Monday, March 23, 2020

The Emotional Path to Action: Empathy Promotes Physical Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Pfattheicher, Stefan, Laila Nockur, Robert Böhm, Claudia Sassenrath, and Michael Bang Petersen. 2020. “The Emotional Path to Action: Empathy Promotes Physical Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/y2cg5

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic presents a major challenge to societies all over the globe. To curb the spread of the disease, one measure implemented in many countries is minimizing close contact between people (“physical distancing”). Engaging in physical distancing is a prosocial act in the sense that it helps protecting other individuals, especially those most vulnerable to the virus. Building on this notion, we tested the idea that physical distancing can be the result of a genuine prosocial motivation—empathy for those most vulnerable to the virus. In three pre-registered studies that include samples from the US, the UK, and Germany (total N = 2,192‬) collected at the beginning of the outbreak, we show that (i) empathy is indeed a basic motivation for physical distancing, and (ii) inducing empathy for those most vulnerable to the virus promotes the motivation to adhere to physical distancing. In sum, the present research provides a better understanding of the basic motivation underlying the willingness to follow one important measure during the COVID-19 pandemic. We further point to the potential for policymakers to use empathy to promote physical distancing – in this way to increase the chance of saving lives.

Money does not stink: Analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money

Money does not stink: Using unpleasant odors as stimulus material changes risky decision making. Bettina von Helversen  Géraldine Coppin  Benjamin Scheibehenne. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, March 23 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2178

Abstract: Odors are strong elicitors of affect, and they play an important role in guiding human behavior, such as avoiding fire or spoiled food. However, little is known about how risky decision making changes when stimuli are olfactory. We investigated this question in an experimental study of risky decision making with unpleasant odors and monetary losses in a fully incentivized task with real outcomes. Odor and monetary decisions were matched so that monetary losses corresponded to the amount of money participants were willing to pay to avoid smelling an odor. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money. These results highlight the importance of taking the sensory modality into account when studying risky decision making.

