President Bush's Lasting Legacy: Missile Defense. By John Kyl
The Bush-Cheney Alumni Association, Feb 03, 2009
When the history of the Bush administration's national security achievements is written, one of the most significant accomplishments will be the building of a national missile defense system.
The idea of a national ballistic missile defense system to supplement the nuclear deterrent was born 25 years ago by our 40th president, Ronald Reagan, who said, "I've become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence."
But, something stood in President Reagan's way: the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This treaty was a classic example of arms control promising much more than it was ever able to deliver.
The theory was that by ensuring mutual vulnerability to nuclear missile attack, the incentive to build increasing numbers of offensive forces would be removed. History proved that theory wrong. And, in fact, strategic nuclear forces expanded not just quantitatively, but also qualitatively.
The ABM treaty also stood in the way of developing defenses against rogue regimes that were - and are - developing ballistic missiles. Deterrence is simply inadequate in dealing with rogue dictators. To depend only on nuclear deterrence - that is, rational decision making - with the Iranian and North Korean regimes would be irresponsible. And so, President Bush officially withdrew the United States the ABM treaty in June 2002.
Four years later, in 2006, the wisdom of President Bush's action was demonstrated when North Korea tested its Tae Po Dong 2 missile and detonated a nuclear device. Had it been necessary, the Missile Defense Agency was able to provide the president a real missile defense capability to combat the threat posed to the American people by a rogue regime armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
The United States missile defense system is now composed of 26 Ground-Based Interceptors in California and Alaska; 18 Aegis ballistic missile defense warships, complete with 65 interceptors on board; an advanced system of command and control; and surveillance and targeting radars. This is a significant capability, but it represents only the beginning of what's needed to protect the American people.
It is now President Obama's responsibility to ensure the safety of the American people against all threats, including the ballistic missile threat. The available evidence suggests this will not be easy. In recent years, Democrats in the House and Senate have made significant cuts to the missile defense budget, including restricting the development of defenses against future threats we know our adversaries are developing.
Our new president should also welcome Congress' recent decision to reverse an ill-conceived decision that it and President Clinton made in 1993 to abandon the study of space-based interceptors for missile defense. As a result of this reversal, the Department of Defense can now move forward on a study that could provide a roadmap for both a future defense of the United States from ballistic missile attack and a defense of our critical national security space systems. Opponents of this decision are already at work to stop the positive momentum created by Congress' decision to fund this study. They will not only attempt to cancel it, they will attempt to permanently shackle the defensive capability of the United States with a "space weapons ban" treaty, which could not work and would effectively amount to nothing more than feel good arms control.
President Bush left office having provided the American people, and his successor, a significant new defense capability. History will not be able to ignore this legacy. President Obama's opportunity to follow this good example has just begun. May history prove his judgment to be as good as his predecessor.
Sen. Kyl serves on the Senate Finance and Judiciary committees and as the Senate Minority Whip. Visit his website at www.kyl.senate.gov.
Showing posts with label defense. Show all posts
Showing posts with label defense. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Conservative views: Opportunities exist to work with President Obama on space security
Securing Space, by Eric Sayers & Jeffrey Dressler
Opportunities exist to work with President Obama on space security.
Weekly Standard, Jan 29, 2009
As Washington remains engulfed in discussion over expected foreign policy shifts on hot-button issues like Iran and Afghanistan, one critical policy area that is primed for far-reaching modifications, yet receiving little attention, is the future of U.S. space security.
Critics of the Bush administration charge that his approach was as unproductive as it was controversial. The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006, including its dismissal of any legal regime to limit U.S. action in space; the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test targeting a weather satellite; and the February 2008 intercept of a damaged U.S. spy satellite have contributed to, or are the product of, an unnecessarily hostile approach to space security that has only served to make us less safe.
Thus, it's likely that the Obama administration will make a significant departure from the policies the Bush administration pursued. While recognizing the strategic importance of space, President Obama has chosen to offer the solution of an international treaty banning space weapons, or at the very least a discussion of "rules of the road" for space, as the solution for securing the nation's space assets. The feasibility of this policy and its desirability for U.S. interests has been widely questioned, perhaps most succinctly by the work of Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although Tellis and others contend that this approach would be detrimental for U.S. security, elections have consequences and the direction President Obama chooses on space issues will be his to chart.
Those who may not agree with the approach the administration is likely to take would do well to identify and bolster support for programs that align with Obama's principles and can still play a beneficial role in securing America's access to space. Prominent amongst such initiatives are defensive-minded space systems, including the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program that aims to provide low-cost, miniaturized satellites that can be used to surge U.S. satellite capabilities or reconstitute those that have been damaged or destroyed.
President Obama recognizes that space is "critical to our national security and economy." This is an accurate and widely held view. The strength of America's military is reliant upon a constellation of satellites and corresponding ground installations that provide imagery, navigation, signal intelligence, communications, and early warning for missile launches. America's economy is similarly interconnected with a constellation of civilian satellites. However, as the military has placed a greater emphasis on networking the warfighter with the battlefield environment over the past two decades, this reliance has developed into a vulnerability.
Both the 2008 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China and the recently-released report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission cite how the People's Liberation Army (PLA) views America's dependence on space assets as its "soft ribs," a strategic weakness to be exploited in an effort to undermine the foundations of American military strength. The U.S.-China Commission determined that the extent of China's anti-satellite capabilities are "significant," to include not just direct-ascent weapons like that used in China's ASAT test of January 2007, but also the development of co-orbital direct attack weapons, directed energy lasers, and various technologies designed for electronic "denial-of-service" attacks.
Preserving America's military advantages, therefore, requires ensuring unfettered access to space. If China continues to develop asymmetric capabilities to target U.S. space assets, without the United States taking the necessary steps to dissuade and deter these actions, it will only increase China's likelihood of prevailing in a short-duration, high-intensity war. Such an outcome would be disadvantageous for the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship, specifically if the United States develops a sense of hesitancy that jeopardizes the credibility of cross-Straits deterrence. Additionally, a more capable PLA will enhance the confidence of Chinese leadership, increasing the chance of a political-military miscalculation by China in the Straits.
Whether or not President Obama will follow through on his broad promise to seek "a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites" is an open question. At the very least, he has been forthright in announcing his opposition to the weaponization of space. Complicating this commitment, however, is the broad range of military and civilian space assets that can be qualified as a "space weapon." The most effective direct-ascent ASAT weapon the U.S. has in its arsenal is the Standard-Missile 3 -- demonstrated by the successful February 2008 shoot-down of an American spy satellite. The dual-use of this weapon will also pose a serious dilemma for getting a space treaty off the ground without also requiring America to forgo its missile defense capabilities. Therefore, whatever the outcome of an international space regime, the utility of the SM-3 and other ASAT weapons as a traditional deterrence mechanism vis-à-vis Chinese ASAT weapons is likely to be downplayed by the Obama administration.
While these unfortunate policy prescriptions are a cause for concern, hope may lie in the possible defensive space measures that President Obama seems poised to embrace. His campaign website and new White House website encouragingly discuss "accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack" and "establishing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets." One of the most promising initiatives for achieving these duel objectives is Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). ORS seeks to rapidly deliver short-term capabilities to the warfighter that serve to augment space-based national security assets through the use of low-cost Tactical Satellites. The ORS Office, stood up in 2007 at the Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, now stands at the forefront of an effort to revolutionize the way the U.S. builds and deploys satellites.
The standard process by which the military continues to construct satellites emphasizes large, time-consuming programs that maintain a slow generational turnover of 15 to 20 years, preventing an important military asset like space to be exploited at the operational level. Alternatively, miniaturized satellites enjoy both nimble and adaptive qualities. Compared to traditional stand-alone satellite, micro satellites can continuously be outfitted with the latest technological upgrades and be sent to replace their outdated counterparts. More importantly, they can be used to help increase capabilities to meet the demands of combatant commanders. Indeed, the ORS Office is working right now on an ambitious 24 month timetable to supply U.S. Central Command with a satellite to meet an identified gap in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Should this effort succeed, it will be a telling example of what the future holds for operationalizing the power of space.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of ORS is the capacity it offers to reconstitute satellites quickly and cheaply. If the administration remains reluctant to pursue active mechanisms for ensuring deterrence in space, ORS could be employed as part of an array of defensive systems to help guarantee U.S. access to space by dissuading and deterring the development and use of Chinese ASAT technologies. If the United States retains the ability to replenish satellite constellations on an as-needed basis, the benefits provided by costly ASAT weapons would be greatly diminished for the PLA.
Of course, this may have the unintended consequence of compelling PLA planners to devote resources to denial-of-service weapons or acquire even more direct-attack weapons in an effort to overwhelm America's reconstitution capabilities. Thus, it will be necessary to develop a multifaceted defensive regime to build reserve micro satellites and stockpile cheap launch vehicles like the Minotaur, harden existing and future satellites against electromagnetic pulse and jamming, and further integrate satellite capabilities with allies.
Considering the benefits of ORS, reports that the budget for the ORS Office may be slashed between fiscal year 2011 and 2014, are highly discouraging. More recent reports now have funding being restored in 2012, but with a likely tightening of defense budgets in the years ahead, the outlook for a program already being targeted to pay Department of Defense's bills is bleak.
Although the level of confidence President Obama is prepared to place in diplomatic solutions to preserve space access is a serious concern, there remains ample opportunity to secure his support in other vital areas. As the administration begins to formulate its policies on space security, the utility and broad support for the ORS concept should make it a core element of its strategy. Remedying the ORS budgeting shortfall before the fiscal year 2010 budget is submitted would be a strong statement to China that the administration is invested in securing America's space assets. While only part of the solution, establishing such a precedent will be a step towards ensuring that the advantages the military procures from space can be further refined and enhanced in the coming decades.
Eric Sayers is a national security research assistant at The Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C. Jeffrey Dressler is an intern at The Heritage Foundation.
Opportunities exist to work with President Obama on space security.
Weekly Standard, Jan 29, 2009
As Washington remains engulfed in discussion over expected foreign policy shifts on hot-button issues like Iran and Afghanistan, one critical policy area that is primed for far-reaching modifications, yet receiving little attention, is the future of U.S. space security.
Critics of the Bush administration charge that his approach was as unproductive as it was controversial. The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006, including its dismissal of any legal regime to limit U.S. action in space; the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test targeting a weather satellite; and the February 2008 intercept of a damaged U.S. spy satellite have contributed to, or are the product of, an unnecessarily hostile approach to space security that has only served to make us less safe.
Thus, it's likely that the Obama administration will make a significant departure from the policies the Bush administration pursued. While recognizing the strategic importance of space, President Obama has chosen to offer the solution of an international treaty banning space weapons, or at the very least a discussion of "rules of the road" for space, as the solution for securing the nation's space assets. The feasibility of this policy and its desirability for U.S. interests has been widely questioned, perhaps most succinctly by the work of Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although Tellis and others contend that this approach would be detrimental for U.S. security, elections have consequences and the direction President Obama chooses on space issues will be his to chart.
Those who may not agree with the approach the administration is likely to take would do well to identify and bolster support for programs that align with Obama's principles and can still play a beneficial role in securing America's access to space. Prominent amongst such initiatives are defensive-minded space systems, including the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program that aims to provide low-cost, miniaturized satellites that can be used to surge U.S. satellite capabilities or reconstitute those that have been damaged or destroyed.
President Obama recognizes that space is "critical to our national security and economy." This is an accurate and widely held view. The strength of America's military is reliant upon a constellation of satellites and corresponding ground installations that provide imagery, navigation, signal intelligence, communications, and early warning for missile launches. America's economy is similarly interconnected with a constellation of civilian satellites. However, as the military has placed a greater emphasis on networking the warfighter with the battlefield environment over the past two decades, this reliance has developed into a vulnerability.
Both the 2008 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China and the recently-released report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission cite how the People's Liberation Army (PLA) views America's dependence on space assets as its "soft ribs," a strategic weakness to be exploited in an effort to undermine the foundations of American military strength. The U.S.-China Commission determined that the extent of China's anti-satellite capabilities are "significant," to include not just direct-ascent weapons like that used in China's ASAT test of January 2007, but also the development of co-orbital direct attack weapons, directed energy lasers, and various technologies designed for electronic "denial-of-service" attacks.
Preserving America's military advantages, therefore, requires ensuring unfettered access to space. If China continues to develop asymmetric capabilities to target U.S. space assets, without the United States taking the necessary steps to dissuade and deter these actions, it will only increase China's likelihood of prevailing in a short-duration, high-intensity war. Such an outcome would be disadvantageous for the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship, specifically if the United States develops a sense of hesitancy that jeopardizes the credibility of cross-Straits deterrence. Additionally, a more capable PLA will enhance the confidence of Chinese leadership, increasing the chance of a political-military miscalculation by China in the Straits.
Whether or not President Obama will follow through on his broad promise to seek "a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites" is an open question. At the very least, he has been forthright in announcing his opposition to the weaponization of space. Complicating this commitment, however, is the broad range of military and civilian space assets that can be qualified as a "space weapon." The most effective direct-ascent ASAT weapon the U.S. has in its arsenal is the Standard-Missile 3 -- demonstrated by the successful February 2008 shoot-down of an American spy satellite. The dual-use of this weapon will also pose a serious dilemma for getting a space treaty off the ground without also requiring America to forgo its missile defense capabilities. Therefore, whatever the outcome of an international space regime, the utility of the SM-3 and other ASAT weapons as a traditional deterrence mechanism vis-à-vis Chinese ASAT weapons is likely to be downplayed by the Obama administration.
While these unfortunate policy prescriptions are a cause for concern, hope may lie in the possible defensive space measures that President Obama seems poised to embrace. His campaign website and new White House website encouragingly discuss "accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack" and "establishing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets." One of the most promising initiatives for achieving these duel objectives is Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). ORS seeks to rapidly deliver short-term capabilities to the warfighter that serve to augment space-based national security assets through the use of low-cost Tactical Satellites. The ORS Office, stood up in 2007 at the Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, now stands at the forefront of an effort to revolutionize the way the U.S. builds and deploys satellites.
The standard process by which the military continues to construct satellites emphasizes large, time-consuming programs that maintain a slow generational turnover of 15 to 20 years, preventing an important military asset like space to be exploited at the operational level. Alternatively, miniaturized satellites enjoy both nimble and adaptive qualities. Compared to traditional stand-alone satellite, micro satellites can continuously be outfitted with the latest technological upgrades and be sent to replace their outdated counterparts. More importantly, they can be used to help increase capabilities to meet the demands of combatant commanders. Indeed, the ORS Office is working right now on an ambitious 24 month timetable to supply U.S. Central Command with a satellite to meet an identified gap in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Should this effort succeed, it will be a telling example of what the future holds for operationalizing the power of space.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of ORS is the capacity it offers to reconstitute satellites quickly and cheaply. If the administration remains reluctant to pursue active mechanisms for ensuring deterrence in space, ORS could be employed as part of an array of defensive systems to help guarantee U.S. access to space by dissuading and deterring the development and use of Chinese ASAT technologies. If the United States retains the ability to replenish satellite constellations on an as-needed basis, the benefits provided by costly ASAT weapons would be greatly diminished for the PLA.
Of course, this may have the unintended consequence of compelling PLA planners to devote resources to denial-of-service weapons or acquire even more direct-attack weapons in an effort to overwhelm America's reconstitution capabilities. Thus, it will be necessary to develop a multifaceted defensive regime to build reserve micro satellites and stockpile cheap launch vehicles like the Minotaur, harden existing and future satellites against electromagnetic pulse and jamming, and further integrate satellite capabilities with allies.
Considering the benefits of ORS, reports that the budget for the ORS Office may be slashed between fiscal year 2011 and 2014, are highly discouraging. More recent reports now have funding being restored in 2012, but with a likely tightening of defense budgets in the years ahead, the outlook for a program already being targeted to pay Department of Defense's bills is bleak.
