The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: How It Threatens Transatlantic Security

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: How It Threatens Transatlantic Security, by Sally McNamara
Heritage Backgrounder #2250
March 17, 2009

[Full article w/notes at the link above]

A series of international events over the past year have pushed the European Union to the front of the international stage. When Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, it was the EU that took the reins of leadership. When Russia turned off the gas taps to Ukraine in December, the EU again assumed the position of negotiator in chief.

Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, the European Union has sought to forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) precisely to take the lead in times of global crises. When Europe's collective weaknesses were cruelly exposed by Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, EU leaders tried to expedite the EU's foreign policy inte­gration. Institutionally and politically, the EU has centralized elements of foreign-policy making in Brussels so that all EU members may "speak with one voice" on international issues.[1] Under proposals in the Lisbon Treaty (successor to the European Consti­tution) this centralization process would receive its most significant boost to date—removing foreign policy from the intergovernmental sphere and mak­ing it a supranational EU competence.

The EU sent a six-page letter to President Obama in early February, seeking to play a greater role on the international stage.[2] When Vice President Joe Biden outlined the Obama Administration's foreign policy vision at the Munich Security Conference that same month, he presented enthusiastic agreement.

But the United States should be wary of relin­quishing its transatlantic leadership role to the Euro­pean Union. Rather than realizing America's need for Europe to take on more of its own security burden, a common EU foreign policy is more likely to drain the already limited military capabilities of the member countries and potentially serve as a tool for those in Europe who believe that American global power must be "counterbalanced." The United States should not seek a single phone line to Europe: It will undermine America's fruitful bilateral relationships, such as the Anglo–American Special Relationship, which have served American interests well since the end of World War II.


The Creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans.[3]
—Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos on the EU's mediation efforts in Yugoslavia, June 1991

When the Yugoslav state started to disintegrate in 1991 and the prospect of widespread regional con­flict loomed, the EU claimed leadership of the crisis, epitomized by Jacques Poos's infamous proclama­tion that the hour of Europe had arrived.[4] Taking place at the same time as the negotiations for the Treaty of Maastricht, which proposed huge central­izing initiatives, such as the Single Currency, the EU immediately sought a unified line on Yugoslavia as a vehicle for proving its foreign policy credentials.

The United States was relieved to see Europe step up to the plate and happily deferred leader­ship. Achieving a successful resolution of the Yugoslavia crisis presented the EU with an oppor­tunity to both prove itself on the international stage, and to disentangle America from European security arrangements.

At the very outset, however, the EU failed to comprehend the sheer complexity of the problem, its own institutional and military limitations, and the very different historical perspectives and poli­cies of its 12 constituent members. The tragedies that followed laid rest to the claim that Europe's time had come or that the EU was even unified. Having failed to secure peace through diplomacy and unable to agree on the deployment of a Euro­pean peacekeeping "interposition force" in Septem­ber 1991, Germany pushed the EU to reverse its previous policy and recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.[5] The EU's initial strategy of maintaining the territorial unity of the Yugoslav Federation at all costs was left in tatters.[6]

Breaking with the EU position and disregarding strong British and French objections, Germany forced Europe's hand by unilaterally recognizing Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states on Decem­ber 23, 1991.[7] The other members of the European Community followed suit on January 15, 1992, in an attempt to reconcile Europe's growing divisions, and thereafter proceeded to steadily hand off lead­ership of the growing Balkan crisis to NATO and the United States. As European analyst Mario Zucconi notes, "The Western Europeans used Yugoslavia to gratify their vanity."[8] "In the end," he concludes, "the Yugoslav conflict dealt a serious blow to the image and credibility of the organization, to its per­ceived weight as a major unitary actor, and to its aspiration to anchor the emerging political order on the European continent."[9]


EU Treaties: The Juggernaut of Integration

In the midst of its early failures over Yugoslavia, the EU signed the Treaty of Maastricht which included institutional and political mechanisms to advance a Common Foreign and Security Policy.[10] The EU quickly drew the conclusion that if Europe had had better decision-making procedures and centralized institutions, its performance in Yugosla­via would have been better. The driving ethos behind the CFSP's creation was the idea that the nations of Europe could be stronger collectively than they are separately. Despite the gaping holes in European unity over Yugoslavia, it was assumed that new institutional arrangements would create unity by themselves.

