Thursday, October 1, 2020

This paper identifies the degree to which scientists are willing to change the direction of their work in exchange for resources

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. Oct 2020, Vol. 12, No. 4: Pages 103-134. The Elasticity of Science. Kyle Myers. https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/app.20180518

Abstract: This paper identifies the degree to which scientists are willing to change the direction of their work in exchange for resources. Data from the National Institutes of Health are used to estimate how scientists respond to targeted funding opportunities. Inducing a scientist to change their direction by a small amount—to work on marginally different topics—requires a substantial amount of funding in expectation. The switching costs of science are large. The productivity of grants is also estimated, and it appears the additional costs of targeted research may be more than offset by more productive scientists pursuing these grants. (JEL H51, I10, I23, O31, O33)

Multiple genome-wide significant loci and genes were identified and polygenic score prediction of suicide death case-control status was demonstrated

Genome-Wide Association Study of Suicide Death and Polygenic Prediction of Clinical Antecedents. Anna R. Docherty et al. The American Journal of Psychiatry, Oct 1 2020. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2020.19101025

Abstract

Objective: Death by suicide is a highly preventable yet growing worldwide health crisis. To date, there has been a lack of adequately powered genomic studies of suicide, with no sizable suicide death cohorts available for analysis. To address this limitation, the authors conducted the first comprehensive genomic analysis of suicide death using previously unpublished genotype data from a large population-ascertained cohort.

Methods: The analysis sample comprised 3,413 population-ascertained case subjects of European ancestry and 14,810 ancestrally matched control subjects. Analytical methods included principal component analysis for ancestral matching and adjusting for population stratification, linear mixed model genome-wide association testing (conditional on genetic-relatedness matrix), gene and gene set-enrichment testing, and polygenic score analyses, as well as single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) heritability and genetic correlation estimation using linkage disequilibrium score regression.

Results: Genome-wide association analysis identified two genome-wide significant loci (involving six SNPs: rs34399104, rs35518298, rs34053895, rs66828456, rs35502061, and rs35256367). Gene-based analyses implicated 22 genes on chromosomes 13, 15, 16, 17, and 19 (q<0.05). Suicide death heritability was estimated at an h2SNP value of 0.25 (SE=0.04) and a value of 0.16 (SE=0.02) when converted to a liability scale. Notably, suicide polygenic scores were significantly predictive across training and test sets. Polygenic scores for several other psychiatric disorders and psychological traits were also predictive, particularly scores for behavioral disinhibition and major depressive disorder.

Conclusions: Multiple genome-wide significant loci and genes were identified and polygenic score prediction of suicide death case-control status was demonstrated, adjusting for ancestry, in independent training and test sets. Additionally, the suicide death sample was found to have increased genetic risk for behavioral disinhibition, major depressive disorder, depressive symptoms, autism spectrum disorder, psychosis, and alcohol use disorder compared with the control sample.


Mates high in physical attractiveness are in short supply, which means that not all people are able to find mates who are sufficiently attractive

Mating Decisions in the Absence of Physical Attraction. Kaitlyn P. White, Peter K. Jonason & Laith Al-Shawaf. Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, Sep 30 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40750-020-00152-2

Abstract

Objective: Mates high in physical attractiveness are in short supply, which means that not all people are able to find mates who are sufficiently attractive. Threshold models of mate preferences suggest that when physical attractiveness minimums are not reached, other traits possessed by a potential partner may play a lesser role in mate choice. However, few studies have sought to understand mating decisions when those minimums are not met.

Methods: In this experiment (N = 186), participants rated images of (pre-rated) unattractive opposite-sex others for long-term and short-term relationships after learning dealbreaker or dealmaker information.

Results: While participants did not find targets highly desirable or physically attractive (as a stimulus check), men were more willing than women to have casual sex, and that men and women reported similar desirability ratings towards long-term partners. Learning dealbreakers was associated with less desire for the targets than dealmakers, but women’s lack of interest was insensitive to mating context, whereas men found the target especially undesirable in the long-term context. Additionally, men were willing to consider a long-term relationship with a physically unattractive partner who possessed dealmakers, but not one who possessed dealbreakers.

Conclusions: Our discussion focuses on men and women’s mating decisions when potential partners fail to meet minimum thresholds for physical attractiveness. Future research is needed to explore the magnitude of the effect of meeting or failing to meet one’s minimum thresholds for physical attractiveness.