Although the level of confidence President Obama is prepared to place in diplomatic solutions to preserve space access is a serious concern, there remains ample opportunity to secure his support in other vital areas. As the administration begins to formulate its policies on space security, the utility and broad support for the ORS concept should make it a core element of its strategy. Remedying the ORS budgeting shortfall before the fiscal year 2010 budget is submitted would be a strong statement to China that the administration is invested in securing America's space assets. While only part of the solution, establishing such a precedent will be a step towards ensuring that the advantages the military procures from space can be further refined and enhanced in the coming decades.
Eric Sayers is a national security research assistant at The Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C. Jeffrey Dressler is an intern at The Heritage Foundation.
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
US–India Strategic Partnership on Laser-Based Missile Defense
U.S.–India Strategic Partnership on Laser-Based Missile Defense. By Lisa Curtis and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
Heritage, January 27, 2009
WebMemo #2250
Last week, the Press Trust of India reported that defense officials intend to produce a laser capable of shooting down enemy ballistic missiles. The United States is a global leader in directed-energy defenses, including both low and high-powered lasers. American military research is also highly advanced in the technologies of acquiring targets as well as the command, control, and battle management systems necessary to identify and direct weapons to destroy missiles and other targets. In recent years, the United States and India have increased bilateral cooperation in a range of defense, counterterrorism, and homeland security areas. This cooperation is helping increase trust and confidence between the two nations while fostering security, stability, and prosperity in Asia. Working together on directed-energy developments offers a significant opportunity to strengthen the U.S.-India strategic partnership.
India Goes to Light Speed
The United States and India share many security concerns, such as the threat of ballistic missiles. V. K. Saraswat of the Defense Research and Development Organization rightly told the Press Times of India: "If you have a laser-based system on an airborne or seaborne platform, it can travel at the speed of light and in a few seconds, [and] we can kill a ballistic missile coming towards [India]." India's interest in developing directed energy defenses is understandable, as lasers have several distinct advantages. Such weapons:
- Can use a high-powered beam of energy to disable electrical components or detonate explosives, rendering the attack means such as the warhead or body of a missile useless;
- Come with an almost infinite magazine--as long as the weapons have power, they can be recharged and fired again;
- Can be aimed effectively using existing target acquisition systems (such as radars) and command and control systems (such as a computer battle management network); and
- Can be employed with a minimum of risk toward surrounding civilians, buildings, or vehicles (such as aircraft, cars, and ships).
In addition, lasers are versatile. While high-powered lasers address ballistic missile threats, low-powered lasers have a number of potential security uses, from disabling small boats to downing shoulder-fired missiles to intercepting rockets and mortars. All these uses have application to Indian security concerns.
It is also worth noting that missile defenses, such as high-powered lasers, limit the potential for regional conflict. Missile defenses serve as important deterrents, undermining the effectiveness of enemy threats. They also provide an alternative to massive retaliation in the face of an actual attack. The security provided by missile defenses actually limits the likelihood of armed escalation or an arms race and makes diplomacy more effective. It is no coincidence that the greatest strides in reducing the nuclear arsenals came in the late 1980s, at the same time the U.S. was pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative. A world with effective missile defenses is safer and more stable.
American Arsenal
The United States has significant research and development capabilities regarding the application of lasers for national security uses. The Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) is one such experimental system tested by the U.S. Army. Development of the THEL began in 1996 as a joint program between the United States and Israel to develop a laser system capable of shooting down Katyusha rockets, artillery, and mortar shells. The THEL system uses radar to detect and track incoming targets. This information is then transferred to an optical tracking system, which refines the target tracking and positions the beam director. The deuterium fluoride chemical laser then fires, hitting the rocket or shell and causing it to explode far short of its intended target. More recently, the Army has experimented with low-power commercial solid-state lasers.
Another system under development in the United States is the Airborne Laser (ABL). The ABL is a system that uses a megawatt chemical laser mounted on a modified Boeing 747 to shoot down theater ballistic missiles. The megawatt-class laser was first successfully tested at full power in early 2006. The system is still under development.
A Shared Security Interest
The American record of military laser research and its many cooperative ventures with friendly and allied powers suggests that a joint U.S.-Indian directed energy program is certainly achievable. The shared interests of both nations in promoting security and stability in Asia also indicates they have a common cause in developing military technologies that would lessen the potential for conflict while effectively countering terrorism. The U.S. should explore opportunities for joint development of cutting edge directed energy technologies--lasers--with India as part of overall missile defense dialogue and deepening of military-to-military ties.
Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Shaping up America's nuclear deterrent
Atomic Bombshells. WSJ Editorial
Shaping up America's nuclear deterrent.
The Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff lost their jobs last year after two incidents involving the misuse of nuclear materials. In one, nuclear-armed cruise missiles were loaded on a B-52 bomber and flown across the country without anyone noticing for a day and a half. In the other, nose cones fitted with nuclear triggers were erroneously shipped to Taiwan.
Neither of those mishaps ended badly, and in retrospect the nation can say thanks for the wake-up call. The blunders focused attention on a problem that might otherwise have gone undetected until catastrophe struck: the neglect of U.S. nuclear forces and -- even more dangerous -- a lack of understanding at the Pentagon about nuclear deterrence.
These are the key findings of the Pentagon's task force on nuclear weapons management, which recently released its final report. The task force was appointed by Defense Secretary Bob Gates in the wake of the Air Force scandals and was led by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. Its initial report, last September, examined the Air Force's errors in its stewardship of nuclear weapons and made several recommendations. These mostly have been implemented, and the latest report commends the Air Force for its swift action.
The task force has now cast its eye more broadly and concludes that the "lack of interest and attention have been widespread" throughout the Pentagon's leadership. The exception is the Navy, which is responsible for submarine-launched nuclear weapons. Even there, though, not all is well. While the report finds the Navy's handling of nukes acceptable, it says there is evidence of some "fraying around the edges."
The Schlesinger panel makes a series of recommendations aimed at improving oversight and policy. They include establishing a position of assistant secretary of defense for deterrence, reducing the nonnuclear related responsibilities of U.S. Strategic Command, and beefing up inspections.
But the task force's most worrisome finding will require a new mindset. The panel finds a "distressing degree" of inattention to the role of nuclear deterrence among senior civilian and military leaders, especially regarding its psychological and political value. It proposes educational measures to "enhance understanding" of why we have a nuclear deterrent -- which, put simply, is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. If adversaries believe the U.S. deterrent is weak, they might be tempted to use nukes against us or threaten to do so.
But there's a proliferation point too. The U.S. provides a nuclear umbrella for 30-plus countries. If our allies lose confidence, Mr. Schlesinger said at a press conference announcing the report, "five or six of those nations are quite capable of beginning to produce nuclear weapons on their own." This is precisely the opposite of what the nuclear-free-world types like to argue: If only the U.S. would get rid of its nukes, other countries would follow suit.
It's now up to the Obama Administration to move on the task force's findings. But adopting the management and personnel changes the report recommends won't be enough. "Strengthening the credibility of our nuclear deterrent should begin at the White House," the report states. If the new President makes clear his commitment to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, that attitude will echo down the chain of command.
Shaping up America's nuclear deterrent.
The Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff lost their jobs last year after two incidents involving the misuse of nuclear materials. In one, nuclear-armed cruise missiles were loaded on a B-52 bomber and flown across the country without anyone noticing for a day and a half. In the other, nose cones fitted with nuclear triggers were erroneously shipped to Taiwan.
Neither of those mishaps ended badly, and in retrospect the nation can say thanks for the wake-up call. The blunders focused attention on a problem that might otherwise have gone undetected until catastrophe struck: the neglect of U.S. nuclear forces and -- even more dangerous -- a lack of understanding at the Pentagon about nuclear deterrence.
These are the key findings of the Pentagon's task force on nuclear weapons management, which recently released its final report. The task force was appointed by Defense Secretary Bob Gates in the wake of the Air Force scandals and was led by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. Its initial report, last September, examined the Air Force's errors in its stewardship of nuclear weapons and made several recommendations. These mostly have been implemented, and the latest report commends the Air Force for its swift action.
The task force has now cast its eye more broadly and concludes that the "lack of interest and attention have been widespread" throughout the Pentagon's leadership. The exception is the Navy, which is responsible for submarine-launched nuclear weapons. Even there, though, not all is well. While the report finds the Navy's handling of nukes acceptable, it says there is evidence of some "fraying around the edges."
The Schlesinger panel makes a series of recommendations aimed at improving oversight and policy. They include establishing a position of assistant secretary of defense for deterrence, reducing the nonnuclear related responsibilities of U.S. Strategic Command, and beefing up inspections.
But the task force's most worrisome finding will require a new mindset. The panel finds a "distressing degree" of inattention to the role of nuclear deterrence among senior civilian and military leaders, especially regarding its psychological and political value. It proposes educational measures to "enhance understanding" of why we have a nuclear deterrent -- which, put simply, is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. If adversaries believe the U.S. deterrent is weak, they might be tempted to use nukes against us or threaten to do so.
But there's a proliferation point too. The U.S. provides a nuclear umbrella for 30-plus countries. If our allies lose confidence, Mr. Schlesinger said at a press conference announcing the report, "five or six of those nations are quite capable of beginning to produce nuclear weapons on their own." This is precisely the opposite of what the nuclear-free-world types like to argue: If only the U.S. would get rid of its nukes, other countries would follow suit.
It's now up to the Obama Administration to move on the task force's findings. But adopting the management and personnel changes the report recommends won't be enough. "Strengthening the credibility of our nuclear deterrent should begin at the White House," the report states. If the new President makes clear his commitment to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, that attitude will echo down the chain of command.
Monday, January 19, 2009
UN: Don't change Afghan strategy
UN to Obama: Don't change Afghan strategy. By Fisnik Abrashi
USAToday, Jan 16, 2009
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The top U.N. official in Afghanistan said U.S. President-elect Barack Obama should resist calls to change strategy in Afghanistan, urging him instead to focus on implementing the one already being pursued.
Kai Eide said that the incoming U.S. administration "has a unique opportunity to gather strength, gather energy ... and build on the trends we have seen" toward building the Afghan security forces and propping up the country's economy.
"My appeal is not grand strategy discussion, my appeal is concrete implementation effort," Eide told The Associated Press in an interview Thursday inside the U.N. compound in Kabul.
Obama has pledged to withdraw American troops from Iraq and deploy more to Afghanistan, where Taliban and al-Qaida linked militants have made a comeback in recent years.
U.S. Vice President-elect Joe Biden, who toured the region earlier this month, said that "things are going to get tougher in Afghanistan before they're going to get better."
Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan increased in 2008 over the previous year and some 6,400 people — mostly militants — died last year as a result of the insurgency.
The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan has forced the U.S. to plan to rush as many as 30,000 more troops to the central Asian country this year.
They will be joining some 32,000 U.S. troops already there who serve alongside 32,000 other NATO-led and coalition troops — the highest number since the U.S.-led invasion that ousted the Taliban from power in 2001.
Obama has said Afghanistan is one of his top priorities, but his incoming team have not yet disclosed a concrete plan.
Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who has been heading the U.N. mission in Afghanistan for the last nine months, warned against any major change in direction.
"Our problem is not that we need a new strategy. ... What happens very often is that we agree on something, we do not implement it and we say something must therefore be wrong with the strategy," Eide said. "That is not the case. The problem is in the implementation."
Eide said that there have been major improvements in two important sectors — building of local security forces and the economy.
"Every month we are getting better at handling the security situation," he said. "There is a greater momentum in building the key parts of the economy."
Staying the course and implementing the priorities set up at an international conference over six months ago must remain the goal, Eide said.
[...]
USAToday, Jan 16, 2009
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The top U.N. official in Afghanistan said U.S. President-elect Barack Obama should resist calls to change strategy in Afghanistan, urging him instead to focus on implementing the one already being pursued.
Kai Eide said that the incoming U.S. administration "has a unique opportunity to gather strength, gather energy ... and build on the trends we have seen" toward building the Afghan security forces and propping up the country's economy.
"My appeal is not grand strategy discussion, my appeal is concrete implementation effort," Eide told The Associated Press in an interview Thursday inside the U.N. compound in Kabul.
Obama has pledged to withdraw American troops from Iraq and deploy more to Afghanistan, where Taliban and al-Qaida linked militants have made a comeback in recent years.
U.S. Vice President-elect Joe Biden, who toured the region earlier this month, said that "things are going to get tougher in Afghanistan before they're going to get better."
Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan increased in 2008 over the previous year and some 6,400 people — mostly militants — died last year as a result of the insurgency.
The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan has forced the U.S. to plan to rush as many as 30,000 more troops to the central Asian country this year.
They will be joining some 32,000 U.S. troops already there who serve alongside 32,000 other NATO-led and coalition troops — the highest number since the U.S.-led invasion that ousted the Taliban from power in 2001.
Obama has said Afghanistan is one of his top priorities, but his incoming team have not yet disclosed a concrete plan.
Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who has been heading the U.N. mission in Afghanistan for the last nine months, warned against any major change in direction.
"Our problem is not that we need a new strategy. ... What happens very often is that we agree on something, we do not implement it and we say something must therefore be wrong with the strategy," Eide said. "That is not the case. The problem is in the implementation."
Eide said that there have been major improvements in two important sectors — building of local security forces and the economy.
"Every month we are getting better at handling the security situation," he said. "There is a greater momentum in building the key parts of the economy."
Staying the course and implementing the priorities set up at an international conference over six months ago must remain the goal, Eide said.
[...]
Brit SecDef Derides 'Freeloading' on US/Brit FM criticizes 'George Bush's war on terror'
Weakness Seeks a Friend In Obama Presidency, by Steve Schippert
The Tank/NRO, Jan 16, 2009
Earlier today, I remarked briefly about President Bush's statement in his farewell address to the American people that "If America does not lead the cause of freedom, that cause will not be led." I also noted, in criticizing our NATO allies' military timidity in the face of darkness, that there are a few exceptions. Britain has clearly been one of those exceptions, and the British defense secretary, John Hutton, demonstrates this.
Hutton offered up a scathing rebuke of the timidity of some fellow European NATO allies, who have often committed forces to Afghanistan but deployed them with orders and requirements that they avoid actual combat. He point-blank accused them of "freeloading on the back of U.S. military security." That'll leave a mark. And the Washington Post left that pointed quote for the final paragraph of their story.
"The campaign in Afghanistan is evidence of the limited appetite amongst some European member states for supporting the most active operation NATO has ever been tasked with," he added. "It isn't good enough to always look to the U.S. for political, financial and military cover. . . . Freeloading on the back of U.S. military security is not an option if we wish to be equal partners in this trans-Atlantic alliance."
Meanwhile, typical of the standard fare between our own Departments of Defense and State, Britian's foreign minister, David Miliband, is visiting Pakistan and speaking an altogether different and damaging language, criticizing "George Bush's 'war on terror'" to a receptive and sensitive foreign audience at the heart of a conflict we neither sought nor welcomed. That, too, will leave a mark.
To demonstrate the value of timidity, Pakistan rounded up over one hundred members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa in the hours before his arrival. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is the name assumed by Lashkar-e-Taiba after it was 'banned' by Pakistan and is the group behind the recent Mumbai terrorist attacks in India. When Miliband departs Pakistan, they will be freed from their cells. We've seen this before.
That's not the half of it. From this morning's DailyBriefing, it is clear that the overall condition is rife with weakness; a weakness hoping to find a friend in Barack Obama.
3. New Gates-Petraeus strategy for Afghanistan is meeting stiff resistance from outside Washington, and the UN is pleading with President-elect Obama not to change the current strategy, one which has been roundly criticized in the past for being ineffective.
The march on Washington — and away from our enemies — has already begun. Consider the related stories for context.
AFGHANISTAN
NATO Nations Scolded by Brit SecDef for Shirking Duties In Afghanistan - Washington Post
UN to Obama: Don't change Afghan strategy - AP
Resistance to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan - Washington Post
Top Afghan general dies in helicopter crash - Los Angeles Times
Separate Incident: US: Helicopter crashed in Afghanistan, all survive - AP
PAKISTAN
Pakistan cracks down on Jamaat ud-Dawa in Mumbai probe? - Los Angeles Times
Pakistan crackdown on eve of UK Foreign Minister's visit - The Independent (UK)
UNITED KINGDOM
British FM David Miliband criticizes 'George Bush's war on terror' while in Pakistan - Telegraph
We must hope that such weakness finds no friend in our new president, because President Bush was unfortunately on the mark last night.
