A Well-Placed Pipeline. WaPo Editorial
How Russia's 19th-century policies produced some 21st-century cooperation
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S appeal to Russia last week that it move beyond a "19th-century" foreign policy appears to have had little impact on President Dmitry Medvedev. Yesterday found Mr. Medvedev in Tskhinvali, the capital of the Georgian province of South Ossetia, which Russia invaded last August and then unilaterally recognized as an independent state. Coming just six days after Mr. Obama left Moscow, the message of Mr. Medvedev's provocative visit was unmistakable: Russia has no intention of abandoning its campaign to turn its neighbors into satellites, using blunt instruments such as military force and its control of energy supplies.
That's why it was encouraging that yesterday also brought a multinational meeting in Ankara at which Turkey and four European countries formally agreed to route a new natural gas pipeline across their territories. The Nabucco project would carry gas from the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East to Europe through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria -- thereby providing a path for European energy supplies not controlled by Russia. Though energy pipelines are not usually the subject of international politics and high diplomacy, Moscow has made them so. Twice in the past four years, it has turned off a pipeline that supplies countries across Europe in an attempt to undermine the democratic government of Ukraine, which, like Georgia, has refused to become a Kremlin vassal.
The midwinter blackmail, personally overseen by Mr. Medvedev's mentor, Vladimir Putin, has had the effect of vitalizing a project that once looked like little more than a pipe dream. Nabucco, which will extend 2,000 miles and cost more than $10 billion to construct, was championed tirelessly by the Bush administration. But the countries that would most benefit from it, such as Hungary and Austria, were more interested in negotiating new pipeline routes with Russia until recently. Now they appear to recognize that diversifying their sources of gas is essential to their national security -- and also to promoting a Russia that will not seek to use its natural resources as a means to rebuild the Soviet empire.
The new pipeline is hardly a panacea. At best it will supply about 10 percent of Europe's gas consumption, sometime after 2014. The product to fill it still needs to be found: Though Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Syria and Egypt have all expressed interest in selling gas through Nabucco, none has committed to doing so. Still, yesterday's signing was an important step toward a more secure Europe; it is a lot more likely to produce results than Mr. Medvedev's lonely trip to Tskhinvali.
Showing posts with label energy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label energy. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Monday, July 13, 2009
Don't Shoot the Speculators
Don't Shoot the Speculators. By L. GORDON CROVITZ
They predict prices, not set them.
WSJ, Jul 13, 2009
Speculators don't get much respect. Short sellers last year were blamed for their trades warning about the credit crisis, and commodities traders are now accused of causing higher oil prices. Even when traders are later proven right -- maybe especially when they're proven right -- we blame them for delivering the bad news.
Maybe it's human nature to reject Shakespeare's warning and shoot the messenger. The good news is that a recent proposal aimed at one group of speculators could prove that speculators of all kinds deserve our thanks -- or if that's too much to ask, at least to be left alone to bring valuable information to markets.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is considering requiring more disclosure, intended to ferret out what politicians like to call "excessive speculation." Whatever the intention, enough transparency could instead show that oil speculators are heroes, not villains.
Last week, new CFTC head Gary Gensler said the agency might set new limits on oil speculators now that oil prices have doubled this year from a low of $34 a barrel. This was surprising because just last fall, the agency issued an exhaustive study concluding that speculators were not to blame for the runup in oil prices that reached $145 last summer. It's also telling that no one accused traders of harmful speculation when oil prices tumbled from their earlier highs.
The more interesting part of the CFTC proposal is for new transparency to the positions that different kinds of traders take in futures trading. Under current rules, the CFTC sets limits on trading positions based on Commitment of Traders reports, which date back to the 1920s. These put trading in two key categories, based on the type of user, not the positions they have in various contracts. This anachronism has long led to uncertainty about why prices move, a lack of transparency that also feeds the blaming of speculators.
Business users such as airlines and oil companies are considered in the "commercial" category, with hedge funds and other financial traders in the other, more regulated "noncommercial" category. But many commercial users have active trading desks. Likewise, financial firms need to hedge against movements in commodities such as oil because they have trading contracts that leave them as exposed to price risks as the companies that actually use the physical product.
More-detailed reporting on who has which kinds of positions in oil would make the market more understandable. It would show that so-called financial speculators are trying to predict price movements, but also trying to hedge risk. Likewise, commercial traders that take delivery of oil are hedging risks, while also predicting future prices. As oil expert Daniel Yergin points out, more visibility "will give a better sense of how much is the market responding to supply and demand in physical oil and how much is it responding to the supply and demand of money on the part of investors."
It doesn't make sense to shoot either kind of messenger. Markets are collections of information, translated through trading into prices. These prices, unless there is manipulation, are the best estimate of future supply and demand. Such price discovery should not be controversial, though it too often has been.
"Oil market speculation is back in the news," Bob McTeer, a former Dallas Federal Reserve president, wrote on his blog. "I'm afraid I don't have much to contribute since Milton Friedman convinced me long ago that profitable speculation is stabilizing and destabilizing speculation is unprofitable. Speculation is profitable if the speculator buys lower than he sells; it's unprofitable if he sells lower than he buys. Even if they don't make a profit, they are trying."
Or, as the sign in the 19th century saloon put it, "Don't shoot the piano player; he's doing the best he can." Oil industry experts, whether "speculators" or not, do their best to predict price movements. Some focus on uncertainty about Iran. Others point to demand trends from China and India. There's the inherent volatility in this market due to the OPEC cartel having a firm grip on the supply spigot.
Finally, there's the growing role that commodities are again playing as a hedge against inflation and a weak dollar. Increased trading in commodities is a danger-ahead warning about U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. While Washington might like to stifle these particular messengers for the warning they're sending, the rest of us should welcome information about troubles to come.
Congress has succeeded in rattling regulators at the CFTC into doing something about speculators. They have more regulation in mind, but if the CFTC can bring more transparency to oil trading, the result will be excellent even if unintended: We can focus our attention on the real pressures on oil prices instead of wallowing in searches for scapegoats. Better disclosure can reduce the human tendency to blame traders for rising prices when the responsibility lies elsewhere.
They predict prices, not set them.
WSJ, Jul 13, 2009
Speculators don't get much respect. Short sellers last year were blamed for their trades warning about the credit crisis, and commodities traders are now accused of causing higher oil prices. Even when traders are later proven right -- maybe especially when they're proven right -- we blame them for delivering the bad news.
Maybe it's human nature to reject Shakespeare's warning and shoot the messenger. The good news is that a recent proposal aimed at one group of speculators could prove that speculators of all kinds deserve our thanks -- or if that's too much to ask, at least to be left alone to bring valuable information to markets.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is considering requiring more disclosure, intended to ferret out what politicians like to call "excessive speculation." Whatever the intention, enough transparency could instead show that oil speculators are heroes, not villains.
Last week, new CFTC head Gary Gensler said the agency might set new limits on oil speculators now that oil prices have doubled this year from a low of $34 a barrel. This was surprising because just last fall, the agency issued an exhaustive study concluding that speculators were not to blame for the runup in oil prices that reached $145 last summer. It's also telling that no one accused traders of harmful speculation when oil prices tumbled from their earlier highs.
The more interesting part of the CFTC proposal is for new transparency to the positions that different kinds of traders take in futures trading. Under current rules, the CFTC sets limits on trading positions based on Commitment of Traders reports, which date back to the 1920s. These put trading in two key categories, based on the type of user, not the positions they have in various contracts. This anachronism has long led to uncertainty about why prices move, a lack of transparency that also feeds the blaming of speculators.
Business users such as airlines and oil companies are considered in the "commercial" category, with hedge funds and other financial traders in the other, more regulated "noncommercial" category. But many commercial users have active trading desks. Likewise, financial firms need to hedge against movements in commodities such as oil because they have trading contracts that leave them as exposed to price risks as the companies that actually use the physical product.
More-detailed reporting on who has which kinds of positions in oil would make the market more understandable. It would show that so-called financial speculators are trying to predict price movements, but also trying to hedge risk. Likewise, commercial traders that take delivery of oil are hedging risks, while also predicting future prices. As oil expert Daniel Yergin points out, more visibility "will give a better sense of how much is the market responding to supply and demand in physical oil and how much is it responding to the supply and demand of money on the part of investors."
It doesn't make sense to shoot either kind of messenger. Markets are collections of information, translated through trading into prices. These prices, unless there is manipulation, are the best estimate of future supply and demand. Such price discovery should not be controversial, though it too often has been.
"Oil market speculation is back in the news," Bob McTeer, a former Dallas Federal Reserve president, wrote on his blog. "I'm afraid I don't have much to contribute since Milton Friedman convinced me long ago that profitable speculation is stabilizing and destabilizing speculation is unprofitable. Speculation is profitable if the speculator buys lower than he sells; it's unprofitable if he sells lower than he buys. Even if they don't make a profit, they are trying."
Or, as the sign in the 19th century saloon put it, "Don't shoot the piano player; he's doing the best he can." Oil industry experts, whether "speculators" or not, do their best to predict price movements. Some focus on uncertainty about Iran. Others point to demand trends from China and India. There's the inherent volatility in this market due to the OPEC cartel having a firm grip on the supply spigot.
Finally, there's the growing role that commodities are again playing as a hedge against inflation and a weak dollar. Increased trading in commodities is a danger-ahead warning about U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. While Washington might like to stifle these particular messengers for the warning they're sending, the rest of us should welcome information about troubles to come.
Congress has succeeded in rattling regulators at the CFTC into doing something about speculators. They have more regulation in mind, but if the CFTC can bring more transparency to oil trading, the result will be excellent even if unintended: We can focus our attention on the real pressures on oil prices instead of wallowing in searches for scapegoats. Better disclosure can reduce the human tendency to blame traders for rising prices when the responsibility lies elsewhere.
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
Supply, Not Speculation, Responsible For Volatile Energy Prices
Supply, Not Speculation, Responsible For Volatile Energy Prices
Latest CFTC Action a Diversion from the Real Cause, Supply and Demand
Institute for Energy Research, Jul 08, 2009
WASHINGTON – This week, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) unveiled a new plan for government takeover of how energy commodities are traded, valued and sold. In response to these proposed actions, Thomas J. Pyle, president of the Institute for Energy Research (IER), issued the following statement:
“For politicians who consistently oppose responsible energy development here at home, the demonization of so-called speculators remains a popular tool for absolving themselves of responsibility for the historically high prices they helped create. But for those with a genuine interest in punishing speculators who make money when oil prices are high, no single action would hurt them more than flooding the market with new supply.
“The CFTC, at least as an institution, understands this fact, and has published dozens of studies over the past several years debunking the myth that market trading activity artificially inflates the price of energy. Unfortunately, it appears that the current head of the commission has not read much of its previous work, joining a long list of policymakers either unwilling or unable to understand the difference between cause and effect.
“Washington has kept billions of barrels of oil shale in the Inter-mountain West under lock-and-key. Billions of barrels of oil remain effectively off-limit in our deep oceans, especially in Alaska. And at the same time, Washington is working to halt American energy production even further through massive tax hikes, mandates, and job-killing regulations. Interested in understanding the real causes of high energy prices? Speculate no more.”
READ MORE:
- IER: Speculators Fixing Oil Prices? Don’t Bet On It
- IER: Question: How Many Times Has the FTC Found Evidence of Price Gouging by Energy Companies?
- Paul Krugman: “Speculative nonsense, once again … The mysticism over how speculation is supposed to drive prices drives me crazy, professionally … A futures contract is a bet about the future price. It has no, zero, nada direct effect on the spot price … As I’ve tried to point out, there just isn’t any evidence from the inventory data that this is happening.” (New York Times, 6/23/08)
- Krugman: “Hyperventilation over oil-market speculation is distracting us from the real issues.” (New York Times, 6/27/08)
- T. Boone Pickens: “A U.S. probe into whether speculators manipulated oil prices up to more than $135 a barrel is a ‘waste of time,‘ … ‘There’s nothing to it to start with,’ Pickens said.” (Bloomberg, 6/3/08)
- Pickens: “Speculation has become a ‘scapegoat’ for what is largely a supply and demand problem.” (Houston Chronicle, 7/10/08)
- Warren Buffett: “But it’s not speculation, it is supply and demand …” (CNBC’s Power Lunch, 6/25/08)
- Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke: “The most important cause [of high gas prices] is the global supply-and-demand balance.” (Congressional testimony, 7/16/08)
- Bernanke: “If financial speculation were pushing oil prices above the levels consistent with the fundamentals of supply and demand, we would expect inventories of crude oil and petroleum products to increase as supply rose and demand fell. But in fact, available data on oil inventories show notable declines over the past year.” (Congressional testimony, 7/15/09)
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
We Must Address Oil-Market Volatility
We Must Address Oil-Market Volatility. By GORDON BROWN and NICOLAS SARKOZY
Erratic price movements in such an important commodity are cause for alarm.
WSJ, Jul 08, 2009
For two years the price of oil has been dangerously volatile, seemingly defying the accepted rules of economics. First it rose by more than $80 a barrel, then fell rapidly by more than $100, before doubling to its current level of around $70. In that time, however, there has been no serious interruption of supply. Despite ongoing conflict in the Middle East, oil has continued to flow. And although the recession and price rises have had some effect on consumption, medium-term forecasts for demand are robust.
The oil market is complex, but such erratic price movement in one of the world's most crucial commodities is a growing cause for alarm. The surge in prices last year gravely damaged the global economy and contributed to the downturn. The risk now is that a new period of instability could undermine confidence just as we are pushing for recovery.
Governments can no longer stand idle. Volatility damages both consumers and producers. Those who rely on oil and have no substitutes readily available have been the victims of extreme price fluctuations beyond their control -- and apparently beyond reason. Importing countries, especially in the developing world, find themselves committed to big subsidies to shield domestic consumers from potentially devastating price shifts.
In Britain and France we also know how the price of crude dictates the price of petrol at filling stations and the effect on families and businesses. For countries heavily reliant on income from oil exports, the windfalls from brief price surges are offset by the consequent difficulties of planning national budgets and investment strategies.
Extreme fluctuations in price are encouraging energy users to reconsider their reliance on oil. The International Energy Agency, for instance, has cut its long-term forecast of oil consumption by almost a quarter. Producers are in danger of finding that their key national resource loses both its market and its long-term value.
More immediately, we as consumers must recognize that abnormally low oil prices, while giving short-term benefits, do long-term damage. They diminish incentives to invest, not only in oil production but also, in our own countries, in energy savings and carbon-free alternatives. As such, future problems are stored up in the form of shortages, greater dependence and an acceleration of global warming. Upstream investment worldwide is already down by 20% over the past year. And with some sources of supply in decline, such as Alaska and the North Sea, the resource we will all need as the economy recovers is being developed in neither an adequate nor a timely way.
There are no easy solutions and any progress must be made with the full co-operation of the world community and the oil industry. On Monday we used the U.K.-France summit in Evian to explore a way forward. We hope our ideas inform meetings both today, at the Group of Eight Summit in Italy, and in future talks between world leaders.
We are committed to intensifying the ongoing dialogue between producers and consumers through the International Energy Forum. Saudi Arabia and OPEC have expressed interest in this and we believe producers and consumers are closer now than at any time in the past 30 years to recognizing the huge common interest in giving clear and stable perspectives to long-term investment.
At the London Energy Meeting last December, all participants agreed that still closer co-ordination between the IEA, OPEC and the IEF was necessary to develop a shared analysis of future demand and supply trends. The Expert Group of the IEF should use this work to arrive at a common long-term view on what price range would be consistent with the fundamentals.
The experts should also consider any measures that could be put in place to reduce volatility. Discussions should look again into the question of whether trading activity is amplifying erratic price movements.
We therefore call upon the International Organization of Securities Regulators to consider improving transparency and supervision of the oil futures markets to reduce damaging speculation and to take forward the recommendations already made by its taskforce in March. This would serve the interests of orderly and adequate investment in future supplies. Volatility and opacity are the enemies of growth. In the absence of transparency, consumers and importing nations are losing confidence in oil. Climate change is also altering government attitudes to energy.
