Saturday, March 30, 2019

Disclosing racial preferences in sexual attraction (whether preference for some race, or disinterest in others) is considered racist even by people who overtly claim that holding such preference is not racism

The “preference” paradox: Disclosing racial preferences in attraction is considered racist even by people who overtly claim it is not. Michael Thai, Matthew J. Stainer, Fiona Kate Barlow. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 83, July 2019, Pages 70-77.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.03.004

Highlights
•    It is considered more racist to have racial preference in attraction than not.
•    Effect emerges even for people who claim it is not racist to have preferences.
•    Effect emerges if preferences are communicated disinterest in certain races.
•    Effect emerges if preferences are communicated as a preference for a certain race.
•    Effect emerges whether preferences are communicated as absolute or soft.


Abstract: There is contention about whether having racial preferences in the domain of sexual attraction constitutes racism, or simply reflects benign partiality. Using a person perception paradigm, we investigated gay men's ratings of targets who disclosed racial preferences in a mock online dating profile. Across three experiments, we found that participants generally rated the target as more racist, less attractive, less dateable, and were less personally willing to have relations with him if he disclosed racial preferences than if he did not. Even participants who believed that having racial preferences is not racist consistently rated a target disclosing racial preferences as more racist, largely less dateable, and were less personally willing to have relations with him. For these participants, however, racial preference disclosure had no reliable effect on how physically attractive they found the target. Findings suggest that disclosing racial preferences in the domain of attraction is interpreted as reflecting racism, even by those who ostensibly believe that people can have non-racist racial preferences.

CEOs imbue their organizations with the ability to feel & ability to suffer, which makes organizational punishments more satisfying, & apologies more effective

CEOs imbue organizations with feelings, increasing punishment satisfaction and apology effectiveness. Simone Tang. KurtGray. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 79, November 2018, Pages 115-125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.06.002

Abstract: Organizations are easy to blame for wrongdoing because they seem capable of intention and planning (i.e., they possess perceived agency). However, punishing organizations for wrongdoing is often unsatisfying, perhaps because organizations seem incapable of feeling pain (i.e., they lack perceived experience). Without the ability to suffer, corporations and organizations cannot slake people's thirst for retribution, even with large fines and other penalties. CEOs may provide a potential solution to this “organization experience deficiency.” As feeling humans who embody the organizations they lead, CEOs provide a possible source of suffering and therefore organizational redemption. Across five experiments and one pre-registered experiment, we found that CEOs imbue their organizations with the ability to feel (Experiments 1–4b) and ability to suffer (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3), which makes organizational punishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3), and apologies more effective (Experiments 4a and 4b). Implications for justice and mind perception in organizations are discussed.

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1. Introduction
In 2014, car manufacturer Toyota was fined $1.2 billion for knowingly selling cars with defective accelerators. Despite the size of the fine—the largest at the time—people seemed dissatisfied and de-manded tougher sanctions (Douglas & Fletcher, 2014). Conversely,when the pharmaceutical company Valeant was fined the equivalent of$143.1 million for price gouging desperate patients—about 10% of the Toyota fine—people appeared more satisfied (Rapoport & Lublin,2016). Why the differences in reaction? Although reactions to any legal case are multiply determined (Demleitner, Berman, Miller, & Wright,2015; Erez & Rogers, 1999;Myers & Greene, 2004), Valeant's punishment might have been more satisfying because its CEO was fired, providing a tangible source of suffering. When wrongdoing occurs, people thirst for retribution, demanding an eye for an eye (Darley, 2009). Given that most immoral deeds end up harming a victim (even if only in perception; Haslam, 2016;Schein,Goranson, & Gray, 2015), people often want the perpetrator of misdeeds to suffer in kind. As most individuals possess the capacity forpain, this thirst for suffering is easily slaked when wrongdoers are punished, whether through prison time, social censure, or personal financial loss.

