Chinese scholars suggest peaceful path with Philippines in South China Sea dispute
Experts emphasise compromise and reject ‘megaphone diplomacy’ to avoid conflicts in the disputed waterway
Raissa Robles, Apr 20 2025
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3307130/chinese-scholars-suggest-peaceful-path-philippines-south-china-sea-dispute
China has no intention of relinquishing its territorial claims in the South China Sea – but it is equally determined to avoid conflict and manage disputes peacefully, four Chinese maritime scholars stated at a recent forum in Manila, framing compromise and restraint as the only viable paths forward.
The scholars shared their views just days after the latest confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels, expressing scepticism about the possibility of resolving the long-standing maritime dispute soon. But argued that mutual trust, patience, and a rejection of “megaphone diplomacy” could help defuse the crisis.
The forum – titled “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea” – was held at the Kamuning Bakery in suburban Manila on April 11, came five days after a near-collision in contested waters that once again highlighted the risks of escalation.
On April 6, a Chinese coastguard vessel attempted to block a Philippine coastguard ship near Scarborough Shoal. Commodore Jay Tarriela, spokesman for the West Philippine Sea, said the incident was a “reckless and dangerous” manoeuvre that showed a “blatant disregard for safety”.
It was the latest in a series of high-stakes encounters between the two sides. Since President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr took office in July 2022, the Philippines has filed more than 200 diplomatic protests against China on this matter, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Despite the challenges, Professor Hu Bo – director of the South China Sea Policy Institute and a research professor at Peking University’s Center for Maritime Strategy Studies – expressed optimism that while a full resolution of the dispute was unlikely “in our lifetime”, he remained “confident that we can peacefully manage these disputes” moving forward.
A maritime dispute was “far more complicated than [a] land boundary dispute,” said Dr Yan Yan, director of the Research Center of Oceans Law and Policy at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.
She explained that resolving the issue was especially difficult because “we have more than 200 features in the South China Sea” and ownership must be determined before drawing maritime boundaries among the five coastal states and their neighbours.
Crisis prevention and management would be crucial, she added. “The first thing is that we need to bear in mind the principle of self-restraint. And we also need to let our communication mechanism work, whether it be the BCM, the bilateral consultative mechanism, or the coastguard hotline to prevent escalation.”
Dr Zheng Zhihua, a research professor and head of the East Asa Marine Policy Project at the Center for Japanese Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, said that China’s rapid economic growth enabled it to uphold its territorial integrity, “I don’t see the possibility for China to give up its territory [and] sovereignty in the South China Sea. So what is important for us is to manage the dispute peacefully.”
According to Lei Xiaolu, professor at the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies of Wuhan University, managing the crisis involved avoiding “megaphone diplomacy” – or publicising every maritime event and encouraging external partners to issue statements or intervene.
She maintained that Asean member states had “no tradition to use the microphone to ask anybody else to intervene to deal with the dispute”, a reference to Manila’s efforts to involve the US, Japan and Australia in its dispute with China. [my comment: Canada and the EU also expressed displeasure with Red China, you filthy liars at the SCMP!]
She also noted that of the 180 global maritime boundary disputes, nearly 160 had been resolved quietly through “mutual negotiations and agreements”, with only a few brought before international tribunals. Her remarks were seen as a veiled reference to Manila’s 2013 arbitration case against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration administered that case in The Hague. In 2016, the tribunal ruled that China’s expansive claims under the so-called nine-dash line had no legal basis. While the outcome was widely regarded as a legal and diplomatic victory for the Philippines, it did not address sovereignty over specific maritime features – and China has refused to recognise the ruling.
“We still have the chance to have a bilateral negotiation with China to resolve all these disputes and manage these crises,” Professor Lei said.
Dr Yan underscored the need for both sides to practice “self-restraint” and “patience” and to have confidence in their ability to manage the crises.
“I’m realistic,” she said. “Everybody [in the dispute] needs to know that nobody wins it all.”
She hinted that China might be open to compromise, referencing the resolution of a maritime boundary dispute between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000, where Vietnam secured 51 per cent and China accepted a lesser share. “China and Vietnam know how to compromise so we can make a deal.”
“I think if the Philippines knows the beauty of compromise, the beauty of achieving what we really want by peaceful means, I think we can finally find a final resolution in the South China Sea,” Yan said.
Dr Rommel Banlaoi, director of the Manila-based Centre for the Study of Philippines-China Relations, noted that China has a record of exhibiting patience in settling territorial disputes peacefully.
“[It] waited 156 years to get back Hong Kong from Great Britain, 442 years to regain Macau from Portugal,” he said
When This Week in Asia asked academics about China’s commitment to the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, Professor Hu said, “China is very serious about the CoC negotiation.”
He also noted Dr Yang’s comments from the forum about the Chinese government’s willingness to finalise the document next year.
“Maybe, this is the only last chance to conclude this document,” he said.
Tuesday, April 22, 2025
Monday, April 21, 2025
An-lin Yen on Taiwan: It is likely to take another five to 10 years to achieve full reunification + We acknowledge that, at present, the US is stronger than us, which is the main reason reunification has not yet been achieved
Open Questions | Beijing adviser Yan Anlin on why a timetable for Taiwan reunification has disadvantages | South China Morning Post
‘We are in a preparatory phase’, noted Taiwan studies expert and former aide to lead negotiator in historic 1993 cross-strait talks says
Amber Wangin, Beijing, Apr 21 2025
Professor Yan Anlin is one of mainland China’s most highly regarded Taiwan studies experts. A former close aide to Wang Daohan, the mainland representative at the historic talks with Taiwan in 1993, Yan is frequently consulted by Beijing on cross-strait policymaking and sits in on official meetings.
Amber Wangin, Beijing, Apr 21 2025
Professor Yan Anlin is one of mainland China’s most highly regarded Taiwan studies experts. A former close aide to Wang Daohan, the mainland representative at the historic talks with Taiwan in 1993, Yan is frequently consulted by Beijing on cross-strait policymaking and sits in on official meetings.
He currently serves as president of the Shanghai Association of Taiwan Studies as well as the Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies. He is also a former vice-president of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies think tank. This interview first appeared in SCMP Plus. For other interviews in the Open Questions series, click here.
What is your assessment of the current state of cross-strait relations and the historical progress towards reunification?
In my view, we are still in the early stages of building momentum towards complete reunification, which can be seen as a preparatory phase.
It is likely to take another five to 10 years to achieve full reunification, as we are still in a phase of quantitative change, rather than having reached a qualitative shift.
However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that – if [Taiwanese leader] William Lai Ching-te and other forces advocating Taiwan independence push matters to the extreme – peaceful reunification becomes no longer feasible, which is when the situation might escalate rapidly.
When I say it will take five to 10 years, I’m referring to peaceful reunification. I believe it would be very difficult to achieve sooner than that.
Does that mean Beijing has a timetable for reunification?
I think the Beijing authorities do not have a specific timetable for reunification, but we do feel a sense of urgency.
Having a timetable can be beneficial – it provides a clear target and enables step-by-step planning. However, the downside is that some aspects of cross-strait reunification are beyond our control, such as international factors, so it comes with both advantages and challenges.
Back in the late 1990s, then [Communist Party] general secretary Jiang Zemin did consider the idea of establishing such a timetable. Hong Kong had returned to China in 1997, with Macau to follow in 1999, leaving Taiwan as the only remaining issue in achieving full reunification.
In June 1998, during a meeting with then US president Bill Clinton, Jiang said: “Frankly speaking, the Taiwan issue cannot be dragged on indefinitely. There must be a timetable”.
There have been internal disagreements over whether to set up a specific timetable. Some argue that if the conditions are not yet ripe, such a timetable could become problematic, as our power might not have reached the required level.
We currently have the capability to prevent Taiwan independence – to ensure it does not succeed. However, we do not yet possess the kind of capability where we can achieve reunification whenever we choose to.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party said in their resolution for the sixth plenum of the 19th party congress in 2021 that, on reunification, “time and momentum are always on our side”. What is your understanding of this assertion?
We believe that time is on the side of reunification, not Taiwan independence, and we are quite confident in this belief.
Ultimately, it comes down to the balance of power. This power, however, is not just about hard power, it also includes soft power, institutional influence, and various other factors.
When comparing the cross-strait power dynamic, the mainland’s strength is steadily surpassing Taiwan’s.
One significant external factor affecting reunification is the balance of power between China and the United States. We acknowledge that, at present, the US is stronger than us, which is the main reason reunification has not yet been achieved.
However, over the long term, we must recognise the reality that the gap between China and the US is narrowing, and we are gaining ground more quickly.
But how do the views of Taiwan’s younger generation affect the mainland’s goal of achieving peaceful reunification?
We do recognise that the number of young people in Taiwan who support reunification is not increasing, but rather decreasing, which is undoubtedly linked to Taiwan’s pro-independence education.
However, I don’t believe this necessarily means that young people in Taiwan want independence or wish to establish a “Republic of Taiwan”. The reluctance to reunify and advocating for Taiwan independence are two distinct concepts.
This is why promoting cross-strait youth exchanges remains important. We also acknowledge that the hope for national reunification lies with the younger generation.
That said, reunification is a major national and state issue and cannot be entirely determined by the will of a single portion of the population.
Therefore, while young people’s views are significant, if they support reunification, the likelihood of peaceful reunification becomes much greater. However, if a portion of the younger generation remains opposed to reunification, the mainland could face greater resistance, potentially lengthening the process.
Last year, you predicted that after William Lai assumed office, cross-strait relations would enter a high-risk period though it wouldn’t escalate to military conflict. Has your viewpoint changed now, especially considering Lai’s recent announcement of 17 strategies targeting the mainland?
I don’t believe my viewpoint has changed significantly.
However, we must acknowledge that Lai’s recent “17 strategies” targeting the mainland and his designation of the mainland as a “foreign hostile force” have had a very negative impact on cross-strait relations, particularly in terms of exchanges.
Many Taiwanese people may now be reluctant to engage in exchanges with the mainland, fearing they could be accused of colluding with the “enemy”.
At the same time, we must recognise that the primary aim of these “17 strategies” is to support the large-scale recall campaign primarily targeting the [opposition] Kuomintang lawmakers, while consolidating Lai’s own power and mobilising his Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) political base ahead of the 2026 local elections in Taiwan.
The “17 strategies” also signal that Lai’s administration may lean towards a more extreme pro-independence stance. However, this doesn’t mean he has already taken that path, as I believe some of the “17 strategies” may prove unfeasible to implement.
There is also the possibility that these strategies could lead to a potential military conflict between the two sides. It will depend on what the Lai administration will do next. The risk of military conflict cannot be ruled out.
The mainland’s Anti-Secession Law states that the government may resort to “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” to achieve reunification under three specific circumstances. So, how close, specifically, are Lai’s 17 strategies to triggering this use of force by Beijing?
It’s getting close, but whether the situation truly crosses the line will depend on the actions that follow – especially the handling of the so-called 10 national security-related law revisions by Taiwan’s legislature.
Lai’s speech on March 13 – in which he outlined these strategies and carried the theme of “resisting China” – combined with the large-scale recall campaign and the proposed revisions to national security laws, is part of a “three-in-one” strategy aimed at consolidating his political power.
These actions are highly provocative in terms of cross-strait relations. They challenge the mainland’s bottom line and test its patience.
That said, I believe it’s difficult to make an objective judgment based solely on Lai’s rhetoric. What truly matters is not what he says, but what he does.
What gives us some degree of confidence is that the forces opposed to “Taiwan independence” far outweigh those supporting it. Even the US government does not support Taiwan independence.
Does Lai really have the courage to become a [Ukrainian leader Volodymyr] Zelensky-like figure in the Taiwan Strait, serving as a proxy of foreign anti-China forces to spark a war? I seriously doubt he possesses that kind of resolve.
From this perspective, we still believe there is hope for peaceful reunification, and it remains a goal that we must continue to pursue.
How do you assess US President Donald Trump’s Taiwan policy and its impact on the cross-strait situation?
Trump has not yet systematically articulated his policy on Taiwan. I believe the bottom line of Trump’s Taiwan policy is to avoid direct US involvement in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, Trump does not want a war there, as it would run counter to his “Make America Great Again” agenda.
However, I don’t think Trump would abandon Taiwan, because supporting Taiwan is politically correct for the US government, rather than being a personal issue for him.
In his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Trump stressed the importance of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, which could be seen as interference in China’s internal affairs. Similar statements were made in the Group of Seven foreign ministers’ declaration, reflecting a continuation of America’s Taiwan policy.
However, this does not mean Trump’s Taiwan Strait policy has fully taken shape. There is still considerable uncertainty and, looking ahead, I believe the risks he poses to cross-strait relations are still significant.
Washington’s Taiwan policy is essentially subordinate to its broader China policy. Within this framework, the Trump administration’s Taiwan Strait policy has involved actions such as facilitating the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to invest another US$100 billion in its American plants in the US and approving US$870 million in military aid to Taiwan. However, these actions have largely been low-key and balanced with considerations for Beijing.
