Why did the U.S. recover faster from the Panic of 1907 than from the 2008 recession and the Great Depression?

Why did the U.S. recover faster from the Panic of 1907 than from the 2008 recession and the Great Depression?
By PHIL GRAMM AND MIKE SOLON
WSJ, Feb 02, 2012
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204740904577193382505500756.html

Commerce Department data released last Friday show that four years after the recession began, real gross domestic product per person is down $1,112, while 5.8 million fewer Americans are working than when the recession started.

Never before in postwar America has either real per capita GDP or employment still been lower four years after a recession began. If in this "recovery" our economy had grown and generated jobs at the average rate achieved following the 10 previous postwar recessions, GDP per person would be $4,528 higher and 13.7 million more Americans would be working today.

Behind the startling statistics of lost income and jobs are the real and painful stories of American families falling further behind: record high poverty levels, record low teenage employment, record high long-term unemployment, shrinking birthrates, exploding welfare benefits, and a crippled middle class.

As the recovery faltered, President Obama first claimed the weakness of the recovery was due to the depth of the recession, saying that it was "going to take a while for us to get out of this. I think even I did not realize the magnitude . . . of the recession until fairly far into it."

But, in fact, the 1981-82 recession was deeper and unemployment was higher. Moreover, the 1982 recovery was constrained by a contractionary monetary policy that pushed interest rates above 21%, a tough but necessary step to break inflation. It was also a recovery that required a painful restructuring of American businesses to become more competitive in the increasingly globalized economy. By way of comparison, our current recovery has benefited from the most expansionary monetary policy in U.S. history and a rapid return to profitability by corporate America.

Despite the significant disadvantages the economy faced in 1982, President Ronald Reagan's policies ignited a recovery so powerful that if it were being repeated today, real per capita GDP would be $5,694 higher than it is now—an extra $22,776 for a family of four. Some 16.9 million more Americans would have jobs.

The most recent excuse for the failed recovery is that financial crises, by their very nature, result in slower, more difficult recoveries. Yet the 1981-82 recession was at least in part financially induced by inflation, record interest rates and the dislocations they generated. The high interest rates wreaked havoc on long-term lenders like S&Ls, whose net worth turned negative in mid-1982. But even if we ignore the financial roots of the 1981-82 recession, the financial crisis rationalization of the current, weak recovery does not stand up to scrutiny.

The largest economic crisis of the 20th century was the Great Depression, but the second most significant economic upheaval was the panic of 1907. It was from beginning to end a banking and financial crisis. With the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the stock market collapsed, loan supply vanished and a scramble for liquidity ensued. Banks defaulted on their obligations to redeem deposits in currency or gold.

Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, in their classic "A Monetary History of the United States," found "much similarity in its early phases" between the Panic of 1907 and the Great Depression. So traumatic was the crisis that it gave rise to the National Monetary Commission and the recommendations that led to the creation of the Federal Reserve. The May panic triggered a massive recession that saw real gross national product shrink in the second half of 1907 and plummet by an extraordinary 8.2% in 1908. Yet the economy came roaring back and, in two short years, was 7% bigger than when the panic started.

It is certainly true that the economy languished in the Great Depression as it has over the past four years. But today's malaise is similar to that of the Depression not because of the financial events that triggered the disease but because of the virtually identical and equally absurd policy prescriptions of the doctors.

Under President Franklin Roosevelt, federal spending jumped by 3.6% of GDP from 1932 to 1936, an unprecedented spending spree, as the New Deal was implemented. Under President Obama, spending exploded by 4.6% of GDP from 2008 to 2011. The federal debt by the end of 1938 was almost 150% above the 1929 level. Publicly held debt is projected to be double the 2008 level by the end of 2012. The regulatory burden mushroomed under Roosevelt, as it has under Mr. Obama.

Tax policy then and now was equally destructive. The top individual income tax rate rose from 24% to 63% and then to 79% during the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations. Corporate rates were increased by 36%. Under Mr. Obama, capital gains taxes are set to rise by one third, the top effective tax rate on dividends will more than triple, and the highest marginal tax rate will effectively rise by 21.4%.

Moreover, the Obama administration's populist tirades against private business are hauntingly similar to the Roosevelt administration's tirades. FDR's demagoguery against "the privileged few" and "economic royalists" has evolved into Mr. Obama's "the richest 1%" and America's "millionaires and billionaires."

Yet, in his signature style, Mr. Obama now claims our weak recovery is not because a Democratic Congress said yes to his policy prescriptions in 2009-10 but because a Republican House said no in 2011. The sad truth is this president sowed his policies and America is reaping the results.

Faced with the failed results of his own governing strategy of tax, spend and control, the president will have no choice but to follow an election strategy of blame, vilify and divide. But come Nov. 6, American voters need only ask themselves the question Reagan asked in 1980: "Are you better off than you were four years ago?"

Sadly, with their income reduced by thousands, the number of U.S. jobs down by millions, and the nation trillions deeper in debt, the answer will be a resounding "No."

Mr. Gramm, a former U.S. senator from Texas, is the senior partner at U.S. Policy Metrics, where Mr. Solon, a former senior budget staffer in both houses of Congress, is also a partner.

How Risky Are Banks’ Risk Weighted Assets? Evidence from the Financial Crisis

How Risky Are Banks’ Risk Weighted Assets? Evidence from the Financial Crisis. By Sonali Das & Amadou N. R. Sy
IMF Working Paper No. 12/36
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25687.0

Summary: We study how investors account for the riskiness of banks’ risk-weighted assets (RWA) by examining the determinants of stock returns and market measures of risk. We find that banks with higher RWA had lower stock returns over the US and European crises. This relationship is weaker in Europe where banks can use Basel II internal risk models. For large banks, investors paid less attention to RWA and rewarded instead lower wholesale funding and better asset quality. RWA do not, in general, predict market measures of risk although there is evidence of a positive relationship before the US crisis which becomes negative afterwards.

Introduction:

“The leverage ratio - a simple ratio of capital to balance sheet assets - and the more complex riskbased requirements work well together. The leverage requirement provides a baseline level of capital to protect the safety net, while the risk-based requirement can capture additional risks that are not covered by the leverage framework. The more advanced and complex the models become, the greater the need for such a baseline. The leverage ratio ensures that a capital backstop remains even if model errors or other miscalculations impair the reliability of risk-based capital. This is a crucial consideration - particularly as we work through the implementation of Basel II standard. By restraining balance sheet growth, the leverage ratio promotes stability and resilience during difficult economic periods.”– Remarks by Sheila Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation before the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Merida, Mexico, October 4, 2006.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 has exposed a number of important weaknesses in banking regulation. A key challenge is how to appropriately determine the riskiness of banks’ assets. The principle that regulatory capital requirements should be tied to the risks taken by banks was accepted internationally and formalized with the Basel I accord in 1988, and the definition of capital and measurement of risks have undergone several revisions since that time.  The second Basel accord, published in 2004, recommended banks hold total regulatory capital equal to at least 8 percent of their risk-weighted assets (RWA). The recently updated Basel III guidelines emphasize higher quality forms of capital, but makes limited strides in the measurement of risks. Instead, Basel III proposes as a complementary measure, a non-riskweighted leverage ratio.

Risk weighted assets are an important element of risk-based capital ratios. Indeed, banks can increase their capital adequacy ratios in two ways: (i) by increasing the amount of regulatory capital held, which boosts the numerator of the ratio, or (ii) by decreasing risk-weighted assets, which is the denominator of the regulatory ratio. A key concern about current methods of determining risk-weighted assets is that they leave room for individual banks to “optimize” capital requirements by underestimating their risks and thus being permitted to hold lower capital. Jones (2000) discusses techniques banks can use to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage and provides evidence on the magnitude of these activities in the Unites States. Even under the Basel I system, in which particular classes of assets are assigned fixed risk-weights, the capital ratio denominator can be circumvented. Merton (1995) provides an example in which, in place of a portfolio of mortgages, a bank can hold the economic equivalent of that portfolio at a riskweight one-eighth as large. Innovations in financial products since the first Basel accord have also likely made it easier for financial institutions to manipulate their regulatory risk measure.  Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) analyze asset-backed commercial paper and find results suggesting that banks used this form of securitization to concentrate, rather than disperse, financial risks in the banking sector while reducing bank capital requirements.

In addition to concerns about underestimating the riskiness of assets, there are differences in calculation of risk weighted assets across countries that may have unintended effects on financial stability. Lord Adair Turner, chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, warned in June that international differences in the calculation of risk-weighted assets could undermine Basel III3 and Sheila Bair, former chairman of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, added her concern that Europe and the US may be diverging in their calculation of RWA: “The risk weightings are highly variable in Europe and have led to continuing declines in capital levels, even in the recession. There's pretty strong evidence that the RWA calculation isn't working as it's supposed to.”

In this paper, we study whether equity investors find banks’ reported risk-weighted assets to be a credible measure of risk. First, did banks with lower risk-weighted assets have higher stock returns during the recent financial crisis? And second, do measures of risk based on equity market information correspond to risk-weighted assets? Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2010) and Beltratti and Stulz (2010) study banks’ stock return performance during the financial crisis as well, focusing primarily on the effect of different measures of capital and bank governance, respectively. Our paper studies whether markets price bank risk as measured by RWA, to inform the debate on how best to measure the risks embedded in banks’ portfolios.  Addressing the first question, we find that banks with higher RWA performed worse during the severe phase of the crisis, from July 2007 to September 2008, suggesting that equity investors did look at RWA as a determinant of banks’ stock returns in this period. This relationship is weaker in Europe where banks can use Basel II internal risk models. For large banks, investors paid less attention to RWA and rewarded instead lower wholesale funding and better asset quality.

