America Needs a New Asian Alliance to Counter China, says one of Biden's Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact, by Ely Ratner

Foreign Affairs, May 27, 2025. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/case-pacific-defense-pact-ely-ratner

America Needs a New Asian Alliance to Counter China

ELY RATNER is Principal at the Marathon Initiative. From 2021 to 2025, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the Biden administration.

Excerpts:

The time has come for the United States to build a collective defense pact in Asia. For decades, such a pact was neither possible nor necessary. Today, in the face of a growing threat from China, it is both viable and essential. American allies in the region are already investing in their own defenses and forging deeper military bonds. But without a robust commitment to collective defense, the Indo-Pacific is on a path to instability and conflict.

Tactical shifts aside, Beijing’s geopolitical aspirations for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” remain unchanged. China seeks to seize Taiwan, control the South China Sea, weaken U.S. alliances, and ultimately dominate the region. If it succeeds, the result would be a China-led order that relegates the United States to the rank of a diminished continental power: less prosperous, less secure, and unable to fully access or lead the world’s most important markets and technologies.

After decades of pouring resources into its armed forces, China could soon have the military strength to make that vision a reality. As CIA Director William Burns revealed in 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed his military “to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan.” But as Burns went on to note, China’s leaders “have doubts about whether they could accomplish that invasion.” To sustain those doubts—concerning Taiwan but also other potential targets in the region—should be a top priority of U.S. foreign policy. That requires convincing Beijing that any attack would ultimately come at an unacceptable cost.

With that objective in mind, the United States has invested in advanced military capabilities and developed new operational concepts. It has moved more mobile and lethal military forces to strategic locations across Asia. Crucially, it has overhauled its security partnerships in the region. In past decades, Washington’s principal focus was to forge close bilateral ties. In recent years, by contrast, the United States has pursued a more networked approach that gives U.S. allies greater responsibilities and encourages closer ties not just with Washington but among the allies themselves. These changes are creating novel military and geopolitical challenges for Beijing, thereby reinforcing China’s doubts about the potential success of aggression. 

The new, more multilateral approach marks a critical step toward stronger deterrence. But the defense initiatives it has produced remain too informal and rudimentary. In the face of continued Chinese military modernization, true deterrence requires the will and capability that only a collective defense arrangement can deliver. Such an alliance—call it the “Pacific Defense Pact”—would bind those countries that are currently most aligned and prepared to take on the China challenge together: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Additional members could join as conditions warrant.

Skeptics may argue that such an arrangement is infeasible with a Trump administration that appears to disavow the importance of the United States’ alliances. But the reality is that leaders in Washington and allied capitals are still working to deepen military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific despite economic and diplomatic tensions. As far as defense matters are concerned, there has been far more continuity than disruption to date. Provided the administration avoids debilitating economic measures targeting U.S. allies, the trends pointing the way toward collective defense in the region are likely to endure. And if the Trump administration ultimately lacks the vision and ambition to grasp this opportunity, defense establishments can and should still lay the foundations for future leaders.

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

This is not the first time Washington has confronted the question of how to design its security partnerships in Asia. After World War II, the United States crafted a network of alliances in the region, hoping to keep Soviet expansion at bay, entrench its own military presence—particularly in East Asia—and curb internecine tensions among its partners. This network, made up of separate security arrangements with Australia and New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, served its constituents well. It insulated large stretches of the Indo-Pacific from great-power conflict, setting the conditions for decades of remarkable economic growth. It also proved resilient, weathering the wars in Korea and Vietnam, successive waves of decolonization and democratization, and even the end of the Cold War itself.

Notably, the network never evolved beyond a set of disparate and almost exclusively bilateral alliances. In Europe, U.S. officials embraced collective defense: an attack on one ally would be treated as an attack on all. (Such was the logic behind the founding, in 1949, of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.) In Asia, however, similar aspirations foundered. As John Foster Dulles, one of the architects of the U.S. postwar security order, wrote in these pages in 1952, shortly before becoming secretary of state: “It is not at this time practicable to draw a line which would bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia into a formal mutual security area.”

For their part, many Asian leaders preferred strong bilateral relationships with the United States over closer links with former adversaries or historical rivals. Some worried that a collective defense arrangement would draw them into a great-power clash between Washington and Moscow. Others doubted that any such institution could overcome the legacies of conflict and mutual distrust among their neighbors and bring together members that were far apart both geographically and in terms of security concerns. The only seeming exception, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, proved the point. Founded in 1954, SEATO was a motley alliance among Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It suffered from a lack of unity and quietly dissolved in 1977.

But times have changed. The conditions once preventing multilateral alignment in Asia are giving way to fresh calls for collective defense. Just before taking office last year, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba warned that “the absence of a collective self-defense system like NATO in Asia means that wars are likely to break out.” In fact, such a collective defense pact is now within reach. Three trends buttress this conclusion: a new strategic alignment centered on an advancing threat from China, a new convergence of security cooperation among U.S. allies, and the demand for a new reciprocity that gives the United States’ partners a larger role in keeping the peace.

COMMON CAUSE

China’s assertiveness throughout the Indo-Pacific is spreading a sense of insecurity, particularly as leaders in Beijing lean on the military as a central instrument in their revisionist aims. The dangerous and threatening activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), combined with its rapidly growing capabilities, have prompted leaders across the region to adopt new defense strategies [...].

Nowhere is this strategic reorientation more apparent than in Tokyo. Despite deep economic interdependence between China and Japan, ties between the two countries have been frail for decades, strained by historical animus, trade tensions, and territorial disputes. Relations have only worsened in recent years, as Beijing has leveraged its budding economic and military power to ramp up pressure on its neighbor. A new law, passed in 2021, allows China’s coast guard to use weapons against foreign ships sailing in what Beijing considers its sovereign waters. In the years since, Chinese incursions into the areas surrounding what Japan refers to as the Senkaku Islands—administered by Japan but also claimed by China [...]—have become more frequent, with greater numbers of larger and more heavily armed vessels. In March, Chinese coast guard ships entered the territorial waters around the islands and lingered for nearly 100 hours—the longest episode to date in a string of incidents that Japan’s top diplomat described as “clearly escalating.”

Tokyo is responding by loosening long-standing political and legal constraints on its armed forces. As early as 2013, the country’s first-ever publicly released national security strategy warned of China’s “rapidly expanded and intensified” activities around Japanese territories. [...] In recent years, it has embarked on a historic military buildup, pledging to double its military spending to roughly two percent of its gross domestic product. Tokyo has also moved beyond its erstwhile focus on defensive capabilities and now aims to acquire and deploy “counterstrike capabilities,” including hundreds of long-range Tomahawk missiles. These changes, as the political scientist and Japan expert Michael Green wrote in these pages in 2022, are establishing Tokyo as “the most important net exporter of security in the Indo-Pacific.”

The Philippines is undergoing a similar transformation. For decades, the Philippine armed forces battled insurgents in the southern reaches of the archipelago. Military investments and operations reflected that domestic focus. Today, the insurgency has weakened, but an external threat looms larger and larger: steady Chinese encroachment on Philippine maritime rights and sovereignty, [...]. In the 2010s, Beijing pursued an unprecedented campaign of land reclamation and built military bases atop reefs and islets that are also claimed by the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states. China has cordoned off one of these atolls, Scarborough Shoal, denying access to Philippine fishing vessels. At another reef, Second Thomas Shoal, violent attacks by Chinese vessels have disrupted efforts to resupply Philippine military personnel. Chinese coast guard ships have even harassed vessels conducting energy exploration inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. 

The view from Manila has sharpened accordingly. Beginning under President Rodrigo Duterte in the late 2010s and accelerating under his successor, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippine military has been undertaking an ambitious modernization effort. The government adopted a watershed defense strategy in 2024 to secure the country’s periphery with investments in additional combat aircraft, tougher cyberdefenses, and more unmanned assets for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. There is little doubt about what is driving the overhaul: the need to better monitor and confront China’s coercive activities.

In Canberra, a few thousand miles to the south, the rise of China was once considered benign and beneficial to Australian interests. A series of diplomatic and military incidents in the past decade, however, have convinced many that the opposite is true. Revelations of malign Chinese Communist Party influence in Australian elections and policymaking ignited a political firestorm. [...]

In the South China Sea, Australian armed forces have suffered the same malign pattern of harassment by Chinese jets and warships. The PLA is also operating closer than ever to Australia’s shores. Earlier this year, Chinese naval vessels circumnavigated Australia and disrupted commercial air traffic with live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea. And amid intense efforts by China to make security inroads with Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and other Pacific Island countries, Australia’s foreign minister said in 2024 that her country is now “in a state of permanent contest in the Pacific.”