1.1. Organizations are deficient in experience
In contrast to individuals, organized group agents like corporations seem to lack the ability to suffer. Research in mind perception reveals that while organizations are seen as equally capable of agency (e.g.,planning and acting) compared to individuals, they are seen as muchless capable of experience (e.g., feeling and sensing, Knobe & Prinz,2008; Rai & Diermeier, 2015). This mind perception profile means that organizations are seen as moral agents (morally capable of perpetrating and being responsible for wrongdoing), but not moral experiencers (or“moral patients,”deserving of moral rights;Gray & Wegner, 2009;Opotow, 1990). In other words, companies are seen as capable of being villains perpetrating harm, but not as victims experiencing harm (Gray&Wegner, 2011;Rai & Diermeier, 2015). Consistent with this idea, society is often willing to paint corporations as evil masterminds ratherthan as deserving of compassion (Litowitz, 2003). This lack of perceived experience may be especially problematic fororganizations after they perpetrate harm because people are retributivists (Darley, 2009), and punishments are most satisfying whenthey cause the wrongdoer clear suffering (e.g.,Fitness & Peterson,2008).  Of  course,  not  all  transgressions  result  in  punishment—sometimes they are addressed through apologies to preemptpunishment (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). Even here, however,successful apologies require sincere expressions of remorse and concern (Davis & Gold, 2011; Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). As organizations seem to lack the capacity to feel remorse and suffer, their apologies may beperceived as less sincere or heartfelt. Despite these apparent deficits ofmind, there may be one way to overcome them: through their CEO.

1.2. The benefits of a CEO
Although an organization may be represented by its logo, aspokesperson, or even its iconic headquarters, the CEO is often seen asthe human embodiment of the entire organization (Forrest, 2011;Woods, 2011; YaleInsights, 2014), such as Bill Gates for Microsoft andMark Zuckerberg for Facebook. CEOs not only provide a human face foran often opaque organizational structure, but may also provide humanfeelings and emotions. Although organizations are generally seen to lackfeelings, CEOs—as human beings—possess both agency and experience,and may be able to confer (at least perceptually) feeling to the orga-nizations they personify.
More specifically, after an organization commits a moral transgression, people may use the CEO's ability to feel as a proxy for theorganization's perceived ability to feel. Although experience is a rela-tively broad construct (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), we suggest onespecific capacity within experience will be of special importance—thecapacity to suffer. Feeling pain is essential to retribution (Darley, 2009),and so we suggest that the benefits of CEO-conferred-experience willhinge upon increased perceptions of suffering in organizations. Of course, there may be other reasons beyond perceived experience as towhy punishments are more satisfying and apologies are more effectivewhen CEOs are emphasized. People often hold leaders responsible fororganizational transgressions (Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006),firmperformance (Crossland & Chen, 2013), and new initiatives (Menon,Sim, Fu, Chiu, & Hong, 2010), but we suggest that another possible,though overlooked, reason for increased punishment satisfaction is the CEO's ability to imbue the organization with perceived experience,especially the ability to suffer.
Here we explore whether CEOs are not only Chief ExecutiveOfficers, but also Chief Experiencing Officers, imbuing their organizations with the capacity to feel and providing their organizations po-tential benefits after organizational malfeasance.1.3. The current researchSix experiments investigate whether CEOs confer experience to organizations. We first test whether an organization represented by its CEO is ascribed relatively more experience than one that is not (Experiment 1). We then examine whether such imbued experi-ence—especially the ability to suffer—makespunishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) and apologies more effective(Experiments 4a and 4b). In our experiments, we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. All data were analyzed after all datacollection was complete, except for preregistered Experiment 2 (be-cause of an issue by the Qualtrics platform that led some participants inthe initial sample to experience error messages during the study), andExperiment 4b (because the effect size was smaller than expected, leaving us with insufficient power from our initial sample).