Discussion

Most research on mate selection has concentrated on what people view as appealing in a potential mate (Buss 1989; Confer et al. 2010; Li et al. 2002; Li and Kenrick 2006) rather than unappealing (Jonason et al. 20152020ab; Stewart-Williams et al. 2017). Parental investment theory suggests that the costs of making mating mistakes is higher for females, the sex with the greater minimum obligatory parental investment (Trivers 1972). Given this imbalance between the sexes, selection pressures may have fashioned different mating psychologies for men and women (Buss and Schmitt 1993). Research on attractiveness thresholds suggests that men consider physical attractiveness to be an essential characteristic in a prospective mate. This suggests that men will be less open to dating someone who is below average in physical attractiveness (Gangestad et al. 2006; Li et al. 2002). However, error management theory (Haselton and Buss 2000; Perilloux 2014) suggests that, whenever mating options are sub-par, men may be willing to overlook their preferences for physical attractiveness to not miss out on a reproductive opportunity, especially if the mating context is short-term and the prospective mate possesses dealmakers (Webster et al. 2020). In this study, we examined men and women’s ratings of prospective mates in both long-term and short-term contexts when these mates were physically unattractive and possessed either favorable (i.e., dealmakers) or unfavorable (i.e., dealbreakers) characteristics.

Both men and women reported low levels of interest in both short-term and long-term relationships with physically unattractive people. This supports past research suggesting that both men and women value physical attractiveness in potential mates (Buss 1989; Li and Kenrick 2006) and that men consider at least average physical attractiveness to be a crucial characteristic of a partner (Buss and Schmitt 1993; Li et al. 2002; Li and Kenrick 2006; Regan 1998ab). Consistent with sexual strategies theory, men were more willing than women were to engage in a short-term sexual relationship (Buss and Schmitt 1993), a finding that extended even to prospective mates of low physical attractiveness (H1). This is also consistent with error management theory (Haselton and Buss 2000; Perilloux 2014) in that, even though men tend to place greater value on physical attractiveness (Buss and Schmitt 1993; Confer et al. 2010; Jonason et al. 2012b; Li et al. 2002; Regan 1998ab), in a low risk, short-term context, men were willing to form a relationship with a physically unattractive mate to avoid missing out on a mating opportunity (Jonason et al. 2020ab; Regan 1998ab; Webster et al. 2020). In addition, both sexes reported lower levels of interest in prospective mates after learning that the potential mate possessed dealbreakers rather than dealmakers (H4). This was true in both the long-term and short-term mating contexts. Further, in the short-term context, men reported greater attraction than women to physically unattractive potential mates with either dealmakers or dealbreakers. However, men were only more willing than women to consider a long-term relationship with a physically unattractive person if that person possessed dealmakers.

If men are more willing to lower their standards to avoid lost mating opportunities and women maintain higher standards in mating regardless of context, men may be sensitive to contextual differences, but women should find unattractive partners undesirable regardless of context. As predicted, women were less willing than men to date physically unattractive prospective mates (H3). Women also showed low levels of interest in a physically unattractive partner no matter the mating context or information learned (H2). This may appear to contradict existing research showing that men place more of a premium on physical attractiveness than women do (Li et al. 2002), but this is likely attributable to the fact that we examined mating decisions when confronted with a physically unattractive potential partner, rather than examining differences between the sexes in the emphasis they place of various characteristics. Indeed, these findings are consistent with existing theory and research highlighting how selective women are in their mating decisions (Buss 2016). This aligns with sexual strategies theory, and perhaps also with error management theory (Haselton and Buss 2000; Perilloux 2014) in that mating mistakes for women are costly enough that the safer error for women may be to avoid any kind of relationship with an undesirable partner. Women’s selectivity across a broad range of traits and mating contexts may aid in carefully screening prospective mates and avoiding entanglements with partners of low mate value (Jonason et al. 2015).

