexts (for example, weddings or sporting competitions) are associated with specific facial expressions14 across different cultures. In two experiments using deep neural networks, we examined the extent to which 16 types of facial expression occurred systematically in thousands of contexts in 6 million videos from 144 countries. We found that each kind of facial expression had distinct associations with a set of contexts that were 70% preserved across 12 world regions. Consistent with these associations, regions varied in how frequently different facial expressions were produced as a function of which contexts were most salient. Our results reveal fine-grained patterns in human facial expressions that are preserved across the modern world.

It is argued that when cultural values provide a rationale for ostracism, this can eliminate ostracism distress

Can cultural values eliminate ostracism distress? Erez Yaakobi. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Volume 80, January 2021, Pages 231-241. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2020.10.014

Abstract: Ostracism has negative psychological and behavioral outcomes, thus making it crucial to better understand how these effects can be mitigated. Two experiments tested whether cultural values can moderate immediate as well as delayed reactions to ostracism in two populations with very different values concerning interactions with the opposite sex. The Ultra-Orthodox population in Israel constitutes a specific subculture whose values differ considerably from those of secular Jews in Israel. In particular, Ultra-Orthodox Jews adhere to strict separation between genders, which is enforced by Ultra-Orthodox men. It was hypothesized that being ostracized by the opposite gender on a computer game would be less distressing in particular for Ultra-Orthodox men than for secular men and women who cultural values have no such prohibition. In both experiments, Jewish secular and Ultra-Orthodox men and women played Cyberball, a virtual ball-toss game against two ostensible players (half same gender, half opposite, but all with their in-groups). The findings showed that whereas secular men and women were more distressed when ostracized by a member of the opposite sex, Ultra-Orthodox males reported lower distress on both the needs satisfaction and mood measures after they were ostracized by ostensible Ultra-Orthodox female players than when receiving fewer ball tosses from ostensible Ultra-Orthodox male players. It is argued that when cultural values provide a rationale for ostracism, this can eliminate ostracism distress. The discussion centers on ways cultural and other embedded values can mitigate the negative outcomes of ostracism.

Keywords: OstracismCultureSocial exclusionValuesReligious observance

General discussion

These two experiments explored whether cultural values moderate ostracism effects on needs satisfaction and mood immediately after participants were ostracized on the Cyberball game as well as after a short delay in a culture where gender ostracism is intrinsic. The findings support these hypotheses. Specifically, when Ultra-Orthodox Jewish males were ostracized by ostensible Ultra-Orthodox Jewish females, they reported significantly lower distress than when ostracized by ostensible Ultra-Orthodox male players. On the mood measure, these cultural values not only alleviated the ostracism effects but eliminated ostracism distress altogether in the reflective stage. Thus, robustly embedded cultural values appear to influence even immediate responses that require fewer cognitive efforts to process this experience. The results also provide empirical evidence that may help account for one of the mechanisms that may mitigate distress after being ostracized by showing that cultural worldview can mediate ostracism distress when this cultural worldview is not threatened, and that cultural values provide a “reasonable explanation” for being ostracized.

Future research should examine whether other mechanisms can eliminate ostracism distress by exploring other strongly embedded factors. Fiske and Yamamoto (2005) as well as Pfundmair, Graupmann, Frey, and Aydin (2015) showed that members of collectivistic cultures tend to focus on belonging securely and trusting more narrowly (primarily in-group members; Yamagishi, 1988) and hence may exhibit more cautiousness in their responses when ostracized by out-group members. The findings also respond to the call by Uskul and Over (2017) to examine whether socially interdependent individuals might be more negatively affected when ostracism comes from in-group members or close others that matter to them. It is thus important to explore whether being ostracized within a group contradicts or is consistent with the cultural values and inherited worldviews of this group. The current experiments showed that ostracism was mitigated when the group's cultural values considers gendered ostracism to be "normal". The current research also provides insights into the way cultures vary along multiple dimensions, since responses to ostracism are likely to be influenced by different social factors including social norms and values (Gelfand, 2012).

These findings have practical implications as well. If the target of an ostracism experience comes from a culture where social distance is a value or is valued in some defined circumstances, reminders of this value could shield victims from its negative emotional effects or lessen them. The results also provide a better understanding of how to allocate limited resources to people who are being ostracized by better identifying, at least initially, who will be more prone to be affected by an ostracism experience. If someone is ostracized, interventions could make clear that there could be reasons such as cultural values that may have nothing to do with the ostracizer's attitude towards the ostracized. Facilitating the value of participation and collaboration plays an important role in augmenting one's wellbeing since values have significant effects on ostracism distress. Thus, making cultural values more salient in one's mind may serve as an intervention mechanism for buffering ostracism distress.

