Friday, March 29, 2019

Religious people believe that engaging in religious behaviors and believing in God boosts one’s morality

Ward, S. J., & King, L. A. (2019). Moral stereotypes, moral self-image, and religiosity. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, Mar 2019.

Abstract: The precise mechanisms that account for the positive association between religion and self-reports of morality are uncertain. Three studies examined whether the association between religiosity and moral self-image was explained by perceptions of the morality of one’s religious ingroup, beliefs that one needs religion to be moral, and impression management. In Study 1 (N = 284), perceptions of the morality one’s religious ingroup, impression management, the perceived desirability of moral traits, and self-reported prosocial behaviors all independently partially explained the religiosity-moral self-image link. Study 2 (N = 593) demonstrated that religious people believe that engaging in religious behaviors and believing in God boosts one’s morality. Study 3 (N = 790) demonstrated that the association between religiosity and moral self-image was partially explained by impression management and perceptions of the morality of one’s religious ingroup. These studies demonstrated a consistent association between religiosity and moral self-image, which was explained by both the perceived morality of one’s religious ingroup and impression management.

Authors propose a new cooperation-based theory of morality; use game theory to identify seven types of cooperation, and seven types of morality; develop and validate a new self-report measure of moral values: Morality-as-cooperation

Mapping morality with a compass: Testing the theory of ‘morality-as-cooperation’ with a new questionnaire. Oliver Scott Curry, Matthew Jones Chesters, Caspar J.Van Lissa. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 78, February 2019, Pages 106-124.

•    Proposes a new cooperation-based theory of morality.
•    Uses game theory to identify seven types of cooperation, and seven types of morality.
•    Develops and validates a new self-report measure of moral values.

Abstract: Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. MAC uses game theory to identify distinct types of cooperation, and predicts that each will be considered morally relevant, and each will give rise to a distinct moral domain. Here we test MAC's predictions by developing a new self-report measure of morality, the Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire (MAC-Q), and comparing its psychometric properties to those of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Over four studies, the results support the MAC-Q's seven-factor model of morality, but not the MFQ's five-factor model. Thus MAC emerges as the best available compass with which to explore the moral landscape.

Check also this meta-analysis of effects of helping on the happiness of the helper: The overall effect of kindness on well-being is small-to-medium:
Happy to help? A systematic review and meta-analysis of the effects of performing acts of kindness on the well-being of the actor. Oliver Scott Curry et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,

1. Introduction

What is morality? What explains its content and structure? And how is it best measured? In recent years, the study of morality has become the focus of a thriving interdisciplinary endeavour, encompassing research not only in psychology, but also in evolutionary theory, genetics, biology, animal behaviour, anthropology, neuroscience and economics (Haidt, 2007, Shackelford and Hansen, 2016, Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007). A common view in this body of work is that the function of morality is to promote cooperation (Curry, 2016, Greene, 2015:40; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010:800; Rai & Fiske, 2011:59; Sterelny & Fraser, 2016:1; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013:231).1
However, previous cooperative accounts of morality have not made full use of the mathematical analysis of cooperation – the theory of nonzerosum games – to provide a systematic taxonomy of cooperation. They have instead tended to focus on a relatively narrow range of cooperative behaviours (typically kin altruism and reciprocal altruism), and omitted others (for example, coordination and conflict resolution) (Table 4 in Curry, 2016). Thus, previous accounts have attempted to explain morality from an unnecessarily restricted base, and missed the opportunity to furnish a broader, more general theory of morality.
The present paper has two goals. First, we use nonzerosum game theory to provide the rigorous, systematic foundation that the cooperative approach to morality has previously lacked. We show how this rich, principled explanatory framework – which we call ‘Morality-as-Cooperation’ (MAC; Curry, 2016, Curry et al., 2019) – incorporates more types of cooperation, and thus explains more types of morality, than previous approaches. The current version of the theory incorporates seven well-established types of cooperation: (1) the allocation of resources to kin (Hamilton, 1963); (2) coordination to mutual advantage (Lewis, 1969); (3) social exchange (Trivers, 1971); and conflict resolution through contests featuring displays of (4) hawkish and (5) dove-ish traits (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973); (6) division (Skyrms, 1996); and (7) possession (Gintis, 2007).
Second, we test MAC’s prediction that each of these types of cooperation will be considered morally relevant, and each will give rise to a distinct moral domain, by developing a new self-report measure of moral values – with facets dedicated to (1) family values, (2) group loyalty, (3) reciprocity, (4) bravery, (5) respect, (6) fairness and (7) property rights – and examine its psychometric properties.

2. How cooperation explains morality

The theory of Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) argues that morality consists of a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life (Curry, 2016). Below we review the general argument, before looking at how specific types of cooperation explain corresponding types of morality.
Life begins when molecules start making copies of themselves. These ‘replicators’ are ‘selfish’ in the technical sense that they promote their own replication (Dawkins, 1976/2006). They can promote their replication at the expense of other replicators. These competitive interactions have a winner and a loser; one’s gain is another’s loss; they are zerosum games (Maynard Smith, 1982, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). But replicators can also replicate in concert with other replicators (Dawkins, 1998). These cooperative interactions can have two winners; they are win-win situations; they are nonzerosum games. Natural selection can favour genes for cooperation – that is, genes for evolutionarily-stable phenotypic strategies designed to achieve superior equilibria in nonzerosum interactions – and has done throughout the history of life. Natural selection for genes that employ cooperative strategies has driven several ‘major transitions’ in the evolution of life on Earth, including the formation of cells, chromosomes and multicellular organisms (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995). Natural selection has also favoured genes for cooperation between individuals, in a wide variety of species (Dugatkin, 1997), including humans. Humans descend from a long line of social primates; they have spent 50 million years living in social groups (Shultz, Opie, & Atkinson, 2011), and two million years making a living as intensely collaborative hunter-gatherers (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). This has equipped humans with a range of biological – including psychological – adaptations for cooperation. These adaptations can be seen as natural selection’s ‘attempts’ to solve the problems of cooperation. More recently, improvisational intelligence and cultural transmission (Boyd et al., 2011, Pinker, 2010) have made it possible for humans to attempt to improve upon natural selection’s solutions by inventing evolutionarily-novel solutions – ‘tools and rules’ – for further bolstering cooperation (Binmore, 1994a, Binmore, 1994b, Hammerstein, 2003, Nagel, 1991, Popper, 1945). Together, these biological and cultural mechanisms provide the motivation for social, cooperative and altruistic behaviour; and they provide the criteria by which individuals evaluate the behaviour of others. According to MAC, it is precisely these solutions to problems of cooperation – this collection of instincts, intuitions, inventions and institutions – that constitute human morality (Curry, 2005, Davies et al., 2014).2
Which problems of cooperation do humans face? And how are they solved? Evolutionary biology and game theory tell us that there is not just one problem of cooperation but many, with many different functionally, and perhaps phenotypically, distinct solutions (Lehmann and Keller, 2006, Nunn and Lewis, 2001, Robinson and Goforth, 2005, Sachs et al., 2004). Our review of this literature suggests that there are (at least) seven well-established types of cooperation: (1) the allocation of resources to kin; (2) coordination to mutual advantage; (3) social exchange; and conflict resolution through contests featuring (4) hawkish displays of dominance and (5) dove-ish displays of submission; (6) division of disputed resources; and (7) recognition of possession. We briefly review each of these below, and we consider how each type of cooperation provides an explanation for a corresponding type of morality (Table 1).
Table 1. Overview of morality-as-cooperation.

