Although the US has historically been a highly-residentially mobile nation, yearly moves are halved from rates in the 1970s and quartered from rates in the late 19th century; 50% of Americans want to move - but can't

The cultural dynamics of declining residential mobility. Buttrick, N., & Oishi, S. American Psychologist, 76(6), 904–916. Jan 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000881

We discuss the cultural power of changes in nation-level residential mobility. Using a theoretically informed analysis of mobility trends across the developed world, we argue that a shift from a culture full of people moving their residence to a culture full of people staying in place is associated with decreases, among its residents, in individualism, happiness, trust, optimism, and endorsement of the notion that hard work leads to success. We use the United States as a case study: Although the United States has historically been a highly-residentially mobile nation, yearly moves in the United States are halved from rates in the 1970s and quartered from rates in the late 19th century. In the past four decades, the proportion of Americans who are stuck in neighborhoods they no longer wish to live in is up nearly 50%. We discuss how high rates of mobility may have originally shaped American culture and how recent declines in residential mobility may relate to current feelings of cultural stagnation. Finally, we speculate on future trends in American mobility and the consequences of a society where citizens increasingly find themselves stuck in place.

Public Significance Statement—This article examines the role that residential mobility may play in shaping cultural values. We discuss how residential mobility may foster an ethos built on dynamism, optimism, and the belief that hard work leads to success; we examine the relationship between shifting levels of mobility and feelings of optimism, well-being, trust, and individualism; and we speculate about how American culture, one specifically formed by mobility, may continue to change as more and more residents find themselves stuck in place.

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They argue that "declining residential mobility (being “stuck”) decreases individualism, happiness, trust, optimism & belief in the hard work equals success." (from one of the authors' tweet, https://twitter.com/NickButtrick/status/1485207997005582340)

These authors claim that Low Socioeconomic Status Is Associated with a Greater Neural Response to Both Rewards and Losses

Low Socioeconomic Status Is Associated with a Greater Neural Response to Both Rewards and Losses. Stuart F. White, Robin Nusslock, Gregory E. Miller. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 1–13. Jan 20 2022. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01821

Abstract: Low socioeconomic status (SES) has been associated with distinct patterns of reward processing, which appear to have adverse implications for health outcomes, well-being, and human capital. However, most studies in this literature have used complex tasks that engage more than reward processing and/or retrospectively studied childhood SES in samples of adults. To clarify how SES relates to the development of reward processing tendencies, we measured income-to-poverty ratio (IPR) in 172 youth who subsequently underwent functional MRI while completing a passive avoidance task to assess neural responses to reward and loss information. Participants were 12–15 years old (mean = 13.94, SD = .52; 65.7% female) from a sample broadly representative of the Chicago area in terms of SES (IPR range = 0.1–34.53; mean = 3.90; SD = 4.15) and racial makeup (40.1% European-American; 30.8% Black; 29.1% Hispanic). To the extent they had lower IPR, children displayed a trend toward worse behavioral performance on the passive avoidance task. Lower IPR also was associated with a greater response in attention brain regions to reward and loss cues and to reward and loss feedback. Lower IPR also was associated with reduced differentiation between reward and loss feedback in the ventromedial prefrontal and parietal cortex. The current data suggest that both increased salience of reward/loss information and reduced discrimination between reward and loss feedback could be factors linking SES with the development of human capital and health outcomes.

From 2010... Beliefs About Cognitive Gender Differences: Accurate for Direction, Underestimated for Size

From 2010... Beliefs About Cognitive Gender Differences: Accurate for Direction, Underestimated for Size. Diane F. Halpern, Carli A. Straight & Clayton L. Stephenson. Sex Roles volume 64, pages 336–347. Nov 7 2010. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11199-010-9891-2

Abstract: Although stereotype accuracy is a large, and often controversial, area of psychological research, surprisingly little research has examined the beliefs people have about gender differences in cognitive abilities. This study investigates the accuracy of these beliefs in a sample of 106 highly educated U.S. adults. Participants provided estimates of male and female performance for 12 cognitive tasks and games. These estimates were compared with published data on gender differences on the same 12 cognitive tasks and games. Results showed that participants were generally accurate about the direction of gender differences, but underestimated the size of gender differences.

Asks whether Is It Morally Bad to Prefer Attractive Partners; this poster, an ugly guy, although clearly disfavored by others because of this preference for beauty, thinks it is not morally bad that others prefer the cute ones (said with clear sadness :-( )

Is It Bad to Prefer Attractive Partners? William D’Alessandro. Forthcoming in the Journal of the American Philosophical Association. Archived Jan 17 2022, contents seem to be from 2018. https://philarchive.org/archive/DALIIB

1 The issue

In a variety of ways, our society favors attractive people and disfavors unattractive people. Social scientists have observed, for instance, that cuter children get more positive attention from their school teachers (Adams & Cohen 1974), that better-looking defendants are treated more leniently by the justice system (Mazzella & Feingold 1994), and that beautiful people are generally perceived as more honest, kind, competent and friendly (Jackson et al. 1995).