8. General discussion
Across six experiments and one preregistered replication, we found that an organization's CEO can imbue it with experience (Experiments 1-4b), which makes punishments more satisfying (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) and apologies more effective (Experiments 4a and 4b). The more capable the CEO is seen of experience, the more effectively they imbue their organization with experience (Experiment 3). Experiment 3 also revealed that, despite thegeneral importance ofimbued experience, the perceived ability to suffer is especially important in generating positive organizational outcomes—likely because of the strong motivation for just deserts (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). These findings are important because they highlight a way for organizations to regain the approval of consumers after wrongdoing. Trust in big businesses is at an all-time low—only 6% of Americans report having a “great deal” of confidence in them (Gallup, 2016)—and such trust is essential for a functioning society (Putnam, 2000; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Our set of studies suggests one path towards rebuilding trust—the apparent suffering or remorse of CEOs.

8.1. Caveats
We note that the role of CEOs is not limited to imbuing experience, as CEOs are generally viewed as the source of an organization's behaviors (Crossland & Chen, 2013; Menon et al., 2010; Zemba et al., 2006). We further note that the presence or absence of an experiential CEO is not the only—or perhaps even most important—determinant of reactions to corporate malfeasance. Researchers have examined the factors that affect attributions of responsibility and blame across crises, including accidents and malfeasance. Consistent with current models of moral judgment (Schein & Gray, 2018), people assign less blame to harmful agents when the harm is seen as unintentional (Alicke, 2000), when they lack clear victims (Alicke & Davis, 1989), when the causation of harm is unclear (Paharia, Kassam, Greene, & Bazerman, 2009), and when they involve gradual degradation rather than abrupt drops in ethical conduct (Fincham & Shultz, 1981; Gino & Bazerman, 2009). We also acknowledge that the results may be different if people are the victims of the wrongdoing, rather than when making third-party judgments (as examined here). However, we suggest that the effects could be even stronger, as wrongdoing is more relevant for and more impactful on victims compared to observers, and related past research on motivated cognition suggests that motivated attitudes and behaviors are stronger when the event is increasingly relevant to the self (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010).

8.2. Implications
More broadly, our experiments replicate past work on mind perception revealing that people ascribe more experience to humans than to organizations (Rai & Diermeier, 2015). However, they also provide an important qualification: when an organization is represented by its CEO, the organization's experience is increased. This effect is not only practically important for organizations seeking to manage their impressions, but also has theoretical implications for how we understand groups in general and organizations in particular. Groups are often seen as the combined collection of their individual members, but this work highlights how they are also identified via their leader, who lends his or her characteristics to the collective. Just as the King or Queen of England is the human symbol of the English Commonwealth—and has the capacity to redirect resentment away from the government to him or herself (Ayling, 1972)—the CEO is the human incarnation of the organization. This helps us understand why some organizations, like Apple (prominently represented by former Steve Jobs), appear to be more capable of experience than other organizations, like Chevron (whose CEO is not as prominent)—and why (among other reasons) organizations do not want a CEO who seems like an unfeeling psychopath. A feeling CEO translates to a feeling organization, as Experiment 3 demonstrates. However, there could be a dark side to the satisfaction that people feel from the CEO's suffering. Although punishing an organization through its CEO may be more satisfying, it is often less effective and more costly than implementing systemic change, such as changes to legal policies (Cohen, 2015). That is, people's satisfaction from retribution may come at the expense of more important change, such as changing the underlying system to prevent future wrongdoing (Tufekci, 2018). This may explain why the government, the news media, and the public relish in seeing CEOs lambasted in court (e.g., The New York Times Editorial Board, 2016) and are often unwilling to let corporations off the hook until senior executives leave in disgrace (Thompson & Liakos, 2015). Given people's desire to satisfy short-term desires over long-term goals (e.g., Baumeister, 2002) and that people punish for retributive reasons (Carlsmith et al., 2002), they may end up extracting suffering from a series of CEOs at the expense of dedicating the limited amount of resources to fixing the underlying problem. An important implication of our findings for scholars and practitioners is the significance of perceiving minds in organizations when it comes to justice and punishment. People care not just about ways to rectify wrongdoing andpunish, butalsoabout whether theycan makea mind suffer in the process—and in organizations, this is often the mind of the CEO. An interesting twist, as we have shown, is that if the CEO is perceived as incapable of feeling or experience, they are less able to confer the benefits of punishment satisfaction (and presumably apology effectiveness). The inability of both the CEO and organization to experience may even lead to less punishment satisfaction and apology effectiveness than only an organization that does not experience.
Finally, although speculative, this research hints at a new understanding of extreme pay packages of CEOs. CEOs receive substantially more compensation than other employees, often making millions more than the next closest executive. Explanations for this pay gap include their background (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001), their talent (Gabaix&Landier,2006), their managerial skills (Combs&Skill,2003), their willingness to weather business volatility (Dow & Raposo, 2005), andtheirpower to influence compensation packages (Bebchuk, Fried,& Walker, 2002), but our results suggest that such a disparity can also inadvertently serve a purposeful function. After wrongdoing, CEOs who make much more money have further to fall, and so sanctions and terminations seem to cause them more suffering. Being high above the rest of the company also draws more attention to them, allowing them to act as a lightning rod to protect the rest of the company. CEOs may therefore be understood not only as powerful leaders, but also as sacrificial lambs, whose disgrace and termination after wrongdoing allows the broader organization to achieve redemption.