1FamilyKin selectionKin AltruismDuty of care, special obligations to kinIncest, neglectBlood is thicker than water
2GroupCoordinationMutualismLoyalty, unity, solidarity, conformityBetrayal, treasonUnited we stand, divided we fall
3ReciprocitySocial DilemmaReciprocal AltruismReciprocity, trustworthiness, forgivenessCheating, ingratitudeOne good turn deserves another
4HeroismConflict Resolution (Contest)Hawkish DisplaysBravery, fortitude, largesseCowardice, miserlinessWith great power comes great responsibility
5DeferenceConflict Resolution (Contest)Dove-ish DisplaysRespect, obedience, humilityDisrespect, hubrisBlessed are the meek
6FairnessConflict Resolution (Bargaining)DivisionFairness, impartiality, equalityUnfairness, favouritismLet’s meet in the middle
7PropertyConflict Resolution (Possession)OwnershipRespect for property, property rightsTheft, trespassPossession in nine-tenths of the law

2.1. Allocation of resources to kin (Family Values)

Genes that benefit replicas of themselves that reside in other individuals – that is, genetic relatives – will be favoured by natural selection if the cost of helping is outweighed by the benefit to the recipient gene(s) (Dawkins, 1979, Hamilton, 1963). So, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that under some conditions organisms will possess adaptations for detecting and delivering benefits (or avoiding doing harm) to kin. This theory of kin selection explains many instances of altruism, in many species (Gardner & West, 2014), including humans (Kurland and Gaulin, 2005, Lieberman et al., 2007). MAC predicts that because strategies for kin altruism realise a mutual benefit, they will be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why caring for offspring (Edel & Edel, 1959/1968; an ‘ethic of care’; Gilligan, 1982), helping family members (Fukuyama, 1996, Wong, 1984, and avoiding inbreeding (Lieberman et al., 2003, Westermarck, 1994) have been widely regarded as important components of morality.

2.2. Coordination to mutual advantage (Group Loyalty)

In game theory, situations in which individuals are uncertain about how to behave in order to bring about a mutual benefit are modelled as coordination problems (Lewis, 1969). Humans and other animals use a variety of strategies – such as focal points, traditions, leadership, signalling, badges of membership, and ‘theory of mind’ – to solve these problems (Alvard, 2001, Boos et al., 2011, Curry and Jones Chesters, 2012, McElreath et al., 2003), and form stable coalitions and alliances (Balliet et al., 2014, Bissonnette et al., 2015, Harcourt and de Waal, 1992). MAC predicts that because solutions to coordination problems realise mutual benefits, they will be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why participating in collaborative endeavours (Royce, 1908), favouring your own group (Bernhard et al., 2006, Gert, 2013), and adopting local conventions (Gibbard, 1990a, Gibbard, 1990b) have been widely regarded as important components of morality.

2.3. Social exchange (Reciprocity)

In game theory, social dilemmas – prisoners dilemmas, public goods games, tragedies of the commons – arise when the fruits of cooperation are vulnerable to ‘free riders’, who accept the benefit of cooperation, without paying the cost (Ostrom & Walker, 2002). This problem can be overcome by a strategy of ‘conditional cooperation’ or ‘reciprocal altruism’, such as tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1984, Trivers, 1971). Evidence for conditional cooperation has been found in numerous animal species (Carter, 2014), including humans (Cosmides and Tooby, 2005, Henrich et al., 2005, Jaeggi and Gurven, 2013). MAC predicts that because solutions to social dilemmas realise mutual benefits, they will be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why reciprocity in general (Chilton and Neusner, 2009, Confucius, 1994), as well as its various subcomponents – trust (Baier, 1995), patience (Curry, Price, & Price, 2008), gratitude (Emmons, 2004), guilt (Gibbard, 1990b), apology (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009), and forgiveness (Downie, 1965, Godfray, 1992, Richards, 1988) – have been widely regarded as important components of morality.

2.4. Contests between Hawks (Heroism) & 2.5 Doves (Deference)

Conflict over resources – food, territory, and mates (Huntingford & Turner, 1987) – presents organisms with an opportunity to cooperate by competing in less mutually-destructive ways (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). There are three ways of achieving this: contests (featuring the display of hawkish and dove-ish traits), division, and possession.
Game theory has shown that conflicts can be settled through ‘contests’, in which individuals display reliable indicators of their ‘fighting ability’, and the weaker ‘contestant’ defers to the stronger (Gintis et al., 2001, Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). Such contests are widespread in nature (Hardy and Briffa, 2013, Riechert, 1998), and often form the basis of dominance hierarchies where resources are allocated by ‘rank’ (Preuschoft & van Schaik, 2000). Humans have a similar repertoire of status-related behaviours (Fiddick et al., 2013, Mazur, 2005, Sell et al., 2009), and culturally elaborated hierarchies (Boone, 1992, Rubin, 2000). MAC predicts that because hawkish displays of dominance, and dove-ish displays of submission, together realise mutual benefits, they will be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why these two apparently contradictory sets of traits (Berlin, 1997) – the ‘heroic virtues’ of fortitude, bravery, skill, and wit, and the ‘monkish virtues’ of humility, deference, obedience, and respect – have been widely regarded as important components of morality (Curry, 2007, MacIntyre, 1981a, MacIntyre, 1981b).

2.6. Division (Fairness)

When the contested resource is divisible, game theory models the situation as a ‘bargaining problem’ (Nash, 1950). Here, one solution is to divide the resource in proportion to the relative (bargaining) power of the protagonists (Skyrms, 1996). In the case of equally powerful individuals, this results in equal shares (Maynard Smith, 1982). Evidence for a ‘sense of fairness’ comes from non-human primates’ adverse reactions to unequal treatment in economic games (Brosnan, 2013, Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). With regard to humans, rules such as “I cut, you choose”, “meet in the middle”, “split the difference”, and “take turns”, are ancient and widespread means of resolving disputes (Brams & Taylor, 1996). And ‘equal shares’ is a spontaneous and cross-culturally prevalent decision rule in economic games (Henrich et al., 2005) and similar situations (Messick, 1993). MAC predicts that because dividing resources avoids a costly fight, and therefore realises a mutual benefit, it will be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why fairness (Rawls, 1958) and willingness to compromise (Pennock & Chapman, 1979) have been widely regarded as important components of morality.

2.7. Possession (Property Rights)

Finally, game theory shows that conflicts over resources can be resolved by deference to prior possession (Gintis, 2007, Hare et al., 2016, Maynard Smith, 1982). The recognition of prior possession is widespread in nature (Sherratt and Mesterton-Gibbons, 2015, Strassmann and Queller, 2014). Humans also defer to prior possession in vignette studies (DeScioli and Karpoff, 2015, Friedman and Neary, 2008), experimental games (the ‘endowment effect’; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the law (Rose, 1985), and international relations (Johnson & Toft, 2014). Private property, in some form or other, appears to be a cross-cultural universal (Herskovits, 1952). MAC predicts that because deferring to prior possession avoids a costly fight, and therefore realises a mutual benefit, it will be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why the right to own property and the prohibition of theft (Becker, 1977, Locke, 2000, Pennock and Chapman, 1980) have been widely regarded as an important components of morality.

3. Summary and predictions

Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality consists of a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. MAC draws upon the mathematics of cooperation to identify and distinguish between different types of cooperation, and thereby explain different facets of morality. The present review has identified seven types of cooperation, and hence seven candidate moral domains: obligations to family, group loyalty, reciprocity, bravery, respect, fairness, and property rights. Thus MAC can explain why specific forms of cooperative behaviour – helping kin, helping one’s group, reciprocating costs and benefits, displaying ‘hawkish’ and dove-ish traits, dividing disputed resources, and respecting prior possession – are regarded as morally good, and why the corresponding forms of uncooperative behaviour – neglecting kin, betraying one’s group, free-riding, cowardice, disrespect, unfairness and theft – are regarded as morally bad.
Starting from these first principles, MAC makes the following predictions about morality. First, with regard to content, MAC predicts that people will regard each type of cooperation as morally relevant; that is, as falling within the moral domain. Second, with regard to structure, MAC predicts that because the incidence and value of these different types of cooperation vary independently in social life (and are perhaps subserved by different psychological mechanisms) the strength of endorsement of each of the corresponding types of morality will vary independently too. In other words, each of these seven types of cooperation will give rise to a distinct moral domain. Accordingly, the theory predicts that moral values will exhibit a multifactorial structure, varying on these seven dimensions. Moreover, as a corollary of this prediction regarding structure, MAC predicts that behaviour not tied to a specific type of cooperation will not constitute a distinct moral domain. These predictions about the content and structure of morality distinguish MAC from previous evolutionary and cooperative theories of morality.