Limitations and Conclusions

The present study is the first to evaluate dealbreakers in relationships with a standardized method for assessing interest in short-term and long-term relationships in the absence of physical attractiveness. Even so, several limitations apply. The first limitations pertain to the W.E.I.R.D. (Henrich et al. 2010) nature of the sample and the disparity between men and women in the sample. As is typical in this type of research, more women than men were willing to participate. Although we found an interaction between mating context and sex, further analysis revealed no difference between long-term and short-term ratings in men or women. This may have resulted from the small percentage of men in the sample. However, because our primary aim in this study was to evaluate dealbreakers and dealmakers in relationships, our a priori power analysis focused on dealbreaker/dealmaker effect sizes. Although our results are consistent with our hypotheses, without replication in an independent, larger sample we cannot be certain of the generalizability or robustness of our findings. However, the fact that our results are consistent with established theories enhances the trustworthiness of our results and undercuts concerns about sample size imbalance or the small—by modern standards—sample size.

Second, physical attractiveness acts as a threshold trait (Kenrick et al. 1990; Li et al. 2002) meaning that the absence of physical attraction often operates as a dealbreaker in both sexes (Jonason et al. 2015). By holding attractiveness low and constant, we (1) isolated effects for nonphysical characteristics when physical attractiveness of the potential mate is low and (2) standardized our materials (Jonason and Antoon 2019). In fact, the generally low desirability ratings may reveal just how little nonphysical qualities—no matter their valence—in a potential short-term or long-term mate influence mate choice when attractiveness falls below threshold. Future research might manipulate the attractiveness of the targets to estimate the magnitude of the effect of meeting (or not) minimum thresholds for physical attractiveness (Jonason et al. 2019).

Third, we assessed romantic interest in short-term and long-term mating contexts in relation to 10 dealbreakers and 10 dealmakers when randomly paired with one of eight photos of physically unattractive people. Each of the items may have its own, distinct effects worthy of independent investigation. We used the composite approach rather than item analyses to avoid Type 1 error inflation and so that we could say something more general about decision-making in romantic relationships (Jonason et al. 2020ab). Therefore, further research is needed at the item-level to examine how each individual dealmaker and dealbreaker affects interest in physically unattractive partners. Moreover, other lists of dealbreakers and dealmakers might be worth considering to evaluate the generalizability of these effects.

Finally, although our picture selection process was reasonably systematic, some limitations were present. We exclusively used pictures of people who appeared to be of Caucasian ethnicity, which limits the generalizability of our findings to other ethnicities. In addition, although the pictures used were pre-rated for attractiveness by numerous independent raters from the source, the attractiveness ratings used were still subjective, as opposed to more objective indices such as fluctuating asymmetry (Little et al. 2011). However, the participants’ mean ratings of attractiveness suggest that, as we had intended, our participants considered the people in the pictures to be of below average physical attractiveness. Despite these limitations, we have provided a novel test of sex differences in mate choice as a function of relationship context and the type of information people learn as they get to know new, potential partners.

One of the most contentious areas in mate choice research is about the role and origin of physical attractiveness preferences (Li and Metzler 2015; Zentner and Eagly 2015). Arguments rage over the function, origin, and consequences of being physically attractive in and outside of mate choice contexts. Evolutionary psychologists point to the adaptive utility of a preference for physical attractiveness, whereas sociocultural models sometimes treat preferences for physical attraction as arbitrary. We decided to strip away physical attraction and learn about the mate selection process in men and women across contexts in the absence of physical attraction. In doing so, we replicated prior findings demonstrating that men are more interested in short-term relationships than women are, and the sexes reported similar desirability ratings towards long-term partners (Buss and Schmitt 1993). We also found that even when prospective mates are low in physical attractiveness, learning dealbreakers was associated with less desirability than dealmakers. Furthermore, men were more interested in pursuing casual sex with people of limited physical attractiveness, no matter what other qualities the prospective partner possessed. Compared to women, men were also more willing to form a serious relationship with prospective partners of low physical attractiveness, but only if the prospective partner possessed other desirable qualities (e.g., “This person is kind to strangers.”; “This person dresses well.”). Importantly, women’s lack of interest in physically unattractive people appeared to be insensitive to mating context. This supports past findings that women also value physical attractiveness in their mates (Li and Kenrick 2006) but, unlike men, women’s selectivity led to a lack of interest in forming a relationship with a person of low physical attractiveness, no matter what type of relationship they were seeking.