The current research also has limitations that deserve mention. It implemented an experimental design that restricts the generalizability of the findings. Future work should test the moderation model on a broader range of populations. Future experiments could also explore whether the desire to adhere to cultural values is heightened as a function of ostracism and use instruments beyond self-report measures to test the effects of ostracism and the moderation model. Furthermore, future research should replicate this study in other cultures with similar values in terms of strict gender rules. It could be argued that the response of Ultra-Orthodox males when playing Cyberball against Ultra-Orthodox women was related to the incongruity of the situation for them. However, this possible reaction was taken into consideration prior to conducting the experiment. All participants were told that the other "players" were sitting in different rooms on campus and that the "computer" chooses the people taking part in each game. The research assistant was specifically instructed to present the choice of the "other players" as a random assignment by the computer. This also eliminated alternative explanations for the results. In addition, these studies used a repeated-measure design where participants completed questionnaires twice (immediate and delayed responses). This was done to better capture when moderation would occur. However, potential order effects may have occurred. Thus, future studies should also use a between-subject research design to reexamine these effects. Finally, other differences that may also moderate this mediation effect should be explored since they are embedded in the ways individuals perceive social connections.

Not only individuals overestimate their intelligence & do so particularly for domains in which they perform poorly; estimates given by others are equally accurate or sometimes even more accurate than self-estimates

Chp 49 - Self- and Other-Estimates of Intelligence. Aljoscha C. Neubauer, Gabriela Hofer. In The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence, Edited by Robert J. Sternberg, 2020, pp 1179-1200. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108770422.050

Summary: It is a widely held view that “nobody knows you better than yourself.” However, the low validity of self-estimates of intelligence and other abilities indicated by a considerable body of research does not support this notion. Individuals overestimate themselves and do so particularly for domains in which they perform poorly (the so-called Dunning-Kruger effect). Interestingly, intelligence estimates given by others are equally accurate or sometimes even more accurate than self-estimates. This chapter provides an overview of research on self- and other-estimates of intelligence and potential moderators of their accuracy. It also aims to bring the research lines on self- and other-estimates of intelligence together within the framework of the self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model proposed by Simine Vazire. The ability to predict for which intelligence subfactors one of the two perspectives might provide more accurate estimates has implications for both research and practical fields like vocational counseling.

Gender Differences in Competition & Evidence From a Matrilineal & a Patriarchal Society: Maasai men opt to compete at roughly twice the rate as Maasai women; Khasi women choose the competitive environment more often than men

From 2009... Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence From a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society. Uri Gneezy  Kenneth L. Leonard  John A. List. Econometrica, October 6 2009. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA6690

Abstract: We use a controlled experiment to explore whether there are gender differences in selecting into competitive environments across two distinct societies: the Maasai in Tanzania and the Khasi in India. One unique aspect of these societies is that the Maasai represent a textbook example of a patriarchal society, whereas the Khasi are matrilineal. Similar to the extant evidence drawn from experiments executed in Western cultures, Maasai men opt to compete at roughly twice the rate as Maasai women. Interestingly, this result is reversed among the Khasi, where women choose the competitive environment more often than Khasi men, and even choose to compete weakly more often than Maasai men. These results provide insights into the underpinnings of the factors hypothesized to be determinants of the observed gender differences in selecting into competitive environments.

Rolf Degen summarizing... The personality trait that keeps people most strongly from infidelity is the "dutifulness" component of conscientiousness

The five factor model and infidelity: Beyond the broad domains. C.J.J. van Zyl. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 172, April 2021, 110553. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110553

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1340167816910090240

Abstract: Several studies have explored the association between personality and infidelity, but our understanding of this relationship is arguably underdeveloped. The fact that most research only examined domain-level effects may have contributed to the situation, as facet-level and item- level information have not sufficiently been taken into consideration. This paper argues that it is an unwarranted assumption that domain-level associations reveal all there is to know about the relationship between personality and infidelity, and proceeds to examine this claim. The present study investigates the association between personality and infidelity but goes beyond the Big Five domains to examine facet and item-level associations in a sample of 685 participants. Bayesian logistic modeling with comprehensive indicators of uncertainty are provided for all models predicting infidelity. Results suggest that two facets in particular are associated with infidelity and that facet and item models contains additional predictive information compared to the broad domains. Findings further suggest that facets and items provide more nuanced information than can be gleaned from domain-level effects, which in turn, could advance our understanding of personality and its association with infidelity.