In the 21st century, security and prosperity at home depend on the expansion of liberty abroad. If America does not lead the cause of freedom, that cause will not be led.
This much can hardly be disputed. It's right before your eyes.
The Tank/NRO, Jan 16, 2009
Earlier today, I remarked briefly about President Bush's statement in his farewell address to the American people that "If America does not lead the cause of freedom, that cause will not be led." I also noted, in criticizing our NATO allies' military timidity in the face of darkness, that there are a few exceptions. Britain has clearly been one of those exceptions, and the British defense secretary, John Hutton, demonstrates this.
Hutton offered up a scathing rebuke of the timidity of some fellow European NATO allies, who have often committed forces to Afghanistan but deployed them with orders and requirements that they avoid actual combat. He point-blank accused them of "freeloading on the back of U.S. military security." That'll leave a mark. And the Washington Post left that pointed quote for the final paragraph of their story.
"The campaign in Afghanistan is evidence of the limited appetite amongst some European member states for supporting the most active operation NATO has ever been tasked with," he added. "It isn't good enough to always look to the U.S. for political, financial and military cover. . . . Freeloading on the back of U.S. military security is not an option if we wish to be equal partners in this trans-Atlantic alliance."
Meanwhile, typical of the standard fare between our own Departments of Defense and State, Britian's foreign minister, David Miliband, is visiting Pakistan and speaking an altogether different and damaging language, criticizing "George Bush's 'war on terror'" to a receptive and sensitive foreign audience at the heart of a conflict we neither sought nor welcomed. That, too, will leave a mark.
To demonstrate the value of timidity, Pakistan rounded up over one hundred members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa in the hours before his arrival. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is the name assumed by Lashkar-e-Taiba after it was 'banned' by Pakistan and is the group behind the recent Mumbai terrorist attacks in India. When Miliband departs Pakistan, they will be freed from their cells. We've seen this before.
That's not the half of it. From this morning's DailyBriefing, it is clear that the overall condition is rife with weakness; a weakness hoping to find a friend in Barack Obama.
3. New Gates-Petraeus strategy for Afghanistan is meeting stiff resistance from outside Washington, and the UN is pleading with President-elect Obama not to change the current strategy, one which has been roundly criticized in the past for being ineffective.
The march on Washington — and away from our enemies — has already begun. Consider the related stories for context.
AFGHANISTAN
NATO Nations Scolded by Brit SecDef for Shirking Duties In Afghanistan - Washington Post
UN to Obama: Don't change Afghan strategy - AP
Resistance to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan - Washington Post
Top Afghan general dies in helicopter crash - Los Angeles Times
Separate Incident: US: Helicopter crashed in Afghanistan, all survive - AP
PAKISTAN
Pakistan cracks down on Jamaat ud-Dawa in Mumbai probe? - Los Angeles Times
Pakistan crackdown on eve of UK Foreign Minister's visit - The Independent (UK)
UNITED KINGDOM
British FM David Miliband criticizes 'George Bush's war on terror' while in Pakistan - Telegraph
We must hope that such weakness finds no friend in our new president, because President Bush was unfortunately on the mark last night.
In the 21st century, security and prosperity at home depend on the expansion of liberty abroad. If America does not lead the cause of freedom, that cause will not be led.
This much can hardly be disputed. It's right before your eyes.
Saturday, January 17, 2009
Peter Beinart: The Surge Worked
Admit It: The Surge Worked. By Peter Beinart
WaPo, Sunday, January 18, 2009; page B07
It's no longer a close call: President Bush was right about the surge. According to Michael O'Hanlon and Jason Campbell of the Brookings Institution, the number of Iraqi war dead was 500 in November of 2008, compared with 3,475 in November of 2006. That same month, 69 Americans died in Iraq; in November 2008, 12 did.
Violence in Anbar province is down more than 90 percent over the past two years, the New York Times reports. Returning to Iraq after long absences, respected journalists Anthony Shadid and Dexter Filkins say they barely recognize the place.
Is the surge solely responsible for the turnaround? Of course not. Al-Qaeda alienated the Sunni tribes; Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army decided to stand down; the United States assassinated key insurgent and militia leaders, all of which mattered as much if not more than the increase in U.S. troops. And the decline in violence isn't necessarily permanent. Iraq watchers warn that communal distrust remains high; if someone strikes a match, civil war could again rage out of control.
Moreover, even if the calm endures, that still doesn't justify the Bush administration's initial decision to go to war, which remains one of the great blunders in American foreign policy history. But if Iraq overall represents a massive stain on Bush's record, his decision to increase America's troop presence in late 2006 now looks like his finest hour. Given the mood in Washington and the country as a whole, it would have been far easier to do the opposite. Politically, Bush took the path of most resistance. He endured an avalanche of scorn, and now he has been vindicated. He was not only right; he was courageous.
It's time for Democrats to say so. During the campaign they rarely did for fear of jeopardizing Barack Obama's chances of winning the presidency. But today, the hesitation is less tactical than emotional. Most Democrats think Bush has been an atrocious president, and they want to usher him out of office with the jeers he so richly deserves. Even if they suspect, in their heart of hearts, that he was right about the surge, they don't want to give him the satisfaction.
Yet they should -- not for his sake but for their own. Because Bush has been such an unusually bad president, an entire generation of Democrats now takes it for granted that on the big questions, the right is always wrong. Older liberals remember the Persian Gulf War, which most congressional Democrats opposed and most congressional Republicans supported -- and the Republicans were proven right. They also remember the welfare reform debate of the mid-1990s, when prominent liberals predicted disaster, and disaster didn't happen.
Younger liberals, by contrast, have had no such chastening experiences. Watching the Bush administration flit from disaster to disaster, they have grown increasingly dismissive of conservatives in the process. They consume partisan media, where Republican malevolence is taken for granted. They laugh along with the "Colbert Report," the whole premise of which is that conservatives are bombastic, chauvinistic and dumb. They have never had the ideologically humbling experience of watching the people whose politics they loathe be proven right.
In this way, they are a little like the Bushies themselves. One reason the Bush administration fell prey to such monumental hubris was that it didn't take its critics seriously. Convinced that the Reagan years had forever vindicated deregulated capitalism and unfettered American might, the Bushies blithely dismissed liberals who warned about deregulation, or Europeans who warned about military force, on the grounds that history had consistently proved those critics wrong. "You want to know what I really think of the Europeans?" a top Bush official declared during the Iraq debate. "I think they have been wrong on just about every major international issue for the past 20 years."
Today, by contrast, it is conservatives who have been proven wrong again and again. Politically and intellectually, the right is discredited, and the arguments of its rump minority in Congress will be easy to dismiss. Liberal self-confidence is sky-high.
That's why it's important to admit that Bush was right about the surge. Doing so would remind Democrats that no one political party, or ideological perspective, has a monopoly on wisdom. That recognition can be the difference between ambition -- which the Obama presidency must exhibit -- and hubris, which it can ill afford.
Being proven right too many times is dangerous. It breeds intellectual arrogance and complacency. As the Democrats prepare to take over Washington, they should publicly acknowledge that on the surge, they were wrong. That acknowledgment may not do much for Bush's legacy, but it could do wonders for their own.
Peter Beinart, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes a monthly column for The Post.
WaPo, Sunday, January 18, 2009; page B07
It's no longer a close call: President Bush was right about the surge. According to Michael O'Hanlon and Jason Campbell of the Brookings Institution, the number of Iraqi war dead was 500 in November of 2008, compared with 3,475 in November of 2006. That same month, 69 Americans died in Iraq; in November 2008, 12 did.
Violence in Anbar province is down more than 90 percent over the past two years, the New York Times reports. Returning to Iraq after long absences, respected journalists Anthony Shadid and Dexter Filkins say they barely recognize the place.
Is the surge solely responsible for the turnaround? Of course not. Al-Qaeda alienated the Sunni tribes; Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army decided to stand down; the United States assassinated key insurgent and militia leaders, all of which mattered as much if not more than the increase in U.S. troops. And the decline in violence isn't necessarily permanent. Iraq watchers warn that communal distrust remains high; if someone strikes a match, civil war could again rage out of control.
Moreover, even if the calm endures, that still doesn't justify the Bush administration's initial decision to go to war, which remains one of the great blunders in American foreign policy history. But if Iraq overall represents a massive stain on Bush's record, his decision to increase America's troop presence in late 2006 now looks like his finest hour. Given the mood in Washington and the country as a whole, it would have been far easier to do the opposite. Politically, Bush took the path of most resistance. He endured an avalanche of scorn, and now he has been vindicated. He was not only right; he was courageous.
It's time for Democrats to say so. During the campaign they rarely did for fear of jeopardizing Barack Obama's chances of winning the presidency. But today, the hesitation is less tactical than emotional. Most Democrats think Bush has been an atrocious president, and they want to usher him out of office with the jeers he so richly deserves. Even if they suspect, in their heart of hearts, that he was right about the surge, they don't want to give him the satisfaction.
Yet they should -- not for his sake but for their own. Because Bush has been such an unusually bad president, an entire generation of Democrats now takes it for granted that on the big questions, the right is always wrong. Older liberals remember the Persian Gulf War, which most congressional Democrats opposed and most congressional Republicans supported -- and the Republicans were proven right. They also remember the welfare reform debate of the mid-1990s, when prominent liberals predicted disaster, and disaster didn't happen.
Younger liberals, by contrast, have had no such chastening experiences. Watching the Bush administration flit from disaster to disaster, they have grown increasingly dismissive of conservatives in the process. They consume partisan media, where Republican malevolence is taken for granted. They laugh along with the "Colbert Report," the whole premise of which is that conservatives are bombastic, chauvinistic and dumb. They have never had the ideologically humbling experience of watching the people whose politics they loathe be proven right.
In this way, they are a little like the Bushies themselves. One reason the Bush administration fell prey to such monumental hubris was that it didn't take its critics seriously. Convinced that the Reagan years had forever vindicated deregulated capitalism and unfettered American might, the Bushies blithely dismissed liberals who warned about deregulation, or Europeans who warned about military force, on the grounds that history had consistently proved those critics wrong. "You want to know what I really think of the Europeans?" a top Bush official declared during the Iraq debate. "I think they have been wrong on just about every major international issue for the past 20 years."
Today, by contrast, it is conservatives who have been proven wrong again and again. Politically and intellectually, the right is discredited, and the arguments of its rump minority in Congress will be easy to dismiss. Liberal self-confidence is sky-high.
That's why it's important to admit that Bush was right about the surge. Doing so would remind Democrats that no one political party, or ideological perspective, has a monopoly on wisdom. That recognition can be the difference between ambition -- which the Obama presidency must exhibit -- and hubris, which it can ill afford.
Being proven right too many times is dangerous. It breeds intellectual arrogance and complacency. As the Democrats prepare to take over Washington, they should publicly acknowledge that on the surge, they were wrong. That acknowledgment may not do much for Bush's legacy, but it could do wonders for their own.
Peter Beinart, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes a monthly column for The Post.
North Korea Says It Has ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium
North Korea Says It Has ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium, by Choe Sang-Hun
TNYT, January 18, 2009
SEOUL, South Korea — The North Korean military declared an “all-out confrontational posture” against South Korea on Saturday as an American scholar said he had been told by North Korean officials that the North had “weaponized” 30.8 kilograms of plutonium, enough for four to six nuclear bombs.
That claim would confirm American intelligence estimates, which suggest that the North has harvested the fuel for six or more bombs.
South Korea ordered its military to heighten vigilance along the heavily fortified border with North Korea, said a spokesman of the South Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
North Korea’s saber-rattling rhetoric against the South has increased in intensity since President Lee Myung-bak came to office in Seoul a year ago, vowing to take a tougher stance on North Korea, reversing 10 years of his liberal predecessors’ efforts to engage the North with economic aid. But what made the threat on Saturday unusual — and more worrisome to some South Korean analysts — was the way it was delivered: in a statement read on North Korean television by a uniformed spokesman for the North Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
“Strong military measures will follow from our revolutionary armed force,” the spokesman, a colonel, said, according to Yonhap, South Korea’s national news agency, which monitors North Korean broadcasts.
Usually the North Korean government issues written statements that are delivered by North Korean media; sometimes the statements are read by press officers, not by a uniformed member of the military.
The spokesman he warned of a clash along a disputed western sea border between the Koreas. The two navies fought skirmishes there in 1999 and 2002. It is always difficult to decipher the messages that North Korea’s reclusive government is trying to send with its often bombastic missives. In times of crucial bargaining, North Korea often tries to drive a wedge between Washington and South Korea to sow discord between the allies, and raises the stakes by increasing demands and issuing dire threats.
With President-elect Barack Obama about to take office in the United States and negotiations over the North’s nuclear program expected to resume, it is possible that the North is merely setting up its negotiating position. But analysts said it could also be an indication that North Korea was intending to hold on to its arms despite an agreement it signed with five countries, including the United States, in 2005, in which it committed to eventually giving up those weapons. The exact conditions under which it would do so were unclear.
Questions over the health of the country’s quixotic leader, Kim Jong-il, also complicate any attempts to understand the country, where few Westerners have access. In August, there were reports that Mr. Kim suffered a stroke, and since then rumors have swirled about who might succeed him.
The news about the possible weaponization of North Korea’s stores of plutonium were delivered Saturday by the American scholar, Selig S. Harrison, the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy, who was in Beijing after returning from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.
Mr. Harrison, said that when pressed, the North Korean officials did not explicitly say what “weaponization” of the plutonium meant, but that the implication was that North Korea had created nuclear bombs with the plutonium.
Mr. Harrison, a former journalist, often travels to North Korea to meet with senior officials there.
“They’ve raised the bar and said, ‘We are a nuclear weapons state and deal with us on that basis,’ ” said Mr. Harrison at a news conference in the St. Regis Hotel in Beijing.
Mr. Harrison acknowledged that North Korea could be bluffing in order to use the claim of having nuclear weapons as a negotiating tactic.
He added that all the officials he met with seemed eager to open discussions with the incoming Obama administration. “All the statements about Obama were very helpful, very respectful,” he said.
Thirty kilograms of plutonium, about 66 pounds, which would account for most of the 37 kilograms North Korea declared that it possessed to the United States last year, is enough for it to make four to six bombs, according to nuclear experts.
South Korea had no immediate reaction to Mr. Harrison’s report.
Earlier Saturday, North Korea also toughened its stance toward Washington, saying that reopening diplomatic ties would not be enough to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons. It said it would maintain its “status as a nuclear weapons state” as long as there was a nuclear threat from the United States.
“We can live without normalizing ties with the United States, but we cannot live without a nuclear deterrent,” a spokesman for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry told its official news agency, KCNA.
In the past, the North had said it would not dismantle the weapons until the United States changed what it termed its “hostile attitude.”
In the spokesman’s comments, and his similar statement last Tuesday, North Korea laid out its demands as it prepared for a new series of negotiations with Mr. Obama, who will be inaugurated on Tuesday.
Its stance posed the hard question to the new Obama administration of what it would take to remove North Korea’s nuclear weapons assets.
In its Tuesday statement, North Korea indicated that the removal of an American nuclear threat meant the removal of South Korea from the American nuclear umbrella, the introduction of a verification mechanism to ensure that no American atomic weapons are deployed in or pass through South Korea, and even simultaneous nuclear disarmament talks among “all nuclear states,” including itself.
Six-nation talks on ending North Korea’s nuclear programs, which include the United States, stalled in the last months of the Bush administration as the United States and North Korea bickered over how much nuclear inspection the North should accept.
Edward Wong contributed reporting from Beijing.
TNYT, January 18, 2009
SEOUL, South Korea — The North Korean military declared an “all-out confrontational posture” against South Korea on Saturday as an American scholar said he had been told by North Korean officials that the North had “weaponized” 30.8 kilograms of plutonium, enough for four to six nuclear bombs.
That claim would confirm American intelligence estimates, which suggest that the North has harvested the fuel for six or more bombs.