Survey: All hospital pharmacists suffered drug shortages in the preceding year & 69.2% had more than 50 shortages; 92.4% had about 1 month from notice to shortage

Prevalence and Severity of Rationing During Drug Shortages: A National Survey of Health System Pharmacists. Andrew Hantel et al. JAMA Intern Med. March 25, 2019. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2018.8251

Abstract: Hospital medication shortages in the United States are associated with decreased quality and/or quantity of life.1,2 In severe cases, shortages require clinicians to decide which patients receive needed medications and which do not (ie, rationing drugs between patients).3 Previous studies have proposed ethical allocation frameworks and assessed the associations of specific shortages.2,4,5 We conducted a national survey of hospital pharmacy managers to investigate current drug allocation and rationing practices of US hospitals during shortages.

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Results
The study’s 719 respondents (response rate, 65.0%,based on unique listserv activity during the time of survey availability) comprised 5.7% of total PPM membership. The question completion rate was 95.4%. Respondents were demographically similar to the overall American Society of Health-System Pharmacists PPM membership. The median age was 44 years (interquartile range, 35-57 years), with 311 (43.2%) self-reporting as women and 381 (53.0%) as men; the median years in practice was 10 (interquartile range, 10-32 years). A total of 453 (63.0%) reported practicing in community hospitals,whereas 143 (19.9%) and 123 (17.1%) reported practicing in academic or academically affiliated hospitals, respectively. Respondents were from hospitals with fewer than 100 (109 [15.2%]), 100 to 199 (139 [19.3%]), 200 to 299 (111 [15.4%]), 300 to 399 (115 [15.9%]), or more than 400 beds (245 [34.0%]). All respondents reported experiencing drug shortages in the preceding year and 498 respondents (69.2%) reported more than 50 shortages. Most respondents (664 [92.4%]) reportedan average of less than 1 month from notification to active shortage, 250 (34.9%) described having no administrative mechanism to respond to shortages, 96 (13.3%) reported a standing committee that included physicians, and 20 (2.8%)included an ethicist. The Table describes the frequency of medication shortages and the strategies used to mitigate and manage them. Notably, medication hoarding was reported by 584 respondents (81.3%). More than one-third of respondents (247 [34.4%]) reportedan episode of rationing within the past year. Rationing occurred more frequently at academic hospitals (47.7% vs 25.5%;P= .01) and academically affiliated hospitals (45.4% vs 25.5%;P=.02) compared with community hospitals and in hospitals with more than 300 beds compared with those with fewer beds (46.1% vs19.7%;P< .01). During rationing, 128 respondents (51.8%) reported that the treating team alone decided on allocation meth-ods, whereas 119(48.2%) used committees, 12 (4.9%) of which included an ethicist. Only 89 patients(36.0%) were informed that their care included rationing.