Trump’s arms sales to Taiwan could ultimately surpass those under Joe Biden, as Trump is driven by business interests and expects Taiwan to pay for its own protection.
What is your view on TSMC’s announced increased chip investment in the US? What impact does this have on Taiwan’s industries and cross-strait relations?
It’s impossible for TSMC to completely relocate its operations to the US, and the shift of the semiconductor industry would require a process. Even if there were a decision on a full transfer during Trump’s presidency, it would be difficult to achieve during his four-year term.
The DPP policy has been to fully comply with Trump’s pressure, which is detrimental to Taiwan. The reason Taiwan’s economy is still holding up is largely due to semiconductors and TSMC. Without TSMC, I think Taiwan could face industrial hollowing, which would also hurt its position in regional economic integration.
If TSMC were to move all of its operations to the US, Taiwan’s strategic importance would decrease further. From this perspective, Lai is effectively selling out Taiwan.
You recently attended a symposium in Beijing marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. Do you think the meeting sent a stronger, more hardline message regarding Taiwan?
The symposium sent a very important message: our major policy on Taiwan remains “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems”. This basic stance has not changed.
We will absolutely not use non-peaceful means to achieve reunification until the very last moment because both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese. However, if Taiwan independence advocates persist in pursuing their separatist agenda, we may take decisive measures.
Since Lai took office, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted at least three large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. How should we understand Beijing’s considerations behind these military drills, and does this pose a greater risk to the Taiwan Strait?
Some people may believe that the PLA’s military exercises have become too frequent, but we should recognise that the reason for this is that Taiwan independence has become a real threat.
Prior to [former US House speaker] Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PLA’s exercises were quite restrained. However, due to [Lai’s predecessor] Tsai Ing-wen’s collusion with Pelosi, the PLA was forced to take countermeasures, with drills aimed at opposing Taiwan independence. The military drills have become natural and even normalised nowadays.
In reality, the risk of conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is rising. No one can guarantee that there won’t be accidental escalation, but from the mainland’s perspective, we remain committed to peaceful reunification and will only take decisive measures as a last resort.
The PLA exercises are certainly not intended to bring risks to peace in the Taiwan Strait, but to reduce the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. What brings risks to the Taiwan Strait are the separatist activities of the “Taiwan independence” forces headed by Lai, as well as the interference of external anti-China forces in the Taiwan issue.
Has there been any new approach or strategy from the mainland regarding Taiwan in recent years? How do we assess the progress and effectiveness of cross-strait “integrated development”?
The core strategy remains focused on peaceful and integrated development between the two sides, gradually building strength and preparing to advance the reunification process. There has been no significant shift in this fundamental approach.
Other key elements, such as complete national reunification in the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and firmly opposing Taiwan independence and external interference, are all valuable lessons accumulated over many years.
If we are to speak of new approaches in recent years, the emphasis has been on deepening integrated development, along with continuous improvements to Beijing’s integrated development policies. However, integration is a long-term process that requires time.
During the eight years of Tsai’s administration and now with Lai in office, integration has been a one-sided effort.
By “one-sided”, I mean that we cannot push for integration in Taiwan, rather, we invite Taiwanese people to come to the mainland to engage in the integration process. This is the current limitation.
Meanwhile, the DPP has staunchly opposed integration, which has further complicated the situation. At present, the mainland’s integration efforts are confined to Fujian province, with no nationwide roll-out yet.
As a result, the effects of integration are still quite localised, and we remain in the early stages of the process, which is also completely normal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the integration process has fully succeeded, nor can we expect to immediately enter a phase of peaceful reunification. This is likely to take more time.
In 2019, President Xi Jinping proposed exploring a one country, two systems model for Taiwan. What progress has been made in terms of research and development of this proposal?
Academic research on the Taiwan plan has entered an intensive and detailed phase. However, there are internal disagreements within the scholarly community. Most scholars still believe the framework should remain one country, two systems, but there’s now an opinion that the manner of reunification – whether peaceful or through force – could determine the final shape of the post-reunification arrangement. That’s one area of divergence.
Another contentious point is whether Taiwan’s military would be retained. Many of the current proposals suggest that it may not be possible for Taiwan to keep its armed forces. Additionally, Taiwan’s de-sinicised education system would definitely need to be reformed.
At present, the Taiwan plan is still under unilateral study and discussion on the mainland – by both academics and the government. It has not yet progressed to cross-strait negotiations. But ultimately, any implementation of the plan will require such negotiations. So far, neither Taiwanese scholars nor the general public have been involved in shaping this proposal.
In my view, the earlier both sides begin negotiations, the better it will be for Taiwan. Early talks would give Taiwan more bargaining chips, and it may be able to secure broader rights. If negotiations only begin as a last resort, Taiwan is likely to be in a much weaker position.
In your opinion, if reunification is achieved through force, would Taiwan be turned into a regular province rather than a special administrative region like Hong Kong or Macau?
In my opinion, that’s impossible. Once the two sides are reunified – especially under the “two systems” Taiwan plan – Taiwan would definitely become a special administrative region. That’s beyond question, though the name might not be exactly “Taiwan Special Administrative Region”.
For example, if the people of Taiwan wish to retain the term “Republic” [Taiwan’s official name is “the Republic of China”] in some form, then perhaps a name like “Taiwan Republic Special Administrative Region” could be negotiable.
Do you personally think the governance model for Taiwan would be more flexible than Hong Kong’s?
I believe it would definitely be more flexible. For example, Taiwan already participates in some international organisations, and that participation may not only continue after reunification but might actually expand.
I also believe elections in Taiwan will absolutely continue. It’s impossible that elections would be cancelled after reunification. However, those elected wouldn’t be called “president,” and the constitution of the Republic of China possibly would not remain in place in its current form.
You worked closely for many years with Wang Daohan, the former president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). What lessons can we draw from Wang’s talks with his Taiwanese counterpart in the 1990s in terms of today’s cross-strait relations? And has institutionalised consultation between the two sides reached a deadlock?
The 1993 Wang-Koo talks in Singapore – with Wang representing ARATS and Koo Chen-fu representing Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) – were a prime example of pragmatic cross-strait engagement.
At the time, Taiwan’s “Three No’s” policy [no contact, no negotiation, no compromise] restricted direct official interaction with the mainland. So, both sides created semi-official organisations – essentially “white gloves” – to shake hands and handle concrete issues arising from growing cross-strait exchanges. The talks were grounded in mutual respect and a “seeking common ground while shelving differences” approach.
After Tsai took office in 2016 and refused to recognise the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for dialogue between ARATS and SEF collapsed, leading to today’s stalemate. In this sense, yes – institutionalised negotiations are currently at an impasse.
That said, on matters directly affecting people’s livelihoods, there’s still room for pragmatic cooperation. For example, issues like mainland residents travelling to Taiwan could still be discussed through smaller, sectoral mechanisms – like the tourism-focused “Mini-Two Associations” [Taiwan Strait Tourism Association and the mainland’s Association for Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Strait] – if there is mutual willingness.
However, Lai has shown no intention of reopening such exchanges – including tourism. He seems to believe that increased cross-strait interaction and mutual understanding among people on both sides are detrimental to the pro-independence agenda.
So in my opinion, at least for this year, it is likely to remain very difficult for residents from places like Shanghai and Fujian to travel to Taiwan. But in the long run, I don’t think such barriers can hold.
Last year, you wrote an article about leveraging the roles of Hong Kong and Macau to ease travel restrictions for certain DPP figures. Could you explain the rationale behind this approach?
Relations between Hong Kong and Taiwan are a crucial part of cross-strait relations and should continue to play an important role. That’s why I suggested that some DPP members, who might be reluctant to visit the mainland including Shanghai, due to the 22 measures targeting pro-independence figures, could travel to Hong Kong and Macau instead.
However, the bigger issue now is that while some DPP members can travel to Shanghai, they are unable to visit Hong Kong [due to regulations in Hong Kong].
Additionally, since the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, some DPP members told me that within their party, a cultural tendency had developed where visiting Hong Kong was seen as politically incorrect.
I believe that exchanges between Taiwan and Hong Kong should take the lead – ahead of, for example Taiwan’s exchanges with mainland cities like Shanghai. But unfortunately this isn’t the reality at the moment.
You visited Taiwan for academic exchanges in January this year, which is considered a rare example of cross-strait Track 2 dialogue since the pandemic. What was your key takeaway from this trip? Additionally, as the first mainland scholar to obtain a PhD in contemporary Taiwan studies, could you share your insights on the current state and challenges of Taiwan research on the mainland?
Our visit to Taiwan was purely for academic exchange as civilian scholars, and this is also the first time I visited Taiwan since the Covid-19 pandemic.
It has been 30 years since my first visit to Taiwan, in 1995, and this time, obtaining entry permission was the most challenging it has ever been. The DPP exerts tighter control over cross-strait exchanges, and, in some respects, this can be likened to a form of “green terror” [a reference to the white terror under which Taiwanese were persecuted by the Kuomintang government during the island’s martial law period].
Reflecting on the trip, I came to realise the critical importance of these exchanges. There exists a significant gap in understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, even within the academic community. Therefore, fostering exchanges is essential for bridging this divide.
As for Taiwan studies, it requires mainland researchers to conduct fieldwork in Taiwan, spend time there, and engage with various sectors of Taiwanese society to gain an authentic understanding of the situation. Otherwise, our perspectives may remain based on mere conjecture.
I have been involved in Taiwan studies since 1989. Some people jokingly point out that after over 30 years of research, the reunification issue remains unresolved. I tell them that if research alone could solve the Taiwan issue, it would reflect a fundamental underestimation of its complexity.
Ultimately, the resolution of the Taiwan issue depends on strength. The mainland must possess the necessary power; without it, reunification is not feasible.
Reunification also requires the ability to clearly articulate its benefit and to lay out both the steps and strategy, which are closely tied to us researchers and our work, calling for us to seize every moment.
What is your assessment of the current state of cross-strait relations and the historical progress towards reunification?
In my view, we are still in the early stages of building momentum towards complete reunification, which can be seen as a preparatory phase.
It is likely to take another five to 10 years to achieve full reunification, as we are still in a phase of quantitative change, rather than having reached a qualitative shift.
However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that – if [Taiwanese leader] William Lai Ching-te and other forces advocating Taiwan independence push matters to the extreme – peaceful reunification becomes no longer feasible, which is when the situation might escalate rapidly.
When I say it will take five to 10 years, I’m referring to peaceful reunification. I believe it would be very difficult to achieve sooner than that.
Does that mean Beijing has a timetable for reunification?
I think the Beijing authorities do not have a specific timetable for reunification, but we do feel a sense of urgency.
Having a timetable can be beneficial – it provides a clear target and enables step-by-step planning. However, the downside is that some aspects of cross-strait reunification are beyond our control, such as international factors, so it comes with both advantages and challenges.
Back in the late 1990s, then [Communist Party] general secretary Jiang Zemin did consider the idea of establishing such a timetable. Hong Kong had returned to China in 1997, with Macau to follow in 1999, leaving Taiwan as the only remaining issue in achieving full reunification.
In June 1998, during a meeting with then US president Bill Clinton, Jiang said: “Frankly speaking, the Taiwan issue cannot be dragged on indefinitely. There must be a timetable”.
There have been internal disagreements over whether to set up a specific timetable. Some argue that if the conditions are not yet ripe, such a timetable could become problematic, as our power might not have reached the required level.
We currently have the capability to prevent Taiwan independence – to ensure it does not succeed. However, we do not yet possess the kind of capability where we can achieve reunification whenever we choose to.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party said in their resolution for the sixth plenum of the 19th party congress in 2021 that, on reunification, “time and momentum are always on our side”. What is your understanding of this assertion?
We believe that time is on the side of reunification, not Taiwan independence, and we are quite confident in this belief.
Ultimately, it comes down to the balance of power. This power, however, is not just about hard power, it also includes soft power, institutional influence, and various other factors.
When comparing the cross-strait power dynamic, the mainland’s strength is steadily surpassing Taiwan’s.
One significant external factor affecting reunification is the balance of power between China and the United States. We acknowledge that, at present, the US is stronger than us, which is the main reason reunification has not yet been achieved.
However, over the long term, we must recognise the reality that the gap between China and the US is narrowing, and we are gaining ground more quickly.
But how do the views of Taiwan’s younger generation affect the mainland’s goal of achieving peaceful reunification?
We do recognise that the number of young people in Taiwan who support reunification is not increasing, but rather decreasing, which is undoubtedly linked to Taiwan’s pro-independence education.
However, I don’t believe this necessarily means that young people in Taiwan want independence or wish to establish a “Republic of Taiwan”. The reluctance to reunify and advocating for Taiwan independence are two distinct concepts.
This is why promoting cross-strait youth exchanges remains important. We also acknowledge that the hope for national reunification lies with the younger generation.
That said, reunification is a major national and state issue and cannot be entirely determined by the will of a single portion of the population.