We find as in Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2010) that markets do not respond to all measures of capital, but respond positively to higher quality measures – that is, capital with greater loss-absorbing potential. We also investigate the possibility of a capital-liquidity trade-off in the market assessment of banks. Our results indicate that there is indeed a capital-liquidity trade-off: (i) banks with more stable sources of short-term funding are not rewarded as highly for having higher capital, and (ii) banks with liquid assets are not rewarded as highly for having higher capital.

Regarding the relationship between RWA and stock market measures of bank risk, we find that RWA do not, in general, predict market measures of banks’ riskiness. There is evidence, however, of a positive relationship between RWA and market risk in the three years prior to the crisis, from 2004 to 2006, and this relationship becomes negative after the crisis. This could result from the large increase in market measures of risk, which reflect the volatility of a bank’s stock price, since the crisis, while banks have not adjusted their RWA to account for increased risk.

Conclusions

There has been a steady decline in the measure of asset-risk that banks report to regulators—riskweighted assets (RWA)—over the last decade. In light of this trend and other indications that banks can “optimize” their capital by under-reporting RWA in an attempt to minimize regulatory burdens, we study how equity market investors account for the riskiness of RWA by examining the determinants of stock returns and stock-market measures of risk of an international panel of banks.

Regarding banking stock returns, we find a negative relationship between RWA and stock returns over periods of financial crisis, suggesting that investors use RWA as an indicator of bank portfolio risk. Indeed, banks with higher risk-weighted assets performed worse during the severe phase of the crisis, from July 2007 to September 2008. We find a similar result when we focus on the ongoing crisis in the Europe.

Comparing regions with different regulatory structures, we find, however, that the relationship between stock returns and RWA is weaker in countries where banks have more discretion in the calculation of RWA. Specifically, in countries that had implemented Basel II before the onset of the recent financial crisis, allowing banks to use their own internal models to assess credit risks, investors look to other balance-sheet measures of risk exposure but not RWA. Our results also suggest that for large banks, investors paid less attention to the quality of capital and RWAs during the crisis and rewarded instead lower reliance on wholesale funding and better asset quality as measured by the relative size of customer deposit and non-performing loans, respectively.

We confirm results from previous studies that only capital with the greatest loss-absorbing potential matters for stock returns. In addition, we find a trade-off between capital and liquidity in terms of their positive effects on bank stock returns. The more stable a bank’s funding, the less positive the effect of higher capital on its stock return; the more liquid a bank’s assets, the less an increase in capital will increase its stock return.

When it comes to stock-market measures of risk, we find that RWA do not, in general, predict market measures of bank risk. There is evidence, however, of a break in the relationship between stock market measures of risk and RWA since the start of the crisis. Indeed, we find a positive relationship between RWA and market risk in the three years prior to the crisis, from 2004 to 2006, and this relationship becomes negative after the crisis. This could result from the large increase in market measures of risk, which reflect the volatility of a bank’s stock price, since the crisis, while banks have not adjusted their RWA to reflect increased risk.

In light of increasing risk-aversion in markets during times of crisis, the question of how market assessments of risk should be incorporated into banking regulation and supervision remains. Indeed, the asymmetry of information between banks, supervisors, and market participants regarding how risky RWA are can lead to increased uncertainty about the adequacy of bank capital, which during a financial crisis, can have damaging effects for financial stability.

Pricing of Sovereign Credit Risk: Evidence from Advanced Economies During the Financial Crisis

Pricing of Sovereign Credit Risk: Evidence from Advanced Economies During the Financial Crisis. By C. Emre Alper, Lorenzo Forni and Marc Gerard

IMF Working Paper WP/12/24
January, 2012

Summary: We investigate the pricing of sovereign credit risk over the period 2008-2010 for selected advanced economies by examining two widely-used indicators: sovereign credit default swap (CDS) and relative asset swap (RAS) spreads. Cointegration analysis suggests the existence of an imperfect market arbitrage relationship between the cash (RAS) and the derivatives (CDS) markets, with price discovery taking place in the latter. Likewise, panel regressions aimed at uncovering the fundamental drivers of the two indicators show that the CDS market, although less liquid, has provided a better signal for sovereign credit risk during the period of the recent financial crisis.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper addressed the linkages and determinants of two widely used indicators of sovereign risk: CDS and RAS spreads. It focused on advanced economies during the recent financial crisis and the sovereign market tensions that followed. It showed strong co-movements between both series, especially for those countries that have come under significant market pressure. At the same time, arbitrage distortions have remained pervasive in the biggest economies. This suggests that the liquidity of the derivatives market is of paramount importance for CDS spreads to fully reflect sovereign credit risk. For those economies where the evidence stands in favor of a cointegration relationship, deviations from arbitrage have been long lasting, though in line with results in the literature. Also, CDS spreads were found to anticipate changes in RAS, suggesting that the derivatives market has been leading in the process of pricing sovereign credit risk. Regarding the role of fundamentals, we showed that variables related to fiscal sustainability are able to explain only a limited share of the variation of CDS spreads. Spreads seem to respond more to financial variables (such as domestic banking sector capitalization, short-term liquidity conditions, large-scale long-term bond purchases by major central banks) or purely global variables (global growth, global risk aversion, dummies for the different stages of the crisis).

These results refer to a specific group of advanced countries over a short span of time. They suggest that movements in CDS and RAS spreads need to be interpreted with caution. First, while in theory they should be strictly connected, CDS and RAS spreads do not, generally, follow the pattern suggested by the no-arbitrage condition. Moreover, they are affected by several factors, with global and financial considerations playing a dominant role, while at the same time leaving room for a large unexplained component. In general, however, CDS spreads seem to have provided better signals than RAS regarding the market assessment of sovereign risk: over the period covered by the analysis, they have led the process of price discoveries in those countries under market pressure and have been more correlated than RAS to those fundamentals that are expected to affect sovereign risk.

PDF here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1224.pdf

Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks: An Assessment of Stylized Institutional Models

Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks: An Assessment of Stylized Institutional Models. Authors: Nier, Erlend; Osinski, Jacek; Jácome, Luis Ignacio; Madrid, Pamela
IMF Working Paper No. 11/250
November 01, 2011 

Summary: A number of countries are reviewing their institutional arrangements for financial stability to support the development of a macroprudential policy function. In some cases, this involves a rethink of the appropriate institutional boundaries between central banks and financial regulatory agencies, or the setting up of dedicated policymaking committees. In others, efforts are underway to enhance cooperation within the existing institutional structure. Against this background, this paper provides basic guidance for the design of effective arrangements, in a manner that can provide a framework for country-specific advice. After reviewing briefly the main institutional elements of existing and emerging macroprudential policy frameworks across countries, the paper identifies stylized institutional models based on key features that distinguish institutional arrangements. It develops criteria to assess the effectiveness of models, examines the strengths and weaknesses of models against these criteria, and explores ways to improve existing setups. The paper finally distills lessons and sets out desired principles for effective macroprudential policy arrangements.


NieretaliiIMF-TowardsEffectiveMacroprudentialPolicyFrameworks-AnAssessmentofStylizedInstitutionalModelsNov2011.pdf

Rapid Credit Growth: Boon or Boom-Bust?

Rapid Credit Growth: Boon or Boom-Bust? By Selim Elekdag & Yiqun Wu
IMF Working Paper No. 11/241
October 01, 2011 
http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/WPIEA2011241

Summary: Episodes of rapid credit growth, especially credit booms, tend to end abruptly, typically in the form of financial crises. This paper presents the findings of a comprehensive event study focusing on 99 credit booms. Loose monetary policy stances seem to have contributed to the build-up of credit booms across both advanced and emerging economies. In particular, domestic policy rates were below trend during the pre-peak phase of credit booms and likely fuelled macroeconomic and financial imbalances. For emerging economies, while credit booms are associated with episodes of large capital inflows, international interest rates (a proxy for global liquidity) are virtually flat during these periods. Therefore, although external factors such as global liquidity conditions matter, and possibly increasingly so over time, domestic factors (especially monetary policy) also appear to be important drivers of real credit growth across emerging economies. 


Executive Summary

This paper is motivated by rapid credit growth across many emerging economies, particularly those in Asia. It presents the results of a comprehensive event study which identifies 99 credit booms, of which 39 and 60 originated in advanced and emerging economies, respectively. Episodes of excessive credit growth—credit booms—lead to growing financial imbalances, and tend to end abruptly, often in the form of financial crises. In particular, relative to booms in other emerging economies, credit booms in emerging Asia were associated with a higher incidence of crises historically.

Three other main conclusions include the following:

• First, as credit booms build, they are jointly associated with deteriorating bank and corporate balance sheet soundness, and symptoms of overheating including: large capital inflows (including less stable bank flows), widening current account deficits, buoyant asset prices, and strong domestic demand.

• Second, while credit booms are associated with episodes of large capital inflows, international interest rates (a proxy for global liquidity), are virtually flat during these periods, which suggests the important role of domestic factors in driving credit growth across emerging economies. This may reflect, in part, that capital inflows are being channeled into other asset classes including real estate, equity, and corporate bonds, for example.

• Third, loose macroeconomic policy stances seem to have contributed to the build-up of credit booms. In particular, this seems to be the case for monetary policy across both advanced and emerging economies. For emerging economies, while international interest rates were essentially flat, domestic policy rates were below trend during the pre-peak phase of credit booms. Therefore, although external factors such as global liquidity conditions matter, and possibly increasingly so over time, domestic factors (especially monetary policy) also appear to be important drivers of real credit growth across emerging economies including those in Asia.

Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It?

Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It?
Authors: Chow, Julian T.S. ; Surti, Jay 
IMF Working Paper
October 01, 2011

Summary: This paper assesses proposals to redefine the scope of activities of systemically important financial institutions. Alongside reform of prudential regulation and oversight, these have been offered as solutions to the too-important-to-fail problem. It is argued that while the more radical of these proposals such as narrow utility banking do not adequately address key policy objectives, two concrete policy measures - the Volcker Rule in the United States and retail ring-fencing in the United Kingdom - are more promising while still entailing significant implementation challenges. A risk factor common to all the measures is the potential for activities identified as too risky for retail banks to migrate to the unregulated parts of the financial system. Since this could lead to accumulation of systemic risk if left unchecked, it appears unlikely that any structural engineering will lessen the policing burden on prudential authorities and on the banks.


Section I, Why redefine scope?

The business of banking involves leveraged intermediation managed by people subject to limited liability and, typically, to profit sharing contracts. This combination is well-known to generate incentives for risk-taking that may be excessive from the perspective of bank creditors. Creditor guarantees such as deposit insurance are known to exacerbate this incentive problem because they weaken creditors’ incentive to monitor and discipline management.

These issues are magnified in the case of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Owing to their size, interconnectedness, or complexity, the negative externalities emanating from financial distress at SIFIs makes them a source of systemic risk, leading to them being perceived to be too-important-to-fail (TITF). Consequently, the market implicitly—and often correctly—assumes that apart from explicit deposit insurance, creditor guarantees of a much wider nature would be extended when such firms are threatened by imminent failure.

This serves to weaken the mitigating force of market discipline. Prior to the crisis, the high likelihood of public support assumed in a distress situation contributed to the ability of SIFIs to carry thinner capital buffers at lower cost, acquire complex business models, and accumulate systemic risk. This trend was reinforced by the diversification premier attributed to universal banks by market participants and prudential authorities, enabling them to integrate the provision of retail, investment, and wholesale banking services without erecting the necessary firewalls there-between. These developments resulted in networks of financial interconnections within and across internationally active SIFIs that proved to be difficult, time consuming and costly to unravel. This made it seemingly less costly, during the crisis, to allocate tax payer resources to preventing SIFI failures than to allowing them, with subsequent resolution and restructuring of their businesses.

Diversification of business lines could serve to better protect a universal bank against idiosyncratic shocks that adversely impact individual lines of business. At the same time, the free flow of capital and liquidity and the associated growth in intra-group exposures would also increase the likelihood of intra-firm contagion in the event of an exogenous shock.  Unlike investment banking clients, retail banking customers typically have few options other than their banks for conducting vital financial transactions. Ensuring business continuity of services to such clients, therefore, serves a clear and important social welfare objective. But, complex business models and high levels of intra-group exposures present a barrier to quickly spinning off the retail parts of a universal bank which can ensure such business continuity.

Restricting the scope of a regulated bank’s business activities could, therefore, serve a number of important policy objectives. From a financial stability perspective, it could limit contagion within and across firms. From the perspective of consumer protection, it could ensure a more efficient provision of assurance of the continuity of retail banking services.  And, by more credibly restricting the ambit of tax-payer funded creditor guarantees to depositors it could furnish these benefits more efficiently and cheaply from a social cost perspective.

Accordingly, the official response to the crisis has, besides recognizing the need for strengthened regulation and oversight of SIFIs, also included complementary proposals to redesign and refocus their business activities. A number of concrete proposals have been made, including:

• Narrow Utility Banking—essentially a reversion of deposit-funded banks into traditional payment function outfits with lending (and investment banking) being carried out by independent finance companies funded by non-deposit means.  
• The Volcker Rule—prohibiting banks from carrying out certain types of investment banking activities if they are to continue to seek deposit funding and to retain banking licenses.  
• A Retail Ring-fence—that, while not prohibiting banking groups from providing both retail and wholesale banking services, mandates legal subsidiarization of certain retail activities, prohibits this subsidiary from undertaking other businesses and risks, and establishes minimum capital and liquidity standards for it on a solo basis. While not limiting capital and liquidity benefits to the retail subsidiary from other affiliates when necessary, the ring-fence limits capital and liquidity transfers in the opposite direction, to non-ring-fenced affiliates. Such functional subsidiarization could enable continuation of retail operations under distress or failure of a SIFI’s other businesses.

This paper focuses on the motivation, content, operational challenges, and potential costs of these proposals to narrow the scope of banking business. The more radical proposals discussed under the narrow banking umbrella involve strict limits on what retail banks’ permissible activities ought to be and could entail significant dead-weight costs if implemented as recommended. By contrast, the design and motivation for the Volcker rule and retail ring-fence are more precisely targeted at the problems arising from the integrated business models used by SIFIs before the crisis.

The challenge facing these latter proposals lies in the feasibility and cost of their implementation. In the case of the Volcker rule, for example, it will be challenging for prudential authorities to tell apart permissible activities (market making and underwriting) from prohibited ones (proprietary trading) when assessing banks’ exposures to securities markets. Similar difficulties will be faced by supervisors assessing the nature of and purpose of hedging tools and contracts utilized by ring-fenced banks. This presents policy makers with a dilemma. Should they invest the financial cost and time towards gathering more contemporaneous information in order to create better filters and limit loopholes? Or, if this is viewed as being too costly or simply inefficient, should they move to outright prohibition of all activities related to securities markets?

The danger with the second option lies in generating incentives to push risk taking beyond the borders of the regulated financial system. If there are indeed no direct financial linkages between retail financial firms and such shadow banking entities, such risk taking may cease being a problem of regulation. However, systemic risk will continue to accumulate in the shadow banks, and since the participants in the regulated and shadow systems are the same, or are, in general linked, a crisis in that sector will continue to exercise a contagion impact on the regulated banking sector.

http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/WPIEA2011236

Global growth and sovereign debt concerns drive markets

In a "Special Feature" in the last Bank of International Settlements' Quarterly Review, Sep. 2011, [1]  two of BIS staff publish "Global growth and sovereign debt concerns drive markets," where they confirm the already known BIS view of several trends and facts:

1  Without credible plans to restore long-term fiscal sustainability, sovereign debt in several euro area and other advanced countries may no longer be regarded as having zero credit risk.

2  [I]n many advanced economies, government debt levels are expected to continue to rise over coming years, due to high fiscal deficits and rising pension and health care costs.

3  Moreover, the level of economic output, which underpins debt servicing capacity, is unlikely to return to its pre-crisis trend any time soon.

4  Sovereign risk premia could thus be persistently higher and more volatile in the future.

There is much dispute regarding the first point, of course. The US Executive is trying to get Congress to approve a further stimulus package, and IMF's Christine Lagarde said last week that "In many corners" of the world austerity was pushed "in too harsh a way," without letting economic growth take root, according to the WSJ. [2]



References

[1]  Michael Davies and Tim Ng: Global growth and sovereign debt concerns drive markets. BIS Quarterly Review, Sep. 2011. http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1109.htm

[2]  Sudeep Reddy: Three Buttons the IMF Could Push. Wall Street Journal, Monday, Sep 19, 2011, page 12.

Higher capital's unintended effect: enabling banks to take more tail risk without the fear of breaching the minimal capital ratio

In Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (IMF Working Paper WP/11/188), authors Enrico Perotti, Lev Ratnovski, and Razvan Vlahu, study banking risk mitigation linked to capital regulation, in a realist context where banks "may choose tail risk asserts." The authors believe that this "undermines the traditional result that high capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability."

Besides, higher capital requirements "may have an unintended effect of enabling banks to take more tail risk without the fear of breaching the minimal capital ratio in non-tail risky project realizations."

Excerpts of the paper's introduction:

Regulatory reform in the wake of the recent financial crisis has focused on an increase in capital cushions of financial intermediaries. Basel III rules have doubled the minimal capital ratio, and directed banks to hold excess capital as conservation and countercyclical buffers above the minimum (BIS, 2010). These arrangements complement traditional moral suasion and individual targets used by regulators to ensure adequate capital cushions.

There are two key arguments in favor of higher capital. The first is an ex post argument: capital can be seen as a buffer that absorbs losses and hence reduces the risk of insolvency. This risk absorption role also mitigates systemic risk factors, such as collective uncertainty over counterparty risk, which had a devastating propagation effect during the recent crisis. The second considers the ex ante effects of buffers: capital reduces limited liability-driven incentives of bank shareholders to take excessive risk, by increasing their “skin in the game” (potential loss in case of bank failure; Jensen and Meckling 1976, Holmstrom and Tirole 1997).

Yet some recent experience calls for caution. First, banks are increasingly exposed to tail risk, which causes losses only rarely, but when those materialize they often exceed any plausible initial capital. Such risks can result from a number of strategies. A first example are carry trades reliant on short term wholesale funding, which in 2007-2008 produced highly correlated distressed sales (Gorton, 2010). A second example is the reckless underwriting of contingent liabilities on systemic risk, callable at times of collective distress (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). Finally, the combination of higher profits in normal times and massive losses occasionally arises in undiversified industry exposures to infl ated housing markets (Shin, 2009). A useful review of such strategies is provided in Acharya et al. (2009); IMF (2010) highlights the importance of recognizing tail risk in financial stability analysis. Since under tail risk banks do not internalize losses independently of the level of initial capital, the buffer and incentive effects of capital diminish. Higher capital may become a less effective way of controlling bank risk.

Second, a number of major banks, particularly in the United States, appeared highly capitalized just a couple of years prior to the crisis. Yet these very intermediaries took excessive risks (often tail risk, or highly negatively skewed gambles). In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that highly capitalized banks were looking for ways to put at risk their capital in order to produce returns for shareholders (Berger et al. 2008, Huang and Ratnovski 2009). Therefore, higher capital may create incentives for risk-taking instead of mitigating them.

This paper seeks to study these concerns by reviewing the effectiveness of capital regulation, and in particular of excess capital buffers (that is, above minimum ratios), in dealing with tail risk events. We reach two key results.