Against this backdrop, Canberra, too, is revising its defense priorities from top to bottom. As recently as 2016, the government’s official view was that a foreign military attack on its territory was “no more than a remote prospect.” By 2024, its updated national defense strategy warned that, owing to the present realities in the Indo-Pacific, “there is no longer a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict.” [...]. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has unveiled plans for record military spending, including major investments in stockpiles of critical munitions such as long-range fires, antiship missiles, and missiles for air defense. The reforms highlight a growing conviction that the country’s advantageous geography no longer offers sufficient protection against the PLA. The public shares that apprehension: [...], the share of Australians who believed China would become a military threat to their country nearly doubled from 2012 to 2022. It now stands above 70 percent.

QUAD GOALS

Japan, the Philippines, and Australia have not only come to recognize China as their primary and common threat; they also increasingly acknowledge that their fates are intertwined with the broader region. This is true even on issues as sensitive as Taiwan, once a taboo subject in the region: “A Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency,” former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared in 2021. “If something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved,” the Philippine military chief warned earlier this year.

The view that Chinese aggression would have massive consequences for countries throughout the Indo-Pacific has resulted in an unprecedented deepening of security partnerships among Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and other regional powers. Analysts have described defense cooperation between Australia and Japan in particular as taking on “alliance-like characteristics.” A new reciprocal access agreement allows the Australian and Japanese militaries to operate in each other’s countries. August 2023 marked the first-ever visit by Japanese F-35 fighter jets to northern Australia, followed only days later by the inaugural deployment of Australian F-35s for military exercises in Japan.

Japan is finalizing a similar access agreement with the Philippines, which has emerged in recent years as the largest recipient of Japanese security assistance. In February, defense leaders from the two countries announced a spate of measures for closer security cooperation. In what could be read only as a thinly veiled reference to China, the Philippine secretary of defense explained that Manila and Tokyo’s “common cause” was to resist “any unilateral attempt to reshape the global order.”

That newfound common cause has animated a series of overlapping, complementary initiatives—what, in 2024, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called “the new convergence in the Indo-Pacific”—that build on the United States’ traditional focus on bilateral ties in the region. The Biden administration in particular worked to supplement the older “hub-and-spokes” model with what it envisioned as a “latticework” of relationships in Asia. The AUKUS partnership brought together Canberra, London, and Washington to help Australia build conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. As members of the Indo-Pacific Quad, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States joined efforts to provide maritime domain awareness throughout the region. American officials also stepped up trilateral security cooperation with Japan and South Korea.

Among the many partners involved in these efforts, Canberra, Manila, and Tokyo frequently stand out as common denominators. At a meeting of their leaders in 2024, the Japanese, Philippine, and U.S. governments expressed “serious concerns” about China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior” and announced initiatives on infrastructure investment and technology cooperation, among other measures. Later that year, Australian, Japanese, and U.S. defense leaders unveiled another set of cooperative activities, including three-way military exercises and advanced defense industrial cooperation. Perhaps most promising of all is a new grouping that brings together all four of these parties—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Known informally as “the Squad” (to distinguish it from the Quad), the group conducts regular naval, maritime, and air force exercises in the South China Sea. It also plans to strengthen information sharing and work together to modernize the Philippine military.

A GOOD START

The new convergence in the Indo-Pacific represents a profound development in the security architecture of the region. But it is best viewed as an incomplete evolution—an important period of transition rather than an optimal end state. The shortcomings are significant. There are no mutual defense obligations between U.S. allies, only with the United States. There is no central headquarters to plan and conduct multilateral operations. And the unofficial nature of these groupings means that there is no regular drumbeat of planning among political and military staffs. Coordination is occurring, but only intermittently. As a result, it rarely receives the necessary urgency, attention, and resources.

A collective defense pact would deliver where the current mechanisms fall short. Getting there would not require a panregional security organization such as NATO, which grew from 12 original members to over 30. Instead, the logical starting point for Washington is to form a pact with the three partners that are most strategically aligned and have the fastest-growing and most robust combined military cooperation: Australia, Japan, and the Philippines.

Additional members could join later, circumstances allowing. As an advanced and stalwart ally in East Asia, South Korea would be an obvious candidate, and its contributions could be quite significant. But Seoul would have to decide whether it was willing to focus its defense forces more on China, partner more closely with Japan, and support a broader regional orientation for its own military and the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. New Zealand would be another prospective partner, especially since it is already part of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing group alongside Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. But although New Zealand has recently shown greater willingness to challenge China and align more closely with the United States, it might not yet be prepared to enter a formal collective defense pact. 

Critical U.S. partners such as India and Singapore would not be expected to join at the outset but could still participate in certain activities as observers or in some other nonmember capacity, as is common in regional groupings. The inclusion of Taiwan would not be possible or advisable under current U.S. policy, nor would it be acceptable to the other members of the pact. As for the United States’ European allies, they are neither politically nor militarily ready to join as full members right now, but that option could be considered in the future, under different circumstances. Larger defense budgets in Europe could produce militaries with more global reach, provided the continent itself is secure and at peace.

Given the urgency of the China challenge, the United States cannot afford to wait for a perfect alignment among all its partners. There is already a core group in place and room to consider additional members in the future. Preparations should begin now. Given that alliances with the United States already exist, a first-order task is to establish mutual obligations among Australia, Japan, and the Philippines themselves. This will demand skillful leadership and intense negotiations, but the benefits of stronger deterrence and greater security should outweigh the risks of closer alignment. Besides, for Australia and Japan in particular, the practical differences between today’s defense partnership and one of mutual defense are relatively small and shrinking by the day.

From an operational perspective, collective defense could build on existing cooperative projects, including in the areas of intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness, combined training and exercises, and command and control. One such project is the Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell, a new U.S.-Japanese effort at Yokota Air Base that monitors Chinese activity in the East China Sea. Japan and the United States could share the cell’s intelligence with Australia and the Philippines, which could in turn contribute personnel at the air base and provide data from their own unmanned surface and aerial platforms. Likewise, the recently inaugurated U.S.-Philippine Combined Coordination Center near Manila could include Australia and Japan, providing similar functions in the South China Sea.

The U.S. military has major operating bases in Japan, access to locations in the Philippines, and regular rotations of U.S. troops throughout Australia. With sufficient legal underpinning—including reciprocal access agreements among the three Asian allies— each of these arrangements could be expanded to include forces from the other members. In fact, there are already plans to integrate Japanese forces into U.S. initiatives in Australia.

The four members could also invest in shared military facilities. Major bilateral and trilateral military exercises involving different combinations of the partners could include all four. Together, they could more readily pre-position weapons to ensure sufficient stockpiles in the event of conflict, further strengthening deterrence. Establishing a headquarters for the Pacific Defense Pact and mechanisms for command and control will be essential. Japan could serve as one potential location. In July 2024, the United States announced its intent to upgrade the U.S. military command in Japan to plan and direct more missions in the region with its Japanese counterpart. As new facilities and communications links are established to support this effort, U.S. and Japanese officials should ensure that it will be possible to include military commanders and personnel from Australia and the Philippines. Alternative locations for the headquarters could be considered in Australia or at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii.

The four countries should establish a series of working groups to negotiate the full range of policy and legal issues associated with more integrated planning and operations. Military and civilian staff from defense and foreign ministries could work together to develop proposals for governance and decision-making processes, including personnel structures and consultation mechanisms that form the engine rooms of day-to-day alliance management. This breadth of tasks only underscores the need to start consultations as soon as possible.

ALL FOR ONE

In addition to deepening their collective cooperation with one another, U.S. allies will also need to rebalance their bilateral security partnerships with Washington. In their current form, those partnerships reflect the asymmetries of a different era, when American military primacy appeared uncontested and immutable. Bilateral treaties in the region were restricted in scope to specific local geographies, and the contributions of allied militaries were limited by design. In essence, the United States promised protection in exchange for military access and political-economic comity in Asia but without demanding fully reciprocal protection for itself.

This framework was sustainable—both strategically and politically—as long as the U.S. military retained its dominance in the region, the threat from China was confined, and the potential contributions of U.S. allies were limited to their own self-defense. None of these conditions holds true today. The PLA now poses serious challenges to the U.S. military and the American homeland. And U.S. allies in Asia are now among the wealthiest and most advanced countries in the world, capable of playing a significant role in both deterrence and warfighting. To adapt to this new reality, U.S. alliances need to build on a foundation not of asymmetry but of reciprocity.