Therefore, while young people’s views are significant, if they support reunification, the likelihood of peaceful reunification becomes much greater. However, if a portion of the younger generation remains opposed to reunification, the mainland could face greater resistance, potentially lengthening the process.
Last year, you predicted that after William Lai assumed office, cross-strait relations would enter a high-risk period though it wouldn’t escalate to military conflict. Has your viewpoint changed now, especially considering Lai’s recent announcement of 17 strategies targeting the mainland?
I don’t believe my viewpoint has changed significantly.
However, we must acknowledge that Lai’s recent “17 strategies” targeting the mainland and his designation of the mainland as a “foreign hostile force” have had a very negative impact on cross-strait relations, particularly in terms of exchanges.
Many Taiwanese people may now be reluctant to engage in exchanges with the mainland, fearing they could be accused of colluding with the “enemy”.
At the same time, we must recognise that the primary aim of these “17 strategies” is to support the large-scale recall campaign primarily targeting the [opposition] Kuomintang lawmakers, while consolidating Lai’s own power and mobilising his Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) political base ahead of the 2026 local elections in Taiwan.
The “17 strategies” also signal that Lai’s administration may lean towards a more extreme pro-independence stance. However, this doesn’t mean he has already taken that path, as I believe some of the “17 strategies” may prove unfeasible to implement.
There is also the possibility that these strategies could lead to a potential military conflict between the two sides. It will depend on what the Lai administration will do next. The risk of military conflict cannot be ruled out.
The mainland’s Anti-Secession Law states that the government may resort to “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” to achieve reunification under three specific circumstances. So, how close, specifically, are Lai’s 17 strategies to triggering this use of force by Beijing?
It’s getting close, but whether the situation truly crosses the line will depend on the actions that follow – especially the handling of the so-called 10 national security-related law revisions by Taiwan’s legislature.
Lai’s speech on March 13 – in which he outlined these strategies and carried the theme of “resisting China” – combined with the large-scale recall campaign and the proposed revisions to national security laws, is part of a “three-in-one” strategy aimed at consolidating his political power.
These actions are highly provocative in terms of cross-strait relations. They challenge the mainland’s bottom line and test its patience.
That said, I believe it’s difficult to make an objective judgment based solely on Lai’s rhetoric. What truly matters is not what he says, but what he does.
What gives us some degree of confidence is that the forces opposed to “Taiwan independence” far outweigh those supporting it. Even the US government does not support Taiwan independence.
Does Lai really have the courage to become a [Ukrainian leader Volodymyr] Zelensky-like figure in the Taiwan Strait, serving as a proxy of foreign anti-China forces to spark a war? I seriously doubt he possesses that kind of resolve.
From this perspective, we still believe there is hope for peaceful reunification, and it remains a goal that we must continue to pursue.
How do you assess US President Donald Trump’s Taiwan policy and its impact on the cross-strait situation?
Trump has not yet systematically articulated his policy on Taiwan. I believe the bottom line of Trump’s Taiwan policy is to avoid direct US involvement in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, Trump does not want a war there, as it would run counter to his “Make America Great Again” agenda.
However, I don’t think Trump would abandon Taiwan, because supporting Taiwan is politically correct for the US government, rather than being a personal issue for him.
In his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Trump stressed the importance of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, which could be seen as interference in China’s internal affairs. Similar statements were made in the Group of Seven foreign ministers’ declaration, reflecting a continuation of America’s Taiwan policy.
However, this does not mean Trump’s Taiwan Strait policy has fully taken shape. There is still considerable uncertainty and, looking ahead, I believe the risks he poses to cross-strait relations are still significant.
Washington’s Taiwan policy is essentially subordinate to its broader China policy. Within this framework, the Trump administration’s Taiwan Strait policy has involved actions such as facilitating the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to invest another US$100 billion in its American plants in the US and approving US$870 million in military aid to Taiwan. However, these actions have largely been low-key and balanced with considerations for Beijing.
Trump’s arms sales to Taiwan could ultimately surpass those under Joe Biden, as Trump is driven by business interests and expects Taiwan to pay for its own protection.
What is your view on TSMC’s announced increased chip investment in the US? What impact does this have on Taiwan’s industries and cross-strait relations?
It’s impossible for TSMC to completely relocate its operations to the US, and the shift of the semiconductor industry would require a process. Even if there were a decision on a full transfer during Trump’s presidency, it would be difficult to achieve during his four-year term.
The DPP policy has been to fully comply with Trump’s pressure, which is detrimental to Taiwan. The reason Taiwan’s economy is still holding up is largely due to semiconductors and TSMC. Without TSMC, I think Taiwan could face industrial hollowing, which would also hurt its position in regional economic integration.
If TSMC were to move all of its operations to the US, Taiwan’s strategic importance would decrease further. From this perspective, Lai is effectively selling out Taiwan.
You recently attended a symposium in Beijing marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. Do you think the meeting sent a stronger, more hardline message regarding Taiwan?
The symposium sent a very important message: our major policy on Taiwan remains “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems”. This basic stance has not changed.
We will absolutely not use non-peaceful means to achieve reunification until the very last moment because both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese. However, if Taiwan independence advocates persist in pursuing their separatist agenda, we may take decisive measures.
Since Lai took office, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted at least three large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. How should we understand Beijing’s considerations behind these military drills, and does this pose a greater risk to the Taiwan Strait?
Some people may believe that the PLA’s military exercises have become too frequent, but we should recognise that the reason for this is that Taiwan independence has become a real threat.
Prior to [former US House speaker] Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PLA’s exercises were quite restrained. However, due to [Lai’s predecessor] Tsai Ing-wen’s collusion with Pelosi, the PLA was forced to take countermeasures, with drills aimed at opposing Taiwan independence. The military drills have become natural and even normalised nowadays.
In reality, the risk of conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is rising. No one can guarantee that there won’t be accidental escalation, but from the mainland’s perspective, we remain committed to peaceful reunification and will only take decisive measures as a last resort.
The PLA exercises are certainly not intended to bring risks to peace in the Taiwan Strait, but to reduce the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. What brings risks to the Taiwan Strait are the separatist activities of the “Taiwan independence” forces headed by Lai, as well as the interference of external anti-China forces in the Taiwan issue.
Has there been any new approach or strategy from the mainland regarding Taiwan in recent years? How do we assess the progress and effectiveness of cross-strait “integrated development”?
The core strategy remains focused on peaceful and integrated development between the two sides, gradually building strength and preparing to advance the reunification process. There has been no significant shift in this fundamental approach.
Other key elements, such as complete national reunification in the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and firmly opposing Taiwan independence and external interference, are all valuable lessons accumulated over many years.
If we are to speak of new approaches in recent years, the emphasis has been on deepening integrated development, along with continuous improvements to Beijing’s integrated development policies. However, integration is a long-term process that requires time.
During the eight years of Tsai’s administration and now with Lai in office, integration has been a one-sided effort.
By “one-sided”, I mean that we cannot push for integration in Taiwan, rather, we invite Taiwanese people to come to the mainland to engage in the integration process. This is the current limitation.
Meanwhile, the DPP has staunchly opposed integration, which has further complicated the situation. At present, the mainland’s integration efforts are confined to Fujian province, with no nationwide roll-out yet.
As a result, the effects of integration are still quite localised, and we remain in the early stages of the process, which is also completely normal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the integration process has fully succeeded, nor can we expect to immediately enter a phase of peaceful reunification. This is likely to take more time.
In 2019, President Xi Jinping proposed exploring a one country, two systems model for Taiwan. What progress has been made in terms of research and development of this proposal?
Academic research on the Taiwan plan has entered an intensive and detailed phase. However, there are internal disagreements within the scholarly community. Most scholars still believe the framework should remain one country, two systems, but there’s now an opinion that the manner of reunification – whether peaceful or through force – could determine the final shape of the post-reunification arrangement. That’s one area of divergence.
Another contentious point is whether Taiwan’s military would be retained. Many of the current proposals suggest that it may not be possible for Taiwan to keep its armed forces. Additionally, Taiwan’s de-sinicised education system would definitely need to be reformed.
At present, the Taiwan plan is still under unilateral study and discussion on the mainland – by both academics and the government. It has not yet progressed to cross-strait negotiations. But ultimately, any implementation of the plan will require such negotiations. So far, neither Taiwanese scholars nor the general public have been involved in shaping this proposal.
In my view, the earlier both sides begin negotiations, the better it will be for Taiwan. Early talks would give Taiwan more bargaining chips, and it may be able to secure broader rights. If negotiations only begin as a last resort, Taiwan is likely to be in a much weaker position.
In your opinion, if reunification is achieved through force, would Taiwan be turned into a regular province rather than a special administrative region like Hong Kong or Macau?
In my opinion, that’s impossible. Once the two sides are reunified – especially under the “two systems” Taiwan plan – Taiwan would definitely become a special administrative region. That’s beyond question, though the name might not be exactly “Taiwan Special Administrative Region”.
For example, if the people of Taiwan wish to retain the term “Republic” [Taiwan’s official name is “the Republic of China”] in some form, then perhaps a name like “Taiwan Republic Special Administrative Region” could be negotiable.
Do you personally think the governance model for Taiwan would be more flexible than Hong Kong’s?
I believe it would definitely be more flexible. For example, Taiwan already participates in some international organisations, and that participation may not only continue after reunification but might actually expand.
I also believe elections in Taiwan will absolutely continue. It’s impossible that elections would be cancelled after reunification. However, those elected wouldn’t be called “president,” and the constitution of the Republic of China possibly would not remain in place in its current form.
You worked closely for many years with Wang Daohan, the former president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). What lessons can we draw from Wang’s talks with his Taiwanese counterpart in the 1990s in terms of today’s cross-strait relations? And has institutionalised consultation between the two sides reached a deadlock?
The 1993 Wang-Koo talks in Singapore – with Wang representing ARATS and Koo Chen-fu representing Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) – were a prime example of pragmatic cross-strait engagement.
At the time, Taiwan’s “Three No’s” policy [no contact, no negotiation, no compromise] restricted direct official interaction with the mainland. So, both sides created semi-official organisations – essentially “white gloves” – to shake hands and handle concrete issues arising from growing cross-strait exchanges. The talks were grounded in mutual respect and a “seeking common ground while shelving differences” approach.
After Tsai took office in 2016 and refused to recognise the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for dialogue between ARATS and SEF collapsed, leading to today’s stalemate. In this sense, yes – institutionalised negotiations are currently at an impasse.
That said, on matters directly affecting people’s livelihoods, there’s still room for pragmatic cooperation. For example, issues like mainland residents travelling to Taiwan could still be discussed through smaller, sectoral mechanisms – like the tourism-focused “Mini-Two Associations” [Taiwan Strait Tourism Association and the mainland’s Association for Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Strait] – if there is mutual willingness.
However, Lai has shown no intention of reopening such exchanges – including tourism. He seems to believe that increased cross-strait interaction and mutual understanding among people on both sides are detrimental to the pro-independence agenda.
So in my opinion, at least for this year, it is likely to remain very difficult for residents from places like Shanghai and Fujian to travel to Taiwan. But in the long run, I don’t think such barriers can hold.
Last year, you wrote an article about leveraging the roles of Hong Kong and Macau to ease travel restrictions for certain DPP figures. Could you explain the rationale behind this approach?
Relations between Hong Kong and Taiwan are a crucial part of cross-strait relations and should continue to play an important role. That’s why I suggested that some DPP members, who might be reluctant to visit the mainland including Shanghai, due to the 22 measures targeting pro-independence figures, could travel to Hong Kong and Macau instead.
However, the bigger issue now is that while some DPP members can travel to Shanghai, they are unable to visit Hong Kong [due to regulations in Hong Kong].
Additionally, since the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, some DPP members told me that within their party, a cultural tendency had developed where visiting Hong Kong was seen as politically incorrect.
I believe that exchanges between Taiwan and Hong Kong should take the lead – ahead of, for example Taiwan’s exchanges with mainland cities like Shanghai. But unfortunately this isn’t the reality at the moment.
You visited Taiwan for academic exchanges in January this year, which is considered a rare example of cross-strait Track 2 dialogue since the pandemic. What was your key takeaway from this trip? Additionally, as the first mainland scholar to obtain a PhD in contemporary Taiwan studies, could you share your insights on the current state and challenges of Taiwan research on the mainland?
Our visit to Taiwan was purely for academic exchange as civilian scholars, and this is also the first time I visited Taiwan since the Covid-19 pandemic.
It has been 30 years since my first visit to Taiwan, in 1995, and this time, obtaining entry permission was the most challenging it has ever been. The DPP exerts tighter control over cross-strait exchanges, and, in some respects, this can be likened to a form of “green terror” [a reference to the white terror under which Taiwanese were persecuted by the Kuomintang government during the island’s martial law period].
Reflecting on the trip, I came to realise the critical importance of these exchanges. There exists a significant gap in understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, even within the academic community. Therefore, fostering exchanges is essential for bridging this divide.