3.0.1. Moral Foundations Theory

The most widely-used, and thus far most extensive, attempt to map the moral domain is Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt & Graham, 2007) operationalised in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011). Like MAC, MFT takes a cooperative approach to morality, and maintains that there are many moral domains. But, unlike MAC, MFT does not derive its domains from any underlying theory of cooperation (Haidt & Joseph, 2011), and proposes only five: Care, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority and Purity.3 Like MAC, MFT includes domains dedicated to group loyalty (Ingroup), deference (Authority) and fairness (Fairness). But unlike MAC, MFT does not include domains dedicated to family, reciprocity, heroism, or property. MFT has no foundation dedicated to kin altruism; the MFQ does have two items pertaining to kin, but they appear under Fairness and Ingroup. Nor has MFT any foundation dedicated to reciprocal altruism: MFT places reciprocity (a solution to iterated prisoners’ dilemmas) and fairness (a solution to bargaining problems) under the same heading, and the MFQ has no items pertaining to reciprocity. MFT has no foundations, and the MFQ has no items, dedicated to hawkish displays of dominance, such as bravery. And the only mention of property occurs in an item about inheritance under the foundation of Fairness.
MFT also includes domains – Care and Purity – that are not related to a specific type of cooperation, and that MAC therefore predicts will not constitute coherent domains.
MAC predicts that moral psychology will be sensitive to the benefits (care, altruism) and costs (harms) of social interaction — for what is cooperation but a particular configuration of benefits and costs? But, as we have seen, MAC suggests that there are different types of benefits and costs — with different causes and consequences. For example, some ‘harms’, such as murder, are considered morally bad because they violate one or more cooperative principles (they break implicit social contracts against the use of force, and constitute an escalation of conflict, as opposed to its peaceful resolution). Other ‘harms’, such as punishment or self-defence, are considered morally good because they promote cooperation. This perspective suggests that it is a mistake to attempt to analyse benefits and costs in isolation, outside of their cooperative context, by placing them in a separate, generic domain dedicated to care or harm.
‘Purity’, meanwhile, has been described as the avoidance of “people with diseases, parasites [and] waste products” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). It has no explicated connection to cooperation; on the contrary, it is regarded as an “odd corner” of morality precisely because it is not “concerned with how we treat other people” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). By contrast, MAC suggests that the problem of avoiding pathogens (and other disgust-eliciting stimuli) is not a moral problem per se; instead, ‘pure’ or ‘impure’ behaviour is moralised only when it provides benefits, or imposes costs on, others – for example, by putting their health at risk. So, avoiding rotten fruit on a tree is not a moral issue, but coughing in public without covering your mouth is. And, because there are many different ways in which disgusting behaviour might influence others – the problem of avoiding incest is not the same as the problem of avoiding people with poor personal hygiene – MAC suggests that it is a mistake to single out ‘purity’ as a separate, generic domain.

3.0.2. Relational Models Theory

Similarly, like MAC, Fiske’s Relational Models Theory (RMT) takes a cooperative approach to morality, and maintains that there are many moral domains. But, unlike MAC, RMT does not derive its domains from any underlying theory of cooperation, and proposes only four: Unity, Hierarchy, Equality and Proportionality (Fiske and Rai, 2014, Rai and Fiske, 2011).4 Unlike MAC, RMT’s domain of Unity does not distinguish between family and group; Hierarchy does not distinguish between hawkish heroism and dove-ish deference; and Equality and Proportionality do not distinguish between reciprocity and fairness. Interestingly, like MAC, and unlike MFT, RMT argues that there are no distinct domains dedicated to ‘harm' or ‘purity’.5

3.0.3. Theory of Dyadic Morality

Unlike MAC (and MFT and RMT), Gray’s Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM) (Schein & Gray, 2018) does not take a cooperative approach to morality, but instead argues that the function of moral rules is to minimise harm to others (and is therefore a form of utilitarianism). TDM recognises that there may be different “genres” of harm that correspond to MFT’s domains, but argues that all moral violations are processed by general-purpose psychological mechanisms, as opposed to distinct special-purpose mechanisms. Like MAC, and RMT, TDM does not accept MFT’s claim that ‘purity’ is a distinct domain of morality – indeed, TDM has marshalled considerable evidence to suggest that ‘impure’ or disgusting acts are merely a particular form of harmful behaviour (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014).

3.0.4. Side-Taking Theory of Morality

Finally, like MAC, DeScioli and Kurzban’s ‘side-taking’ theory of morality (STTM) agrees that cooperation explains moral behaviour: “evolutionary theories of morality [that] focus on understanding cooperation…do an excellent job of explaining why humans…care for offspring, cooperate in groups, trade favors, communicate honestly, and respect property” (DeScioli, 2016: 23). However, whereas MAC would argue that these cooperative theories also explain why people make and express moral judgements – for example, to decide with whom to cooperate in future (Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016), to warn friends and family of uncooperative individuals, to enhance one’s reputation as trustworthy or heroic (Barclay, 2016), or to recruit allies to prosecute an offender (Petersen, 2013) – STTM argues instead that the sole function of moral judgements is to provide salient focal points around which people coordinate when taking sides in interpersonal conflicts (DeScioli and Kurzban, 2009, DeScioli and Kurzban, 2013). STTM maintains that a wide range of content, including cooperative rules, can fulfil this function.
Thus MAC makes predictions about the content and structure of morality that are more extensive and detailed than those of previous theories. For the remainder of this paper we will focus on testing MAC’s predictions against those of the most well-developed theory – MFT – and return to the implications of our findings for the other theories in the general discussion.
Previous empirical research provides some support for MAC’s predictions about the content and structure of morality.

3.1. The content of morality

With regard to content, an analysis of the historical ethnographic records of 60 societies found that the moral valence of these seven cooperative behaviours was uniformly positive, and that there is evidence for the majority of these cooperative moral values in the majority of cultures, in all regions of the world (Curry et al., 2019). Research on more contemporary populations paints a similar picture. First, a survey of family values involving student samples from 30 countries (Byrne and van de Vijver, 2014, Georgas et al., 2006) and responses to items in the World Values Survey, conducted in over 65 societies (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), indicate that ‘helping kin’ is widely considered to be morally good. Second, responses from internet samples to the Ingroup items in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), and responses from student samples in 20 countries to items from the Schwartz Basic Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992) both indicate that ‘helping your group’ is widely considered to be morally good. Third, endorsement of the norms of positive and negative reciprocity in student samples (Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004), in Britain and Italy (Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003), and responses to some items in the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths in 54 countries (Park et al., 2006, Peterson and Seligman, 2004) and Schwartz’s Values Scale (Schwartz, 1992) indicate that ‘reciprocity’ is widely considered to be morally good. Fourth, investigations into the concept of honour, among students in the US and Turkey (Cross et al., 2014) indicate that various hawkish traits such as bravery are considered to be morally good. Fifth, responses to Authority items in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), and to items from the Schwartz Basic Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992) indicate that ‘respecting superiors’ is widely considered to be morally good. Sixth, responses to items in the Merit Principle Scale in student samples (Davey, Bobocel, Son Hing, & Zanna, 1999) indicate that ‘dividing disputed resources’ is considered to be morally good. And seventh, responses to items in the World Values Survey (reported in Weeden & Kurzban, 2013) indicate that ‘respecting property’ is widely considered to be morally good.
However, previous research has not provided a full test of MAC’s predictions about the content of morality; no previous study has investigated the moral relevance of all seven forms of cooperative behaviour in a single, contemporary, representative sample. Instead, the studies reviewed above have measured different aspects of morality, in different ways; the scales they employ typically measure something other than the moral relevance (or valence) of cooperation (for example, they ask whether a person or a society possesses a particular trait, rather than whether the trait is moral); and the samples they use are typically composed only of students.