The world's economy is still reliant on secure supplies at prices that are not so high as to destroy the prospects of economic growth but not so low as to lead to a slump in investment, as happened in the 1990s.
It is a thorny issue, but complex markets need not be volatile or damaging to the wider global economy. We are convinced that producers and consumers alike would benefit from greater transparency, greater stability and greater consensus on the market fundamentals. After two years of destructive volatility the time has come for both sides to work together to build on this common interest.
Mr. Brown is prime minister of the United Kingdom. Mr. Sarkozy is president of France.
Erratic price movements in such an important commodity are cause for alarm.
WSJ, Jul 08, 2009
For two years the price of oil has been dangerously volatile, seemingly defying the accepted rules of economics. First it rose by more than $80 a barrel, then fell rapidly by more than $100, before doubling to its current level of around $70. In that time, however, there has been no serious interruption of supply. Despite ongoing conflict in the Middle East, oil has continued to flow. And although the recession and price rises have had some effect on consumption, medium-term forecasts for demand are robust.
The oil market is complex, but such erratic price movement in one of the world's most crucial commodities is a growing cause for alarm. The surge in prices last year gravely damaged the global economy and contributed to the downturn. The risk now is that a new period of instability could undermine confidence just as we are pushing for recovery.
Governments can no longer stand idle. Volatility damages both consumers and producers. Those who rely on oil and have no substitutes readily available have been the victims of extreme price fluctuations beyond their control -- and apparently beyond reason. Importing countries, especially in the developing world, find themselves committed to big subsidies to shield domestic consumers from potentially devastating price shifts.
In Britain and France we also know how the price of crude dictates the price of petrol at filling stations and the effect on families and businesses. For countries heavily reliant on income from oil exports, the windfalls from brief price surges are offset by the consequent difficulties of planning national budgets and investment strategies.
Extreme fluctuations in price are encouraging energy users to reconsider their reliance on oil. The International Energy Agency, for instance, has cut its long-term forecast of oil consumption by almost a quarter. Producers are in danger of finding that their key national resource loses both its market and its long-term value.
More immediately, we as consumers must recognize that abnormally low oil prices, while giving short-term benefits, do long-term damage. They diminish incentives to invest, not only in oil production but also, in our own countries, in energy savings and carbon-free alternatives. As such, future problems are stored up in the form of shortages, greater dependence and an acceleration of global warming. Upstream investment worldwide is already down by 20% over the past year. And with some sources of supply in decline, such as Alaska and the North Sea, the resource we will all need as the economy recovers is being developed in neither an adequate nor a timely way.
There are no easy solutions and any progress must be made with the full co-operation of the world community and the oil industry. On Monday we used the U.K.-France summit in Evian to explore a way forward. We hope our ideas inform meetings both today, at the Group of Eight Summit in Italy, and in future talks between world leaders.
We are committed to intensifying the ongoing dialogue between producers and consumers through the International Energy Forum. Saudi Arabia and OPEC have expressed interest in this and we believe producers and consumers are closer now than at any time in the past 30 years to recognizing the huge common interest in giving clear and stable perspectives to long-term investment.
At the London Energy Meeting last December, all participants agreed that still closer co-ordination between the IEA, OPEC and the IEF was necessary to develop a shared analysis of future demand and supply trends. The Expert Group of the IEF should use this work to arrive at a common long-term view on what price range would be consistent with the fundamentals.
The experts should also consider any measures that could be put in place to reduce volatility. Discussions should look again into the question of whether trading activity is amplifying erratic price movements.
We therefore call upon the International Organization of Securities Regulators to consider improving transparency and supervision of the oil futures markets to reduce damaging speculation and to take forward the recommendations already made by its taskforce in March. This would serve the interests of orderly and adequate investment in future supplies. Volatility and opacity are the enemies of growth. In the absence of transparency, consumers and importing nations are losing confidence in oil. Climate change is also altering government attitudes to energy.
The world's economy is still reliant on secure supplies at prices that are not so high as to destroy the prospects of economic growth but not so low as to lead to a slump in investment, as happened in the 1990s.
It is a thorny issue, but complex markets need not be volatile or damaging to the wider global economy. We are convinced that producers and consumers alike would benefit from greater transparency, greater stability and greater consensus on the market fundamentals. After two years of destructive volatility the time has come for both sides to work together to build on this common interest.
Mr. Brown is prime minister of the United Kingdom. Mr. Sarkozy is president of France.
Ethanol and biofuels get 190 times as much subsidies as natural gas and petroleum liquids
So Much for 'Energy Independence.' By ROBERT BRYCE
The Wall Street Journal, Jul 07, 2009, p A15
Whenever you read about ethanol, remember these numbers: 98 and 190.
They offer an essential insight into U.S. energy politics and the debate over cap-and-trade legislation that recently passed the House. Here is what the numbers mean: The U.S. gets about 98 times as much energy from natural gas and oil as it does from ethanol and biofuels. And measured on a per-unit-of-energy basis, Congress lavishes ethanol and biofuels with subsidies that are 190 times as large as those given to oil and gas.
Those numbers come from an April 2008 report by the Energy Information Administration: "Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Markets 2007." Table ES6 lists domestic energy sources that get subsidies. In 2007, the U.S. consumed nearly 55.8 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs), or about 9.6 billion barrels of oil equivalent, in natural gas and oil. That's about 98 times as much energy as the U.S. consumed in ethanol and biofuels, which totaled 98 million barrels of oil equivalent.
Meanwhile, ethanol and biofuels are getting subsidies of $5.72 per million BTU. That's 190 times as much as natural gas and petroleum liquids, which get subsidies of $0.03 per million BTU.
The report also shows that the ethanol and biofuels industry are more heavily subsidized -- in total dollar terms -- than the oil and gas industry. In 2007, the ethanol and biofuels industries got $3.25 billion in subsidies. The oil and gas industry got $1.92 billion.
Despite these subsidies, the ethanol lobby is queuing up for more favors. And they are doing so at the very same time that the Obama administration and Congress are pushing to eliminate the relatively modest subsidies for domestic oil and gas producers. Democrats want to cut drilling subsidies while simultaneously trumpeting their desire for "energy independence."
The cap-and-trade bill passed by the House aims to "create energy jobs" and "achieve energy independence." Meanwhile, Democrats are calling to eliminate drilling subsidies that have encouraged advances in technology that have opened up vast new U.S. energy sources. These advances have made it profitable to extract natural gas from the Barnett Shale deposit in Texas and the Marcellus in Pennsylvania -- deposits once thought too expensive to tap.
President Barack Obama's 2010 budget calls for the elimination of two tax breaks: the expensing of "intangible drilling costs" (such as wages, fuel and pipe), which allows energy companies to deduct the bulk of their expenses for drilling new wells; and the allowance for percentage depletion, which allows well owners to deduct a portion of the value of the production from their wells. Those breaks provide the bulk of the $1.92 billion in oil and gas subsidies.
In May, Mr. Obama called the tax breaks for the oil and gas industry "unjustifiable loopholes" that do "little to incentivize production or reduce energy prices."
That's flat not true. The deduction for intangible drilling costs encourages energy companies to plow huge amounts of capital into more drilling. And that drilling has resulted in unprecedented increases in natural gas production and potential.
An April Department of Energy report estimated that the newly available shale resources total 649 trillion cubic feet of gas. That's the energy equivalent of 118.3 billion barrels of oil, or slightly more than the proven oil reserves of Iraq.
Eliminating the tax breaks for drilling will make natural gas more expensive. Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co., a Houston-based investment-banking firm, estimates that eliminating the intangible drilling cost provision could increase U.S. natural gas prices by 50 cents per thousand cubic feet. Why? Because without the tax break, fewer wells will be drilled and less gas will be produced. The U.S. consumes about 23 trillion cubic feet of gas per year. Simple arithmetic shows that eliminating the drilling subsidies that cost taxpayers less than $2 billion per year could result in an increased cost to consumers of $11.5 billion per year in the form of higher natural gas prices.
Amid all this, Growth Energy, an ethanol industry front-group, is pushing the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt a proposal that would increase the amount of ethanol blended into gasoline from the current maximum of 10% to as much as 15%.
That increase would be a gift to corn ethanol producers who have never been able to make a go of it despite decades of federal subsidies and mandates. Growth Energy is also pushing the change even though only about seven million of the 250 million motor vehicles now on U.S. roads are designed to run on fuel containing more than 10% ethanol.
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that gasoline with 10% ethanol is already doing real harm. In January, Toyota announced that it was recalling 214,570 Lexus vehicles. The reason: The company found that "ethanol fuels with a low moisture content will corrode the internal surface of the fuel rails." (The rails carry fuel to the engine injectors.) Furthermore, there have been numerous media reports that ethanol-blended gasoline is fouling engines in lawn mowers, weed whackers and boats.
Lawyers in Florida have already sued a group of oil companies for damage allegedly done to boat fuel tanks and engines from ethanol fuel. They are claiming that consumers should be warned about the risk of using the fuel in their boats.
There is also corn ethanol's effect on food prices. Over the past two years at least a dozen studies have linked subsidies that have increased the production of corn ethanol with higher food prices.
Mr. Obama has been pro-ethanol and anti-oil for years. But he and his allies on Capitol Hill should understand that removing drilling incentives will mean less drilling, which will mean less domestic production and more imports of both oil and natural gas.
That's hardly a recipe for "energy independence."
Mr. Bryce is the managing editor of Energy Tribune. His latest book is "Gusher of Lies: The Dangerous Delusions of 'Energy Independence'" (PublicAffairs, 2008).
The Wall Street Journal, Jul 07, 2009, p A15
Whenever you read about ethanol, remember these numbers: 98 and 190.
They offer an essential insight into U.S. energy politics and the debate over cap-and-trade legislation that recently passed the House. Here is what the numbers mean: The U.S. gets about 98 times as much energy from natural gas and oil as it does from ethanol and biofuels. And measured on a per-unit-of-energy basis, Congress lavishes ethanol and biofuels with subsidies that are 190 times as large as those given to oil and gas.
Those numbers come from an April 2008 report by the Energy Information Administration: "Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Markets 2007." Table ES6 lists domestic energy sources that get subsidies. In 2007, the U.S. consumed nearly 55.8 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs), or about 9.6 billion barrels of oil equivalent, in natural gas and oil. That's about 98 times as much energy as the U.S. consumed in ethanol and biofuels, which totaled 98 million barrels of oil equivalent.
Meanwhile, ethanol and biofuels are getting subsidies of $5.72 per million BTU. That's 190 times as much as natural gas and petroleum liquids, which get subsidies of $0.03 per million BTU.
The report also shows that the ethanol and biofuels industry are more heavily subsidized -- in total dollar terms -- than the oil and gas industry. In 2007, the ethanol and biofuels industries got $3.25 billion in subsidies. The oil and gas industry got $1.92 billion.
Despite these subsidies, the ethanol lobby is queuing up for more favors. And they are doing so at the very same time that the Obama administration and Congress are pushing to eliminate the relatively modest subsidies for domestic oil and gas producers. Democrats want to cut drilling subsidies while simultaneously trumpeting their desire for "energy independence."
The cap-and-trade bill passed by the House aims to "create energy jobs" and "achieve energy independence." Meanwhile, Democrats are calling to eliminate drilling subsidies that have encouraged advances in technology that have opened up vast new U.S. energy sources. These advances have made it profitable to extract natural gas from the Barnett Shale deposit in Texas and the Marcellus in Pennsylvania -- deposits once thought too expensive to tap.
President Barack Obama's 2010 budget calls for the elimination of two tax breaks: the expensing of "intangible drilling costs" (such as wages, fuel and pipe), which allows energy companies to deduct the bulk of their expenses for drilling new wells; and the allowance for percentage depletion, which allows well owners to deduct a portion of the value of the production from their wells. Those breaks provide the bulk of the $1.92 billion in oil and gas subsidies.
In May, Mr. Obama called the tax breaks for the oil and gas industry "unjustifiable loopholes" that do "little to incentivize production or reduce energy prices."
That's flat not true. The deduction for intangible drilling costs encourages energy companies to plow huge amounts of capital into more drilling. And that drilling has resulted in unprecedented increases in natural gas production and potential.
An April Department of Energy report estimated that the newly available shale resources total 649 trillion cubic feet of gas. That's the energy equivalent of 118.3 billion barrels of oil, or slightly more than the proven oil reserves of Iraq.
Eliminating the tax breaks for drilling will make natural gas more expensive. Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co., a Houston-based investment-banking firm, estimates that eliminating the intangible drilling cost provision could increase U.S. natural gas prices by 50 cents per thousand cubic feet. Why? Because without the tax break, fewer wells will be drilled and less gas will be produced. The U.S. consumes about 23 trillion cubic feet of gas per year. Simple arithmetic shows that eliminating the drilling subsidies that cost taxpayers less than $2 billion per year could result in an increased cost to consumers of $11.5 billion per year in the form of higher natural gas prices.
Amid all this, Growth Energy, an ethanol industry front-group, is pushing the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt a proposal that would increase the amount of ethanol blended into gasoline from the current maximum of 10% to as much as 15%.
That increase would be a gift to corn ethanol producers who have never been able to make a go of it despite decades of federal subsidies and mandates. Growth Energy is also pushing the change even though only about seven million of the 250 million motor vehicles now on U.S. roads are designed to run on fuel containing more than 10% ethanol.
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that gasoline with 10% ethanol is already doing real harm. In January, Toyota announced that it was recalling 214,570 Lexus vehicles. The reason: The company found that "ethanol fuels with a low moisture content will corrode the internal surface of the fuel rails." (The rails carry fuel to the engine injectors.) Furthermore, there have been numerous media reports that ethanol-blended gasoline is fouling engines in lawn mowers, weed whackers and boats.
Lawyers in Florida have already sued a group of oil companies for damage allegedly done to boat fuel tanks and engines from ethanol fuel. They are claiming that consumers should be warned about the risk of using the fuel in their boats.
There is also corn ethanol's effect on food prices. Over the past two years at least a dozen studies have linked subsidies that have increased the production of corn ethanol with higher food prices.
Mr. Obama has been pro-ethanol and anti-oil for years. But he and his allies on Capitol Hill should understand that removing drilling incentives will mean less drilling, which will mean less domestic production and more imports of both oil and natural gas.
That's hardly a recipe for "energy independence."
Mr. Bryce is the managing editor of Energy Tribune. His latest book is "Gusher of Lies: The Dangerous Delusions of 'Energy Independence'" (PublicAffairs, 2008).
Thursday, July 2, 2009
Orszag nails it: The 'largest corporate welfare program' ever
The Carbonated Congress. WSJ Editorial
Orszag nails it: The 'largest corporate welfare program' ever.
The Wall Street Journal, Jul 03, 2009, p A12
President Obama is calling the climate bill that the House passed last week an "extraordinary" achievement, and so it is. The 1,200-page wonder manages the supreme feat of being both hugely expensive while doing almost nothing to reduce carbon emissions.
The Washington press corps is playing the bill's 219-212 passage as a political triumph, even though one of five Democrats voted against it. The real story is what Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House baron Henry Waxman and the President himself had to concede to secure even that eyelash margin among the House's liberal majority. Not even Tom DeLay would have imagined the extravaganza of log-rolling, vote-buying, outright corporate bribes, side deals, subsidies and policy loopholes. Every green goal, even taken on its own terms, was watered down or given up for the sake of political rents.
Begin with the supposed point of the exercise -- i.e., creating an artificial scarcity of carbon in the name of climate change. The House trimmed Mr. Obama's favored 25% reduction by 2020 to 17% in order to win over Democrats leery of imposing a huge upfront tax on their constituents; then they raised the reduction to 83% in the out-years to placate the greens. Even that 17% is not binding, since it would be largely reached with so-called offsets, through which some businesses subsidize others to make emissions reductions that probably would have happened anyway.