South Korea ordered its military to heighten vigilance along the heavily fortified border with North Korea, said a spokesman of the South Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
North Korea’s saber-rattling rhetoric against the South has increased in intensity since President Lee Myung-bak came to office in Seoul a year ago, vowing to take a tougher stance on North Korea, reversing 10 years of his liberal predecessors’ efforts to engage the North with economic aid. But what made the threat on Saturday unusual — and more worrisome to some South Korean analysts — was the way it was delivered: in a statement read on North Korean television by a uniformed spokesman for the North Korean military joint chiefs of staff.
“Strong military measures will follow from our revolutionary armed force,” the spokesman, a colonel, said, according to Yonhap, South Korea’s national news agency, which monitors North Korean broadcasts.
Usually the North Korean government issues written statements that are delivered by North Korean media; sometimes the statements are read by press officers, not by a uniformed member of the military.
The spokesman he warned of a clash along a disputed western sea border between the Koreas. The two navies fought skirmishes there in 1999 and 2002. It is always difficult to decipher the messages that North Korea’s reclusive government is trying to send with its often bombastic missives. In times of crucial bargaining, North Korea often tries to drive a wedge between Washington and South Korea to sow discord between the allies, and raises the stakes by increasing demands and issuing dire threats.
With President-elect Barack Obama about to take office in the United States and negotiations over the North’s nuclear program expected to resume, it is possible that the North is merely setting up its negotiating position. But analysts said it could also be an indication that North Korea was intending to hold on to its arms despite an agreement it signed with five countries, including the United States, in 2005, in which it committed to eventually giving up those weapons. The exact conditions under which it would do so were unclear.
Questions over the health of the country’s quixotic leader, Kim Jong-il, also complicate any attempts to understand the country, where few Westerners have access. In August, there were reports that Mr. Kim suffered a stroke, and since then rumors have swirled about who might succeed him.
The news about the possible weaponization of North Korea’s stores of plutonium were delivered Saturday by the American scholar, Selig S. Harrison, the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy, who was in Beijing after returning from the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.
Mr. Harrison, said that when pressed, the North Korean officials did not explicitly say what “weaponization” of the plutonium meant, but that the implication was that North Korea had created nuclear bombs with the plutonium.
Mr. Harrison, a former journalist, often travels to North Korea to meet with senior officials there.
“They’ve raised the bar and said, ‘We are a nuclear weapons state and deal with us on that basis,’ ” said Mr. Harrison at a news conference in the St. Regis Hotel in Beijing.
Mr. Harrison acknowledged that North Korea could be bluffing in order to use the claim of having nuclear weapons as a negotiating tactic.
He added that all the officials he met with seemed eager to open discussions with the incoming Obama administration. “All the statements about Obama were very helpful, very respectful,” he said.
Thirty kilograms of plutonium, about 66 pounds, which would account for most of the 37 kilograms North Korea declared that it possessed to the United States last year, is enough for it to make four to six bombs, according to nuclear experts.
South Korea had no immediate reaction to Mr. Harrison’s report.
Earlier Saturday, North Korea also toughened its stance toward Washington, saying that reopening diplomatic ties would not be enough to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons. It said it would maintain its “status as a nuclear weapons state” as long as there was a nuclear threat from the United States.
“We can live without normalizing ties with the United States, but we cannot live without a nuclear deterrent,” a spokesman for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry told its official news agency, KCNA.
In the past, the North had said it would not dismantle the weapons until the United States changed what it termed its “hostile attitude.”
In the spokesman’s comments, and his similar statement last Tuesday, North Korea laid out its demands as it prepared for a new series of negotiations with Mr. Obama, who will be inaugurated on Tuesday.
Its stance posed the hard question to the new Obama administration of what it would take to remove North Korea’s nuclear weapons assets.
In its Tuesday statement, North Korea indicated that the removal of an American nuclear threat meant the removal of South Korea from the American nuclear umbrella, the introduction of a verification mechanism to ensure that no American atomic weapons are deployed in or pass through South Korea, and even simultaneous nuclear disarmament talks among “all nuclear states,” including itself.
Six-nation talks on ending North Korea’s nuclear programs, which include the United States, stalled in the last months of the Bush administration as the United States and North Korea bickered over how much nuclear inspection the North should accept.
Edward Wong contributed reporting from Beijing.
Japanese Defense Ministry eyes developing early warning satellite for missile shield
Ministry eyes developing early warning satellite for missile shield
Kyodo News, Saturday, Jan 17, 2009 @ 06:28 AM JST
TOKYO — The Defense Ministry is considering developing an early warning satellite to detect a ballistic missile in its boost phase to better deal with threats under Japan’s missile shield, according to the ministry’s basic policy on space development and use released Friday. The development of a man-made orbiter, if realized, would be the first step toward Japan having a satellite-based missile detection system of its own.
Japan currently relies on the United States for information on ballistic missile launches, such as those undertaken by North Korea. The early warning satellite would be designed to detect the heat released by a ballistic missile during its boost phase using infrared sensors, providing Tokyo with more time to respond. The development of such a satellite is likely to face many hurdles, however, not only due to technical problems and the huge costs involved but also because of the potential reaction of the United States, Japan’s closest ally.
Kyodo News, Saturday, Jan 17, 2009 @ 06:28 AM JST
TOKYO — The Defense Ministry is considering developing an early warning satellite to detect a ballistic missile in its boost phase to better deal with threats under Japan’s missile shield, according to the ministry’s basic policy on space development and use released Friday. The development of a man-made orbiter, if realized, would be the first step toward Japan having a satellite-based missile detection system of its own.
Japan currently relies on the United States for information on ballistic missile launches, such as those undertaken by North Korea. The early warning satellite would be designed to detect the heat released by a ballistic missile during its boost phase using infrared sensors, providing Tokyo with more time to respond. The development of such a satellite is likely to face many hurdles, however, not only due to technical problems and the huge costs involved but also because of the potential reaction of the United States, Japan’s closest ally.
Thursday, January 15, 2009
"Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in 2009"
Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in 2009. By Steven Pifer
The Brookings Institution, Jan 2009
As the Bush administration comes to a close, U.S.-Russian relations have fallen to their lowest level since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Unresolved and problematic issues dominate the agenda, little confidence exists between Washington and Moscow, and the shrill tone of official rhetoric approaches that of the Cold War.
This state of affairs is a far cry from what Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin envisaged in 2002, when they defined a framework for a qualitatively different U.S.-Russian relationship. Both sides bear responsibility for the failure to realize that vision.
As President Barack Obama takes charge of the Oval Office, he confronts a wary and assertive Russia among the many foreign policy challenges in his inbox. Moscow desires to reclaim “great power” status, an ambition fueled over the past five years by hundreds of billions of dollars in energy revenues. Its desires are colored by a bitter perception that the West took advantage of Russian weakness in the 1990s and that Washington has failed to take serious account of Moscow’s interests. Building a more sustainable relationship with Russia will not prove easy.
Securing Russian help in controlling nuclear materials, pressuring Iran not to acquire nuclear arms, and countering international terrorism is very much in the U.S. interest. Getting Russia right, however, will require a carefully considered, focused and sustained Russia policy, not just treating Russia as a function of the U.S. approach to other issues. Washington should seek to put U.S.-Russian relations on a more solid footing.
Building areas of cooperation not only can advance specific U.S. goals, it can reduce frictions on other issues. Further, the more there is to the bilateral relationship, the greater the interest it will hold for Russia, and the greater the leverage Washington will have with Moscow. The thin state of U.S.-Russian relations in August gave the Kremlin little reason for pause before answering the Georgian military incursion into South Ossetia with a large and disproportionate response. Washington should strive to build a relationship so that, should a similar crisis arise in the future, Russian concern about damaging relations with the United States would exercise a restraining influence.
The Obama administration should aim for a balance in its approach toward Russia, making clear the unacceptability of Russian actions that violate international norms while encouraging cooperation and integration that will make Russia a stakeholder in existing international institutions. The new administration can offer initiatives in several areas to test Moscow’s readiness for cooperation on issues of interest to Washington:
[Get the paper here]
The Brookings Institution, Jan 2009
As the Bush administration comes to a close, U.S.-Russian relations have fallen to their lowest level since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Unresolved and problematic issues dominate the agenda, little confidence exists between Washington and Moscow, and the shrill tone of official rhetoric approaches that of the Cold War.
This state of affairs is a far cry from what Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin envisaged in 2002, when they defined a framework for a qualitatively different U.S.-Russian relationship. Both sides bear responsibility for the failure to realize that vision.
As President Barack Obama takes charge of the Oval Office, he confronts a wary and assertive Russia among the many foreign policy challenges in his inbox. Moscow desires to reclaim “great power” status, an ambition fueled over the past five years by hundreds of billions of dollars in energy revenues. Its desires are colored by a bitter perception that the West took advantage of Russian weakness in the 1990s and that Washington has failed to take serious account of Moscow’s interests. Building a more sustainable relationship with Russia will not prove easy.
Securing Russian help in controlling nuclear materials, pressuring Iran not to acquire nuclear arms, and countering international terrorism is very much in the U.S. interest. Getting Russia right, however, will require a carefully considered, focused and sustained Russia policy, not just treating Russia as a function of the U.S. approach to other issues. Washington should seek to put U.S.-Russian relations on a more solid footing.
Building areas of cooperation not only can advance specific U.S. goals, it can reduce frictions on other issues. Further, the more there is to the bilateral relationship, the greater the interest it will hold for Russia, and the greater the leverage Washington will have with Moscow. The thin state of U.S.-Russian relations in August gave the Kremlin little reason for pause before answering the Georgian military incursion into South Ossetia with a large and disproportionate response. Washington should strive to build a relationship so that, should a similar crisis arise in the future, Russian concern about damaging relations with the United States would exercise a restraining influence.
The Obama administration should aim for a balance in its approach toward Russia, making clear the unacceptability of Russian actions that violate international norms while encouraging cooperation and integration that will make Russia a stakeholder in existing international institutions. The new administration can offer initiatives in several areas to test Moscow’s readiness for cooperation on issues of interest to Washington:
- A revived nuclear arms control dialogue could lower the number of nuclear weapons capable of striking the United States while exerting a positive influence on the broader relationship. The Obama administration should propose reducing each side to no more than 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads, with ancillary limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers).
- Different timelines for Iran’s missile development and for U.S. missile defense deployment in Central Europe offer a possibility to defuse the missle defense issue. The Obama administration should impose a two- or three-year moratorium on the construction of missile defense facilities in Central Europe and in form the Russians that the moratorium could be extended if the Iranian missile program slows or stops.
- Expanding commercial links would add economic ballast that could cushion the overall relationship against differences on other issues. Specific steps include bringing Russia into the World Trade Organization, moving forward with the agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, and conferring permanent normal trade relations status on Russia by graduating it from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
- Greater creativity in the NATO-Russia channel could, over the longer term, reshape how Moscow views the Alliance and European security. This should include new areas for NATO-Russia cooperation, such as counter piracy operations, and greater transparency about NATO plans.
Transnational challenges may offer other areas for U.S.-Russian cooperation. Proposing new ideas to develop better relations with Moscow does not mean overlooking unacceptable Russian behavior or areas of difference, and differences will remain, even in an improved relationship. For example, the United States will continue to have concerns about the course of democracy within Russia. These questions should be addressed candidly and clearly. But the Obama administration should seek a different way to conduct the dialogue from that of the past five years, which has not worked.
[Get the paper here]
Encouraging a Resilient Public
Encouraging a Resilient Public, by Bernard Finel
Cato Unbound, January 14th, 2009
Excerpts:
On most issues, I think the gap between my perspective and Dr. Burns’ is quite small. I don’t think that policy success directly translates into changes in public perceptions. And I agree with his conclusion, “Take-away lesson: To be effective, reducing risk must be accompanied by identifying gaps in public understanding.” Where I am more skeptical is about the role of an explicit communication strategy in bringing about the changes we seek.
Aside from the problem of cutting through the noise that I mentioned earlier, I just don’t think there is any good evidence that nuanced discourse affects perceptions. Indeed, virtually every public policy debate in the United States tends to resolve itself down a set of unsophisticated sound-bites that gain traction through their appeal to broader, inchoate beliefs and norms. We don’t debate the actual merits of policy options. What we debate is whether a proposal looks vaguely like something we like or hate. The public tends to lodge policy debates into quite broad boxes… much to the frustration of policy wonks. But it is what it is.
And frankly, there is nothing really wrong with that. Communication with the public always has theatrical elements. It is often about images and symbols more than about details. Which is why, ultimately, I think that any public reassurance strategy will inevitably gravitate away from the sophisticated discourse envisaged by Dr. Burns and toward the blunt “security theater” approaches that we’ve already seen.
[...]
[Full text in the link above]
Cato Unbound, January 14th, 2009
Excerpts:
On most issues, I think the gap between my perspective and Dr. Burns’ is quite small. I don’t think that policy success directly translates into changes in public perceptions. And I agree with his conclusion, “Take-away lesson: To be effective, reducing risk must be accompanied by identifying gaps in public understanding.” Where I am more skeptical is about the role of an explicit communication strategy in bringing about the changes we seek.
Aside from the problem of cutting through the noise that I mentioned earlier, I just don’t think there is any good evidence that nuanced discourse affects perceptions. Indeed, virtually every public policy debate in the United States tends to resolve itself down a set of unsophisticated sound-bites that gain traction through their appeal to broader, inchoate beliefs and norms. We don’t debate the actual merits of policy options. What we debate is whether a proposal looks vaguely like something we like or hate. The public tends to lodge policy debates into quite broad boxes… much to the frustration of policy wonks. But it is what it is.
And frankly, there is nothing really wrong with that. Communication with the public always has theatrical elements. It is often about images and symbols more than about details. Which is why, ultimately, I think that any public reassurance strategy will inevitably gravitate away from the sophisticated discourse envisaged by Dr. Burns and toward the blunt “security theater” approaches that we’ve already seen.
[...]
[Full text in the link above]
Monday, January 12, 2009
Strengthening Our Japanese Alliance
Strengthening Our Japanese Alliance, by Dan Blumenthal
Why the United States should sell the F-22 to its most important Asian ally.
The Weekly Standard, Jan 08, 2009 @12:00:00 AM
Of the many items on President-elect Obama's foreign policy to-do list, one of the most important long-term tasks is repairing America's relationship with its key Asian ally, Japan. Though often taken for granted by American policymakers, Japan is the linchpin of America's strategic position in Asia. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-Japan alliance has underwritten the relative peace in Asia that has allowed the region to prosper.
While the relationship was attended to with renewed vigor during the early years of the Bush administration, the outgoing president's North Korea policy and lean toward Beijing has alarmed policymakers in Tokyo, and set the relationship on a downward spiral.
Now the president-elect has a chance to revitalize the Japanese alliance while at the same time creating high paying American jobs during a recession, reducing the costs of recapitalizing its U.S. air fleet, and improving America's strategic position in Asia. How? He can sell the F-22 fifth generation fighter aircraft to Japan.
Tokyo is in the market for a new air-superiority aircraft. The Japan Air Self- Defense Force currently has three fighter jet models in its fleet: an F-15 variant, a Vietnam era F-4, and the F-2 (a longer-range variant of the F-16C). But Japan will begin retiring the F-4 platform entirely early next decade.
To retain its ability to maintain dominance over Japan's airspace, Tokyo needs a fighter that can outperform China's growing fleet of Su-30s. The F-22 is unmatched in range, stealth, speed and reconnaissance capability.
Moreover, since 2001, the United States and Japan have made great strides in their ability to defend against common threats. The two countries have set up a combined air operations center to help meet the growing regional air and missile threat Tokyo's possession of the F-22 would further Washington's longstanding goal of increasing the two countries' interoperability.
Washington's sale of the F-22 to Japan would also help reduce unit costs of the plane for the U.S. Air Force. The USAF originally wanted to purchase 700 to 800 F-22 fighters, but was told they needed to cut their buy to 442, then 381, and finally 180. These cuts have substantially increased the cost per aircraft, and now F-22 production may end by 2010. The U.S. military is concerned about its long-term ability to maintain air dominance in the Asia-Pacific, with China's vast airpower advances. Exporting the F-22 to Japan would keep the production line open and allow the air force to purchase more aircraft at a lower price. An added benefit for the Obama administration is that many good manufacturing jobs would be saved, and created, by producing more F-22s. Approximately 95,000 American (mostly union) workers help produce or are suppliers for the aircraft.