First, we show that the traditional buffer and incentives effects of capital become less powerful when banks have access to tail risk projects. The reason is that tail risk realizations can wipe out almost any level of capital. Left tails limit the effectiveness of capital as the absorbing buffer and restrict “skin in the game” because a part of the losses is never borne by shareholders. Hence, under tail risk, excess risk-shifting incentives of bank shareholders may exist almost independently of the level of initial or required capital.

Second, having established that under tail risk the benefits of higher capital are limited, we consider its possible unintended effects. We note that capital regulation also affects bank risk choices through the threat of capital adjustment costs when banks have to raise equity to comply with minimum capital ratios. (These costs are most commonly associated with equity dilution under asymmetric information on the value of illiquid bank assets,Myers and Majluf, 1984, or reduced managerial incentives for efficiency, Jensen, 1986).2 Similar to "skin in the game", capital adjustment costs make banks averse to risk, and may discourage risky bank strategies. However, unlike "skin in the game", the incentive effects of capital adjustment costs fall with higher bank capital because the probability of breaching the minimal capital ratio decreases.

Of course, if highly capitalized banks internalized all losses, they would have taken risk only if that was socially optimal (would have offered a higher NPV). Yet this result changes dramatically once we introduce tail risk. Then, even banks with high capital never internalize all losses, and may take excess risk. Moreover, the relationship between capital and risk can become non-monotonic. The reason is interesting. In the first place, tail risk leads to insolvency whatever the initial bank capital, so higher capital does not sufficiently discourage risk-taking for well capitalized banks through "skin in the game". At the same time, higher excess capital allows banks to take the riskier projects without breaching the minimal capital ratio (and incurring large capital adjustment costs) in the case of low (non tail) returns. So under tail risk, higher capital may create conditions where highly capitalized banks take more excess risk. Further, we show that the negative effect of extra capital on risk-taking becomes stronger when banks get access to projects with even higher tail risk.

To close the model, we derive the bank’s choice of initial capital in the presence of tail risk, and the implications for optimal capital regulation. We show that a bank may choose to hold higher capital in order to create a cushion over the minimal capital requirement so as to be able to take tail risk without the fear of a corrective action in case of marginally negative project realizations.  Then, capital regulation has to implement two bounds on the values of bank capital: a bound from below (a minimal capital ratio) to prevent ordinary risk-shifting and a bound from above (realistically, in the form of special attention devoted to banks with particularly high capital) in order to assure that they are not taking tail risk.

These results are interesting to consider in historic context. Most sources of tail risk that we described are related to recent financial innovations. In the past, tail risk in traditional loan-oriented depository banking was low (both project returns and withdrawals largely satisfied the law of large numbers), hence “skin in the game” effects dominated, and extra capital led to lower risk-taking. Yet now, when banks have access to tail risk projects, the buffer and "skin in the game" effects that are the cornerstone of the traditional approach to capital regulation became weak, while effects where higher capital enables risk-taking became stronger. Therefore, due to financial innovation, the beneficial effects of higher capital were reduced, while the scope for undesirable effects increased.

The paper has policy implications relevant for the current debate on strengthening capital regulation. The simpler conclusion is that it is impossible to control all aspects of risk-taking using a single instrument. The problem of capital buffers is that they are effective as long as they can minimize not just the chance of default, but also the loss given default. Contractual innovation in finance has enabled intermediaries to manufacture risk profiles which allow them to take maximum advantage of limited liability even with high levels of capital. The key to contain gambles with skewed returns is to either prohibit extreme bets, or to increase their ex ante cost.  Leading policy proposals now emerging are to charge prudential levies on strategies exposed to systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2010), such as extremely mismatched strategies (Perotti and Suarez, 2009, 2010), or derivative positions written on highly correlated risks.

A more intricate conclusion relates to implications for capital regulation. The results do not imply that less capital is better: this was not the case in recent years. However, they suggest the following. First, regulators should acknowledge that traditional capital regulation has limitations in dealing with tail risk. This is similar, for example, to an already-accepted understanding that it has limitations in dealing with correlation risk (Acharya, 2009). Second, banks with significant excess capital may be induced to take excess risk (in order to use or put at risk their capital), as amply demonstrated by the crisis experience. Hence, simply relying on higher and "excess" capital of banks as a means of crisis prevention may have ruinous effects if it produces a false sense of comfort. Finally, authorities should introduce complementary measures to target tail risk next to the policy on pro-cyclical and conservation buffers. In this context, enhanced supervision with a focus on capturing tail risk may be essential.

We see our paper as related to two key strands of the banking literature. First are the papers on the unintended effects of bank capital regulation. Early papers (Kahane 1977, Kim and Santomero 1988, Koehn and Santomero 1980) took a portfolio optimization approach to banking and caution that higher capital requirements can lead to an increase in risk of the risky part of the bank’s portfolio. Later studies focus on incentive effects. Boot and Greenbaum (1993) show that capital requirements can negatively affect asset quality due to a reduction in monitoring incentives. Blum (1999), Caminal and Matutes (2002), Flannery (1989) and Hellman et al. (2000) argue that higher capital can make banks take more risk as they attempt to compensate for the cost of capital. Our paper follows this literature, with a distinct and contemporary focus on tail risk.3 On the empirical front, Angora et al. (2009) and Bichsel and Blum (2004) find a positive correlation between levels of capital and bank risk-taking.

The second strand are the recent papers on the regulatory implications of increased sophistication of financial intermediaries and the recent crisis. These papers generally argue that dealing with new risks (including systemic and tail risk) requires new regulatory tools (Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007, Acharya et al. 2010, Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2008, Huang and Ratnovski 2011, Perotti and Suarez 2009, 2010).

You can order a print copy here or request a PDF copy from us.

Possible Unintended Consequences of Basel III and Solvency II

Some IMF staff published some ideas about the financial regulatory regime in a paper titled as this post:

In today’s financial system, complex financial institutions are connected through an opaque network of financial exposures. These connections contribute to financial deepening and greater savings allocation efficiency, but are also unstable channels of contagion. Basel III and Solvency II should improve the stability of these connections, but could have unintended consequences for cost of capital, funding patterns, interconnectedness, and risk migration.

Excerpts:

Efforts to strengthen the quality of capital for banks and insurers through Basel III and Solvency II are well advanced. On the one hand, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the organization responsible for developing international standards for banking supervision, adopted the Basel II framework in 2004 and, in response to the financial crisis, has taken steps to strengthen it in an incremental fashion to form what is now known the Basel III framework (BCBS 2009, 2011a, 2011b, and 2011c). On the other hand, the European Commission (EC) is leading the Solvency II project, in close cooperation with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), to develop harmonized standards for insurance supervision within the European Union. A directive was adopted in 2009, and work—which included a series of quantitative impact studies—has been underway to develop supporting rules.

The regional scope of application of the two accords varies. Basel is an  “accord”/agreement with no legal force but potentially global applicability, whereas Solvency II is a legal instrument that will be binding in 30 European Economic Area (EEA) countries4 (27 European Union (EU) states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway).  However, Solvency II has also implications beyond Europe through, for example, its influence on the international standards being developed by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and because external insurance groups will be more easily able to operate in the EU if their home supervisory regimes are considered equivalent.

Although these standards have much in common, differences do exist. Both take a risk-based approach to minimum capital requirements and supervision and promote the integrated use of models by institutions in managing risks and assessing solvency. However, their objectives overlap only partially. In particular, Basel III attempts to increase the overall quantum of capital and its quality as a means of protecting against bank failures, including improved quantification of risks that were poorly catered for under Basel II. However, Solvency II attempts to strengthen the quality of capital and tailor the quantity of capital within the sector as a whole. Finally, the two accords have been tailored to the business characteristics of the respective sectors, often as a result of bilateral negotiations, and shaped by the views of those involved in their development in a piecemeal manner. Accordingly, they have generated long and complex documents which define the same concepts in different ways and often deal differently with the same or similar issues.

Paper objectives: (i) to present similarities and differences among Pillar 1 requirements of the two accords; and (ii) to discuss possible unintended consequences of their implementation. In order to ensure focus in the analysis, this paper is intentionally limited to aspects related to Pillar 1 (minimum capital requirement) in the two capital accords. The paper acknowledges that there can be significant overlap in the business activities of banks and insurers. For example, consumers save with banks through deposits and with life insurers through annuity with savings products. In addition, banks and insurers invest in many of the same types of assets and they compete with one another in raising capital, both in the capital markets and within the financial conglomerates of which many are members. Due to this overlap, differences in the two accords can generate unintended consequences in the area of cost of capital, funding patterns, and interconnectedness, and promote risk/product migration across or away from the two sectors. These unintended consequences are summarized in the conclusions together with policy considerations. Finally, the paper acknowledges that other sources of arbitrage not analyzed in this paper, like differences in Pillar 2 (supervisory approach) and Pillar 3 (market discipline), as well as differences in accounting (partially discussed here) and tax treatments, could reinforce or offset the impact of differences in the capital regulatory frameworks.  required more closely to the risks of each insurer, without necessarily increasing the quantity

Conclusions (edited):

124. The nature of capital needed by banks and insurers is naturally different. [...]

125. Basel III and Solvency II both attempt to increase the quality of capital in their respective sectors, but often have different provisions for similar issues. [...]