Chimpanzees: Sex differences in personality were observed, with overall sex differences found for three traits, and males and females showing different trajectories for two further traits over the 10 year period

Sex differences in longitudinal personality stability in chimpanzees. Bruce Rawlings et al. Evolutionary Human Sciences, Volume 22020 , e46, Sep 9 2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/evolutionary-human-sciences/article/sex-differences-in-longitudinal-personality-stability-in-chimpanzees/6D94DE5CE1BBB5A9E14A21A9A212CFCA

Abstract: Personality factors analogous to the Big Five observed in humans are present in the great apes. However, few studies have examined the long-term stability of great ape personality, particularly using factor-based personality instruments. Here, we assessed overall group, and individual-level, stability of chimpanzee personality by collecting ratings for chimpanzees (N = 50) and comparing them with ratings collected approximately 10 years previously, using the same personality scale. The overall mean scores of three of the six factors differed across the two time points. Sex differences in personality were also observed, with overall sex differences found for three traits, and males and females showing different trajectories for two further traits over the 10 year period. Regardless of sex, rank-order stability analysis revealed strong stability for dominance; individuals who were dominant at the first time point were also dominant 10 years later. The other personality factors exhibited poor to moderate rank-order stability, indicating that individuals were variable in their rank-position consistency over time. As many studies assessing chimpanzee cognition rely on personality data collected several years prior to testing, these data highlight the importance of collecting current personality data when correlating them with cognitive performance.


Republicans Need Not Apply: An Investigation of the American Economic Association Using Voter Registration and Political Contributions

Republicans Need Not Apply: An Investigation of the American Economic Association Using Voter Registration and Political Contributions. Mitchell Langbert. Econ Journal Watch, 17(2). Pages 392–404, Sep 2020. https://econjwatch.org/articles/republicans-need-not-apply-an-investigation-of-the-american-economic-association-using-voter-registration-and-political-contributions

Abstract: The American Economic Association (AEA) is the premier national organization for professional economics in the United States. This paper shows that the AEA is nearly devoid of Republicans, though many Republicans are found among its membership, which remains open to all who pay the membership dues. I find that the political skew increases up the AEA hierarchy. I use voter registration and political contribution data to examine what I call ‘players’—AEA officers, editors, authors, and acknowledgees (that is, those thanked in published acknowledgments). For AEA players, the Democratic:Republican ratio is 13:1 in voter registrations and 81:1 in political contributors. The most influential professional association of economists in the United States is dominated by people on the political left.





Why puzzling? --- In reaction to positive events, studies show a puzzling “mood brightening” effect in individuals with mood disorder symptoms that suggests hyper responsiveness to real-life rewards

Heininga, Vera E., and Peter Kuppens. 2020. “Short Review: Psychopathology and Positive Emotions in Daily Life.” PsyArXiv. October 1. doi:10.31234/osf.io/yse56

Rolf Degen: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311659537145888772

Abstract: In this short review, we describe recent trends from research investigating positive affect (PA) in daily life in relation to mood disorders. Aside from notable exceptions (e.g., mania), most mood disorders involve relatively lower levels of PA in daily life, often combined with a larger level of variability in PA. In reaction to positive events, studies show a puzzling “mood brightening” effect in individuals with mood disorder symptoms that suggests hyper responsiveness to real-life rewards. Studies into anhedonia (i.e., lack of, or lower levels of PA) suggest that high-arousal PA and anticipatory PA are potential targets for intervention. Despite PA-focused interventions bear promises of greater therapeutic effectiveness, so far, these promises have not materialized yet.


Ideological differences in attitudes characterized by threat, complexity, morality, political ideology, religious ideology, or harm: The political domain was the only significant predictor of ideological differences

Identifying the domains of ideological similarities and differences in attitudes. Emily Kubin & Mark J. Brandt. Comprehensive Results in Social Psychology, Volume 4, 2020 - Issue 1. Pages 53-77. May 4 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/23743603.2020.1756242

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311634367517732866

ABSTRACT: Liberals and conservatives disagree, but are there some domains where we are more or less likely to observe ideological differences? To map the types of attitudes where we may be more or less likely to observe ideological differences, we draw on two approaches, the elective affinities approach, which suggests individual differences explains differences between liberals and conservatives, and the divergent content approach, which posits the key distinction between ideologues are their value orientations. The goal of the current research was to explore when and why liberals and conservatives disagree. We tested whether ideological differences are more likely to emerge in attitudes characterized by threat, complexity, morality, political ideology, religious ideology, or harm (as compared to objects not characterized by these domains) using both explicit and implicit measures of 190 attitude objects. While all domains predicted ideological differences, the political domain was the only significant predictor of ideological differences when controlling for the other domains. This study provides insight into which attitudes we are most and least likely to find ideological differences.