So what are the downsides? Some argue that the F-22's technology is too advanced to sell to anyone and that Japan has already leaked information about its Aegis- class destroyer. But if Washington's defense policy of building strong partnerships is to have any real meaning, it must be ready to sell advanced technology to key allies. Washington's technology transfer policies remained mired in Cold War-thinking, designed to keep U.S. technology out of the hands of the Soviets. Today, there is broad consensus in the defense policy-making community that U.S. arms sales policy should be to build up the strength and capacity of allies to defend themselves. It is time to change a policy that does the reverse. Moreover, Japan has no record of proliferating advanced technology.
Others say that the sale of F-22s to Japan will enrage South Korea and "create an arms race" with China. Is it true that South Korea, America's other key ally in Northeast Asia is, for historical reasons, still suspicious of Tokyo. Washington can mitigate these concerns by pushing for closer three way ties among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, while quietly urging Japan to be more forthcoming about its past with South Korea. Tokyo has no aggressive intent, and regards South Korea as an ally. And, there is no reason why South Korea should be prohibited from buying the F-22 if they indicate an interest.
The China question is somewhat more complex. There may be an emerging "arms race" in Asia, but so far only one country is off to the races: China. Over the past decade it has deployed more that 1,000 ballistic and cruise missiles and 300 advanced fighter aircraft to its Southern coast. Japan, for obvious reasons, is concerned. The task for the U.S.-Japan alliance is to maintain a regional political system that China does not dominate. At this stage, this means a greater military presence in the region to check China's destabilizing military advances.
The time has come to stop talking about the need for a favorable balance of power in Asia, and to begin to act. Exporting the F-22 to Japan makes sound strategic and military sense. President-elect Obama could improve alliance relations, further America's Asia-Pacific defense policy, and create good jobs at home. Once alliance relations are righted, the United States and its allies can continue to engage China on issues of common interest from a position of strength.
Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Why the United States should sell the F-22 to its most important Asian ally.
The Weekly Standard, Jan 08, 2009 @12:00:00 AM
Of the many items on President-elect Obama's foreign policy to-do list, one of the most important long-term tasks is repairing America's relationship with its key Asian ally, Japan. Though often taken for granted by American policymakers, Japan is the linchpin of America's strategic position in Asia. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-Japan alliance has underwritten the relative peace in Asia that has allowed the region to prosper.
While the relationship was attended to with renewed vigor during the early years of the Bush administration, the outgoing president's North Korea policy and lean toward Beijing has alarmed policymakers in Tokyo, and set the relationship on a downward spiral.
Now the president-elect has a chance to revitalize the Japanese alliance while at the same time creating high paying American jobs during a recession, reducing the costs of recapitalizing its U.S. air fleet, and improving America's strategic position in Asia. How? He can sell the F-22 fifth generation fighter aircraft to Japan.
Tokyo is in the market for a new air-superiority aircraft. The Japan Air Self- Defense Force currently has three fighter jet models in its fleet: an F-15 variant, a Vietnam era F-4, and the F-2 (a longer-range variant of the F-16C). But Japan will begin retiring the F-4 platform entirely early next decade.
To retain its ability to maintain dominance over Japan's airspace, Tokyo needs a fighter that can outperform China's growing fleet of Su-30s. The F-22 is unmatched in range, stealth, speed and reconnaissance capability.
Moreover, since 2001, the United States and Japan have made great strides in their ability to defend against common threats. The two countries have set up a combined air operations center to help meet the growing regional air and missile threat Tokyo's possession of the F-22 would further Washington's longstanding goal of increasing the two countries' interoperability.
Washington's sale of the F-22 to Japan would also help reduce unit costs of the plane for the U.S. Air Force. The USAF originally wanted to purchase 700 to 800 F-22 fighters, but was told they needed to cut their buy to 442, then 381, and finally 180. These cuts have substantially increased the cost per aircraft, and now F-22 production may end by 2010. The U.S. military is concerned about its long-term ability to maintain air dominance in the Asia-Pacific, with China's vast airpower advances. Exporting the F-22 to Japan would keep the production line open and allow the air force to purchase more aircraft at a lower price. An added benefit for the Obama administration is that many good manufacturing jobs would be saved, and created, by producing more F-22s. Approximately 95,000 American (mostly union) workers help produce or are suppliers for the aircraft.
So what are the downsides? Some argue that the F-22's technology is too advanced to sell to anyone and that Japan has already leaked information about its Aegis- class destroyer. But if Washington's defense policy of building strong partnerships is to have any real meaning, it must be ready to sell advanced technology to key allies. Washington's technology transfer policies remained mired in Cold War-thinking, designed to keep U.S. technology out of the hands of the Soviets. Today, there is broad consensus in the defense policy-making community that U.S. arms sales policy should be to build up the strength and capacity of allies to defend themselves. It is time to change a policy that does the reverse. Moreover, Japan has no record of proliferating advanced technology.
Others say that the sale of F-22s to Japan will enrage South Korea and "create an arms race" with China. Is it true that South Korea, America's other key ally in Northeast Asia is, for historical reasons, still suspicious of Tokyo. Washington can mitigate these concerns by pushing for closer three way ties among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, while quietly urging Japan to be more forthcoming about its past with South Korea. Tokyo has no aggressive intent, and regards South Korea as an ally. And, there is no reason why South Korea should be prohibited from buying the F-22 if they indicate an interest.
The China question is somewhat more complex. There may be an emerging "arms race" in Asia, but so far only one country is off to the races: China. Over the past decade it has deployed more that 1,000 ballistic and cruise missiles and 300 advanced fighter aircraft to its Southern coast. Japan, for obvious reasons, is concerned. The task for the U.S.-Japan alliance is to maintain a regional political system that China does not dominate. At this stage, this means a greater military presence in the region to check China's destabilizing military advances.
The time has come to stop talking about the need for a favorable balance of power in Asia, and to begin to act. Exporting the F-22 to Japan makes sound strategic and military sense. President-elect Obama could improve alliance relations, further America's Asia-Pacific defense policy, and create good jobs at home. Once alliance relations are righted, the United States and its allies can continue to engage China on issues of common interest from a position of strength.
Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Friday, January 2, 2009
Heritage: Toward an Alternative Strategic Security Posture
Toward an Alternative Strategic Security Posture, by Baker Spring
Heritage WebMemo #2183
On December 12, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its interim report.[1] The commission is charged with guiding policy for a strategic posture for the United States that meets today's security needs. This guidance will define the future of U.S. strategic nuclear, strategic conventional, and strategic defense forces.
Currently, there is no consensus in Congress on an appropriate strategic posture. As an interim report, the commission's tentative recommendations do not provide such a consensus. However, the report does describe an alternative policy that would recognize the essential role of nuclear weapons in providing for U.S. security while establishing a defense-oriented strategic posture and seeking the circumstance where comprehensive nuclear disarmament becomes a real possibility.
The final report is due on April 1, 2009. If the tentative and general recommendations in the interim report can be translated into this alternative strategic policy, then a strategic posture that is broadly supported in Congress should result.
Global Nuclear Disarmament
Individuals both within the commission and outside it fervently desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons.[2] The commission recognizes, however, that this goal is "extremely difficult to attain and would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order."[3] This means those favoring nuclear disarmament have recognized that their preferred outcome is not appropriate under present circumstances and that there is no direct path to nuclear disarmament at this time. Implicit in this understanding is that these same individuals will abandon unilateral steps aimed at atrophying the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure. They will, for example, have to abandon immediate steps to de-alert U.S. nuclear forces, cease efforts to curtail all programs for modernizing the nuclear force, put off ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and cease efforts to impose changes on the declared policy governing the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Strategic Defenses, Conventional Superiority, and the Prospect of Nuclear Disarmament
The commission's recommendations regarding global nuclear disarmament are not only qualified; they are conditioned on taking other steps regarding the broader strategic posture of the U.S. Included in these are steps to field robust missile defenses and preserve U.S. conventional superiority. In this context, those who strongly favor nuclear disarmament should recognize that robust strategic defensive measures--including ballistic missile defenses--and conventional superiority can create a circumstance where nuclear disarmament is appropriate.
In this context, the commission should support a longer-term approach for strengthening strategic defenses and strategic conventional forces, along with select steps for nuclear modernization, that recognizes that neither is provocative under the right circumstances. This option would use U.S. diplomacy to convince other states (starting with China and Russia) that a "protect and defend" strategy will serve their interests as much as those of the U.S.
Such an effort should encourage the principle of non-aggression and reducing and ultimately eliminating those strategic weapons that pose the greatest threat to civilian populations, vital national institutions, and infrastructure. This policy would start by focusing on controlling high-yield nuclear weapons that are mounted on inaccurate delivery systems and offer little or no defensive value. For its part, the U.S. should produce lower-yield weapons mounted on highly accurate delivery systems and hold at risk those weapons that pose a threat of widespread destruction to itself and its allies. While nothing is certain, the adoption of fundamentally defensive strategies by these three nations may lead to a direct path to nuclear disarmament.
Strengthening Strategic Defenses
Regarding strategic defenses specifically, the interim report states, "Missile defenses appropriate to defend against a rogue nuclear nation could serve a damage-limiting and stabilizing role in the US strategic posture, assuming such defenses are perceived as being effective enough to at least sow doubts in the minds of potential attackers that such an attack would succeed."[4] Limiting the strategic defensive posture to missile defenses, however, is too narrow. Accordingly, the final report should expand this recommendation to cover the other means of delivering strategic attacks on the U.S. and its allies.
Further, the commission warns against fielding defenses that might provoke China and Russia. This point should be qualified in two ways. First, it must identify an objective standard for what might provoke China or Russia. Otherwise, any claim of China's or Russia's provocation would be seen as legitimate. Second, the commission should describe how the diplomatic and arms control options toward both China and Russia described earlier will cause both to see America's defensive measures as not provocative but stabilizing, reinforcing their security against attack.
An Alternative Vision
If the proponents of nuclear disarmament on the commission honor the qualifications and conditions described here and convince Congress to do likewise, then the proponents of fielding robust strategic defenses should offer an alternative vision for the U.S. strategic posture. This alternative vision points to a future circumstance where the U.S. and other states could consider direct steps to nuclear disarmament. It would represent the indirect path to global nuclear disarmament. All concerned, however, need to recognize that the consensus outlined here does not mean an end to the debate. It will only serve to define the parameters of the debate from here forward. The fact of the matter is that substantive differences of opinions regarding the appropriate strategic posture of the United States will remain.
Baker Spring is F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
References
[1] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, "Interim Report," December 11, 2008, at www.usip.org/strategic_posture/sprc_interim_report.pdf (December 17, 2008).
[2] See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A-15; Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html (December 18, 2008).
[3] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, "Interim Report," p. 9.
[4] Ibid., p. 10.
Heritage WebMemo #2183
On December 12, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its interim report.[1] The commission is charged with guiding policy for a strategic posture for the United States that meets today's security needs. This guidance will define the future of U.S. strategic nuclear, strategic conventional, and strategic defense forces.
Currently, there is no consensus in Congress on an appropriate strategic posture. As an interim report, the commission's tentative recommendations do not provide such a consensus. However, the report does describe an alternative policy that would recognize the essential role of nuclear weapons in providing for U.S. security while establishing a defense-oriented strategic posture and seeking the circumstance where comprehensive nuclear disarmament becomes a real possibility.
The final report is due on April 1, 2009. If the tentative and general recommendations in the interim report can be translated into this alternative strategic policy, then a strategic posture that is broadly supported in Congress should result.
Global Nuclear Disarmament
Individuals both within the commission and outside it fervently desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons.[2] The commission recognizes, however, that this goal is "extremely difficult to attain and would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order."[3] This means those favoring nuclear disarmament have recognized that their preferred outcome is not appropriate under present circumstances and that there is no direct path to nuclear disarmament at this time. Implicit in this understanding is that these same individuals will abandon unilateral steps aimed at atrophying the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure. They will, for example, have to abandon immediate steps to de-alert U.S. nuclear forces, cease efforts to curtail all programs for modernizing the nuclear force, put off ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and cease efforts to impose changes on the declared policy governing the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Strategic Defenses, Conventional Superiority, and the Prospect of Nuclear Disarmament
The commission's recommendations regarding global nuclear disarmament are not only qualified; they are conditioned on taking other steps regarding the broader strategic posture of the U.S. Included in these are steps to field robust missile defenses and preserve U.S. conventional superiority. In this context, those who strongly favor nuclear disarmament should recognize that robust strategic defensive measures--including ballistic missile defenses--and conventional superiority can create a circumstance where nuclear disarmament is appropriate.
In this context, the commission should support a longer-term approach for strengthening strategic defenses and strategic conventional forces, along with select steps for nuclear modernization, that recognizes that neither is provocative under the right circumstances. This option would use U.S. diplomacy to convince other states (starting with China and Russia) that a "protect and defend" strategy will serve their interests as much as those of the U.S.
Such an effort should encourage the principle of non-aggression and reducing and ultimately eliminating those strategic weapons that pose the greatest threat to civilian populations, vital national institutions, and infrastructure. This policy would start by focusing on controlling high-yield nuclear weapons that are mounted on inaccurate delivery systems and offer little or no defensive value. For its part, the U.S. should produce lower-yield weapons mounted on highly accurate delivery systems and hold at risk those weapons that pose a threat of widespread destruction to itself and its allies. While nothing is certain, the adoption of fundamentally defensive strategies by these three nations may lead to a direct path to nuclear disarmament.
Strengthening Strategic Defenses
Regarding strategic defenses specifically, the interim report states, "Missile defenses appropriate to defend against a rogue nuclear nation could serve a damage-limiting and stabilizing role in the US strategic posture, assuming such defenses are perceived as being effective enough to at least sow doubts in the minds of potential attackers that such an attack would succeed."[4] Limiting the strategic defensive posture to missile defenses, however, is too narrow. Accordingly, the final report should expand this recommendation to cover the other means of delivering strategic attacks on the U.S. and its allies.
Further, the commission warns against fielding defenses that might provoke China and Russia. This point should be qualified in two ways. First, it must identify an objective standard for what might provoke China or Russia. Otherwise, any claim of China's or Russia's provocation would be seen as legitimate. Second, the commission should describe how the diplomatic and arms control options toward both China and Russia described earlier will cause both to see America's defensive measures as not provocative but stabilizing, reinforcing their security against attack.
An Alternative Vision
If the proponents of nuclear disarmament on the commission honor the qualifications and conditions described here and convince Congress to do likewise, then the proponents of fielding robust strategic defenses should offer an alternative vision for the U.S. strategic posture. This alternative vision points to a future circumstance where the U.S. and other states could consider direct steps to nuclear disarmament. It would represent the indirect path to global nuclear disarmament. All concerned, however, need to recognize that the consensus outlined here does not mean an end to the debate. It will only serve to define the parameters of the debate from here forward. The fact of the matter is that substantive differences of opinions regarding the appropriate strategic posture of the United States will remain.
Baker Spring is F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
References
[1] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, "Interim Report," December 11, 2008, at www.usip.org/strategic_posture/sprc_interim_report.pdf (December 17, 2008).
[2] See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A-15; Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html (December 18, 2008).
[3] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, "Interim Report," p. 9.
[4] Ibid., p. 10.
Thursday, January 1, 2009
Haass and Indyk: Beyond Iraq
Beyond Iraq. By Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyk
A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009
Summary: To be successful in the Middle East, the Obama administration will need to move beyond Iraq, find ways to deal constructively with Iran, and forge a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement.
On taking office, U.S. President Barack Obama will face a series of critical, complex, and interrelated challenges in the Middle East demanding urgent attention: an Iraq experiencing a fragile lull in violence that is nonetheless straining the U.S. military, an Iran approaching the nuclear threshold, a faltering Israeli-Palestinian peace process, weak governments in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories challenged by strong militant Islamist groups, and a U.S. position weakened by years of failure and drift. He will also discover that time is working against him.