Since its formulation in the Treaty of Maastricht, the backbone of a common EU foreign policy has been that Europe should seek a common position that no EU member state should break, regardless of evolving circumstances. The Maastricht treaty states:

The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with."[11]

As stated in Maastricht, the goal of a common defense policy is to reinforce, "the European iden­tity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world."[12] The treaty also called on member states to coordinate positions at international institutions and to "uphold the common positions in such fora."[13] Maastricht specifically called on the perma­nent members of the United Nations Security Council (France and Britain) to defend EU positions at the U.N.[14]

The EU argued that the CFSP was an attempt to address its foreign policy shortcomings and to improve its military capabilities, which were nakedly displayed over Yugoslavia. The EU's credi­bility gap, however, was once again exposed when America was forced to supply the vast majority of equipment used during NATO's air campaign against Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999.[15] In addition to revealing a massive chasm between Europe and America in terms of military capability, Kosovo also demonstrated the vital role of American leadership in the Balkans. After years of failed EU negotiations with Milosevic, using lucra­tive carrots but less credible sticks, only America was able to legitimately threaten action, which was ultimately taken through NATO without an explicit authorizing resolution from the U.N. Security Council (in part due to French opposition to a fur­ther resolution authorizing military action).[16]

Resentment festered in many European quarters that NATO, and more specifically the United States, had once again been called in to resolve a European conflict.[17] Having failed to play the lead role, or even a meaningful part in resolving the Kosovo con­flict, the EU decided once more that further central­ization of power was the answer. It is significant that after every foreign policy failure the EU's analysis led to the conclusion that ever more concentration of power and more institution-building in Brussels could remedy the problem. The EU's failures in Kos­ovo, combined with the impetus for European mil­itary integration after the St. Malo summit between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French Presi­dent Jacques Chirac in 1998, gave EU planners a green light to propose ever bolder initiatives to supra-nationalize European foreign policy.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 and implemented in 1999, created the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy—effectively an EU Foreign Minister. Amsterdam also reformed decision making for the CFSP, introducing the concept of "constructive abstention," and extended qualified majority voting to some areas of foreign policy.[18]

The ensuing Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001 and implemented in 2003, provided for the development of autonomous EU military arrangements, including the creation of permanent political and military structures and commitment to an EU-level rapid reaction force. Nice established defense policy as a formal EU competence for the first time and spearheaded the development of the EU's military policy.[19] Through the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, foreign policy was centralized in Brussels step by step.


Components of Failure

The creation of new institutional mechanisms and the centralization of foreign-policy making in Brussels have not created a stronger Europe capable of handling global, or even European, security. Instead, the CFSP has resulted in inaction, or been subject to domination by France and Germany. It has also frequently been used as a platform from which to confront America and frustrate U.S. policy, particularly the war on terrorism. In fact, three char­acteristics can be drawn from looking at the perfor­mance of the CFSP to date.

1. Inaction. Many Europeans have argued that the members of the European Union can exert greater influence in the world if they act together rather than separately; and that following the decline of Europe's major powers, individual states' power can collectively create a more powerful and credible European voice on the world stage. Ele­ments of this philosophy are also to be found in the Obama Administration's theory that when acting within a multilateral alliance, the legitimacy and effectiveness of a specific action is enhanced. Dur­ing the presidential election campaign, Barack Obama called for America and Europe to embrace new forms of multilateralism for the 21st century, to jointly confront "dangerous currents," such as climate change, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.[20]

Sovereignty, however, cannot be traded for influence. The ability to project power, whether regionally or globally, depends on several factors, including leadership, credibility, military capability, popular support, and dependable allies. The EU lacks all of these qualities and in assembling its con­stituent parts, it, therefore, tends to adopt the posi­tion of its slowest actors. Or, as The Times opined in 1996 as the EU stood impotent before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, "It looks impressive but the increase in size has been bought by losing punch."[21]

In order for 27 member states to agree on a united foreign policy, almost all the meat will have to be taken off the bones of that policy in order to build a consensus. However, that consensus, no matter how weak, may then restrict member states from taking stronger actions outside its parameters. As EU academic analyst Professor Simon Hix explains:

The reforms contained in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties may have reduced the institutional constraints on the capacity for common action, but the rival historical and political interests of the member states prevent the definition of a common Euro­pean security identity, and undermine any possibility of acting upon this identity in a united front.[22]