126. Provisions that cannot be related to the intrinsic differences between the two sectors can result in unintended consequences. For instance, it is unclear whether and, if so, to what extent the cost of capital for banks is going to increase compared to the cost of capital for insurers. On the one hand (i) the lack of an explicit objective to increase capital levels under Solvency II; (ii) the more restricted geographical application of Solvency II; (iii) the less persuasive need for capital systemic risk surcharges for insurers; and (iv) the yet to be defined standards for internal models for insurers suggest that cost of capital may increase more for banks than for insurers. On the other hand, arguments in support of higher cost of capital for insurers can also be made. But in general, Pillar 1 requirements across the two sectors are too different to argue conclusively in either direction. In addition, the new liquidity standards for banks and the new credit risk charges for insurers could affect the funding patterns of banks and increase the interconnectedness of the two sectors through the sovereign balance sheet. Finally, the two accords may result in an increased use of securitization for funding purposes by both banks and insurers. Hence, these unintended consequences could translate into risk migration between or away from the two sectors. 

127. Several policy considerations stem from the aforementioned analysis:

* Basel III and Solvency II suggest a need for insurance regulators to communicate with their banking counterparts to understand the combined implications of the behavioral incentives that the two regimes may provide. This could significantly reduce the risk of unintended consequences associated with seemingly inconsistent treatment of same risks under the respective accords. This would also avoid unintentional arbitrage between internal models and the standardized approach under Solvency II, as has happened under Basel II.

* In addition, while group supervision has been strengthened, concerns about leakages still remain. This is especially a concern under Solvency II, due to its restricted geographical application and the potential use of non-equivalent jurisdictions for reinsurance. A key challenge for all groups remains what will be the approach by the EC to equivalence.

* Also, the adequacy of safety nets may need to be reviewed in the future. The likely increased use of covered bonds by banks for funding purposes would ring-fence assets so that they are unavailable to depositors and unsecured creditors in case of resolution.

* Basel III and Solvency II could further increase the need to expand the perimeter of regulation. As both Basel III and Solvency II push banks and insurers toward shorter duration and less risky business, non-regulated entities and market-based risk transfer mechanisms might evolve to fill any gap in market capacity that emerges. In addition, the likely increased use of securitization by banks and insures alike requires a strengthening in transparency and oversight of these contagion channels including securities lending-related cash collateral reinvestment programs, implementing macro-prudential measures (such as counter-cyclical margin requirements) related to securitization, repos and securities lending where appropriate, and improving market infrastructure for secured funding markets.

* Basel III and Solvency II may lead to excessive risk transfer to consumers and therefore, may require strengthening consumer protection. To the extent that the new accords increase capital and funding costs, the product mix offered by banks and insurers may change and entail additional risks for consumers. For example, excessive risk transfers could be a concern in the area of pension benefits where consumers already bear significant investment and longevity risk. Additional risk transfers to consumers may not be socially desirable from the pension policy point of view.

* Finally, there appears to be a need for empirical investigation about the magnitude of the impact of unintended consequences. There is no universally agreed set of unintended consequences and this paper is the first attempt (that we know of) to generate a set and relate it to the specifics of the Basel III and Solvency II accords. In addition, there is a general absence of empirical studies on the extent of the impact of possible unintended consequences

Order a print copy here: http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/WPIEA2011187 (broken link for now).

Or request a PDF copy from us leaving a comment to this post.

The Bright and the Dark Side of Cross-Border Banking Linkages

The Bright and the Dark Side of Cross-Border Banking Linkages
Author/Editor: Cihák, Martin; Muñoz, Sònia; Scuzzarella, Ryan
August 05, 2011

Summary: When a country’s banking system becomes more linked to the global banking network, does that system get more or less prone to a banking crisis? Using model simulations and econometric estimates based on a world-wide dataset, we find an M-shaped relationship between financial stability of a country’s banking sector and its interconnectedness. In particular, for banking sectors that are not very connected to the global banking network, increases in interconnectedness are associated with a reduced probability of a banking crisis. Once interconnectedness reaches a certain value, further increases in interconnectedness can increase the probability of a banking crisis. Our findings suggest that it may be beneficial for policies to support greater interlinkages for less connected banking systems, but after a certain point the advantages of increased interconnectedness become less clear.

Excerpts:

One of the hallmarks of financial globalization has been a growth in cross-border linkages (exposures) among banks. On the positive side, these linkages have been associated with new funding and investment opportunities, contributing to rapid economic growth in many countries (especially in the early part of the 2000s). But the growing financial linkages also have a “dark side”: the increased cross-border interconnectedness made it easier for disruptions in one country to be transmitted to other countries and mutate into systemic problems with global implications.

The potential harmful consequences of cross-border interconnectedness for domestic banking sector stability have been illustrated rather dramatically during the recent global financial crisis, when shocks to one country’s financial system were rapidly transmitted to many others. One of the upshots of the crisis was that considerable efforts have been devoted to better measuring “systemic importance” of jurisdictions around the world. There is a growing consensus that interconnectedness, together with size, should be a key variable in assessing the systemic importance of a jurisdiction from the viewpoint of financial stability (IMF, BIS, and FSB, 2009; IMF, 2010).

This paper aims to answer the following key question: when a country’s banking system gets more linked to the global banking network, does it become more stable, or less stable? The answer to this question is obviously relevant for policymakers and regulators in individual countries. To the extent that interlinkages help banking stability, should policies and regulations be designed to promote such cross-border interconnectedness? And to the extent that interlinkages are bad for stability, should policies and regulations aim to stop or, at least limit, the growth of such interlinkages?

We examine the above key question in two ways: First, we analyze it conceptually, using simulations. Second, we examine it empirically, based on a range of econometric approaches—parametric as well as non-parametric—that combine data on banking crises around the world with a comprehensive data set on cross-border banking linkages.  To preview the main results, our short answer to the above question is: it depends on the degree of interconnectedness. The relationship between the likelihood of a banking crisis in a country and the degree of integration of that country’s banking sector into the global banking network is far from trivial. We find that in a country whose banking sector has relatively few linkages to other banking sectors, increased cross-border linkages tend to improve that system’s stability, controlling for other factors. In other words, within a certain range, connections serve as a shock-absorber. The system acts as a mutual insurance device with disturbances dispersed and dissipated. Connectivity engenders robustness. Risk-sharing – diversification – prevails. But at some point—which we estimate to be at about the 95th percentile of the distribution of countries in terms of interconnectedness—increases in crossborder links begin to have detrimental effects on domestic banking sector stability. At a yet higher point, when a country’s network of interlinkages becomes almost complete, the probability of a crisis goes down again.

One of the novel insights of our paper is that it is important to distinguish whether the crossborder interlinkages are stemming primarily from banks’ asset side or from their liabilities side. We introduce measures that distinguish those two types of interconnectedness (which we call “downstream” and “upstream” interconnectedness), and we find that the impact of changes in interconnectedness on banking system fragility are more significant for liabilities-side (“upstream”) interconnectedness than for asset-side (“downstream”) interconnectedness. 

Order a print copy (broken link as of today): http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/WPIEA2011186

Or ask us for a PDF copy.

Iranians adjust to increases in fuel – diesel costs 837% more than a month ago

Please see commentary on this and other subjects at TradeFlow21.com

Iranians adjust to increases in fuel – diesel costs 837% more than a month ago

You can request the full WSJ report in the link above.

Demirgüç: one of the culprits was the duo of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

In "Life After the Crisis: Where do we go from here?", World Bank Chief Economist Asli Demirgüç-Kunt says:

[...] while the recent global crisis had multiple causes, one of the culprits was the duo of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. U.S. policymakers encouraged these financial institutions to increase the availability of mortgages to borrowers with questionable ability to repay. Subsequent relaxing of standards, the increase in home prices due to a larger pool of “qualified” borrowers, and their eventual default in large numbers during the downturn all added to the severity of the crisis.

I asked her (first comment to her post above):

hi, can you provide references for that part of your post? Stiglitz [2] is very adamant that this is a red herring.

I know that AEI's Peter J. Wallison has persuasively shown arguments putting guilt on the GSEs, the CRA and lawmakers and the Executive [3], but I'd like to see analyses a bit less political and clearly academic about the subject, replying to Stiglitz's comments and his references:

Those that want to believe in the market have struggled to find someone else to whom blame can be shifted. One often heard candidates are government efforts to encourage lending to minorities and underserved communities through the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements and to increase home ownership through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Default rates on CRA lending are actually lower than on other categories of lending, and CRA lending is just too small, in any case, to have accounted for the magnitude of the problem.14

His reference #14 is a note:

See Canner and Bhutta (2008) and Kroszner (2008).

Those references, in turn, are [4] and [5]. Both Stiglitz's comments and his references are preivous to July 2009, that is a bit old.


References

[1]  Asli Demirgüç-Kunt: "Life After the Crisis: Where do we go from here?", Sep 17, 2010, http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/life-after-the-crisis-where-do-we-go-from-here

[2]  Joseph Stiglitz: Interpreting the causes of the great recession of 2008. Lecture prepared for the Eighth BIS Annual Conference, Basel, 25–26 June 2009.

[3]  Peter Wallison: "The True Origins of This Financial Crisis", in "Getting the Story Right: The True Origin of the Financial Crisis", AEI Online, Feb 2009, http://www.aei.org/issue/100012

[4]  Canner, G. and N. Bhutta, “Staff Analysis of the Relationship between the CRA and the Subprime Crisis,” memorandum, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November 21, 2008.

[5]  Kroszner, R.S., “The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis,” speech at Confronting Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2008.

Liberals issue dire warnings to argue for more stimulus spending. Conservative Republicans argue (quite plausibly) that hundreds of billions in "stimulus spending" has proven counterproductive so far.The economy isn't that bad.

Don't Believe the Double-Dippers. By ALAN REYNOLDS
Liberals issue dire warnings to argue for more stimulus spending. Conservative Republicans argue (quite plausibly) that hundreds of billions in "stimulus spending" has proven counterproductive so far.The economy isn't that bad.WSJ, Jun 10, 2010

'We're falling into a double-dip recession," former Labor Secretary Robert Reich declares in a Christian Science Monitor blog post. His evidence? The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimated that only 41,000 private jobs were added in May. But that is much too flimsy a statistic to justify predicting an aborted recovery—something that has happened only once since 1933.