Domestic politics in the United States also makes greater reciprocity necessary. Although most Americans support military ties in principle, increasing numbers would like to see U.S. allies contribute more in practice. U.S. President Donald Trump has focused in particular on the notion that allies need to pay their “fair share,” casting doubts on whether the United States would defend NATO members that failed to meet certain levels of military spending. U.S. allies do need to spend more on defense—but reciprocity should extend far beyond bigger military budgets.

U.S. allies will also need to commit to greater degrees of mutual obligation with the United States. Washington’s security treaty with Tokyo, for instance, is bound only to “the territories under the administration of Japan.” The resulting imbalance is on display at every major bilateral summit, where U.S. leaders reaffirm their commitment to defend Japan and Japanese leaders stay silent on whether their forces would assist the U.S. military elsewhere. Instead, U.S. allies should commit to supporting the United States both in crises throughout the region and in defending the U.S. homeland.

This new reciprocity would further enable collective defense. The upshot of more mutual obligation would be that U.S. allies could take on new roles and missions in crises and conflicts, especially when combined with recent investments in their own militaries. This would, in turn, open new pathways for cooperation that do not exist today in sufficient form: members of the pact could draft combined military plans, more effectively target their defense spending toward specialized and complementary capabilities, and rehearse and improve together through tailored military exercises and operations. These measures would fortify the collective power and deterrence of the United States’ alliances far beyond what is possible under today’s informal mechanisms.

Greater reciprocity should also entail greater clarity on what military strategists refer to as “access, basing, and overflight”—that is, the ability of the U.S. military to operate in and around allied territory. Given the vast distances involved, forward-deployed U.S. forces are essential to ensuring rapid response times and sustaining the military during a contingency. More certainty surrounding U.S. military access would strengthen deterrence in the western Pacific by ensuring that the United States would have the right forces and capabilities ready to fight in the right places. More assured access would also lead to greater infrastructure investments and the deployment of more advanced capabilities, which further enhance the potential utility of various locations. While U.S. allies should not be expected to give the U.S. military a blank check, a robust Pacific Defense Pact will require more flexible and assured access for U.S. forces.

THE CORE FOUR

Collective defense touches on matters of sovereignty and treaty obligations, deeply political issues that require intense negotiations and deft diplomacy. This will be all the more challenging if the Trump administration moves forward with punishing tariffs or other measures that strain Washington’s alliances in the region. But even amid tense diplomatic relations, defense and military establishments can continue laying the foundations for collective defense. Short of a severe break in ties, the four partners should work as best they can to silo security cooperation from economic and diplomatic disagreements. The stakes are simply too high to do otherwise. It is also worth underscoring that the demand for more reciprocal relationships has become a political and strategic imperative that spans the partisan divide in Washington.

The evidence to date is that the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies are managing to deepen defense cooperation despite political and economic headwinds. This is largely owing to the mounting threat from China, the continued demand for a U.S. military presence in the region, and the growing trend of intra-Asian security cooperation. To be sure, the Trump administration may be too divided, distracted, or confrontational to play the winning hand it has been dealt. In that case, many of the building blocks can still be put in place for a future administration. Given the number of tasks ahead, a pact might not be finalized until the next U.S. administration anyway.

For their part, leaders in Canberra, Manila, and Tokyo will need to win the support of their respective domestic publics. Beyond strategic arguments about deterrence and national security, the United States can support these conversations by highlighting the potential benefits to its allies’ domestic constituencies. These could include technology sharing, infrastructure investments, and improved disaster response. In the United States, skeptics can be assured that a defense pact in the Pacific would entail no obligations for the U.S. military beyond what is already in place—but that it would reduce threats to the U.S. homeland and to U.S. troops.

Given the historic significance of such an arrangement, Washington should also be prepared to manage reactions and concerns from others in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. officials can underscore that a Pacific Defense Pact would be but one of several components of its approach to the region. In both rhetoric and practice, Washington should remain committed to a network of overlapping and complementary institutions, including the Indo-Pacific Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The publicly stated objective of the pact should be the pursuit of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a goal shared by nearly every country in the region.

Moreover, the pact should remain focused on defense rather than subsuming or taking on the economic and diplomatic roles of other important institutions. Indeed, the pact will be most successful if complemented by a robust regional trade agenda, active diplomatic efforts, and effective foreign assistance programs.

Protests from Beijing will no doubt be as loud as they are predictable. China has long accused the United States of “Cold War thinking” and “bloc politics.” PLA officials have already warned that current U.S. efforts to bring American security partners closer together are “tying the region’s countries to the U.S. war chariot.” These refrains will feature prominently in China’s reaction precisely because a stronger coalition could stymie Beijing’s revisionist ambitions. To push back and make potential members think twice about a new pact, Beijing will likely draw from its traditional playbook of disinformation and economic coercion. With that in mind, the United States should help its allies prepare for China’s efforts to scuttle a collective defense arrangement in Asia.

None of this will be easy. But neither was the great progress that Washington’s allies have already made, not only in acknowledging the threat from China but also in taking unprecedented steps to invest in their own militaries, build ties with their neighbors, and double down on their alliances with the United States. In fact, in recent years, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines have already made moves on defense and security matters that were previously deemed implausible. The conditions are now set for strong leadership to transform a collective defense pact in Asia from something once unimaginable into a defining feature of the region’s future peace and prosperity.

Professor Po Hu expressed optimism that while a full resolution of the dispute with the Philippines was unlikely “in our lifetime,” he remained “confident that we can peacefully manage these disputes” moving forward

Chinese scholars suggest peaceful path with Philippines in South China Sea dispute
Experts emphasise compromise and reject ‘megaphone diplomacy’ to avoid conflicts in the disputed waterway
Raissa Robles, Apr 20 2025
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3307130/chinese-scholars-suggest-peaceful-path-philippines-south-china-sea-dispute

China has no intention of relinquishing its territorial claims in the South China Sea – but it is equally determined to avoid conflict and manage disputes peacefully, four Chinese maritime scholars stated at a recent forum in Manila, framing compromise and restraint as the only viable paths forward.

The scholars shared their views just days after the latest confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels, expressing scepticism about the possibility of resolving the long-standing maritime dispute soon. But argued that mutual trust, patience, and a rejection of “megaphone diplomacy” could help defuse the crisis.

The forum – titled “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea” – was held at the Kamuning Bakery in suburban Manila on April 11, came five days after a near-collision in contested waters that once again highlighted the risks of escalation.

On April 6, a Chinese coastguard vessel attempted to block a Philippine coastguard ship near Scarborough Shoal. Commodore Jay Tarriela, spokesman for the West Philippine Sea, said the incident was a “reckless and dangerous” manoeuvre that showed a “blatant disregard for safety”.

It was the latest in a series of high-stakes encounters between the two sides. Since President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr took office in July 2022, the Philippines has filed more than 200 diplomatic protests against China on this matter, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Despite the challenges, Professor Hu Bo – director of the South China Sea Policy Institute and a research professor at Peking University’s Center for Maritime Strategy Studies – expressed optimism that while a full resolution of the dispute was unlikely “in our lifetime”, he remained “confident that we can peacefully manage these disputes” moving forward.

A maritime dispute was “far more complicated than [a] land boundary dispute,” said Dr Yan Yan, director of the Research Center of Oceans Law and Policy at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

She explained that resolving the issue was especially difficult because “we have more than 200 features in the South China Sea” and ownership must be determined before drawing maritime boundaries among the five coastal states and their neighbours.

Crisis prevention and management would be crucial, she added. “The first thing is that we need to bear in mind the principle of self-restraint. And we also need to let our communication mechanism work, whether it be the BCM, the bilateral consultative mechanism, or the coastguard hotline to prevent escalation.”

Dr Zheng Zhihua, a research professor and head of the East Asa Marine Policy Project at the Center for Japanese Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, said that China’s rapid economic growth enabled it to uphold its territorial integrity, “I don’t see the possibility for China to give up its territory [and] sovereignty in the South China Sea. So what is important for us is to manage the dispute peacefully.”

According to Lei Xiaolu, professor at the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies of Wuhan University, managing the crisis involved avoiding “megaphone diplomacy” – or publicising every maritime event and encouraging external partners to issue statements or intervene.

She maintained that Asean member states had “no tradition to use the microphone to ask anybody else to intervene to deal with the dispute”, a reference to Manila’s efforts to involve the US, Japan and Australia in its dispute with China. [my comment: Canada and the EU also expressed displeasure with Red China, you filthy liars at the SCMP!]