For six years, U.S. policy in the Middle East has been dominated by Iraq. This need not, and should not, continue. The Obama administration will be able to gradually reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, limit their combat role, and increasingly shift responsibility to Iraqi forces. The drawdown will have to be executed carefully and deliberately, however, so as not to risk undoing recent progress.
The improved situation in Iraq will allow the new administration to shift its focus to Iran, where the clock is ticking on a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear program. Obama should offer direct official engagement with the Iranian government, without preconditions, along with other incentives in an attempt to turn Tehran away from developing the capacity to rapidly produce substantial amounts of nuclear-weapons-grade fuel. At the same time, he should lay the groundwork for an international effort to impose harsher sanctions on Iran if it proves unwilling to change course.
Preventive military action against Iran by either the United States or Israel is an unattractive option, given its risks and costs. But it needs to be examined carefully as a last-ditch alternative to the dangers of living with an Iranian bomb. To increase Israel's tolerance for extended diplomatic engagement, the U.S. government should bolster Israel's deterrent capabilities by providing an enhanced anti-ballistic-missile defense capability and a nuclear guarantee.
The U.S. president should also spend capital trying to promote peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in particular Syria. Damascus is currently allied with Tehran, and an Israeli-Syrian deal would weaken Iran's regional influence, reduce external support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and improve the prospects for stability in Lebanon. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, there is an urgent need for a diplomatic effort to achieve a two-state solution while it is still feasible. Although divisions on both sides and the questionable ability of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to control any newly acquired territory make a sustainable peace agreement unlikely for the moment, these factors argue not for abandoning the issue but rather for devoting substantial time and effort now to creating the conditions that would help diplomacy succeed later. What all these initiatives have in common is a renewed emphasis on diplomacy as a tool of U.S. national security policy, since the United States can no longer achieve its objectives without the backing of its regional allies as well as China, Europe, and Russia.
Some might argue that these efforts are not worth it, that the Bush administration paid too much attention to and invested too much American blood and treasure in an ill-advised attempt to transform the Middle East and that the Obama administration should focus its attention at home or elsewhere abroad. But such arguments underestimate the Middle East's ability to force itself onto the U.S. president's agenda regardless of other plans. Put simply, what happens in the Middle East will not stay in the Middle East. From terrorism to nuclear proliferation to energy security, managing contemporary global challenges requires managing the Middle East.
[...]
Full article: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88104/richard-n-haass-martin-indyk/obama-s-middle-east-agenda.html
A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009
Summary: To be successful in the Middle East, the Obama administration will need to move beyond Iraq, find ways to deal constructively with Iran, and forge a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement.
On taking office, U.S. President Barack Obama will face a series of critical, complex, and interrelated challenges in the Middle East demanding urgent attention: an Iraq experiencing a fragile lull in violence that is nonetheless straining the U.S. military, an Iran approaching the nuclear threshold, a faltering Israeli-Palestinian peace process, weak governments in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories challenged by strong militant Islamist groups, and a U.S. position weakened by years of failure and drift. He will also discover that time is working against him.
For six years, U.S. policy in the Middle East has been dominated by Iraq. This need not, and should not, continue. The Obama administration will be able to gradually reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, limit their combat role, and increasingly shift responsibility to Iraqi forces. The drawdown will have to be executed carefully and deliberately, however, so as not to risk undoing recent progress.
The improved situation in Iraq will allow the new administration to shift its focus to Iran, where the clock is ticking on a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear program. Obama should offer direct official engagement with the Iranian government, without preconditions, along with other incentives in an attempt to turn Tehran away from developing the capacity to rapidly produce substantial amounts of nuclear-weapons-grade fuel. At the same time, he should lay the groundwork for an international effort to impose harsher sanctions on Iran if it proves unwilling to change course.
Preventive military action against Iran by either the United States or Israel is an unattractive option, given its risks and costs. But it needs to be examined carefully as a last-ditch alternative to the dangers of living with an Iranian bomb. To increase Israel's tolerance for extended diplomatic engagement, the U.S. government should bolster Israel's deterrent capabilities by providing an enhanced anti-ballistic-missile defense capability and a nuclear guarantee.
The U.S. president should also spend capital trying to promote peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in particular Syria. Damascus is currently allied with Tehran, and an Israeli-Syrian deal would weaken Iran's regional influence, reduce external support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and improve the prospects for stability in Lebanon. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, there is an urgent need for a diplomatic effort to achieve a two-state solution while it is still feasible. Although divisions on both sides and the questionable ability of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to control any newly acquired territory make a sustainable peace agreement unlikely for the moment, these factors argue not for abandoning the issue but rather for devoting substantial time and effort now to creating the conditions that would help diplomacy succeed later. What all these initiatives have in common is a renewed emphasis on diplomacy as a tool of U.S. national security policy, since the United States can no longer achieve its objectives without the backing of its regional allies as well as China, Europe, and Russia.
Some might argue that these efforts are not worth it, that the Bush administration paid too much attention to and invested too much American blood and treasure in an ill-advised attempt to transform the Middle East and that the Obama administration should focus its attention at home or elsewhere abroad. But such arguments underestimate the Middle East's ability to force itself onto the U.S. president's agenda regardless of other plans. Put simply, what happens in the Middle East will not stay in the Middle East. From terrorism to nuclear proliferation to energy security, managing contemporary global challenges requires managing the Middle East.
[...]
Full article: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88104/richard-n-haass-martin-indyk/obama-s-middle-east-agenda.html
Conservative views: National Security Resolutions for 2009
National Security Resolutions for 2009, by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
Heritage WebMemo #2182
December 31, 2008
The United States should resolve to help make the world a better place with initiatives that keep Americans safe, free, and prosperous in the coming year. Here is a short list of commitments Washington can offer:
Finish the Job in Iraq. A stable, secure, and free Iraq remains a worthy long-term U.S. goal, but this project now rests primarily in Iraqi hands. However, America still has a vital role to play in training and supporting Iraqi security forces and building the instruments of governance for a fledgling democracy. Meeting these obligations should be the most important factor in determining the pace of the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq.
Finish the Long War. Rooting out the al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan would be a severe--if not fatal--blow to the transnational Islamist terrorist movement. Achieving that end will require an integrated policy that gets Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India working together jointly toward that end.
Don't Mess with Homeland Security. U.S. law enforcement has thwarted a number of post-9/11 conspiracies aimed at killing Americans. Meanwhile, FEMA has just completed a record year of responding to floods, forest fires, and hurricanes. Further major reorganization or changes in the Department of Homeland Security's mission are wholly unwarranted.
Build Missile Defenses. Of all the threats of the modern era, the danger of a ballistic missile attack on the U.S. is most troubling. While the U.S. has built land-based interceptors capable of dealing with a missile fired from North Korea, much more needs to be done. America as well as friends and allies in the Middle East and Europe would be largely defenseless against an Iranian ballistic missile threat. To address that, the U.S. needs to, as it promised to NATO, build land-based missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, the United States must field land- and sea-based regional assets, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense systems. More work also needs to be done on developing "boost-phase" interceptors capable of knocking down enemy missiles right after they are fired and are their most vulnerable. Finally, we need to continue, with our friends and allies, to develop a global command and control network capable of dealing with new missile threats wherever they might come from.
Do Something about Space. Space is the "ultimate" high ground, not just for the military but for the private sector as well. U.S. assets and assured "access" to space are vulnerable to disruption and direct attack. At a minimum, the United States needs to develop better "space awareness" with hardened and redundant capabilities to track both what is being sent into space and activities in earth-orbit. Washington can get the ball rolling by funding a space-based platform for experimentation this year.
Worry about Iran. Iran routinely employs terrorism as instrument of foreign policy. It is developing long-range ballistic missiles to threaten other nations. It supported insurgents in Iraq who targeted American soldiers and fermented ethnic-civil war. It may test a nuclear weapon at any time. For starters, the U.S. must lead an international coalition to impose the strongest possible targeted economic sanctions against Iran and mobilize allies to contain and deter Iran's drive for regional hegemony.
Build Better Border Security. The Bush Administration has made significant progress in making America's borders more secure, from a host of measures for thwarting terrorist travel to the Merida Initiative--an effort to promote U.S./Mexican cooperation in combating transnational smuggling in drugs, people, arms, and money. Terrorists see post-9/11 America as a hard target, not easy to get to. Meanwhile, both the unlawful population in the United States and the number of attempted illegal border crossings are on the decline. Successful programs--from building border obstacles to enforcing immigration laws and strengthening the surety of identity credentials like driver's licenses--need to continue. Stopping now would roll back progress.
Get Smart on Cybersecurity. Many in Washington have rightly expressed concerned over the surety of information technology and control systems that serve our economy. Most, however, are woefully ignorant about the nature of these systems and the threats to them. Even as Washington wrestles with issues concerning organization, authorities, responsibilities, and programs to deal with cyber competition, it must place more emphasis on developing leaders who are competent to engage in these issues. This will require a professional development system that can provide a program of education, assignment, and accreditation to develop a corps of experienced, dedicated service professionals who have an expertise in the breadth of issues related to the cyber environment. This program must be backed by effective public-private partnerships that produce cutting-edge research, development, and capabilities to operate with freedom, safety, and security in the cyber world.
Stop Doing Stupid Security. A number of congressional national security mandates have proven unnecessary and unworkable, consuming precious time, manpower, and money to implement measures of little value at great cost. Requirements such as 100 percent scanning of cargo sent to the United States have been documented by the Department of Homeland Security and the Government Accountability Office as extremely problematic. Congress should repeal ill-advised mandates and refrain from imposing excessive regulatory restrictions in the name of national security.
Don't Let the Military Go Hollow. A military is hollow when it lacks the resources to conduct current missions, maintain adequate trained and ready forces, and prepare for future threats. There is no way to prevent the armed forces from becoming inadequate to defend the nation's interests and provide for our men and women in uniform other than robust defense budgets year in and year out. Changes in strategy, cuts in acquisition programs, and promises to slash fraud, waste, and abuse are all chimeras--smokescreens to cut costs without appearing weak on national security. The United States must spend at least 4 percent of its annual GDP over the next decade to recover from the long post-Cold War "peace dividend" of the 1990s and refurbish the military after years of fighting the long war in Iraq and Afghanistan. To plan to do anything less over the foreseeable future will put both the nation's security and the lives of our troops in jeopardy.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Heritage WebMemo #2182
December 31, 2008
The United States should resolve to help make the world a better place with initiatives that keep Americans safe, free, and prosperous in the coming year. Here is a short list of commitments Washington can offer:
Finish the Job in Iraq. A stable, secure, and free Iraq remains a worthy long-term U.S. goal, but this project now rests primarily in Iraqi hands. However, America still has a vital role to play in training and supporting Iraqi security forces and building the instruments of governance for a fledgling democracy. Meeting these obligations should be the most important factor in determining the pace of the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq.
Finish the Long War. Rooting out the al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan would be a severe--if not fatal--blow to the transnational Islamist terrorist movement. Achieving that end will require an integrated policy that gets Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India working together jointly toward that end.
Don't Mess with Homeland Security. U.S. law enforcement has thwarted a number of post-9/11 conspiracies aimed at killing Americans. Meanwhile, FEMA has just completed a record year of responding to floods, forest fires, and hurricanes. Further major reorganization or changes in the Department of Homeland Security's mission are wholly unwarranted.
Build Missile Defenses. Of all the threats of the modern era, the danger of a ballistic missile attack on the U.S. is most troubling. While the U.S. has built land-based interceptors capable of dealing with a missile fired from North Korea, much more needs to be done. America as well as friends and allies in the Middle East and Europe would be largely defenseless against an Iranian ballistic missile threat. To address that, the U.S. needs to, as it promised to NATO, build land-based missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, the United States must field land- and sea-based regional assets, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense systems. More work also needs to be done on developing "boost-phase" interceptors capable of knocking down enemy missiles right after they are fired and are their most vulnerable. Finally, we need to continue, with our friends and allies, to develop a global command and control network capable of dealing with new missile threats wherever they might come from.
Do Something about Space. Space is the "ultimate" high ground, not just for the military but for the private sector as well. U.S. assets and assured "access" to space are vulnerable to disruption and direct attack. At a minimum, the United States needs to develop better "space awareness" with hardened and redundant capabilities to track both what is being sent into space and activities in earth-orbit. Washington can get the ball rolling by funding a space-based platform for experimentation this year.
Worry about Iran. Iran routinely employs terrorism as instrument of foreign policy. It is developing long-range ballistic missiles to threaten other nations. It supported insurgents in Iraq who targeted American soldiers and fermented ethnic-civil war. It may test a nuclear weapon at any time. For starters, the U.S. must lead an international coalition to impose the strongest possible targeted economic sanctions against Iran and mobilize allies to contain and deter Iran's drive for regional hegemony.
Build Better Border Security. The Bush Administration has made significant progress in making America's borders more secure, from a host of measures for thwarting terrorist travel to the Merida Initiative--an effort to promote U.S./Mexican cooperation in combating transnational smuggling in drugs, people, arms, and money. Terrorists see post-9/11 America as a hard target, not easy to get to. Meanwhile, both the unlawful population in the United States and the number of attempted illegal border crossings are on the decline. Successful programs--from building border obstacles to enforcing immigration laws and strengthening the surety of identity credentials like driver's licenses--need to continue. Stopping now would roll back progress.
Get Smart on Cybersecurity. Many in Washington have rightly expressed concerned over the surety of information technology and control systems that serve our economy. Most, however, are woefully ignorant about the nature of these systems and the threats to them. Even as Washington wrestles with issues concerning organization, authorities, responsibilities, and programs to deal with cyber competition, it must place more emphasis on developing leaders who are competent to engage in these issues. This will require a professional development system that can provide a program of education, assignment, and accreditation to develop a corps of experienced, dedicated service professionals who have an expertise in the breadth of issues related to the cyber environment. This program must be backed by effective public-private partnerships that produce cutting-edge research, development, and capabilities to operate with freedom, safety, and security in the cyber world.
Stop Doing Stupid Security. A number of congressional national security mandates have proven unnecessary and unworkable, consuming precious time, manpower, and money to implement measures of little value at great cost. Requirements such as 100 percent scanning of cargo sent to the United States have been documented by the Department of Homeland Security and the Government Accountability Office as extremely problematic. Congress should repeal ill-advised mandates and refrain from imposing excessive regulatory restrictions in the name of national security.
Don't Let the Military Go Hollow. A military is hollow when it lacks the resources to conduct current missions, maintain adequate trained and ready forces, and prepare for future threats. There is no way to prevent the armed forces from becoming inadequate to defend the nation's interests and provide for our men and women in uniform other than robust defense budgets year in and year out. Changes in strategy, cuts in acquisition programs, and promises to slash fraud, waste, and abuse are all chimeras--smokescreens to cut costs without appearing weak on national security. The United States must spend at least 4 percent of its annual GDP over the next decade to recover from the long post-Cold War "peace dividend" of the 1990s and refurbish the military after years of fighting the long war in Iraq and Afghanistan. To plan to do anything less over the foreseeable future will put both the nation's security and the lives of our troops in jeopardy.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Sunday, December 28, 2008
TNYT believes it is necessary to expand the Army by 65,000 soldiers
Recruiting the Best
TNYT Editorial, December 28, 2008
As commander of the Army recruiting station in Patchogue, N.Y., Sgt. Clayton Dickinson sees firsthand why it is so hard to staff his military service at the prescribed levels. His station recruited 65 new soldiers in 2007-8, missing its target by 10.
Of the young people in his largely middle-class community who express interest in an Army career, roughly 70 percent do not qualify, he says. They either have criminal charges against them, cannot pass the drug test or cannot pass the military qualifying test, which measures math and verbal proficiency. “It’s pretty rare to find that one perfect individual,” he admits.
And those are the ones who want to join. Many of the young people Sergeant Dickinson and his fellow recruiters try to woo at high school career fairs and in telephone canvassing have one reaction: No way. They don’t want to fight in Iraq. Neither do their parents want them to fight.