Discussion
Pharmacy practice managers reported frequent medication shortages with variation in allocation and rationing methods during shortages. Many respondents described little forewarning of upcoming shortages and a lack of administrative mechanisms with which to guide medication conser-vation, and although discouraged, hoarding was widespread.3,4 Rationing was prevalent, particularly in large hospitals and academic or academically affiliated hospitals. Most respondents noted that rationing decisions were generally made by the care team without the involvement of hospital committees or ethicists. Disclosing rationing to patients was not common. This survey of PPMs suggests that more systematic approaches areneeded to address the common problem of drug shortages and consequent drug rationing. Progress in this area would be furthered by research to better understand patient and physician preferences for disclosure and the association of different management strategies with the outcomes of high-risk groups.

Hadza Hunter-gatherers Disagree on Perceptions of Moral Character

Smith, Kristopher M., and Coren L. Apicella. 2019. “Hadza Hunter-gatherers Disagree on Perceptions of Moral Character.” PsyArXiv. March 29. doi:10.31234/osf.io/er4jb

Abstract: To the extent that moral character is grounded in stable and observable truths, there should exist agreement between people in their judgements of others’ character. In Western populations, this agreement is found. We examine whether this is universal in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-four judges ranked their campmates on global character and relevant character traits for a total of 824 observations. Judges disagreed on rankings of global character, generosity, and honesty, but agreed more on hard work and hunting ability. Individual rankings on specific traits predicted character evaluations. There was agreement between judges on the extent to which generosity and hard work related to character. These findings suggest that Hadza have shared beliefs about what traits constitute character, but disagree on which of their campmates exhibit these traits. We discuss these findings in light of other research suggesting that stable moral dispositions may not be universal.