She also noted that of the 180 global maritime boundary disputes, nearly 160 had been resolved quietly through “mutual negotiations and agreements”, with only a few brought before international tribunals. Her remarks were seen as a veiled reference to Manila’s 2013 arbitration case against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration administered that case in The Hague. In 2016, the tribunal ruled that China’s expansive claims under the so-called nine-dash line had no legal basis. While the outcome was widely regarded as a legal and diplomatic victory for the Philippines, it did not address sovereignty over specific maritime features – and China has refused to recognise the ruling.

“We still have the chance to have a bilateral negotiation with China to resolve all these disputes and manage these crises,” Professor Lei said.

Dr Yan underscored the need for both sides to practice “self-restraint” and “patience” and to have confidence in their ability to manage the crises.

“I’m realistic,” she said. “Everybody [in the dispute] needs to know that nobody wins it all.”

She hinted that China might be open to compromise, referencing the resolution of a maritime boundary dispute between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000, where Vietnam secured 51 per cent and China accepted a lesser share. “China and Vietnam know how to compromise so we can make a deal.”

“I think if the Philippines knows the beauty of compromise, the beauty of achieving what we really want by peaceful means, I think we can finally find a final resolution in the South China Sea,” Yan said.

Dr Rommel Banlaoi, director of the Manila-based Centre for the Study of Philippines-China Relations, noted that China has a record of exhibiting patience in settling territorial disputes peacefully.

“[It] waited 156 years to get back Hong Kong from Great Britain, 442 years to regain Macau from Portugal,” he said

When This Week in Asia asked academics about China’s commitment to the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, Professor Hu said, “China is very serious about the CoC negotiation.”

He also noted Dr Yang’s comments from the forum about the Chinese government’s willingness to finalise the document next year.

“Maybe, this is the only last chance to conclude this document,” he said.

An-lin Yen on Taiwan: It is likely to take another five to 10 years to achieve full reunification + We acknowledge that, at present, the US is stronger than us, which is the main reason reunification has not yet been achieved

Open Questions | Beijing adviser Yan Anlin on why a timetable for Taiwan reunification has disadvantages | South China Morning Post

 

‘We are in a preparatory phase’, noted Taiwan studies expert and former aide to lead negotiator in historic 1993 cross-strait talks says

Amber Wangin, Beijing, Apr 21 2025

Professor Yan Anlin is one of mainland China’s most highly regarded Taiwan studies experts. A former close aide to Wang Daohan, the mainland representative at the historic talks with Taiwan in 1993, Yan is frequently consulted by Beijing on cross-strait policymaking and sits in on official meetings.

He currently serves as president of the Shanghai Association of Taiwan Studies as well as the Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies. He is also a former vice-president of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies think tank. This interview first appeared in SCMP Plus. For other interviews in the Open Questions series, click here.

What is your assessment of the current state of cross-strait relations and the historical progress towards reunification?

In my view, we are still in the early stages of building momentum towards complete reunification, which can be seen as a preparatory phase.

It is likely to take another five to 10 years to achieve full reunification, as we are still in a phase of quantitative change, rather than having reached a qualitative shift.

However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that – if [Taiwanese leader] William Lai Ching-te and other forces advocating Taiwan independence push matters to the extreme – peaceful reunification becomes no longer feasible, which is when the situation might escalate rapidly.

When I say it will take five to 10 years, I’m referring to peaceful reunification. I believe it would be very difficult to achieve sooner than that.

Does that mean Beijing has a timetable for reunification?

I think the Beijing authorities do not have a specific timetable for reunification, but we do feel a sense of urgency.

Having a timetable can be beneficial – it provides a clear target and enables step-by-step planning. However, the downside is that some aspects of cross-strait reunification are beyond our control, such as international factors, so it comes with both advantages and challenges.

Back in the late 1990s, then [Communist Party] general secretary Jiang Zemin did consider the idea of establishing such a timetable. Hong Kong had returned to China in 1997, with Macau to follow in 1999, leaving Taiwan as the only remaining issue in achieving full reunification.

In June 1998, during a meeting with then US president Bill Clinton, Jiang said: “Frankly speaking, the Taiwan issue cannot be dragged on indefinitely. There must be a timetable”.

There have been internal disagreements over whether to set up a specific timetable. Some argue that if the conditions are not yet ripe, such a timetable could become problematic, as our power might not have reached the required level.

We currently have the capability to prevent Taiwan independence – to ensure it does not succeed. However, we do not yet possess the kind of capability where we can achieve reunification whenever we choose to.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party said in their resolution for the sixth plenum of the 19th party congress in 2021 that, on reunification, “time and momentum are always on our side”. What is your understanding of this assertion?

We believe that time is on the side of reunification, not Taiwan independence, and we are quite confident in this belief.

Ultimately, it comes down to the balance of power. This power, however, is not just about hard power, it also includes soft power, institutional influence, and various other factors.

When comparing the cross-strait power dynamic, the mainland’s strength is steadily surpassing Taiwan’s.

One significant external factor affecting reunification is the balance of power between China and the United States. We acknowledge that, at present, the US is stronger than us, which is the main reason reunification has not yet been achieved.

However, over the long term, we must recognise the reality that the gap between China and the US is narrowing, and we are gaining ground more quickly.

But how do the views of Taiwan’s younger generation affect the mainland’s goal of achieving peaceful reunification?

We do recognise that the number of young people in Taiwan who support reunification is not increasing, but rather decreasing, which is undoubtedly linked to Taiwan’s pro-independence education.

However, I don’t believe this necessarily means that young people in Taiwan want independence or wish to establish a “Republic of Taiwan”. The reluctance to reunify and advocating for Taiwan independence are two distinct concepts.

This is why promoting cross-strait youth exchanges remains important. We also acknowledge that the hope for national reunification lies with the younger generation.

That said, reunification is a major national and state issue and cannot be entirely determined by the will of a single portion of the population.

Therefore, while young people’s views are significant, if they support reunification, the likelihood of peaceful reunification becomes much greater. However, if a portion of the younger generation remains opposed to reunification, the mainland could face greater resistance, potentially lengthening the process.

Last year, you predicted that after William Lai assumed office, cross-strait relations would enter a high-risk period though it wouldn’t escalate to military conflict. Has your viewpoint changed now, especially considering Lai’s recent announcement of 17 strategies targeting the mainland?

I don’t believe my viewpoint has changed significantly.

However, we must acknowledge that Lai’s recent “17 strategies” targeting the mainland and his designation of the mainland as a “foreign hostile force” have had a very negative impact on cross-strait relations, particularly in terms of exchanges.

Many Taiwanese people may now be reluctant to engage in exchanges with the mainland, fearing they could be accused of colluding with the “enemy”.

At the same time, we must recognise that the primary aim of these “17 strategies” is to support the large-scale recall campaign primarily targeting the [opposition] Kuomintang lawmakers, while consolidating Lai’s own power and mobilising his Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) political base ahead of the 2026 local elections in Taiwan.

The “17 strategies” also signal that Lai’s administration may lean towards a more extreme pro-independence stance. However, this doesn’t mean he has already taken that path, as I believe some of the “17 strategies” may prove unfeasible to implement.

There is also the possibility that these strategies could lead to a potential military conflict between the two sides. It will depend on what the Lai administration will do next. The risk of military conflict cannot be ruled out.

The mainland’s Anti-Secession Law states that the government may resort to “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” to achieve reunification under three specific circumstances. So, how close, specifically, are Lai’s 17 strategies to triggering this use of force by Beijing?

It’s getting close, but whether the situation truly crosses the line will depend on the actions that follow – especially the handling of the so-called 10 national security-related law revisions by Taiwan’s legislature.

Lai’s speech on March 13 – in which he outlined these strategies and carried the theme of “resisting China” – combined with the large-scale recall campaign and the proposed revisions to national security laws, is part of a “three-in-one” strategy aimed at consolidating his political power.

These actions are highly provocative in terms of cross-strait relations. They challenge the mainland’s bottom line and test its patience.

That said, I believe it’s difficult to make an objective judgment based solely on Lai’s rhetoric. What truly matters is not what he says, but what he does.

What gives us some degree of confidence is that the forces opposed to “Taiwan independence” far outweigh those supporting it. Even the US government does not support Taiwan independence.

Does Lai really have the courage to become a [Ukrainian leader Volodymyr] Zelensky-like figure in the Taiwan Strait, serving as a proxy of foreign anti-China forces to spark a war? I seriously doubt he possesses that kind of resolve.