Even if the law works as intended, over the next decade or two real U.S. greenhouse emissions might be reduced by 2% compared to business as usual. However, consumers would still face higher prices for electric power, transportation and most goods and services as this inefficient and indirect tax flowed down the energy chain.
The sound bite is that this policy would only cost households "a postage stamp a day." But that's true only as long as the program doesn't really cut emissions. The goal here is to tell voters they'll pay nothing in order to get the cap-and-tax bureaucracy in place -- even though the whole idea is to raise prices to change American behavior. At the same time -- wink, wink -- Democrats tell the greens they can tighten the emissions vise gradually over time.
Meanwhile, Congress had to bribe every business or interest that could afford a competent lobbyist. Carbon permits are valuable, yet the House says only 28% of the allowances would be auctioned off; the rest would be given away. In March, White House budget director Peter Orszag told Congress that "If you didn't auction the permit, it would represent the largest corporate welfare program that has ever been enacted in the history of the United States."
Naturally, Democrats did exactly that. To avoid windfall profits, they then chose to control prices, asking state regulators to require utilities to use the free permits to insulate ratepayers from price increases. (This also obviates the anticarbon incentives, but never mind.) Auctions would reduce political favoritism and interference, as well as provide revenue to cut taxes to offset higher energy costs. But auctions don't buy votes.
Then there was the peace treaty signed with Agriculture Chairman Colin Peterson, which banned the EPA from studying the carbon produced by corn ethanol and transferred farm emissions to the Ag Department, which mainly exists to defend farm subsidies. Not to mention the 310-page trade amendment that was introduced at 3:09 a.m. When Congress voted on the bill later that day, the House clerk didn't even have an official copy.
The revisions were demanded by coal-dependent Rust Belt Democrats to require tariffs on goods from countries that don't also reduce their emissions. Democrats were thus admitting that the critics are right that this new energy tax would send U.S. jobs overseas. But instead of voting no, their price for voting yes is to impose another tax on imports from China and India, among others. So a Smoot-Hawley green tariff is now official Democratic policy.
Mr. Obama's lobbyists first acquiesced to this tariff change to get the bill passed. Afterwards the President said he disliked "sending any protectionist signals" amid a world recession, but he refused to say whether this protectionism was enough to veto the bill. Then in a Saturday victory lap, he talked about green jobs and a new clean energy economy, but he made no reference to cap and trade -- no doubt because he knows that energy taxes are unpopular and that the bill faces an even tougher slog in the Senate.
Mr. Obama wants something tangible to take to the U.N. climate confab in Denmark in December, but the more important issue is what this exercise says about his approach to governance. The President seems to believe that the Carter and Clinton Presidencies failed by fighting too much with Democrats in Congress. So his solution is to abdicate his agenda to Congress -- first the stimulus, now cap and trade, and soon health care. We wish he had told us he was running to be Prime Minister.
Orszag nails it: The 'largest corporate welfare program' ever.
The Wall Street Journal, Jul 03, 2009, p A12
President Obama is calling the climate bill that the House passed last week an "extraordinary" achievement, and so it is. The 1,200-page wonder manages the supreme feat of being both hugely expensive while doing almost nothing to reduce carbon emissions.
The Washington press corps is playing the bill's 219-212 passage as a political triumph, even though one of five Democrats voted against it. The real story is what Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House baron Henry Waxman and the President himself had to concede to secure even that eyelash margin among the House's liberal majority. Not even Tom DeLay would have imagined the extravaganza of log-rolling, vote-buying, outright corporate bribes, side deals, subsidies and policy loopholes. Every green goal, even taken on its own terms, was watered down or given up for the sake of political rents.
Begin with the supposed point of the exercise -- i.e., creating an artificial scarcity of carbon in the name of climate change. The House trimmed Mr. Obama's favored 25% reduction by 2020 to 17% in order to win over Democrats leery of imposing a huge upfront tax on their constituents; then they raised the reduction to 83% in the out-years to placate the greens. Even that 17% is not binding, since it would be largely reached with so-called offsets, through which some businesses subsidize others to make emissions reductions that probably would have happened anyway.
Even if the law works as intended, over the next decade or two real U.S. greenhouse emissions might be reduced by 2% compared to business as usual. However, consumers would still face higher prices for electric power, transportation and most goods and services as this inefficient and indirect tax flowed down the energy chain.
The sound bite is that this policy would only cost households "a postage stamp a day." But that's true only as long as the program doesn't really cut emissions. The goal here is to tell voters they'll pay nothing in order to get the cap-and-tax bureaucracy in place -- even though the whole idea is to raise prices to change American behavior. At the same time -- wink, wink -- Democrats tell the greens they can tighten the emissions vise gradually over time.
Meanwhile, Congress had to bribe every business or interest that could afford a competent lobbyist. Carbon permits are valuable, yet the House says only 28% of the allowances would be auctioned off; the rest would be given away. In March, White House budget director Peter Orszag told Congress that "If you didn't auction the permit, it would represent the largest corporate welfare program that has ever been enacted in the history of the United States."
Naturally, Democrats did exactly that. To avoid windfall profits, they then chose to control prices, asking state regulators to require utilities to use the free permits to insulate ratepayers from price increases. (This also obviates the anticarbon incentives, but never mind.) Auctions would reduce political favoritism and interference, as well as provide revenue to cut taxes to offset higher energy costs. But auctions don't buy votes.
Then there was the peace treaty signed with Agriculture Chairman Colin Peterson, which banned the EPA from studying the carbon produced by corn ethanol and transferred farm emissions to the Ag Department, which mainly exists to defend farm subsidies. Not to mention the 310-page trade amendment that was introduced at 3:09 a.m. When Congress voted on the bill later that day, the House clerk didn't even have an official copy.
The revisions were demanded by coal-dependent Rust Belt Democrats to require tariffs on goods from countries that don't also reduce their emissions. Democrats were thus admitting that the critics are right that this new energy tax would send U.S. jobs overseas. But instead of voting no, their price for voting yes is to impose another tax on imports from China and India, among others. So a Smoot-Hawley green tariff is now official Democratic policy.
Mr. Obama's lobbyists first acquiesced to this tariff change to get the bill passed. Afterwards the President said he disliked "sending any protectionist signals" amid a world recession, but he refused to say whether this protectionism was enough to veto the bill. Then in a Saturday victory lap, he talked about green jobs and a new clean energy economy, but he made no reference to cap and trade -- no doubt because he knows that energy taxes are unpopular and that the bill faces an even tougher slog in the Senate.
Mr. Obama wants something tangible to take to the U.N. climate confab in Denmark in December, but the more important issue is what this exercise says about his approach to governance. The President seems to believe that the Carter and Clinton Presidencies failed by fighting too much with Democrats in Congress. So his solution is to abdicate his agenda to Congress -- first the stimulus, now cap and trade, and soon health care. We wish he had told us he was running to be Prime Minister.
Saturday, June 27, 2009
The Washington Post Discovers the Problems with Energy Subsidies
The Washington Post Discovers the Problems with Energy Subsidies.
Institute for Energy Research, Jun 24, 2009
From the Washington Post editors:
"Uncertainties abound: What if the costs of clean coal don’t come down enough to make it economical relative to other measures? If clean coal turns out to be less than its advocates envision, can Congress ever work up the political will to kill the subsidy program? Subsidies are set to phase out after 10 years of paying for operating costs, but won’t powerful coal-state lawmakers fight to keep them going? And even if it does work, won’t members of Congress insist that big carbon repositories not be located in their districts?"
Institute for Energy Research, Jun 24, 2009
From the Washington Post editors:
"Uncertainties abound: What if the costs of clean coal don’t come down enough to make it economical relative to other measures? If clean coal turns out to be less than its advocates envision, can Congress ever work up the political will to kill the subsidy program? Subsidies are set to phase out after 10 years of paying for operating costs, but won’t powerful coal-state lawmakers fight to keep them going? And even if it does work, won’t members of Congress insist that big carbon repositories not be located in their districts?"
Thursday, June 25, 2009
WSJ Editorial Page: Democrats off-loading economics to pass climate change bill
The Cap and Tax Fiction. WSJ Editorial
Democrats off-loading economics to pass climate change bill.
The Wall Street Journal, page A14
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has put cap-and-trade legislation on a forced march through the House, and the bill may get a full vote as early as Friday. It looks as if the Democrats will have to destroy the discipline of economics to get it done.
Despite House Energy and Commerce Chairman Henry Waxman's many payoffs to Members, rural and Blue Dog Democrats remain wary of voting for a bill that will impose crushing costs on their home-district businesses and consumers. The leadership's solution to this problem is to simply claim the bill defies the laws of economics.
Their gambit got a boost this week, when the Congressional Budget Office did an analysis of what has come to be known as the Waxman-Markey bill. According to the CBO, the climate legislation would cost the average household only $175 a year by 2020. Edward Markey, Mr. Waxman's co-author, instantly set to crowing that the cost of upending the entire energy economy would be no more than a postage stamp a day for the average household. Amazing. A closer look at the CBO analysis finds that it contains so many caveats as to render it useless.
For starters, the CBO estimate is a one-year snapshot of taxes that will extend to infinity. Under a cap-and-trade system, government sets a cap on the total amount of carbon that can be emitted nationally; companies then buy or sell permits to emit CO2. The cap gets cranked down over time to reduce total carbon emissions.
To get support for his bill, Mr. Waxman was forced to water down the cap in early years to please rural Democrats, and then severely ratchet it up in later years to please liberal Democrats. The CBO's analysis looks solely at the year 2020, before most of the tough restrictions kick in. As the cap is tightened and companies are stripped of initial opportunities to "offset" their emissions, the price of permits will skyrocket beyond the CBO estimate of $28 per ton of carbon. The corporate costs of buying these expensive permits will be passed to consumers.
The biggest doozy in the CBO analysis was its extraordinary decision to look only at the day-to-day costs of operating a trading program, rather than the wider consequences energy restriction would have on the economy. The CBO acknowledges this in a footnote: "The resource cost does not indicate the potential decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) that could result from the cap."
The hit to GDP is the real threat in this bill. The whole point of cap and trade is to hike the price of electricity and gas so that Americans will use less. These higher prices will show up not just in electricity bills or at the gas station but in every manufactured good, from food to cars. Consumers will cut back on spending, which in turn will cut back on production, which results in fewer jobs created or higher unemployment. Some companies will instead move their operations overseas, with the same result.
When the Heritage Foundation did its analysis of Waxman-Markey, it broadly compared the economy with and without the carbon tax. Under this more comprehensive scenario, it found Waxman-Markey would cost the economy $161 billion in 2020, which is $1,870 for a family of four. As the bill's restrictions kick in, that number rises to $6,800 for a family of four by 2035.
Note also that the CBO analysis is an average for the country as a whole. It doesn't take into account the fact that certain regions and populations will be more severely hit than others -- manufacturing states more than service states; coal producing states more than states that rely on hydro or natural gas. Low-income Americans, who devote more of their disposable income to energy, have more to lose than high-income families.
Even as Democrats have promised that this cap-and-trade legislation won't pinch wallets, behind the scenes they've acknowledged the energy price tsunami that is coming. During the brief few days in which the bill was debated in the House Energy Committee, Republicans offered three amendments: one to suspend the program if gas hit $5 a gallon; one to suspend the program if electricity prices rose 10% over 2009; and one to suspend the program if unemployment rates hit 15%. Democrats defeated all of them.
The reality is that cost estimates for climate legislation are as unreliable as the models predicting climate change. What comes out of the computer is a function of what politicians type in. A better indicator might be what other countries are already experiencing. Britain's Taxpayer Alliance estimates the average family there is paying nearly $1,300 a year in green taxes for carbon-cutting programs in effect only a few years.
Americans should know that those Members who vote for this climate bill are voting for what is likely to be the biggest tax in American history. Even Democrats can't repeal that reality.
Democrats off-loading economics to pass climate change bill.
The Wall Street Journal, page A14
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has put cap-and-trade legislation on a forced march through the House, and the bill may get a full vote as early as Friday. It looks as if the Democrats will have to destroy the discipline of economics to get it done.
Despite House Energy and Commerce Chairman Henry Waxman's many payoffs to Members, rural and Blue Dog Democrats remain wary of voting for a bill that will impose crushing costs on their home-district businesses and consumers. The leadership's solution to this problem is to simply claim the bill defies the laws of economics.
Their gambit got a boost this week, when the Congressional Budget Office did an analysis of what has come to be known as the Waxman-Markey bill. According to the CBO, the climate legislation would cost the average household only $175 a year by 2020. Edward Markey, Mr. Waxman's co-author, instantly set to crowing that the cost of upending the entire energy economy would be no more than a postage stamp a day for the average household. Amazing. A closer look at the CBO analysis finds that it contains so many caveats as to render it useless.
For starters, the CBO estimate is a one-year snapshot of taxes that will extend to infinity. Under a cap-and-trade system, government sets a cap on the total amount of carbon that can be emitted nationally; companies then buy or sell permits to emit CO2. The cap gets cranked down over time to reduce total carbon emissions.
To get support for his bill, Mr. Waxman was forced to water down the cap in early years to please rural Democrats, and then severely ratchet it up in later years to please liberal Democrats. The CBO's analysis looks solely at the year 2020, before most of the tough restrictions kick in. As the cap is tightened and companies are stripped of initial opportunities to "offset" their emissions, the price of permits will skyrocket beyond the CBO estimate of $28 per ton of carbon. The corporate costs of buying these expensive permits will be passed to consumers.
The biggest doozy in the CBO analysis was its extraordinary decision to look only at the day-to-day costs of operating a trading program, rather than the wider consequences energy restriction would have on the economy. The CBO acknowledges this in a footnote: "The resource cost does not indicate the potential decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) that could result from the cap."
The hit to GDP is the real threat in this bill. The whole point of cap and trade is to hike the price of electricity and gas so that Americans will use less. These higher prices will show up not just in electricity bills or at the gas station but in every manufactured good, from food to cars. Consumers will cut back on spending, which in turn will cut back on production, which results in fewer jobs created or higher unemployment. Some companies will instead move their operations overseas, with the same result.
When the Heritage Foundation did its analysis of Waxman-Markey, it broadly compared the economy with and without the carbon tax. Under this more comprehensive scenario, it found Waxman-Markey would cost the economy $161 billion in 2020, which is $1,870 for a family of four. As the bill's restrictions kick in, that number rises to $6,800 for a family of four by 2035.
Note also that the CBO analysis is an average for the country as a whole. It doesn't take into account the fact that certain regions and populations will be more severely hit than others -- manufacturing states more than service states; coal producing states more than states that rely on hydro or natural gas. Low-income Americans, who devote more of their disposable income to energy, have more to lose than high-income families.
Even as Democrats have promised that this cap-and-trade legislation won't pinch wallets, behind the scenes they've acknowledged the energy price tsunami that is coming. During the brief few days in which the bill was debated in the House Energy Committee, Republicans offered three amendments: one to suspend the program if gas hit $5 a gallon; one to suspend the program if electricity prices rose 10% over 2009; and one to suspend the program if unemployment rates hit 15%. Democrats defeated all of them.
The reality is that cost estimates for climate legislation are as unreliable as the models predicting climate change. What comes out of the computer is a function of what politicians type in. A better indicator might be what other countries are already experiencing. Britain's Taxpayer Alliance estimates the average family there is paying nearly $1,300 a year in green taxes for carbon-cutting programs in effect only a few years.
Americans should know that those Members who vote for this climate bill are voting for what is likely to be the biggest tax in American history. Even Democrats can't repeal that reality.
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Enron Accounting: CBO and EPA Cooked the Books on Cost Estimates for Waxman-Markey Energy Tax
Enron Accounting: CBO and EPA Cooked the Books on Cost Estimates for Waxman-Markey Energy Tax
IER, June 24, 2009
Later this week, the U.S. House will take up the Waxman-Markey global warming bill, the centerpiece of which is a cap and trade program that advocates argue will reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The bill features a remarkably aggressive timetable, one that would force businesses to cut emissions by 17% (relative to the 2005 baseline) by the year 2020, and by a cumulative 83% by 2050. On cue, “independent” agencies of the government such as CBO and EPA have announced cost estimates that grossly understate the burden Waxman-Markey will place on most U.S. households.