These forms of discrimination deserve to be discussed more widely and taken more seriously than they usually are. But treatments of “lookism” by philosophers have condemned most forms of the practice in unambiguous terms (cf. (Chambers forthcoming), (Davis 2007), (Mason 2021), (Minerva 2017). And rightly so: it’s easy to see that cuter kindergartners aren’t entitled to a better educational experience, that ugly convicts don’t deserve harsher punishments, and so on. 

Treating people differently in these ways for these reasons is bad, just as it would be morally unacceptable to favor white students or wealthy defendants.

There’s another type of lookist discrimination, however, that’s both extremely common and widelycondoned by people of all moral persuasions. The attitude I’m talking about is the preference for attractive sexual and romantic partners. Of course, it would be an understatement to say that we merely tolerate this type of discrimination. It’s not only acceptable but thoroughly normal, and in fact normative, in the sense that we expect people to prefer attractive partners and deviant preferences are often met with surprise and disapproval. This impression survives empirical scrutiny: as one researcher writes, “abundant evidence has been collected to show that people clearly prefer physically attractive potential partners over less attractive potential partners” (Greitemeyer 2010: 318).

Philosophers have yet to give this phenomenon much thought. This paper sets out do so, by trying to answer the question posed in the title: Is it morally bad to prefer attractive partners? Or is this a form of discrimination we should accept, and perhaps even promote?

I consider arguments for both views. In broad strokes, I think there’s at least one strong argument that preferring attractive partners is bad. The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. In particular, a case can be made that the preference for attractive partners is both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.

Early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in the US: The adverse mental health impact of risk perception and expected infection severity appeared to be much stronger for Republicans than Democrats

The interplay between partisanship, risk perception, and mental distress during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Soyoung Kwon. Psychology, Health & Medicine, Jan 20 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/13548506.2022.2029916 

Abstract: COVID-19 is a profoundly partisan issue in the U.S., with increasing polarization of the Republicans’ and Democrats’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their precautionary actions to reduce virus transmission. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether and how partisan gaps in many aspects of the pandemic are linked to mental health, which has increasingly been a major concern. This study examined the association between political partisanship and mental health by assessing the mediating and moderating relationships between risk perception, expected infection severity of COVID-19, and partisanship in terms of mental health during the early stages of the pandemic. The data were drawn from a cross-sectional web survey conducted between March 20 and 30, 2020, with a sample of U.S. adults (N = 4,327). Of those participants, 38.9% and 29.6% were Democrats and Republicans, respectively. The results indicate that Democrats were more likely to experience COVID-induced mental distress than Republicans, and higher risk perception and expected infection severity were associated with mental distress. Furthermore, risk perception and expected infection severity of COVID-19 mediated approximately 24%–34% of the associations between political partisanship and mental distress. Finally, the adverse mental health impact of risk perception and expected infection severity appeared to be much stronger for Republicans than Democrats. The findings suggest that political partisanship is a key factor to understanding mental health consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S.

Keywords: Partisanshipmental distresspandemicrisk perception

Across all model specifications, high-income individuals were more likely to donate their money and volunteer their time than low-income individuals; were more likely to engage in prosocial behavior under high (vs. low) income inequality

The Link Between Income, Income Inequality, and Prosocial Behavior Around the World - A Multiverse Approach. Lucía Macchia and Ashley V. Whillans. Social Psychology Vol. 52, No. 6, January 10, 2022 https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000466

Abstract. The questions of whether high-income individuals are more prosocial than low-income individuals and whether income inequality moderates this effect have received extensive attention. We shed new light on this topic by analyzing a large-scale dataset with a representative sample of respondents from 133 countries (N = 948,837). We conduct a multiverse analysis with 30 statistical models: 15 models predicting the likelihood of donating money to charity and 15 models predicting the likelihood of volunteering time to an organization. Across all model specifications, high-income individuals were more likely to donate their money and volunteer their time than low-income individuals. High-income individuals were more likely to engage in prosocial behavior under high (vs. low) income inequality. Avenues for future research and potential mechanisms are discussed.

