Monday, May 10, 2021

More women (45.8%) than men (21.6%) report that they wished they had waited until an older age to have sex; fewer women (1.5%) than men (13.9%) wished that it had occurred sooner; no differences in actual age of sexual debut

Perhaps It Was Too Soon: College Students’ Reflections on the Timing of Their Sexual Debut. Susan Sprecher et al. The Journal of Sex Research , Mar 1 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2021.1885599

Abstract: Early sexual debut has been a focus of social scientific research due to its association with adverse circumstances and negative outcomes. However, there has been a recent shift to considering not only chronological age, but also the degree to which the event is viewed to be optimally timed (i.e., the perception that it occurred at the “right time” versus too soon). The purpose of this study was to assess how individual/family background variables and contextual aspects of the experience (including partner and relationship aspects) are associated with both the actual age at sexual debut and the perceived acceptability of the timing of the event. Using data collected from students at a U.S. university between 1990 and 2019 (N = 6,430), several factors (in addition to chronological age) were associated with the perceived acceptability of the timing of sexual debut. Strong gender differences were found – women perceived their timing to be less acceptable, even though they did not differ from men in actual age at sexual debut. Other robust predictors of perceived acceptability included (lower) religious involvement and recalling desire (for the experience), pleasure, and lower guilt at the time. Only slight changes occurred over the 30-year period in age at sexual debut and perceived acceptability of the timing. Suggestions for future research are provided and implications for sex education/sexual health interventions are discussed.

Attractive‐disadvantageous partners were preferred to the same extent (or more) as unattractive‐advantageous partners; the effect of attractiveness was fully explained by the perceived trustworthiness of the financial partners

What is a face worth? Facial attractiveness biases experience‐based monetary decision‐making. Gayathri Pandey  Vivian Zayas. British Journal of Psychology, May 9 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12495

Abstract: There is ample evidence that attractive individuals, across diverse domains, are judged more favourably. But most research has focused on single/one‐shot decisions, where decision‐makers receive no feedback following their decisions, and outcomes of their judgements are inconsequential to the self. Would attractive individuals still be judged favourably in experience‐based decision‐making where people make iterative decisions and receive consequential feedback (money gained/lost) following each decision? To investigate this question, participants viewed headshots of four financial partners presented side‐by‐side and repeatedly (over 50–100 trials) selected partners that would help maximize their profits. Following every partner‐selection, participants received feedback about the net monetary gains/losses the partner had conferred. Unbeknownst to participants, two partners (one attractive, one unattractive) were equally advantageous (conferred net‐gains overtime) and two partners (one attractive and one unattractive) were equally disadvantageous (conferred net‐losses overtime). Even though attractive and unattractive partners were equally profitable and despite receiving feedback, participants selected attractive partners more throughout the task were quicker to reselect them even when they conferred losses and judged them as more helpful. Indeed, attractive‐disadvantageous partners were preferred to the same extent (or more) as unattractive‐advantageous partners. Importantly, the effect of attractiveness on decision‐making was fully explained by the perceived trustworthiness of the financial partners.


Scratch-cards are less strongly associated with problem gambling, since it is less continuous than slot machines, has a slower event frequency, & near-miss design features are unlikely to have a significant impact upon behaviour

Empirical Evidence Relating to the Relative Riskiness of Scratch-Card Gambling. Paul Delfabbro & Jonathan Parke. Journal of Gambling Studies, May 10 2021. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10899-021-10033-2

Abstract: Scratch cards (SCs) or tickets are lottery-based games which are played by scratching to reveal numbers, letters or symbols to win prizes. Such activities have sometimes been likened to paper-based slot-machines, but relatively little systematic analyses have been conducted to examine the risk or harm associated with these activities. In this paper, we provide a narrative review of the peer-reviewed literature relating to the potential association between SCs and problem gambling and what is known from publically available data sources (e.g., prevalence studies and treatment data). Evidence is analysed within the context of the Bradford Hill Criteria. Both prevalence and peer reviewed literature suggest that SCs are less strongly associated with problem gambling than most other gambling activities. We argue that this difference is due to the nature of the products. SC gambling differs from slot-machine gambling in a number of structural ways; it is less continuous; has a slower event frequency; and, emerging literature suggests that near-miss design features are unlikely to have a significant impact upon behaviour. Thus, in our view, and based on the empirical evidence, it appears that earlier parallels between SCs and slot-machines now appear more tenuous. Nevertheless, we encourage further investigation into the potential impact of new and emerging online lottery products because of the more immersive, faster and more technology-based nature of these products.



Moving toward a single‐payer system will reduce billing and insurance‐related costs, but certain reforms to contracts could generate at least as many cost savings without radically reforming the health system

Reducing administrative costs in US health care: Assessing single payer and its alternatives. David Scheinker  Barak D. Richman  Arnold Milstein  Kevin A. Schulman. Health Services Research, March 31 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13649

Abstract

Objective: Excess administrative costs in the US health care system are routinely referenced as a justification for comprehensive reform. While there is agreement that these costs are too high, there is little understanding of what generates administrative costs and what policy options might mitigate them.

Data Sources: Literature review and national utilization and expenditure data.

Study Design: We developed a simulation model of physician billing and insurance‐related (BIR) costs to estimate how certain policy reforms would generate savings. Our model is based on structural elements of the payment process in the United States and considers each provider's number of health plan contracts, the number of features in each health plan, the clinical and nonclinical processes required to submit a bill for payment, and the compliance costs associated with medical billing.

Data Extraction: For several types of visits, we estimated fixed and variable costs of the billing process. We used the model to estimate the BIR costs at a national level under a variety of policy scenarios, including variations of a single payer “Medicare‐for‐All” model that extends fee‐for‐service Medicare to the entire population and policy efforts to reduce administrative costs in a multi‐payer model. We conducted sensitivity analyses of a wide variety of model parameters.

Principal Findings: Our model estimates that national BIR costs are reduced between 33% and 53% in Medicare‐for‐All style single‐payer models and between 27% and 63% in various multi‐payer models. Under a wide range of assumptions and sensitivity analyses, standardizing contracts generates larger savings with less variance than savings from single‐payer strategies.