As for Taiwan studies, it requires mainland researchers to conduct fieldwork in Taiwan, spend time there, and engage with various sectors of Taiwanese society to gain an authentic understanding of the situation. Otherwise, our perspectives may remain based on mere conjecture.
I have been involved in Taiwan studies since 1989. Some people jokingly point out that after over 30 years of research, the reunification issue remains unresolved. I tell them that if research alone could solve the Taiwan issue, it would reflect a fundamental underestimation of its complexity.
Ultimately, the resolution of the Taiwan issue depends on strength. The mainland must possess the necessary power; without it, reunification is not feasible.
Reunification also requires the ability to clearly articulate its benefit and to lay out both the steps and strategy, which are closely tied to us researchers and our work, calling for us to seize every moment.
Monday, April 7, 2025
Dennis Wilder on US-China ties, Taiwan, internal reforms in the US, the Quad, India, technological prowess and economic might
SCMP Exclusive | Dennis Wilder, national security specialist and former CIA official, on US-China ties
Sylvie Zhuangin, Beijing. Apr 7, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3305386/they-will-never-use-signal-anything-again-dennis-wilder
Before becoming a senior fellow with Georgetown University’s Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues, Dennis Wilder served in the George Bush Jnr and Barack Obama administrations in a number of national security positions, including as the CIA’s deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific from 2015 to 2016.
In the latest instalment of the Open Questions series, Wilder shares his views on President Donald Trump’s cuts to the US federal government’s bureaucracy as well as the most sensitive issues determining China-US relations.
Excerpts
How do you view the current state of the Ukraine war and would you say that transatlantic relations are undergoing a significant shift? Will the post-World War II international order be fundamentally reshaped in the coming four years?
The Ukraine war is a stalemate and neither side can win on the battlefield, so President Donald Trump’s attempt to get both sides to see the futility of continued combat is very appropriate and, frankly, long overdue. America should have taken this stand a while ago.
I can’t tell you what I think a peace agreement should look like but certainly, whatever the peace agreement is, Russian President Vladimir Putin has got to make sincere promises that he will never again aggress against another country and its sovereignty.
The attack on Ukraine was outrageous and illegal. It ran against all the principles established by China and the Bandung Conference of 1955. Sovereignty is a critical point in international relations and Putin violated it.
In terms of transatlantic relations, ever since the end of World War II the US has carried a very heavy burden financially in protecting Europe and these democracies came to rely on this, instead of spending on their own defence. So yes there is a fundamental shift – again, that is long overdue.
The change, and we see it happening already, is that Europeans are responding appropriately. They are talking about doing what they need to do for their own defence. This will be good for the alliance.
Nato will have spent more on its own defence. We will have reduced our burden so we can become stronger in other ways and as long as the Nato agreement continues, from my point of view, what is happening now is a good change to the international order, not a bad change.
Some say that a rift has opened between European countries and the US since Trump’s return to the White House. What is your view and, if there is division, could Beijing benefit from it and in what way?
I think the rift is highly exaggerated. Changes in a relationship that are positive for the relationship are not a rift. I think this is exaggerated by those who would like to have the opportunity to take advantage, but will be disappointed.
Beijing has a big problem with Europe that doesn’t even involve the United States. First of all, China has been illegally supporting Russia’s war and the Europeans are very upset about that, and they’ve talked to the Chinese about this.
Secondly, the Chinese overcapacity in things like electric vehicles is a big problem, so China’s problems with Europe are separate from America’s changes in its relationship with Europe. These problems don’t go away. So again, the opportunities for China are overblown.
What do you think about Trump’s moves to cut the bureaucracy, which seem to have caused some public discontent. What might be the implications?
The 1.9 per cent of Americans – about 3 million people – who work for the US federal government make up a very small percentage of the population. Getting rid of some poor government employees will have very little effect on the American economy.
Now of course, if you are one of those government workers to be let go, no question about it you will be unhappy. But if you look across the United States and talk to the people, they want this to happen.
Americans in general have been asking for decades for someone to deal with the bloated and inefficient government bureaucracy.
The last time an American president reduced the size of the US government was under Bill Clinton when we had a “peace dividend”. But ever since, the US government keeps growing and it is inefficient. Everybody knows there is waste and fraud.
So again, we will be stronger after we cut the fat out of the government. This is not negative, but positive. As a US government employee for 36 years, I can assure you there is waste, fraud and abuse in the US government.
What would you say is the end game behind these cuts in the long run? Is it just to make the US stronger?
Yes. My Chinese friends say “we wish we could do this in China”. Do you think there’s waste and inefficiency? So maybe we are the model.
At a London School of Economics and Political Science forum in March, you said people only see Trump’s America first slogan, ignoring that it does not mean “America only”. Could you elaborate on that?
During Trump’s first term in office, he did not have a strong appreciation for our alliances and our partners. But what I am seeing now in his second term is much more understanding of the national security position of the US government.
We need our allies in Asia and elsewhere. We need them, as I said about Nato, and we will be stronger if we can get our allies to do more.
So what you will see is the Trump administration talking with our allies in Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and Taiwan. We’ve already talked to Taiwan about the fact that they need to do more for their own defence and that they don’t spend enough. These discussions will continue.
But that doesn’t mean we don’t value alliances. After all, President Trump has already had a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) here in Washington and the value of the alliances is unquestioned. So when people say that America first means America only, they don’t understand it.
The Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te recently described mainland China as a “foreign hostile force”. Does this suggest that he was given tacit support by the US? What role do you think Lai may play in the US-China dynamic?
The United States is very lucky that we have an excellent representative in Taipei and his name is Raymond Greene. He speaks beautiful Chinese. He understands the Democratic Progressive Party very well, and he has had excellent conversations with Lai.
The United States is very clear with him that the status quo must be maintained by both Taipei and Beijing. Period. Full stop. No question.
Given Lai’s increasingly confrontational style, how might this affect Beijing’s stance on the overall cross-strait relationship?
I would not say that Beijing has been particularly nice to Lai. I don’t see that Beijing’s rhetoric towards him is conciliatory. Obviously Beijing expects him to kowtow. We don’t want him to kowtow.
So what is Washington’s Taiwan policy at this stage?
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said it very directly the other day in a discussion with Hugh Hewitt on his podcast. I don’t need to elaborate. The American policy is consistent. It has been consistent from the Joe Biden administration, consistent to now that I see nothing that says we are changing policy on Taiwan.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest chip manufacturer, announced in March that it would invest US$100 billion in the US over the next four years. What will be the impact on Taiwan’s economy? Will it hollow out the island’s chip industry?
The US$100 billion deal is the largest single investment ever by a foreign company in the United States. It is very significant and very helpful to rebuilding American manufacturing.
But the leader of TSMC has also said that he will retain the most sophisticated, advanced computer chip capability in Taiwan, not in the United States, so there is no danger of hollowing out the TSMC plants in Taiwan, as long as he is committed to building the highest level of computer chip in Taiwan, the people on Taiwan should not worry.
What is the likelihood of a meeting between Trump and President Xi Jinping and if it does take place, what deal should we expect?
We are far away from a Xi-Trump meeting right now. I don’t think it will happen any time soon, and the reason is that China has not responded appropriately to President Trump, who has made clear that before negotiations can begin, China needs to take positive steps on the fentanyl problem.
What has China done? China has told Trump that he should thank China for what they have done on fentanyl. They have issued a white paper suggesting that they’ve done all they can. But fentanyl from China continues to be caught at the American border in large numbers.
So how is it that all of this fentanyl is still coming to the United States if Beijing is doing such a good job?
Beijing needs to unilaterally take steps, such as imprisoning the people involved in the fentanyl trade, sentencing them, and punishing the companies involved. Until it takes those steps, I don’t think Trump is very interested in negotiations.
Look at what Mexico did when Trump said you need to do more: they put 10,000 troops on the border, they sent back dozens of gang members to the United States, they allowed the CIA to put drones over Mexico. The Mexicans didn’t say, “oh, we need to negotiate”.
My problem is, China has used this fentanyl issue as a political card. When relations were good, China did a little more on fentanyl, but when relations were bad, China did nothing.
China needs to stop using this card, because a huge number of Americans between the ages of 18 and 45 die every year. It is the largest killer of people in that age group. This should not be a political negotiation. China could do the right thing.
If those issues were addressed, do you think Xi and Trump would be more likely to meet?
The next step would be negotiations, not a meeting. The economic trade negotiations will begin, and Trump will appoint a negotiator, and President Xi will appoint a negotiator, like he did with Liu He.
There are many good steps that each side could take. China could invest in the United States and create jobs here, like TSMC is doing. Beijing could go back to the phase-one trade agreement and agree to buy US$200 billion of goods a year from the US.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration could promise that controls on hi-tech exports to China will be targeted and limited, not very wide in their scope. The Trump administration could take some companies off sanction lists, or stop some sanctions against Chinese officials.
There are many areas where we can come to agreements. After the negotiators have come to something, then the two leaders can sit down and meet.
Some have argued that the differences in economic models between China and the US are not just about policy choices but are determined by long-standing debates on the role of government in the economy, which stem from deep historical and ideological roots.
For example, the United States’ free-market philosophy is rooted in thinkers like John Locke and Milton Friedman, while China’s state-centric approach has been influenced by Legalism traditions dating back over 2,000 years. What do you think?
There is Chinese exceptionalism and American exceptionalism. American exceptionalism is based on the idea that we are the city on the hill. We have created the ideal society through a combination of democracy and capitalism.
Our system is very much based on individual freedoms, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, so we think we have the ideal model.
But Beijing also thinks it has the ideal model. And their model is based on a combination of communism and Confucianism, and it is very much based less on the individual than on collective harmony.
And so in the socialist system that China practices, its economy is collectively based. For example, it is not a consumer-led economy which is about consumer sovereignty. Xi Jinping is much more interested in the collective and therefore in the state-led economy.
So we have two very fundamentally different political and economic systems and we both believe we have the best system in the world.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will expire in 2026. China has said repeatedly that its nuclear capabilities are not on the same level as the US or Russia and refused to engage in nuclear arms talks.
Do you think China may engage more in future negotiations? Europe is also working on developing its own nuclear deterrence strategy. How might that affect global security?
I’ve been trying to get the Chinese to have strategic security talks ever since I was in the White House in 2004, and it’s been very frustrating. We were only successful once in getting a senior general from the PLA’s strategic rocket force to come to Washington when George W. Bush was president.
I went to that meeting and the Chinese officer shouted at us in his speech. He didn’t want to be there nor talk to us. It was quite clear that the only reason he was there was because former president Hu Jintao told him that he had to be there.
But he had no interest in discussing his nuclear forces. Because China’s nuclear force was small, and they believed that by hiding the force, it gave them an advantage.
What I hope today is that with China building 360 new ICBM sites and increasing its nuclear weapons stockpile dramatically, the Chinese may be more comfortable now with coming to strategic stability talks.
In terms of other countries, I am much less worried about Europe than I am about Asia. The constant building by the North Koreans of nuclear capabilities, and the inability of China to stop them, will lead to pressure in South Korea and Japan to think about building their own nuclear capabilities.
Both countries have plenty of capability to do this, and it will become harder and harder for the United States to argue with these countries that they should not build their own nuclear weapons as the North Korean threat grows.
What are your thoughts on the idea that is being expressed as “East rising, West declining”? If the US does decline, would it create an opportunity for China? If so, how realistic is it for China to move towards the centre of the global stage?
I am very tired of this line of analysis. After the Vietnam war, Mao Zedong said we were finished. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, and after the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese scholars said the US was finished. China’s ability to predict this is not very strong today.
The Magnificent Seven – Microsoft, Google, Tesla, Apple, Nvidia, Meta and Amazon – are the most dynamic companies in the world. DeepSeek was only a derivative of ChatGPT.
China has not invented anything like ChatGPT, and I will predict that the Magnificent Seven are going to lead the way in frontier technologies for the next two decades at least, and China will just be following behind, so where is this East rising?
We were also told the Chinese economy would be bigger than the American economy and it’s not going to happen for a long time.
Given the current situation, especially with Trump’s influence, how do you see middle powers such as Britain and Australia navigating their positions? Will they face greater pressure in choosing a side when balancing respective ties with China and the US?
People don’t understand our allies very well if they think that they just follow our policies. There is a new Labour government in Britain, which I spoke to when I was in London. It has its own China policy that is very different from our policy today. We can be comfortable with that. Britain has its own national needs. It has its own economic needs.
Australia is the same. Australia is much more dependent on trade with China than we are. Of course they’re going to take a different stance in their relationship with Beijing, but that doesn’t undercut the strategic alliance, which remains strong.
The Australian military has been with us in every conflict we have fought since World War II. They will be there with us.
How would India benefit from the tension between the US and China?
Indians will always go their own way. They will never be part of the American strategic alliance – nor part of a strategic alliance with anybody. The Indians cherish their independence. They are the leaders of what’s called the non-aligned movement and will always remain that way.