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Evaluation of moral character is an important component of person perception (Goodwin,
2015; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). When learning about a new person, we seek
information about whether they are trustworthy (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini,
2011). When identifying features and traits most relevant to identity, people consider morality to
be an essential component (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). And when considering what
attributes a partner should have in different types of relationships, morally relevant features, such
as trustworthiness, are most important (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). This makes sense because
a person’s character is used to infer their intentions toward us and whether they would help or
hinder our goals (Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016). Indeed, people use information about moral
character to decide who to interact and cooperate with (Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett,
2018; Martin & Cushman, 2015; van der Lee, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Rutjens, 2017).
Despite the importance of moral character in person perception, some have argued that
character does not exist and that people do not have stable moral dispositions  (Doris, 2002;
Harman, 2003). Social psychologists and philosophers have used classic findings from social
psychology, such as the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 1968) or the
good Samaritan experiment (Darley & Batson, 1973), to argue against the existence of moral
character and that moral behavior is determined wholly by the situation (Doris, 2002; Harman,
2003). One way to determine whether people behave similarly across situations is to examine
agreement between independent observers. Because different observers are likely to interact with
the target in different situations, if they agree in their evaluations, it then suggests there is a
stable disposition that is being observed (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). So, if independent observers
have similar perceptions of targets’ moral character, then it provides some evidence for the
existence of moral character.
People generally agree on who does, and does not, have moral character. Self-report and
informant ratings of morally-relevant traits, such as honesty or guilt-proneness, moderately
correlate (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2013). Independent observers also agree on
global evaluations of moral character, as well as specific moral traits and trait profiles. (Helzer et
al., 2014). And people agree on morally relevant traits displayed by respected cultural figures,
even across the US political divide (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013). Again, this
agreement is used as evidence that moral character exists.
Like much of behavioral and social science research, samples in studies of moral
psychology have largely been drawn from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic—or WEIRD—societies (Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 2019;
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Despite this, the importance of moral character in identity
and person perception is theorized to be universal (Strohminger, Knobe, & Newman, 2017).
Most often, when moral psychology is examined in other cultures, the emphasis is on the content
of moral norms and the shared or unique prescriptions and prohibitions across cultures (Curry,
Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Purzycki et al., 2018). Yet, when
research has looked at processes in moral judgments, important differences have been found. For
example, whether a wrong is done intentionally is an important distinction in moral judgments
among Western populations, presumably because it reveals information about moral character
(Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). However, unintentional violations are judged as wrong as intentional
violations in some cultures, including the Hadza and South Pacific islanders (Barrett et al., 2016;
McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2019). To our knowledge, no research has been
conducted on perceptions of moral character in small-scale societies.
There are reasons to suspect important differences in moral character and its perception
in small-scale societies. First, there is some evidence for less personality variation in non
WEIRD societies. For example, personality traits in the Tsimané forager-horticulturalists of
Bolivia do not cluster into five distinct factors, but rather two, and there is less variation within
those factors compared to Western samples (Gurven, von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Vie,
2013). And in fact, across 55 nations, populations with fewer economic opportunities to
specialize have less variation in personality traits (Lukaszewski, Gurven, von Rueden, &
Schmitt, 2017). To the extent that there is a relationship between personality traits and moral
character (Thalmayer, Saucier, Srivastava, Flournoy, & Costello, 2019), we might then similarly
expect less variation in morally-relevant character traits. Second, there is no evidence for
generous dispositions in small-scale societies. In longitudinal data among the Hadza,
contributions to a public good game were not predicted by previous contributions, but rather the
contributions of an individual’s campmates (Smith, Larroucau, Mabulla, & Apicella, 2018).
Here, strong, local norms governing generosity may be reducing individual variation in morally
relevant behavior leading to a lack of agreement on perceptions of moral character.
In the current study, we examine perceptions of moral character among the Hadza of
Tanzania, one of the last remaining hunter-gatherer groups in the world. The Hadza are an ideal
population because they live in small groups of known individuals where behavior is observable,
and because of their harsh environment, knowing who is moral would be seemingly important.
We examine agreement on these perceptions in two ways. First, do Hadza agree on who has
moral character? And second, do Hadza agree on what traits contribute to global moral
character? To answer these questions, we ask the Hadza to rank their campmates on moral
character, as well as specific traits of hard work, generosity, and honesty. We examine the
consensus within each camp on rank orderings for each trait to answer the first question. We
examine the relationship between the specific traits and global character rankings and the
variation between Hadza on the importance of the specific traits in determining global character
to answer the second question.


