Monday, December 19, 2022

Our findings suggest though that liberals view emotion as a feature of rationality while conservatives view it as a bug

Do liberals value emotion more than conservatives? Political partisanship and Lay beliefs about the functionality of emotion. Minyoung Choi, Melissa M. Karnaze, Heather C. Lench & Linda J. Levine. Motivation and Emotion, Dec 19 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11031-022-09997-4

Abstract: Relying on feelings to guide thoughts and plans may be functional from the perspective of the individual but threaten the cohesion of social groups. Thus, liberals, who prioritize caring and fairness for individuals, may view emotion as more functional than do conservatives, who prioritize preserving social groups, hierarchies, and institutions. To test this, participants in three studies (total N = 1,355) rated political partisanship, beliefs about the functionality of emotion, and well-being. Study 3 also assessed how much participants prioritized “individualizing” versus “socially binding” values (Graham et al., 2011). Across all studies, the more liberal participants were, the more they viewed emotion as functional, despite reporting less emotional well-being. In Study 3, the link between liberalism and valuing emotion was mediated by more liberal participants’ greater endorsement of individualizing than socially binding values. These results suggest that emotion is viewed as more functional by those who prioritize the needs of individuals, but as less functional by those who prioritize the cohesion of social groups.

General discussion

As the gap between liberals and conservatives widens to a chasm, and each group accuses the other of being either heartless or bleeding hearts, it becomes critically important to understand partisan perspectives on emotion. This investigation examined the relation between people’s political orientation and their beliefs about the functionality of emotion. The results across three studies were strikingly similar. The more liberal participants were, the more they viewed emotion as functional despite also reporting less well-being. In Study 3, the link between liberal partisanship and viewing emotion as functional was mediated by liberals’ greater endorsement of “individualizing” than “socially binding” moral values. These findings suggest that emotion is viewed as more functional by those who prioritize the needs of individuals, and as less functional by those who prioritize the cohesion of social groups.

Liberals value emotion more than conservatives

Powerful emotion, and appeals for greater rationality, are prevalent on both sides of the political continuum (Finkel et al., 2020; Frimer et al., 2019). Our findings suggest though that liberals view emotion as a feature of rationality while conservatives view it as a bug. Across three studies, liberals viewed emotion as more functional than conservatives – that is, as a healthy source of information about the self that provides direction in life rather than as a weakness and a waste of time. This link between liberalism and viewing emotion as functional remained after taking into account participants’ gender (in all studies) and religiosity (assessed in Studies 1 and 2). In Study 1, participants also reported the intensity with which they typically experience emotion and how they regulate emotion. The more liberal participants were, the more they reported experiencing intense emotion and the less they reported suppressing the expression of emotion. Further, viewing emotion as more functional mediated the association between liberal partisanship and reports of experiencing more intense emotion and engaging in less suppression. Thus, beliefs about the functionality of emotion may help to explain why people who are more liberal value emotional expressiveness more (Matsumoto et al., 2008), whereas people who endorse conservative policies are more motivated to avoid emotion (Leone & Chirumbolo, 2008).

Social values explained the Link between partisanship and Lay beliefs about emotion

In Study 3, we investigated whether participants’ social values explained the association between liberal partisanship and valuing emotion. Emotions provide information and guide action in a manner that is often functional for attaining the goals of the individual (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Scherer, 2019). However, relying on personal feelings to guide thoughts and plans may disrupt the harmonious functioning of social groups which include individuals with disparate goals (Mooijman et al., 2018). Thus, we expected participants who were primarily concerned with the needs of individuals to view emotion as more functional than those who were more attuned to the needs of social groups. We tested this by examining participants’ responses to the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011).