Keywords: Five-factor modelPersonalityInfidelityCheatingDomainsFacetsNuances

COVID-19 until Aug 2020: Overall, we find that fear steadily decreased after a peak in April 2020; elevated fear was predicted by region (i.e., North America), anxious traits, and media use

Mertens, Gaëtan, Stefanie Duijndam, Paul Lodder, and Tom Smeets. 2020. “Pandemic Panic? Results of a 6-month Longitudinal Study on Fear of COVID-19.” PsyArXiv. December 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/xtu3f

Abstract: Fear is an evolutionary adaptive emotion that serves to protect the organism from harm. Once a threat diminishes, fear should also dissipate as otherwise fear may become chronic and pathological. While threat (i.e., number of infections, hospitalizations and deaths) during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has substantially varied over time, it remains unclear whether fear has followed a similar pattern. To examine the development of fear of COVID-19 and investigate potential predictors for chronic fear, we conducted a large online longitudinal study (N = 2000) using the Prolific platform. Participants represented unselected residents of 34 different countries. The Fear of the Coronavirus Questionnaire (FCQ) and several other demographic and psychological measures were completed monthly between March and August 2020. Overall, we find that fear steadily decreased after a peak in April 2020. Additional analyses showed that elevated fear was predicted by region (i.e., North America), anxious traits, and media use.

Bisexual disclosure was positively associated with well-being after accounting for the contribution of sexual minority disclosure

Brownfield, J. M., & Brown, C. (2020). The relations among outness, authenticity, and well-being for bisexual adults. Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity, Dec 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/sgd0000390

Abstract: Outness, a proximal minority stressor for sexual minority people, consists of 2 subconstructs (disclosure and concealment) and demonstrates relationships with mental health outcomes such as well-being. Newly studied, authenticity may be related to outness and to mental health outcomes, potentially influencing the outness-well-being relationship. Additionally, a majority of research has examined minority stressors for lesbians and gay men, and few studies have investigated the unique experiences of bisexual individuals. The present study examined the associations of 2 subconstructs of outness—disclosure and concealment (as a sexual minority and specifically as bisexual)—with bisexual adults’ well-being and whether authenticity mediated the relationship between these subconstructs of outness and well-being. Four-hundred and 47 bisexual participants completed an online survey. Analyses revealed that bisexual disclosure was positively associated with well-being after accounting for the contribution of sexual minority disclosure, whereas bisexual concealment was not associated with well-being when accounting for the contribution of sexual minority concealment. Authenticity mediated the relationship between bisexual disclosure and well-being, and it mediated the relationship between bisexual concealment and well-being. Results further our understanding of bisexual individuals’ mental health, particularly in regards to bisexual disclosure and concealment.

Thus, we cannot conclude from this study that lies always travel faster than the truth

Bruns, Axel & Keller, Tobias (2020) News diffusion on Twitter: Comparing the dissemination careers for mainstream and marginal news. In International Conference on Social Media and Society, 2020-07-22 - 2020-07-24. (Unpublished). https://eprints.qut.edu.au/202868/

Description: Current scholarly as well as mainstream media discussion expresses substantial concerns about the influence of ‘problematic information’ (Jack 2017) from hyperpartisan and downright fraudulent news sources on public debate and public opinion formation (e.g., Humprecht 2018). Often encapsulated by the imprecise term ‘fake news’, the publishers of such content seek to exploit network effects, that is, the absence of echo chambers and filter bubbles in social media spaces (Bruns 2019) to maximise the visibility and dissemination of their content. They do so for a combination of political and commercial reasons (Wardle & Derakhshan 2017). Some recent studies – most prominently an article by Vosoughi et al. (2018) in Science, examining story dissemination on Twitter – present evidence that such marginal, hyperpartisan and propagandist sites are outpacing their more mainstream counterparts in the dissemination of content: put simply, ‘fake news’ content seems to spread more quickly across social networks than ‘real news’. The generalisability of such findings is limited, however, by the source data: for instance, to establish a comparison between ‘real’ and ‘fake’ news, Vosoughi et al. (2018) consider only news stories that were evaluated by a fact-checking organisation. But this introduces a systematic bias: news stories that were dubious or controversial enough to warrant fact-checking may well disseminate in entirely different ways from stories that are more obviously truthful or incorrect. Uncontroversially truthful stories from mainstream news outlets could well disseminate across Twitter with greater speed than the ‘fake news’ content observed by Vosoughi et al., but such stories would not have been included in their analysis unless they had been fact-checked. Thus, we cannot conclude from this study that lies always travel faster than the truth.

Is the Myth of Left-wing Authoritarianism Itself a Myth?