Discussion

 In WEIRD societies, people evaluate the moral character of others and use those
perceptions to decide with whom to interact. Underscoring the importance of character in these
populations, independent observers agree on how moral others are (Helzer et al., 2014). But is
this universal? To answer this, we asked if Hadza hunter-gatherers agree on who is moral and
what traits make someone moral. The Hadza disagree on which of their campmates have a good
heart, are generous, and are honest, and agree more on which campmates are hard working
(effort) and produce the most food (hunting ability). At the level of the population, hard work,
generosity, and honesty contribute to global character; however, there is variation between
Hadza judges on how much honesty contributes to global character, though judges agree more on
how much hard work and generosity contribute to character. Overall, these results suggest that
Hadza use some of the same criteria—hard work and generosity—for evaluating moral character,
but disagree on who displays those traits, leading to disagreement on global character
perceptions. 
 Agreement between independent observers on ratings about a trait is taken as evidence
for that trait existing because raters are likely observing the same behaviors despite being in
different situations (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). The disagreement between Hadza judges on
character traits suggests that Hadza do not have moral dispositions. However, disagreement does
not definitively rule out the existence of moral character. For example, the Hadza may have been
unwilling to make assessments about their campmates’ character, though notably we do see
agreement on hunting ability, which is highly valued in the Hadza. Or there could be
disagreement because there are not many opportunities to display moral behavior; however, it
should be easy to observe moral behavior because they live together in small groups and depend
on each other for survival.
 One alternative interpretation of the data is that the Hadza can agree on moral character,
and in fact they do have moral dispositions, but that our measure is unreliable and cannot detect
agreement. A good measure measuring a phenomenon that does not exist and a bad measure
measuring a phenomenon that does exist will produce the same result: noise. However, we argue
there are two reasons to suspect that our measure would be reliable enough to detect agreement
on moral character if it existed. First, we were able to detect moderate relationships between the
specific character traits and moral character, indicating reliability was not so low as to be unable
to detect any effects. Second, we did find moderate agreement on hard work and hunting ability.
And in fact, given what we know about the noisy relationship between hunting returns and
hunting reputation (Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018), the fact that we were able to detect agreement
suggests low reliability can not fully explain the disagreement in perceptions of moral character. 
 It may seem that hunting ability would be easily observable, but in the anthropological
literature, this is notoriously difficult to measure, and because of this hunting reputation is
criticized as a measure of hunting success (Hill & Kintigh, 2009). First, hunting ability is rarely
directly observed, as most hunting happens alone. And second, there is high variance in hunting
returns, in which men return to camp with nothing on most days, but occasionally (about 3% of
days) bring in large game (Hawkes, O’Connell, & Blurton-Jones, 1991). In fact, for
anthropologists to reliably estimate hunting ability using hunting returns, they need 200 to 600
days of observations (Hill & Kintigh, 2009). Despite this, in our study and others (Stibbard
Hawkes et al., 2018), the Hadza are able to agree on who the best hunters are, and hunting
reputation does relate to proxies of actual hunting ability, such as strength, accuracy, and
ecological knowledge (Apicella, 2014; Stibbard-Hawkes et al., 2018). This suggests that if there
are moral dispositions among the Hadza, the signal is much weaker than that of hunting ability,
which is itself a noisy signal (Stibbard-Hawkes, 2019). And in fact, if it is this hard to detect
moral dispositions, it then raises the question of whether the Hadza can reliably determine
character enough to provide useful social information.
 Data measuring morally-relevant behavior, such as generosity, further suggest a lack of
moral dispositions in the Hadza and other non-WEIRD populations. In a longitudinal study, a
Hadza’s previous generosity in an economic game did not predict their subsequent contributions,
and instead the only significant predictor was how much his or her campmates contribute (Smith
et al., 2018). And in a small study (n = 12) of the Tsimané of Bolivia, generosity in a dictator
game in one year did not predict generosity in a later year (Gurven, 2014).  
 These results further support recent research finding that character and moral reputation
do not play a role in Hadza campmate preferences. When asked who they prefer to live with,
Hadza do not choose the most generous people, whether generosity is measured using an
economic game (Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler, & Christakis, 2012) or via reputation (Smith &
Apicella, 2019). Rather, Hadza prefer to live with better hunters (Smith & Apicella, 2019; Wood,
2006). If moral behavior changes across time and situations as our results here suggest, then
choosing campmates based on their current behavior is useless. Instead, traits related to
productivity, such as being a hard worker or a good hunter, may become more important in
campmate preferences (Barclay, 2016); if everyone is expected to share because of strong norms,
such as in the Hadza, then choosing productive campmates is more important. And in fact, a
preference for productive partners may influence friendships in Western societies. People prefer
partners in economic games and are more generous to partners who are perceived to be more
productive, even though it is irrelevant to the game (Eisenbruch, Grillot, Maestripieri, & Roney,
2016; Eisenbruch & Roney, 2017). The effect of a productivity preference in various
relationships may be a fruitful area for future research. 
 Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the situationist paradigm in social
psychology casted doubt on the existence of moral character. However, more recent research in
moral psychology has argued that moral character does in fact exist (Fleeson, Furr,
Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014). In Western societies, people agree on who is moral
(Helzer et al., 2014), and perceptions of moral character play an important role in social
cognition (Goodwin, 2015; Landy & Uhlmann, 2018). Our results here question the universality
of moral character and its centrality in social life, and highlights the importance of cross-cultural
research using underrepresented samples. By conducting research with populations in a variety
of socio-ecologies, we can better understand the variation in our moral psychology.