From this perspective, we still believe there is hope for peaceful reunification, and it remains a goal that we must continue to pursue.

How do you assess US President Donald Trump’s Taiwan policy and its impact on the cross-strait situation?

Trump has not yet systematically articulated his policy on Taiwan. I believe the bottom line of Trump’s Taiwan policy is to avoid direct US involvement in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, Trump does not want a war there, as it would run counter to his “Make America Great Again” agenda.

However, I don’t think Trump would abandon Taiwan, because supporting Taiwan is politically correct for the US government, rather than being a personal issue for him.

In his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Trump stressed the importance of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, which could be seen as interference in China’s internal affairs. Similar statements were made in the Group of Seven foreign ministers’ declaration, reflecting a continuation of America’s Taiwan policy.

However, this does not mean Trump’s Taiwan Strait policy has fully taken shape. There is still considerable uncertainty and, looking ahead, I believe the risks he poses to cross-strait relations are still significant.

Washington’s Taiwan policy is essentially subordinate to its broader China policy. Within this framework, the Trump administration’s Taiwan Strait policy has involved actions such as facilitating the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to invest another US$100 billion in its American plants in the US and approving US$870 million in military aid to Taiwan. However, these actions have largely been low-key and balanced with considerations for Beijing.

Trump’s arms sales to Taiwan could ultimately surpass those under Joe Biden, as Trump is driven by business interests and expects Taiwan to pay for its own protection.

What is your view on TSMC’s announced increased chip investment in the US? What impact does this have on Taiwan’s industries and cross-strait relations?

It’s impossible for TSMC to completely relocate its operations to the US, and the shift of the semiconductor industry would require a process. Even if there were a decision on a full transfer during Trump’s presidency, it would be difficult to achieve during his four-year term.

The DPP policy has been to fully comply with Trump’s pressure, which is detrimental to Taiwan. The reason Taiwan’s economy is still holding up is largely due to semiconductors and TSMC. Without TSMC, I think Taiwan could face industrial hollowing, which would also hurt its position in regional economic integration.

If TSMC were to move all of its operations to the US, Taiwan’s strategic importance would decrease further. From this perspective, Lai is effectively selling out Taiwan.

You recently attended a symposium in Beijing marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. Do you think the meeting sent a stronger, more hardline message regarding Taiwan?

The symposium sent a very important message: our major policy on Taiwan remains “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems”. This basic stance has not changed.

We will absolutely not use non-peaceful means to achieve reunification until the very last moment because both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese. However, if Taiwan independence advocates persist in pursuing their separatist agenda, we may take decisive measures.

Since Lai took office, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted at least three large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. How should we understand Beijing’s considerations behind these military drills, and does this pose a greater risk to the Taiwan Strait?

Some people may believe that the PLA’s military exercises have become too frequent, but we should recognise that the reason for this is that Taiwan independence has become a real threat.

Prior to [former US House speaker] Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PLA’s exercises were quite restrained. However, due to [Lai’s predecessor] Tsai Ing-wen’s collusion with Pelosi, the PLA was forced to take countermeasures, with drills aimed at opposing Taiwan independence. The military drills have become natural and even normalised nowadays.

In reality, the risk of conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is rising. No one can guarantee that there won’t be accidental escalation, but from the mainland’s perspective, we remain committed to peaceful reunification and will only take decisive measures as a last resort.

The PLA exercises are certainly not intended to bring risks to peace in the Taiwan Strait, but to reduce the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. What brings risks to the Taiwan Strait are the separatist activities of the “Taiwan independence” forces headed by Lai, as well as the interference of external anti-China forces in the Taiwan issue.

Has there been any new approach or strategy from the mainland regarding Taiwan in recent years? How do we assess the progress and effectiveness of cross-strait “integrated development”?

The core strategy remains focused on peaceful and integrated development between the two sides, gradually building strength and preparing to advance the reunification process. There has been no significant shift in this fundamental approach.

Other key elements, such as complete national reunification in the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and firmly opposing Taiwan independence and external interference, are all valuable lessons accumulated over many years.

If we are to speak of new approaches in recent years, the emphasis has been on deepening integrated development, along with continuous improvements to Beijing’s integrated development policies. However, integration is a long-term process that requires time.

During the eight years of Tsai’s administration and now with Lai in office, integration has been a one-sided effort.

By “one-sided”, I mean that we cannot push for integration in Taiwan, rather, we invite Taiwanese people to come to the mainland to engage in the integration process. This is the current limitation.

Meanwhile, the DPP has staunchly opposed integration, which has further complicated the situation. At present, the mainland’s integration efforts are confined to Fujian province, with no nationwide roll-out yet.

As a result, the effects of integration are still quite localised, and we remain in the early stages of the process, which is also completely normal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the integration process has fully succeeded, nor can we expect to immediately enter a phase of peaceful reunification. This is likely to take more time.

In 2019, President Xi Jinping proposed exploring a one country, two systems model for Taiwan. What progress has been made in terms of research and development of this proposal?

Academic research on the Taiwan plan has entered an intensive and detailed phase. However, there are internal disagreements within the scholarly community. Most scholars still believe the framework should remain one country, two systems, but there’s now an opinion that the manner of reunification – whether peaceful or through force – could determine the final shape of the post-reunification arrangement. That’s one area of divergence.

Another contentious point is whether Taiwan’s military would be retained. Many of the current proposals suggest that it may not be possible for Taiwan to keep its armed forces. Additionally, Taiwan’s de-sinicised education system would definitely need to be reformed.

At present, the Taiwan plan is still under unilateral study and discussion on the mainland – by both academics and the government. It has not yet progressed to cross-strait negotiations. But ultimately, any implementation of the plan will require such negotiations. So far, neither Taiwanese scholars nor the general public have been involved in shaping this proposal.

In my view, the earlier both sides begin negotiations, the better it will be for Taiwan. Early talks would give Taiwan more bargaining chips, and it may be able to secure broader rights. If negotiations only begin as a last resort, Taiwan is likely to be in a much weaker position.

In your opinion, if reunification is achieved through force, would Taiwan be turned into a regular province rather than a special administrative region like Hong Kong or Macau?

In my opinion, that’s impossible. Once the two sides are reunified – especially under the “two systems” Taiwan plan – Taiwan would definitely become a special administrative region. That’s beyond question, though the name might not be exactly “Taiwan Special Administrative Region”.

For example, if the people of Taiwan wish to retain the term “Republic” [Taiwan’s official name is “the Republic of China”] in some form, then perhaps a name like “Taiwan Republic Special Administrative Region” could be negotiable.

Do you personally think the governance model for Taiwan would be more flexible than Hong Kong’s?

I believe it would definitely be more flexible. For example, Taiwan already participates in some international organisations, and that participation may not only continue after reunification but might actually expand.

I also believe elections in Taiwan will absolutely continue. It’s impossible that elections would be cancelled after reunification. However, those elected wouldn’t be called “president,” and the constitution of the Republic of China possibly would not remain in place in its current form.

You worked closely for many years with Wang Daohan, the former president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). What lessons can we draw from Wang’s talks with his Taiwanese counterpart in the 1990s in terms of today’s cross-strait relations? And has institutionalised consultation between the two sides reached a deadlock?

The 1993 Wang-Koo talks in Singapore – with Wang representing ARATS and Koo Chen-fu representing Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) – were a prime example of pragmatic cross-strait engagement.

At the time, Taiwan’s “Three No’s” policy [no contact, no negotiation, no compromise] restricted direct official interaction with the mainland. So, both sides created semi-official organisations – essentially “white gloves” – to shake hands and handle concrete issues arising from growing cross-strait exchanges. The talks were grounded in mutual respect and a “seeking common ground while shelving differences” approach.

After Tsai took office in 2016 and refused to recognise the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for dialogue between ARATS and SEF collapsed, leading to today’s stalemate. In this sense, yes – institutionalised negotiations are currently at an impasse.

That said, on matters directly affecting people’s livelihoods, there’s still room for pragmatic cooperation. For example, issues like mainland residents travelling to Taiwan could still be discussed through smaller, sectoral mechanisms – like the tourism-focused “Mini-Two Associations” [Taiwan Strait Tourism Association and the mainland’s Association for Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Strait] – if there is mutual willingness.

However, Lai has shown no intention of reopening such exchanges – including tourism. He seems to believe that increased cross-strait interaction and mutual understanding among people on both sides are detrimental to the pro-independence agenda.