5 DISCUSSION

To reach a better understanding of how decision making changes when outcomes are affect rich, unpleasant, olfactory stimuli compared with monetary losses, we asked participants in a laboratory experiment to make a series of decisions involving real consequences (monetary losses or smelling unpleasant odors) that were matched in subjective value. On a behavioral level, participants were more likely to choose the more risky option in the monetary gambles than in the odor gambles, suggesting that participants were less sensitive to differences in probabilities with odor gambles. In line with these findings, modeling participants' choices with CPT using a Bayesian hierarchical approach showed a more strongly curved probability weighting function for odors than for monetary gambles. These results correspond to the literature on the changes in decision processes when outcomes are affect rich (e.g., Lejarraga et al., 2016; Pachur et al., 2014; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Suter et al., 2016). They suggest that in decisions involving affect‐rich odors, participants' decision processes are less sensitive to probabilities. This result extends previous findings by Stancak et al. (2015) that unpleasant odors can increase loss aversion by showing that olfactory outcomes can also affect the subjective weighting or perception of probabilities. These insights are of direct importance for situations in which outcomes are olfactory. Furthermore, they support the initial findings by Ditto et al. (2006) showing a change in decision making when outcomes included an olfactory dimension. This suggests that odors will also affect risky decision making in situations in which odors are an integral and important feature of the outcomes, as in partner or food choice, for instance, when deciding whether food is still edible past its expiration date.
Moreover, our study provides clear evidence that affect‐rich outcomes change sensitivity to probabilities even when outcomes are real and decisions consequential. By using choices with real consequences, we were able to investigate whether the choices participants made with money and odors differed in “quality” in the sense that they affected the likelihood of losing. Participants chose the gamble with the higher expected value less frequently in the odor gambles than in the monetary gambles. Furthermore, participants for whom the payout gamble was an odor gamble were more likely to incur a loss than participants for whom the payout gamble was a monetary gamble. Thus, participants may be less able to choose options that maximize their earnings when decision outcomes contain affect‐rich outcomes such as unpleasant odors.
Although our results dovetail with those of previous studies using affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), there were some noteworthy differences from studies that used real affect‐rich outcomes: Specifically, Krawczyk (2015) and Berns et al. (20072008) did not find a decrease in sensitivity for the probabilities of affect‐rich outcomes. Krawczyk used vouchers in his study and measured affect richness with how excited participants were about receiving the voucher. Possibly, the observed differences between affect‐rich and affect‐poor vouchers in this study reflected differences not only in affect but also in perceived utility.
For the differences from the studies by Berns et al. (20072008), there are at least two possible explanations. First, Berns et al. investigated risky decisions using real affect‐rich outcomes (i.e., electric shocks) but did not have a monetary control group and thus compared their findings with parameter estimates for gamma parameters within CPT reported in the literature (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In our study, we found differences in probability weighting, but the average probability weighting function estimated for the odor gambles actually resembled the parameter estimates reported in the above‐mentioned studies more closely than the probability weighting function in the monetary gambles. 7 Thus, it is possible that in the studies by Berns et al., differences in probability weighting would have appeared if the same gambles had been presented with matched monetary outcomes. Second, in Berns et al.'s studies, participants received immediate feedback after each choice, whereas in our task, participants experienced the odor at the beginning but then did not receive feedback until the payout gamble selected at the end of the experiment. Perhaps differences in probability weighting diminish over time when participants experience real affect‐rich outcomes repeatedly.
In addition, there are some limitations of our study. First, we had to exclude 20% of our participants because they did not perceive the odors as unpleasant enough to be willing to spend money to avoid smelling them again. Although we tried to include only participants with a normal sense of smell, we used a self‐report measure. Thus, it is possible that these (or some of these) participants had a reduced sensitivity to odors that they were not aware of or not willing to disclose. Regarding the generalizability of our results, it could mean that the overall influence of odors on decisions is less strong than our results indicate. Second, we equated monetary losses and unpleasant odors based on participants' WTP judgments. This relies on the assumption that participants are able to accurately price smelling an unpleasant odor. Difficulties in setting a price for smelling an unpleasant odor might have driven the differences in choices, suggesting an alternative explanation for why odors or affect‐rich outcomes in general lead to different choices than monetary outcomes (see also McGraw et al., 2010). What speaks against this explanation is that people's evaluations of unpleasant odors do not seem to change much over time and are not affected by familiarity (Delplanque et al., 2008; Delplanque, Coppin, Bloesch, Cayeux, & Sander, 2015), and participants' WTPs in our study were highly correlated with their odor ratings. Third, we used a combination of choice data and mathematical modeling to understand the changes in risky taking. However, to fully understand the cognitive processes underlying the observed changes in choices, we would need to use process‐tracing methods, such as eye tracking or mouse tracking, which would allow us to investigate whether the observed differences in risky decision making can be traced to information processing, such as the attention allocated to outcomes (e.g., Lejarraga, Schulte‐Mecklenbeck, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2019; Pachur, Schulte‐Mecklenbeck, Murphy, & Hertwig, 2018). Finally, in our study, outcomes were odors, whereas in many decisions such as when evaluating food items, a new car, or clothes that still smell of the chemicals used for dying, odors will be just one attribute of the outcome. Here, it will be important in the future to test whether odors still affect the sensitivity to probabilities when other attributes also influence the overall utility of an option.
In conclusion, our study shows a qualitative change in decision processes for affect‐rich olfactory outcomes, leading to a reduced sensitivity to probabilities. These results highlight the importance of taking olfactory stimulus dimensions into account when studying risky decision making. Furthermore, by using consequential decisions with real outcomes, the present study provides solid evidence that the affective intensity of outcomes is an important factor in risky decision making that should be taken into account to better understand the underlying cognitive processes.

Individual Differences in Accepting Personal Restrictions to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic: Results from a Danish Adult Sample

Zettler, Ingo, Christoph Schild, Lau Lilleholt, and Robert Böhm. 2020. “Individual Differences in Accepting Personal Restrictions to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic: Results from a Danish Adult Sample.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pkm2a

Abstract: Political authorities are working hard on fighting the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Corresponding interventions often address cooperative behavior, because they pose restrictions on the individual level (e.g., limiting one’s physical contacts) with the aim to serve the greater good (e.g., not overtaxing the health systems). In a sample of Danish adults (N = 799) randomly drawn from a representative sample, we link different personality characteristics to people’s willingness in accepting personal restrictions for fighting COVID-19. When simultaneously considering all characteristics including the basic traits from the HEXACO personality model, we find that, next to people’s age, Emotionality as well as the Dark Factor of Personality (D) explain who is more willing to accept restrictions. D further explains acceptance based on whether restrictions aim to protect oneself rather than others. The results show the importance of individual differences for following large-scale interventions that should serve the greater good.