Consistent with prior research, when judging actions as right or wrong, the more liberal participants were, the higher they scored on progressivism (Graham et al., 20092011). That is, more liberal participants prioritized the “individualizing” moral foundations of caring and fairness, which address the needs of individuals, to a greater extent than the “binding” moral foundations of loyalty, authority, and sanctity, which help to maintain the cohesion of social groups. As expected, the link between liberalism and viewing emotion as functional was mediated by liberals’ greater endorsement of individualizing than binding social values. Thus, prioritizing the needs of individuals more than the cohesion of social groups helped explain the association between liberal partisanship and viewing emotion as more functional.

Openness to experience and well-being

We also assessed whether participants’ openness to experience (Study 1) or well-being (all three studies) could account for the link between liberal partisanship and viewing emotion as more functional. In Study 1, participants who were more open to experience viewed emotion as more functional. However, in contrast to past research (e.g., Desimoni & Leone, 2014; Sibley et al., 2012), openness to experience was not associated with political partisanship in our sample. Thus, this personality trait did not explain the association between partisanship and beliefs about emotion. Study 1 included relatively few conservative participants, so we interpret this finding with caution. Future research sampling a broader range of political partisanship should examine whether conservatives’ preference for stability and certainty over novelty and ambiguity contributes their view of emotion as less functional.

With respect to well-being, past research shows that feeling threatened and anxious can lead people to endorse more conservative views (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Oxley et al., 2008). We found that participants who reported less well-being viewed emotion as less functional (Karnaze & Levine, 20182020; Luong et al., 2016). But the link found between conservatism and viewing emotion as less functional was not explained by poorer well-being. In all three studies, more conservative participants viewed emotion as less functional despite reporting greater well-being. In summary, participants’ social values, but not their openness to experience or well-being, helped explain the association between liberal partisanship and viewing emotion as more functional.

Emotional responses to specific events

Finally, we explored whether participants’ beliefs about the functionality of emotion explained associations between partisanship and emotional responses to specific events. In Study 2, we assessed participants’ emotional responses to a personal experience of success or failure – receiving a favorable or unfavorable grade on an exam. After adjusting for the appraised importance of their grade and the specific letter grade received, participants’ feelings about their grades were not related to political partisanship. Irrespective of partisanship, those who viewed emotion as more functional felt happier about getting the grade they expected or higher. Emotion beliefs were not related to the unhappiness participants felt about receiving a grade that was lower than expected. In Study 3, we assessed participants’ emotional responses to a political experience of success or failure – Biden’s victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. After adjusting for how important the election outcome was for participants, and how much they agreed that Biden’s election was good for the country, partisanship did not predict how happy participants felt about Biden’s victory, but more conservative participants reported more anger and fear. Participants’ beliefs about the functionality of emotion were not related to the intensity of happiness, anger, or fear they reported.

In summary, our findings with respect to partisan differences in emotional experience were mixed. On one hand, as noted above, viewing emotion as functional explained more liberal participants’ reports of generally experiencing more intense emotion and engaging in less expressive suppression. On the other hand, when participants reported their actual emotional responses to specific events, we found few associations between emotional experience and partisanship after accounting for their appraisals of those events. The one partisan association found – between conservatism and greater anger and fear about Biden’s victory – was not related to beliefs about the functionality of emotion. Overall, these findings were in keeping with past research showing that group differences in emotion values (e.g., differences in the emotions people ideally want to feel) are more pronounced and consistent than group differences in people’s actual feelings in response to concrete day-to-day events (Tsai et al., 2006).

Limitations and directions for Future Research

This investigation extended the emerging literature on lay beliefs about emotion to address an increasingly contentious and defining feature of people’s identity – political partisanship. Our findings suggest that prioritizing the needs of individuals over those of social institutions contributes to the association between liberal partisanship and the belief that emotions are functional. A limitation of this investigation, however, is that the causal direction of the relationship between partisanship and beliefs about emotion cannot be determined from correlational data. Future research could assess if experimentally manipulating whether people prioritize the needs of individuals over groups increases the value they place on the directive and expressive functions of emotion.