Conclusion: Although moving toward a single‐payer system will reduce BIR costs, certain reforms to payer‐provider contracts could generate at least as many administrative cost savings without radically reforming the entire health system. BIR costs can be meaningfully reduced without abandoning a multi‐payer system.


People in disaster situations tend to adhere to their social expectations; some groups have cohesive subsets of members who can split off from each other during evacuation without violating their group’s internal expectations

Network Structure in Small Groups and Survival in Disasters. Benjamin Cornwell, Jing-Mao Ho. Social Forces, soab036, April 29 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soab036

Abstract: People in disaster and emergency situations (e.g., building fires) tend to adhere to the social obligations and expectations that are embedded in their preexisting roles and relationships. Accordingly, people survive or perish in groups—specifically, alongside those to whom they were connected before the situation emerged. This article uses social network analysis to expand on this collective behavior account. Specifically, we consider structural heterogeneity with respect to the internal configurations of social ties that compose small groups facing these situations together. Some groups are composed of cohesive subsets of members who can split off from each other during evacuation without violating their group’s internal role-based expectations. We argue that groups that possess this “breakaway” structure can respond to emergencies more flexibly. We explore this using data from the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire of 1977, which killed 165 people. Our data include 303 groups (“parties”) that consisted of 746 people who were present in the dining room where most of the fatalities occurred. Fatality rates were significantly lower in groups that were internally structured such that they could split up in different ways during the escape while still maintaining their strongest social bonds.




Sunday, May 9, 2021

The end of Hale magnetic cycles affect the Sun's radiative output and particulate shielding of our atmosphere through the rapid global reconfiguration of solar magnetism, which makes El Nino switch to La Nina and back

Termination of Solar Cycles and Correlated Tropospheric Variability. Robert J. Leamon  Scott W. McIntosh  Daniel R. Marsh. Earth and Space Science, February 24 2021. https://doi.org/10.1029/2020EA001223

Abstract: The Sun provides the energy required to sustain life on Earth and drive our planet's atmospheric circulation. However, establishing a solid physical connection between solar and tropospheric variability has posed a considerable challenge. The canon of solar variability is derived from the 400 years of observations that demonstrates the waxing and waning number of sunspots over an 11(‐ish) year period. Recent research has demonstrated the significance of the underlying 22 years magnetic polarity cycle in establishing the shorter sunspot cycle. Integral to the manifestation of the latter is the spatiotemporal overlapping and migration of oppositely polarized magnetic bands. We demonstrate the impact of “terminators”—the end of Hale magnetic cycles—on the Sun's radiative output and particulate shielding of our atmosphere through the rapid global reconfiguration of solar magnetism. Using direct observation and proxies of solar activity going back some six decades we can, with high statistical significance, demonstrate a correlation between the occurrence of terminators and the largest swings of Earth's oceanic indices: the transition from El Niño to La Niña states of the central Pacific. This empirical relationship is a potential source of increased predictive skill for the understanding of El Niño climate variations, a high‐stakes societal imperative given that El Niño impacts lives, property, and economic activity around the globe. A forecast of the Sun's global behavior places the next solar cycle termination in mid‐2020; should a major oceanic swing follow, then the challenge becomes: when does correlation become causation and how does the process work?


3 Discussion

In the previous section, we have made use of a modified Superposed Epoch Analysis (mSEA) to investigate the relationships between solar activity measures and variability in a standard measure of the variability in the Earth's largest ocean—the Pacific. We have observed that this mSEA method brackets solar activity and correspondingly systematic transitions from warm‐to‐cool Pacific conditions around abrupt changes in solar activity we have labeled termination points. These termination points mark the transition from one solar activity (sunspot) cycle to the next following the cancellation or annihilation of the previous cycle's magnetic flux at the solar equator—the end of Hale magnetic cycles.

Correlation does not imply causation; however, the recurrent nature of the ONI signal in the terminator fiducial would appear to indicate a strong physical connection between the two systems. Appendix B discusses three statistical Monte Carlo tests that show the chances of these events lining up for five cycles are remote: in summary we may reject the null hypothesis of random cooccurrences with a confidence level p < 3.4 × 10−3. We do not present an exhaustive set of solar activity proxies, but it would appear that the CRF, as the measure displaying the highest variability, as something to be explored in greater detail in coupled climate system models.

There have been many possible explanations postulated for a cosmic‐ray climate connection, including: (i) Forbush decreases inducing increased extratropical storm vorticity (Roberts & Olson, 1973; Tinsley et al., 1989) and atmospheric gravity waves propagating from the auroral ionosphere (Prikryl et al., 2009); (ii) global electric conductivity inducing changes in cloud microphysics (Harrison, 2004; Tinsley, 2000); and (iii) direct formation of ionization particles seeding cloud formation (Svensmark & Friis‐Christensen, 1997; Svensmark et al., 2017). However, the effects of cosmic rays on cloud formation are a matter of hot debate (e.g., Gray et al., 2010; Kristjánsson et al., 2002; Pierce, 2017), with even the sign of the correlation between cosmic rays and climate not agreed on. For all the debate these explanations have generated, they are all irrelevant in terms of the correlations and empirical predictions we discuss here.

Independent of the exact mechanisms of coupling solar modulation to ENSO, which are beyond the scope of this manuscript, the results discussed above and shown in Figure 5 hold for the past five solar cycles, or 60 or so years. The question must be asked, then, why has the regular pattern of Figure 5 occurred and reoccurred regularly since 1966?