Check also Does economic inequality moderate the effect of class on prosocial behavior? A large-scale test of a recent hypothesis by Côté et al. Hagen von Hermanni, Andreas Tutic. PLOS, August 9, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/08/cote-et-al-argue-that-societies-with.html

Almost half of the participants had felt pressured to orgasm; most common action in response was to fake the orgasm

Orgasm Coercion: Overlaps Between Pressuring Someone to Orgasm and Sexual Coercion. Sara B. Chadwick & Sari M. van Anders. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Jan 20 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-021-02156-9

Abstract: Trying to ensure that a partner orgasms during sex is generally seen as positive, but research has yet to assess how this might involve pressuring partners to orgasm in coercive ways. In the present study, we tested whether pressuring a partner to orgasm is a coercive behavior by assessing how this behavior overlaps with sexual coercion (i.e., pressuring someone into having sex). Participants of diverse gender/sex and sexual identities (N = 912, M age = 31.31 years, SD = 9.41) completed an online survey that asked them whether they had ever felt pressured by a partner to orgasm, to describe what partners have said or done to pressure them, and to answer a series of questions about the most recent incident in which this occurred. Mixed quantitative and qualitative results showed that orgasm pressure tactics were analogous to sexual coercion tactics and that being pressured to orgasm was associated with experiencing sexual coercion, faking orgasms, and negative psychological and relationship outcomes. Together, findings challenge the assumption that trying to ensure a partner’s orgasm occurrence is necessarily positive and demonstrate that orgasm coercion exists.

Relationship satisfaction is but one factor that contributes to whether a couple stays together or separates; other factors include investment, perception of alternatives, and commitment

Development of Relationship Satisfaction Across the Life Span: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Janina Larissa Bühler email the author, Samantha Krauss, Ulrich Orth. Psychological Bulletin, 147(10), 1012-1053, Jan 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000342

Abstract: Previous research has not led to any agreement as to the normative trajectory of relationship satisfaction. In this systematic review and meta-analysis, we summarize the available evidence on development of relationship satisfaction, as a function of age and relationship duration. Data came from 165 independent samples including 165,039 participants. In the analyses, we examined cross-sectional information on mean level, that is, the percent-of-maximum-possible (POMP) score at the first assessment, and longitudinal information on mean change (i.e., change in POMP scores per year). The mean age associated with effect sizes ranged from 20 to 76 years and the mean relationship duration from 3 months to 46 years. Results on mean levels indicated that relationship satisfaction decreased from age 20 to 40, reached a low point at age 40, then increased until age 65, and plateaued in late adulthood. As regards the metric of relationship duration, relationship satisfaction decreased during the first 10 years of the relationship, reached a low point at 10 years, increased until 20 years, and then decreased again. Results on mean change indicated that relationship satisfaction decreased within a given relationship, with the largest declines in young adulthood and in the first years of a relationship. Moderator analyses suggested that presence of children and measure of relationship satisfaction explained variance in the mean level. Except for these two moderators, the pattern of findings held across characteristics such as birth cohort, sample type, country, ethnicity, gender, household shared with partner, marital status, relationship transitions, and dyadic data.

Public Significance Statement: This systematic review and meta-analysis provides a robust picture of normative development of relationship satisfaction across the life span, focusing on the role of age and relationship duration in describing this pattern. On average, results indicated both decreases and increases in relationship satisfaction across the life span, but trajectories differed systematically between the time metrics. Specifically, the findings showed a U-shaped trend for age and a more complex, dynamic pattern for relationship duration.

Keywords: relationship satisfaction, life-span development, longitudinal studies, meta-analysis

Is There a Reason to Worry?

The meta-analytic evidence on a decline in relationship satisfaction—particularly in young adulthood and in relationships with a duration of less than 10 years—raises the important question of whether there is reason to worry. Do couples unavoidably become less satisfied in their relationship over the years? And does declining relationship satisfaction automatically lead to relationship dissolution?

First, it is crucial to emphasize that the present findings show the average trajectory across a large number of individuals. Clearly, the development of relationship satisfaction is characterized by a large degree of interindividual (or between-couple) variability, as evident from many primary studies (e.g., Bühler et al., 2020; Mund et al., 2015). Research has identified a number of key individual differences that account for variability in relationship development and that may soften or aggravate the decline of relationship satisfaction (e.g., couple members’ personality; e.g., Karney & Bradbury, 1995; McNulty, 2016). Hence, individuals and couples may well deviate from the average trajectory of relationship satisfaction.

Second, although classic theories on romantic relationships considered declining relationship satisfaction as the major reason why couples separate (Gottman & Levenson, 1992; Lewis & Spanier, 1982), research has questioned this assumption. Instead, as described in the investment model (Rusbult, 1980, 1983), relationship satisfaction is but one factor that contributes to whether a couple stays together or separates. Other factors include investment, perception of alternatives, and commitment. Consequently, although relationship satisfaction may decrease—especially in young adulthood and at the beginning of the relationship—commitment may increase and bond the couple together.