On June 19, the CBO announced that the cap-and trade program contained in Waxman-Markey would cost households an average of $175 in the year 2020 (measured in today’s dollars). On June 23, in an effort to reassert its green bona fides, the EPA came out with an even lower estimate of $80-$111 per household. But even a cursory examination of the methodologies involved in manufacturing those numbers reveals that even the higher CBO figure is far too optimistic, since it leads citizens to believe that energy prices will only go up modestly because of the new cap and trade program.
In fact, very little related to the consequences of Waxman-Markey can be characterized as “modest.” Households will pay far more than $175 per year due to cap and trade, notwithstanding CBO’s attempts to hide it. The EPA study is misleading in the same fashion, but here we focus on the CBO report which can be read by the layperson and states quite clearly how it comes up with its low cost estimate.
Rags to Riches: How the CBO Transforms a Stealth Tax Into a Phantom Tax Cut
There are several major flaws with the CBO approach, but perhaps the most outrageous example of sleight of hand is the CBO’s focus on after-tax income. Because Waxman-Markey will raise prices more than incomes, households will necessarily become poorer. This will push households into lower tax brackets—and thus have lower tax liabilities to the tune of roughly $8.7 billion. Normal people would consider this to be a downside of Waxman-Markey. CBO is not normal. It considers this $8.7 billion as an addition to total household income—money from heaven!—and goes about celebrating the effect of this policy without saying a thing about the cause.
After explaining that some government benefits are indexed to the Consumer Price Index, which means that federal spending will have to increase owing to Waxman-Markey’s energy price hikes, the CBO study points out the silver lining:
Because the federal income tax system is largely indexed to the consumer price index, an increase in consumer prices with no increase in nominal incomes would also reduce federal income taxes. That effect would increase households’ after-tax income but would also add to the federal deficit. In combination, the effect of price changes on the government’s indexed benefit payments and income tax receipts would convey an estimated $8.7 billion to households. (p. 7)
Beyond the absurdity of translating rising prices into a benefit for households—on the basis that poorer people pay less in taxes—the CBO’s treatment of income tax revenues is inconsistent with its treatment of carbon allowance auction receipts. The CBO study acknowledges that households will pay higher energy prices partly because businesses will “pass on” the cost of buying emission allowances. But CBO didn’t include this component as a net cost to households, because the government could spend the auction receipts and thus recycle some of the money back into households.
But if that’s how the CBO wants to do its accounting, then it can’t credit households with a fictitious $8.7 billion “tax cut.” As the quotation above points out, the falling income tax revenues will simply mean a larger budget deficit if the government doesn’t cut other spending. This extra borrowing by the federal government will push up interest rates and transfer $8.7 billion out of the private capital markets. Households will ultimately lose wealth (in the form of greater public debt) that exactly offsets their alleged gain from falling into lower tax brackets.
Impacts on the “Average” Household
The CBO study admits on page 1 that the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission schedule would raise prices for Americans:
This analysis examines the average cost per household that would result from implementing the GHG cap-and-trade program under H.R. 2454….Reducing emissions to the level required by the cap would be accomplished mainly by stemming demand for carbon-based energy by increasing its price…. Those higher prices, in turn, would reduce households’ purchasing power. (p.1)
However, the CBO’s reported annual cost estimate of $175 per household in the year 2020, does not refer to the tallying up of the price hikes acknowledged in the quotation above. The CBO reduces the “gross cost” by mixing in all of the financial benefits that will accrue to “households” from the cap and trade program:
At the same time, the distribution of emission allowances would improve households’ financial situation. The net financial impact of the program on households…would depend in large part on how many allowances were sold (versus given away), how the free allowances were allocated, and how any proceeds from selling allowances were used. That net impact would reflect both the added costs that households experienced because of higher prices and the share of the allowance value that they received in the form of benefit payments, rebates, tax decreases or credits, wages, and returns on their investments. (pp. 1-2)
The problem should be obvious: If the government spends auction revenues, or hands out “free” allowances that possess high market value, to fund alternative energy boondoggles, the CBO study will carefully chalk that money up as flowing back into the pockets of U.S. “households.”
The CBO’s logic makes sense from a certain point of view: A firm that makes solar panels is owned by shareholders who live in houses, right? So when that solar panel firm sees huge profits in the new scheme, the wealth showered on its owners will accrue to households. Even though all electricity consumers will be paying higher prices, the “average” hit will be mitigated to the extent that some of those consumers happen to be on the receiving end of the cap and trade gravy train.
The CBO’s reasoning may be appropriate in some applications, but it is grossly misleading in the current political context. Citizens may come away from the report believing that their annual expenses will rise only $175 because of Waxman-Markey. The real figure is much higher.
The CBO’s Gross Cost
In contrast to the net cost of “$22 billion—or about $175 per household” (p.2), what does the CBO say about the gross cost, meaning the actual reduction in household purchasing power? In other words, how much of a hit will households take in the form of higher prices and lower wages, before the CBO adds back in all the pork spending and other goodies? They tell us on page 4:
According to CBO’s estimates, the gross cost of complying with the GHG cap-and-trade program delineated in H.R. 2454 would be about $110 billion in 2020…or about $890 per household…(p. 4)
We see that the number reported in the press—“$175 per household by 2020”—represents only 20 percent of the CBO’s projected increase in household costs. The other 80 percent of the gross price hikes is transferred away from unlucky consumers and into the pockets of politically-connected beneficiaries. Since this wealth is redistributed, it’s still in “households” (somewhere) and so the CBO doesn’t report the gross figure, which is five times higher than the number bouncing around the press. But that’s not the end of it. CBO didn’t score anything but the “cap and trade” part of the bill…not the renewable energy mandate, not the additional costs of complying with the bureaucratic nirvana of new standards for energy efficiency of lighting for home art and “personal spas,” etc. In some parts of the country, the “You Must Obey” renewable energy mandate could force significantly higher costs on consumers and businesses.
Winners and Losers
The CBO study acknowledges that its estimates are average figures, and that the impacts on particular sectors will be uneven:
The measure of costs described above reflects the costs that would occur once the economy had adjusted to the change in the relative prices of goods and services. It does not include the costs that some current investors and workers in sectors of the economy that produce energy and energy-intensive goods and services would incur as the economy moved away from the use of fossil fuels….Stock losses would tend to be widely dispersed among investors because shareholders typically diversify their portfolios. In contrast, the costs of unemployment would probably be concentrated among relatively few households and, by extension, their communities. (p.8)
In addition to the negative impact on workers in energy-intensive sectors, the Waxman-Markey bill would also hurt energy consumers to different degrees, depending on which region of the country they lived in. The Southern and Midwestern states are much more reliant on coal and other fossil fuels for their electricity production. Consumers in these regions will see their electricity rates jump higher than in other areas of the country.
Conclusion
Make no mistake: Waxman-Markey is a tax that, to work properly, must find a way to drive up energy prices. CBO bends over backwards to try to disguise this fact, but even they admit Waxman-Markey will increase energy prices.
The CBO’s gross cost estimate of $890 per household is also optimistic. Other studies put the figure at $1,500 per family in higher energy costs. That makes the much lower figure of $175 per household extremely misleading.
Bent on disguising the true costs of Waxman-Markey, CBO performed a deeply flawed analysis. They treat lower household income as a good thing because households will be subject to lower tax rates, even though this will increase the budget deficit and help drive up interest rates making economic growth more difficult.
The CBO is also disingenuous in its treatment of free allowances. The financial benefit of the free allowances will go a small subset of the population (and to overseas investors), but CBO merely averages the benefits across the U.S. population. This is deeply disingenuous and misleading. Households are in for much bigger price hikes than the CBO would lead them to believe.
Despite CBO’s heroic attempts to put a nice gloss on Waxman-Markey, cap and trade is what Rep. Dingell said it was—a tax, and a great big one.
IER, June 24, 2009
Later this week, the U.S. House will take up the Waxman-Markey global warming bill, the centerpiece of which is a cap and trade program that advocates argue will reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The bill features a remarkably aggressive timetable, one that would force businesses to cut emissions by 17% (relative to the 2005 baseline) by the year 2020, and by a cumulative 83% by 2050. On cue, “independent” agencies of the government such as CBO and EPA have announced cost estimates that grossly understate the burden Waxman-Markey will place on most U.S. households.
On June 19, the CBO announced that the cap-and trade program contained in Waxman-Markey would cost households an average of $175 in the year 2020 (measured in today’s dollars). On June 23, in an effort to reassert its green bona fides, the EPA came out with an even lower estimate of $80-$111 per household. But even a cursory examination of the methodologies involved in manufacturing those numbers reveals that even the higher CBO figure is far too optimistic, since it leads citizens to believe that energy prices will only go up modestly because of the new cap and trade program.
In fact, very little related to the consequences of Waxman-Markey can be characterized as “modest.” Households will pay far more than $175 per year due to cap and trade, notwithstanding CBO’s attempts to hide it. The EPA study is misleading in the same fashion, but here we focus on the CBO report which can be read by the layperson and states quite clearly how it comes up with its low cost estimate.
Rags to Riches: How the CBO Transforms a Stealth Tax Into a Phantom Tax Cut
There are several major flaws with the CBO approach, but perhaps the most outrageous example of sleight of hand is the CBO’s focus on after-tax income. Because Waxman-Markey will raise prices more than incomes, households will necessarily become poorer. This will push households into lower tax brackets—and thus have lower tax liabilities to the tune of roughly $8.7 billion. Normal people would consider this to be a downside of Waxman-Markey. CBO is not normal. It considers this $8.7 billion as an addition to total household income—money from heaven!—and goes about celebrating the effect of this policy without saying a thing about the cause.
After explaining that some government benefits are indexed to the Consumer Price Index, which means that federal spending will have to increase owing to Waxman-Markey’s energy price hikes, the CBO study points out the silver lining:
Because the federal income tax system is largely indexed to the consumer price index, an increase in consumer prices with no increase in nominal incomes would also reduce federal income taxes. That effect would increase households’ after-tax income but would also add to the federal deficit. In combination, the effect of price changes on the government’s indexed benefit payments and income tax receipts would convey an estimated $8.7 billion to households. (p. 7)
Beyond the absurdity of translating rising prices into a benefit for households—on the basis that poorer people pay less in taxes—the CBO’s treatment of income tax revenues is inconsistent with its treatment of carbon allowance auction receipts. The CBO study acknowledges that households will pay higher energy prices partly because businesses will “pass on” the cost of buying emission allowances. But CBO didn’t include this component as a net cost to households, because the government could spend the auction receipts and thus recycle some of the money back into households.
But if that’s how the CBO wants to do its accounting, then it can’t credit households with a fictitious $8.7 billion “tax cut.” As the quotation above points out, the falling income tax revenues will simply mean a larger budget deficit if the government doesn’t cut other spending. This extra borrowing by the federal government will push up interest rates and transfer $8.7 billion out of the private capital markets. Households will ultimately lose wealth (in the form of greater public debt) that exactly offsets their alleged gain from falling into lower tax brackets.
Impacts on the “Average” Household
The CBO study admits on page 1 that the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission schedule would raise prices for Americans:
This analysis examines the average cost per household that would result from implementing the GHG cap-and-trade program under H.R. 2454….Reducing emissions to the level required by the cap would be accomplished mainly by stemming demand for carbon-based energy by increasing its price…. Those higher prices, in turn, would reduce households’ purchasing power. (p.1)
However, the CBO’s reported annual cost estimate of $175 per household in the year 2020, does not refer to the tallying up of the price hikes acknowledged in the quotation above. The CBO reduces the “gross cost” by mixing in all of the financial benefits that will accrue to “households” from the cap and trade program:
At the same time, the distribution of emission allowances would improve households’ financial situation. The net financial impact of the program on households…would depend in large part on how many allowances were sold (versus given away), how the free allowances were allocated, and how any proceeds from selling allowances were used. That net impact would reflect both the added costs that households experienced because of higher prices and the share of the allowance value that they received in the form of benefit payments, rebates, tax decreases or credits, wages, and returns on their investments. (pp. 1-2)
The problem should be obvious: If the government spends auction revenues, or hands out “free” allowances that possess high market value, to fund alternative energy boondoggles, the CBO study will carefully chalk that money up as flowing back into the pockets of U.S. “households.”
The CBO’s logic makes sense from a certain point of view: A firm that makes solar panels is owned by shareholders who live in houses, right? So when that solar panel firm sees huge profits in the new scheme, the wealth showered on its owners will accrue to households. Even though all electricity consumers will be paying higher prices, the “average” hit will be mitigated to the extent that some of those consumers happen to be on the receiving end of the cap and trade gravy train.
The CBO’s reasoning may be appropriate in some applications, but it is grossly misleading in the current political context. Citizens may come away from the report believing that their annual expenses will rise only $175 because of Waxman-Markey. The real figure is much higher.
The CBO’s Gross Cost
In contrast to the net cost of “$22 billion—or about $175 per household” (p.2), what does the CBO say about the gross cost, meaning the actual reduction in household purchasing power? In other words, how much of a hit will households take in the form of higher prices and lower wages, before the CBO adds back in all the pork spending and other goodies? They tell us on page 4:
According to CBO’s estimates, the gross cost of complying with the GHG cap-and-trade program delineated in H.R. 2454 would be about $110 billion in 2020…or about $890 per household…(p. 4)
We see that the number reported in the press—“$175 per household by 2020”—represents only 20 percent of the CBO’s projected increase in household costs. The other 80 percent of the gross price hikes is transferred away from unlucky consumers and into the pockets of politically-connected beneficiaries. Since this wealth is redistributed, it’s still in “households” (somewhere) and so the CBO doesn’t report the gross figure, which is five times higher than the number bouncing around the press. But that’s not the end of it. CBO didn’t score anything but the “cap and trade” part of the bill…not the renewable energy mandate, not the additional costs of complying with the bureaucratic nirvana of new standards for energy efficiency of lighting for home art and “personal spas,” etc. In some parts of the country, the “You Must Obey” renewable energy mandate could force significantly higher costs on consumers and businesses.
Winners and Losers
The CBO study acknowledges that its estimates are average figures, and that the impacts on particular sectors will be uneven:
The measure of costs described above reflects the costs that would occur once the economy had adjusted to the change in the relative prices of goods and services. It does not include the costs that some current investors and workers in sectors of the economy that produce energy and energy-intensive goods and services would incur as the economy moved away from the use of fossil fuels….Stock losses would tend to be widely dispersed among investors because shareholders typically diversify their portfolios. In contrast, the costs of unemployment would probably be concentrated among relatively few households and, by extension, their communities. (p.8)
In addition to the negative impact on workers in energy-intensive sectors, the Waxman-Markey bill would also hurt energy consumers to different degrees, depending on which region of the country they lived in. The Southern and Midwestern states are much more reliant on coal and other fossil fuels for their electricity production. Consumers in these regions will see their electricity rates jump higher than in other areas of the country.
Conclusion
Make no mistake: Waxman-Markey is a tax that, to work properly, must find a way to drive up energy prices. CBO bends over backwards to try to disguise this fact, but even they admit Waxman-Markey will increase energy prices.
The CBO’s gross cost estimate of $890 per household is also optimistic. Other studies put the figure at $1,500 per family in higher energy costs. That makes the much lower figure of $175 per household extremely misleading.
Bent on disguising the true costs of Waxman-Markey, CBO performed a deeply flawed analysis. They treat lower household income as a good thing because households will be subject to lower tax rates, even though this will increase the budget deficit and help drive up interest rates making economic growth more difficult.
The CBO is also disingenuous in its treatment of free allowances. The financial benefit of the free allowances will go a small subset of the population (and to overseas investors), but CBO merely averages the benefits across the U.S. population. This is deeply disingenuous and misleading. Households are in for much bigger price hikes than the CBO would lead them to believe.