We believe it is necessary to expand the Army by 65,000 soldiers to help rebuild the world’s best ground force after an extraordinary period of overuse. That expansion could magnify recruiters’ problems far into the future if steps are not taken quickly to address them.
The Army, which must remain an all-volunteer force, has borne the brunt of seven years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan —repeated and long-term deployments, disrupted families. More than 4,000 service members have died; thousands more have been injured.
Unlike the Marines, Navy and Air Force, the Army has had trouble meeting its recruiting targets since 2004 and fell short in 2005 by about 8 percent, or 6,400 recruits. After that, national targets were met, but only by lowering standards. In 2007, only 79 percent of recruits had high school diplomas; in 2008, the figure was 83 percent. This key measure of whether soldiers will complete their enlistment period is down from 92 percent in 2003.
The Army is also granting an increasing number of “moral waivers” to recruits with criminal records. In 2007, this affected some 14,000 Army recruits (18 percent) compared with an average of less than 6 percent annually between 2003 and 2006.
Retaining officers, especially majors but also lieutenant colonels and captains, is also a struggle. That is because of the two wars, which have kept upward of 200,000 troops on the battlefield, and because of a failure to recruit enough officers in the post-cold-war drawdown of the 1990s. Even officers produced by West Point — the cream of the crop — have been leaving at an accelerated rate after their obligatory five years of service. The way the Army restructured itself — expanding from 33 brigades to 42 smaller brigade combat teams — added more stress by increasing the demand for more officers.
To meet the need, the Army has accelerated promotions of junior officers (tapping some before they are ready) and has retained officers passed over for promotion, who in normal times would have been retired involuntarily. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment says this has led to a decline in overall quality.
The economic crisis and sharp cuts in private-sector jobs, especially if prolonged, could make military careers more attractive. Recession could also persuade soldiers to stay on until retirement. That is no long-term solution. President-elect Barack Obama should consider these steps to ensure the high-quality Army America needs:
¶A democracy of 300 million led by an inspirational leader should be able to find high-quality recruits. Mr. Obama should fulfill his campaign pledge to call on Americans to contribute to the nation’s security, including serving in the military. By withdrawing troops from Iraq and pursuing a foreign policy that shuns such ill-advised wars, he could both reduce the stress on troops and make service more attractive. More forces are being shifted to Afghanistan, but the total is not expected to approach the commitment in Iraq.
¶All qualified Americans who wish to serve should be embraced. That means dropping the ban on women serving in combat and repealing the insulting “don’t ask, don’t tell” law that has marginalized gays.
¶Consider expanding a pilot program under which foreigners who have been living in the United States on student or work visas or with refugee or political asylum status are recruited as doctors, nurses and linguists. They should be given an accelerated path to citizenship. Noncitizens have served in the military since the United States was founded.
¶According to most experts, military pay and civilian pay are nearly comparable after a decade of steady Pentagon increases. Keep military pay competitive and invest in new inducements that are more cost-effective: more in cash benefits, less in non-cash benefits like pensions; more in re-enlistment and other bonuses, less in across-the-board raises. Most potential recruits and serving personnel are far more drawn to immediate cash benefits than deferred non-cash benefits, studies show.
¶Create more flexible personnel management systems so the services have more leeway to vary compensation and length of assignments according to individuals and the job slots needed to be filled.
¶Easier, quicker promotions may be a short-term necessity but should be ended as soon as practical. West Point and the Reserve Officer Training Corps are the best sources of top leaders and should be expanded.
All the fancy planes, helicopters and high-tech weaponry mean nothing without competent forces. A military increasingly dependent on technological advances must maintain an increasingly well-educated and well-trained force. People are the Army’s best assets. They must be managed accordingly.
TNYT Editorial, December 28, 2008
As commander of the Army recruiting station in Patchogue, N.Y., Sgt. Clayton Dickinson sees firsthand why it is so hard to staff his military service at the prescribed levels. His station recruited 65 new soldiers in 2007-8, missing its target by 10.
Of the young people in his largely middle-class community who express interest in an Army career, roughly 70 percent do not qualify, he says. They either have criminal charges against them, cannot pass the drug test or cannot pass the military qualifying test, which measures math and verbal proficiency. “It’s pretty rare to find that one perfect individual,” he admits.
And those are the ones who want to join. Many of the young people Sergeant Dickinson and his fellow recruiters try to woo at high school career fairs and in telephone canvassing have one reaction: No way. They don’t want to fight in Iraq. Neither do their parents want them to fight.
We believe it is necessary to expand the Army by 65,000 soldiers to help rebuild the world’s best ground force after an extraordinary period of overuse. That expansion could magnify recruiters’ problems far into the future if steps are not taken quickly to address them.
The Army, which must remain an all-volunteer force, has borne the brunt of seven years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan —repeated and long-term deployments, disrupted families. More than 4,000 service members have died; thousands more have been injured.
Unlike the Marines, Navy and Air Force, the Army has had trouble meeting its recruiting targets since 2004 and fell short in 2005 by about 8 percent, or 6,400 recruits. After that, national targets were met, but only by lowering standards. In 2007, only 79 percent of recruits had high school diplomas; in 2008, the figure was 83 percent. This key measure of whether soldiers will complete their enlistment period is down from 92 percent in 2003.
The Army is also granting an increasing number of “moral waivers” to recruits with criminal records. In 2007, this affected some 14,000 Army recruits (18 percent) compared with an average of less than 6 percent annually between 2003 and 2006.
Retaining officers, especially majors but also lieutenant colonels and captains, is also a struggle. That is because of the two wars, which have kept upward of 200,000 troops on the battlefield, and because of a failure to recruit enough officers in the post-cold-war drawdown of the 1990s. Even officers produced by West Point — the cream of the crop — have been leaving at an accelerated rate after their obligatory five years of service. The way the Army restructured itself — expanding from 33 brigades to 42 smaller brigade combat teams — added more stress by increasing the demand for more officers.
To meet the need, the Army has accelerated promotions of junior officers (tapping some before they are ready) and has retained officers passed over for promotion, who in normal times would have been retired involuntarily. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment says this has led to a decline in overall quality.
The economic crisis and sharp cuts in private-sector jobs, especially if prolonged, could make military careers more attractive. Recession could also persuade soldiers to stay on until retirement. That is no long-term solution. President-elect Barack Obama should consider these steps to ensure the high-quality Army America needs:
¶A democracy of 300 million led by an inspirational leader should be able to find high-quality recruits. Mr. Obama should fulfill his campaign pledge to call on Americans to contribute to the nation’s security, including serving in the military. By withdrawing troops from Iraq and pursuing a foreign policy that shuns such ill-advised wars, he could both reduce the stress on troops and make service more attractive. More forces are being shifted to Afghanistan, but the total is not expected to approach the commitment in Iraq.
¶All qualified Americans who wish to serve should be embraced. That means dropping the ban on women serving in combat and repealing the insulting “don’t ask, don’t tell” law that has marginalized gays.
¶Consider expanding a pilot program under which foreigners who have been living in the United States on student or work visas or with refugee or political asylum status are recruited as doctors, nurses and linguists. They should be given an accelerated path to citizenship. Noncitizens have served in the military since the United States was founded.
¶According to most experts, military pay and civilian pay are nearly comparable after a decade of steady Pentagon increases. Keep military pay competitive and invest in new inducements that are more cost-effective: more in cash benefits, less in non-cash benefits like pensions; more in re-enlistment and other bonuses, less in across-the-board raises. Most potential recruits and serving personnel are far more drawn to immediate cash benefits than deferred non-cash benefits, studies show.
¶Create more flexible personnel management systems so the services have more leeway to vary compensation and length of assignments according to individuals and the job slots needed to be filled.
¶Easier, quicker promotions may be a short-term necessity but should be ended as soon as practical. West Point and the Reserve Officer Training Corps are the best sources of top leaders and should be expanded.
All the fancy planes, helicopters and high-tech weaponry mean nothing without competent forces. A military increasingly dependent on technological advances must maintain an increasingly well-educated and well-trained force. People are the Army’s best assets. They must be managed accordingly.
Wednesday, December 24, 2008
Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus
In the WSJ: Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus, by Martin Feldstein
All three service branches are in need of upgrade and repair.
Dec 23, 2008, 10:04 P.M. ET
The Department of Defense is preparing budget cuts in response to the decline in national income. The DOD budgeteers and their counterparts in the White House Office of Management and Budget apparently reason that a smaller GDP requires belt-tightening by everyone.
That logic is exactly backwards. As President-elect Barack Obama and his economic advisers recognize, countering a deep economic recession requires an increase in government spending to offset the sharp decline in consumer outlays and business investment that is now under way. Without that rise in government spending, the economic downturn would be deeper and longer. Although tax cuts for individuals and businesses can help, government spending will have to do the heavy lifting. That's why the Obama team will propose a package of about $300 billion a year in additional federal government outlays and grants to states and local governments.
A temporary rise in DOD spending on supplies, equipment and manpower should be a significant part of that increase in overall government outlays. The same applies to the Department of Homeland Security, to the FBI, and to other parts of the national intelligence community.
The increase in government spending needs to be a short-term surge with greater outlays in 2009 and 2010 but then tailing off sharply in 2011 when the economy should be almost back to its prerecession level of activity. Buying military supplies and equipment, including a variety of off-the-shelf dual use items, can easily fit this surge pattern.
For the military, the increased spending will require an expanded supplemental budget for 2009 and an increased budget for 2010. A 10% increase in defense outlays for procurement and for research would contribute about $20 billion a year to the overall stimulus budget. A 5% rise in spending on operations and maintenance would add an additional $10 billion. That spending could create about 300,000 additional jobs. And raising the military's annual recruitment goal by 15% would provide jobs for an additional 30,000 young men and women in the first year.
An important challenge for those who are designing the overall stimulus package is to avoid wasteful spending. One way to achieve that is to do things during the period of the spending surge that must eventually be done anyway. It is better to do them now when there is excess capacity in the economy than to wait and do them later.
Replacing the supplies that have been depleted by the military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of something that might be postponed but that should instead be done quickly. The same is true for replacing the military equipment that has been subject to excessive wear and tear. More generally, replacement schedules for vehicles and other equipment should be accelerated to do more during the next two years than would otherwise be economically efficient.
Industry experts and DOD officials confirm that military suppliers have substantial unused capacity with which to produce additional supplies and equipment. Even those production lines that are currently at full capacity can be greatly expanded by going from a single shift to a two-shift production schedule. With industrial production in the economy as a whole down sharply, there is no shortage of potential employees who can produce supplies and equipment.
Military procurement has the further advantage that almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the United States, creating demand and jobs here at home.
Increased military spending should involve more than just accelerated replacement schedules. Each of the military services can identify new equipment and additional quantities of existing equipment that can improve our fighting ability in Afghanistan and our ability to protect our military forces while they are in combat.
Military planners must also look ahead to the missions that each of the services may be called upon to do in the future. Additional funding would allow the Air Force to increase the production of fighter planes and transport aircraft without any delays. The Army could accelerate its combat modernization program. The Navy could build additional ships to deal with its increased responsibilities in protecting coastal shipping and in countering terrorism. And all three services have significant infrastructure needs.
Although some activities like ship building cannot be completed in the two year stimulus period, the major part of the expenditures can be brought forward in time by acquiring components and materials quickly and holding them in inventory until they are needed in the ship building process. Such a departure from just-in-time inventory management would be wasteful under normal conditions, but makes economic sense when there is temporary excess capacity.
Now is also a good time for the military to increase recruiting and training. Because of the current very high and rising unemployment rates among young men and women, it would make sense to depart from the military's traditional enlistment rules and bring in recruits for a short, two-year period of training followed by a return to the civilian economy. As a minimum this would provide education in a variety of technical skills -- electronics, equipment maintenance, computer programming, nuclear facility operations, etc. -- that would lead to better civilian careers for this group. It would also provide a larger reserve force that could be called upon if needed by the military in the future.
The budgets for homeland security, for intelligence activities, and for the FBI have increased substantially during the past decade. The greater terrorist threat fully justifies these additional funds. The current two-year stimulus period provides an opportunity for additional temporary spending increases with high payoffs.
Investments in port security would reduce a major homeland vulnerability. Expanding the government's language training programs for new intelligence community recruits would provide more translators who can monitor the terrorist communications that we are able to intercept. Additional infrastructure for the FBI would remove an important constraint on the number of new FBI agents.
The Obama team's goal of sending a stimulus package to Congress before the end of January may not leave enough time to work out the details of expanded military and intelligence budgets. If so, the stimulus plan should ask the Congress to provide a total of at least $30 billion a year of increased outlays in these budget categories. A substantial short-term rise in spending on defense and intelligence would both stimulate our economy and strengthen our nation's security.
Mr. Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, is a professor at Harvard and a member of The Wall Street Journal's board of contributors.
All three service branches are in need of upgrade and repair.
Dec 23, 2008, 10:04 P.M. ET
The Department of Defense is preparing budget cuts in response to the decline in national income. The DOD budgeteers and their counterparts in the White House Office of Management and Budget apparently reason that a smaller GDP requires belt-tightening by everyone.
That logic is exactly backwards. As President-elect Barack Obama and his economic advisers recognize, countering a deep economic recession requires an increase in government spending to offset the sharp decline in consumer outlays and business investment that is now under way. Without that rise in government spending, the economic downturn would be deeper and longer. Although tax cuts for individuals and businesses can help, government spending will have to do the heavy lifting. That's why the Obama team will propose a package of about $300 billion a year in additional federal government outlays and grants to states and local governments.
A temporary rise in DOD spending on supplies, equipment and manpower should be a significant part of that increase in overall government outlays. The same applies to the Department of Homeland Security, to the FBI, and to other parts of the national intelligence community.
The increase in government spending needs to be a short-term surge with greater outlays in 2009 and 2010 but then tailing off sharply in 2011 when the economy should be almost back to its prerecession level of activity. Buying military supplies and equipment, including a variety of off-the-shelf dual use items, can easily fit this surge pattern.
For the military, the increased spending will require an expanded supplemental budget for 2009 and an increased budget for 2010. A 10% increase in defense outlays for procurement and for research would contribute about $20 billion a year to the overall stimulus budget. A 5% rise in spending on operations and maintenance would add an additional $10 billion. That spending could create about 300,000 additional jobs. And raising the military's annual recruitment goal by 15% would provide jobs for an additional 30,000 young men and women in the first year.
An important challenge for those who are designing the overall stimulus package is to avoid wasteful spending. One way to achieve that is to do things during the period of the spending surge that must eventually be done anyway. It is better to do them now when there is excess capacity in the economy than to wait and do them later.
Replacing the supplies that have been depleted by the military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of something that might be postponed but that should instead be done quickly. The same is true for replacing the military equipment that has been subject to excessive wear and tear. More generally, replacement schedules for vehicles and other equipment should be accelerated to do more during the next two years than would otherwise be economically efficient.
Industry experts and DOD officials confirm that military suppliers have substantial unused capacity with which to produce additional supplies and equipment. Even those production lines that are currently at full capacity can be greatly expanded by going from a single shift to a two-shift production schedule. With industrial production in the economy as a whole down sharply, there is no shortage of potential employees who can produce supplies and equipment.
Military procurement has the further advantage that almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the United States, creating demand and jobs here at home.
Increased military spending should involve more than just accelerated replacement schedules. Each of the military services can identify new equipment and additional quantities of existing equipment that can improve our fighting ability in Afghanistan and our ability to protect our military forces while they are in combat.
Military planners must also look ahead to the missions that each of the services may be called upon to do in the future. Additional funding would allow the Air Force to increase the production of fighter planes and transport aircraft without any delays. The Army could accelerate its combat modernization program. The Navy could build additional ships to deal with its increased responsibilities in protecting coastal shipping and in countering terrorism. And all three services have significant infrastructure needs.
Although some activities like ship building cannot be completed in the two year stimulus period, the major part of the expenditures can be brought forward in time by acquiring components and materials quickly and holding them in inventory until they are needed in the ship building process. Such a departure from just-in-time inventory management would be wasteful under normal conditions, but makes economic sense when there is temporary excess capacity.