As Figure 4 shows, we only have continuous cosmic‐ray observations from 1964, just before the cycle 19 terminator. The F10.7 record extends back to 1947 (near the peak of cycle 17), but Pacific Sea Surface temperatures and sunspot areas extend to the 1870s. Other than the 1915 termination of solar cycle 14, there is little evidence for such a correlation prior to the events discussed here. (Cycle 14 was notably the weakest cycle of the twentieth Century, and thus almost certainly had the highest CRF prior to the continuous observation record.) However, there certainly have been changes in the Earth's atmosphere over the twentieth Century…

3.1 Atmospheric Changes

It is probably not a coincidence that the period of terminator‐ENSO correlation corresponds to the close‐to‐monotonic rise in global sea surface temperatures over the same time period as Figure 4 (the “hockey stick” graph). Tropospheric warming leads to stratospheric cooling (Ramaswamy et al., 2006); do the effects of a colder stratosphere on the physical and chemical processes in it make it more susceptible to amplifying transient changes in solar input? Further, since about 1945, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (Mantua et al., 1997) has been in a predominantly negative phase, the feedback to net irradiance from clouds has been increasingly negative (Zhou et al., 2016), and a ∼4%–6% decrease in cloud cover over the western Pacific (∼140–160°E) has been reported from ship‐borne observations since 1954, with a comparable increase over the mid‐Pacific (∼150–120°W; Bellomo et al., 2014). Note that 160°E is the “balance point” about which warm and cold SSTs flip in an El Niño‐La Niña transition (Pinker et al., 2017).

Thus, over the past several decades the cloud pattern in the western Pacific has adopted an almost El Niño‐like default state, consistent with an observed eastward shift in precipitation in the tropical Pacific and weakening of the Walker circulation over the last century (Deser et al., 2004; Vecchi & Soden, 2007a), and which has been tied, via simple thermodynamics, to a warmer atmosphere. Over the same past four decades timeframe, evidence for a changing Brewer‐Dobson circulation—the mass exchange between troposphere and stratosphere characterized by persistent upwelling of air in the tropics—comes from satellite and radiosonde data, which indicate a reduction in temperatures and ozone and water vapor concentrations, particularly in the tropical lower stratosphere at all longitudes (Thompson & Solomon, 2005), pointing to an accelerated tropical upwelling (Rosenlof & Reid, 2008). Domeisen et al. (2019) discuss the teleconnection of ENSO both vertically, to the stratosphere, and thence latitudinally affecting the strength and variability of the stratospheric polar vortex in the high latitudes of both hemispheres: El Niño events are associated warming and weakening of the polar vortex in the polar stratosphere of both hemispheres, while a cooling can be observed in the tropical lower stratosphere. These impacts are linked by a strengthened Brewer‐Dobson circulation, with planetary waves generated by latent heat release from tropical thunderstorms being the likely modulation mechanism (Deckert & Dameris, 2008; Domeisen et al., 2019).

Thus, it is entirely plausible that since changes in the (upper) atmosphere brought on by a strengthened Brewer‐Dobson circulation, weakened Pacific Walker circulation, and less cloudy Western Pacific, enables the relatively constant terminator‐driven changes to have sufficient “impact” to flip the system from El Niño to La Niña, independent of the actual mechanism that couples solar changes to clouds and ENSO. Such circulation changes are only likely to intensify in a future with higher tropical heat and moisture at the sea surface, affecting not only tropospheric climate but also stratospheric dynamics.

3.2 Socioeconomic Implications

Forecasting ENSO and its related climate variations is a high‐stakes societal imperative given that El Niño impacts “lives, property, and economic activity around the globe” (McPhaden, 2015). For instance, as an example of not necessarily being concerned about why or how an empirical relationship works from a forecast standpoint, Smith et al. (2016) noted “An ability to forecast the time‐averaged NAO months to years ahead would be of great societal benefit, but current operational seasonal forecasts show little skill.” Dunstone et al. (2016) thus improved the skill of 12 months ahead NAO forecasts when an 11 years (solar cycle) parameterized solar irradiance forcing term was added. Smith et al. and Dunstone et al. focused on the severity of the British winter, primarily from the viewpoint of the energy and insurance sectors.

Directly focused on catastrophic ENSO impacts, flooding in Australia during the 2010–2012 La Niñas and the ensuing economic cleanup costs (A$5–10 billion (US$4.9–9.8 billion) in Queensland alone) led to the commissioning of a Government Report on “two of the most significant events in Australia's recorded meteorological history” (Bureau of Meteorology, 2012). Similarly, the Peruvian government estimated the very strong 1997–1998 El Niño event cost about US$3.5 billion, or about 5% of their gross domestic product (GDP). Globally, United Nations estimates of El Niño‐related damage from the same event ranged from US$32 to US$96 billion. In the United States, NOAA assessed direct economic losses from that event likely exceeded US$10 billion (Weiher, 1999).

The mild winters and greater than average rainfall to the Southwest in El Niño years save US energy consumers US$2.2 billion less in fuel heating costs (Teisberg, 1999); however, the savings is lost in La Niña years with more sever winters. Agriculture is the most climate sensitive industry and climate is the primary determinant of agricultural productivity. Estimates of the impacts on U.S. agriculture of the 1997–1998 El Niño and the 1998–1999 La Niña; those losses range from US$1.5–$1.7 billion from El Niño and US$2.2–$6.5 billion from La Niña (Chen et al., 2001; Weiher & Kite‐Powell, 1999). That assessment comes with the important caveat that losses associated with El Niño‐related floods or droughts in some areas can be offset by gains elsewhere, for instance through reduced North Atlantic hurricane activity, lower winter heating bills or better harvests for certain crops—Argentinian wheat yields are strongly increased in El Niño years, for example, whereas US (and moreso Canadian) yields fall (Gutierrez, 2017). Nevertheless, combining the costs of natural disaster recovery with the costs associated with yields of major commodity crops (Gutierrez, 2017; Iizumi et al., 2014), the need to be able to predict ENSO events beyond a seasonal forecast (e.g., https://community.wmo.int/activity‐areas/climate/wmo‐el‐ninola‐nina‐updates (World Meteorological Organization) is high.

That crop yields in North and South America, Australia, and Eurasia vary, along with regional temperature and precipitation changes, makes it clear that ENSO influences, through “teleconnections,” (e.g., Bjerknes, 1969; Domeisen et al., 2019) the global dynamics of seasonal winds, rainfall, and temperature. These teleconnections imply, indeed require, coupling throughout the atmosphere, and despite the mention of troposphere in the title of this paper, manifestations of ENSO are observed throughout the neutral atmosphere and higher.