Despite CBO’s heroic attempts to put a nice gloss on Waxman-Markey, cap and trade is what Rep. Dingell said it was—a tax, and a great big one.
Monday, June 22, 2009
Does the "Smart Grid" Have a Smartest-Guys-in-the-Room Problem?
Does the "Smart Grid" Have a Smartest-Guys-in-the-Room Problem? By Ken Maize
Master Resource, June 19, 2009
[...]
However politically incorrect my conclusion, I’m convinced that the “smart grid” is not smart and even dumb. It diverts attention from what is a more important objective–a strong grid. And it politicizes in the very area where we need more consumer-driven, free-market incentives.
Following the Northeast grid collapse of 2003, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) popped out the smart grid concept, largely the brainchild of then EPRI’s CEO Kurt Yeager. The blueprint was for an interconnected intelligent network reaching from the generating station to your toaster, able to talk up-and-down the line, matching supply and demand seamlessly.
Sounds cool, but doesn’t stand up to analysis in my judgment.
Where Did ‘Smart Grid’ Come From?
The idea of a smart grid has been laying around in bits and pieces for many years. I recall visiting Southern California Edison (SEC) in the 1980s where a group of us energy reporters visited the utility’s “smart house.” It kinda reminded me of the Betty Furness advertisements for Westinghouse kitchens when I grew up in Pittsburgh in the 1950s and 1960s. SCE assured us that the smart house, connected to the utility over phone lines (this was pre-World Wide Web) and through radio signals, would dominate home construction in the coming years. (Enron would have a ’smart house’ a decade later to awe visitors to 1400 Smith Street in Houston, but that’s another story.)
Didn’t happen, for lots of reasons, most of them good. It didn’t make economic sense for consumers (although it did for the utility — remember all-electric “gold medallion” homes?). It was way too technologically optimistic, assuming communications protocols that really didn’t exist, and appliances that weren’t remotely ready to talk to each other and the utility. Heck, this was largely before cell phones were making a big impact in the market.
Fast forward to the 21st Century. The grid has shown that it is in trouble. The Internet has demonstrated the utility of Vint Cerf’s IP communications protocol. EPRI is facing an existential moment (what the heck is our role here?). Presto! The smart grid. It controls power flows, adjusts supply demand on the fly, instantly corrects for frequency and power imbalances. It slices, it dices, it’s the latest, biggest, best Ronco product of all time. We can get Billy Mays (no relation, he spells it differently) to peddle it on late-night cable.
Rescuing Dumb Renewables
The concept of the smart grid (if not the reality) also fits into the allegedly new paradigm of renewables. We want lots of power from the wind and the sun (water doesn’t count). But the places where the winds blows a lot and the sun shines a lot are a long way away from where there are a lot of people.
Hence proposals to build a transcontinental, high-voltage (AC and DC) backbone grid on top of the existing transmission and distribution network (which former energy secretary Bill Richardson famously and erroneously called a “third world” grid following the 2003 grid collapse). What’s a trillion dollars or so to bring unreliable power to market?
So here is the Big Green Grid Dream: tie renewables to consumers, with a smart grid to govern (Big Brother?) usage. We could imbue the entire grid — high-voltage transmission and lower-voltage distribution with smarts, from the generator to the substation to the refrigerator. It’s the Big Rock Candy Mountain–or Dream Green Machine.
Another Problem: Cybersecurity
Another problem with the concept of a smart grid (which most advocates assume will use IP/TCP communications protocols) is cybersecurity. It’s hard to bring down a dumb but strong grid in a cyber attack. The smarter it is, the more vulnerable it becomes. There was a report in the Wall Street Journal not long ago that hackers from China and Russia had successfully penetrated the U.S.”grid,” which was undefined in the article.
I don’t believe it, and no other mainstream media outlet backed up the story. But the “smarter” the grid becomes, the more likely such hacking becomes. That’s a real problem.
The Legacy Problem
The U.S. transmission grid (and I’m talking about the big pipes — 365 kV and above) has clear weaknesses. We don’t have a U.S. grid, but loosely-interconnected regional grids. East and West don’t meet very easily. Texas is an island unto itself. Florida is aspiring to the same. Without strong physical interconnections, it’s impossible to dispatch and control a national grid. So a lot of “smart grid” is putting the cart before the horse.
Color Me Skeptical
I don’t buy any part of it, and it ain’t going to happen. It’s what I have described elsewhere as lemon-meringue pie-in-the-sky. Among other problems, the costs are simply unknown, and who will bear them is also unknown. Most of what I’ve seen implicitly suggests that taxpayers will get the check, since customers would revolt if the costs showed up on their monthly bills.
I’ve tuned into recent FERC discussions about grid issues, and heard what I think is a lot of nonsense about smart grids. I’d rather our regulators and policy makers were focusing on muscle, not brains. It’s heavy lifting we need, not heavy thinking.
—————————————
Ken Maize is executive editor of MANAGING POWER magazine and editor of POWER Blog. He was the founder and editor of Electricity Daily (1993-2006) and a reporter and editor at The Energy Daily for a dozen years, starting on March 28, 1979, the date of the Three Mile Island problem. Contact address: kmaize@hughes.net.
Master Resource, June 19, 2009
[...]
However politically incorrect my conclusion, I’m convinced that the “smart grid” is not smart and even dumb. It diverts attention from what is a more important objective–a strong grid. And it politicizes in the very area where we need more consumer-driven, free-market incentives.
Following the Northeast grid collapse of 2003, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) popped out the smart grid concept, largely the brainchild of then EPRI’s CEO Kurt Yeager. The blueprint was for an interconnected intelligent network reaching from the generating station to your toaster, able to talk up-and-down the line, matching supply and demand seamlessly.
Sounds cool, but doesn’t stand up to analysis in my judgment.
Where Did ‘Smart Grid’ Come From?
The idea of a smart grid has been laying around in bits and pieces for many years. I recall visiting Southern California Edison (SEC) in the 1980s where a group of us energy reporters visited the utility’s “smart house.” It kinda reminded me of the Betty Furness advertisements for Westinghouse kitchens when I grew up in Pittsburgh in the 1950s and 1960s. SCE assured us that the smart house, connected to the utility over phone lines (this was pre-World Wide Web) and through radio signals, would dominate home construction in the coming years. (Enron would have a ’smart house’ a decade later to awe visitors to 1400 Smith Street in Houston, but that’s another story.)
Didn’t happen, for lots of reasons, most of them good. It didn’t make economic sense for consumers (although it did for the utility — remember all-electric “gold medallion” homes?). It was way too technologically optimistic, assuming communications protocols that really didn’t exist, and appliances that weren’t remotely ready to talk to each other and the utility. Heck, this was largely before cell phones were making a big impact in the market.
Fast forward to the 21st Century. The grid has shown that it is in trouble. The Internet has demonstrated the utility of Vint Cerf’s IP communications protocol. EPRI is facing an existential moment (what the heck is our role here?). Presto! The smart grid. It controls power flows, adjusts supply demand on the fly, instantly corrects for frequency and power imbalances. It slices, it dices, it’s the latest, biggest, best Ronco product of all time. We can get Billy Mays (no relation, he spells it differently) to peddle it on late-night cable.
Rescuing Dumb Renewables
The concept of the smart grid (if not the reality) also fits into the allegedly new paradigm of renewables. We want lots of power from the wind and the sun (water doesn’t count). But the places where the winds blows a lot and the sun shines a lot are a long way away from where there are a lot of people.
Hence proposals to build a transcontinental, high-voltage (AC and DC) backbone grid on top of the existing transmission and distribution network (which former energy secretary Bill Richardson famously and erroneously called a “third world” grid following the 2003 grid collapse). What’s a trillion dollars or so to bring unreliable power to market?
So here is the Big Green Grid Dream: tie renewables to consumers, with a smart grid to govern (Big Brother?) usage. We could imbue the entire grid — high-voltage transmission and lower-voltage distribution with smarts, from the generator to the substation to the refrigerator. It’s the Big Rock Candy Mountain–or Dream Green Machine.
Another Problem: Cybersecurity
Another problem with the concept of a smart grid (which most advocates assume will use IP/TCP communications protocols) is cybersecurity. It’s hard to bring down a dumb but strong grid in a cyber attack. The smarter it is, the more vulnerable it becomes. There was a report in the Wall Street Journal not long ago that hackers from China and Russia had successfully penetrated the U.S.”grid,” which was undefined in the article.
I don’t believe it, and no other mainstream media outlet backed up the story. But the “smarter” the grid becomes, the more likely such hacking becomes. That’s a real problem.
The Legacy Problem
The U.S. transmission grid (and I’m talking about the big pipes — 365 kV and above) has clear weaknesses. We don’t have a U.S. grid, but loosely-interconnected regional grids. East and West don’t meet very easily. Texas is an island unto itself. Florida is aspiring to the same. Without strong physical interconnections, it’s impossible to dispatch and control a national grid. So a lot of “smart grid” is putting the cart before the horse.
Color Me Skeptical
I don’t buy any part of it, and it ain’t going to happen. It’s what I have described elsewhere as lemon-meringue pie-in-the-sky. Among other problems, the costs are simply unknown, and who will bear them is also unknown. Most of what I’ve seen implicitly suggests that taxpayers will get the check, since customers would revolt if the costs showed up on their monthly bills.
I’ve tuned into recent FERC discussions about grid issues, and heard what I think is a lot of nonsense about smart grids. I’d rather our regulators and policy makers were focusing on muscle, not brains. It’s heavy lifting we need, not heavy thinking.
—————————————
Ken Maize is executive editor of MANAGING POWER magazine and editor of POWER Blog. He was the founder and editor of Electricity Daily (1993-2006) and a reporter and editor at The Energy Daily for a dozen years, starting on March 28, 1979, the date of the Three Mile Island problem. Contact address: kmaize@hughes.net.
The Potential Gas Committee has raised its gas resource estimate for the US
U.S. Gas Resources: Julian Simon Lives! (Malthus, Hotelling, Hubbert are wrong again). By Michael Lynch
Master Resource, June 22, 2009
The Potential Gas Committee has issued its new biennial gas resource estimate for the United States and once again raised its estimate, this time by 15%, or from 1,321 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) to 1,525 Tcf. This equates to a 70-year domestic cushion, given annual U.S. consumption of 20 Tcf. The evaluation of available shale gas, production of which is now soaring, played a major role in this re-evaluation and potently demonstrates how new technology (aka human ingenuity, what the late Julian Simon called the ultimate resource) creates resources, refuting the static fixity/depletion view of the mineral-resource world.
Few realize that the PGC has been raising the estimates of conventional resources throughout history, even as the United States has consumed large amounts of natural gas. Thus gas has been and is an expanding resource, not a depleting one.
In 1966, the PGC’s estimate of ultimately recoverable resource (i.e., including cumulative production) was 1,283 Tcf, versus the current estimate of approximately 2,600 Tcf, including 1,100 Tcf of cumulative production. While that includes several hundred Tcf of shale gas and coal-bed methane (CBM), conventional gas resources have surpassed 2,000 Tcf and are far beyond even the most optimistic estimates of a quarter century ago.
An excellent summary of those estimates can be found in the Office of Technology Assessment’s U.S. Natural Gas Availability: Conventional Gas Supply Through the Year 2000, which noted that the pessimistic projections for production in 2000 were about 9 Tcf. Total production that year proved to be over twice that amount, at 18.7 Tcf, of which less than 2 Tcf were shale gas and CBM.
In fact, resource estimates from that era have proved wildly pessimistic. A review of URR estimates from 11 different sources, including M. King Hubbert and Richard Nehring, found none that came close to current levels, with the highest at 1,800 Tcf. Indeed, five of the nine estimates of lower-48 remaining undiscovered resources came in below 200 Tcf, whereas production since then has been 500 Tcf.
Against this background, we have any number of pundits decrying the optimists arguments that resources will be sufficient for our needs, pointing to a few years of elevated prices, and encouraging the building of numerous—now idle—LNG import terminals. Even more, arguments that global gas resources are somehow constrained should be put to bed.
Master Resource, June 22, 2009
The Potential Gas Committee has issued its new biennial gas resource estimate for the United States and once again raised its estimate, this time by 15%, or from 1,321 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) to 1,525 Tcf. This equates to a 70-year domestic cushion, given annual U.S. consumption of 20 Tcf. The evaluation of available shale gas, production of which is now soaring, played a major role in this re-evaluation and potently demonstrates how new technology (aka human ingenuity, what the late Julian Simon called the ultimate resource) creates resources, refuting the static fixity/depletion view of the mineral-resource world.
Few realize that the PGC has been raising the estimates of conventional resources throughout history, even as the United States has consumed large amounts of natural gas. Thus gas has been and is an expanding resource, not a depleting one.
In 1966, the PGC’s estimate of ultimately recoverable resource (i.e., including cumulative production) was 1,283 Tcf, versus the current estimate of approximately 2,600 Tcf, including 1,100 Tcf of cumulative production. While that includes several hundred Tcf of shale gas and coal-bed methane (CBM), conventional gas resources have surpassed 2,000 Tcf and are far beyond even the most optimistic estimates of a quarter century ago.
An excellent summary of those estimates can be found in the Office of Technology Assessment’s U.S. Natural Gas Availability: Conventional Gas Supply Through the Year 2000, which noted that the pessimistic projections for production in 2000 were about 9 Tcf. Total production that year proved to be over twice that amount, at 18.7 Tcf, of which less than 2 Tcf were shale gas and CBM.
In fact, resource estimates from that era have proved wildly pessimistic. A review of URR estimates from 11 different sources, including M. King Hubbert and Richard Nehring, found none that came close to current levels, with the highest at 1,800 Tcf. Indeed, five of the nine estimates of lower-48 remaining undiscovered resources came in below 200 Tcf, whereas production since then has been 500 Tcf.
Against this background, we have any number of pundits decrying the optimists arguments that resources will be sufficient for our needs, pointing to a few years of elevated prices, and encouraging the building of numerous—now idle—LNG import terminals. Even more, arguments that global gas resources are somehow constrained should be put to bed.
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
When ‘Green’ Travel isn’t ‘Green’ - Thesis by Mikhail Chester
When ‘Green’ Travel isn’t ‘Green’. By Greg Pollowitz
Planet Gore/NRO, Monday, June 08, 2009
Here's a great article via Breitbart on the difficulty of determining what the "greenest" form of travel actually is. Worth reading in its entirety, but here's an excerpt:
So you always prefer to take the train or the bus rather than a plane, and avoid using a car whenever you can, faithful to the belief that this inflicts less harm to the planet.
Well, there could be a nasty surprise in store for you, for taking public transport may not be as green as you automatically think, says a new US study.
Its authors point out an array of factors that are often unknown to the public.
These are hidden or displaced emissions that ramp up the simple "tailpipe" tally, which is based on how much carbon is spewed out by the fossil fuels used to make a trip.
Environmental engineers Mikhail Chester and Arpad Horvath at the University of California at Davis say that when these costs are included, a more complex and challenging picture emerges.
In some circumstances, for instance, it could be more eco-friendly to drive into a city — even in an SUV, the bete noire of green groups — rather than take a suburban train. It depends on seat occupancy and the underlying carbon cost of the mode of transport.
"We are encouraging people to look at not the average ranking of modes, because there is a different basket of configurations that determine the outcome," Chester told AFP in a phone interview.
"There's no overall solution that's the same all the time."
Planet Gore/NRO, Monday, June 08, 2009
Here's a great article via Breitbart on the difficulty of determining what the "greenest" form of travel actually is. Worth reading in its entirety, but here's an excerpt:
So you always prefer to take the train or the bus rather than a plane, and avoid using a car whenever you can, faithful to the belief that this inflicts less harm to the planet.
Well, there could be a nasty surprise in store for you, for taking public transport may not be as green as you automatically think, says a new US study.
Its authors point out an array of factors that are often unknown to the public.
These are hidden or displaced emissions that ramp up the simple "tailpipe" tally, which is based on how much carbon is spewed out by the fossil fuels used to make a trip.