3.2. The structure of morality

With regard to structure, no previous research has investigated MAC’s prediction that these seven different types of cooperation will give rise to distinct domains of morality. This is because no previous attempts to map the moral domain – even those that have argued that the function of morality is to promote cooperation – have been guided by the mathematics of cooperation reviewed above, and hence none contain all of the domains predicted by MAC (Curry, 2016).
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, it is possible to ask whether previous work using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) supports MAC’s predictions where the two theories overlap. Here the evidence is mixed. Factor analysis has provided only limited support for MFT’s five-factor model. The original exploratory factor analysis of data collected using the MFQ suggested a two-factor model (Table 2 in Graham et al., 2011). Confirmatory factor analysis of this data suggested that MFT’s five-factor model provided a better fit; but the size of the improvement was marginal, and more importantly, none of the resulting five-factor models exhibited a conventionally ‘acceptable’ model fit (CFIs ≤ 0.88; Table 10; Graham et al., 2011). Subsequent independent replications in Italy (CFI = 0.88; Bobbio, Nencini, & Sarrica, 2011), New Zealand (CFI = 0.83; Davies, Sibley, & Liu, 2014), Korea (CFI = 0.68; Glover et al., 2014), Sweden (CFI = 0.68; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015), and Turkey (CFI = 0.78; Yilmaz, Harma, Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016), as well as a 27 country study using the short-form MFQ (CFIs ≤ 0.70; Iurino & Saucier, submitted), all suggest a similar pattern. For this reason, an alternative two-factor model – consisting of an ‘individualising’ domain of Care and Fairness, and the ‘binding’ domain of Ingroup, Authority and Purity – is typically used in research (for example, see: Lewis and Bates, 2010, Smith et al., 2016).
Thus empirical research with the MFQ does not support MAC’s prediction that group, deference and fairness will be distinct domains; but it does support MAC’s prediction that domains not tied to specific forms of cooperation – namely Care and Purity – will not constitute distinct domains.
However, it is not clear whether these findings indicate a problem with the cooperative approach to morality in general, or merely a problem with the way that it has been operationalised and measured in Moral Foundations Theory and the MFQ. After all, proponents of MFT have acknowledged that the original list of foundations was somewhat “arbitrary” (p. 107), based on a limited review of only “five books and articles” (p. 107); that this list was never meant to be “exhaustive” (p. 104); and that they “do not know how many moral foundations there really are” (p. 58). And they have positively encouraged research that could “demonstrate the existence of an additional foundation, or show that any of the current five foundations should be merged or eliminated” (Graham et al., 2013, p. 99).
And so, in order to test MAC’s predictions – that there will be three additional domains (Family, Heroism, Property), that Reciprocity should not be merged with Fairness; and that Care and Purity should be eliminated – and to overcome the limitations of MFT and the MFQ, we set out to develop a new measure of morality, the ‘Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire’.6

[...][Methods, studies]

8. General discussion

Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality consists of a collection of solutions to recurrent problems of cooperation. Here we have shown how the mathematics of cooperation – derived from evolutionary biology and nonzero sum game theory – can be used to develop this theory; and by identifying seven candidate types of cooperative behaviour, we have extended the theory to incorporate and explain more aspects of morality than previous cooperative accounts.
We have also tested MAC’s predictions regarding the content and structure of morality, over the course of four studies. Regarding content, the results support the prediction that all seven types of cooperative behaviours – helping kin, helping one’s group, reciprocating costs and benefits, displaying ‘hawkish’ and dove-ish traits, dividing disputed resources, and respecting prior possession – will be considered relevant to morality. And regarding structure, the results support the prediction that there will be distinct moral domains dedicated to family, groups, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property. In this way, MAC goes beyond previous theories of morality, including MFT, to identify for the first time novel moral domains of morality relating to family, reciprocity, heroism and property.
More specifically, the results support MAC’s claim that (contrary to RMT) ‘family' can be distinguished from ‘group’, and (contrary to MFT and RMT) ‘reciprocity’ can be distinguished from ‘fairness’. And the results support MAC’s prediction that behaviour not tied to specific forms of cooperation (‘care’ and ‘purity’) will not form distinct moral domains (consistent with RMT, and RMT and TDM, respectively).
These studies have also produced a new scale for the measurement of morality – the MAC-Q – that exhibits broader and more detailed coverage than, and superior psychometric properties to, the previous leading scale. The results also question the routine combination of Relevance and Judgement scales. As originally anticipated (Graham et al., 2009), the Relevance and Judgement scales seem to measure somewhat disparate aspects of morality. Across three studies, we found consistent evidence indicating that Relevance and Judgement items should not be combined into a common scale without accounting for their differences. Until the reasons for this discrepancy between moral relevance and judgement is understood, we recommend either combining the measures using a MTMM model, as described above, or using one or both scales separately.

8.1. Limitations and future directions

First, the present study tested the general theory of MAC with respect to seven specific types of cooperation. Future research search should test the theory more widely still, using additional examples of cooperative behaviour. These might include ‘subcomponents’ of the types of cooperation discussed here; for example, ‘social exchange’ involves not just reciprocity, but also trust, gratitude, guilt, apology and forgiveness. Or it might include novel types of cooperation yet to be discovered or adumbrated by game theory and the behavioural sciences. Such research could extend MAC to other, as yet poorly understood, aspects of morality.
Second, the present study found that even though ‘care' and ‘purity' did not reliably emerge as unitary domains, the items they contained were nevertheless rated as relevant to morality. Future research should aim to explain why. Perhaps, as MAC suggests, these constructs reflect the operation of proximate mechanisms, such as sympathy and disgust, that contribute to the solution of multiple distinct problems of cooperation.15
Third, the present study has successfully ‘isolated’ seven different types of morality. Future research should investigate how they interact. For example, MAC predicts that having to choose between alternative, incompatible cooperative courses of action will give rise to moral dilemmas. Should you tend to your ailing mother, or go off to fight for your country (Sartre, 1946/1973)? MAC also predicts that when one cooperative opportunity is pursued at the expense of some larger more valuable opportunity (‘the greater good’), the former will be regarded as (relatively) morally bad (Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi, & Henrich, 2017). And MAC suggests that these seven first-order ‘moral elements’ may combine to form 21  second-order ‘moral molecules’ (and 35 third-order molecules, and so on). For example, Family and Deference may combine to form Filial Piety (Nichols, 2013). Investigating how dilemmas arise and are resolved, and how higher-order concepts emerge, could extend the explanatory scope of the theory further still.
Fourth, the present study has looked for invariant aspects of morality, in two English-speaking Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic cultures (W.E.I.R.D; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Future research should test this factor-structure in a wider range of languages and cultures, and investigate how morality varies between individuals, within and between cultures – especially, whether moral values reflect the value of different types of cooperation under different social conditions.
Fifth, reviewing the final set of items, we note the possibility that some may be less-than-optimally phrased. For example, it’s possible that questions that use comparative (“there should be more X”), superlative (“Y is the most admirable trait”) or extreme (“you should always do Z”) terms may be somewhat ambiguous, and hence difficult to interpret. Participants may value X, but disagree with the item because they think there is enough of it; they may admire Y, but disagree with because they think it is the second most important trait; or they may endorse X, but disagree because they can conceive of plausible exceptions. This applies to MAC-Q items like “Society should do more to honour its heroes”, “Courage in the face of adversity is the most admirable trait”, and “You should always be loyal to your family”, as well as MFQ items like “It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself”, “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue”, “It can never be right to kill a human being”. Future research should experiment with simpler positive language, being mindful of the ceiling and floor effects that ‘milder' items may produce. We also note that the MAC-Q Heroism item “To be willing to lay down your life for your country is the height of bravery” introduces a possible confound with Mutualism, and should be avoided in future. In addition, we note that the Division items focus on the simplest form of fairness: equality. Future research should aim to explore other more nuanced expressions of fairness, such as proportionality or merit, which can lead to unequal outcomes (Starmans, Sheskin, & Bloom, 2017). Lastly, the item selection procedure delivered reversed Judgement items for Property, and for Property only, which may have introduced a confound in the valence of the items. Future work should investigate this, and if necessary correct it. Generally speaking, future research should aim to replicate the present findings with alternative sets of items, and indeed with other types of stimuli (such as standardised vignettes) (Clifford, Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015).
Finally, the present study found that the MAC-Q’s psychometrics performed well, and compare favourably to the MFQ’s, but there is room for improvement, especially with regard to external criterion scales. Future research should aim to identify external scales which ask questions more directly related to the moral valence of the behaviour (rather than, as noted above, asking whether a person performs that behaviour). Such research should also extend beyond self-report scales to use performances on tasks, and behavioural measures such as experimental games.