KEYWORDS: Ideological differences, attitudes, ideology, threat, complexity


Discussion

We have two key findings. First, we find support for both the elective affinities and divergent content approaches; topics associated with threat, complexity, morality, politics, religion, and harm are also characterized by greater ideological disagreement than topics not associated with these domains. Second, we found that the political domain was the strongest predictor of ideological disagreement.

The current research attempted to map the types of attitudes where we are most and least likely to observe ideological differences. We used two approaches, the elective affinities approach, and the divergent content approach to explore which domains characterize attitudes when there is disagreement between liberals and conservatives. The elective affinities approach, which suggests people prefer views that match their dispositions (Hirsh et al., 2010; Jost et al., 2009), posits that attitude objects characterized by threat (i.e., threat hypothesis) or complexity (i.e., complexity hypothesis) are more likely to be associated with liberal-conservative differences, compared to attitude objects not associated with threat or complexity. The divergent content approach, which suggests that they key difference between groups are underlying values (Haidt & Graham, 2007), posited that attitude objects characterized by morality (i.e., moral hypothesis), politics (i.e., political hypothesis), religion (i.e., religion hypothesis), or harm (i.e., harm hypothesis) are more likely to be associated with liberal-conservative disagreement, compared to attitude objects not associated with morality, politics, religion, or harm.

We tested these hypotheses by estimating ideological differences on implicit (IAT) and explicit (preference and evaluation) measures of attitudes and analyzed the extent to which attitude objects characterized by the proposed domains are more likely to be associated with ideological disagreement. When focusing on each domain individually, we found support for both the elective affinities and divergent content approaches. Results suggested attitudes associated with threat, complexity, morality, politics, religion, and harm were also attitude objects liberals and conservatives tended to disagree on. This was the case for both reaction time (IAT) and self-report (preference or evaluations) measures and for both joint (IAT or preference) and individual judgment (evaluation) contexts. Further, these findings were consistent when controlling for attitude object category, in nearly all cases was not affected by domain rater ideology, and was consistent across robust regression analyses.

Analyses also indicated that the political domain was the most robust predictor of ideological disagreement. When controlling for the other domains, the political domain was the only domain that still predicted the size of ideological differences – suggesting that ideological differences are substantially reduced outside of the political realm. For example, below the midpoint of political ratings the maximum ideological difference is never larger than a small effect (in r, maximum difference on IAT = .20, preference = .22, evaluations = .18) and the means are quite small (in r, mean difference on IAT = .02, preference = .03, evaluations = .03). 10 This is most consistent with the political hypothesis from the divergent content approach (e.g., Brandt & Crawford, in press; Graham et al., 2011).

Primacy of politics?

There are multiple ways to interpret the primacy of politics result. First, this result might suggest that the results supporting the elective affinities approach, as well as the harm, religion, and morality hypotheses of the divergent content approach are not good evidence because domains such as threat and complexity, as well as morality and religion are conflated with political differences. This is consistent with arguments that suggest that links between political ideology, personality, and motivations may be due to content overlap rather than personality or motivational differences per se (Malka et al., 2017). This possibility is represented in the causal structure in Figure S1 (in supplemental materials). 11 All of the domains have the possibility of directly causing ideological differences, but due to shared variance with politics, the political variable is the only significant predictor of ideological differences.

A second possibility is that factors like threat and complexity are the very topics that humans are likely to make into political, moral, or religious issues. When times are threatening or particularly complex, turning issues into political, moral, or religious issues may give people a sense of certainty or a method for interpreting the world that they otherwise would not have. If this is the case, then politics may act more like a mediator of the effects of threat and complexity. This possibility is represented in the causal structure in Figure S2 (in supplemental materials). Notably, in exploratory analyses where we excluded politics as a predictor, threat and complexity were still not significant predictors. Instead either no domain was a significant predictor, or morality was a significant predictor. This hints that morality may also be more proximal than threat and complexity.