The EU's policy on Zimbabwe illustrates the fal­lacy of this approach. In 2003, the EU failed to renew travel sanctions against brutal dictator Robert Mugabe after French President Jacques Chirac invited him to attend a Franco–African summit in Paris.[23] Despite indisputable proof of Mugabe's sys­tematic violation of human rights and political free­doms, he was once again given the red-carpet treatment in 2007 when Portugal officially broke with an EU travel ban (with Brussels' political bless­ing) to allow Mugabe and his senior aides to travel to Lisbon for an EU–Africa Summit.[24] Despite Brit­ish protestations and a boycott by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Mugabe attended the Summit, and Britain sent a low-level government representative in order to conform to the EU's consensus decision that Mugabe should be welcomed by the EU.[25]

Considering Mugabe's tyrannical and oppressive leadership, with routine politically motivated vio­lence and economic collapse, a united policy sanc­tioning the dictator's travel would seem an obvious one. Yet the EU was incapable of forming any sub­stantial policy, while simultaneously preventing other members from meaningful dissention.

2. Franco–German Dominance. While the EU rarely manages to speak with one voice in any meaningful way, there have been certain instances where the EU has taken the lead role on an interna­tional issue. Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 is one such instance where French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as the EU's biggest political figure and then-president of the European Council, assumed the role of world spokesman.

Unfortunately, Sarkozy's handling of the crisis was a disaster and represented a barely concealed Franco–German agenda to restore EU–Russian rela­tions as quickly as possible. From the very outset of the crisis, Sarkozy focused exclusively on achieving a six-point ceasefire—a ceasefire that was thrust upon Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and which Moscow had no intention of observing. With no enforcement mechanisms, Sarkozy failed to compel Russia to fulfill the conditions of the cease­fire and also failed to prevent Russia's subsequent de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Further, despite German Chancellor Angela Mer­kel's trip to Tbilisi during the height of the conflict where she publicly affirmed Germany's support for Georgia's membership in NATO, she soon reversed position to veto it during NATO's Foreign Ministe­rial summit in Brussels in December 2008.[26]

Despite the failure of his ceasefire and Russia's redrawing of Europe's borders by force, Sarkozy went on to engineer a return to "business as usual" between Russia and the EU. This was done without any formal negotiation with the Secretary General of NATO, who had suspended all high-level diplo­matic contact with Russia in support of the EU-led ceasefire negotiations. In a bid to protect Europe's relationship with Moscow, especially Russian–Ger­man energy projects and a deal for Russian helicop­ters for the EU's mission to Chad, Sarkozy sidelined NATO and used the European Union as a cosmetic cover for Franco–German interests.[27]

3. Limiting American Power. Successive Amer­ican Administrations have argued that a stronger Europe means greater help for realizing American goals of international peace and stability. President George W. Bush spent much of his second term try­ing to repair ties in Europe, hoping to engage Europe in supporting a transatlantic agenda on issues such as free trade, energy security, and stabilizing Afghan­istan. But the EU chose to obstruct American poli­cies instead of engaging on areas of mutual concern. In areas such as the rendition of terrorists, visa waiver policy, and data sharing, the European Union purposefully obstructed American policy.[28]

Some European leaders also describe the EU as a check on American global power. Former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin described America as an "unchecked hyper-power."[29] Belgian Prime Min­ister Guy Verhofstadt talked about EU integration in terms of its "emancipation" from the United States.[30] Current Spanish Prime Minister José Zap­atero openly talked about deconstructing American global influence within two decades.[31]

A report published by the U.K. House of Lords in July 2003 found that the EU tended to oppose U.S. policy "simply to make its voice heard."[32] This explains why, standing next to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in November 2008, EU president Sarkozy called for a temporary moratorium on the planned U.S. missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.[33] Speaking to the European Parliament immediately before the NATO Summit in December, French defense minister Hervé Morin also questioned the need for the "third site."[34] The French position was especially important since Paris was holding the EU presi­dency at that time, speaking with the added authority of that office.

This position contrasts sharply with two NATO endorsements of the planned deployment, includ­ing the alliance's foreign ministerial endorsement that came immediately after Mr. Morin's comments before the European Parliament.[35] Although France officially backed both NATO communiqués, its position within the EU was the polar opposite, demonstrating a frustrating inconsistency. It should give the U.S. Administration pause in supporting further EU foreign policy integration when it cannot expect to hear the same message from NATO as it does from the European Union.