One final economic impact consideration, also tied to global teleconnections, is the strength of Atlantic hurricane season, which is relatively strong in the first year of La Niña after an El Niño, when waters are still warm but upper‐level wind shears are favorable for cyclone genesis (Vecchi & Soden, 2007b). As such, we may expect a particularly active season in 2021, and maybe even 2020, depending on exactly when the terminator and ENSO transition occurs.

4 Conclusion

As discussed in M2014, the band‐o‐gram developed therein could be extrapolated linearly out in time. The linear extrapolation of the solar activity bands outward in time was verified in McIntosh et al. (2017) by updating the original observational analysis and comparing to the earlier band‐o‐gram. M2014 projected that sunspot cycle 25 spots would start to appear in 2019 and swell in number following the terminator in mid‐2020. Six years later, we are seeing these predictions come true with the first numbered active regions and low level (C‐class) flaring activity. Based on the mSEA of the past 60 years, an enduring warm pool in the central and western Pacific at solar minimum (ONI has been consistently positive since early 2018, even though it never got so warm to become a fully fledged strong El Niño event) was not unexpected, and we expect a rapid transition into La Niña conditions later in 2020 following the sunspot cycle 24 terminator. Given the warm waters, we project a particularly active Atlantic hurricane season in 2021, and maybe even 2020, depending on exactly when the terminator and ENSO transition occurs this year.

In conclusion, we have presented clear evidence in Figure 5 of a recurring empirical relationship between ENSO and the end of solar cycles. We have tried to avoid discussion of causation, which, due to its controversial nature could lead to dismissal of the empirical relationship, and we want open a broader scientific discussion of solar coupling to the Earth and its environment. Nevertheless, independent of the exact coupling mechanisms, the question must be asked, why has the pattern occurred and reoccurred regularly for the past five solar cycles, or 60 years? We have only a few months at most to wait to see if this Terminator‐ENSO relation continues at the onset of the coming solar cycle 25. Should this next terminator be associated with a swing to La Niña then we must seriously consider the capability of coupled global terrestrial modeling efforts to capture “step‐function” events, and assess how complex the Sun‐Earth connection is, with particular attention to the relationship between incoming cosmic rays and clouds and precipitation over our oceans. ENSO is the largest mode of atmospheric variability driving extreme weather events with large costs and so any improvement in prediction of that would be of societal benefit. 

Men are less likely than women to do listening during troubles talk

Santoro, Erik, and Hazel Markus. 2021. “How Do You Listen?: The Relationship Between How Men Listen and Women’s Power and Respect in the U.S.” PsyArXiv. May 10. doi:10.31234/osf.io/4ycf7

Abstract: As American culture confronts the issues raised by #MeToo, some ask, what can men do in interpersonal interactions to become allies and empower women? Building on research in linguistics, communication, sociology, as well as psychology, seven pre-registered studies investigate the relationship between how men listen during troubles talk (i.e., communication about problems) and women’s sense of power and respect. We theorize and compare two styles of effective listening: more other-focused interdependent listening (e.g., asking a question) and more self-focused independent listening (e.g., giving advice). We find that though men are less likely than women to do interdependent listening during troubles talk (Study 1), men can be encouraged to ask questions (Study 2). When investigating the effect on women of how men listen, we found that women anticipate feeling more powerful and respected when listened to by a man friend doing interdependent (vs. independent) listening (Studies 3a – 3c), particularly those women who do not endorse stereotypic gender roles (Study 3c). We partially replicated these findings in two live interaction studies involving strangers communicating over text: women felt more powerful and respected when listened to by men who asked open-ended questions compared to men who gave prescriptive, unsolicited advice (Study 5), though they did not when men simply asked more questions (Study 4). We suggest that listening can assume multiple productive forms, but that compared to independent listening, interdependent listening can serve as an everyday anti-sexist practice to attenuate rather than accentuate the gender hierarchy.


Restarting “Normal” Life after Covid-19: Systematically negative expectations regarding the future and the recovery, majoritarian fears of an economic depression, a new outbreak, & a permanent restriction on freedom

Restarting “Normal” Life after Covid-19 and the Lockdown: Evidence from Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Cristiano Codagnone, Francesco Bogliacino, Camilo Gómez, Frans Folkvord, Giovanni Liva, Rafael Charris, Felipe Montealegre, Francisco Lupiañez Villanueva & Giuseppe A. Veltri. Social Indicators Research, May 8 2021. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11205-021-02697-5

Abstract: In this article, we examine the expectations of the economic outlook, fear of the future, and behavioural change during the first Covid-19 wave, for three European countries (Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy) that have been severely hit. We use a novel dataset that we collected to monitor the three countries during the crisis. As outcome variables, we used expectations (e.g., economic outlook, labour market situation, recovery), fear (e.g., scenario of new outburst, economic depression, restriction to individual rights and freedom), and behavioural change across the following dimensions: savings, cultural consumption, social capital, and risky behaviour. We provide descriptive evidence that is representative of the population of interest, and we estimate the impact of exposure to shock occurred during the crisis on the same outcome variables, using matching techniques. Our main findings are the following: we detected systematically negative expectations regarding the future and the recovery, majoritarian fears of an economic depression, a new outbreak, and a permanent restriction on freedom, a reduction in saving and in social capital. Exposure to shocks decreased expected job prospects, increased withdrawal from accumulated savings, and reduced contacts with the network relevant to job advancement, whereas it had inconclusive effects over fears.


Discussion and Conclusions

In this article, we have shown the beliefs, fears, and behavioural changes of citizens in three countries (Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy), on the verge of the post Covid-19 first wave. We have discussed how the crisis always forces citizens to reassess their beliefs, their fears and their behaviour. We postulate that the climate of uncertainty and the exposure to shocks that occurred during the crisis were likely to shape those outcome variables. This contribution fills a gap in the current literature on the effects of Covid-19 and related lockdown mitigation strategy where evidence is largely missing on how the gradient of exposure to negative shocks has shaped expectations and emotions about the future, and behavioural change. We did so, by presenting a novel database from a longitudinal study conducted in three waves in Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy between April 24 and May 20 (Bogliacino et al. 2020). We focussed on the data from the third wave on expectations (general, labour market situation, recovery), fear (scenario of new outbreak, economic depression, restriction to individual rights and freedom), and behavioural change across the following dimensions: savings, cultural consumption, social capital, unhealthy lifestyle. We used, however, also the data from wave 1 and wave 2 to control for the effects of, respectively, socio-economic background and health status (from wave I), and the indirect effect via cognitive performances and preferences (from wave II).