Third, relationship satisfaction mainly declined from age 20 to 40 years and during the first 10 years of relationships but the absolute level of relationship satisfaction at the low points was still relatively high. Indeed, mean POMP scores never went below 77% (of the maximum possible), neither as a function of age nor as a function of relationship duration. Hence, even individuals with lower scores in relationship satisfaction were fairly satisfied with their romantic relationship. These findings might contribute to understanding why the association of relationship satisfaction and relationship stability is often much weaker than expected (Karney & Bradbury, 1995).

Relative to right-wing authoritarians, left-wing ones were lower in dogmatism & cognitive rigidity, & higher in negative emotionality; LWA powerfully predicts behavioral aggression and is strongly correlated with participation in political violence

Costello, T. H., Bowes, S. M., Stevens, S. T., Waldman, I. D., Tasimi, A., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2022). Clarifying the structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 122(1), 135–170, Jan 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000341

Authoritarianism has been the subject of scientific inquiry for nearly a century, yet the vast majority of authoritarianism research has focused on right-wing authoritarianism. In the present studies, we investigate the nature, structure, and nomological network of left-wing authoritarianism (LWA), a construct famously known as “the Loch Ness Monster” of political psychology. We iteratively construct a measure and data-driven conceptualization of LWA across six samples (N = 7,258) and conduct quantitative tests of LWA’s relations with more than 60 authoritarianism-related variables. We find that LWA, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation reflect a shared constellation of personality traits, cognitive features, beliefs, and motivational values that might be considered the “heart” of authoritarianism. Relative to right-wing authoritarians, left-wing authoritarians were lower in dogmatism and cognitive rigidity, higher in negative emotionality, and expressed stronger support for a political system with substantial centralized state control. Our results also indicate that LWA powerfully predicts behavioral aggression and is strongly correlated with participation in political violence. We conclude that a movement away from exclusively right-wing conceptualizations of authoritarianism may be required to illuminate authoritarianism’s central features, conceptual breadth, and psychological appeal.

Dehumanization: trends, insights, and challenges

Dehumanization: trends, insights, and challenges. Nour S. Kteily, Alexander P. Landry. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, January 15 2022. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2021.12.003

Highlights

To deny or overlook the humanity of others is to exclude them from one of the core category memberships that all people share. Still, research suggests that individuals engage in dehumanization surprisingly often, both in subtle ways and, in certain contexts, by blatantly associating other groups with ‘lower’ animals.

We review evidence highlighting the plethora of distinct ways in which we dehumanize, the consequences dehumanization imposes on its targets, and intervention efforts to alleviate dehumanization.

We provide a framework to think about different operationalizations of dehumanization and consider how researchers’ definitions of dehumanization may shape the conclusions they draw about key questions such as the association between dehumanization and violence.

We address a number of theoretical challenges to dehumanization research and lay out several important questions dehumanization researchers need to address in order to propel the field further forward.

Despite our many differences, one superordinate category we all belong to is ‘humans’. To strip away or overlook others’ humanity, then, is to mark them as ‘other’ and, typically, ‘less than’. We review growing evidence revealing how and why we subtly disregard the humanity of those around us. We then highlight new research suggesting that we continue to blatantly dehumanize certain groups, overtly likening them to animals, with important implications for intergroup hostility. We discuss advances in understanding the experience of being dehumanized and novel interventions to mitigate dehumanization, address the conceptual boundaries of dehumanization, and consider recent accounts challenging the importance of dehumanization and its role in intergroup violence. Finally, we present an agenda of outstanding questions to propel dehumanization research forward.

Keywords: dehumanizationmoralityprejudiceaggressionconflict

Concluding remarks

Dehumanization has attracted renewed and widespread interest amidst prominent examples of overtly dehumanizing rhetoric and rising hate crimesxii. We reviewed advances in research on subtle dehumanization, highlighting new conceptualizations ranging from the ways we visually process faces to our attributions of individuals’ psychological (versus physiological) needs. We also highlight the revived scholarly attention to blatant forms of dehumanization in which individuals openly liken some groups to lower animals, noting that such dehumanization may be more prevalent than previously assumed, and documenting its stronger association (versus subtle dehumanization) with hostile attitudes and behaviors. Additionally, we point to new work on the experience of being dehumanized and on intervention efforts that seek to reduce the prevalence of dehumanization. Despite its growth, dehumanization research has recently faced several important challenges, with scholars wondering whether certain conclusions may have been overstated and questioning the role of dehumanization in facilitating violence. We use these debates to advance a broader perspective on dehumanization, arguing that several of the critiques arrive at their conclusions on the basis of operationalizations of dehumanization that may not capture the breadth of the phenomenon. Still, these challenges place an onus on dehumanization researchers to better specify the contours of psychological processes underlying dehumanization and to clarify its causal contributions to violent conflict (see Outstanding questions). By rising to this challenge, dehumanization researchers will be better positioned to help address one of the most pressing issues of our time.