Now is also a good time for the military to increase recruiting and training. Because of the current very high and rising unemployment rates among young men and women, it would make sense to depart from the military's traditional enlistment rules and bring in recruits for a short, two-year period of training followed by a return to the civilian economy. As a minimum this would provide education in a variety of technical skills -- electronics, equipment maintenance, computer programming, nuclear facility operations, etc. -- that would lead to better civilian careers for this group. It would also provide a larger reserve force that could be called upon if needed by the military in the future.
The budgets for homeland security, for intelligence activities, and for the FBI have increased substantially during the past decade. The greater terrorist threat fully justifies these additional funds. The current two-year stimulus period provides an opportunity for additional temporary spending increases with high payoffs.
Investments in port security would reduce a major homeland vulnerability. Expanding the government's language training programs for new intelligence community recruits would provide more translators who can monitor the terrorist communications that we are able to intercept. Additional infrastructure for the FBI would remove an important constraint on the number of new FBI agents.
The Obama team's goal of sending a stimulus package to Congress before the end of January may not leave enough time to work out the details of expanded military and intelligence budgets. If so, the stimulus plan should ask the Congress to provide a total of at least $30 billion a year of increased outlays in these budget categories. A substantial short-term rise in spending on defense and intelligence would both stimulate our economy and strengthen our nation's security.
Mr. Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, is a professor at Harvard and a member of The Wall Street Journal's board of contributors.
Sunday, December 21, 2008
Wesley K. Clark: Actually, Democrats and the military can get along. Here's how.
Taking Command. By Wesley K. Clark
Actually, Democrats and the military can get along. Here's how.
Washington Post. Sunday, December 21, 2008; Page B01
The last time the United States elected a Democrat as its president to govern with a majority-Democratic Congress, an immediate fracas arose over gays in the military, reinforcing a partisan story line that Democrats can't be trusted with the nation's security. Sixteen years later, some will certainly be watching how deftly President-elect Barack Obama salutes, or how House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid say the Pledge of Allegiance.
These are symbols, of course, but the national security challenges the nation faces now are anything but symbolic: two wars, an ongoing terrorist menace, a growing list of unmet military needs and a long roster of other threats arising from new quarters. So it's natural to ask: What do the Democrats need to understand about the military? And what does the military need to understand about the Democrats? As someone who has labored in both camps, I offer some thoughts.
Let's start by facing the truth: Democrats have long had an ambivalent relationship with the military, and vice versa. While Democrats profess to like and support the military, Republicans usually win more military and veterans' votes than Democrats, and no wonder: Democrats have been pilloried for supposedly wanting to cut defense spending, for being soft on America's enemies and for wanting to use the armed forces for "social engineering" -- code for letting openly gay soldiers serve. As one senior Army leader told me a few years ago, "The Democrats may be all in favor of using force in a crisis, but can you trust them to stick with us when the going gets tough?" Exit polls last month showed that voters who've served in the military went for the Republican candidate, Sen. John McCain, over Obama by 54 percent to 44 percent.
And the mistrust runs both ways. To some Democrats, the armed forces appear, in the words of one New Hampshire activist who chided me in 2003, to be an "authoritarian, hierarchical, male-dominated" institution that's out of touch with liberal values. A small number of Democrats can usually be counted on to oppose any use of force and occasionally go after the institution that makes the use of force possible. (I sometimes hear concerns on college campuses that the make-up of our all-volunteer force is not "representative" of America, but I don't see the students rushing to volunteer themselves to redress the balance.)
So it's easy to assume that the military and the Democrats don't and won't get along. It's also wrong. As the 2000 election approached, a member of the Joint Chiefs confided to me: "You know, people wouldn't believe it, but probably no one else will ever treat us as well as the Clinton administration has." From a shaky beginning, including the confidence-battering 1993 "Black Hawk Down" shootout in Somalia, the top civilians on Clinton's team and the president himself took pains to build respect and trust with the military's top brass -- above all by engaging in forthright dialogue.
Building on that, Obama is off to a promising start with the Pentagon, steering clear of a reprise of the fight over "don't ask, don't tell" and picking pragmatic, non-ideological leaders whom top military officers will find highly reassuring -- especially since so many may have discovered from personal experience that a particular partisan label is no guarantee of good leadership. Retaining Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, designating Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (with her six years of experience on the Senate Armed Services Committee) as secretary of state and appointing James L. Jones (a retired four-star Marine general) as national security adviser should go a long way toward assuring members of the armed forces that their concerns will be given a fair hearing at the very highest levels.
But the incoming team and the Democrat-dominated Congress still need to work hard to understand the lower ranks and the culture of today's military. Perhaps as many as 75 million Americans have either served in uniform or have family members who have done so. At any given time, the armed forces total some 2 million Americans on active duty, in the National Guard or in the reserves -- all volunteers. Most read military-focused newspapers, such as the Army Times, and many live on bases, relatively isolated from nearby communities. The majority are married, and almost half have children, creating a subculture of families that endure frequent moves and frightening absences. Most Americans just can't fathom the stress and pain this lifestyle imposes (although Michelle Obama can -- as the future first lady showed by reaching out to military family members during the campaign).
Our military is a values-based institution. Don't think of it as Republican or Democratic. Sure, occasionally someone will pop up, like the radio talk-show host I met while traveling in Arizona, who assured me that he had become a dues-paying Republican while serving as a Marine officer and thought that everyone else should, too. But most of us are uncomfortable with partisanship. True, many in the military, especially those who have served longer, lean toward the conservative end of the political spectrum. (What would you expect? The military must obey the orders of the commander in chief and follow the chain of command, which means giving up one's own liberties and spending time in difficult and often very dangerous circumstances.) But the real military values aren't partisan values; they're service, loyalty, honesty, patriotism, respect, achievement and personal responsibility.
Which brings us to one more core military value, one that Democrats can easily embrace: fairness. Military leaders take care of their troops -- and their unit's families. They don't take advantage of their authority. Captains eat after their troops do, not before. Good officers get to work earlier than their subordinates and leave later. I used to joke on the campaign trail that the Army was a socialist organization: The government owned the housing and all the equipment I worked with, everyone's children went to the same schools and used the same hospitals, and the highest-ranking person (after more than 30 years in uniform) earned only about 10 or 12 times the salary of a raw recruit. In the military, we don't like favoritism, show-boating or elitism.
That's a good base upon which to build. But Democrats must also realize that the military's respect has to be earned. We don't consider ourselves an "interest group." Sure, we will always appreciate more pay, better housing and stronger veterans' benefits. But that isn't how the Democrats will win over the military. They'll win by being straight-up, clear-eyed and professional about national security. And if they are, the military will trust them, even with a painful withdrawal from Iraq and the inevitable defense cutbacks.
Above all, don't think that we are anxious to "use our toys." Forget about the Hollywood dramatics: Soldiers are the last to seek war. We know its personal and professional consequences painfully well. Those in uniform would prefer that President Obama use every other tool and method -- diplomacy, sanctions, calling in the allies -- before sending troops into combat. You're better off leaving political and economic development to others, too. As for crisis response? Please, let the diplomats work their magic first.
But the military will have to show some understanding as well. We don't have a monopoly on knowing what the nation's best interests are. National security now involves such spheres as law enforcement, the economy, the nation's industrial and scientific base and even such matters as health care and civil liberties. The military is just one voice among many.
Nor are our military plans and proposals beyond questioning. There's a lot of judgment involved in strategy and operations, and not a lot of certainty. The military is a cautious institution, and plans and options sometimes reflect just the opinion of the most senior person in the room. Even hard military "requirements" should stand up to public scrutiny. So when new members of Congress, Hill staffers and political appointees question tactics, techniques, troop levels and programs, we have to continue to treat these questions seriously and answer them with respect and diligence.
Recognize, too, that the Democrats have generally been pulling for the human side of the military. Worried about veterans' benefits, on-base child care facilities, health care and troop retention? Since at least the early 1990s, Democrats have been putting the "juice" into the all-important people programs that have made the armed forces such a successful institution today.
Finally, let's put aside the partisan legacy of Vietnam once and for all. We all grieve for the losses there and for the needy, homeless vets today. But almost no one now in uniform served in that conflict, and most of the Democrats who will be moving into offices at the National Security Council, the Pentagon and in Congress are too young to have been part of the bitter national debates over the war. Iraq just isn't Vietnam, and the debates over a U.S. withdrawal need not tear the country apart -- especially if we in the military recognize that the Democratic Party that I have been associated with is every bit as patriotic and service-oriented as any other group in the United States.
We have a president-elect who has set out a pragmatic, nonpartisan, visionary course. It's time to lay to rest the old stereotypes about feckless, pacifist Democrats and authoritarian, war-mongering soldiers. If there were ever a time to get the relationship between Democrats and the military right, this is it.
Wesley K. Clark, a retired four-star general, commanded the 1999 war in Kosovo as NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe. He is a senior fellow at UCLA's Burkle Center for International Relations.
Actually, Democrats and the military can get along. Here's how.
Washington Post. Sunday, December 21, 2008; Page B01
The last time the United States elected a Democrat as its president to govern with a majority-Democratic Congress, an immediate fracas arose over gays in the military, reinforcing a partisan story line that Democrats can't be trusted with the nation's security. Sixteen years later, some will certainly be watching how deftly President-elect Barack Obama salutes, or how House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid say the Pledge of Allegiance.
These are symbols, of course, but the national security challenges the nation faces now are anything but symbolic: two wars, an ongoing terrorist menace, a growing list of unmet military needs and a long roster of other threats arising from new quarters. So it's natural to ask: What do the Democrats need to understand about the military? And what does the military need to understand about the Democrats? As someone who has labored in both camps, I offer some thoughts.
Let's start by facing the truth: Democrats have long had an ambivalent relationship with the military, and vice versa. While Democrats profess to like and support the military, Republicans usually win more military and veterans' votes than Democrats, and no wonder: Democrats have been pilloried for supposedly wanting to cut defense spending, for being soft on America's enemies and for wanting to use the armed forces for "social engineering" -- code for letting openly gay soldiers serve. As one senior Army leader told me a few years ago, "The Democrats may be all in favor of using force in a crisis, but can you trust them to stick with us when the going gets tough?" Exit polls last month showed that voters who've served in the military went for the Republican candidate, Sen. John McCain, over Obama by 54 percent to 44 percent.
And the mistrust runs both ways. To some Democrats, the armed forces appear, in the words of one New Hampshire activist who chided me in 2003, to be an "authoritarian, hierarchical, male-dominated" institution that's out of touch with liberal values. A small number of Democrats can usually be counted on to oppose any use of force and occasionally go after the institution that makes the use of force possible. (I sometimes hear concerns on college campuses that the make-up of our all-volunteer force is not "representative" of America, but I don't see the students rushing to volunteer themselves to redress the balance.)
So it's easy to assume that the military and the Democrats don't and won't get along. It's also wrong. As the 2000 election approached, a member of the Joint Chiefs confided to me: "You know, people wouldn't believe it, but probably no one else will ever treat us as well as the Clinton administration has." From a shaky beginning, including the confidence-battering 1993 "Black Hawk Down" shootout in Somalia, the top civilians on Clinton's team and the president himself took pains to build respect and trust with the military's top brass -- above all by engaging in forthright dialogue.
Building on that, Obama is off to a promising start with the Pentagon, steering clear of a reprise of the fight over "don't ask, don't tell" and picking pragmatic, non-ideological leaders whom top military officers will find highly reassuring -- especially since so many may have discovered from personal experience that a particular partisan label is no guarantee of good leadership. Retaining Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, designating Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (with her six years of experience on the Senate Armed Services Committee) as secretary of state and appointing James L. Jones (a retired four-star Marine general) as national security adviser should go a long way toward assuring members of the armed forces that their concerns will be given a fair hearing at the very highest levels.
But the incoming team and the Democrat-dominated Congress still need to work hard to understand the lower ranks and the culture of today's military. Perhaps as many as 75 million Americans have either served in uniform or have family members who have done so. At any given time, the armed forces total some 2 million Americans on active duty, in the National Guard or in the reserves -- all volunteers. Most read military-focused newspapers, such as the Army Times, and many live on bases, relatively isolated from nearby communities. The majority are married, and almost half have children, creating a subculture of families that endure frequent moves and frightening absences. Most Americans just can't fathom the stress and pain this lifestyle imposes (although Michelle Obama can -- as the future first lady showed by reaching out to military family members during the campaign).
Our military is a values-based institution. Don't think of it as Republican or Democratic. Sure, occasionally someone will pop up, like the radio talk-show host I met while traveling in Arizona, who assured me that he had become a dues-paying Republican while serving as a Marine officer and thought that everyone else should, too. But most of us are uncomfortable with partisanship. True, many in the military, especially those who have served longer, lean toward the conservative end of the political spectrum. (What would you expect? The military must obey the orders of the commander in chief and follow the chain of command, which means giving up one's own liberties and spending time in difficult and often very dangerous circumstances.) But the real military values aren't partisan values; they're service, loyalty, honesty, patriotism, respect, achievement and personal responsibility.
Which brings us to one more core military value, one that Democrats can easily embrace: fairness. Military leaders take care of their troops -- and their unit's families. They don't take advantage of their authority. Captains eat after their troops do, not before. Good officers get to work earlier than their subordinates and leave later. I used to joke on the campaign trail that the Army was a socialist organization: The government owned the housing and all the equipment I worked with, everyone's children went to the same schools and used the same hospitals, and the highest-ranking person (after more than 30 years in uniform) earned only about 10 or 12 times the salary of a raw recruit. In the military, we don't like favoritism, show-boating or elitism.
That's a good base upon which to build. But Democrats must also realize that the military's respect has to be earned. We don't consider ourselves an "interest group." Sure, we will always appreciate more pay, better housing and stronger veterans' benefits. But that isn't how the Democrats will win over the military. They'll win by being straight-up, clear-eyed and professional about national security. And if they are, the military will trust them, even with a painful withdrawal from Iraq and the inevitable defense cutbacks.
Above all, don't think that we are anxious to "use our toys." Forget about the Hollywood dramatics: Soldiers are the last to seek war. We know its personal and professional consequences painfully well. Those in uniform would prefer that President Obama use every other tool and method -- diplomacy, sanctions, calling in the allies -- before sending troops into combat. You're better off leaving political and economic development to others, too. As for crisis response? Please, let the diplomats work their magic first.
But the military will have to show some understanding as well. We don't have a monopoly on knowing what the nation's best interests are. National security now involves such spheres as law enforcement, the economy, the nation's industrial and scientific base and even such matters as health care and civil liberties. The military is just one voice among many.
Nor are our military plans and proposals beyond questioning. There's a lot of judgment involved in strategy and operations, and not a lot of certainty. The military is a cautious institution, and plans and options sometimes reflect just the opinion of the most senior person in the room. Even hard military "requirements" should stand up to public scrutiny. So when new members of Congress, Hill staffers and political appointees question tactics, techniques, troop levels and programs, we have to continue to treat these questions seriously and answer them with respect and diligence.
Recognize, too, that the Democrats have generally been pulling for the human side of the military. Worried about veterans' benefits, on-base child care facilities, health care and troop retention? Since at least the early 1990s, Democrats have been putting the "juice" into the all-important people programs that have made the armed forces such a successful institution today.
Finally, let's put aside the partisan legacy of Vietnam once and for all. We all grieve for the losses there and for the needy, homeless vets today. But almost no one now in uniform served in that conflict, and most of the Democrats who will be moving into offices at the National Security Council, the Pentagon and in Congress are too young to have been part of the bitter national debates over the war. Iraq just isn't Vietnam, and the debates over a U.S. withdrawal need not tear the country apart -- especially if we in the military recognize that the Democratic Party that I have been associated with is every bit as patriotic and service-oriented as any other group in the United States.
We have a president-elect who has set out a pragmatic, nonpartisan, visionary course. It's time to lay to rest the old stereotypes about feckless, pacifist Democrats and authoritarian, war-mongering soldiers. If there were ever a time to get the relationship between Democrats and the military right, this is it.
Wesley K. Clark, a retired four-star general, commanded the 1999 war in Kosovo as NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe. He is a senior fellow at UCLA's Burkle Center for International Relations.
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