France and Missile Defense: Taking One Position for NATO, a Different Position Elsewhere

Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.
—NATO Heads of State Final Declaration, April 3, 2008

…[P]lease let's not have any more talk of deployment of missiles or deployment of antimissile systems. Deployment of a missile defense system would bring nothing to security in Europe.
—President Sarkozy at EU–Russia Summit in France, November 15, 2008

Who would hold the key to their [European-based United States missile defense assets] use? What threat would they tackle? There are risks, yes, but to say that there is a threat today would need to be checked.
—French Defense Minister, Hervé Morin, December 1, 2008

Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory, and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. As tasked at the Bucharest Summit, we are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts… As all options include the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets, we note as a relevant development the signature of agreements by the Czech Republic and the Republic of Poland with the United States regarding those assets.
—NATO Foreign Ministers' Final Communiqué, December 3, 2008

War and Peace
The divisions among the powers of Europe over the war in Iraq in 2003 revealed the problem of imposing a single foreign policy on all EU member states. Faced with its members and acceding coun­tries supporting one of two diametrically opposed positions, the EU descended into chaos trying to fashion a single policy out of pure contradiction.[36] Europe's countries were broadly split down the middle. France heightened tensions in Europe by telling largely pro-war accession countries that they had "missed a good opportunity to keep quiet."[37] France also sought to deny Turkey planning assis­tance within the NATO alliance, owing to Paris's vehement opposition to the American-led invasion of Iraq.[38]

The Atlanticists responded with a letter of sup­port to the U.S. Administration, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote to all EU capitals urging them to consider military action as a viable last resort.[39] Less than a week before the invasion, the leaders of the United States, the U.K., and Spain met in the Azores to build international momentum for action on Iraq in a summit that was quickly inter­preted as a confrontation with the Franco–German led anti-war axis.

The president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, commented that "Whatever the out­come of the war, there can be no denying that this is a bad time for the common foreign and security pol­icy for the European Union as a whole."[40] EU divi­sions over Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate the fallacy of assuming the nations of Europe have a sin­gle foreign policy voice. Washington diplomatically engaged its European allies on a systematic bilateral basis, and, where necessary, on an ad hoc multilat­eral basis. The juggernaut of European integration, however, seeks to remove that option, making Brus­sels the only port of call for American foreign policy planners. It is inevitable that this will be to the det­riment of American foreign policy. As Henry Kiss­inger has noted:

When the United States deals with the nations of Europe individually, it has the possibility of consulting at many levels and to have its view heard well before a decision is taken. In dealing with the European Union, by contrast, the United States is excluded from the decision-making process and interacts only after the event, with spokesmen for decisions taken by ministers at meetings in which the United States has not participated at any level.... Growing estrangement between America and Europe is thus being institutionally fostered.[41]


The Lisbon Treaty

Following the deep European divisions over whether to support or oppose the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the EU more determinedly wrestled with the question of how to fashion a supranational foreign policy, determined that such division should not happen again. Former Member of the European Parliament and current leader of Britain's Liberal Democratic Party, Nick Clegg, stated in 2003 at the height of EU tensions over Iraq:

The relish with which the anti-European British press has rushed to proclaim the last rites over the EU's fledgling common foreign and security policy is premature. The EU has a habit of rebounding strongly from internal crisis and strife.[42]

In 2004, EU leaders signed the European Con­stitution, which would have codified the supreme legal basis of the 25 member states at the time, marking a monumental departure from the previous, treaty-based approach to European integration.[43] The constitution was an audacious document, which proposed to significantly extend the EU's competency in foreign-policy making and intro­duce permanent high-ranking political positions, such as an EU president and a single EU foreign minister. It was subsequently rejected in referenda by the voters of France and Holland. The EU pressed on regardless of this stark popular opposi­tion and "renegotiated" a virtually identical docu­ment, the Lisbon Treaty.[44]

The Lisbon Treaty is currently pending ratifica­tion by all EU member states, having already been rejected once by voters in Ireland. The Irish govern­ment has committed to holding a second referen­dum on the treaty later this year, since Lisbon cannot proceed without the ratification of all mem­ber states. Just like the European Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty contains the building blocks of a United States of Europe and will shift power from the member states of the EU to Brussels in several areas of policymaking, including defense, national security, and foreign policy.[45] The treaty is a blue­print for restricting the sovereign right of EU mem­ber states to determine their own foreign policies; above all, the treaty underscores the EU's long-held ambitions to become a global power.