Outstanding questions

To what extent are the various measures of dehumanization inter-related? For example, how closely associated are the tendency to downplay a target’s capacity for agency and experience; the tendency to process a target’s face using featural (versus holistic) processing; and the tendency to consider a target group ‘savage’ or ‘unevolved’, like lower animals? Under what conditions are these associations stronger versus weaker? Can they be considered interchangeable measures of a singular underlying construct, or is it more useful to think of them as assessing distinct aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon?

Under what conditions are dehumanization and dislike more likely to converge versus diverge? Given that they appear to be less associated among children versus adults, how (and why) does the degree of convergence develop over time?

What is the full set of traits and qualities that comprise individuals’ concept of an ‘ideal human’? What comes spontaneously to mind when individuals are asked to define membership in the human category and to what extent are the relevant traits desirable versus undesirable? Which attributions carry particular weight in influencing perceptions of humanness?

What is the threshold at which falling short of the human ideal becomes meaningful and precisely how do the consequences of slipping away from the human ideal track with distance from it? Although this remains an (testable) empirical question, we posit that the consequences may not track linearly; there may be a particular ‘hump’ at the threshold at which the target is seen to cross from just within the category human (even if at its ‘lower limits’) to just outside it.

How does dehumanization contribute to violent aggression? Is this association causal? Does dehumanization precede violence, follow violence, or both? To what extent are the answers to these questions dependent on the type of dehumanization assessed? Experiments and longitudinal studies (perhaps leveraging natural language at scale) considering multiple forms of dehumanization and aggression would be ideal to address these questions.

Sexual satisfaction did not change significantly before retirement, but decreased afterards; women showed higher levels of sexual satisfaction as well as a more positive development of both pre- and post-retirement sexual satisfaction

Henning, Georg, Dikla Segel-Karaps, Marcus P. Björk, Pär Bjälkebring, and Anne I. Berg. 2022. “Retirement and Sexual Satisfaction.” PsyArXiv. January 21. doi:10.31234/osf.io/68r4w

Abstract: Although interest in sexuality in older age has increased over the last decades, few studies have focused on longitudinal change in sexual satisfaction around retirement age. In the present study, we studied change in sexual satisfaction across retirement in a sample of Swedish older adults with a partner. Our analyses were based on n = 759 participants (359 male, 400 female) from the Health, Aging, and Retirement Transitions in Sweden (HEARTS) study. The HEARTS study is an ongoing longitudinal study with annual measurements. For this study, we used five waves spanning over a period of four years. On average, sexual satisfaction did not change significantly before retirement, but decreased after retirement. Interestingly, women showed higher levels of sexual satisfaction (compared to men) as well as a more positive development of both pre- and post-retirement sexual satisfaction. Individuals with higher relationship satisfaction had a higher sexual satisfaction until retirement, but their sexual satisfaction also decreased faster after retirement whereas those with lower relationship satisfaction showed a stable but lower sexual satisfaction. In conclusion, the transition to retirement significantly impacts sexual satisfaction in several important ways, further studies on the impact of retirement and other late life stage transitions is warranted.

A Longitudinal Study of Adolescents’ Pornography Use Frequency, Motivations, and Problematic Use Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic

A Longitudinal Study of Adolescents’ Pornography Use Frequency, Motivations, and Problematic Use Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Beáta Bőthe, Marie-Pier Vaillancourt-Morel, Jacinthe Dion, Marie-Michèle Paquette, Maude Massé-Pfister, István Tóth-Király & Sophie Bergeron. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Jan 20 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-021-02282-4

Abstract: Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, an increase in pornography use has been reported based on cross-sectional findings, raising concerns about associated adverse outcomes, such as problematic pornography use (PPU). The aims of the present study were to document potential changes in adolescents’ pornography use frequency, motivations, and PPU before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. As part of an ongoing study on adolescents’ sexual health, we used a large sample (NTime 1 = 1771; 47.6% girls, Mage = 15.42 years, SD = 0.59) to examine changes from baseline (before the COVID-19 pandemic) to one year later (during the COVID-19 pandemic) in adolescents’ self-reported pornography use frequency, motivations, and PPU, using latent change models and examining potential gender differences. No significant changes were observed in adolescents’ pornography use frequency and pornography use motivations, and no gender differences were present in these trends. Although statistically significant, slight decrease was observed in boys’ PPU levels, and a statistically significant, slight increase was observed in girls’ PPU levels, these changes were very small, providing no practical or clinical relevance. In sum, despite previous propositions, concerns, and cross-sectional findings, longitudinal results suggest that adolescents’ pornography use characteristics were rather stable between November 2019 and June 2021, and the COVID-19 pandemic and related lockdowns might not have led to general increases in adolescents’ pornography use as it was expected.