We devote disproportionate attention to already-known positive information about the performance of individual stocks within our portfolios

Attention Utility: Evidence from Individual Investors. Edika Quispe-Torreblanca, John Gathergood, George Loewenstein, Neil Stewart. CESifo Working Paper No. 8091, Feb 2020. https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8091.pdf

Abstract: Attention utility is the hedonic pleasure or pain derived purely from paying attention to information. Using data on brokerage account logins by individual investors, we show that individuals devote disproportionate attention to already-known positive information about the performance of individual stocks within their portfolios. This aversion to paying attention to unfavorable information, through its effect on logins, has consequences for trading activity; it reduces trading after recent losses and increases trading after recent gains. Attention utility is distinct from models of belief-based utility and information aversion (in which information not sought is not fully known), and implies that the pleasure and pain of attending to known information may be important for individual behavior.

JEL-Codes: G400, G410, D140.
Keywords: information utility, attention, login, investor behavior.


Psychological Correlates of News Monitoring, Social Distancing, Disinfecting, and Hoarding Behaviors Among US Adolescents During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Oosterhoff, Benjamin, and Cara palmer. 2020. “Psychological Correlates of News Monitoring, Social Distancing, Disinfecting, and Hoarding Behaviors Among US Adolescents During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/rpcy4

Abstract
Importance: As COVID-19 spreads across the globe, it is critical to understand the psychological factors that influence pandemic-related behaviors (i.e., news monitoring, social distancing, hygiene/disinfecting, hoarding). This may be especially important to study among youth, who are less likely to experience severe symptoms but contribute to the spread of the virus.

Objective: To examine psychological correlates of adolescents’ behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Design: Self-report survey conducted between March 20th and March 22nd, 2020.

Setting: This is an online survey study of youth from the United States.
Participants: A population-based sample of adolescents were recruited via social media to complete an anonymous survey. Youth were eligible if they had internet access, lived in the United States, and were between the ages of 13 and 18.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Outcomes included COVID-19 news monitoring, social distancing, disinfecting, and hoarding behaviors over the 7 days after the US declared a national emergency. The correlates measured were attitudes about COVID-19 severity, values related to social responsibility, social trust, and self-interest. The a priori hypotheses were that attitudes about the severity of COVID-19, along with greater social responsibility and social trust, would be associated with greater news monitoring, social distancing, and disinfecting, whereas greater self-interest would be associated with more hoarding.

Results: The final analytic sample included 770 adolescents (Mage = 16.34, 72% female). The majority of teens reported not engaging in pure social distancing (70%), but were monitoring the news (75%) and engaging in at least one disinfecting behavior multiple times per day (88%). Some teens reported engaging in hoarding behavior (19%). Greater attitudes about the severity of COVID-19 were associated with more social distancing, disinfecting, and news monitoring, but also more hoarding. Greater social responsibility was associated with more disinfecting and news monitoring, and less hoarding. Participants who reported valuing their own self-interest over others reported less social distancing and more hoarding. Greater social trust was associated with less hoarding.

Conclusions and Relevance: Emphasizing the severity of COVID-19 and the social implications of pandemic-related behaviors may be important for teens, particularly for those who are not following recommended preventative health behaviors or who are engaging in hoarding.

In 2012, two independent groups demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God; replication failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample

Does intuitive mindset influence belief in God? A registered replication of Shenhav, Rand and Greene (2012). S. Adil Saribay, Onurcan Yilmaz, Gülay Gözde Körpe. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 2, March 2020, pp. 193–202. http://journal.sjdm.org/18/18412/jdm18412.pdf

Abstract: In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies.

Keywords: intuitive thinking, belief in God, replication, analytic cognitive style, reflection, intuition