As with the EU Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty will create a permanent EU president, and extend the roles of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the EU's powerful diplomatic corps. With a single legal per­sonality, Brussels would sign international agree­ments on behalf of all member states. Critically, unanimous voting has been removed in several key areas and majority voting introduced for 12 differ­ent areas of foreign policy, including the election of the EU foreign minister and proposals emanating from the foreign minister.[46]

The treaty will restrict the ability of member states to operate on the international stage on an independent basis. Should the EU decide on a common foreign policy position, the EU will auto­matically speak for the U.K. and France in the United Nations Security Council.[47] This should be particularly worrisome to the United States since the U.K. and U.S. have proved to be valuable part­ners in this body in the past. The treaty further asserts the value and importance of the European Union over members' sovereign rights and national interests. It states:

Before undertaking any action on the inter­national scene or entering into any commit­ment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Mem­ber States shall show mutual solidarity.[48]


A Threat to the Anglo–American-Led Operation in Afghanistan

The Lisbon Treaty represents a major threat to the NATO alliance. Rather than creating addi­tional military resources, Lisbon will lead to the replication of NATO and duplicate many of its functions. The long-term goal of creating a Euro­pean army and duplicating NATO's Article V com­mitment—that an attack against one member constitutes an attack against all members—illus­trates these dangers.

In 2000, the EU announced proposals for an army of 100,000 (60,000 of whom could be deployed at 60 days' notice for up to a year at a time). Britain's Conservative Party commented at the time that this would effectively destroy NATO.[49] The British government rejected this criticism, claiming that the EU was not taking on collective defense, which was purely NATO's responsibility.[50] The Treaty of Lisbon however, proposes an EU mutual defense clause:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not preju­dice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.[51]

In addition to duplicating NATO's Article V, the EU remains intent on creating its own military. In the absence of additional defense spending, these resources will have to come at NATO's expense. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU would have "Per­manent Structured Cooperation"—an inner group of EU nations (currently proposed to consist of France, the U.K., Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland) pooling military resources and manpower to form an army of 60,000 to undertake EU missions.[52] The reality is that frontline British troops would have to be mandated for EU availability at NATO's expense, probably from Afghanistan. As Open Europe, a Brit­ish policy institute, warns:

In simple terms, the UK would have to ear­mark 10,000 frontline troops for service on EU missions. For the EU force to be viable UK troops would need to be constantly available for EU operations. The fact that the UK is one of the few EU countries to have modern combat forces is likely to mean that the UK would have to keep its 10,000 in the UK/EU. Given the UK's current military overstretch, the plans would almost certainly divert vital resources away from the British mission in Afghanistan.[53]

A cross-party group of former senior British min­isters commented in 2000 that the creation of an EU army was "an openly political project,"[54] a point confirmed by then-German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: "This is part of the European inte­gration process."[55] Now, as then, no additional troops are available for this paper army. Either troops already committed to NATO will be counted twice, or, in the worst case scenario, troops will be withdrawn from existing NATO missions.

In 2000, Lady Thatcher described the creation of an EU army as "a piece of monumental folly that puts our security at risk in order to satisfy political vanity."[56] Rather than representing a genuine attempt to increase Europe's military contribution to vital missions, such as Afghanistan, the EU is merely seeking to advance its own political ambitions.

This is of particular importance to the United Kingdom, whose relationship with the United States has been underpinned by shared military commit­ments over the years. President Barack Obama has already stated that the war in Afghanistan is Amer­ica's top foreign policy priority; a deterioration of Britain's commitment to Afghanistan at this time would be unacceptable to the United States. [57]

Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton argues that the Lisbon Treaty poses a threat to both the Anglo–American Special Rela­tionship and to NATO.[58] By reducing the ability of member states to set their own foreign policies and work with America outside of the EU's purview, the Treaty of Lisbon represents a profound threat to the Obama Administration's pledge to renew positive relations with European countries.[59]