So in my opinion, at least for this year, it is likely to remain very difficult for residents from places like Shanghai and Fujian to travel to Taiwan. But in the long run, I don’t think such barriers can hold.

Last year, you wrote an article about leveraging the roles of Hong Kong and Macau to ease travel restrictions for certain DPP figures. Could you explain the rationale behind this approach?

Relations between Hong Kong and Taiwan are a crucial part of cross-strait relations and should continue to play an important role. That’s why I suggested that some DPP members, who might be reluctant to visit the mainland including Shanghai, due to the 22 measures targeting pro-independence figures, could travel to Hong Kong and Macau instead.

However, the bigger issue now is that while some DPP members can travel to Shanghai, they are unable to visit Hong Kong [due to regulations in Hong Kong].

Additionally, since the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, some DPP members told me that within their party, a cultural tendency had developed where visiting Hong Kong was seen as politically incorrect.

I believe that exchanges between Taiwan and Hong Kong should take the lead – ahead of, for example Taiwan’s exchanges with mainland cities like Shanghai. But unfortunately this isn’t the reality at the moment.

You visited Taiwan for academic exchanges in January this year, which is considered a rare example of cross-strait Track 2 dialogue since the pandemic. What was your key takeaway from this trip? Additionally, as the first mainland scholar to obtain a PhD in contemporary Taiwan studies, could you share your insights on the current state and challenges of Taiwan research on the mainland?

Our visit to Taiwan was purely for academic exchange as civilian scholars, and this is also the first time I visited Taiwan since the Covid-19 pandemic.

It has been 30 years since my first visit to Taiwan, in 1995, and this time, obtaining entry permission was the most challenging it has ever been. The DPP exerts tighter control over cross-strait exchanges, and, in some respects, this can be likened to a form of “green terror” [a reference to the white terror under which Taiwanese were persecuted by the Kuomintang government during the island’s martial law period].

Reflecting on the trip, I came to realise the critical importance of these exchanges. There exists a significant gap in understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, even within the academic community. Therefore, fostering exchanges is essential for bridging this divide.

As for Taiwan studies, it requires mainland researchers to conduct fieldwork in Taiwan, spend time there, and engage with various sectors of Taiwanese society to gain an authentic understanding of the situation. Otherwise, our perspectives may remain based on mere conjecture.

I have been involved in Taiwan studies since 1989. Some people jokingly point out that after over 30 years of research, the reunification issue remains unresolved. I tell them that if research alone could solve the Taiwan issue, it would reflect a fundamental underestimation of its complexity.

Ultimately, the resolution of the Taiwan issue depends on strength. The mainland must possess the necessary power; without it, reunification is not feasible.

Reunification also requires the ability to clearly articulate its benefit and to lay out both the steps and strategy, which are closely tied to us researchers and our work, calling for us to seize every moment.

Dennis Wilder on US-China ties, Taiwan, internal reforms in the US, the Quad, India, technological prowess and economic might

SCMP Exclusive | Dennis Wilder, national security specialist and former CIA official, on US-China ties
Sylvie Zhuangin, Beijing. Apr 7, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3305386/they-will-never-use-signal-anything-again-dennis-wilder

Before becoming a senior fellow with Georgetown University’s Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues, Dennis Wilder served in the George Bush Jnr and Barack Obama administrations in a number of national security positions, including as the CIA’s deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific from 2015 to 2016.

In the latest instalment of the Open Questions series, Wilder shares his views on President Donald Trump’s cuts to the US federal government’s bureaucracy as well as the most sensitive issues determining China-US relations.


Excerpts

How do you view the current state of the Ukraine war and would you say that transatlantic relations are undergoing a significant shift? Will the post-World War II international order be fundamentally reshaped in the coming four years?

The Ukraine war is a stalemate and neither side can win on the battlefield, so President Donald Trump’s attempt to get both sides to see the futility of continued combat is very appropriate and, frankly, long overdue. America should have taken this stand a while ago.

I can’t tell you what I think a peace agreement should look like but certainly, whatever the peace agreement is, Russian President Vladimir Putin has got to make sincere promises that he will never again aggress against another country and its sovereignty.

The attack on Ukraine was outrageous and illegal. It ran against all the principles established by China and the Bandung Conference of 1955. Sovereignty is a critical point in international relations and Putin violated it.

In terms of transatlantic relations, ever since the end of World War II the US has carried a very heavy burden financially in protecting Europe and these democracies came to rely on this, instead of spending on their own defence. So yes there is a fundamental shift – again, that is long overdue.

The change, and we see it happening already, is that Europeans are responding appropriately. They are talking about doing what they need to do for their own defence. This will be good for the alliance.

Nato will have spent more on its own defence. We will have reduced our burden so we can become stronger in other ways and as long as the Nato agreement continues, from my point of view, what is happening now is a good change to the international order, not a bad change.

Some say that a rift has opened between European countries and the US since Trump’s return to the White House. What is your view and, if there is division, could Beijing benefit from it and in what way?

I think the rift is highly exaggerated. Changes in a relationship that are positive for the relationship are not a rift. I think this is exaggerated by those who would like to have the opportunity to take advantage, but will be disappointed.

Beijing has a big problem with Europe that doesn’t even involve the United States. First of all, China has been illegally supporting Russia’s war and the Europeans are very upset about that, and they’ve talked to the Chinese about this.

Secondly, the Chinese overcapacity in things like electric vehicles is a big problem, so China’s problems with Europe are separate from America’s changes in its relationship with Europe. These problems don’t go away. So again, the opportunities for China are overblown.

What do you think about Trump’s moves to cut the bureaucracy, which seem to have caused some public discontent. What might be the implications?

The 1.9 per cent of Americans – about 3 million people – who work for the US federal government make up a very small percentage of the population. Getting rid of some poor government employees will have very little effect on the American economy.

Now of course, if you are one of those government workers to be let go, no question about it you will be unhappy. But if you look across the United States and talk to the people, they want this to happen.

Americans in general have been asking for decades for someone to deal with the bloated and inefficient government bureaucracy.

The last time an American president reduced the size of the US government was under Bill Clinton when we had a “peace dividend”. But ever since, the US government keeps growing and it is inefficient. Everybody knows there is waste and fraud.

So again, we will be stronger after we cut the fat out of the government. This is not negative, but positive. As a US government employee for 36 years, I can assure you there is waste, fraud and abuse in the US government.

What would you say is the end game behind these cuts in the long run? Is it just to make the US stronger?

Yes. My Chinese friends say “we wish we could do this in China”. Do you think there’s waste and inefficiency? So maybe we are the model.

At a London School of Economics and Political Science forum in March, you said people only see Trump’s America first slogan, ignoring that it does not mean “America only”. Could you elaborate on that?

During Trump’s first term in office, he did not have a strong appreciation for our alliances and our partners. But what I am seeing now in his second term is much more understanding of the national security position of the US government.

We need our allies in Asia and elsewhere. We need them, as I said about Nato, and we will be stronger if we can get our allies to do more.

So what you will see is the Trump administration talking with our allies in Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and Taiwan. We’ve already talked to Taiwan about the fact that they need to do more for their own defence and that they don’t spend enough. These discussions will continue.

But that doesn’t mean we don’t value alliances. After all, President Trump has already had a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) here in Washington and the value of the alliances is unquestioned. So when people say that America first means America only, they don’t understand it.

The Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te recently described mainland China as a “foreign hostile force”. Does this suggest that he was given tacit support by the US? What role do you think Lai may play in the US-China dynamic?

The United States is very lucky that we have an excellent representative in Taipei and his name is Raymond Greene. He speaks beautiful Chinese. He understands the Democratic Progressive Party very well, and he has had excellent conversations with Lai.

The United States is very clear with him that the status quo must be maintained by both Taipei and Beijing. Period. Full stop. No question.

Given Lai’s increasingly confrontational style, how might this affect Beijing’s stance on the overall cross-strait relationship?

I would not say that Beijing has been particularly nice to Lai. I don’t see that Beijing’s rhetoric towards him is conciliatory. Obviously Beijing expects him to kowtow. We don’t want him to kowtow.

So what is Washington’s Taiwan policy at this stage?

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said it very directly the other day in a discussion with Hugh Hewitt on his podcast. I don’t need to elaborate. The American policy is consistent. It has been consistent from the Joe Biden administration, consistent to now that I see nothing that says we are changing policy on Taiwan.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest chip manufacturer, announced in March that it would invest US$100 billion in the US over the next four years. What will be the impact on Taiwan’s economy? Will it hollow out the island’s chip industry?