Discussion

Similar trends were observed in boys and girls’ pornography use characteristics when examining potential changes before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite prior studies reporting a self-perceived increase in adolescents and young adults’ pornography use since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (Li et al., 2020a, b; Nebot-Garcia et al., 2020; Nelson et al., 2020), our results suggest that adolescents during the COVID-19 pandemic did not report using pornography more frequently and they did not engage more frequently in pornography use due to different motivations (e.g., using pornography to decrease boredom or suppress negative emotions). Moreover, in line with the findings of the only longitudinal study reporting temporal trends in PPU in adults (Grubbs et al., 2021), our results suggest that PPU slightly decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic in boys, compared to pre-COVID-19 times. Although girls’ PPU levels were low before and during the COVID-19 pandemic as well, a statistically significant increase was observed in girls’ PPU levels. Yet, these changes were negligible and the overall score of girls is still considered low, providing no real practical relevance.

No Significant Changes in Adolescents’ Pre-COVID-19 and During COVID-19 Pornography Use Frequency and Motivations

Despite previously documented differences between adolescent boys and girls’ pornography use characteristics (Bőthe et al., 2019; 2021d; Bőthe et al., 2020b; Peter & Valkenburg, 2016), no gender differences were observed in the trends of changes in pornography use frequency and pornography use motivations. In contrast with our hypothesis and findings of prior studies among adolescents and young adults (Li et al., 2020a, b; Nelson et al., 2020), adolescents during the COVID-19 pandemic and related lockdowns did not show significant changes in their frequency of pornography use compared to the pre-COVID-19. On average, boys used pornography many times per week, while girls used it less than once a month both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

One main difference between the present study and previous ones is that we used a longitudinal study design to compare adolescents’ pornography use characteristics before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, whereas past studies used samples recruited during the pandemic and asked about participants’ perception concerning changes in their pornography use (e.g., whether they watched less, more, or the same amount of pornography since the pandemic; Li et al., 2020a, b; Nelson et al., 2020). Given potential recall biases in retrospective studies of online activities (Kahn et al., 2014), adolescents’ reports about their pornography use before the pandemic or changes in their pornography use during the pandemic may not be as accurate as comparing actual reports on pornography use characteristics before and during the pandemic.

Another difference between previous studies (Li et al., 2020a, b; Nelson et al., 2020) and the present one is related to samples’ characteristics. Our study included a diverse sample of adolescents aged between 14 and 18 years (with a mean age of 15.4 years at baseline), including all genders and sexual orientations. However, two of the prior studies included both adolescents and young adults (i.e., 967 participants were aged between 15 and 35 with a mean age of 26.6 years in Li et al., 2020a, b; and 134 participants were aged between 16 and 20 with a mean age of 19.2 in Nebort-Garcia et al., 2020), while the other study focused on a more specific population of 151 adolescents, namely sexual minority boys aged between 15 and 17 years (Nelson et al., 2020). These differences in sample characteristics might have yielded different results. For example, as our sample only included adolescents, most lived with their parents. As many parents also followed COVID-19-related regulations (e.g., social distancing, closure of workplaces) and experienced shutdowns, adolescents were more likely at home with their parents, and thus, might not have more opportunities to view pornography than before, while young adults might have lived alone and worked from home during the pandemic, providing more opportunities for pornography use.

Moreover, adolescents aged between 13 and 18 years also vary in their level of engagement in social distancing, with only 30.5% of them engaging in pure social distancing (no in-person contact with those outside their household; Oosterhoff & Palmer, 2020; Oosterhoff et al., 2020). Therefore, it is possible that adolescents spent more time with their friends in offline settings, leaving less time for engaging in online activities, including pornography use, resulting in no changes in their pornography use frequency.

Lastly, adolescents returned to a hybrid model of education (i.e., half in-class and half online) in the province of Quebec (Canada) between the fall of 2020 and summer of 2021 (i.e., when the follow-up survey was administered), which might have provided them with the opportunity to return to part of their pre-COVID-19 academic routine, resulting in the no significant changes in their long-term pornography use frequency. Still, temporary increases in pornography use might have been present among adolescents in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic (i.e., spring and summer of 2020). One of the largest pornography websites reported higher traffic on their website in Canada between March and July 2020 compared to pre-COVID-19 rates, with a peak of a 21.5% increase in pornography use on March 25, 2020 (Pornhub.com, 2020a, 2020b). These reports of increases in pornography use were also supported by a global analysis of Google search trends (Zattoni et al., 2020). Yet, in line with our findings, when a longer-term trend in pornography use frequency was examined before and during the COVID-19 pandemic among adults, individuals’ use had returned to similar or even lower levels of use as reported before the pandemic by August to October 2020 (Grubbs et al., 2021). In sum, findings suggest that although a temporary increase might have been present in individuals’ pornography use frequency in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, these changes were likely transient.