Environmental engineers Mikhail Chester and Arpad Horvath at the University of California at Davis say that when these costs are included, a more complex and challenging picture emerges.
In some circumstances, for instance, it could be more eco-friendly to drive into a city — even in an SUV, the bete noire of green groups — rather than take a suburban train. It depends on seat occupancy and the underlying carbon cost of the mode of transport.
"We are encouraging people to look at not the average ranking of modes, because there is a different basket of configurations that determine the outcome," Chester told AFP in a phone interview.
"There's no overall solution that's the same all the time."
Monday, June 8, 2009
Brookings: Consequences of Cap and Trade
Consequences of Cap and Trade. By Warwick McKibbin, Adele Morris, Peter Wilcoxen, and Yiyong Cai
Brookings, Jun 08, 2009
SUMMARY
The U.S. Congress continues to debate a potential cap-and-trade program for the control of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The economic effects of such a bill remain in dispute, with some arguing that a cap-and-trade program would create jobs and improve economic growth and others arguing that the program would shift jobs overseas and hit households with large energy price increases.
This report applies a global economic model to evaluate different emission reduction paths and to offer insights to policymakers about how to the design the program to lower the costs of achieving long-run environmental goals. The study examines emissions reduction paths that are broadly consistent with proposals by President Obama, Representatives Waxman and Markey, along with two cost minimizing paths that reach similar goals.
KEY FINDINGS
The study estimates that alternative paths to reach an emission reduction target of 83% below 2005 levels by 2050:
• reduce cumulative U.S. emissions by 38% to 49%, about 110 to 140 billion metric tons CO2
• reduce total personal consumption by 0.3% to 0.5%, or about $1 to $2 trillion in discounted present value from 2010 to 2050
• reduce the level of U.S. GDP by around 2.5% relative to what it otherwise would have been in 2050
• reduce employment levels by 0.5% in the first decade, with large differences across sectors
• create an annual value of emission allowances peaking at around $300 billion by 2030, and a total value of about $9 trillion from 2012 to 2050
The different timing of emissions reductions under the various paths explored has significant effects:
• Without banking, in the short run the Obama and Waxman-Markey emission paths result in more gradual carbon price rises than the paths that minimize the present value of abatement costs. In the medium run, Obama and Waxman-Markey targets are relatively more stringent.
Incremental stringency produces high incremental cost, e.g. an extra 8% reduction increases costs by 45%.
LEARN MORE
For more information about the Climate and Energy Economic Project, please visithttp://www.brookings.edu/topics/climate-and-energy-economics.aspx
Brookings, Jun 08, 2009
SUMMARY
The U.S. Congress continues to debate a potential cap-and-trade program for the control of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The economic effects of such a bill remain in dispute, with some arguing that a cap-and-trade program would create jobs and improve economic growth and others arguing that the program would shift jobs overseas and hit households with large energy price increases.
This report applies a global economic model to evaluate different emission reduction paths and to offer insights to policymakers about how to the design the program to lower the costs of achieving long-run environmental goals. The study examines emissions reduction paths that are broadly consistent with proposals by President Obama, Representatives Waxman and Markey, along with two cost minimizing paths that reach similar goals.
KEY FINDINGS
The study estimates that alternative paths to reach an emission reduction target of 83% below 2005 levels by 2050:
• reduce cumulative U.S. emissions by 38% to 49%, about 110 to 140 billion metric tons CO2
• reduce total personal consumption by 0.3% to 0.5%, or about $1 to $2 trillion in discounted present value from 2010 to 2050
• reduce the level of U.S. GDP by around 2.5% relative to what it otherwise would have been in 2050
• reduce employment levels by 0.5% in the first decade, with large differences across sectors
• create an annual value of emission allowances peaking at around $300 billion by 2030, and a total value of about $9 trillion from 2012 to 2050
The different timing of emissions reductions under the various paths explored has significant effects:
• Without banking, in the short run the Obama and Waxman-Markey emission paths result in more gradual carbon price rises than the paths that minimize the present value of abatement costs. In the medium run, Obama and Waxman-Markey targets are relatively more stringent.
Incremental stringency produces high incremental cost, e.g. an extra 8% reduction increases costs by 45%.
LEARN MORE
For more information about the Climate and Energy Economic Project, please visithttp://www.brookings.edu/topics/climate-and-energy-economics.aspx
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Cap-and-Trade: All Cost, No Benefit
Cap-and-Trade: All Cost, No Benefit. By Martin Feldstein
WaPo, Monday, June 1, 2009
The Obama administration and congressional Democrats have proposed a major cap-and-trade system aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Scientists agree that CO2 emissions around the world could lead to rising temperatures with serious long-term environmental consequences. But that is not a reason to enact a U.S. cap-and-trade system until there is a global agreement on CO2 reduction. The proposed legislation would have a trivially small effect on global warming while imposing substantial costs on all American households. And to get political support in key states, the legislation would abandon the auctioning of permits in favor of giving permits to selected corporations.
The leading legislative proposal, the Waxman-Markey bill that was recently passed out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, would reduce allowable CO2 emissions to 83 percent of the 2005 level by 2020, then gradually decrease the amount further. Under the cap-and-trade system, the federal government would limit the total volume of CO2 that U.S. companies can emit each year and would issue permits that companies would be required to have for each ton of CO2 emitted. Once issued, these permits would be tradable and could be bought and sold, establishing a market price reflecting the targeted CO2 reduction, with a tougher CO2 standard and fewer available permits leading to higher prices.
Companies would buy permits from each other as long as it is cheaper to do that than to make the technological changes needed to eliminate an equivalent amount of CO2 emissions. Companies would also pass along the cost of the permits in their prices, pushing up the relative price of CO2-intensive goods and services such as gasoline, electricity and a range of industrial products. Consumers would respond by cutting back on consumption of CO2-intensive products in favor of other goods and services. This pass-through of the permit cost in higher consumer prices is the primary way the cap-and-trade system would reduce the production of CO2 in the United States.
The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that the resulting increases in consumer prices needed to achieve a 15 percent CO2 reduction -- slightly less than the Waxman-Markey target -- would raise the cost of living of a typical household by $1,600 a year. Some expert studies estimate that the cost to households could be substantially higher. The future cost to the typical household would rise significantly as the government reduces the total allowable amount of CO2.
Americans should ask themselves whether this annual tax of $1,600-plus per family is justified by the very small resulting decline in global CO2. Since the U.S. share of global CO2 production is now less than 25 percent (and is projected to decline as China and other developing nations grow), a 15 percent fall in U.S. CO2 output would lower global CO2 output by less than 4 percent. Its impact on global warming would be virtually unnoticeable. The U.S. should wait until there is a global agreement on CO2 that includes China and India before committing to costly reductions in the United States.
The CBO estimates that the sale of the permits for a 15 percent CO2 reduction would raise revenue of about $80 billion a year over the next decade. It is remarkable, then, that the Waxman-Markey bill would give away some 85 percent of the permits over the next 20 years to various businesses instead of selling them at auction. The price of the permits and the burden to households would be the same whether the permits are sold or given away. But by giving them away the government would not collect the revenue that could, at least in principle, be used to offset some of the higher cost to households.
The Waxman-Markey bill would give away 30 percent of the permits to local electricity distribution companies with the expectation that their regulators would require those firms to pass the benefit on to their customers. If they do this by not raising prices, there would be less CO2 reduction through lower electricity consumption. The permit price would then have to be higher to achieve more CO2 reduction on all other products. Some electricity consumers would benefit, but the cost to all other American families would be higher.
In my judgment, the proposed cap-and-trade system would be a costly policy that would penalize Americans with little effect on global warming. The proposal to give away most of the permits only makes a bad idea worse. Taxpayers and legislators should keep these things in mind before enacting any cap-and-trade system.
Martin Feldstein, a professor of economics at Harvard University and president emeritus of the nonprofit National Bureau of Economic Research, was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1982 to 1984.
WaPo, Monday, June 1, 2009
The Obama administration and congressional Democrats have proposed a major cap-and-trade system aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Scientists agree that CO2 emissions around the world could lead to rising temperatures with serious long-term environmental consequences. But that is not a reason to enact a U.S. cap-and-trade system until there is a global agreement on CO2 reduction. The proposed legislation would have a trivially small effect on global warming while imposing substantial costs on all American households. And to get political support in key states, the legislation would abandon the auctioning of permits in favor of giving permits to selected corporations.
The leading legislative proposal, the Waxman-Markey bill that was recently passed out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, would reduce allowable CO2 emissions to 83 percent of the 2005 level by 2020, then gradually decrease the amount further. Under the cap-and-trade system, the federal government would limit the total volume of CO2 that U.S. companies can emit each year and would issue permits that companies would be required to have for each ton of CO2 emitted. Once issued, these permits would be tradable and could be bought and sold, establishing a market price reflecting the targeted CO2 reduction, with a tougher CO2 standard and fewer available permits leading to higher prices.
Companies would buy permits from each other as long as it is cheaper to do that than to make the technological changes needed to eliminate an equivalent amount of CO2 emissions. Companies would also pass along the cost of the permits in their prices, pushing up the relative price of CO2-intensive goods and services such as gasoline, electricity and a range of industrial products. Consumers would respond by cutting back on consumption of CO2-intensive products in favor of other goods and services. This pass-through of the permit cost in higher consumer prices is the primary way the cap-and-trade system would reduce the production of CO2 in the United States.
The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that the resulting increases in consumer prices needed to achieve a 15 percent CO2 reduction -- slightly less than the Waxman-Markey target -- would raise the cost of living of a typical household by $1,600 a year. Some expert studies estimate that the cost to households could be substantially higher. The future cost to the typical household would rise significantly as the government reduces the total allowable amount of CO2.
Americans should ask themselves whether this annual tax of $1,600-plus per family is justified by the very small resulting decline in global CO2. Since the U.S. share of global CO2 production is now less than 25 percent (and is projected to decline as China and other developing nations grow), a 15 percent fall in U.S. CO2 output would lower global CO2 output by less than 4 percent. Its impact on global warming would be virtually unnoticeable. The U.S. should wait until there is a global agreement on CO2 that includes China and India before committing to costly reductions in the United States.
The CBO estimates that the sale of the permits for a 15 percent CO2 reduction would raise revenue of about $80 billion a year over the next decade. It is remarkable, then, that the Waxman-Markey bill would give away some 85 percent of the permits over the next 20 years to various businesses instead of selling them at auction. The price of the permits and the burden to households would be the same whether the permits are sold or given away. But by giving them away the government would not collect the revenue that could, at least in principle, be used to offset some of the higher cost to households.
The Waxman-Markey bill would give away 30 percent of the permits to local electricity distribution companies with the expectation that their regulators would require those firms to pass the benefit on to their customers. If they do this by not raising prices, there would be less CO2 reduction through lower electricity consumption. The permit price would then have to be higher to achieve more CO2 reduction on all other products. Some electricity consumers would benefit, but the cost to all other American families would be higher.
In my judgment, the proposed cap-and-trade system would be a costly policy that would penalize Americans with little effect on global warming. The proposal to give away most of the permits only makes a bad idea worse. Taxpayers and legislators should keep these things in mind before enacting any cap-and-trade system.
Martin Feldstein, a professor of economics at Harvard University and president emeritus of the nonprofit National Bureau of Economic Research, was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1982 to 1984.
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Ethanol's Grocery Bill - Two federal studies add up the corn fuel's exorbitant cost
Ethanol's Grocery Bill. WSJ Editorial
Two federal studies add up the corn fuel's exorbitant cost.
WSJ, Jun 02, 2009
The Obama Administration is pushing a big expansion in ethanol, including a mandate to increase the share of the corn-based fuel required in gasoline to 15% from 10%. Apparently no one in the Administration has read a pair of new studies, one from its own EPA, that expose ethanol as a bad deal for consumers with little environmental benefit.
The biofuels industry already receives a 45 cent tax credit for every gallon of ethanol produced, or about $3 billion a year. Meanwhile, import tariffs of 54 cents a gallon and an ad valorem tariff of four to seven cents a gallon keep out sugar-based ethanol from Brazil and the Caribbean. The federal 10% blending requirement insures a market for ethanol whether consumers want it or not -- a market Congress has mandated will double to 20.5 billion gallons in 2015.
The Congressional Budget Office reported last month that Americans pay another surcharge for ethanol in higher food prices. CBO estimates that from April 2007 to April 2008 "the increased use of ethanol accounted for about 10 percent to 15 percent of the rise in food prices." Ethanol raises food prices because millions of acres of farmland and three billion bushels of corn were diverted to ethanol from food production. Americans spend about $1.1 trillion a year on food, so in 2007 the ethanol subsidy cost families between $5.5 billion and $8.8 billion in higher grocery bills.
A second study -- by the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Transportation and Air Quality -- explains that the reduction in CO2 emissions from burning ethanol are minimal and maybe negative. Making ethanol requires new land from clearing forest and grasslands that would otherwise sequester carbon emissions. "As with petroleum based fuels," the report concludes: "GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions are associated with the conversion and combustion of bio-fuels and every year they are produced GHG emissions could be released through time if new acres are needed to produce corn or other crops for biofuels."
The EPA study also explores a series of alternative scenarios over 30 to 100 years. In some cases ethanol leads to a net reduction in carbon relative to using gasoline. But many other long-term scenarios observe a net increase in CO2 relative to burning fossil fuels. Ethanol produced in a "basic natural gas fired dry mill" will over a 30-year horizon produce "a 5% increase in GHG emissions compared to petroleum gasoline." When ethanol is produced with coal burning mills, the process "significantly worsens the lifecycle GHG impact of ethanol" creating 34% more greenhouse gases than gasoline does over 30 years.
Both CBO and EPA find that in theory cellulosic ethanol -- from wood chips, grasses and biowaste -- would reduce carbon emissions. However, as CBO emphasizes, "current technologies for producing cellulosic ethanol are not commercially viable." The ethanol lobby is attempting a giant bait-and-switch: Keep claiming that cellulosic ethanol is just around the corner, even as it knows the only current technology to meet federal mandates is corn ethanol (or sugar, if it didn't face an import tariff).
As public policy, ethanol is like the joke about the baseball prospect who is a poor hitter but a bad fielder. It doesn't reduce CO2 but it does cost more. Imagine how many subsidies the Beltway would throw at ethanol if the fuel actually had any benefits.
Two federal studies add up the corn fuel's exorbitant cost.
WSJ, Jun 02, 2009
The Obama Administration is pushing a big expansion in ethanol, including a mandate to increase the share of the corn-based fuel required in gasoline to 15% from 10%. Apparently no one in the Administration has read a pair of new studies, one from its own EPA, that expose ethanol as a bad deal for consumers with little environmental benefit.
The biofuels industry already receives a 45 cent tax credit for every gallon of ethanol produced, or about $3 billion a year. Meanwhile, import tariffs of 54 cents a gallon and an ad valorem tariff of four to seven cents a gallon keep out sugar-based ethanol from Brazil and the Caribbean. The federal 10% blending requirement insures a market for ethanol whether consumers want it or not -- a market Congress has mandated will double to 20.5 billion gallons in 2015.
The Congressional Budget Office reported last month that Americans pay another surcharge for ethanol in higher food prices. CBO estimates that from April 2007 to April 2008 "the increased use of ethanol accounted for about 10 percent to 15 percent of the rise in food prices." Ethanol raises food prices because millions of acres of farmland and three billion bushels of corn were diverted to ethanol from food production. Americans spend about $1.1 trillion a year on food, so in 2007 the ethanol subsidy cost families between $5.5 billion and $8.8 billion in higher grocery bills.
A second study -- by the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Transportation and Air Quality -- explains that the reduction in CO2 emissions from burning ethanol are minimal and maybe negative. Making ethanol requires new land from clearing forest and grasslands that would otherwise sequester carbon emissions. "As with petroleum based fuels," the report concludes: "GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions are associated with the conversion and combustion of bio-fuels and every year they are produced GHG emissions could be released through time if new acres are needed to produce corn or other crops for biofuels."