The US$100 billion deal is the largest single investment ever by a foreign company in the United States. It is very significant and very helpful to rebuilding American manufacturing.

But the leader of TSMC has also said that he will retain the most sophisticated, advanced computer chip capability in Taiwan, not in the United States, so there is no danger of hollowing out the TSMC plants in Taiwan, as long as he is committed to building the highest level of computer chip in Taiwan, the people on Taiwan should not worry.

What is the likelihood of a meeting between Trump and President Xi Jinping and if it does take place, what deal should we expect?

We are far away from a Xi-Trump meeting right now. I don’t think it will happen any time soon, and the reason is that China has not responded appropriately to President Trump, who has made clear that before negotiations can begin, China needs to take positive steps on the fentanyl problem.

What has China done? China has told Trump that he should thank China for what they have done on fentanyl. They have issued a white paper suggesting that they’ve done all they can. But fentanyl from China continues to be caught at the American border in large numbers.

So how is it that all of this fentanyl is still coming to the United States if Beijing is doing such a good job?

Beijing needs to unilaterally take steps, such as imprisoning the people involved in the fentanyl trade, sentencing them, and punishing the companies involved. Until it takes those steps, I don’t think Trump is very interested in negotiations.

Look at what Mexico did when Trump said you need to do more: they put 10,000 troops on the border, they sent back dozens of gang members to the United States, they allowed the CIA to put drones over Mexico. The Mexicans didn’t say, “oh, we need to negotiate”.

My problem is, China has used this fentanyl issue as a political card. When relations were good, China did a little more on fentanyl, but when relations were bad, China did nothing.

China needs to stop using this card, because a huge number of Americans between the ages of 18 and 45 die every year. It is the largest killer of people in that age group. This should not be a political negotiation. China could do the right thing.

If those issues were addressed, do you think Xi and Trump would be more likely to meet?

The next step would be negotiations, not a meeting. The economic trade negotiations will begin, and Trump will appoint a negotiator, and President Xi will appoint a negotiator, like he did with Liu He.

There are many good steps that each side could take. China could invest in the United States and create jobs here, like TSMC is doing. Beijing could go back to the phase-one trade agreement and agree to buy US$200 billion of goods a year from the US.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration could promise that controls on hi-tech exports to China will be targeted and limited, not very wide in their scope. The Trump administration could take some companies off sanction lists, or stop some sanctions against Chinese officials.

There are many areas where we can come to agreements. After the negotiators have come to something, then the two leaders can sit down and meet.

Some have argued that the differences in economic models between China and the US are not just about policy choices but are determined by long-standing debates on the role of government in the economy, which stem from deep historical and ideological roots.

For example, the United States’ free-market philosophy is rooted in thinkers like John Locke and Milton Friedman, while China’s state-centric approach has been influenced by Legalism traditions dating back over 2,000 years. What do you think?

There is Chinese exceptionalism and American exceptionalism. American exceptionalism is based on the idea that we are the city on the hill. We have created the ideal society through a combination of democracy and capitalism.

Our system is very much based on individual freedoms, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, so we think we have the ideal model.

But Beijing also thinks it has the ideal model. And their model is based on a combination of communism and Confucianism, and it is very much based less on the individual than on collective harmony.

And so in the socialist system that China practices, its economy is collectively based. For example, it is not a consumer-led economy which is about consumer sovereignty. Xi Jinping is much more interested in the collective and therefore in the state-led economy.

So we have two very fundamentally different political and economic systems and we both believe we have the best system in the world.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will expire in 2026. China has said repeatedly that its nuclear capabilities are not on the same level as the US or Russia and refused to engage in nuclear arms talks.

Do you think China may engage more in future negotiations? Europe is also working on developing its own nuclear deterrence strategy. How might that affect global security?

I’ve been trying to get the Chinese to have strategic security talks ever since I was in the White House in 2004, and it’s been very frustrating. We were only successful once in getting a senior general from the PLA’s strategic rocket force to come to Washington when George W. Bush was president.

I went to that meeting and the Chinese officer shouted at us in his speech. He didn’t want to be there nor talk to us. It was quite clear that the only reason he was there was because former president Hu Jintao told him that he had to be there.

But he had no interest in discussing his nuclear forces. Because China’s nuclear force was small, and they believed that by hiding the force, it gave them an advantage.

What I hope today is that with China building 360 new ICBM sites and increasing its nuclear weapons stockpile dramatically, the Chinese may be more comfortable now with coming to strategic stability talks.

In terms of other countries, I am much less worried about Europe than I am about Asia. The constant building by the North Koreans of nuclear capabilities, and the inability of China to stop them, will lead to pressure in South Korea and Japan to think about building their own nuclear capabilities.

Both countries have plenty of capability to do this, and it will become harder and harder for the United States to argue with these countries that they should not build their own nuclear weapons as the North Korean threat grows.

What are your thoughts on the idea that is being expressed as “East rising, West declining”? If the US does decline, would it create an opportunity for China? If so, how realistic is it for China to move towards the centre of the global stage?

I am very tired of this line of analysis. After the Vietnam war, Mao Zedong said we were finished. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, and after the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese scholars said the US was finished. China’s ability to predict this is not very strong today.

The Magnificent Seven – Microsoft, Google, Tesla, Apple, Nvidia, Meta and Amazon – are the most dynamic companies in the world. DeepSeek was only a derivative of ChatGPT.

China has not invented anything like ChatGPT, and I will predict that the Magnificent Seven are going to lead the way in frontier technologies for the next two decades at least, and China will just be following behind, so where is this East rising?

We were also told the Chinese economy would be bigger than the American economy and it’s not going to happen for a long time.

Given the current situation, especially with Trump’s influence, how do you see middle powers such as Britain and Australia navigating their positions? Will they face greater pressure in choosing a side when balancing respective ties with China and the US?

People don’t understand our allies very well if they think that they just follow our policies. There is a new Labour government in Britain, which I spoke to when I was in London. It has its own China policy that is very different from our policy today. We can be comfortable with that. Britain has its own national needs. It has its own economic needs.

Australia is the same. Australia is much more dependent on trade with China than we are. Of course they’re going to take a different stance in their relationship with Beijing, but that doesn’t undercut the strategic alliance, which remains strong.

The Australian military has been with us in every conflict we have fought since World War II. They will be there with us.

How would India benefit from the tension between the US and China?

Indians will always go their own way. They will never be part of the American strategic alliance – nor part of a strategic alliance with anybody. The Indians cherish their independence. They are the leaders of what’s called the non-aligned movement and will always remain that way.

So will they play the United States off against China and play the United States off against Russia? Yes, of course they will. That is where the Indians like to be, and we have to accept that’s the Indian position in the world.

How do you envision the Quad – the US alliance with Australia, India and Japan – and the Aukus agreement on nuclear-powered submarines between the US, Britain and Australia, under Trump 2.0?

There is a review going on right now on Aukus, as there are some problems with the nuclear submarine programme. I’m not sure what the conclusion will be.

There are some in the Trump administration, such as Elbridge Colby, who think the submarine programme is not a good idea. I think this is an open question. I don’t know the answer to what the future of Aukus will look like, but I think it will be rethought a bit.

One of the things people don’t understand about the Quad is that it is much less about strategic military matters and much more about cooperation on health and economic issues.

People misread the Quad. If you look at the Quad website, you will see that they do a lot of things that have nothing to do with strategic military issues. The Quad is successful in that regard but again, the Indians are not going to become part of a strategic alliance.

Will ideological confrontation be less of a priority in US competition with China during Trump’s second term? For example, could the issue of Tibet and the choice of the next Dalai Lama become another thorny issue?

The United States has not had a president who was a real businessman since Harry Truman, who owned a hat store in Missouri.

Now, Trump is a businessman. He thinks geo-economically, not geo- strategically. He wants reciprocal trade agreements with everybody around the world that benefit the American worker. That is his focus.

Look at what he has proposed in Ukraine – to buy rare earths from the Ukrainians. His argument is that it would be a better security guarantee than putting American forces in there, because it would be an economic stake for the US, which forms protection for Ukraine.

It’s a different ideology. It’s the ideology of a capitalist, of a businessman. And he is very different from past American presidents who were part of the national security elite of the United States. He never was part of that elite, and he doesn’t think in those terms.

On the Dalai Lama, the selection of the next Dalai Lama will be upon us in the next 10 years. The way that Beijing handled the Panchen Lama was atrocious from the American point of view. It was a rights violation.