The only double-dip recession in modern times began during the election year of 1980, when President Jimmy Carter's newly appointed Fed Chairman Paul Volcker slashed the federal-funds rate to 9% that April from 17.5% in July. Inflation returned with a vengeance, so the Fed gradually reversed course by pushing the fed-funds rate above 19% by the time Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981. Are those currently predicting a double-dip recession expecting the Fed to raise interest rates to 19%?

It is also misleading to label this a "jobless" recovery, which indeed took place in the early 2000s. After the recession of 2001 ended that November, the number of private jobs continued to fall by 1.3 million through July 2003. Yet production continued to grow.

This year, by contrast, civilian employment has increased by more than 1.6 million jobs, according to the BLS Current Population Survey of households. True, the Current Employment Survey of employers shows a smaller gain of 982,000 in nonfarm jobs over the past five months, nearly half of which were government jobs. But that still leaves private employment up by 495,000 or roughly 100,000 a month.

Mr. Reich divined an imminent recession largely because the increase in private jobs supposedly slowed to 41,000 in May, according to the BLS. But these monthly estimates are much too rough and variable to be taken so seriously. The household survey, for example, would have us believe the labor force suddenly surged by 805,000 in April then collapsed by 322,000 in May. By smoothing out such wild gyrations, it turns out that the labor force rose by 267,000 a month this year, while employment rose by 326,000 a month. The combination was enough to trim unemployment, but not by much.

Double-dippers use dubious devices to make mediocre job gains appear much worse than they are. One is to claim, "There are still nearly six workers competing for every available job," as Rep. Jim McDermott (D., Wash.) wrote in a May 28 letter to this newspaper.

After talking to me about those figures, CNNMoney reporter Tami Luhby wrote, "Though Labor Department statistics say there are 5.5 job seekers for every opening, Reynolds said there is work available if people are willing to relocate or take jobs in a different field." What I actually told her was that it is completely untrue that BLS statistics "say there are 5.5 job seekers for every job opening." I also remarked, with less emphasis, that making 79-99 weeks of unemployment benefits available only in states with the highest unemployment rates has the perverse effect of punishing people for moving to the 14 states where unemployment ranges from 4% to 7%.

The myth that there are nearly six job seekers for every available job arises from the misnamed BLS "Job Opening and Turnover Survey" (JOLT), which asks a few thousand businesses how many new jobs they are actively advertising outside the firm. But note well that this concept of "job openings" does not purport to include "every available job." On the contrary, it is closer to being a measure of help wanted ads.

"Many jobs are never advertised," explains the BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook; "People get them by talking to friends, family, neighbors, acquaintances, teachers, former coworkers, and others who know of an opening." Because many jobs are never advertised they are also never counted as job openings!

The BLS Handbook also notes that, "Directly contacting employers is one of the most successful means of job hunting." Those jobs are also not counted as job openings. Job openings inside a firm are also excluded—including laid-off workers who are rehired or relocated within large corporations.

Despite these severe limitations, the trend has been more upbeat than you might gather from depressing news reports. "The number of job openings increased in April to 3.1 million," reports the BLS. "Since the most recent trough of 2.3 million in July 2009, the number of job openings has risen by 740,000."

Another popular device for denigrating this year's modest-yet-positive job gains is to claim the "real" unemployment rate is actually 16.6%. That figure, called U6, is the largest of six BLS measures. The more familiar U3 rate (now 9.7%) defines "unemployment" as people who say they have looked for work at some time during the past month but have not yet started a new job.

An alternative U2 measure includes only those who were unemployed because they were laid off or fired—not because they quit or were newcomers to the job market. That rate of job loss unemployment is 6%.

A broader U4 measure, by contrast, adds "discouraged workers." People need not have looked for a job recently to be counted as discouraged. It is sufficient for them to think no work is available, or think they are too young or too old, or think they lack the necessary schooling or training. Psychological discouragement adds relatively little to the conventional unemployment rate, lifting the U4 measure to 10.3% in May (down from 10.6% in April).

The broadest U6 statistic goes much further by adding "all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part-time for economic reasons."

The phrase "working part-time for economic reasons" implies a clear divide between part-time and full-time status. That creates the misimpression that those working part-time for economic reasons means would rather have different ("full-time") jobs. In reality, only a fourth of them say they could not find a full-time job; the rest work in occupations where hours vary. The BLS counts anything below 35 hours as part-time, so those who normally work 9-to-5 are counted as working part-time for economic reasons if they report losing even a single hour due to "slack work or unfavorable business conditions . . . or seasonal declines in demand."

The "marginally attached" in the U6 statistic do not even claim to imagine they can't find work. They are not looking for work, the BLS explains, "for such reasons as school or family responsibilities, ill health, and transportation problems." To describe people who are not available for work as unemployed or even underemployed is a misuse of the language.

Using all of this statistical trickery to convert a weak job market into an imminent recession has become a bipartisan political strategy. Robert Reich and other big government Democrats play the "double dip" card to peddle more deficit spending on refundable tax credits and transfer payments. Conservative Republicans often become double-dippy for very different reasons—to argue (quite plausibly) that hundreds of billions in "stimulus spending" has proven counterproductive so far, contributed to the debt, and will eventually lead to higher taxes.

Those who want to know what is going on must sift through all of this bipartisan gloom to distinguish between (1) agenda-driven dire warnings and (2) the boring reality of a sluggish recovery being partially paralyzed by ominous threats of punitive taxes and onerous regulation.

Mr. Reynolds is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and the author of "Income and Wealth" (Greenwood Press, 2006).

Hoosiers vs. Crony Capitalism - How Indiana took on the federal bailout machine and restored the rule of law

Hoosiers vs. Crony Capitalism. By MITCH DANIELS
How my state took on the Obama bailout machine and restored the rule of law.WSJ, June 04, 2010

June 10 will be a silent anniversary, but one worth noting by those alarmed at the past year's assault on free institutions. It was last June 10 when the federal government tossed aside the option of proven, workable bankruptcy procedures in order to nationalize Chrysler on behalf of its union allies.

In order to provide preferential treatment to its cronies, the Obama administration confiscated the property of those creditors who had lent money to Chrysler in good faith, believing that their interest was legally secured and that they stood at the head of the line in the event of the auto company's failure.

The shock wave through the economic markets from this arbitrary redefinition of "secured creditors" rights was profound. Could centuries of crystal-clear law really be overthrown by executive fiat? Apparently, yes. The Supreme Court declined to intervene in the takeover. The cost of corporate borrowing was clearly headed upward as the U.S. for the first time imitated those Third World despotisms where economic rules can be changed without warning at the ruler's whim and convenience.

Equally profound was the message sent to the legal community, which quickly began to cite the "Chrysler precedent" as the now-acceptable judicial model for stripping secured creditors' rights in the name of expediency. Just days after the decision, the Phoenix Coyotes of the National Hockey League invoked the Chrysler case in an attempt to undermine secured creditors' rights and hasten bankruptcy.

Those brave few who protested the brute force taking of their money were attacked by administration apparatchiks for the sin of doing their fiduciary duty to their investors and shareholders. Calls went out from the White House, encouraging submission and warning of the consequences of opposition. One by one, potential plaintiffs surrendered.

The one effort to stop the Chrysler cramdown was launched by three Indiana pension funds. Believing they were making both a wise investment and a gesture supportive of a longtime state employer, Hoosier retired teachers and state policemen had purchased some $19 million in Chrysler's secured debt. The market consensus at the time was that, at 43 cents to par, the bonds were well below their value if bankruptcy ultimately came.

Bankruptcy came, all right, but in a new, extra-legal form run by the federal government. The United Auto Workers, who owned no interest in the company, were simply handed a 55% interest, a gift valued then at $4.5 billion. When no one else wanted to buy the firm, Fiat was given a 20% stake for free to take it over. After this looting, the legitimate creditors were told to be happy with the remnants. For Indiana's retired teachers and state policemen, this amounted to 29 cents on the dollar, a loss of $6 million versus the purchase price and millions more below the expected value in a standard Chapter 11 proceeding.

When, alone among the victims, Indiana retirees went to court, they caused a lot of discomfort but no change in the outcome. The Second District U.S. Court of Appeals declined to overturn the cramdown, but the judges refused to go within a mile of the merits. How could they? The law calls certain instruments "secured" credit for a reason, and there was absolutely zero precedent for the Chrysler confiscation.

In an article by Zach Lowe published last fall in the Am Law Daily and the American Lawyer magazine, UCLA Law School Prof. Lynn LoPucki said of the cramdown: "What happened . . . was so outrageous and illegal that until March of this year [2009], nobody even conceptualized it." The Second Circuit opinion, like the Supreme Court's refusal to stay the nationalization, went out of its way to state that the ruling did not reach the substantive issues raised.

Aided by incensed counsel donating much of their time pro bono, Indiana returned to the Supreme Court with a slim hope of recovering its pensioners' assets, reinstating traditional American property rights and making secured credit secure once more. It seemed to some an exercise in futility: The judge in the Coyotes case commented from the bench that the "poor pension manager from Indiana . . . was kind of like the gentlemen in Tiananmen Square when the tanks came rolling."

On Dec. 14, 2009, in the under-reported news story of the year, the Supreme Court granted the request of Indiana pensioners and took the case. The Court immediately ruled from the bench to strike down the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, eliminating it as a possible precedent in any future proceeding. Our retirees are still out the $6 million but enjoyed the small vindication of being awarded the court clerk's costs at Chrysler's expense.

The nation is not safe from crony capitalism. In the past year we've experienced the nationalization of the student loan industry and the passage of national health-care and financial-services regulation, each of which is rife with new opportunities for government favoritism and preferential handouts to favored corporations like Chrysler.