What the Administration and Congress Should Do

The transatlantic relationship is vital to European and international security. European countries and the United States must nurture their relationships in order to achieve and maintain global peace and security. Specifically:

• The Obama Administration must make clear that building enduring bilateral alliances is a top U.S. foreign policy priority. The Adminis­tration should engage with the European Union on issues such as trade and international com­merce. On issues of high foreign policy impor­tance, especially defense and counterterrorism, the Administration must invest its diplomatic efforts in European capitals.
• Congress should hold hearings to analyze the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for the transatlantic alliance. The full range of policies advanced in the Lisbon Treaty must be analyzed, particularly the implications for foreign-policy making and alliance-building. The results of these hearings must be considered by the Administration before any tacit or public endorsement of the treaty.
• The Administration must challenge NATO's European members to support reform and revitalization within the alliance. The Admin­istration should reaffirm NATO as the corner­stone of the transatlantic alliance, and invite European members to strongly back key reform measures, including the formulation of a new threat assessment and a pro-enlargement agenda.
• The Administration should take the lead in promoting missile defense in Europe. The Administration should support deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Central and Eastern Europe and dispatch high-level members to Warsaw and Prague to reaffirm the Administra­tion's support for the "third site" installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. It should call on the NATO alliance to build on the U.S. system with complementary missile defenses.
• The Administration and Congress should withdraw support for a European army and a separate EU defense identity. French-led plans to develop the Common Foreign and Security Pol­icy through the European Security and Defense Policy and the development of European military arrangements, separate from NATO, were signifi­cantly advanced under the French EU presidency. The United States must stress the primacy of NATO in Europe's security architecture—and the unacceptability of duplicating NATO or placing additional stress on its considerably over­stretched resources.

Conclusion

Foreign policy is an attribute of statehood that must remain at the nation-state level if it is to be meaningful or effective. If the United States wishes to continue enjoying the benefits of its long-stand­ing relationships with the countries of Europe, it must oppose the creation of a supranational EU foreign policy and the duplication of NATO resources by the European Union. U.S. support for a single European foreign and military policy has been misplaced. While successive U.S. Administra­tions have believed their desire for Europe to under­take a greater share of the global security burden to be achievable through further European integration, evidence suggests the exact opposite to be the case.

The U.S. government should instead pursue a policy under which its bilateral engagements with European nations are prioritized, and engagement with the EU is based purely on where Brussels can add value to a specific policy area. The United States and Europe should engage on critical foreign policy issues, such as military planning and counterterror­ism, both bilaterally and through NATO. The usur­pation of power by Brussels jeopardizes these types of engagements—and ultimately threatens the secu­rity of the United States.

Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in Euro­pean Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Free­dom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The author is grateful to Morgan L. Roach, Research Assistant in the Thatcher Center, and Parker Broaddus, Thatcher Center intern, for their assistance in preparing this paper.

A Hero's Welcome: Britain greets a Guantánamo detainee

A Hero's Welcome, by Janet Daley
Britain greets a Guantánamo detainee
The Weekly Standard, Mar 09, 2009, Volume 014, Issue 24

LondonWell, it wasn't quite Nelson Mandela's release from Robben Island, but the treatment was nearly as reverential. The news channels followed every detail of the progress of Binyam Mohamed, the first detainee released from Guantánamo by the Obama administration, from the moment it was solemnly announced that his plane had left the ground to return him to Britain--the country that had granted him asylum (but not citizenship) before his unfortunately timed journey to Afghanistan in June 2001--until the moment the private jet touched down at RAF Northolt in west London.

It was the works: minute-by-minute live coverage of Mohamed's deplaning, flanked by burly men who ushered him quickly to a waiting car. These proceedings were enlivened by an offstage chorus of demands from Labour MPs, human rights lawyers, and the liberal media that the government and the security services tell all they knew about Britain's alleged role in Mohamed's alleged torture at Guantánamo. A parade of activists, from the openly Trotskyite leaders of the Stop the War Coalition to the usual array of anti-American protesters and always-available legal experts, weighed in with speculation on everything from the released man's mental state after force-feeding during a hunger strike to the judicial implications of Britain's participation in torture.