At descriptive level, the findings support our initial hypotheses, showing that most of the respondents in the three countries report negative expectations about the future and appear entrenched by possibly unjustified fears about extremely negative scenarios. The descriptive results are consistent with the hypothesis that, given the objective and subjectively perceived radical uncertainty and the framing adopted by governments and the media, even those individuals who were not severely impacted by the pandemic and/or lockdown have updated their expectations about the future and are fearful about what awaits in the coming months. Two findings from those presented earlier suffice here to support this statement: 56% of the sample expected 2021 to be worse than 2020; an economic depression was considered somewhat likely or very likely by 91% of sample. Descriptive data are also quite unequivocal on the fact that this has produced sizeable behavioural changes for what concerns savings and social capital. Almost one third of the sample was forced to use their savings during lockdown more than in last month before the outbreak of Covid-19. This evidence suggests a tangible behavioural change and a source of worry that feeds back into the creation of negative expectations and fears. As much as 47.3% of the sample has lost contact with people relevant for their career, status or the future possibility to get a job during the lockdown as compared to before the outbreak of the pandemic. Behavioural changes are less pronounced for what concerns risky health behaviour and more polarized for the case of cultural consumption. Only 23% of the sample indicated that they adopted unhealthier lifestyle during the lockdown compared to before. On the other hand, for cultural consumption 22.1% have increased it, 36.5 maintained the same pattern, and 41.4% consumed less.

We presented a DAG positing that negative shocks have a direct effect on our outcome variables, an indirect effect via cognitive ability and preferences, and are potentially confounded by socio-economic background, and health status. Controlling for the latter three causal paths via adoption of a selection on observables research design, we have been able to conclude that the gradient of exposure to negative events (above the median) has statistically significant effects on six out of 10 outcomes. First, being severely exposed to shocks determined stronger negative expectations about one’s future jobs prospects. Second, the severity of exposure decreased the fears of an economic depression, of a new outbreak of the pandemic, and of permanent limitations to our freedom and rights, although the result was not robust to the choice of the estimator. Third, individuals who were more severely exposed to shocks used their saving more than before the pandemic outbreak in ways that are more marked than had they not experienced. Fifth, the same applied to social capital in that strong negative shocks led individuals to disregard instrumental social relations more than in presence of milder exposure to shocks.

With respect to the latter findings, it is important to remark, in particular, the first and the last results for, if consolidated, could lead to a negatively self-propelling loop. It is known that income and employment shocks exert negative effects on social capital reducing the social networks that help the unemployed to find new opportunities (Machin & Manning, 1998). Decades of research demonstrate that social connections are vital to wellbeing and coping with difficult situations (Sibley et al., 2020) and that those without social connections and with pre-existing vulnerabilities may be more at risk. As high exposure to shocks is making individuals, at the same time, more pessimistic on their jobs’ prospect and using less their social capital, there is a short-term negative interaction effect that may become a long-term effect, especially if expectations and fears are reinforced. Furthermore, the sociological literature and the literature on the psychology of class already tell us that more vulnerable groups are less used to take advantage of social capital and tend to interpret constraints and the structure of opportunities in self-limiting way. This already entrenched patterns could be multiplied by the negative shocks produced by Covid-19 and related lockdown mitigation strategies, so that the impact of the latter would become even more unequal than it is currently being shown to be. The emerging studies cited in the introduction about the inequality effect of lockdown, in fact, focus only on the tangible dimensions. Our findings suggest that there is a less tangible dimension related to habitus, beliefs, and emotions that could further exacerbate the inequalities generated by the pandemic and lockdown.

One of the strengths of the current study is that we have conducted data collection in three separate countries that have been more severely hit by the Covid-19 than other European countries. Second, the richness of the data made it possible to provide a characterization of the outcome variables that is representative of the population of interest (external validity), and to estimate a plausible counterfactual of exposure to shock to identify the causal impact (internal validity). Third, as the literature on Covid-19 is expanding rapidly, only limited studies have focused on the psychological, social, and economic consequences of the current economic halt. Nonetheless, the current study also has some limitations. First, although our surveys have been conducted for several weeks, following the panel for a longer period would have provided us with a better understanding of the long-term effects of the pandemic and the lock-down situation on people’s health and well-being, and of course ideally, one would have included a baseline pre-lockdown. Second, this study focused on three countries that have been hit hardest by the pandemic, whereby Spain and Italy had very strict lockdown regulations. If we would have included also countries that have experienced less health consequences of the Covid-19, such as Eastern European countries, or countries that implemented less strict regulations, such as the Netherlands and Germany, the comparisons between countries could have been richer. Third, regional variations are also very important to understand the first wave of the Covid-19, as it was clearly the case for Italy, but exploring them was beyond the scope of this paper.

Our findings have clear policy implications. From the first set of results, we infer the need for policies that are able to restore hope and reduce radical uncertainty. Government ought to present the citizenry with contingent mid-term plan, not only in terms of public budget resources earmarked to the purpose. Particularly, they should mitigate fears that very pessimistic scenarios will occur. The second set of implications from the results concerns the consequences of shocks. Government should recognize that the degree of exposure has been heterogenous and should design new instruments of social policy and social assistance that provide coverage even to those households which are normally outside the range of social insurance schemes, softening the deaccumulation that took place from private assets and savings. Moreover, they might introduce active labour market policies to counteract the neglect of important networking activities during the lockdowns. Finally, they should mitigate negative job prospect expectations, as this may lead to an exit of the labour force with detrimental consequences in the long term. 