The fact that the Tibetans chose a Panchen Lama, then Beijing made the boy disappear and chose its own young man has created a big flag between Americans who believe in religious freedom and Beijing.

If Beijing once again decides that it will choose the next Dalai Lama, there is going to be a big problem.

The Dalai Lama is now 89 years old and is unlikely to live beyond 100. Thus the issue of his reincarnation will be upon us all. China will want to control the process as it did with the Panchen Lama. The US will want to support the autonomous decision making of the international leadership of Tibetan Buddhism.

What areas do you see that could provide opportunities for substantive cooperation between China and the US?

There are certainly areas for American and Chinese cooperation. As I said on the drugs trade, this could be a win-win if China would stop the gangs from doing what they are doing.

In the trade area, we can have a win-win result. Trump has said China can invest in the US.

The Japanese were in trouble with the US in the 1980s until they started building car factories there and then the relationship became much smoother. China ought to look at that model.

There are areas on disease control and on food security for the Global South. For Africa and other areas, we should be working together.

The African population in the next few decades will explode in size. This will cause problems in food security and stability. The two great economic powers need to work together on Africa but right now, we are not.

Also on the issue of North Korea, neither side is interested in a conflict on the Korean peninsula. It would be very helpful of the Chinese to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table.

We will be competing in the Global South. There’s no question. And that is one of the many areas of US-China competition. This is a good thing. The Global South countries have options and can leverage us against each other.

If I were sitting in a Global South country, I would be figuring out how I can get the most benefits out of Beijing and out of Washington.

How the establishment thinks in the UK about energy and the citizen's quality of life

How the establishment thinks in the UK about energy and the citizen's quality of life

Co-authored by the Royal Academy of Engineering, this past month they presented 'Critical materials: demand-side resource efficiency measures for sustainability and resilience' https://nepc.raeng.org.uk/media/qutgamxj/nepc-critical-materials-report.pdf. Oct 2024.

Among the many pearls, just to print one:

As an alternative policy focus, a significant reduction in vehicle numbers can be made through ‘modal shift’ – policies and infrastructure that enable a change from one mode of transport to another. Moving passengers from low-capacity vehicles such as cars into buses or trains allows more people to be transported per journey. This relates directly to a reduction in critical materials – a study of transport in California, US, modelled a 71% decrease in system-wide lithium demand from shifting policies away from a focus on replacing existing vehicles with EVs to e-bikes or e-buses.

As the report says, no one expects such gains of 71pct in the UK because there is much less car use, but still...

Let's remember also the thing about eating worms, our not having the right to travel via jets but slow rail, the rationing of construction and homes,our having to live with less clothes, the change from trade via ships to trains, etc. A member of Volkswagen board since Nov 2022, Julia Willie Hamburg, says (https://x.com/terran_liberty/status/1850972755916636178), translated from German:

Talking about rationing: it’s clear that if we shrink economically, we won’t have to be as poor as the British were in 1939; rather, we’d have to be as rich as the West Germans were in 1978. That is a huge difference, because we can take advantage of all the growth of the post-war period and the entire economic miracle.

The central elements of the economy would have to be rationed. First of all, living space, because cement emits endless amounts of CO2. Actually, new construction would have to be banned outright and living space rationed to 50 square metres per capita. That should actually be enough for everyone. Then meat would have to be rationed, because meat production emits enormous amounts of CO2. You don’t have to become a vegetarian, but you’ll have to eat a lot less meat.

Then train travel has to be rationed. So this idea, which many people also have – “so okay then I don’t have a car but then I always travel on the Intercity Express trains” – that won’t work either, because of course air resistance increases with speed. Yes, it’s all totally insane. Trains won’t be allowed to travel faster than 100 kilometres per hour, but you can still travel around locally quite a lot. This is all in my book, okay? But I didn’t expand on it there because I didn’t want to scare all the readers.

Dockworkers strike: Only about half of the union’s members are obliged to show up to work each day; the rest sit at home collecting “container royalties” negotiated in previous ILA contracts

On the Waterfront, the Sequel. By The WSJ Editorial Board

The dockworkers strike is an education in monopoly union power.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/longshoremen-union-strike-ports-waterfront-commission-new-york-harbor-harold-daggett-debd179a

Updated Oct. 3, 2024 8:30 pm ET

Extracts:

One myth exposed by the strike is that unions need more economic and political power because they help the working man. The union behind this strike, the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), helps some workers at the expense of countless others.

Start with the astounding fact that there were 50,000 or so ILA strikers but only 25,000 or so port jobs. That’s right, only about half of the union’s members are obliged to show up to work each day. The rest sit at home collecting “container royalties” negotiated in previous ILA contracts intended to protect against job losses that result from innovation.

And what a deal for those favored few who do show up to work. The 2019-2020 report of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor laid out the reality: “The absolute control of the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (ILA) over hiring in the Port for over 60 years has not only led to a lack of diversity and inclusion in waterfront employment, but also to the perpetuation of criminality and corruption.”

Residents near the ports can’t get hired because of this union control. “Meanwhile, those who are connected to union leadership or organized crime figures are rewarded with high paying, low-show or no-work special compensation packages,” the report said.

More than “590 individuals continue to receive over $147 million in outsized salaries not required by the industry’s collective bargaining agreement and for hours they do not even have to be at the Port,” the report continued. “Such positions were overwhelmingly given to white males connected to organized crime figures or union leadership.”

This is how ILA boss Harold Daggett earns $900,000 a year, drives a Bentley and owns a 76-foot yacht. And this is the union that President Biden, Kamala Harris and “national conservative” intellectuals extol as tribunes of the working class. Why hasn’t Mr. Biden rung up these guys for “systemic racism”?

This is what happens when unions are granted monopoly negotiating power that lets them extort outsized rents. The ILA is the sole union bargainer for East and Gulf Coast ports, and there is little non-union port competition. The union has a chokehold on commerce that gives it extortionary leverage.

The ILA is like the coal miners and railroad unions that shut down the British economy in the 1970s, or the unions that paralyze transportation in France today. When ILA members strike, they stop trade in goods and hurt literally millions of workers who earn far less than the members of the ILA. Mr. Daggett was happy to put countless truck drivers, warehouse employees, retail clerks and auto workers out of work so he and his “connected” members can buy another yacht.

This is why Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over the veto of Harry Truman in 1947. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act had handed vast new power to unions that resulted in waves of strikes, including secondary boycotts and forced union membership. Taft-Hartley rebalanced the rules for collective bargaining that continue today.

Taft-Hartley also gives the President the authority to seek a court order for an 80-day cooling-off period so companies and unions can negotiate without a strike. The provision was intended for labor disputes like the one at U.S. ports that do great economic harm. George W. Bush invoked it in 2002 to stop an 11-day labor action at West Coast ports.

Yet Mr. Biden refused to invoke the law, and Ms. Harris agreed. “I don’t believe in Taft-Hartley,” Mr. Biden said.

Time ago it was desertification, 'turning the Earth barren,' and 'leaving entire countries facing famine'; now the worry is that in the receding drylands 'vegetation may soak up scarce water supplies'

Although by then it was well-known that it was a better theory that the deserts were receding and the earth was greening, than the opposite one (the deserts were extending), since at least 2016*, and that there was a continental-scale greening (not specifically of dry areas) since 1997**, The Guardian, as late as 2021, had the nerve to say (my emphasis):

"Desertification is turning the Earth barren – but a solution is still within reach. The expansion of drylands is leaving entire countries facing famine. It’s time to change the way we think about agriculture" — David R Montgomery. The Guardian, Jun 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/sep/02/desertification-barren-solution-famine-agriculture

The guy is not a journo... It is (& was at the moment) professor of geomorphology at the University of Washington.

When I thought the revenge finally came, a top notch university saying the drylands were going green, as was known for a decade:

With CO2 Levels Rising, World’s Drylands Are Turning Green. Fred Pearce. Yale Environment 360, Jul 16 2024. https://e360.yale.edu/features/greening-drylands-carbon-dioxide-climate-change

, I had to experience a deep disappointment... Unfortunately, even admitting to this stuff of a greening earth, of course they found that something bad and very worrying is happening, despite this positive "news": "But scientists warn this added vegetation may soak up scarce water supplies." :-)

* Zhu, Z., Piao, S., Myneni, R. et al. Greening of the Earth and its drivers. Nature Clim Change 6, 791–795 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3004

** Myneni, R. B., Keeling, C. D., Tucker, C. J., Asrar, G. & Nemani, R. R. Increased plant growth in the northern high latitudes from 1981 to 1991. Nature 386, 698–702 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1038/386698a0