9. Conclusion

Here we have introduced the theory of Morality-as-Cooperation, and shown how it provides a principled, predictive and productive approach to the content and structure of morality. Using cooperation as our compass, we have charted a new course, and drawn up a more accurate map of the moral landscape – revealing familiar ground in greater detail, and surveying previously unexplored territory. Thus equipped, with map and compass, we look forward to further discoveries ahead.

A behavioral genetic analysis of developmental increases in personality variance from childhood to adolescence: Kids become less alike with time due to increases in the magnitude of genetic influences

Mõttus, R., Briley, D. A., Zheng, A., Mann, F. D., Engelhardt, L. E., Tackett, J. L., . . . Tucker-Drob, E. M. (2019). Kids becoming less alike: A behavioral genetic analysis of developmental increases in personality variance from childhood to adolescence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Mar 2019.

Abstract: Recent work in personality development has indicated that the magnitude of individual differences in personality increases over child development. Do such patterns reflect the differentiation of individuals by genotype, an increasing influence of environmental factors, or some (interactive) combination of the two? Using a population-based sample of over 2,500 twins and multiples from the Texas Twin Project, we estimated age trends in the variances in self- and parent-reported measures of the Big Five personality traits between Ages 8 and 18 years. We then estimated age trends in the genetic and environmental components of variance in each measure. Individual differences in personality increased in magnitude from childhood through mid-adolescence. This pattern emerged using both children’s self-reports and ratings provided by their parents, and was primarily attributable to increases in the magnitude of genetic influences. Most of the increasing genetic variance appeared nonadditive, pointing to the possibility that developmental processes tend to make genetically similar individuals disproportionately more alike in their personality traits over time. These findings could reflect increasing or accumulating effects of trait-by-trait interactions; person-by-environment transactions, whereby genetically similar people are disproportionally likely to experience similar environments; the activation of dominant genes across developmental transitions (e.g., puberty); or some combination of these three processes, among other factors. Theories of personality development will need to accommodate these descriptive findings, and longitudinal, genetically informed designs are needed to test some of the specific hypotheses springing from this study.

It is argued in this article that citizens in democracies use their subjective well‐being as an evaluative criterion when deciding how willing they are to support and comply with government dictates (political system support)

In pursuit of happiness: Life satisfaction drives political support. Peter Esaiasson, Stefan Dahlberg, Andrej Kokkonen. European Journal of Political Research, March 28 2019.

Abstract: It is argued in this article that citizens in democracies use their subjective well‐being (SWB) as an evaluative criterion when deciding how willing they are to support and comply with government dictates (political system support). When life is satisfactory, government authorities are rewarded with support, when it is not, citizens punish authorities by withholding their support. To make sense of the relationship, it is suggested that citizens act as if they have signed a happiness contract with ‘those in power’. In support of this argument, comparative survey data shows that SWB predicts attitudes on political system support across country contexts and under strong control conditions. Establishing that the relationship is causal, panel data documents that attitudes on political system support can be undermined following the termination of a close personal relationship, and that the causal effect is mediated via changes in SWB. Finally, as predicted, the happiness‐support relationship is weaker among individuals who are high on spirituality/religiousness and attribute blame for external events to both worldly and non‐worldly powers.

Love is not exactly blind, at least for some people: Analytic cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs

Love is not exactly blind, at least for some people: Analytic cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs. BastienTrémolière, Hakim Djeriouat. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 145, July 15 2019, Pages 119-131.

Abstract: Recent research has highlighted the importance of people's cognitive style on the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g., beliefs in paranormal). The present studies extend that tradition of research to another form of epistemically suspect beliefs, that is, romantic beliefs. Using different cognitive style measures, we observed that an analytical cognitive style was associated with a decreased endorsement of romantic beliefs (Studies 1a–b) and the effect is qualified by conflict detection sensitivity (Studies 2a–b). Study 3 tested a structural equation model showing that cognitive style predicts romantic beliefs just as it predicts traditional epistemically suspect beliefs. Finally, an exploratory study (Study 4) unsuccessfully tested the possibility that differences in belief in the value of science might explain the association between cognitive style and romantic beliefs. Results are discussed in the light of the literature regarding the everyday consequences of cognitive style and the proposed psychological mechanisms underlying these associations.