Behavioral and Neural Signatures of Visual Imagery Vividness Extremes: Aphantasia vs. Hyperphantasia

Behavioral and Neural Signatures of Visual Imagery Vividness Extremes: Aphantasia vs. Hyperphantasia. Fraser Milton, Jon Fulford, Carla Dance, James Gaddum, Brittany Heuerman-Williamson, Kealan Jones, Kathryn F Knight, Matthew MacKisack, Crawford Winlove, Adam Zeman. Cerebral Cortex Communications, tgab035, May 5 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/texcom/tgab035

Abstract: Although Galton recognized in the 1880s that some individuals lack visual imagery, this phenomenon was mostly neglected over the following century. We recently coined the terms ‘aphantasia’ and ‘hyperphantasia’ to describe visual imagery vividness extremes, unlocking a sustained surge of public interest. Aphantasia is associated with subjective impairment of face recognition and autobiographical memory. Here we report the first systematic, wide-ranging neuropsychological and brain imaging study of people with aphantasia (n = 24), hyperphantasia (n = 25) and mid-range imagery vividness (n = 20). Despite equivalent performance on standard memory tests, marked group differences were measured in autobiographical memory and imagination, participants with hyperphantasia outperforming controls who outperformed participants with aphantasia. Face recognition difficulties were reported more commonly in aphantasia. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory highlighted reduced extraversion in the aphantasia group and increased openness in the hyperphantasia group. Resting state fMRI revealed stronger connectivity between prefrontal cortices and the visual network among hyperphantasic than aphantasic participants. In an active fMRI paradigm, there was greater anterior parietal activation among hyperphantasic and control than aphantasic participants when comparing visualization of famous faces and places with perception. These behavioral and neural signatures of visual imagery vividness extremes validate and illuminate this significant but neglected dimension of individual difference.

Keywords: Aphantasia, hyperphantasia, imagery, neuroimaging, autobiographical


CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks; an additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average

From 2012... Engelberg, Joseph and Gao, Pengjie and Parsons, Christopher A., The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (May 2012). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364595

Abstract: CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for “important” members such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Social Network

JEL Classification: G30


Weight systems and the emergence of the first Pan-European money

Nicola Ialongo et al, A small change revolution. Weight systems and the emergence of the first Pan-European money, Journal of Archaeological Science (2021). DOI: 10.1016/j.jas.2021.105379

Highlights

• Metal trade in Europe increases in the course of the Bronze Age.

• Systematic fragmentation of metal objects increases in the course of the Bronze Age.

• The spread of weighing technology is correlated to the spread of fragmentation.

• Cosine Quantogram Analysis and Monte Carlo simulations show that metal fragments comply with weight systems.

• Metal fragments were likely used as money.

Abstract: In the Bronze Age (c. 2300–800 BC), European communities gave up their economic independence and became entangled in a continental trade network. In this paper, we will test the hypothesis that the adoption of a ‘Pan-European’ currency has favoured the development of such a network. We define a methodology to test the money-hypothesis in pre-literate economies, based on analogies with the material characters of metallic money in the Ancient Near East. The statistical properties of metals from European hoards are compared with those of balance weights, in order to test the following expectation: if they were used as money, complete objects and fragments are expected to comply with standard weight systems. The results meet the expectation, and indicate that bronze fragments possess the same statistical properties as hack-silver money in the Ancient Near East. The sample includes approximately 3000 metal objects, collected from two test-areas: Italy and Central Europe. The sample of balance weights includes all the items known to date for pre-literate Bronze Age Europe, collected within the framework of the ERC Project ‘Weight and Value.’


Popular version: Scrap for cash: Bronze Age witnessed revolution in small change across Europe (phys.org)

4. Discussion

4.1. Weight regulation

The results of the statistical analysis support the money-hypothesis for Late BA Europe, showing that metal objects were probably intentionally fragmented in order to comply with weight systems. The analogy with the Ancient Near East suggests that bronze fragments in Europe had the same function as silver fragments in Mesopotamia, i.e. they performed the basic functions of money. The joint analysis of balance weights and bronze objects suggests that monetary patterns of exchange existed in BA Europe, that they complied with a Pan-European index of value, and that they were based on the use of metals as standard media of exchange. The actual relevance of the phenomenon is difficult to quantify. For the time being, we can only observe that metal fragments were used as money frequently enough to leave measurable traces in the archaeological record; how frequently is still not possible to define. Unlike proper balance weights – that produce sharp, neatly separated clusters of mass values (Ialongo and Rahmstorf, 2019) – bronze fragments produce small clusters that stand out from a diffused background noise. FDA suggest that weight-regulated fragmentation is not very accurate. Based on the statistical analysis, we can derive that systematic fragmentation tends to produce fragments with mass values that are multiples of weight units, and that complete objects and ingots were cast with no specific mass prescription. Just like in the Mesopotamian world, the compliance with weight systems is an indirect consequence of trade, rather than a pre-defined regulation. Assessing the actual relevance of the phenomenon will require further research and a larger number of regional samples.

As to why fragments tend to assume regular mass values, we can propose a hypothesis. The typical trade situation – documented in Mesopotamian texts – includes two agents, each provided with their own weighing equipment (Peyronel, 2011). Metal fragments do not need to be weight-regulated, since each agent can easily quantify the value of the transaction. However, pre-weighed fragments would speed up the operations, by preventing the calculation of a remainder. Breaking bronze objects is relatively simple, and does not require any particular metallurgical knowledge. Experimental results show that a socketed axe made of tin bronze (8%) breaks into pieces with three blows if heated up at c. 560°, the temperature of a medium-sized campfire (Knight, 2017). The required temperature is lower if copper is alloyed with lead (Knight, 2019). In order to produce accurate fragments, one can progressively break off small bits and repeat the weighing until the desired mass is obtained. The repetitiveness of the operation increases the skill of the operator, and skill increases accuracy. Fragmentation can be performed either before or during the transaction, depending on the situation. Archaeological evidence suggests that, at least in the Late BA, bringing along small stocks of metal fragments was a rather common habit. Many burials in central and northern Europe include small boxes of organic materials, containing metal fragments and scraps, blunt tools suited for breaking metals and, sometimes, scale beams and balance weights (Pare, 1999Roscio et al., 2011). One of such boxes was recently identified among the finds of the Late BA battlefield in the Tollense Valley (Northern Germany, c. 1350–1200 BC) (Fig. 2), which attests that their use was not limited to the burial rite (Uhlig et al., 2019). These containers offer a suggestive picture of how metallic money could be carried around for everyday purposes.