The distinction between these two possibilities is theoretically important. The first possibility, represented in Figure S1, would suggest that the elective affinities approach, at least for our research questions, is not viable. The findings that seem to support it are merely due to the confounds between threat, complexity, and politics. The same conclusion could also be drawn from the moral, religious, and harm-related versions of the divergent content approach. However, the second possibility, represented in Figure S2, would suggest that the elective affinities approach, at least for our research questions, is viable. These findings show the disagreements over the political domain is the strongest predictor of ideological disagreement; however, the other domains are potentially still casually potent as precursors to the political domain. Unfortunately, it is not possible to tease apart these possibilities with the current data as the data are cross-sectional. Teasing apart these two possibilities is a necessary task for future research. Ideally, tests might include tracking ideological differences in large numbers across a great diversity of attitudes over time to study changes and stability in ideological differences.

Strength, limitations, and future directions

These findings are just one-step in mapping which attitudes we are most and least likely to anticipate ideological differences. We studied the 190 attitude objects from the AIID study. However, we expect that our findings will likely generalize to other attitudes, especially in the American context. We also would expect a similar pattern of results in other countries with polarized political systems (cf. Pew Research Center, 2017; Vachudova, 2019; Wendler, 2014). We are less certain that these results would replicate in political systems with less polarization and where political differences are, presumably, less important.

In contrast to many studies of ideological differences that focus on differences in one particular attitude, the attitudes in the AIID study cover many topics. These topics range from abstract principles (e.g., realism vs. idealism) to people (e.g., celebrities such as Denzel Washington vs. Tom Cruise) and regions of the world (e.g., Japan vs. the United States). The diversity of attitude objects should make our findings more comparable to the large swath of attitudes in the everyday world. Thus, these findings improve our ability to predict the locations of ideological differences and similarities in untested fields. One challenge with using a large number of attitudes is that not every attitude conforms to the model. As one example, some of the attitudes that scored highly in the political domain nonetheless had low levels of ideological differences. One reason for this is that there were attitudes that were political (e.g., preferences for Bill Clinton vs. Hillary Clinton; evaluations of politicians), but which did not map onto differences between liberals and conservatives. This suggests that more precise predictions can be made by considering the political dimension the attitude maps on to.

Despite the large sample of people and attitudes, and replication across multiple measures, this study also had several limitations. The domains used were based on previously discussed perspectives; however, other domains that we did not include may also play a key role. For example, we did not test the domain of disgust, but attitude objects associated with disgust may be associated with ideological differences, as previous research highlights ideological differences in what is viewed as disgusting (Elad-Strenger et al., 2019; Inbar et al., 2012). Moreover, as previously mentioned, the findings are cross-sectional. Although we discussed the results in causal terms for illustrative purposes, the current data is consistent with a number of different causal models. One way to test this will be to examine if and how ideological differences emerge as an attitude is imbued with different properties. Things that were once not moralized, politicized, threatening, etc., can become linked to our moral or political sensibilities, or be viewed as highly threatening. For example, at one point attitudes about the NFL may have not seemed overly political, however once NFL athletes began kneeling during the national anthem, and President Trump began commenting about these actions (Klein, 2018), the league may have become more politicized. We would expect ideological differences in opinions on the NFL to track this politicization.

Finally, this study is primarily based on self-reports and survey methodology. In the AIID study participants reported which attitude objects they prefer and the extent to which they positively evaluate attitude objects. In Rating Samples 1 and 2, collected many years after the original AIID study, participants self-reported the extent to which they think each domain could explain other people’s disagreement about the attitude objects. Thus, Rating Samples 1 and 2 focus on measuring what people think could cause others to disagree about attitude objects, rather than measuring what actually causes people to disagree about attitude objects. This may limit the validity of the study as participants in Rating Samples 1 and 2 may not be aware of the true factors that drive disagreement over attitude objects.

Furthermore, while implicit associations are assessed, and similar results are found across results, some of our findings are based on self-reports. Tracking ideological disagreement in terms of preference and evaluation can only occur in contexts where individuals are able and willing to report their true political attitudes – meaning further exploration into mapping ideological differences using these self-report methodologies relies on participants willingness to disclose their attitudes.