Conway, Lucian G., III, Alivia Zubrod, Linus Chan, James McFarland, and Evert Van de Vliert. 2020. “Is the Myth of Left-wing Authoritarianism Itself a Myth?.” PsyArXiv. December 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/frcks

Abstract: Is left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) closer to a myth or a reality? Twelve studies test the empirical existence and theoretical relevance of LWA. Study 1 reveals that both conservative and liberal Americans identify a large number of left-wing authoritarians in their lives. In Study 2, participants explicitly rate items from a recently-developed LWA measure as valid measurements of authoritarianism. Studies 3-11 show that persons who score high on this same LWA scale possess the traits associated with models of authoritarianism (while controlling for political ideology): LWA is positively related to threat sensitivity across multiple areas, including general ecological threats (Study 3), COVID disease threat (Study 4), Belief in a Dangerous World (Study 5), and Trump threat (Study 6). Further, controlling for ideology, high-LWA persons show more support for restrictive political correctness norms (Study 7), rate African-Americans and Jews more negatively (Studies 8-9), and show more domain-specific dogmatism and attitude strength (Study 10). Study 11 reveals that the majority of the effects from Studies 3-10 hold when looking only within liberals, thus revealing these effects are about liberal authoritarianism. Study 12 uses the World Values Survey to provide evidence of Left-Wing Authoritarianism around the globe. Taken in total, this large array of triangulating evidence from 12 studies comprised of over 8,000 participants from the U.S. and over 66,000 participants world-wide strongly suggests that left-wing authoritarianism is much closer to a reality than a myth.

Traditional (print and audiovisual) media, including popular outlets, continue to be the major contributors to people’s knowledge about current affairs and that social media hardly contribute at all

What do people learn from following the news? A diary study on the influence of media use on knowledge of current news stories. Kathleen Beckers et al. European Journal of Communication, December 16, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323120978724

Abstract: One of the main functions of news media in democracies is informing the citizenry on day-to-day affairs. However, the way in which citizens gather news has changed as nowadays people have more opportunities than ever before to adapt their media consumption based on their preferences. One of the major game changers was the introduction of social media. This raises the question to what extent traditional media still contribute to people’s knowledge of current affairs. Using a time-diary study in the Flemish media context, we investigate the influence of different forms of news consumption on current news knowledge. We conclude that traditional (print and audiovisual) media, including popular outlets, continue to be the major contributors to people’s knowledge about current affairs and that social media hardly contribute at all.

Keywords: Current affairs knowledge, media consumption, news, time diary

Less youth crime not related to changes in attachment/commitment to school, community involvement, or parental supervision, but to a decrease in unstructured socializing & alcohol consumption, & less preference for risky activities

The contemporary transformation of american youth: An analysis of change in the prevalence of delinquency, 1991–2015. Eric P. Baumer  Kelsey Cundiff  Liying Luo. Criminology, December 16 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12264

Abstract: Youth involvement in crime has declined substantially over the past few decades, yet the reasons for this trend remain unclear. We advance the literature by examining the role of several potentially important shifts in individual attitudes and behaviors that may help to account for the observed temporal variation in youth delinquency. Our multilevel analysis of repeated cross‐sectional data from eighth and tenth grade students in the Monitoring the Future (MTF) study indicates that changes in youth offending prevalence were not associated with changes in youth attachment and commitment to school, community involvement, or parental supervision after school. In contrast, the study provides suggestive evidence that the significant reduction in youth offending prevalence observed since the early 1990s was significantly associated with a decrease in unstructured socializing and alcohol consumption and, to a lesser extent, with a decrease in youth preferences for risky activities. Implications for existing theoretical explanations and future research on youth crime trends are discussed.

Risk Taking for Potential Losses (but Not Gains) Increases with Time of Day

Bedder, Rachel, Matilde M. Vaghi, Raymond J. Dolan, and Robb Rutledge. 2020. “Risk Taking for Potential Losses but Not Gains Increases with Time of Day.” PsyArXiv. December 17. doi:10.31234/osf.io/3qdnx

Abstract: Humans exhibit distinct risk preferences when facing choices involving potential gains and losses. These preferences are subject to neuromodulatory influence, particularly from dopamine and serotonin. As these neuromodulators manifest distinct circadian rhythms, this suggests decision making under risk might be affected by time of day. Here, in a large subject sample (N = 26,899), we tested the hypothesis of a diurnal modulation in risk taking for gains and losses. We found that risky options with potential losses were increasingly chosen over the course of the day, but observed no such change for how often risky options with only potential gains were chosen. Using a computational modelling approach to obtain a more fine-grained account, we show this diurnal change in risk preference reflects a decrease in sensitivity to increasing losses, but no change in the relative impacts of gains and losses on choice. This diurnal sensitivity, present across two different task designs, was robust to between- and within-subject analysis, to country (i.e., UK and US samples), age, and gender. Thus, our findings reveal a striking diurnal modulation in human decision making, a pattern with potential importance for real-life preferences that include voting, medical decision making, and global stock market investments.