The EPA study also explores a series of alternative scenarios over 30 to 100 years. In some cases ethanol leads to a net reduction in carbon relative to using gasoline. But many other long-term scenarios observe a net increase in CO2 relative to burning fossil fuels. Ethanol produced in a "basic natural gas fired dry mill" will over a 30-year horizon produce "a 5% increase in GHG emissions compared to petroleum gasoline." When ethanol is produced with coal burning mills, the process "significantly worsens the lifecycle GHG impact of ethanol" creating 34% more greenhouse gases than gasoline does over 30 years.
Both CBO and EPA find that in theory cellulosic ethanol -- from wood chips, grasses and biowaste -- would reduce carbon emissions. However, as CBO emphasizes, "current technologies for producing cellulosic ethanol are not commercially viable." The ethanol lobby is attempting a giant bait-and-switch: Keep claiming that cellulosic ethanol is just around the corner, even as it knows the only current technology to meet federal mandates is corn ethanol (or sugar, if it didn't face an import tariff).
As public policy, ethanol is like the joke about the baseball prospect who is a poor hitter but a bad fielder. It doesn't reduce CO2 but it does cost more. Imagine how many subsidies the Beltway would throw at ethanol if the fuel actually had any benefits.
Friday, May 29, 2009
Waxman-Markey: What About Innovation?
Waxman-Markey: What About Innovation? By Mark Muro
Brookings, May 26, 2009
Brookings, May 26, 2009
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Pres. Clinton Concedes Spain’s Green Jobs Program “Has Cost Many Jobs”
In España, Veritas: Pres. Clinton Concedes Spain’s Green Jobs Program “Has Cost Many Jobs”
Former president channels Prof. Gabriel Calzada in delivering veiled rebuke of Obama’s Spanish-inspired green jobs plan
The Institute for Energy Research , May 27, 2009
Washington, DC – Spain’s decade-long program to subsidize the creation and continued existence of so-called green jobs through a massive infusion of taxpayer resources “has cost many jobs,” former President Bill Clinton admitted to a Spanish audience at the European University of Madrid this week, according to the Spanish daily newspaper El Mundo (a translated version of the piece can be found below).
The statement mirrors closely the findings of a recent study authored by Professor Gabriel Calzada of Spain, a report that has attracted attention in the United States as the current president continues to cite Spain as a model to be followed in promoting a similar green jobs plan here at home.
In response to former President Clinton’s comments, Institute for Energy Research (IER) president Thomas J. Pyle issued the following statement:
“Though efforts continue to be made in the United States to discredit the Spanish green jobs study, and even personally attack its author, President Clinton’s affirmation of its core findings serves as just the latest reminder that the facts are what they are – and they aren’t pretty. More than 10 years and nearly $40 billion in public investment later, Spain still only acquires less than one percent of its power from solar, and the vast majority of the so-called green jobs created by the government to support that industry are no longer in existence today. If this is the model for near-term economic growth and long-term energy security that President Obama envisions for our country, we may be in for a longer, more severe recession than we know.”
Please find below the translated version of the El Mundo article:
–Clinton: Green Energy “Has Cost Many Jobs”
J. G. Gallego/C. CaballeroEl Mundo, p. 46May 23, 2009
Madrid — Former US President turned ecologist Bill Clinton is aware of the impact on employment by the development on renewable energy. Even though he is, as a former dweller of the White House, one of the most visible supporters in that industry, the US Democrat recognized yesterday that clean energies “have cost many jobs” in Spain.
Though without citing it directly, Clinton was acknowledging yesterday during his conference in Madrid that the study about the impact of public support on renewable energies, released by Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, has very valid conclusions.
That report, which has received enormous coverage in US media and been used against Barack Obama’s energy policy, argues that every job in renewable energies created in Spain in the year 2000 has cost 571138 Euros and has been the cause of the loss of 2.2 jobs elsewhere in the economy.
Bill Clinton recognized yesterday that “this commitment to clean energy has cost many jobs” while at the same time calling for Spain to intensify investment in this industry to be able to turn high costs into new jobs.–
NOTE: Former President Clinton’s comments in Madrid making the link between “green” government intervention and the hemorrhaging of jobs and opportunity follows a statement he made last year in which he suggested that “we just have to slow down our economy … because we’ve got to save the planet for our grandchildren.”
More from IER on the fallacy and unintended consequences of “green jobs”:
Spanish Report: Study of the Effects on Employment of Public Aid to Renewable Energy Sources
Study: Green Jobs: Fact or Fiction?
Study: Seven Myths about Green Jobs
Blog: Green Jobs That Nobody Wants
Blog: It Takes a Lot of Government Green to Create a Green Job
Former president channels Prof. Gabriel Calzada in delivering veiled rebuke of Obama’s Spanish-inspired green jobs plan
The Institute for Energy Research , May 27, 2009
Washington, DC – Spain’s decade-long program to subsidize the creation and continued existence of so-called green jobs through a massive infusion of taxpayer resources “has cost many jobs,” former President Bill Clinton admitted to a Spanish audience at the European University of Madrid this week, according to the Spanish daily newspaper El Mundo (a translated version of the piece can be found below).
The statement mirrors closely the findings of a recent study authored by Professor Gabriel Calzada of Spain, a report that has attracted attention in the United States as the current president continues to cite Spain as a model to be followed in promoting a similar green jobs plan here at home.
In response to former President Clinton’s comments, Institute for Energy Research (IER) president Thomas J. Pyle issued the following statement:
“Though efforts continue to be made in the United States to discredit the Spanish green jobs study, and even personally attack its author, President Clinton’s affirmation of its core findings serves as just the latest reminder that the facts are what they are – and they aren’t pretty. More than 10 years and nearly $40 billion in public investment later, Spain still only acquires less than one percent of its power from solar, and the vast majority of the so-called green jobs created by the government to support that industry are no longer in existence today. If this is the model for near-term economic growth and long-term energy security that President Obama envisions for our country, we may be in for a longer, more severe recession than we know.”
Please find below the translated version of the El Mundo article:
–Clinton: Green Energy “Has Cost Many Jobs”
J. G. Gallego/C. CaballeroEl Mundo, p. 46May 23, 2009
Madrid — Former US President turned ecologist Bill Clinton is aware of the impact on employment by the development on renewable energy. Even though he is, as a former dweller of the White House, one of the most visible supporters in that industry, the US Democrat recognized yesterday that clean energies “have cost many jobs” in Spain.
Though without citing it directly, Clinton was acknowledging yesterday during his conference in Madrid that the study about the impact of public support on renewable energies, released by Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, has very valid conclusions.
That report, which has received enormous coverage in US media and been used against Barack Obama’s energy policy, argues that every job in renewable energies created in Spain in the year 2000 has cost 571138 Euros and has been the cause of the loss of 2.2 jobs elsewhere in the economy.
Bill Clinton recognized yesterday that “this commitment to clean energy has cost many jobs” while at the same time calling for Spain to intensify investment in this industry to be able to turn high costs into new jobs.–
NOTE: Former President Clinton’s comments in Madrid making the link between “green” government intervention and the hemorrhaging of jobs and opportunity follows a statement he made last year in which he suggested that “we just have to slow down our economy … because we’ve got to save the planet for our grandchildren.”
More from IER on the fallacy and unintended consequences of “green jobs”:
Spanish Report: Study of the Effects on Employment of Public Aid to Renewable Energy Sources
Study: Green Jobs: Fact or Fiction?
Study: Seven Myths about Green Jobs
Blog: Green Jobs That Nobody Wants
Blog: It Takes a Lot of Government Green to Create a Green Job
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Historic compromise on tough fuel economy rules: 'Ford Might Not Survive'
'Ford Might Not Survive.' By Henry Payne
Planet Gore/NRO, May 22, 2009
Detroit, Mich. — Washington’s lap-dog press obediently wagged their tails yesterday at The One’s announcement that autos would have to achieve an absurd 35 mpg in six years (a 40 percent increase in little over one product cycle). Even the Detroit Free Press — which might ask whether the bankrupt industry in its backyard could afford government edicts that will increase their per vehicle costs from $2,500 to $8,000 — fell in line.“President Barack Obama announced a historic compromise on tough fuel economy rules,” gushed Washington reporter Justin Hyde, that “were a ‘harbinger of a change’ for Washington.”
The only dissonant note in the Free Press account was a stray thought about whether anyone would actually buy Obama’s dream cars. “The wild card remains consumers,” allowed the Freep. In a consumer-based market economy, consumers are a “wild card?”Fortunately, media watchdogs still exist.
Los Angeles Times reporter Jim Tankersley took the novel approach of calling sources to find that the “great victory” (as Obama pal Guv Schwarzenegger put it) reached by automakers, greens, and pols was not all hugs and kisses.In fact, Ford had cold feet about the deal right through the weekend. As the only Detroit company without a direct line to Uncle Sugar, Ford faces the massive costs of new mandates alone.
On Sunday, just two days before Obama’s big Rose Garden announcement, reports Tankersley, “a senior Ford executive said the company had run the numbers again and concluded it might not survive if it accepted the deal.”
Ford might not survive.
“In the end, with more number-crunching and another application of White House pressure, Ford did not bolt,” continued the Times report. And since we know the Obama adminstration threatened Chrysler secured debtholders into submission, “White House pressure” is a loaded term.
Whatever pressure was brought, Ford also likely got guarantees that it would have access to the 3 percent of cap-and-tax revenue Mich. Rep. John Dingell has negotiated as part of the upcoming energy bill.
In an industry where government wields unprecedented power, we need watchdog journalism.
The Times report also bucked its media brethren by actually talking to Republicans and the picture got even more chilling.
"These exact companies were fighting this . . . tooth and nail six months ago, and now suddenly they love it?" Rep. John Campbell (R., Calif.) said, accurately reconstructing the recent past. "No, they don't love it. This is what this administration is doing: This administration is autocratically forcing people to do whatever it wants."
Even Schwarzenegger pointed out the 800-pound Rottweiler in the room. "All of a sudden, the car manufacturers needed . . . the taxpayers' money," he said. "So in order to get that help, I'm sure that President Obama said: 'OK . . . here's what you need to do.' "
Translation: Let me make a deal youse Detroiters can’t refuse.
Planet Gore/NRO, May 22, 2009
Detroit, Mich. — Washington’s lap-dog press obediently wagged their tails yesterday at The One’s announcement that autos would have to achieve an absurd 35 mpg in six years (a 40 percent increase in little over one product cycle). Even the Detroit Free Press — which might ask whether the bankrupt industry in its backyard could afford government edicts that will increase their per vehicle costs from $2,500 to $8,000 — fell in line.“President Barack Obama announced a historic compromise on tough fuel economy rules,” gushed Washington reporter Justin Hyde, that “were a ‘harbinger of a change’ for Washington.”
The only dissonant note in the Free Press account was a stray thought about whether anyone would actually buy Obama’s dream cars. “The wild card remains consumers,” allowed the Freep. In a consumer-based market economy, consumers are a “wild card?”Fortunately, media watchdogs still exist.
Los Angeles Times reporter Jim Tankersley took the novel approach of calling sources to find that the “great victory” (as Obama pal Guv Schwarzenegger put it) reached by automakers, greens, and pols was not all hugs and kisses.In fact, Ford had cold feet about the deal right through the weekend. As the only Detroit company without a direct line to Uncle Sugar, Ford faces the massive costs of new mandates alone.
On Sunday, just two days before Obama’s big Rose Garden announcement, reports Tankersley, “a senior Ford executive said the company had run the numbers again and concluded it might not survive if it accepted the deal.”
Ford might not survive.
“In the end, with more number-crunching and another application of White House pressure, Ford did not bolt,” continued the Times report. And since we know the Obama adminstration threatened Chrysler secured debtholders into submission, “White House pressure” is a loaded term.
Whatever pressure was brought, Ford also likely got guarantees that it would have access to the 3 percent of cap-and-tax revenue Mich. Rep. John Dingell has negotiated as part of the upcoming energy bill.
In an industry where government wields unprecedented power, we need watchdog journalism.
The Times report also bucked its media brethren by actually talking to Republicans and the picture got even more chilling.
"These exact companies were fighting this . . . tooth and nail six months ago, and now suddenly they love it?" Rep. John Campbell (R., Calif.) said, accurately reconstructing the recent past. "No, they don't love it. This is what this administration is doing: This administration is autocratically forcing people to do whatever it wants."
Even Schwarzenegger pointed out the 800-pound Rottweiler in the room. "All of a sudden, the car manufacturers needed . . . the taxpayers' money," he said. "So in order to get that help, I'm sure that President Obama said: 'OK . . . here's what you need to do.' "
Translation: Let me make a deal youse Detroiters can’t refuse.
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Waxman-Markey Cost-Benefit Analysis
Waxman-Markey Cost-Benefit Analysis. By Jim Manzi
The Corner/NRO, Wednesday, May 20, 2009
There has been widespread agitation in the influential blogosphere for a cost-benefit analysis of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade proposal. This sure seems like a reasonable request to me, and you have to wonder why the sponsors and advocates of this bill — who are, after all, proposing an enormous commitment of resources — haven’t provided one. So I tried to do a quick version of it. I have a longer and more complete version of this coming in the next National Review, but wanted to get the bones of the analysis out for discussion as rapidly as possible.
Background Analysis
According to the authoritative U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), under a reasonable set of assumptions for global economic and population growth, the world should expect (Table SPM.3) to warm by about 2.8°C over the next century. Also according to the IPCC (page 17), a global increase in temperature of 4°C should cause the world to lose about 3 percent of its economic output. So if we do not take measures to ameliorate global warming, the world should expect to be about 3 percent poorer sometime in the 22nd century than it otherwise would be. This is very far from the rhetoric of global destruction. Because of its geographical position and mix of economic activities, the United States is expected (Table 3) to experience no net material economic costs from such warming through the end of this century, and to begin experiencing net costs only thereafter.
A government program to force emissions reductions to avoid some of these potential future losses would impose a cost of its own: The loss in consumption we would experience if we used less energy, substituted higher-cost sources of energy for fossil fuels, and paid for projects — which are termed “offsets” — to ameliorate the effect of emissions (an example would be planting lots of trees). It’s complicated to estimate the cost of an emissions-reduction program, but the leading economists in this area generally agree that it would be large, and that we should simply let most emissions happen, because it would be more expensive to avoid them than to accept the damage they would cause. This makes sense, if you consider that most such plans (for example, Waxman-Markey) call for eliminating something like 80 percent of carbon dioxide emissions within the next 40 years or so. Even if the economy becomes more efficient over this period, such a quick transition away from our primary fossil-fuel sources will be expensive.
If a) the total potential benefit of emissions abatement is about 3 percent of economic output more than 100 years from now, b) we can avoid only some of this damage, and c) it’s expensive to prevent those emissions that we can prevent, the net benefit of emissions reduction will likely be a very small fraction of total economic output. William Nordhaus, who heads the widely respected environmental-economics-modeling group at Yale, estimates (page 84) the total expected net benefit of an optimally designed, implemented, and enforced global program to be equal to the present value of about 0.2 percent of future global economic consumption. In the real world of domestic politics and geostrategic competition, it is not realistic to expect that we would ever have an optimally designed, implemented, and enforced global system, and the side deals made to put in place even an imperfect system would likely have costs that would dwarf 0.2 percent of global economic consumption. The expected benefits of emissions mitigation do not cover its expected costs. This is the root reason that proposals to mitigate emissions have such a hard time justifying themselves economically. (If interested, you can read much more about this here).
Costs vs. Benefits of Waxman-Markey
Let’s start with the costs. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has done the first cost estimate for Waxman-Markey. It finds (page 17) that by 2020 Waxman-Markey would cause a typical U.S. household to consume about $160 less per year than it otherwise would, and about $1,100 less per year by 2050 (before any potential benefits from avoiding warming). That doesn’t sound like the end of the world, but this cost estimate is based on a number of assumptions that seem pretty unrealistic, to put it mildly.