Particularly notable was the psychologist who specialized in the study of torture victims. He had not met Mohamed, nor did he have any personal knowledge of the specifics of his case, but that did not prevent the BBC news presenter from engaging him in a lengthy discussion of the likely effects on Mohamed of the treatment he might or might not have endured at Guantánamo--which might or might not have involved the active assistance of the British security forces. The final exchange in this rather surreal dialogue went something like this:

BBC: Isn't it possible that a victim of torture could actually be radicalized by his treatment and led into terrorism, even if he had had no inclinations of that kind in the first place?

Psychologist: Oh yes. We often find that torture victims are so alienated by their experience that they turn toward active terrorism.

This speculative analysis is, of course, plausible. It just happens that neither the psychologist nor his inquisitor had the remotest idea whether it applied in any way to Mohamed. They were simply weaving a hypothesis. But the subtext of this flight of fancy is not insignificant: If Mohamed should, in the future, be found to be involved in terrorist activity, it will be argued not that this vindicates the U.S. decision to detain and interrogate him in the first place--but that he was radicalized by his (wrongful) detention and interrogation. So even if he turns out to be a terrorist, it'll be our fault.

By the time the main evening news came on, the BBC coverage had become a bit more skeptical. Judicious doubt was inserted into the accounts given by Mohamed himself and his eager legal team about the treatment he had received and his absolute conviction that British forces had been somehow complicit in it. But after another 24 hours, there was a new hyperbole in Mohamed's descriptions of his torture as "medieval" (the rack?) and an apparent acceptance by much of the media of his confident assertion of British involvement.

No one seemed inclined to ask the obvious question: If he believed so firmly that Britain had betrayed him ("Those I hoped would rescue me were allied with my abusers"), why was he so eager to return and make his home here? One sentence from the Guardian's coverage captures this paradox neatly: "Binyam was 'extraordinarily grateful to be back in Britain,' said [his lawyer] Stafford Smith, who said he had 'zero doubt' Britain was complicit in his client's ill-treatment."

How very strange: to be extraordinarily grateful to be back in a country which you believe to have helped to torture you. Now this is not inconceivable. People often have confused and contradictory emotional reactions to traumatic events. But it does seem odd that, in all the excitement of pursuing the British government over its possible engagement in torture, scarcely anyone has thought to raise this query.

Any doubts about the credibility of Mohamed's testimony were pretty well lost in the scrum of the early coverage. This story has everything: above all, anti-Americanism combined with the delights of British self-flagellation.

As one pundit put it, "Now that Binyam Mohamed has returned to the U.K. from detention at Guantánamo Bay, there must be quite a few Whitehall mandarins--not to mention some ex-ministers--who are wandering Westminster frantically trying to clean the blood from their hands." Bush and Blair meet Lady Macbeth: The image is irresistible.

Janet Daley is a columnist for the Daily Telegraph (London).

WaPo: No deal on Iran and missile defense

No Deal. WaPo Editorial
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev offer welcome clarity on Iran and missile defense.
TWP, Wednesday, March 4, 2009; A14

PROPONENTS of a diplomatic "grand bargain" between the Obama administration and Russia -- by which the United States would obtain Russian cooperation in stopping Iran's nuclear program in exchange for concessions to what Moscow sees as its security interests in Europe -- got a double drenching of cold water yesterday. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a news conference that "any swaps" between action on Iran and a planned U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic "would not be productive." For his part, President Obama made clear that his administration's decisions on missile defense would be guided not by Russian behavior but by the threat from Iran.

As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton prepares for her first official meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Saturday, these were revealing and important clarifications. Vice President Biden's call for a "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations and long-standing questions about the efficacy and cost of missile defense may have encouraged Russian expectations that the new administration could be bluffed into retreating from the deals struck by the Bush administration with Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy missile interceptors and a radar station. If undertaken as a concession to Russia, any such move would have the effect of undermining the bonds between former Soviet bloc members and the United States and NATO -- which, of course, is Moscow's aim.

That's why it was important for Mr. Obama to say yesterday that his willingness to reconsider missile defense would be based on judgments about Iran, not about Russia -- and that any decision made in that context does not diminish "my commitment to making sure that Poland, the Czech Republic and other NATO members are fully enjoying the partnership, the alliance and U.S. support with respect to their security." One way to back up that principle is for the administration to make clear in public -- as it has in private -- that deployment of a U.S. Patriot missile defense battery to Poland, promised by the Bush administration, will go ahead regardless of what is ultimately decided about the larger missile defense system.