But thanks to a quiet correction by the Supreme Court—and a little Hoosier stubbornness—the rule of law has been re-established. The greatest benefits will accrue not to lenders and borrowers but to all those whose jobs are created because investors once again can trust that the money they've risked is safe from seizure by the state.

Mr. Daniels, a Republican, is the governor of Indiana.

American Jobbery Act - Dissecting this week's stimulus bill

American Jobbery Act. WSJ Editorial
Dissecting this week's stimulus billWSJ, May 25, 2010

President Obama and Democrats on Capitol Hill are publicly fretting about the dangers of spending and debt, which can mean only one thing: Another big spending "stimulus" bill is in the works. And sure enough, the House plans to vote this week on $190 billion in new spending, $134 billion of which it won't even pretend to pay for.

Sander Levin, the new Ways and Means Chairman, calls this exercise the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act. Mr. Levin has waited 28 years to ascend to this throne and this is the best he can do? "Jobs" were also the justification in February 2009 for the $862 billion stimulus that has managed to hold the jobless rate down to a mere 9.9%. Maybe Mr. Levin's spending can hold it down to even greater heights.

The nearby table gives a flavor of what's in this grab bag of political payoffs, corporate welfare and transfer payments. There's $24 billion to help states pay the exploding tab for Medicaid, the same program that ObamaCare expands by some 16 million new recipients. The bill also offers $1 billion for summer jobs for teens, whose jobless rate is 25.4%. Congress could do far more to create teen jobs if it merely suspended last year's minimum wage increase to $7.25 an hour, which priced millions of young workers out of the labor market. But that would be too rational.

The biggest item is $65 billion to prevent a 21% cut in Medicare physician reimbursements. Democrats promised this to the American Medical Association in return for its ObamaCare support, but they left the $65 billion out of the health-care law to make it look less expensive. Now they're pushing it through under separate cover when they assume the press corps won't notice.

The $47 billion to extend unemployment insurance to nearly two full years will bring the total spent on this program to $137 billion during this recession—five times more than in either of the prior two recessions. That's nearly as much as the federal corporate income raised in 2009.
The sages in Congress continue to claim that these payments for not working will lead to more work. Representative Jim McDermott recently declared on the House floor that jobless payments are "one of the most effective forms of economic stimulus" because "every unemployment dollar spent returns $1.64 of economic benefits." So let's lay off everybody, pay them for not working, and watch the economy really boom. Where do they teach this stuff?

This bill is also one of the most expensive corporate welfare giveaways in recent years with subsidies for municipal bond traders, cotton farmers, yarn producers, sheep growers, Hawaiian sugar cane cooperatives, motor sports businesses, renewable energy firms, the steel lobby, and so on. Any industry that doesn't get a tax credit or other handout in this bill should fire its lobbyist.
All of this is "paid for," in the Beltway lingo, with a net tax increase on business of about $40 billion and at least $134 billion of new debt. There's a new 24 cent a barrel tax on oil companies, which would flow to consumers in higher gas prices, because Congress says the industry's profits are excessive.

U.S. multinational companies would pay a higher tax rate on their overseas income, which will not help them create more jobs here. The better way to discourage job outsourcing is to cut the corporate income tax rate, but Mr. Levin and his union allies will have none of that.
Managers of private equity and venture capital firms that provide the start-up and expansion funding to businesses would see their tax rate rise to as high as 35% from 15% today—a huge tax increase when businesses are starved for capital. And small, often family-owned Subchapter S companies that provide professional services would be required to subject more of their profits to the self-employment tax. These firms already pay up to 35% tax on these profits, so under the Democratic plan their tax rate could reach 50%.

Perhaps you're wondering what happened to the "pay as you go" budget rules that Mr. Obama announced to great media fanfare as recently as February. Democrats now say "paygo" doesn't apply because this spending qualifies as an "emergency." But while the new spending isn't paid for, Democrats are insisting that the bill's extension of the R&D tax credit and small business depreciation allowance must be offset by the tax increases.

Oh, and by the way, the President is unveiling a new line-item veto proposal this week to "rein in wasteful spending and hold Congress accountable," as Senator John Kerry put it yesterday in a press release. If any of them were remotely serious, they'd start by line-item vetoing this entire bill.

The Euro's Tribulations - Don't blame the single currency for the failures of Keynesian economics

The Euro's Tribulations. WSJ Editorial
Don't blame the single currency for the failures of Keynesian economics.WSJ, Monday,May 10, 2010

Twelve years ago, economist Robert Mundell wrote a series of articles in these pages under the headline, "The Case for the Euro," touting the benefits of the single European currency due in 1999. The subsequent decade exceeded the rosiest scenarios set out by the "father of the euro." Sixteen countries came to enjoy prosperity and stability in the world's second most successful zone of sound money and free commerce (after the U.S.).

This year, the party has come to a crashing halt with Greece's financial meltdown, and one consequence has been a run on confidence in the euro. Last week, as the European Union and International Monetary Fund approved a €110 billion rescue and the Greeks adopted an austerity package, the euro tumbled to 14-month lows.

The euro will be tested in the coming months and years by policy makers and markets. The challenges ahead include continued economic weakness, particularly across a Mediterranean flirting with insolvency from Greece to Portugal, political tensions and calls to winnow euroland to the strong economies, or to shelve the euro altogether.

Europe's unprecedented monetary union can no doubt be improved, but its benefits in economic efficiency and monetary discipline should not be ignored, much less tossed away at the first serious challenge. It's also important to understand that the single currency is the scapegoat du jour for a crisis whose real causes are inconvenient for the political class.
***

In one anti-euro corner are weak-money neo-Keynesians. Greece was their model pupil, spending its way to supposedly drive growth. But when the time came to pay the piper, the lament now heard from Paul Krugman and elsewhere is that the Greeks are unjustly shackled by the euro. Take back national control over monetary policy and the EU's weak economies can once again devalue their way out of trouble. Blaming the euro for the failures of Keynesianism sets a new standard for chutzpah, and this prescription would debase not only the currencies but the middle class for a generation.

Then there's the idea to save the euro by creating a European super-state to set economic policy, harmonize taxes and ease transfers from rich countries to the poor. George Soros stands in this camp, as does prominent German central banker Otmar Issing, who earlier this year wrote that "starting monetary union without having established a political union was putting the cart before the horse." This is really a call for imposing on all countries the welfare state agenda that got Europe into this jam in the first place.

Before offering cures, let's diagnose the Greek disease properly. Joining the euro gave the poorer southern EU countries a perfect opportunity to "pull up their socks," in Professor Mundell's words. Some, like Italy and Spain, did so for a while. But sitting pretty inside the euro club, many politicians took the foot off the pedal of unpopular reforms, such as liberalizing labor codes or lowering costs to business.

Greek politicians in particular lived beyond their means and put much of this spending, in Wall Street parlance, off their balance sheet. The euro did enable bad habits by letting Greece borrow at German interest rates. This postponed the day of reckoning for the failures of reform, until a new Athens government last year came clean about the lies and the mess. But don't blame a currency for irresponsible leadership.

Europe isn't experiencing a currency crisis. It is a debt crisis driven by overborrowing, large and inefficient government, and insufficient economic growth. Some of the sickest countries use the euro as their legal tender, but others don't. Iceland, Latvia, Romania and Hungary were all forced into the arms of the IMF, though none of them is in the euro zone. Britain is also outside the euro bloc but is facing its own day of debt reckoning.

Iceland is a sobering might-have-been for the Greeks. The small Arctic island's financial crisis was compounded by a currency crisis. It's now fast-tracking an application to join the EU and the euro. The Icelanders understand that small countries with shallow capital markets are most vulnerable to currency volatility in a world of floating exchange rates.

Before Greece or Portugal seriously consider bringing back the drachma and escudo, and devaluing their way out of trouble, recall that Argentina took this advice in late 2001. Dropping its dollar peg, the Argentines beggared their people and avoided policy changes. They ended up defaulting and continue to fall behind Brazil and Chile.

The Greeks can leave the euro if they prefer, and neither Berlin nor Brussels would spill many tears. But the costs of dropping out would be substantial. The bulk of Greek financial contracts are in euros. Were a reconstituted drachma devalued by 50%, the public debt to GDP ratio would essentially double—in Greece's case to well over 200% of GDP. Our guess is that the Greeks restructure their debts or default before they drop out of the single currency.
***

While not the cause of this crisis, the euro has been tarnished by it. Greece's Madoff-like bookkeeping broke the mutual trust that is essential to any monetary compact, and this will take time to restore.

Shortcomings in the rules governing the euro zone were evident long before this crisis, and they now need to be addressed. In one of his 1998 Journal articles, Mr. Mundell wrote that the rules on fiscal deficits and public debts in the Stability and Growth Pact—adopted by euro-zone countries to govern the single currency—needed bite to guard against the obvious free-rider problem: Countries would be tempted to take advantage of a colossal and low-interest bond market believing that "when the chips are down the union will act as lender of last resort." He essentially predicted the problems of Greece and the proposed EU-IMF bailout.

Fines were decreased and the stability pact was never seriously enforced. Germany and France, which pushed hardest for strict penalties, were the first to break the rules without suffering any consequences. Five years ago, Berlin and Paris shot down the European Commission's proposal to oversee national statistical agencies to safeguard against Greek-like cheating.

On Tuesday, the Commission plans to unveil proposals on closer surveillance of euro-zone budgets. Next it should restore some teeth to the stability pact. These modest steps won't excite euro federalists as much as a grand and unrealistic political union, but they might do some actual good.
***

The future of the euro in the next decade depends on the will of European politicians. First the beggar-thy-currency crowd must be ignored. The European Central Bank has, at least so far, been a bulwark against such talk. On the other hand, the EU's decision to create a "bailout fund" tells creditors and borrower governments alike that they will always be rescued, increasing moral hazard and the odds of another crisis. If asked to foot the bill again, unhappy German or Dutch taxpayers may decide the euro isn't worth the price and themselves push for its dissolution.