In their 2015's Current Directions in Psychological Science paper, Pennycook and colleagues (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) reviewed evidence of the consequential nature of reasoning: the fact that differences in cognitive style predict a vast range of people's everyday beliefs and behaviors. Hence, cognitivestyle was found to predict reasoning activities (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011;Trippas,Pennycook, Verde, & Handley, 2015), but it also extends beyond the reasoning domain: it predicts paranormal beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs, beliefs in ghosts, superstition), beliefs in conspiracy theories, beliefs in alternative medicine, moral values, prosociality, and also receptivity to non sensical sentences intended to convey the appearance of depth and sophistication (also known as ‘pseudo-profound bullshit’). In the present research, we focusonanother aspect of people's daily life that maybe associated with cognitive style, that is, romantic beliefs. Although romantic beliefs have never been given consensual definition, some of their dimensions are clearly to be thought of as epistemically suspect. Should it be the case, cognitive style is likely to predict these beliefs as well.1. Cognitive style and (some of) its everyday consequences. The definition of cognitive style (or thinking disposition) commonly draws on the distinction made by the dual process theories of thinking about the way people reason, judge, and decide (Evans,2008;Evans&Stanovich,2013;Kahneman, 2011). Although there are different dual process models (Epstein, 1994;Evans & Stanovich, 2013;Kahneman,2011;  Sloman,1996),they all share the core idea that human thinking consists of two fundamentally different types of processing. Type 1 processing is assumed to be fast and almost effortless (i.e., it does not require much cognitive resources). By contrast, Type 2 processing is slow and greedy in cognitive resources (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Many clever tasks are designed in such a way that an incorrect intuitive (Type 1) response springs immediately to mind, at the expense of a correct reflective (Type 2) response. In such cases, people need tooverridethatincorrectType1responsesoastocalculateandreachthecorrect Type 2 response. This disposition to rely on either of the twotypes of processing is labelled as cognitive style, defined as people'spropensity and willingness to think rather intuitively (Type 1 proces-sing)oranalytically(Type2processing).Importantly, cognitivestyleis not reducible to cognitive (or rea-soning)ability, although both dimensions positively correlate(Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000). Let us consider, for instance, the fa-mousbatandballbrainteasing(Frederick,2005)whichhasbeenus asaproxyofcognitivestyleincountlessstudies.Inthisproblem,a bat and ball cost $1.10 in total, and the bat costs $1 morethanball. Whenasked to indicate the price of the ball, a majority of people answer $0.10. Although that response springs rapidly to mind, it is incorrect. The correct, reflective response is $0.05. In this problem, the correct solving does not necessarily reflect differences in people's cognitive abilities (e.g., numerical, mathematical skills) as the calculation is very basic. Rather, the problem reflects people's cognitive style, and itscorrect solving captures primarily people's propensity to think analy-
tically (Toplak et al., 2011). In brief, cognitive style refers to an in-dividual's tendencyto rely on fast, automatic, and intuitivereasoning(Type 1 processing) versus slower, reflective, and analytic reasoning(Type 2 processing) in situations in which a misleading intuitive re-sponse cue is present. By contrast, cognitive ability captures people'sabilitytorelyonlogicandnormativereasoning(i.e.,toengageType2processing),intheabsenceofamisleadingintuitiveresponse.The fact that people who rely the most on Type 2 processing arethose who perform the best on reasoning tasks might not sound sur-prising,sincereasoningsuccessisabyproductofreflectivethinkinginsuch cases. Yet, it was recently found that cognitive style had con-sequencesthatextendbeyondthereasoningfield.Althoughitpredictsbeliefs and behaviors in a vast range of domains, such as morality(Garvey&Ford,2014;Pennycook,Cheyne,Barr,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2014b) or prosociality (Rand et al., 2014;Rand, Greene, & Nowak,2012), we focus, in regard to the present research, on the predictivevalueofcognitivestyleonbeliefslabelledasepistemicallysuspect.Epistemically suspect (or unwarranted)beliefs refer to beliefs thatconflict with common naturalistic conceptions of the world, and thatcannotbeexplainedviascienceorempirically-basedexplanations(seeLobato,Mendoza,Sims,&Chin,2014;Pennycooketal.,2015).Thesebeliefsareunfalsifiablestatements,ortheystandincontradictionwiththeconsensuallyadmittedprinciplesofreasonanddemonstrability.Forinstance,beliefsinghosts,afterlife,astrology,allbelongtothecategoryof epistemically suspect beliefs; and these beliefs have been recentlyshown tobe predictedbypeople's cognitivestyle(for ameta-analysisdevoted to exploring the relationship between cognitive style and re-ligiousbeliefs,seePennycook,Ross,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2016).Itwasshown,forinstance,thatmoreanalyticalpeople,whoscoredhighontheCognitiveReflectionTest(CRT;ashortmeasurecapturingpeople's cognitive style; that includes the bat and ball problem we il-lustratedpreviously;seeFrederick,2005)endorsedreligiousbeliefslessthan less analytic participants (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Pennycook,Cheyne,Seli,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2012;Shenhav,Rand,& Greene, 2012). Similar conclusions were obtained using differentclassicreasoningtasksdesignedtomakeanintuitiveresponseconflictwith an analytic response: less religious people endorsed the analyticresponsethemostinabase-ratetask(Pennycooketal.,2014b,2012;Pennycook,Cheyne,Barr,Koehler,&Fugelsang,2014a)andinabelief-bias task (Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013). By con-trast, analytic cognitive style predicts endorsement of evolutionaryaccountsofhumanorigins(Gervais,2015).Comparable measures and manipulations have led to similar con-clusions for other beliefs cast supernatural and/or epistemically un-warranted:analyticcognitivestylewasassociatedwithlowerlevelsofbeliefs in conspiracy theories (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, &Furnham, 2014) and paranormal beliefs (e.g., beliefs in ghosts, tele-pathy,omens)(Pennycooketal.,2012;Svedholm&Lindeman,2013).In that vein, less analytic people are more likely to attribute super-natural causation to experimentally controlled, but at first glance un-cannyexperiences(Bouvet&Bonnefon,2015;seealsoRoss,Hartig,&McKay,2017).Whetheritbetranscendentalorimmanent,allthesebeliefsshareacommonfeature:theyfallintothedomainofunfalsifiableassumptions.In thepresent paper, we areinterested in another type ofbeliefs thathavethepotentialtobecastasepistemicallysuspect,thatis,romanticbeliefs. The interest of examining cognitive style in relation to thesebeliefsisthat,albeitbaseless,theprocessunderlyingthemanifestationsoflovecanbeelucidatedbyscientificorempiricalobservations(e.g.,attachment in mammals;neurochemistry of attraction). Noteworthily,thereisadiscrepancybetweentheunderlyingprocessbywhichpeopleexperienceloveontheonehandandthesocio-culturalconstructionofthese experienceson theotherhand.Importantly,romantic love,per-tainstothelatter.Further,itisacategoryofbeliefswhichalmostev-erybody has ever experienced, by contrast to other epistemically sus-pect beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs, conspiracy theories, etc.). Thiscategory of beliefs is part of personal phenomenal experience, whichexcludesanyreferencetoexternalpowerfulentitiesonwhichtoinvestdevotion,admiration,orfear.Inthisperspective,thepresentresearchquestions the possibility that cognitive style is also associated withdifferencesintheendorsementofbaselessbeliefsofintrinsicnature.2. RomanticloveandconflictdetectionAlthough there is no consensual definition, it is proposed that ro-mantic love includes but is not reducible to passion (i.e., the physio-logicalarousalunderlyingattraction;Sternberg,1986).Itisthoughttobeaculturaluniversal(Hatfield&Rapson,2006;Jankowiak&Fischer,1992),anditservesanevolutionaryfunctionofsexualselection(Buss,2003) and pair-bond attachment (Miller, 2001). Beyond basic biolo-gicalneeds,romanticlovealsoseemstoservesocialfunctions,amongwhichcreatingandmaintainingmaritalbondsandunitingkingroupsofrespectivepartners(Rosenblatt,1967).Romanticloveisinthesocialrealm mostly expressed in terms of a set of beliefs rather than as abiological phenomenon (Weaver & Ganong, 2004). Understandably,romantictales,songs,andpoetriesaredeeplyrootedinhumancultures,and people daily life is filled with romantic narratives (Weaver &Ganong,2004).Culturalportrayalofromanticloverecurrentlyreferstothenotionsof love predestination (Franiuk, Cohen, & Pomerantz, 2002), love atfirstsight(Tanner,Haddock,Zimmerman,&Lund,2003)andtherightone mate (Signorielli, 1997). Consistent with these notions,SprecherandMetts(1999)haveproposedthatromanticbeliefsrefertotheideathat‘loveatfirstsightispossible,thattherecanbeonlyonetruelove,thattruelovelastsforever,thatthebelovedisperfectineveryrespect,and that true love can overcome all obstacles’ (p. 835;Sprecher &Metts, 1999), see also (Cunningham & Antill, 1981;Knox Jr &Sporakowski,1968;Peplau&Gordon,1985).1People, especially young ones, rely proactively on cultural trans-mission of romantic