So will they play the United States off against China and play the United States off against Russia? Yes, of course they will. That is where the Indians like to be, and we have to accept that’s the Indian position in the world.
How do you envision the Quad – the US alliance with Australia, India and Japan – and the Aukus agreement on nuclear-powered submarines between the US, Britain and Australia, under Trump 2.0?
There is a review going on right now on Aukus, as there are some problems with the nuclear submarine programme. I’m not sure what the conclusion will be.
There are some in the Trump administration, such as Elbridge Colby, who think the submarine programme is not a good idea. I think this is an open question. I don’t know the answer to what the future of Aukus will look like, but I think it will be rethought a bit.
One of the things people don’t understand about the Quad is that it is much less about strategic military matters and much more about cooperation on health and economic issues.
People misread the Quad. If you look at the Quad website, you will see that they do a lot of things that have nothing to do with strategic military issues. The Quad is successful in that regard but again, the Indians are not going to become part of a strategic alliance.
Will ideological confrontation be less of a priority in US competition with China during Trump’s second term? For example, could the issue of Tibet and the choice of the next Dalai Lama become another thorny issue?
The United States has not had a president who was a real businessman since Harry Truman, who owned a hat store in Missouri.
Now, Trump is a businessman. He thinks geo-economically, not geo- strategically. He wants reciprocal trade agreements with everybody around the world that benefit the American worker. That is his focus.
Look at what he has proposed in Ukraine – to buy rare earths from the Ukrainians. His argument is that it would be a better security guarantee than putting American forces in there, because it would be an economic stake for the US, which forms protection for Ukraine.
It’s a different ideology. It’s the ideology of a capitalist, of a businessman. And he is very different from past American presidents who were part of the national security elite of the United States. He never was part of that elite, and he doesn’t think in those terms.
On the Dalai Lama, the selection of the next Dalai Lama will be upon us in the next 10 years. The way that Beijing handled the Panchen Lama was atrocious from the American point of view. It was a rights violation.
The fact that the Tibetans chose a Panchen Lama, then Beijing made the boy disappear and chose its own young man has created a big flag between Americans who believe in religious freedom and Beijing.
If Beijing once again decides that it will choose the next Dalai Lama, there is going to be a big problem.
The Dalai Lama is now 89 years old and is unlikely to live beyond 100. Thus the issue of his reincarnation will be upon us all. China will want to control the process as it did with the Panchen Lama. The US will want to support the autonomous decision making of the international leadership of Tibetan Buddhism.
What areas do you see that could provide opportunities for substantive cooperation between China and the US?
There are certainly areas for American and Chinese cooperation. As I said on the drugs trade, this could be a win-win if China would stop the gangs from doing what they are doing.
In the trade area, we can have a win-win result. Trump has said China can invest in the US.
The Japanese were in trouble with the US in the 1980s until they started building car factories there and then the relationship became much smoother. China ought to look at that model.
There are areas on disease control and on food security for the Global South. For Africa and other areas, we should be working together.
The African population in the next few decades will explode in size. This will cause problems in food security and stability. The two great economic powers need to work together on Africa but right now, we are not.
Also on the issue of North Korea, neither side is interested in a conflict on the Korean peninsula. It would be very helpful of the Chinese to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table.
We will be competing in the Global South. There’s no question. And that is one of the many areas of US-China competition. This is a good thing. The Global South countries have options and can leverage us against each other.
If I were sitting in a Global South country, I would be figuring out how I can get the most benefits out of Beijing and out of Washington.
Sylvie Zhuangin, Beijing. Apr 7, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3305386/they-will-never-use-signal-anything-again-dennis-wilder
Before becoming a senior fellow with Georgetown University’s Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues, Dennis Wilder served in the George Bush Jnr and Barack Obama administrations in a number of national security positions, including as the CIA’s deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific from 2015 to 2016.
In the latest instalment of the Open Questions series, Wilder shares his views on President Donald Trump’s cuts to the US federal government’s bureaucracy as well as the most sensitive issues determining China-US relations.
Excerpts
How do you view the current state of the Ukraine war and would you say that transatlantic relations are undergoing a significant shift? Will the post-World War II international order be fundamentally reshaped in the coming four years?
The Ukraine war is a stalemate and neither side can win on the battlefield, so President Donald Trump’s attempt to get both sides to see the futility of continued combat is very appropriate and, frankly, long overdue. America should have taken this stand a while ago.
I can’t tell you what I think a peace agreement should look like but certainly, whatever the peace agreement is, Russian President Vladimir Putin has got to make sincere promises that he will never again aggress against another country and its sovereignty.
The attack on Ukraine was outrageous and illegal. It ran against all the principles established by China and the Bandung Conference of 1955. Sovereignty is a critical point in international relations and Putin violated it.
In terms of transatlantic relations, ever since the end of World War II the US has carried a very heavy burden financially in protecting Europe and these democracies came to rely on this, instead of spending on their own defence. So yes there is a fundamental shift – again, that is long overdue.
The change, and we see it happening already, is that Europeans are responding appropriately. They are talking about doing what they need to do for their own defence. This will be good for the alliance.
Nato will have spent more on its own defence. We will have reduced our burden so we can become stronger in other ways and as long as the Nato agreement continues, from my point of view, what is happening now is a good change to the international order, not a bad change.
Some say that a rift has opened between European countries and the US since Trump’s return to the White House. What is your view and, if there is division, could Beijing benefit from it and in what way?
I think the rift is highly exaggerated. Changes in a relationship that are positive for the relationship are not a rift. I think this is exaggerated by those who would like to have the opportunity to take advantage, but will be disappointed.
Beijing has a big problem with Europe that doesn’t even involve the United States. First of all, China has been illegally supporting Russia’s war and the Europeans are very upset about that, and they’ve talked to the Chinese about this.
Secondly, the Chinese overcapacity in things like electric vehicles is a big problem, so China’s problems with Europe are separate from America’s changes in its relationship with Europe. These problems don’t go away. So again, the opportunities for China are overblown.
What do you think about Trump’s moves to cut the bureaucracy, which seem to have caused some public discontent. What might be the implications?
The 1.9 per cent of Americans – about 3 million people – who work for the US federal government make up a very small percentage of the population. Getting rid of some poor government employees will have very little effect on the American economy.
Now of course, if you are one of those government workers to be let go, no question about it you will be unhappy. But if you look across the United States and talk to the people, they want this to happen.
Americans in general have been asking for decades for someone to deal with the bloated and inefficient government bureaucracy.
The last time an American president reduced the size of the US government was under Bill Clinton when we had a “peace dividend”. But ever since, the US government keeps growing and it is inefficient. Everybody knows there is waste and fraud.
So again, we will be stronger after we cut the fat out of the government. This is not negative, but positive. As a US government employee for 36 years, I can assure you there is waste, fraud and abuse in the US government.
What would you say is the end game behind these cuts in the long run? Is it just to make the US stronger?
Yes. My Chinese friends say “we wish we could do this in China”. Do you think there’s waste and inefficiency? So maybe we are the model.
At a London School of Economics and Political Science forum in March, you said people only see Trump’s America first slogan, ignoring that it does not mean “America only”. Could you elaborate on that?
During Trump’s first term in office, he did not have a strong appreciation for our alliances and our partners. But what I am seeing now in his second term is much more understanding of the national security position of the US government.
We need our allies in Asia and elsewhere. We need them, as I said about Nato, and we will be stronger if we can get our allies to do more.
So what you will see is the Trump administration talking with our allies in Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and Taiwan. We’ve already talked to Taiwan about the fact that they need to do more for their own defence and that they don’t spend enough. These discussions will continue.
But that doesn’t mean we don’t value alliances. After all, President Trump has already had a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) here in Washington and the value of the alliances is unquestioned. So when people say that America first means America only, they don’t understand it.
The Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te recently described mainland China as a “foreign hostile force”. Does this suggest that he was given tacit support by the US? What role do you think Lai may play in the US-China dynamic?
The United States is very lucky that we have an excellent representative in Taipei and his name is Raymond Greene. He speaks beautiful Chinese. He understands the Democratic Progressive Party very well, and he has had excellent conversations with Lai.
The United States is very clear with him that the status quo must be maintained by both Taipei and Beijing. Period. Full stop. No question.
Given Lai’s increasingly confrontational style, how might this affect Beijing’s stance on the overall cross-strait relationship?
I would not say that Beijing has been particularly nice to Lai. I don’t see that Beijing’s rhetoric towards him is conciliatory. Obviously Beijing expects him to kowtow. We don’t want him to kowtow.
So what is Washington’s Taiwan policy at this stage?
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said it very directly the other day in a discussion with Hugh Hewitt on his podcast. I don’t need to elaborate. The American policy is consistent. It has been consistent from the Joe Biden administration, consistent to now that I see nothing that says we are changing policy on Taiwan.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest chip manufacturer, announced in March that it would invest US$100 billion in the US over the next four years. What will be the impact on Taiwan’s economy? Will it hollow out the island’s chip industry?
The US$100 billion deal is the largest single investment ever by a foreign company in the United States. It is very significant and very helpful to rebuilding American manufacturing.
But the leader of TSMC has also said that he will retain the most sophisticated, advanced computer chip capability in Taiwan, not in the United States, so there is no danger of hollowing out the TSMC plants in Taiwan, as long as he is committed to building the highest level of computer chip in Taiwan, the people on Taiwan should not worry.
What is the likelihood of a meeting between Trump and President Xi Jinping and if it does take place, what deal should we expect?
We are far away from a Xi-Trump meeting right now. I don’t think it will happen any time soon, and the reason is that China has not responded appropriately to President Trump, who has made clear that before negotiations can begin, China needs to take positive steps on the fentanyl problem.
What has China done? China has told Trump that he should thank China for what they have done on fentanyl. They have issued a white paper suggesting that they’ve done all they can. But fentanyl from China continues to be caught at the American border in large numbers.
So how is it that all of this fentanyl is still coming to the United States if Beijing is doing such a good job?
Beijing needs to unilaterally take steps, such as imprisoning the people involved in the fentanyl trade, sentencing them, and punishing the companies involved. Until it takes those steps, I don’t think Trump is very interested in negotiations.
Look at what Mexico did when Trump said you need to do more: they put 10,000 troops on the border, they sent back dozens of gang members to the United States, they allowed the CIA to put drones over Mexico. The Mexicans didn’t say, “oh, we need to negotiate”.
My problem is, China has used this fentanyl issue as a political card. When relations were good, China did a little more on fentanyl, but when relations were bad, China did nothing.
China needs to stop using this card, because a huge number of Americans between the ages of 18 and 45 die every year. It is the largest killer of people in that age group. This should not be a political negotiation. China could do the right thing.
If those issues were addressed, do you think Xi and Trump would be more likely to meet?
The next step would be negotiations, not a meeting. The economic trade negotiations will begin, and Trump will appoint a negotiator, and President Xi will appoint a negotiator, like he did with Liu He.
There are many good steps that each side could take. China could invest in the United States and create jobs here, like TSMC is doing. Beijing could go back to the phase-one trade agreement and agree to buy US$200 billion of goods a year from the US.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration could promise that controls on hi-tech exports to China will be targeted and limited, not very wide in their scope. The Trump administration could take some companies off sanction lists, or stop some sanctions against Chinese officials.
There are many areas where we can come to agreements. After the negotiators have come to something, then the two leaders can sit down and meet.
Some have argued that the differences in economic models between China and the US are not just about policy choices but are determined by long-standing debates on the role of government in the economy, which stem from deep historical and ideological roots.
For example, the United States’ free-market philosophy is rooted in thinkers like John Locke and Milton Friedman, while China’s state-centric approach has been influenced by Legalism traditions dating back over 2,000 years. What do you think?
There is Chinese exceptionalism and American exceptionalism. American exceptionalism is based on the idea that we are the city on the hill. We have created the ideal society through a combination of democracy and capitalism.
Our system is very much based on individual freedoms, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, so we think we have the ideal model.
But Beijing also thinks it has the ideal model. And their model is based on a combination of communism and Confucianism, and it is very much based less on the individual than on collective harmony.
And so in the socialist system that China practices, its economy is collectively based. For example, it is not a consumer-led economy which is about consumer sovereignty. Xi Jinping is much more interested in the collective and therefore in the state-led economy.
So we have two very fundamentally different political and economic systems and we both believe we have the best system in the world.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will expire in 2026. China has said repeatedly that its nuclear capabilities are not on the same level as the US or Russia and refused to engage in nuclear arms talks.
Do you think China may engage more in future negotiations? Europe is also working on developing its own nuclear deterrence strategy. How might that affect global security?
I’ve been trying to get the Chinese to have strategic security talks ever since I was in the White House in 2004, and it’s been very frustrating. We were only successful once in getting a senior general from the PLA’s strategic rocket force to come to Washington when George W. Bush was president.
I went to that meeting and the Chinese officer shouted at us in his speech. He didn’t want to be there nor talk to us. It was quite clear that the only reason he was there was because former president Hu Jintao told him that he had to be there.