Although it was proposed in the literature that pornography may be used as a potential distraction from negative emotions and stress that accompany the COVID-19 pandemic (Mestre-Bach et al., 2020), adolescents did not report significantly higher levels of emotional distraction and suppression, boredom avoidance, and stress reduction pornography use motivations during the COVID-19 pandemic, compared to the pre-COVID-19 levels. Still, it is important to note that adolescents during COVID-19 may have experienced varying levels of stress and negative emotions due to the pandemic and related restrictions (Duan et al., 2020; Ellis et al., 2020; Fegert et al., 2020; Racine et al., 2020) and may choose other activities to cope with these difficulties. Studies conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic documented that adolescents engaged in more online activities, including schoolwork, monitoring the latest news about the pandemic and used social media to stay in touch with friends and peers (Ellis et al., 2020; Munasinghe et al., 2020). This suggests that adolescents may engage in these activities instead of pornography use, and that these may help them cope with COVID-19-related stress. Concerning other pornography use motivations that were assessed in the present study (i.e., sexual pleasure, sexual curiosity, fantasy, lack of sexual satisfaction, and self-exploration), adolescents did not report significantly different levels of these motivations pre- vs. during COVID-19.

In sum, these results suggest that adolescents’ pornography use characteristics, in general, might not have changed as significantly as it was suggested by previous findings (Li et al., 2020a, b; Nelson et al., 2020) or predicted in popular media outlets (Döring, 2020). Prior studies also suggest that adolescents may use pornography out of curiosity or as an aid for masturbation, rather than a means to cope with negative emotions and stress (Arrington-Sanders et al., 2015; Bőthe et al., 2019; Romito & Beltramini, 2011; Ševčíková & Daneback, 2014), and these motivations may not be impacted as profoundly by the pandemic as the coping-related motivations. Yet, substantial inter-individual variability was observed in both the initial levels and changes of pornography use frequency and motivations in boys and girls as well, suggesting that some adolescents might have had higher, whereas others might have had lower, initial pornography use frequency and motivations levels than the average, and individual changes were likely to be heterogeneous (i.e., different levels of increase, decrease, or stability might have been present for some adolescents), reinforcing the need to better understand the factors involved in adolescents’ pornography use.

Negligible Changes in Adolescents’ Pre-COVID-19 and During COVID-19 Problematic Pornography Use

Corroborating the findings of the only longitudinal study reporting temporal trends in PPU in adults (Grubbs et al., 2021), our results also suggested that PPU slightly decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic in boys, compared to pre-COVID-19 times. Although the latent changes models suggested that this general decrease in boys’ PPU levels were significant, this change was very small on a descriptive level (i.e., when observing boys’ pre-COVID-19 and during COVID-19 mean scores, the change was -0.03 on a scale from one to seven). Concerning girls, the latent changes models suggested that their PPU levels significantly increased over the one-year period of the study. However, again, it needs to be noted that this change was very small on the descriptive level (i.e., when observing girls’ pre-COVID-19 and during COVID-19 mean scores, the change was + 0.03 on a scale from one to seven). These significant changes might derive from the large sample size (i.e., with large sample sizes, even small differences turn out to be significant differences), and thus, we do not consider them as meaningful changes.

Yet, it needs to be noted that as in the case of pornography use frequency and pornography use motivations, substantial inter-individual variability was observed in both the initial levels and changes of PPU in boys and girls as well. These findings suggest that some adolescents might have had higher or lower initial PPU levels than the average. Also, individual changes were likely to be heterogeneous, suggesting that some adolescents might have experienced steeper increases or decreases in their PPU than the mean PPU changes. Thus, it may be plausible that some adolescents who might already have had problems with their pornography use before the COVID-19 pandemic might experience an increase in their PPU under such an unprecedented situation as a pandemic (Király et al., 2020; Mestre-Bach et al., 2020).

Limitations and Future Directions

The results of the present study provide preliminary answers to current concerns about whether adolescents’ pornography use characteristics, including pornography use frequency, motivations, and PPU, might have changed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions (e.g., social distancing). Nevertheless, some limitations of this study need to be noted. We used data from a self-selected sample of adolescents, who completed self-report measures. Thus, the findings may include some biases (e.g., recall bias, under- or over-reporting, or selective loss of participants; Štulhofer et al., 2021). Although moral incongruence toward pornography use may be associated with self-perceived PPU (Grubbs & Perry, 2019; Grubbs et al., 2019a, b, c), it was not assessed in this study. The present study only assessed intentional pornography use; unwanted exposure was not examined. We used a diverse sample in terms of gender and sexual orientation, but it was not representative of all adolescents in the country, limiting the findings’ generalizability. The fact that our sample included adolescents from a Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) country also limits the generalizability of the findings. Future studies are needed to replicate and extend the present study’s findings, preferably in pre-registered study designs, including non-WEIRD samples (Klein et al., 2021).