A second limitation is that factors in addition to social values may contribute to partisan differences in valuing emotion. For example, children’s early experiences shape both their political orientation and their attitudes about emotion. Children tend to adopt their parents’ political ideology (Boshier & Thom, 1973) and, when it comes to responding to children’s emotions, the parenting philosophies and practices of liberals and conservatives differ. Liberal parents encourage children to identify and communicate emotions rather than suppress them (Friedlmeier et al., 2011). What liberals consider to be sensitive and responsive emotion coaching, conservatives consider irresponsibly indulgent (Schreiber et al., 2013). Future research should explore how these parenting approaches shape liberals’ and conservatives’ differing beliefs about the value of emotion.

A third limitation is that, Studies 2 and 3 used the most common unidimensional measure of U.S. political partisanship which ranges from strongly conservative to strongly liberal. A recent meta-analysis showed that the association between moral progressivism (that is, individualist vs. binding values) and political partisanship is stronger for social than economic political orientation, varies modestly across countries with different political histories, and even varies across U.S. demographic and political groups (Kivikangas et al., 2021). For example, when libertarians make more decisions, they rely less on emotion, less on all five moral foundations, and more on considerations of individual freedom, than both liberals and conservatives (Iyer et al., 2012). Thus, extending the research beyond a unidimensional measure of partisanship, and to demographic groups from non-university samples, may yield further insights about the generalizability of the findings and the relations among political orientation, social values, and beliefs about the functionality of emotion.

Finally, participants in our studies may have interpreted questions about the functionality of emotion as referring to individuals’ emotional responses to events that impact their personal goals. Future research should examine whether conservatives value emotions as much or more than liberals when emotions are experienced and expressed on behalf of their social groups and institutions. For example, compared to liberals, conservatives may place greater value on feelings of pride toward family, community, and country, and anger toward perceived threats to these institutions (Porat et al., 2016). Compared to both liberals and conservatives, libertarians may value pride in individual achievement and anger about infringements on individual autonomy (Iyer et al., 2012).

Human capacity for emotional experiences of pleasure and pain spans an incredibly wide range of intensity, a minimum of two orders of magnitude between the most mild and the most intense experiences

Gómez-Emilsson, Andrés, and Chris Percy. 2022. “The Heavy-tailed Valence Hypothesis: The Human Capacity for Vast Variation in Pleasure/pain and How to Test It.” PsyArXiv. December 19. psyarxiv.com/krysx

Abstract: This paper proposes the "Heavy-Tailed Valence” (HTV) hypothesis: the notion that human capacity for emotional experiences of pleasure and pain spans an incredibly wide range of intensity, a minimum of two orders of magnitude between the most mild and the most intense experiences. We set out a thought experiment, the "integer experiment test", to demonstrate that such a capacity is not arbitrary: a wide range could not simply be mapped onto a narrow range without losing something tangible.

In directional support of the hypothesis, we discuss three stylized facts, based on heavy-tailed neurological functions, the application of pain/discomfort scales, and the existence of extreme events. We also present five intuitions against the hypothesis and suggest reasons to reject these counter-intuitions. Recognizing this theoretical ambiguity, we turn to specifying additional assumptions under which the hypothesis results in testable empirical claims.

A pilot survey (n=97) investigated how people describe their most intense experiences, finding tentative support for the hypothesis in preparation for a larger survey revised based on insights from the pilot. Over half said their most intense painful experience was at least three times more intense than the second most intense. Simulations further suggest an underlying heavy-tailed distribution of experience valences is more consistent with the survey responses. The results also raise doubts over the cardinal interpretation at the high end of 0-10 scales for pleasure or pain, with over 80% of respondents appearing to compress experienced intensity in order to report high values.

Finally, we discuss how a larger future survey could mitigate the limitations in the pilot study and discuss potential implications of the hypothesis for wellbeing economics, ethics, and personal life choices.