But he had no interest in discussing his nuclear forces. Because China’s nuclear force was small, and they believed that by hiding the force, it gave them an advantage.
What I hope today is that with China building 360 new ICBM sites and increasing its nuclear weapons stockpile dramatically, the Chinese may be more comfortable now with coming to strategic stability talks.
In terms of other countries, I am much less worried about Europe than I am about Asia. The constant building by the North Koreans of nuclear capabilities, and the inability of China to stop them, will lead to pressure in South Korea and Japan to think about building their own nuclear capabilities.
Both countries have plenty of capability to do this, and it will become harder and harder for the United States to argue with these countries that they should not build their own nuclear weapons as the North Korean threat grows.
What are your thoughts on the idea that is being expressed as “East rising, West declining”? If the US does decline, would it create an opportunity for China? If so, how realistic is it for China to move towards the centre of the global stage?
I am very tired of this line of analysis. After the Vietnam war, Mao Zedong said we were finished. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, and after the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese scholars said the US was finished. China’s ability to predict this is not very strong today.
The Magnificent Seven – Microsoft, Google, Tesla, Apple, Nvidia, Meta and Amazon – are the most dynamic companies in the world. DeepSeek was only a derivative of ChatGPT.
China has not invented anything like ChatGPT, and I will predict that the Magnificent Seven are going to lead the way in frontier technologies for the next two decades at least, and China will just be following behind, so where is this East rising?
We were also told the Chinese economy would be bigger than the American economy and it’s not going to happen for a long time.
Given the current situation, especially with Trump’s influence, how do you see middle powers such as Britain and Australia navigating their positions? Will they face greater pressure in choosing a side when balancing respective ties with China and the US?
People don’t understand our allies very well if they think that they just follow our policies. There is a new Labour government in Britain, which I spoke to when I was in London. It has its own China policy that is very different from our policy today. We can be comfortable with that. Britain has its own national needs. It has its own economic needs.
Australia is the same. Australia is much more dependent on trade with China than we are. Of course they’re going to take a different stance in their relationship with Beijing, but that doesn’t undercut the strategic alliance, which remains strong.
The Australian military has been with us in every conflict we have fought since World War II. They will be there with us.
How would India benefit from the tension between the US and China?
Indians will always go their own way. They will never be part of the American strategic alliance – nor part of a strategic alliance with anybody. The Indians cherish their independence. They are the leaders of what’s called the non-aligned movement and will always remain that way.
So will they play the United States off against China and play the United States off against Russia? Yes, of course they will. That is where the Indians like to be, and we have to accept that’s the Indian position in the world.
How do you envision the Quad – the US alliance with Australia, India and Japan – and the Aukus agreement on nuclear-powered submarines between the US, Britain and Australia, under Trump 2.0?
There is a review going on right now on Aukus, as there are some problems with the nuclear submarine programme. I’m not sure what the conclusion will be.
There are some in the Trump administration, such as Elbridge Colby, who think the submarine programme is not a good idea. I think this is an open question. I don’t know the answer to what the future of Aukus will look like, but I think it will be rethought a bit.
One of the things people don’t understand about the Quad is that it is much less about strategic military matters and much more about cooperation on health and economic issues.
People misread the Quad. If you look at the Quad website, you will see that they do a lot of things that have nothing to do with strategic military issues. The Quad is successful in that regard but again, the Indians are not going to become part of a strategic alliance.
Will ideological confrontation be less of a priority in US competition with China during Trump’s second term? For example, could the issue of Tibet and the choice of the next Dalai Lama become another thorny issue?
The United States has not had a president who was a real businessman since Harry Truman, who owned a hat store in Missouri.
Now, Trump is a businessman. He thinks geo-economically, not geo- strategically. He wants reciprocal trade agreements with everybody around the world that benefit the American worker. That is his focus.
Look at what he has proposed in Ukraine – to buy rare earths from the Ukrainians. His argument is that it would be a better security guarantee than putting American forces in there, because it would be an economic stake for the US, which forms protection for Ukraine.
It’s a different ideology. It’s the ideology of a capitalist, of a businessman. And he is very different from past American presidents who were part of the national security elite of the United States. He never was part of that elite, and he doesn’t think in those terms.
On the Dalai Lama, the selection of the next Dalai Lama will be upon us in the next 10 years. The way that Beijing handled the Panchen Lama was atrocious from the American point of view. It was a rights violation.
The fact that the Tibetans chose a Panchen Lama, then Beijing made the boy disappear and chose its own young man has created a big flag between Americans who believe in religious freedom and Beijing.
If Beijing once again decides that it will choose the next Dalai Lama, there is going to be a big problem.
The Dalai Lama is now 89 years old and is unlikely to live beyond 100. Thus the issue of his reincarnation will be upon us all. China will want to control the process as it did with the Panchen Lama. The US will want to support the autonomous decision making of the international leadership of Tibetan Buddhism.
What areas do you see that could provide opportunities for substantive cooperation between China and the US?
There are certainly areas for American and Chinese cooperation. As I said on the drugs trade, this could be a win-win if China would stop the gangs from doing what they are doing.
In the trade area, we can have a win-win result. Trump has said China can invest in the US.
The Japanese were in trouble with the US in the 1980s until they started building car factories there and then the relationship became much smoother. China ought to look at that model.
There are areas on disease control and on food security for the Global South. For Africa and other areas, we should be working together.
The African population in the next few decades will explode in size. This will cause problems in food security and stability. The two great economic powers need to work together on Africa but right now, we are not.
Also on the issue of North Korea, neither side is interested in a conflict on the Korean peninsula. It would be very helpful of the Chinese to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table.
We will be competing in the Global South. There’s no question. And that is one of the many areas of US-China competition. This is a good thing. The Global South countries have options and can leverage us against each other.
If I were sitting in a Global South country, I would be figuring out how I can get the most benefits out of Beijing and out of Washington.
Friday, November 1, 2024
How the establishment thinks in the UK about energy and the citizen's quality of life
How the establishment thinks in the UK about energy and the citizen's quality of life
Co-authored by the Royal Academy of Engineering, this past month they presented 'Critical materials: demand-side resource efficiency measures for sustainability and resilience' https://nepc.raeng.org.uk/media/qutgamxj/nepc-critical-materials-report.pdf. Oct 2024.
Among the many pearls, just to print one:
As an alternative policy focus, a significant reduction in vehicle numbers can be made through ‘modal shift’ – policies and infrastructure that enable a change from one mode of transport to another. Moving passengers from low-capacity vehicles such as cars into buses or trains allows more people to be transported per journey. This relates directly to a reduction in critical materials – a study of transport in California, US, modelled a 71% decrease in system-wide lithium demand from shifting policies away from a focus on replacing existing vehicles with EVs to e-bikes or e-buses.
As the report says, no one expects such gains of 71pct in the UK because there is much less car use, but still...
Let's remember also the thing about eating worms, our not having the right to travel via jets but slow rail, the rationing of construction and homes,our having to live with less clothes, the change from trade via ships to trains, etc. A member of Volkswagen board since Nov 2022, Julia Willie Hamburg, says (https://x.com/terran_liberty/status/1850972755916636178), translated from German:
Talking about rationing: it’s clear that if we shrink economically, we won’t have to be as poor as the British were in 1939; rather, we’d have to be as rich as the West Germans were in 1978. That is a huge difference, because we can take advantage of all the growth of the post-war period and the entire economic miracle.
The central elements of the economy would have to be rationed. First of all, living space, because cement emits endless amounts of CO2. Actually, new construction would have to be banned outright and living space rationed to 50 square metres per capita. That should actually be enough for everyone. Then meat would have to be rationed, because meat production emits enormous amounts of CO2. You don’t have to become a vegetarian, but you’ll have to eat a lot less meat.
Then train travel has to be rationed. So this idea, which many people also have – “so okay then I don’t have a car but then I always travel on the Intercity Express trains” – that won’t work either, because of course air resistance increases with speed. Yes, it’s all totally insane. Trains won’t be allowed to travel faster than 100 kilometres per hour, but you can still travel around locally quite a lot. This is all in my book, okay? But I didn’t expand on it there because I didn’t want to scare all the readers.
Monday, October 14, 2024
Dockworkers strike: Only about half of the union’s members are obliged to show up to work each day; the rest sit at home collecting “container royalties” negotiated in previous ILA contracts
On the Waterfront, the Sequel. By The WSJ Editorial Board
The dockworkers strike is an education in monopoly union power.
Updated Oct. 3, 2024 8:30 pm ET
Extracts:
One myth exposed by the strike is that unions need more economic and political power because they help the working man. The union behind this strike, the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), helps some workers at the expense of countless others.
Start with the astounding fact that there were 50,000 or so ILA strikers but only 25,000 or so port jobs. That’s right, only about half of the union’s members are obliged to show up to work each day. The rest sit at home collecting “container royalties” negotiated in previous ILA contracts intended to protect against job losses that result from innovation.
And what a deal for those favored few who do show up to work. The 2019-2020 report of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor laid out the reality: “The absolute control of the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (ILA) over hiring in the Port for over 60 years has not only led to a lack of diversity and inclusion in waterfront employment, but also to the perpetuation of criminality and corruption.”
Residents near the ports can’t get hired because of this union control. “Meanwhile, those who are connected to union leadership or organized crime figures are rewarded with high paying, low-show or no-work special compensation packages,” the report said.
More than “590 individuals continue to receive over $147 million in outsized salaries not required by the industry’s collective bargaining agreement and for hours they do not even have to be at the Port,” the report continued. “Such positions were overwhelmingly given to white males connected to organized crime figures or union leadership.”
This is how ILA boss Harold Daggett earns $900,000 a year, drives a Bentley and owns a 76-foot yacht. And this is the union that President Biden, Kamala Harris and “national conservative” intellectuals extol as tribunes of the working class. Why hasn’t Mr. Biden rung up these guys for “systemic racism”?
This is what happens when unions are granted monopoly negotiating power that lets them extort outsized rents. The ILA is the sole union bargainer for East and Gulf Coast ports, and there is little non-union port competition. The union has a chokehold on commerce that gives it extortionary leverage.
The ILA is like the coal miners and railroad unions that shut down the British economy in the 1970s, or the unions that paralyze transportation in France today. When ILA members strike, they stop trade in goods and hurt literally millions of workers who earn far less than the members of the ILA. Mr. Daggett was happy to put countless truck drivers, warehouse employees, retail clerks and auto workers out of work so he and his “connected” members can buy another yacht.
This is why Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over the veto of Harry Truman in 1947. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act had handed vast new power to unions that resulted in waves of strikes, including secondary boycotts and forced union membership. Taft-Hartley rebalanced the rules for collective bargaining that continue today.
Taft-Hartley also gives the President the authority to seek a court order for an 80-day cooling-off period so companies and unions can negotiate without a strike. The provision was intended for labor disputes like the one at U.S. ports that do great economic harm. George W. Bush invoked it in 2002 to stop an 11-day labor action at West Coast ports.
Yet Mr. Biden refused to invoke the law, and Ms. Harris agreed. “I don’t believe in Taft-Hartley,” Mr. Biden said.
Sunday, July 21, 2024
Time ago it was desertification, 'turning the Earth barren,' and 'leaving entire countries facing famine'; now the worry is that in the receding drylands 'vegetation may soak up scarce water supplies'
Although by then it was well-known that it was a better theory that the deserts were receding and the earth was greening, than the opposite one (the deserts were extending), since at least 2016*, and that there was a continental-scale greening (not specifically of dry areas) since 1997**, The Guardian, as late as 2021, had the nerve to say (my emphasis):
"Desertification is turning the Earth barren – but a solution is still within reach. The expansion of drylands is leaving entire countries facing famine. It’s time to change the way we think about agriculture" — David R Montgomery. The Guardian, Jun 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/sep/02/desertification-barren-solution-famine-agriculture
The guy is not a journo... It is (& was at the moment) professor of geomorphology at the University of Washington.
When I thought the revenge finally came, a top notch university saying the drylands were going green, as was known for a decade:
With CO2 Levels Rising, World’s Drylands Are Turning Green. Fred Pearce. Yale Environment 360, Jul 16 2024. https://e360.yale.edu/features/greening-drylands-carbon-dioxide-climate-change
, I had to experience a deep disappointment... Unfortunately, even admitting to this stuff of a greening earth, of course they found that something bad and very worrying is happening, despite this positive "news": "But scientists warn this added vegetation may soak up scarce water supplies." :-)
* Zhu, Z., Piao, S., Myneni, R. et al. Greening of the Earth and its drivers. Nature Clim Change 6, 791–795 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3004
** Myneni, R. B., Keeling, C. D., Tucker, C. J., Asrar, G. & Nemani, R. R. Increased plant growth in the northern high latitudes from 1981 to 1991. Nature 386, 698–702 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1038/386698a0
Tuesday, July 16, 2024
It is reassuring to read these sycophants explaining that shooting down Nancy Pelosi was discarded as an idea; it also certifies that the tyrant won't go to war over Taiwan
China ramps ups military education for younger ages to help sow ‘seeds’ of patriotism. Amber Wang in Beijing. Southern China Morning Post, Jul 16 2024.