Above all, the euro will thrive only if Europe thrives. Austerity plans intended to stem the fiscal hemorrhaging are no substitute for policies to promote growth. Should Europe use this crisis to make itself more competitive and rein in the welfare state, the Continent would be even better placed to take advantage of a huge single market underpinned by a stable currency and low inflation. And if that were to happen, the second decade of the euro could turn out to be better than the first.

A Centrist Agenda for Economic Growth

A Centrist Agenda for Economic Growth. By JIM OWENS
Freer trade plus lower corporate and investment taxes would go a long way.WSJ, May 03, 2010

The long-term health of the U.S. economy is at risk. There are signs of recovery from the worst recession since the Great Depression. But not enough.

We need a renewed, centrist political agenda to support economic policies that will enhance our global competitiveness. America cannot sustain itself as a great country without a strong economy. Yet significant economic decisions are made in Washington with little consideration as to how they will affect the global competitiveness of the small and large companies that employ our citizens.

Here are a few policy suggestions:

• Restore fiscal discipline. Simply stated, we must balance the books. This means deciding how much government we want and the best way to generate the tax revenues to pay for it.

To get there, federal and state governments must be required to use the same transparent accounting standards required of corporations for employee retirement benefits. With baby boomers retiring, we have a ticking time bomb on our hands. Transparency would make it clear to everyone just where the unfunded obligations are and get us on road to begin funding them. Further, we should mandate that federal budget deficits be balanced over a business cycle.

• Simplify the federal tax code with flat personal income taxes. This means incentivizing savings and investment with significantly lower rates for dividends and long-term capital gains. Use consumption taxes to raise additional funds to achieve social goals, such as lowering emissions or tobacco consumption.

• Tax business only on profits earned in the United States. This means adopting a territorial tax system for U.S.-based global companies, which will encourage them to repatriate global profits (billions await) to the United States and increase the likelihood of investment here. We should also recruit foreign direct investment to serve U.S. customers and to pay taxes to our government.

Recognizing that the U.S. has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world, the government should not eliminate the current provision that allows companies to "defer" paying a U.S. tax on foreign income until it is brought back into this country. Over time this would destroy U.S.-based global companies.

• Increase infrastructure investment. Since the 1970s U.S. investment in infrastructure has grown at only half the rate of GDP growth. Today, our roads are crumbling, bridges are in need of repair, and our power grid is inefficient. Meanwhile, emerging economies (notably China, India and Brazil) are making huge investments in modern infrastructure.

Infrastructure is the foundation for an economy's global competitiveness. We don't want to wake up in 10 years and find ourselves hopelessly behind.

• Free up international trade. The U.S. needs to provide leadership for completion of the World Trade Organizations' Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations. Moreover, Americans need to pressure Washington to ratify the three Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)—for Panama, Colombia and South Korea—that have already been negotiated. Passage of these agreements will show the world we're open for business, create immediate exports and related jobs, and it would also strengthen the economies of three important allies.

• Improve the health-care system's cost effectiveness. To get there, the country needs to further reform its tort system and to continue to adopt better information technology. It's also critical that consumers have access to better information on health-care prices and outcomes and to be able to purchase competitively priced insurance offered in other states. Finally, citizens must have a personal stake in the costs of their care, which will enable them to make prudent decisions.

• Reform immigration laws to make existing "guest" workers legal, tax-paying employees. We should provide legal avenues for guest workers to apply for U.S. citizenship. It is to our advantage to grant more visas to the best and brightest students from around the world who come to our best universities. Students receiving qualifying advanced degrees (such as in math and science) should get an automatic green card to work in our country.

• Maintain the independence of the Federal Reserve. The task of the central bank is to manage money supply to keep inflation low (0%-2%), employment high and the financial system healthy. Excessive political influence could prevent the Fed from taking decisive actions when needed.

These recommendations are not particularly novel. In fact, the majority of economists and business leaders I've talked to agree with virtually all of them. Real GDP growth of 3.5% over the next decade is an aggressive target—but achievable. We need to think like winners.

Mr. Owens is chairman and CEO of Caterpillar Inc.

How to Avoid a 'Bailout Bill' - A new bankruptcy process is the right way to deal with failing financial institutions

How to Avoid a 'Bailout Bill'. By JOHN B. TAYLOR
A new bankruptcy process is the right way to deal with failing financial institutions.WSJ, May 03, 2010

It's good news there's now bipartisan agreement that the financial reform bill should not be a "bailout bill," and that amendments to Connecticut Sen. Chris Dodd's draft legislation are being proposed and debated with this agreement in mind. The biggest challenge in this bailout reform debate is to avoid giving the federal government more discretionary power, whether by creating a special bailout fund or by providing more ways to bypass proven bankruptcy rules. Experience shows that such power would increase, not decrease, the likelihood of another crisis.

Some say that the government did not have enough power to intervene with certain firms during the financial crisis. But it had plenty of power and it used it, beginning with Bear Stearns. This highly discretionary power—to bail out some creditors and not others, to take over some businesses and not others, to let some firms go through bankruptcy and not others—was a major cause of the financial panic in the fall of 2008. The broad justification used for the bailout of Bear Stearns creditors led many to believe the government would again intervene if another similar institution, such as Lehman Brothers, failed.

But when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department could not persuade private firms to provide funds to Lehman to pay its creditors in September 2008, the Fed surprisingly cut off access to its funds. The examiner's report on Lehman makes it very clear there was no preparation for bankruptcy proceedings before the day the government suddenly cut off the funds. No wonder there was a disruption.

Then, the next day, the Fed reopened its balance sheet to make loans to rescue the creditors of AIG, including billions for Goldman Sachs. The funding spigot was then turned off again, and a new program, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), was proposed. This on-again off-again policy was part of a series of unpredictable and confusing government interventions which led to panic.

This experience demonstrates why it is dangerous for the "orderly liquidation" section of the Dodd bill to institutionalize such a process by giving the government even more discretion and power to take over businesses; the interventions are likely again to cause more harm than good, even with the best of intentions. Many experts doubt the ability of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) to take over large, complex financial institutions, as the current bill calls for, without causing disruption.

The moral hazard associated with protecting creditors will continue even if the FDIC has the discretionary authority to claw back later some of the funds it provides in the bailout. The proposed liquidation process would have the unintended consequence of increasing the incentive for creditors and other counterparties to run whenever there is a rumor that a government official is thinking about intervening. Who is going to be helped? Who is going to be hurt? It is up to government officials to decide, not the rule of law.

Fortunately, it is not necessary to provide this additional discretionary authority. During the past year since the administration proposed its financial reforms, bankruptcy experts have been working on a reform to the bankruptcy law designed especially for nonbank financial institutions. Sometimes called Chapter 11F, the goal is to let a failing financial firm go into bankruptcy in a predictable, rules-based way without causing spillovers to the economy and permitting, if possible, people to continue to use its financial services—just as people flew on United Airlines planes, bought Kmart sundries and tried on Hartmax suits when those firms were in bankruptcy.

What would a Chapter 11F amendment look like? It would create a special financial bankruptcy court, or at least a group of "special masters" consisting of judges knowledgeable about financial markets and institutions, which would be responsible for handling the case of a financial firm.

In addition to the normal commencement of bankruptcy petitions by creditors or debtors, an involuntary proceeding could be initiated by a government regulatory agency as prescribed by the new bankruptcy law, and the government would be able to propose a reorganization plan—not simply a liquidation. Defining and defending the circumstances for such an initiation—including demonstrating systemic risk using quantitative measures such as interbank credit exposures—is essential.

Third, Chapter 11F would handle the complexities of repurchase agreements and derivatives by enabling close-out netting of contracts in which offsetting credit exposures are combined into a single net amount, which would reduce likelihood of runs.

Fourth, a wind-down plan, filed in advance by each financial firm with its regulator, would serve as a blueprint for the bankruptcy proceedings.

The advantage of this bankruptcy approach is that debtors and creditors negotiate with clear rules and judicial review throughout the process. In contrast, the proposed "orderly liquidation" authority in the current bill is secretive and potentially capricious. Rather than a government official declaring "we will wipe out the shareholders" or "it's unfair for us to claw back so much from creditors," under Chapter 11F the rule of law applies.

A discretionary punishment can be just as harmful as a discretionary bailout. As George Shultz puts it in the book "Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them," recently published by the Hoover Press, "Let's write Chapter 11F into the law so that we have a credible alternative to bailouts in practice."

What are the obstacles to following this sensible advice? One is that the proposals are new; much of the creative work was done in the past year since the administration first made its reform proposals. A common perception is that bankruptcy is too slow to deal with systemic risk situations in a large complex institution, but the new proposals would have a team of experts ready to go.

Another obstacle is that the Judiciary Committee rather than the Banking Committee has jurisdiction over bankruptcy law, and it is too hard to coordinate. But bureaucratic silos should not get in the way when the stakes are so high.

Yet another hurdle to reform is that the current bill was put together by many of the same people who were in government at the time of the bailouts. A typical government excuse for the crisis is that government did not have enough power, but a more likely explanation is that it had too much discretionary power and, as is so often the case, did not use it effectively.

You do not prevent bailouts by giving the government more power to intervene in a discretionary manner. You prevent bailouts by requiring adequate capital based on simple, enforceable rules and by making it possible for failing firms to go through bankruptcy without causing disruption to the financial system and the economy.

Mr. Taylor, a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is co-editor with Kenneth Scott and George Shultz of "Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them" (Hoover Press, 2010).