narratives to educate themselves about love(Bachen & Illouz, 1996). For instance, classic western fairy tales orromantic movies create prescriptive models structuring widespreadrelationships schemas and scripts (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979;Holmberg & MacKenzie, 2002). Accordingly, people become ac-quainted with what to be expected in events related to romantic re-lationshipsandthenecessarystagesfromitsinitiationtoitsprojectedpleasing outcomes (e.g., marriage, children; seeHolmberg &MacKenzie, 2002). These internalized scripts have been evidenced toframetheenactmentofrelationship-relevantbehaviorsandtofacilitaterelational construction in a friendly manner as well as relationshipswell-being when personal scripts dovetail with normative scripts(Wilson&Capitman,1982).Theculturally-shapedstructurationofro-mantic beliefs generates various consequences on love, commitmentandrelationshipssatisfaction.Thereisevidencethatromanticbeliefs,fostered by unrealistic optimism and positive illusions, strengthen re-lationshipsdurationandquality(Knee,1998;Murray&Holmes,1997);and this trend has been longitudinally evidenced (Sprecher & Metts, 1989).Alternatively,someresearchhasemphasizedthedysfunctionalcharacter of these beliefs as they create a gap between preconceivedstandardsof‘perfectrelationship’andreality.Thisexpectationgaphasthepotentialtodecreaserelationshipquality(Baucom&Epstein,1990)and can be associated with inadequate problem-solving responses inrelationships (Metis & Cupach, 1990). These beliefs may lead to anelevated incidence of marital distress (N.Epstein, Pretzer, & Fleming,1987) and decreased expectations that any dialogue designed to fixrelationshipsproblemsormaritaltherapycanbesuccessful(Epstein&Eidelson,1981).Importantly,thereisnoscientificevidencefortheexactitudeofthegeneral claims as depicted bySprecher and Metts (1999). Examiningromanticlovethroughtheperspectiveofrationalityhasoccupiedalargesegmentofthephilosophicaldebates.ThephilosopherPascalinPensées(Pascal,1670/1976)advocatedthatlovedoesnotpertaintothecategoryofreasonallowingthediscoveryofdemonstrabletruth.Bycontrast,loveis thought of as a class of sentiments related to a form of universalknowledgewhichdispenseswithrationalthought.Muchmorerecently,some authors have even considered some of unrealistic beliefs aboutrelationships as irrational (Ellis, 1986;Gündogdu, Yavuzer, & Karatas,2018),partlybecausetheystemfromrigidandpreconceivedunrealisticschemes (e.g., “partners cannot change”, “mindreading is expected”)(Epstein&Eidelson,1981).Itisthenpossiblethatsomeromanticbeliefsqualifyasunwarrantedorepistemicallysuspectbeliefs.Thequestionremains astowhysomepeople hold thesebeliefs.Apromising way of addressing this issue is to rely on a cognitive ex-planation.Romanticnarrativesmightderivefromcognitivebiasessuchasoptimismbias(seeWeinstein&Klein,1996)orwishfulthinking(seeBastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011). Perhaps, some people nurture thehope of experiencing an ethereal love story or think that love dis-appointment would not concern them. If these beliefs is rooted incognitivebiases,thenpeoplemorepronetobiasesandfallacieswouldbe more likely to endorse romantic beliefs. In this perspective, thecognitivemechanismspromptingpeopletosubscribeorrejectromanticbeliefsmighthavetodowithcognitiveconflictdetection(forareviewonconflictdetection,seeDeNeys,2014).Inanutshell,conflictemergeswhenever Type 2 processing (necessary to correctly endorse logico-probabilistic principles) stands in contradiction to Type 1 processing(whichreliesonpersonalexperienceandbeliefs).Insuchsituations,theType 2 processing system is needed to overcome the belief-based re-sponse generated by the Type 1 processing system.2Multiple studieshave shown, however, that people regularly fail to override this cog-nitive conflict (e.g.,De Neys & Glumicic, 2008;Evans, 2003, 2008;Kahneman, 2011), just as it is the case in the bat and ball problemwhich we discussed earlier; further, it was recently found individualdifferencesinthepropensitytodetectconflictduringreasoningactiv-ities(Frey,Johnson,&DeNeys,2018).Thatis,somepeoplearemorelikelytodetectthenoverridecognitiveconflictthanothers.There is evidence that analytical cognitive style predicts lowerepistemicallysuspectbeliefs,inthecontextreligiousbeliefs,becauseofahigherpropensitytodetectconflict(Pennycooketal.,2014a,2013).Within the context of religion, conflict refers to the incompatibilitybetween the way human cognitive armature is designed to grasp thephysical world and the presence of supernatural entities or presumedhidden forces that transcend them (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). Forexample,acknowledgingtheexistenceofectoplasmscapableofpassingindiscriminately through physical objects escape universal cognitiveprinciples(Pennycooketal.,2014a),andwouldreflectfailureincon-flict detection. Consistent with this possibility, Pennycook and collea-gues observed that performance on conflict reasoning problems (inwhichaType1responseisconflictingwithaType2response)predictsendorsementofreligiousbeliefs,withparticipantsperformingwellonthe problems being those who endorsed religious beliefs the least.Consistent with the conflict detection account, performance on noconflict problems (in which a Type 1 and a Type 2 response are con-gruent)wasnotassociatedwithreligiousbeliefs.Theseresultsarealsosupportedbyneuroimagingstudies.Activationoftheanteriorcingulatecortex (ACC), a critical brain region for conflict detection (Botvinick,Cohen, & Carter, 2004), has been shown to be negatively associatedwithreligiousbeliefs(Inzlicht&Tullett,2010).Conflict,inthecontextofromanticism,wouldresideintherationalreluctance to acknowledge the notions of soul mate, perfect mate,eternallove,andtheideathatloveisimbuedwithamysticalforcethathelps alleviate obstacles or conquer all. Essentially, conflict detectionhas itsimportanceregardingromantic narrativesbecauseoftheir ste-reotypical nature (Dion & Dion, 1973). For instance, the belief thatthere is ‘one and only one’ love is conflicting with the scientific evi-dence that polygyny is a natural component of mammals (includinghumanbeings;seeBarash&Lipton,2002).Besides,thebeliefthatlovelastsforevermaybeconsideredasaformofbaserateneglect.Forin-stance, some single and married people tend to rate their divorcelikelihood as considerably lower than population base rates (Fowers,Lyons,Montel,&Shaked,2001).Itwasevenobservedthansomepeopleheldthatthereisnochanceofdivorcedespitetheevidencethatatleasthalf of marriages terminated in divorce at the time of the study (seeFowersetal.,2001).3. ThecurrentresearchStudying the psychological processes associated with the endorse-mentofromanticnarrativesisofimportanceastheyareapivotalde-terminant of the relational construction, with important societal im-plications regarding intimate relations; further, their endorsement issometimesconducivetonegativeoutcomes.Romanticbeliefsalsoseemtosharesimilitudeswithmoretraditionalepistemicallysuspectbeliefs(e.g.,beliefsinparanormal)whichbringstraightforwardexplanationsof the world (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), and are thus easilyspreadableinthesocialsphere(Mercier,Majima,&Miton,2018).The current literature linking people's cognitive style to traditionalepistemically suspect beliefs has demonstrated that a more analyticthinking activity was the price for disqualifying these beliefs(Norenzayan&Gervais,2013).Romanticbeliefs,asepistemicallysuspectbeliefs,areintuitivelyappealingbecausetheymatchculturalvaluesre-garding romantic relational construction (schema, scripts and rituals)andbecausetheyserveahopeful,palliativepurpose.Becauseromanticnarrativesarewell-knownandmostpeoplehavealreadyexperiencedorhope to experience a romantic relationship, we seek to understand ifmore analytic people disregard these beliefs more than less analyticpeople,justastheywouldrejectanyotherepistemicallysuspectbeliefs.Suchaninvestigationwouldbeagoodtesttoseewhetherpeoplewithhigher rational dispositions would resist these powerful, universallywidespread beliefs. If this is the case, then we would observe that,whatever the differential nature of these specific beliefs, a rationalmindsetisassociatedwithareluctanceofthesebeliefs.Intheend,weseethepresentstudyasarelevantcomplementarytestoftheconsequencesof reasoning style, affording a sharper examination of the dual processaccountofepistemicallysuspect(dis)beliefs.Straightforwardpredictionsarederivableregardingtheassociationbetween cognitive style and endorsement of romantic beliefs, in thesamewayascognitivestylepredictsanyepistemicallysuspectbeliefs:the more analytical (intuitive) people are, the less (more) they sub-scribetoromanticbeliefs.Inasetof6studies,weexplorethepossibleassociationofcognitivestyleandromanticbeliefs.Importantly,wewilluse multiple, different measures (performance tests, self-report mea-sures)soastoensureboththerobustnessofthepredictedassociationandtheinternalvalidityofourstudies.Studies1aand1btestdiffer measures of cognitive style, which have been extensively used in thefieldofreasoningpsychology,toexplorethepredictedassociationwithromanticbeliefs.Studies2aand2btestthepossibilitythatthisexpectedassociation between cognitive style and romantic beliefs is primarilyexplained by individual differences in conflict detection. Study 3 ex-ploresthepossibilitythattherelationshipsbetweencognitivestyleandromantic beliefs on the one hand, and between cognitive style andparanormal beliefs on the other hand, are concomitant. Study 4 ex-ploresapotentialexplanationoftheassociationbetweencognitivestyleandromanticbeliefs,thatis,theroleofbeliefsinthevalueofscience.