More primary and secondary schoolchildren are participating in pilot programmes to improve their military awareness and skills
Days after former US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, hundreds of students at a school in mainland China gathered for a lecture in which they were told how the trip represented US moves to “contain” Beijing’s rise.
“Why did Pelosi risk being condemned by the world for visiting Taiwan? Why didn’t we shoot it down?” asked a teacher at the No 10 Middle School in Liuyang, Hunan province, according to an online post by the school.
The question prompted heated discussion among the students – all clad in combat uniforms – before the teacher wrapped up the lecture.
Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, which prompted Beijing to launch unprecedented military exercises around the self-ruled island, happened “against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict” and represented “the latest manifestation of great power competition”, the teacher reasoned.
“The intention of the US elite is to use the Taiwan issue to disrupt our development rhythm and curb our rise,” the teacher concluded.
The “national defence education class”, which according to the school was intended to “train student minds to resist the erosion of foreign ideology”, was one of many similar sessions being held around the country as Beijing ramps up efforts to raise awareness among young people about national security.
They come as patriotic fervour is on the rise – driven by Beijing – in response to geopolitical rivalries, notably with countries like the US, and as analysts express concerns about declining military recruitment levels due to factors such as falling birth rates.
Meanwhile, in recent years, drones and rocket launchers have been introduced into combat training at some universities, while groups of children as young as kindergarten age have been sent to tour military camps so that the “seeds” of a “strong military” can be planted, as military commanders have described it.
China is also making changes to a law in a bid to boost national defence education, including exploring ways to enhance the combat skills of teenagers to prepare for potential risks in a “complex and ever-changing security and development environment”.
The trends, according to experts, underline growing concerns in Beijing over what are seen as geopolitical risks, and challenges to attract young people to join the military, all while experts attempt to extract military lessons from key battlegrounds like Ukraine.
“The world is not peaceful, the education on patriotism and national defence should be cultivated from an early age,” Chinese military analyst Fu Qianshao said.
“In the future, when war breaks out, all citizens must be mobilised, which can be seen in the Ukraine war.”
Reaching younger kids
For decades, in addition to its mostly voluntary conscription system, China has deployed a system of public military education that includes compulsory training in high schools and universities. The approach, while not common, has also been used in Russia and North Korea.
Russia revived compulsory military training for high school students in 2023, a year after it invaded Ukraine, and decades since the practice was dropped following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Most countries offer some form of national defence education for their young people through optional courses or specialised military academies, or organisations that teach values and skills.
[A large screen shows a promotion for China’s military on a street in Beijing in August 2022. Photo: AFP]
Military training in Chinese high schools has shades of the Scouts of America, founded in 1910, which also weaves in messages of patriotism across a range of activities and educational programmes. The key difference is the Chinese version is mandatory.
But as geopolitical headwinds intensify, Beijing now believes that more must be done to rally China’s youth to support its military.
Under new amendments to China’s National Defence Education Law, the first changes since 2018, a key focus will be on military education among the country’s teenagers.
For the first time since the law was introduced more than two decades ago, primary school pupils from about age six are now required to have military “awareness” through compulsory classes, according to a draft submitted in April for first reading to the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC).
Meanwhile, according to the draft, junior high schools may, for the first time, organise military training for students ages 12-15 to master combat skills, following the implementation of the mandatory programme in universities and high schools in the past.
The amendments, which have to pass a second or possibly third reading, were part of an array of many similar policy readouts in recent years.
For example, according to rules issued in 2022 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, national defence education should be incorporated into school curriculums and examination processes, and primary schools are urged to conduct seven-day combat training sessions.
As of January this year, 2,431 primary and secondary schools had been selected for pilot programmes to improve military awareness and skills among children.
Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at the Taiwanese naval academy in Kaohsiung, said the most important component of national defence education is learning patriotism.
“If you receive national defence education as early as possible, whether it is physical fitness, national identity, or the construction of patriotic thinking, you will have a correct view on how to protect the country,” Lu said.
“Now that the US is joining forces with allies to launch all-round containment on China, including in science and technology, strengthening defence education is very important for uniting national consciousness,” he added.
Combat training and drones
When they were first adopted in the 1980s, these short-term military training sessions for Chinese students were little more than military marching, formation drills and physical exercise.
But recently, the exercises have become much more immersive, as some training features the use of combat equipment such as drones, and the simulation of real battlefield environments, according to publicly available information.
In China’s southern Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region, which borders Vietnam, students at Guilin University of Electronic Technology underwent combat training with rocket launchers and simulated drone bombings, according to a report by The Beijing News last September.
That same month, students at Peking University in Beijing conducted target practice with guns, while 5,000 students at Shanghai Jiao Tong University marched at night while learning how to avoid air attacks, according to a report by The Paper.
China’s unique short-term military training programmes are unlike those of many other countries, which operate some form of conscription that requires longer stints of military service, with 32 of them requiring more than 18 months of service for men.
However, military education in China is systematically conducted across different levels of schools through courses and lectures beginning in primary schools, as well as activities such as visits to military memorial sites and military training camps.
In April, a group of kindergarten children was sent to observe the training of frontline soldiers in the Eastern Theatre Command Air Force, according to an official military post on Weibo.
“The zero distance” engagement between the kids and soldiers allowed the “seeds” of a “strong military” and patriotism to be planted in the hearts of the children, the post on Weibo said.
National defence education in primary and secondary schools is the “foundation” of the national security strategy, Ma Dan, a researcher with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences wrote in an article in Guangming Daily last year.
“Exposing the enemy’s lies by explaining the truth has become an urgent issue that national defence education in primary and secondary schools must face in a new era,” said Ma, who is part of the team responsible for the country’s defence education system.
Military awareness and basic combat skills should be cultivated gradually from childhood so that they can “spontaneously and proactively” react with national defence behaviours to help prevent threats like separatism and defend territorial integrity, Ma wrote in the article.
Recruitment problems
The trend to ramp up military indoctrination among Chinese youth comes as concerns grow in Beijing over having enough recruits to sustain the country’s military, as conflicts like Moscow’s war in Ukraine cast a spotlight on military preparedness.
In several addresses, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed Taiwan’s “reunification” with the mainland as “inevitable”, preferably through peaceful means, but never renouncing the use of force to accomplish the task.
[Mainland China launches PLA blockade around Taiwan, 3 days after William Lai speech]
The NPC argues that the amendments to the national defence education law are necessary to cope with what has been described as a complex security environment and various growing risks, according to an explanation presented alongside the amendments in April.
Other government papers have linked military education to the overall strength of the PLA, as it becomes increasingly challenging to recruit members among China’s youth.
According to those papers, the tasks of national defence education are difficult but greatly important in safeguarding national sovereignty, and achieving the army centenary goal in 2027.
Many of China’s challenges in attracting people to enlist in military service can be traced to demographics, as the country’s population ages and the proportion of young people declines.
However, a “weak sense” of national defence is also a factor, according to a paper published in Contemporary Youth Research in 2014. Because they have grown up in an extended era of peacetime, younger generations are increasingly influenced by “hedonistic” trends in social media that steer them away from military service, according to a proposal by a Chinese local advisory body.
Fu Qianshao, the military analyst, said young people are part of the country’s reserve forces that could play roles in wartime, so it is necessary to cultivate their awareness and skills from an early age, though the enhancement of education was not “directly” related to the recruitment considerations.
But some have expressed doubts about how effective such initiatives will be in addressing Beijing’s concerns.
“The programmes aim to bolster patriotic enthusiasm and perhaps expand the ranks of potential recruits for the PLA,” said Timothy Heath, a senior international and defence analyst at the RAND Corporation, who expressed doubts that coordinated indoctrination could effectively address those challenges.
“Nor will the measures fundamentally improve the PLA’s recruitment situation, because young people do not like to experience hardship and life in the barracks in China, or anywhere else in the developed world.”
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My comments on several of the sad sentences by these emaciated running dogs (like why "did Pelosi risk being condemned by the world"!?!?!?!?!?):
1 Their words are revolting, I'm throwing up reading the bootlickers.
2 Those who promote educating the young for war and the military are, for the most part, just extracting rent from the taxpayer. This education program won't work, and they know it is not effective, but they make a living of this. Nauseating.
3 As I said above, reading these kowtowing minions contemplating shooting down Nancy Pelosi means there will be no war over Taiwan. Tyrant Chin-p'ing Hsi has said to von der Leyen, and to his lackeys*, that "the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take the bait," and the greasy slaves supra confirm this.
4 To finish the comments, let me express my hope that we may, at the end, see the tyrant's fall and harmony on the Strait.
* [Chin-p'ing Hsi] claimed US wants China to attack Taiwan https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a
Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington and Joe Leahy in Beijing, June 15 2024
China’s President Xi Jinping told European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen that Washington was trying to goad Beijing into attacking Taiwan, according to people familiar with the matter.
The Chinese leader has also delivered the warning to domestic officials in his own country, one person said.
Xi issued the warning in a meeting with von der Leyen in April 2023 that was described to the Financial Times by several people. He said the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take the bait. Another person said he had issued similar warnings to his officials.
The comments provide a window into Xi’s thinking on Taiwan — the most thorny issue in US-China relations.
Some Chinese academics and retired military officers have claimed that Washington is trying to provoke Beijing by providing weapons to Taiwan and pushing other measures to lure China into military confrontation.
Speaking at the Asia Society in January, Cui Tiankai, a former Chinese ambassador to Washington, said China would “not fall into the trap somebody may be preparing for us”, in a veiled reference to the US.
Xi’s remark to von der Leyen is the first known case of him making the claim to a foreign leader. Xi also said that a conflict with the US would destroy many of China’s achievements and undermine his goal of achieving a “great rejuvenation” by 2049.
“If Xi genuinely believes that the US actively seeks conflict with China over Taiwan, then concerns that Xi has created an information vacuum or is otherwise getting poor counsel from subordinates are, worryingly, true,” said Jude Blanchette, a China expert at CSIS, a think-tank.
The revelation comes as tensions are high across the Taiwan Strait. China responded to May’s inauguration of Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s new president with major military exercises around the island. Beijing has described Lai as a “dangerous separatist”.
Washington has an obligation to help Taiwan provide for its own defence under the Taiwan Relations Act. But the Biden administration has long stressed that it does not support Taiwanese independence and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo.
Chinese anxiety over US intentions has grown in recent years, as have US concerns about assertive Chinese military activity around Taiwan.
One Chinese academic said Washington was “actively encouraging independence forces in Taiwan” and the US knew that if they crossed a red line by declaring independence, China would be forced to take military action.
Blanchette said one possible explanation for Xi’s comment was that some subordinates were trying to steer him away from more aggressive policies.
“Whatever the explanation for Xi’s comments, it’s clear that the decision-making environment — and the information feeding into it — is being warped, either by Xi’s lieutenants, or by his own autocratic behaviour,” Blanchette said.
Bonnie Glaser, a German Marshall Fund China expert, said the comment might have been part of China’s attempt to pull Europe away from the US on the Taiwan issue, but it was also possible that Xi believed it.
The Chinese embassy in Washington did not comment on Xi’s remark, but said the US was selling weapons to Taiwan and backing “independence separatist forces”.
Von der Leyen’s spokesperson said she did not disclose details about private meetings. The White House did not comment.
Additional reporting by Henry Foy in Brussels
Thursday, July 11, 2024
Gen. Wei, a senior party and PLA leader, had “a collapse of faith and a loss of loyalty” and “seriously polluted the political ecosystem of the PLA”; Gen. Li had “abandoned the original mission and lost the principles of the party” & seriously contaminated the PLA’s military equipment industry
China’s military commits to full ‘rectification’ in corruption investigations’ wake. Xinlu Liang in Beijing. South China Morning Post, Jul 11 2024
The Central Military Commission says political education is crucial to advancing the PLA and war preparations
China’s military will double down on political education following the downfall of two former defence ministers accused of “polluting” the armed forces.
The Central Military Commission (CMC), the country’s top military decision-making body, said on Wednesday that the People’s Liberation Army would undergo complete “rectification” as part of its combat-readiness mission.
“Deepening the military’s political education and training is crucial for advancing the military’s development and achieving its strategic goals,” the CMC said.
“It is a serious and significant political task that requires unwavering determination and practical actions.
“We must integrate our efforts into the struggle, preparation for war, and construction of the military ... We must also continuously consolidate the Communist Party’s leadership in the new era and achieve the great goal of building a strong military.”
This process, it said using a rarely used phrase, would include “rectification of the mind, personnel appointments, organisation, working style and discipline”.
It would also involve a thorough review of the military’s policies and practices, as well as the promotion of a sense of discipline and responsibility among its personnel, state news agency Xinhua reported.
video: China sacks defence minister Li Shangfu with no explanation after nearly two-month absence
The wide-ranging pledge comes two weeks after authorities announced that former defence ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were under investigation for alleged corruption.