For the complete objects, the absence of weight-regulation has a perfectly logical explanation. The subsample between 7 and 200 g includes every type of ornament, tool and weapon with the only exception of swords, which are exclusively represented in fragments. Since the size of a useable object is dictated by its function, there is no reason to assume that its mass should be regulated in order to fit a predetermined value.

CQA does not give significant results for ingots and ingot fragments in the shekel-range. This can depend on several factors. The fact that ingots are, on average, thicker than any other object in the sample could imply that they are more difficult to break into pieces with a predetermined mass. It could also mean that ingots and ingot fragments were not used as currency. Ingots are usually made of pure copper (e.g. Pernicka et al., 2016), and thus might have been used exclusively as raw material. It should be noted, however, that we could not compare the ingots to the balance weights in the mina-range. It is possible that, since they are on average significantly more massive than other object categories, their mass was measured in fractions of the mina rather than in multiples of the shekel. Finally, one has to consider that the main use of heavy balance weights is to weigh out bulks of goods, rather than single objects. The fact that individual ingot fragments do not comply with weight systems does not rule out the likely possibility that they were traded in weighed bulks. One way to test this could be to analyse the total weight of hoards, and verify if they conform to multiples of the European mina. Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine if a hoard is in pristine conditions, or if it underwent modifications before or after its recovery.

4.2. The value of money

Our results show that the value of bronze was quantified according to a shared frame of reference. What we define as ‘bronze,’ however, is an umbrella term for many different copper alloys, mostly containing variable proportions of tin and lead. It is theoretically possible that different alloys had different values, which could somehow hamper the circulation of metals as money. For BA Europe the puzzle is difficult to solve, as we have no direct evidence of value equivalences between different types of bronze and between bronze and other commodities.

An argument in favour of the hypothesis of the different values could be that, since bronze fragments are made of different alloys, their indiscriminate use as currency would hamper or entirely prevent their reuse as raw material. The argument, however, fails to correctly account for the evidence. Substantial quantities of fragments exist in the archaeological record and fragments were undoubtedly exchanged, regardless of whether or not one accepts their monetary use. At the same time, it would seem that metallurgists did not have problems in finding the right alloy for their purposes. This either implies that they were able to determine the alloy of fragments, or that they used fragments in limited quantities and mostly relied on other forms of raw metal, such as ingots. Hence, the argument also fails to acknowledge the relevant role of recycling (e.g. Radivojević et al., 2018). A second argument could be that some metals used in bronze alloys are rarer than others, and thus more expensive. Lead, for example, is alternatively assumed to be expensive (e.g. Johansen, 2016) or cheap (e.g. Needham and Cook, 1988), depending on whether it had to be imported (Scandinavia) or was locally available (British Isles). But if distance played such a determinant role, how can one explain, for instance, the rich metallic record of Denmark, which completely lacks copper and tin sources? The problem of value is extremely complex, and bears far-reaching implications; it basically implies theorising a continent-wide market economy for BA Europe, and cannot be addressed here. Hence, while these arguments are worthy of consideration, they should not play, for now, a decisive role in the interpretation, in one way or another.

An alternative solution could be to assume that the problem of value is not correlated to the diversity of alloys, but rather to different modes of circulation. Different models on the circulation of metals tend to focus perhaps too much on metallurgy: If fragments were mainly exchanged as money their main purpose was to circulate, not to be recycled. Moreover, their circulation was certainly not limited to metallurgists. In theory, a single fragment could circulate for decades without ever ending up in a metallurgist's hands.

Economic theory does not explain why money has value. One way to justify why worthless pieces of paper can have the same monetary function of precious metals (the so-called ‘Hahn's problem’; Hahn, 1965) is to admit that ‘if people believe that money has value, it does’ (Velde, 2021: 201). Once money is acknowledged to be valuable, however, the market dictates how much value money has. It follows that, if money can be a worthless substance, its market value is not necessarily correlated to the substance of which money is made. Since the value of money (and commodities alike) is regulated by the market, that value will be determined by the most frequent use that the market makes of the substance of which money is made. Hence, if metallurgy is the prevalent use, then it is possible that different alloys will have different values. If monetary use is prevalent, then the difference of alloys will play a minor role in the determination of value.

4.3. The origin of money? Towards a theoretical framework for money in BA Europe

Weighed currency was not the first form of money in Europe. It was, however, the first that could be potentially accepted anywhere, provided that weighing technology was available. In other words, weighing technology does not originate money, but simply provides a universally-valid frame of reference for the quantification of its value (Rahmstorf, 2016). The idea that the origin of money is correlated to technology or to the complexity of socio-economic systems implies an evolutionary paradigm, which hampers our understanding of the functions of pre-modern economies. There is nothing in economic theory that prevents the emergence of money in any given market, in economies of any complexity, and at any point in history (e.g. Jones, 1976Velde, 2021). Economic evolutionism has been shown to be based on a substantial misunderstanding of the social dynamics that regulate the modern economy (Bloch and Parry, 1989). On the contrary, it has been contended that the modern western economy is still as much embedded in social institutions as only ‘primitive’ economies were previously believed to be (e.g. Appadurai, 1986), and that the economy in ‘primitive’ societies is substantially less embedded than the evolutionary paradigm would predict (e.g. Granovetter, 1985). The contemporary approach to prehistoric money owes much to a seminal article by G. Dalton (1965), in which the author traces a sharp distinction between ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’ money. Soon after, however, J. Melitz – an economist – demonstrated that Dalton failed to acknowledge that supposedly ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’ monies have, in fact, the same functions and limitations (Melitz, 1970). Since then, the functional equivalence between ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’ money is generally accepted by most economists, economic historians, and economic anthropologists (e.g. Jones, 1976Velde, 2021Zelizer, 2000).