Behavioral manipulations could also be included in future work, such as having participants actually choose between helping one group (e.g., gay people) vs. another (e.g., straight people). This would help map attitudes where ideological disagreement is (or is not) present to aid in our understanding of the behavioral consequences of differences between liberals and conservatives. However, the consistency in results between the reaction time and self-report measures gives us some confidence that these findings are robust to measurement type.

The current research attempted to map where we are most and least likely to see ideological disagreement. In this paper, we have two key findings. First, we find support for both the elective affinities and divergent content approaches; topics associated with threat, complexity, morality, politics, religion, and harm are also characterized by greater ideological disagreement than topics not associated with these domains. Second, we found that the political domain was the strongest predictor of ideological disagreement. These findings provide evidence for a systematic explanation for when and why liberals and conservatives disagree, and can aid in predicting whether future events will be heavily contested or will be similarly perceived by liberals and conservatives.

The major genetic risk factor for severe COVID-19 is inherited from Neanderthals

The major genetic risk factor for severe COVID-19 is inherited from Neanderthals. Hugo Zeberg & Svante Pääbo. Nature, Sep 30 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2818-3

Abstract: A recent genetic association study1 identified a gene cluster on chromosome 3 as a risk locus for respiratory failure upon SARS-CoV-2 infection. A new study2 comprising 3,199 hospitalized COVID-19 patients and controls finds that this is the major genetic risk factor for severe SARS-CoV-2 infection and hospitalization (COVID-19 Host Genetics Initiative). Here, we show that the risk is conferred by a genomic segment of ~50 kb that is inherited from Neanderthals and is carried by ~50% of people in South Asia and ~16% of people in Europe today.

Popular version: https://www.cathlabdigest.com/content/neandertal-gene-variant-increases-risk-severe-covid-19


The Persistence of Outcomes for Descendants of the Age of Mass Migration

The Not-So-Hot Melting Pot: The Persistence of Outcomes for Descendants of the Age of Mass Migration. Zachary Ward. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. Oct 2020, Vol. 12, No. 4: Pages 73-102. https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/app.20170382

Abstract: How persistent are economic gaps across ethnicities? The convergence of ethnic gaps through the third generation of immigrants is difficult to measure because few datasets include grandparental birthplace. I overcome this limitation with a new three-generational dataset that links immigrant grandfathers in 1880 to their grandsons in 1940. I find that the persistence of ethnic gaps in occupational income is 2.5 times stronger than predicted by a standard grandfather-grandson elasticity. While part of the discrepancy is due to measurement error attenuating the grandfather-grandson elasticity, mechanisms related to geography also partially explain the stronger persistence of ethnic occupational differentials.

JEL J15, J22, J31, J51



 

No significant unique relation between deontological inclinations & compassion (sympathy, empathic concern)—or any other emotion-infused trait—as predicted by emotion-centered views of deontological moral judgment

Smillie, Luke D., Milena Katic, and Simon Laham. 2020. “Personality and Moral Judgment: Curious Consequentialists and Polite Deontologists (journal of Personality).” PsyArXiv. October 1. doi:10.31234/osf.io/73bfv

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311542323139031040

Abstract

Objective: How does our personality relate to the ways in which we judge right from wrong? Drawing on influential theories of moral judgment, we identify candidate traits that may be linked with inclinations toward (a) consequentialist judgments (i.e., those based on the outcomes of an action) and (b) deontological judgments (i.e., those based on the alignment of an action with particular moral rules).

Method: Across two studies (total N = 843), we examined domains and aspects of the Big Five in relation to inclinations toward consequentialist and deontological judgments.

Results: In both studies, we found a unique association between intellect (curiosity, cognitive engagement) and consequentialist inclinations, in line with the view that deliberative cognitive processes drive such inclinations. We also found a consistent unique association between politeness (respectfulness, etiquette) and deontological inclinations, in line with the view that norm-adherence drives such inclinations. Neither study yielded a significant unique relation between deontological inclinations and compassion (sympathy, empathic concern)—or any other emotion-infused trait (e.g., neuroticism)—as would be expected based on emotion- centered views of deontological moral judgment.

Conclusions: These findings have implications for theories of moral judgment, and reveal how our personality guides our approach to questions of ethics and morality.