In unusually harsh language about the two former generals, the official reports said, Wei, a senior party and PLA leader, had “a collapse of faith and a loss of loyalty” and “seriously polluted the political ecosystem of the PLA”. Meanwhile, Li had “abandoned the original mission and lost the principles of the party” and seriously contaminated the PLA’s military equipment industry.
Their actions “betrayed the trust of the party’s central leadership and the CMC … and caused great damage to the party’s cause, national defence and the construction of the PLA, as well as to the image of the senior leading cadres”, official reports said.
The investigations uncovered evidence of other possible “serious disciplinary and criminal offences” by the two men, according to the CMC, and both will face criminal prosecution.
China has emphasised the importance of maintaining a clean and efficient military, and has vowed to take decisive action against any officials found to be tainted by corruption. The campaign is seen as a key part of President Xi Jinping’s efforts to strengthen party control over the military and instil a culture of integrity within its ranks.
In June, Xi told the top brass that the PLA must show absolute loyalty to the party and there could be no room for corruption in the military.
“We must make it clear that the barrels of guns must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and dependable to the party … And we must make it clear that there is no place for any corrupt elements in the military,” Xinhua quoted Xi as saying.
He warned that the world was undergoing complex and profound changes, and the military must adapt to these changes by promoting politics in its development and ensuring that the nature and principles of the people’s army remain unchanged.
“[PLA] cadres at all levels, the senior ones in particular, must step forward, dare to lose face and face their own shortcomings and flaws … make earnest rectifications, and resolve problems that are deeply rooted in their thinking,” Xi said.
China has seen a number of high-profile corruption cases involving senior military officers in recent years.
Nine senior generals – including past and serving top commanders of the PLA Rocket Force, a former air force commander and a series of CMC officials with the Equipment Development Department – were removed from their positions in December.
Monday, July 1, 2024
The disasters of excessive patriotic zeal, or of dotardness, I can't tell... Corrupt running dog, bootlicker, (p)sycophant and mafioso Shih-ts'un Wu urges to construct narratives defending Chinese maritime claims raiding Western archives/libraries
South China Sea: Chinese academics urged to ‘construct narratives’ to defend maritime claims. Laura Zhou. South China Morning Post, Jun 30 2024.
China faces ‘an increasingly arduous battle’ to win over public opinion in the disputed waters, speakers tell an academic seminar in Hainan
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3268562/south-china-sea-chinese-academics-urged-construct-narratives-defend-maritime-claims
Preserving a copy for posterity, they may very well end up removing this filth. My emphasis:
Chinese academics have called for more studies of the country’s claims to the disputed South China Sea.
“Narrative construction and discourse building are essential if we are to effectively defend our rights and interests in the South China Sea – both in the present and in future,” Wu Shicun, founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, told a seminar held in Hainan province last week.
Beijing lays claim to much of the South China Sea, citing historic activities and records in support.
Its claims were rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 2016 in a case filed by the Philippines.
Recently the two countries have been involved in a series of clashes near disputed reefs – including collisions, China using water cannons and a recent incident in which a Philippine sailor lost a thumb. These have raised fears that the situation may escalate into a more serious conflict.
Without naming any country, Wu said China faced “an increasingly arduous battle over public perception and opinion”, adding that “rival claimants” were “stepping up cooperation with extraterritorial forces in the study of historical and legal issues” concerning the South China Sea.
Beijing has dismissed the Hague ruling as “null and void” and continued to build up its infrastructure and troop presence in the South China Sea.
But the Philippines and other claimants – which include Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei – along with the United States and its allies have repeatedly urged China to abide by international law.
The Philippines has signalled that it may turn to the Hague for another ruling, fuelling worries in Beijing that it would put the country in a bind and harm its reputation as a peacemaker and friendly neighbour in the region.
Yi Xianliang, a former ambassador to Norway who previously served as deputy director of the foreign ministry’s boundary and ocean affairs department, also spoke at Tuesday’s seminar and dismissed the 2016 ruling as a “bad joke”.
But he warned “we have to ask why the ruling is flawed” and ask if it “will happen again and how we can prevent it from happening again”.
Wu, who now chairs the Huayang Institute for Research on Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, denied China had violated international law in its disputes with the Philippines, and accused the US and its allies for “taking sides … by supporting whoever confronts China and violates China’s rights in the South China Sea”.
“Some strange theories which deliberately distort the history of the South China Sea and maliciously smear China’s rights and claims in the South China Sea have begun to circulate in the international academic community,” Wu said.
He urged the 100 or so historians and legal scholars present to help “restore the rightful background on South China Sea issues from historical and legal perspectives”.
Wu also said the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – which governs maritime rights and the freedom of navigation – could not take precedence over countries’ historical titles and rights, citing a previous case involving Eritrea and Yemen in the 1990s.
He said scholars could make their case by tapping into foreign manuscript collections, maritime histories and Western naval literature to support China’s claims.
This would allow them to “give a forceful response to the false narratives that China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea, that China has failed to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Wu said.
This, he said, would help rebut accusations that Beijing was making “excessive maritime claims”.
---
My comment (and my emphasis): Shih-ts'un Wu, founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (中国南海研究院 (nanhai.org.cn)), now (it seems) the capo at the Huayang Institute for Research on Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance (can't get website of that snake pit, and its name varies wildly, sometimes is Center on Maritime, or Research Center on Maritime), told seminar assistants in Hainan province last week to construct narratives defending Chinese maritime claims with any means necessary, including raiding Western archives/libraries: "scholars could make their case by tapping into foreign manuscript collections, maritime histories and Western naval literature to support China’s claims, which would allow them to 'give a forceful response to the false narratives that China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea, that China has failed to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.'"
My assessment is that the lackeys will not only covertly, clandestinely infiltrate libraries and research institues, but that they, in their demented patriotic cowardice, will plunder and scavenge the archives, like the vulptures they are, destroying documents that support the Philippines' claims.
This is the implicit command of these savages of the Party.
---
Board of Governors (中国南海研究院 (nanhai.org.cn)), page now lost:
Wu Shicun has a PhD in history and is president and senior research fellow of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies, chairman of board of directors of China-Southeast Asia Research Center on the South China Sea, vice president of China Institute for Free Trade Ports Studies, deputy director of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University.
Dr Wu’s research interests cover the history and geography of the South China Sea, maritime delimitation, maritime economy, international relations and regional security strategy. His main single-authored books include What One Needs to Know about the South China Sea (Current Affairs Press, 2016), What One Needs to Know about the Disputes between China and the Philippines (Current Affairs Press,2014), Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South China Sea: A Chinese perspective (Chandos Publishing, 2013). His main edited books include: The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Challenges and Opportunities for Asia and Europe (Routledge, 2019), South China Sea Law fare: Post-Arbitration Policy Options and Future Prospects (South China Sea Think Tank / Taiwan Center for Security Studies, 2017), Arbitration Concerning the South China Sea: Philippines versus China (Ashgate, 2016), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the South China Sea (Ashgate, 2015), Non-Traditional Security Issues and the South China Sea-Shaping a New Framework for Cooperation (Ashgate, 2014), Recent Developments in the South China Sea Dispute: The Prospect of a Joint Development Regime (Routledge, 2014), Securing the Safety of Navigation in East Asia—Legal and Political Dimensions (Chandos Publishing, 2013). Dr Wu has published widely in academic journals and been the subject of frequent media interviews as a senior commentator on South China Sea, regional security issues, the Belt & Road Initiative and the development of Hainan Province.
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Update Jul 10 2024. The reprobate imperious colonizer, highly dishonorable, recidivist offender, and intemperate, libelous, impious, defiling, noxious, pretentious, harmful, poisonous, virulent, vitiating, "malignant" (he writes ' "tumor" ' infra), pestilential, indecent, injurious, contaminative, pernicious, sinful, ignoble, polluting, maleficent, venomous, sinister, debasing, demoralizing, corrupting, venenose, lachrymose, environmentally unfriendly Shih-ts'un Wu, the psychotic, sacrilegious mafioso, one of the most loyal lieutenant desecrators, the most indecorous, immodest one, with no regrets ever, a hooligan, a refurbished, recalcitrant lackey, in a joint effort with the Global Times published the article below.
The viperous, provincial, felonious, demonic, depraved, truth eclipser, disreputable, impish, septic Global Times, who shamelessly, almost with voluptuousness, delights in schadenfreude, let this hatchet job of Shih-ts'un see the light and in doing so detracted from the sum of human knowledge once again.
The GT editorial board and many of the gossipers there seems to experience extreme pleasure with their soiled words, it is a study case of lack of benevolence from the Heights of Power. The butlers despise the dissident, the free-thinker, and the hoi polloi, and have no qualms about crushing others' rights.
The revolting piece, calling to reject not only what the arbitral court (Permanent Court of Arbitration) said more than a lustrum ago, but also what it may decide in the future, shows how low we can sink when we are enemies of Reason. A sure way to go that path is to become slaves of sentimentality, blindly follow a political party, and revoltingly gush about the Fatherland, seeing the other peoples as inferior.
It is the old, repulsive imperial view that for so many centuries we had to endure of these brutes, who, like proverbial capital-city dwellers, behave as bullies but see themselves as refined, polite professionals, good lads that have to suffer the obnoxious, illiterate, unsophisticated peasants who deserve no voice. Why the rough, ungraceful country cousins think still of having the right to avoid taxation when there is no representation? The mandarinate knows better. Always knew.
Urgent call to clear toxicity of [the] SCS arbitration award. Shih-ts'un Wu.
https://en.nanhai.org.cn/index/research/paper_c/id/598.html
My emphasis:
With the approach of the 8th anniversary of the illegal award on the South China Sea arbitration, some troubling developments have recently emerged in the region. A number of extraterritorial countries have increased their military activities in the South China Sea, and the Philippines has ratcheted up legal motions and maritime actions aimed at solidifying this arbitration award. Certain countries have intensified unilateral actions to consolidate and expand their vested interests.
In less than two years, the current Philippine government has nearly dismantled the good practices established over recent years for managing maritime differences and properly handling the South China Sea issue between China and the Philippines. The bilateral relationship, which had gradually emerged from the shadow of the illegal South China Sea arbitration case, now appears to have reset and is even regressing.
The international community is widely aware of China's position of not accepting or recognizing the award. However, some countries have not fully grasped the significant damage and harm that the award has caused to the handling of the South China Sea dispute, the rule-building in the region, the fairness and authority of international dispute settlement mechanisms, and the international order based on international law. Some even harbor unrealistic fantasies about the award.
Judging from the current provocative actions of the Philippines against China's rights and claims in the South China Sea, the current Philippine government has intensified its use of the award to change the status quo, consolidate illegal gains and expand the scope of infringement. Since taking office, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has frequently cited the award as a so-called "basis" to attack and smear China's actions of safeguarding legitimate rights at the Ren'ai Jiao and Huangyan Dao. In fact, the arbitration award contains significant errors and flaws in legal interpretation and application, fact-finding and evidence acceptance. China's stance is precisely an act of maintaining its legitimate rights and interests, maintaining maritime peace and stability and upholding the rule of law.
Looking back at the volatile situation in the South China Sea since the award was issued eight years ago, it can be asserted that the award has not brought, and indeed cannot bring, peace and tranquility to the South China Sea. The arbitration award has become a "troublemaker" for peace and stability in the South China Sea, a "spoiler" for bilateral relations between China and relevant parties, and a "roadblock" for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the orderly advancement of consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
We must recognize that the arbitration award has had an extremely negative impact on political mutual trust at all levels between China and the Philippines. Outside the Philippines, some other disputant sides also occasionally refer to or cite the arbitration award as the basis for their respective claims. Additionally, some extraterritorial countries hold the arbitration award as a standard, pressuring the Chinese government to "respect" or "implement" the award. Therefore, it is crucial to make relevant countries within and outside the region clearly understand the essence and dangers of the award, and to promote the relevant parties to return to the correct track of resolving disputes through negotiation and consultation, mitigating differences through maritime cooperation and managing crises through rule-building.
As for the Philippines' threat to initiate new arbitration against China, it is, in a sense, a manifestation of the lingering toxicity of this arbitration award. No matter how the Philippine government packages the so-called "second arbitration," its content will definitely be related to some errors in the previous arbitration award. China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and the adjacent waters. It needs to repeatedly and continuously clarify the toxicity of the arbitration award from a legal standpoint to thoroughly eradicate this "tumor" that has long undermined the rule of law and order at sea.
Rebutting the arbitration award and countering the erroneous statements of countries within and outside the region are not intended to provoke a new round of legal battles, but to make a rightful response to actions and forces that disrupt peace and stability in the South China Sea, interfere with China-Philippine relations and profit from the award. This will further reveal to the international community the political background of the arbitral tribunal's composition and the historical errors of the arbitration award, and lay bare the irreversible severe harm the award has caused to the rule of law and maritime order.
Wu Shicun is the chairman of the Huayang Research Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance and founding president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.
Link: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1315786.shtml
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