11. GeneraldiscussionIn the vein of the recent studies investigating everyday con-sequences of people's cognitive style, we explored the way it affectsanotheryetunexploredepistemicallysuspectbelief,romanticbeliefs.Ina set of experiments, we showed that cognitive style impacted onpeople'sendorsementofromanticbeliefs:lessanalyticpeopleendorsethesebeliefsmore.Thisresultwasreplicatedusingdifferentmeasures andtests,providingrobustevidenceofthephenomenon.Importantly,our results showed that the predictive power of cognitive style heldeven after controlling for cognitive ability (Studies 2a–b), putting thelightonthedecisiveroleofconflictdetection.Study3showedparalleleffects of cognitive style on romantic beliefs and paranormal beliefs.Study 4 explored a possible explanation of the relationship betweencognitive style and romantic beliefs, that is, that intuitive people be-lieve more in romanticism because they trust less scientific evidence.Theobtainedpatternofcorrelations,however,wasdifficulttodecipher,in particular regarding the positive association between belief in sci-ence and belief in romanticism (when cognitive style was positivelyassociated with belief in science, and negatively associated with ro-manticism). Because that study was exploratory, we refrained fromspeculating too much about the possible candidate explanations thatwouldfitthispatternofresults.ItisworthnotingthatNeedForCognition(NFC),usedasaproxyforcognitivestyle(Studies1band2),wasneverassociatedwithromanticbeliefs (and additional unreported analyses showed that NFC neverpredictedromanticbeliefsevenwhenexcludingFIfromtheanalyses).Faith in Intuition, the other subscale of the Rational-Experientialthinkingmeasure(S.Epsteinetal.,1996)didmuchbetter,beingsys-tematically positively associated with the endorsement of romanticbeliefs.Onabrighternote,theActivelyOpen-mindedThinking(AOT)measure showed strong and consistent associations with romantic be-liefs.Takentogether,theseresultssupporttheimportantroleofcognitivestyleindifferentsetsofeverydaybeliefs.Theimportanceofcognitivestyle lies initsincremental valueaboveandbeyond cognitive ability.Cognitive ability, however, was consistently proven to be much lesspredictivethancognitivestyle(inthreeoutfourofourstudies,cogni-tive ability did not predict romantic beliefs when cognitive style wascontrolled,similarlytotheobservationofPennycooketal.,2012).Although secondary in regard to our current purpose, one wouldpossibly find surprising that we systematically distinguished betweenperformance tests (CRT) and self-report measures of cognitive style(e.g.,AOT).Inouranalyses,wealmostalwaysexploredonefacetwhilecontrolling for the other (Studies 2–4). For instance, one may haveexpected that the CRT (which captures both cognitive style and cog-nitive ability;Pennycook & Ross, 2016) loses its predictive valuewhenever AOT (which captures cognitive style) and Numeracy/BRN(whichcapturecognitiveability)areincludedascovariates(andvice-versawithAOT,leavingNumeracy/BRNaside).Ourresultsshowed,bycontrast,thatthetwofacetsofcognitivestyledonotcompletelyoverlapandremainsignificantwhencontrollingforeachother.Itsuggeststhatthese classic measures of cognitive style, although part of a uniformconcept, each explain a proportion of unshared variance to a givencommonphenomenon.Additional remarks would concern the tasks we used to infer theroleofconflictdetection.Weacknowledgethattheasymmetrybetweenthe Cognitive Reflection Test and the tasks used to assess cognitiveability (numeracy and Base Rate neutral) may lead us to nuance ourclaim regarding conflict detection. This issue was also addressed byPennycooketal.(2014b)whonotedthatpossiblyanyofthetasksusedin the field purely captures either cognitive style or cognitive ability.Possibly,allthetaskscapturebothcognitivestyleandcognitiveability,buttodifferentextents(beingdisposedtothinkanalyticallywillnotbeefficient if one does not have therequisite cognitive abilities, and, si-milarly,beingcognitivelyabletofindasolutionwillbeuselessifonedoesnothavethewillingnesstoengageanalyticthinking).Intheend,one will ultimately never know whether one fully controlled the cog-nitive ability dimension. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of the mea-sures we used, as well as the consistency of our results, both providerobustevidencethatweisolated,atleasttoacertaindegree,thecon-flictdetectionmechanism.Atanotherlevel,onemayworryaboutthereliability of theCognitive ReflectionTest, asit has been heavilyem-ployed on online crowdsourcing platforms, making the search andfindingofparticipantsnaivetothetestdifficult.Althoughwedidnotcontrol for familiarity, there is recent evidence showing that the pre-dictive validity of the CRT is robust to multiple exposure (Bialek &Pennycook,2017),rulingoutthatpotentialissue.Romanticloveisapeculiar andcomplexintrinsicsensationthat amajority of people, including analytic people, have already experi-enced. In this perspective, a possible explanation of the associations we found might be that romanticism calls for a different kind of knowledge, a sort of intuitionistic truth,whichdoesnotfitwiththerationalmindset, hence its rejection in people who adopt a rational mode of apprehension of the world.Romanticloveoffersagoodavenueofre-search for understanding the role cognitive style plays on people's endorsementof irrationalbeliefs.It is worth noting that we are not making any value judgment re-gardingwhetherpeople shouldorshould not favor ananalytic cognitive style over an intuitive one. Although many reasoning researcheswould pointtotheneedofrelyingonanalyticprocessingoverintuitiveone,thereisevidencethatintuitiondoesbetterthanreflectionincer-taincontexts (see Dijksterhuis,2004;Kruglanski&Gigerenzer,2011),raising the need to consider intuition as a useful psychological pro-cessing as well. We are not making any value judgments, either, regardingwhetherpeopleshouldorshouldnotendorseromanticbeliefs.Regardless the negative associations between cognitive style and romantic beliefsweobservedinourstudies,onehastonotethatromanticbeliefs have important functions in partnership. Romanticism is considered a cultural universal (Hatfield&Rapson,2006), suggesting that it has possibly evolved across cultures to facilitate pair-bonding (Fisher,2012). Romanticbeliefs(measuredvia the same romantic beliefs scale weusedinthepresentresearch),forinstance, were found to be highly associated with relationship quality (love, satisfaction, and commit-mentSprecher&Metts,1999).The study of the consequences of cognitive style on real-world attitudes and behaviors are still very recent and as a consequence scarce. As Pennycook et al. (2015)stated, research is needed to identify themany domains in which cognitive style may operate; our study is di-rectly aligned with that purpose. Undoubtedly, any belief or attitude cast supernatural or epistemically unwarranted may be associated with cognitive style, as was the case with paranormal beliefs (Pennycooket al., 2012;Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), beliefs in conspiracy theories (Swamietal.,2014) or the attribution of supernatural causation of uncanny experiences (Bouvet&Bonnefon,2015). Of great importance is that cognitive style does not merely predictasetofeverydaybeliefs, but it also extends to the explanationofpublicutility behaviors, such as in the domain of prosociality and cooperation(Randetal.,2012,2014).Suchrecentdiscoveriesconfirmtheneedtodeisolatethefieldofrea-soning psychology so at to put it at the service of humanity (seeBonnefon, 2013), and promote, in parallel, the usefulness to deeperexplore the beliefs, attitudes, and everyday behaviors that are asso-ciated with reasoning, many of which are undoubtedly yet to be dis-covered.