As is usually the case in large-scale and longitudinal studies among adolescents (Kohut et al., 2021; Vandenbosch & Peter, 2016; Vandenbosch et al., 2015), we had to reduce the number of items per construct. Therefore, although we assessed a diverse set of pornography use characteristics, each motivation (Bőthe et al., 2021a) and pornography use frequency were measured by one item that may bias findings. Moreover, the use of self-report measures to assess motivations may introduce biases (e.g., it is not possible to differentiate between reports of actual motivations and posterior attributions concerning the reasons of given behaviors). Thus, study designs focusing on real-time data collection when a behavior occurs (e.g., ecological momentary assessment, EMA) might provide a more accurate and nuanced understanding of motivations underlying pornography use. Given the presence of substantial inter-individual variability in the latent change models, future studies would do well in relying on an analytic approach that is able to identify subpopulations of adolescents characterized by different change scores. Lastly, while no differences were observed in the results concerning boys’ pornography use with and without the included control variables, most of the minimal increases in girls’ pornography use disappeared when control variables were added. These results highlight the importance of considering potential confounding variables when examining pornography use, though the selection of these potential control variables requires careful consideration and justification (Wright, 2021), and results should be preferably reported with and without the control variables for full transparency.

Given that many major religions prescribe parent-benefitting norms restricting sexual promiscuity and socially disruptive behavior, we hypothesized that both parenthood and parental care motivation would predict higher levels of religiosity

The Holy Father (and Mother)? Multiple Tests of the Hypothesis that Parenthood and Parental Care Motivation Lead to Greater Religiosity. Nicholas Kerry, Marjorie L Prokosch, Damian R Murray. January 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357888322

Description: Parenting is a universal element of human life. However, the motivational and attitudinal implications of parenthood remain poorly understood. Given that many major religions prescribe parent-benefitting norms restricting sexual promiscuity and socially disruptive behavior, we hypothesized that both parenthood and parental care motivation would predict higher levels of religiosity. Studies 1-3 (N >2,100 US MTurkers; two pre-registered) revealed that parental status and motivation were robustly associated with religiosity in Americans, and that age-related increases in religiosity were mediated by parenthood. Study 4a (376 students) found a moderated experimental effect, such that emotionally engaged participants showed increases in religiosity in response to a childcare manipulation. Study 4b then replicated this effect in recoded data from studies 1-2. Study 5 used data from the World Values Survey (N=89,565) and found further evidence for a relationship between parenthood and religiosity. These findings support functional accounts of the relationship between parenthood and mainstream religiosity.

 

We need to have a partner in order to show high levels of sex frequency; but once we got one, committing and living together reduces sex frequency significantly: Married people have relatively less sex, close to those without a partner

Which People Have the Most Sex? The sex frequency “billboard,” according to new research. Elyakim Kislev. Psychology Today, January 19, 2022. https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/happy-singlehood/202201/which-people-have-the-most-sex

[Excerpts, full text and references/links at the article]

In recent years, many studies have documented a decline in sexual activity.2, 7 For example, Twenge finds that Generation Y is on track to have fewer sex partners than members of the two preceding generations. In fact, her numbers show that those who identify as members of Generation Y are two-and-a-half times as likely to be abstinent as Gen Xers in their early 20s.8

According to an analysis of the General Social Survey, the percentage of 18-29-year-olds reporting no sex in the year preceding the survey increased from around 15% in 1990 to 23% in 2018. In addition, the average American adult went from having sex over 60 times a year 20 years ago, to around 50 times in 2018.9

The Implications for Sexual Satisfaction

These results also address a secondary-level question that was raised previously regarding the effect of sex frequency. The results clearly show that sex frequency significantly correlates with sexual satisfaction for men and women alike. The variance accounted for by sex frequency is 22.9% for men and 21.5% for women. This means that couples who are higher on sex frequency (those living apart) are likely to be higher on sexual satisfaction. Indeed, this was also found to be the case.

Married people, in any event, have relatively less sex, close to those without a partner. This makes one think about the reasons for the decline of marriage as an institution and why people choose to forgo wedlock.

Check also Does Marriage Really Improve Sexual Satisfaction? Evidence From the Pairfam Data Set. Elyakim Kislev. The Journal of Sex Research, May 3 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/05/marriage-is-not-determinant-for-sexual.html