Paper finds no support for the idea that casual sexual relationships & experiences are inherently negative and emotionally harmful experiences

Emotional Outcomes of Casual Sexual Relationships and Experiences: A Systematic Review. Rose Wesche, Shannon E. Claxton & Emily A. Waterman. The Journal of Sex Research, Sep 29 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2020.1821163

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311520122276917248

ABSTRACT: Casual sexual relationships and experiences (CSREs) are common and emotionally significant occurrences. Given the uncommitted, often emotionally complicated nature of CSREs, researchers have asked whether these experiences may have positive and/or negative emotional consequences. We reviewed 71 quantitative articles examining emotional outcomes of CSREs, including subjective emotional reactions (e.g., excitement, regret) and emotional health (e.g., depression, self-esteem). Overall, people evaluated their CSREs more positively than negatively. In contrast, CSREs were associated with short-term declines in emotional health in most studies examining changes in emotional health within a year of CSRE involvement. Emotional outcomes of CSREs differed across people and situations. Women and individuals with less permissive attitudes toward CSREs experienced worse emotional outcomes of CSREs. Alcohol use prior to CSREs, not being sexually satisfied, and not knowing a partner well were also associated with worse emotional outcomes. These findings suggest directions for prevention/intervention related to CSREs. For example, skill-building related to sexual decision-making may help individuals decide whether, and under what circumstances, CSREs are likely to result in positive or negative emotional outcomes. In addition, the limitations of extant research suggest directions for future inquiry (e.g., examining whether verbal and nonverbal consent practices predict emotional outcomes of CSREs).



Effectiveness of titles of psychology papers: Participants significantly preferred long over short titles, titles containing colons over the absence of a colon, and titles phrased as questions

I’ll Read That!: What Title Elements Attract Readers to an Article? Robert M. Hallock, Tara N. Bennett. Teaching of Psychology, September 29, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0098628320959948

Abstract: The title of an article is the first chance at catching a reader’s attention. We set to develop a list of title attributes that lead to attractive titles in psychology papers, which could then be used to help instruct undergraduate students on how to write good titles for their papers and projects. Currently, research into successful elements that comprise an effective title is generally limited to publication metrics (the number of hits and citations an article has). Here, we created and administered a survey to 99 undergraduate students to rate the effectiveness of titles of psychology papers that varied in length, use of colons, acronyms, clichés, being results-oriented, and phrased the title as a question. We then reworded these titles as the opposite choice (e.g., we made a longer title shorter or took the colon out of a title without changing the meaning or length). We found that participants significantly preferred long over short titles, titles containing colons over the absence of a colon, and titles phrased as questions. We hope our results aid in the instruction of writing in the discipline, and that undergraduate psychology students and authors alike can develop more effective and attractive titles to attract attention from scholars and invite broader audiences to read their work.

Keywords article titles, effective titles, colon, title length, publication metrics, writing style


Intelligence Can Be Detected but Is Not Found Attractive in Videos and Live Interactions

Driebe, Julie C., Morgan Sidari, Michael Dufner, Juliane M. von der Heiden, Paul - Christian Bürkner, Lars Penke, Brendan P. Zietsch, et al. 2020. “Intelligence Can Be Detected but Is Not Found Attractive in Videos and Live Interactions.” PsyArXiv. September 30. doi:10.31234/osf.io/qv3eh

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1311337058196127748

Abstract: Humans’ extraordinary intelligence seems to extend beyond the needs for survival. One theory to explain this surplus intelligence is that it evolved via sexual selection as a fitness indicator to advertise genetic quality to prospective mates. Consistent with this idea, self-reported mate preferences suggest intelligence is valued across cultures. Yet, as the validity of these self-reports has been questioned, it remains unclear whether objectively assessed intelligence is indeed attractive. We analysed data from two studies to test this key premise of the sexual selection theory of intelligence. In Study 1, 88 target men had their intelligence measured and based on short video clips were rated on intelligence, funniness, physical attractiveness and mate appeal by 179 women. In Study 2 (N = 729), participants took part in 2 to 5 speed-dating sessions in which their intelligence was measured and they rated each other’s intelligence, funniness, and mate appeal. Measured intelligence did not predict increased mate appeal in either study, whereas perceived intelligence and funniness did. More intelligent people were perceived as more intelligent, but not as funnier. Results suggest that intelligence is not important for initial attraction, which raises doubts concerning the sexual selection theory of intelligence.