Money is not an evolutionary milestone, but simply a solution to the practical problem of the ‘double coincidence of wants’ (Jevons, 1875:3), stating that no one can trade with anyone who does not need or does not want whatever it is that they have to offer in payment. For example, if a pig breeder wants wheat and has only pigs to offer, they cannot obtain wheat if the crop farmer does not need or want pigs. The problem can be solved by agreeing upon using a third medium that everyone will eventually come to accept, as it is widely documented in many so-called primitive economies (e.g. Einzig, 1966Pryor, 1977). Money is not inevitable but it is convenient, as it has no requirements other than being customarily accepted by most agents in a given market. Metals represent only a limited part of all the pre-coinage monies documented either historically or ethnographically, which include perishable materials such as barley (e.g. BA Mesopotamia: Steinkeller, 2004), textiles (e.g. Classic Maya: Baron, 2018), bark-cloth (e.g. Early Colonial West Africa: Pallaver, 2015), and dried fish (e.g. Medieval Iceland: Mehler and Gardiner, 2021). Money is merely a convention, whose embodied physical media can have intrinsic value (such as silver coins) as well as none at all (i.e. banknotes) (Velde, 2021).

Concerning BA Europe, money is often believed to appear in some forms with the spread of mass metallurgy. The so-called Ösenringbarren (a type of ingot-like objects shaped as open rings common in Central Europe in the Early BA, c. 2150–1700 BC) are a common example. They show a noticeable regularity in shape, mass, and composition (Lenerz-de Wilde, 1995), and are regarded by some scholars as evidence of the earliest money in Europe (e.g. Pare, 2013Kuijpers and Popa, 2021). Since they exist several centuries before the introduction of weighing technology in Central Europe, their approximate regularity can be explained by relatively standardised moulds, and by the intuitive ability of experienced users to determine the approximate mass-equivalence of two objects simply by holding them in both hands (Kuijpers and Popa, 2021). If Ösenringbarren were indeed money – which we have no reason to doubt – their function was no different from the later, weight-regulated metal currencies. The difference is in their circulation. Since weighing technology was not available (until proven otherwise) there was no way to assess their value objectively or, for example, to calculate fractions and multiples. One can think of Ösenringbarren as a form of ‘fiduciary money’, i.e. a standard medium of exchange whose value is conventionally agreed upon, and whose intrinsic value is not relevant for the quantification of their exchange value. As it was recently proposed, fiduciary currencies can predate the emergence of commodity currencies, contrary to the common belief (Bresson, 2021). Whether classifying different types of money may or may not be the point, we would like to draw attention on the reasons why some monies are accepted in some regions and not in others. The Ösenringbarren relied on their recognisable shape, approximate size, and peculiar chemical composition in order to be accepted, because these characters were well-known and understood in the limited area where they were in common use, i.e. between southern Germany and the Czech Republic. The reason why we do not find Ösenringbarren outside this area is because those same characters were not recognised as ‘valid’ elsewhere. The spread of metallurgy undoubtedly expands trade networks, and increases the potential utility of money. The introduction of weighing technology, on the other hand, exponentially expands the user base by providing an objective frame of reference that transcends traditional cultural boundaries. At the same time, weighing technology does not alter the functions of money, and does not imply the erasure of other patterns of monetary and non-monetary exchange. Finally, if weighing technology is not a requisite for money, neither is metallurgy. By the same token, we should not prejudicially rule out a wide range of perishable commodities that are invisible in the archaeological record, but which could have been used as money before, during and after the introduction of metallurgy.

People who are involved in politics tend "to be attracted by its intellectual challenge," and tend "not to be easily shamed, nor to be particularly humble"

Bromme, Laurits, and Tobias Rothmund. 2021. “Mapping Political Trust and Involvement in the Personality Space – A Systematic Review and Analysis.” PsyArXiv. May 2. doi:10.31234/osf.io/hrk8f

Abstract: Individual differences in political trust and involvement in politics have been linked to Big Five personality dispositions. However, inconsistent correlational patterns have been reported. As a systematic review is still missing, the present paper provides an overview of the current state of the empirical literature. A systematic review of 43 publications (N = 215,323 participants) confirmed substantial inconsistency in the correlational patterns and corroborated a suspicion that the frequent use of low-bandwidth personality short scales might be responsible, among other reasons. In a second step, we conducted two empirical studies (N1 = 988 and N2 = 795), estimating latent correlations between the Big Five and political trust and involvement at different hierarchical levels. We found that personality relations were consistent across different subdimensions of trust (e.g., trust in politicians, institutional trust) and involvement (e.g., political interest, political self-efficacy, participation propensity) and are therefore best estimated at aggregated levels (i.e., general political trust and involvement). Meanwhile, correlational patterns differed substantially between Big Five facets, confirming that previous inconsistencies can be partly attributed to a misbalanced representation of facets in Big Five short scales and indicating that associations should be estimated at lower levels of the personality hierarchy.


Rolf Degen summarizing... Is everybody's sin nobody's sin? The prevalence of behaviors has only very small effects on their evaluation as morally good or bad

Do behavioral base rates impact associated moral judgments? Carl P. Jago. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 95, July 2021, 104145. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104145

Abstract: In a series of studies, we ask whether and to what extent the base rate of a behavior influences associated moral judgment. Previous research aimed at answering different but related questions are suggestive of such an effect. However, these other investigations involve injunctive norms and special reference groups which are inappropriate for an examination of the effects of base rates per se. Across five studies, we find that, when properly isolated, base rates do indeed influence moral judgment, but they do so with only very small effect sizes. In another study, we test the possibility that the very limited influence of base rates on moral judgment could be a result of a general phenomenon such as the fundamental attribution error, which is not specific to moral judgment. The results suggest that moral judgment may be uniquely resilient to the influence of base rates. In a final pair of studies, we test secondary hypotheses that injunctive norms and special reference groups would inflate any influence on moral judgments relative to base rates alone. The results supported those hypotheses.

Keywords: MoralityMoral judgmentBlameCharacterHarmNormBase rateNormalityDescriptive normInjunctive normSocial influenceCorruptConformityInfluenceMoral norm


Check also: Making moral principles suit yourself. Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Laura Niemi, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, May 4 2021. People’s commitment to moral principles may be maintained when they recall others’ past violations, but their commitment may wane when they recall their own violations