First, it assumes that every dollar collected by selling the right to emit carbon dioxide will be returned to taxpayers through rebates or lowered taxes. Waxman-Markey establishes this intention but doesn’t (as of the time I’m writing this) describe how it would be achieved, which reflects the political difficulty of achieving it. Second, it assumes no costs for enforcement and other compliance measures, which would be awfully nice. Third, it assumes that large numbers of foreign offsets will be available for purchase; without these, costs would be far higher. Fourth, it assumes that the rest of the world will begin similar carbon-reduction programs. Lack of such foreign action would either increase U.S. costs or risk a trade war if we tried to compensate for lack of international cooperation with targeted tariffs. Fifth, it assumes that there will be no exemptions or other side deals — that is, no economic drag created by the kind of complexity that has attached to every large, long-term revenue-collection program in history. And so on.
The EPA forecast is something like an estimate of the pure loss in economic productivity from replacing some fossil fuels with less economically efficient fuels or conservation in a laboratory setting; in the real world, expected costs are far above 0.8 percent of economic consumption by 2050. The EPA does not forecast costs beyond 2050.
Remember that the U.S. should not expect any net economic damage from global warming before 2100. That is, the bill’s benefits would accrue to U.S. consumers — who are also bearing its costs — sometime in the next century. The EPA underestimate has costs rising from zero to 0.8 percent of consumption between now and 2050, and offers no projection beyond that year; but to what level would costs rise over the more than 50 years between 2050 and the point in 22nd century when we might actually expect some net economic losses from global warming? The answer is likely to be much higher.
Now consider the benefits. Climatologist Chip Knappenberger has applied standard climate models to project that, under the scenario for global economic and population growth referenced above (A1B), Waxman-Markey’s emissions reductions would have the net effect of lowering global temperatures by about 0.1°C by 2100. Remember that the estimated cost of a 4°C increase in temperature (40 times this amount) is about 3 percent of global economic output. Assume for the moment that global warming has the same impact on the U.S. as a percentage of GDP as it does on the world as a whole (an assumption that almost certainly exaggerates the impact on the U.S.). A crude estimate of the U.S. economic costs that Waxman-Markey would avoid sometime later than 2100 would then be about one-fortieth of 3 percent, or about 0.08 percent of economic output. This number is one-tenth of 0.8 percent, the EPA’s estimate of consumption loss from Waxman-Markey by 2050. To repeat: The costs would be more than ten times the benefits, even under extremely unrealistic assumptions of low costs and high benefits. More realistic assumptions would make for a comparison far less favorable to the bill.
I’ve had to rely on informal studies and back-of-envelope calculations to do this cost/benefit analysis. Why haven’t advocates and sponsors of the proposal done their own? Why are they urging Congress to make an incredible commitment of resources without even cursory analysis of the net economic consequences? The answer should be obvious: This is a terrible deal for American taxpayers.
Two Potential Objections
One potential objection to my analysis is that the bill is part of a global drive for all countries to reduce emissions, and that the U.S. needs to “show leadership.” By this logic, we should ascribe much larger benefits to the Waxman-Markey bill — specifically, the benefits to American consumers of the whole world’s engaging in similar programs. There are two obvious problems with this argument, however. First, ascribing all of the benefits of a global deal to reduce emissions to a specific bill that does not create such a commitment on the part of any other countries is loading the dice. The benefit we should ascribe to the bill is rather that of an increase in the odds of such a global deal. But would Waxman-Markey actually increase them, or would it decrease them instead? Whenever one nation sacrifices economic growth in order to reduce emissions, the whole world can expect to benefit, because future temperature should decrease for the entire globe. Every nation’s incentive, therefore, is to free ride on everybody else. Our most obvious leverage with other emitting nations would be to offer to reduce our emissions if they reduced theirs. Giving up this leverage and hoping that our unilateral reductions would put moral pressure on China, Russia, Brazil, and similar countries to reduce their emissions reveals a touchingly sunny view of human nature, but it strikes me as a poor negotiating strategy. Second and more fundamentally, even if the whole world were to enact similar restraints on emissions, the cost/benefit economics would still not be compelling, for the reasons outlined at the beginning of this post.
A second and more serious potential objection to my analysis is that while Waxman-Markey may not create benefits if the projections I offered above turn out to be accurate, climate science is highly inexact, and the bill is an insurance policy against higher-than-expected costs. Now, climate and economics modelers aren’t idiots, so it’s not as though this hadn’t occurred to them. Competent modelers don’t assume only the most likely case, but build probability distributions for levels of warming and associated economic impacts (e.g., there is a 5 percent chance of 4.5°C warming, a 10 percent chance of 4.0°C warming, and so on). The economic calculations that compose, for example, the analysis by William Nordhaus that I cited earlier are executed in just this manner. So the possibility of “worse than expected” impacts means, more precisely, the possibility of “impacts worse than those derived from our current probability distribution.” That is, we are concerned here with the inherently unquantifiable possibility that our entire probability distribution is wrong.
This concept has been called, somewhat grandiosely, the “Precautionary Principle.” Once you get past all the table-pounding, this is the crux of the argument for emissions abatement. It is an emotionally appealing political position, as it easy to argue that we should reduce some consumption now to head off even a low-odds possibility of disaster. The most compelling version of this argument, by far, has been presented by Martin Weitzman. You can read my detailed response here (note that this was to a slightly earlier edition of the paper). The essence of my response is that in order to drive a decision, Weitzman must take his argument from the conceptual idea of a “fat-tailed distribution” of danger to a numerical estimate of risk. He recognizes that the logic of his argument entails this. In his article, he ends up having to do the kind of armchair climate science that has been the bane of the “global warming is all a hoax” set. He uses a couple of ice bore studies to develop his own probability distribution for potential warming that calls for a 1% chance of 22.6C or more of warming by 2100. To put this in perspective, a 22.6C increase in the earth’s temperature would mean that the average global year-round temperature would be the same as summertime Death Valley is today. If you could convince me that there was a reliably-quantified 1% chance of this happening, you wouldn’t need all of the mathematical formalism of Weitzman’s paper — I’d be the biggest emissions-mitigation proponent on earth. The problem is that the IPCC has already built a distribution of potential temperature changes (see Figure 10.28, page 808) that looks nothing like this. If you don’t want to believe me, read Cass Sunstein’s book about why the Precautionary Principle, even in sophisticated form, is a very bad decision rule.
In the end, clarity about costs and benefits is the enemy of Waxman-Markey. It is hard to get around the conclusion that it can not be justified rationally based on the avoidance of climate change damages.
The Corner/NRO, Wednesday, May 20, 2009
There has been widespread agitation in the influential blogosphere for a cost-benefit analysis of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade proposal. This sure seems like a reasonable request to me, and you have to wonder why the sponsors and advocates of this bill — who are, after all, proposing an enormous commitment of resources — haven’t provided one. So I tried to do a quick version of it. I have a longer and more complete version of this coming in the next National Review, but wanted to get the bones of the analysis out for discussion as rapidly as possible.
Background Analysis
According to the authoritative U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), under a reasonable set of assumptions for global economic and population growth, the world should expect (Table SPM.3) to warm by about 2.8°C over the next century. Also according to the IPCC (page 17), a global increase in temperature of 4°C should cause the world to lose about 3 percent of its economic output. So if we do not take measures to ameliorate global warming, the world should expect to be about 3 percent poorer sometime in the 22nd century than it otherwise would be. This is very far from the rhetoric of global destruction. Because of its geographical position and mix of economic activities, the United States is expected (Table 3) to experience no net material economic costs from such warming through the end of this century, and to begin experiencing net costs only thereafter.
A government program to force emissions reductions to avoid some of these potential future losses would impose a cost of its own: The loss in consumption we would experience if we used less energy, substituted higher-cost sources of energy for fossil fuels, and paid for projects — which are termed “offsets” — to ameliorate the effect of emissions (an example would be planting lots of trees). It’s complicated to estimate the cost of an emissions-reduction program, but the leading economists in this area generally agree that it would be large, and that we should simply let most emissions happen, because it would be more expensive to avoid them than to accept the damage they would cause. This makes sense, if you consider that most such plans (for example, Waxman-Markey) call for eliminating something like 80 percent of carbon dioxide emissions within the next 40 years or so. Even if the economy becomes more efficient over this period, such a quick transition away from our primary fossil-fuel sources will be expensive.
If a) the total potential benefit of emissions abatement is about 3 percent of economic output more than 100 years from now, b) we can avoid only some of this damage, and c) it’s expensive to prevent those emissions that we can prevent, the net benefit of emissions reduction will likely be a very small fraction of total economic output. William Nordhaus, who heads the widely respected environmental-economics-modeling group at Yale, estimates (page 84) the total expected net benefit of an optimally designed, implemented, and enforced global program to be equal to the present value of about 0.2 percent of future global economic consumption. In the real world of domestic politics and geostrategic competition, it is not realistic to expect that we would ever have an optimally designed, implemented, and enforced global system, and the side deals made to put in place even an imperfect system would likely have costs that would dwarf 0.2 percent of global economic consumption. The expected benefits of emissions mitigation do not cover its expected costs. This is the root reason that proposals to mitigate emissions have such a hard time justifying themselves economically. (If interested, you can read much more about this here).
Costs vs. Benefits of Waxman-Markey
Let’s start with the costs. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has done the first cost estimate for Waxman-Markey. It finds (page 17) that by 2020 Waxman-Markey would cause a typical U.S. household to consume about $160 less per year than it otherwise would, and about $1,100 less per year by 2050 (before any potential benefits from avoiding warming). That doesn’t sound like the end of the world, but this cost estimate is based on a number of assumptions that seem pretty unrealistic, to put it mildly.
First, it assumes that every dollar collected by selling the right to emit carbon dioxide will be returned to taxpayers through rebates or lowered taxes. Waxman-Markey establishes this intention but doesn’t (as of the time I’m writing this) describe how it would be achieved, which reflects the political difficulty of achieving it. Second, it assumes no costs for enforcement and other compliance measures, which would be awfully nice. Third, it assumes that large numbers of foreign offsets will be available for purchase; without these, costs would be far higher. Fourth, it assumes that the rest of the world will begin similar carbon-reduction programs. Lack of such foreign action would either increase U.S. costs or risk a trade war if we tried to compensate for lack of international cooperation with targeted tariffs. Fifth, it assumes that there will be no exemptions or other side deals — that is, no economic drag created by the kind of complexity that has attached to every large, long-term revenue-collection program in history. And so on.
The EPA forecast is something like an estimate of the pure loss in economic productivity from replacing some fossil fuels with less economically efficient fuels or conservation in a laboratory setting; in the real world, expected costs are far above 0.8 percent of economic consumption by 2050. The EPA does not forecast costs beyond 2050.
Remember that the U.S. should not expect any net economic damage from global warming before 2100. That is, the bill’s benefits would accrue to U.S. consumers — who are also bearing its costs — sometime in the next century. The EPA underestimate has costs rising from zero to 0.8 percent of consumption between now and 2050, and offers no projection beyond that year; but to what level would costs rise over the more than 50 years between 2050 and the point in 22nd century when we might actually expect some net economic losses from global warming? The answer is likely to be much higher.
Now consider the benefits. Climatologist Chip Knappenberger has applied standard climate models to project that, under the scenario for global economic and population growth referenced above (A1B), Waxman-Markey’s emissions reductions would have the net effect of lowering global temperatures by about 0.1°C by 2100. Remember that the estimated cost of a 4°C increase in temperature (40 times this amount) is about 3 percent of global economic output. Assume for the moment that global warming has the same impact on the U.S. as a percentage of GDP as it does on the world as a whole (an assumption that almost certainly exaggerates the impact on the U.S.). A crude estimate of the U.S. economic costs that Waxman-Markey would avoid sometime later than 2100 would then be about one-fortieth of 3 percent, or about 0.08 percent of economic output. This number is one-tenth of 0.8 percent, the EPA’s estimate of consumption loss from Waxman-Markey by 2050. To repeat: The costs would be more than ten times the benefits, even under extremely unrealistic assumptions of low costs and high benefits. More realistic assumptions would make for a comparison far less favorable to the bill.
I’ve had to rely on informal studies and back-of-envelope calculations to do this cost/benefit analysis. Why haven’t advocates and sponsors of the proposal done their own? Why are they urging Congress to make an incredible commitment of resources without even cursory analysis of the net economic consequences? The answer should be obvious: This is a terrible deal for American taxpayers.
Two Potential Objections
One potential objection to my analysis is that the bill is part of a global drive for all countries to reduce emissions, and that the U.S. needs to “show leadership.” By this logic, we should ascribe much larger benefits to the Waxman-Markey bill — specifically, the benefits to American consumers of the whole world’s engaging in similar programs. There are two obvious problems with this argument, however. First, ascribing all of the benefits of a global deal to reduce emissions to a specific bill that does not create such a commitment on the part of any other countries is loading the dice. The benefit we should ascribe to the bill is rather that of an increase in the odds of such a global deal. But would Waxman-Markey actually increase them, or would it decrease them instead? Whenever one nation sacrifices economic growth in order to reduce emissions, the whole world can expect to benefit, because future temperature should decrease for the entire globe. Every nation’s incentive, therefore, is to free ride on everybody else. Our most obvious leverage with other emitting nations would be to offer to reduce our emissions if they reduced theirs. Giving up this leverage and hoping that our unilateral reductions would put moral pressure on China, Russia, Brazil, and similar countries to reduce their emissions reveals a touchingly sunny view of human nature, but it strikes me as a poor negotiating strategy. Second and more fundamentally, even if the whole world were to enact similar restraints on emissions, the cost/benefit economics would still not be compelling, for the reasons outlined at the beginning of this post.
A second and more serious potential objection to my analysis is that while Waxman-Markey may not create benefits if the projections I offered above turn out to be accurate, climate science is highly inexact, and the bill is an insurance policy against higher-than-expected costs. Now, climate and economics modelers aren’t idiots, so it’s not as though this hadn’t occurred to them. Competent modelers don’t assume only the most likely case, but build probability distributions for levels of warming and associated economic impacts (e.g., there is a 5 percent chance of 4.5°C warming, a 10 percent chance of 4.0°C warming, and so on). The economic calculations that compose, for example, the analysis by William Nordhaus that I cited earlier are executed in just this manner. So the possibility of “worse than expected” impacts means, more precisely, the possibility of “impacts worse than those derived from our current probability distribution.” That is, we are concerned here with the inherently unquantifiable possibility that our entire probability distribution is wrong.
This concept has been called, somewhat grandiosely, the “Precautionary Principle.” Once you get past all the table-pounding, this is the crux of the argument for emissions abatement. It is an emotionally appealing political position, as it easy to argue that we should reduce some consumption now to head off even a low-odds possibility of disaster. The most compelling version of this argument, by far, has been presented by Martin Weitzman. You can read my detailed response here (note that this was to a slightly earlier edition of the paper). The essence of my response is that in order to drive a decision, Weitzman must take his argument from the conceptual idea of a “fat-tailed distribution” of danger to a numerical estimate of risk. He recognizes that the logic of his argument entails this. In his article, he ends up having to do the kind of armchair climate science that has been the bane of the “global warming is all a hoax” set. He uses a couple of ice bore studies to develop his own probability distribution for potential warming that calls for a 1% chance of 22.6C or more of warming by 2100. To put this in perspective, a 22.6C increase in the earth’s temperature would mean that the average global year-round temperature would be the same as summertime Death Valley is today. If you could convince me that there was a reliably-quantified 1% chance of this happening, you wouldn’t need all of the mathematical formalism of Weitzman’s paper — I’d be the biggest emissions-mitigation proponent on earth. The problem is that the IPCC has already built a distribution of potential temperature changes (see Figure 10.28, page 808) that looks nothing like this. If you don’t want to believe me, read Cass Sunstein’s book about why the Precautionary Principle, even in sophisticated form, is a very bad decision rule.
In the end, clarity about costs and benefits is the enemy of Waxman-Markey. It is hard to get around the conclusion that it can not be justified rationally based on the avoidance of climate change damages.
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