Such a statement might be somewhat out of sync with the honeymoonish tone of much of the public rhetoric between Moscow and Washington since Mr. Obama's inauguration. But as Mr. Medvedev made clear yesterday, so far there isn't much substance behind the cheery facade. He declared that Russia, which is about to complete a nuclear power plant for Iran and has repeatedly opposed tough sanctions, is "already working in close contact" with the United States on Iran. In other words, while Russia expects the new administration to "show common sense" on missile defense by proposing something that "would be acceptable to us," it shouldn't expect more help stopping an Iranian bomb. Perhaps the Kremlin leadership believes that "reset" is another way of saying "capitulate." If so, Ms. Clinton would do well to clarify the administration's policy when she meets Mr. Lavrov.

CSIS: NATO and France

NATO and France, by Manuel Lafont Rapnouil and Julianne Smith
CSIS, Mar 02, 2009

Q1: Why did France leave NATO’s integrated military structures in the first place and why has France decided to reintegrate into NATO this year?

A1: At General Charles de Gaulle’s urging, France left NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966 to maintain its own independent defense policy. Since then, however, France has continued to participate in NATO’s political structures and make sizeable and important contributions to NATO’s ongoing missions, particularly in Kosovo and Afghanistan. France has also committed itself to alliance transformation efforts such as the NATO Response Force (NRF).

In 1995, at the beginning of Jacques Chirac’s presidency, France contemplated reintegration into NATO’s military structures. But after two years of difficult negotiations over changes to NATO command structures and the arrival of Lionel Jospin as prime minister, the idea was taken off the table. Nevertheless, the French government had already started resuming its full presence in the NATO Military Committee.

Over the last two decades, NATO has changed significantly. Its membership and missions have expanded, and with it, so too have French contributions. Given France’s active role in NATO, President Nicolas Sarkozy’s administration may decide to match France’s formal status in the alliance with its actual contributions. Many of the original obstacles both inside France and among NATO members have been removed in recent years. Questions over NATO commands are far less contentious than in years past and concerns over France’s independence can be easily addressed. For example, no French troops will be under permanent allied command in peacetime. If desired, France could also remain outside of the Nuclear Planning Group, preserving the independence of its deterrent force.

Q2: What will this change mean for the United States and transatlantic relations?

A2: Some analysts in Washington predict that France’s full reintegration into NATO will translate into an alignment of U.S. and French policies. This will not necessarily be the case. Instead, Washington should expect that, on issues such as disarmament or enlargement, France will maintain its distinct positions, which are sometimes in direct contradiction with U.S. views. Paris may also try to maximize its influence within the alliance and seek to design a more deliberative decisionmaking process.

In Europe, some analysts there fear that Paris will soften its ambitions for—and dedicate fewer resources to—a stronger European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) inside the European Union. On the contrary, Sarkozy’s team hopes that this move will ease suspicions about ESDP inside NATO and among NATO member states such as the United States and the United Kingdom. This new climate could lead to enhanced EU-NATO ties and enhance transatlantic relations more broadly.

Q3: What will NATO have to offer in exchange? Will this alter France’s influence in NATO?

A3: It is important to remember that France will make this decision on its own. The alliance is not trying to persuade the French to reintegrate. Therefore, NATO has not been asked to present a package of concessions in exchange for this French decision. However, France’s reintegration would certainly trigger discussions about high-level posts in NATO’s integrated command structures, which would be settled in the weeks and months ahead.

Ultimately, France’s influence inside NATO will be driven by its continuing contributions to NATO missions, its vision for NATO’s future role in global security, its input into the next Strategic Concept, and its contributions to ongoing NATO reform efforts.

Manuel Lafont Rapnouil is a French career diplomat and a visiting fellow with the Europe Program, and Julianne Smith is director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

The Obama–Brown White House Talks: The U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship Must Be Maintained

The Obama–Brown White House Talks: The U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship Must Be Maintained. By Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.
Heritage, March 1, 2009
WebMemo #2317

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown will be the first European leader to meet with President Barack Obama when he visits the White House on March 3. The two world leaders are expected to discuss a range of issues, including the war in Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear threat, and the global financial crisis, as well as the upcoming G-20 talks in London and the NATO 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg/Kehl.

In addition to meeting with the President, Brown will address a joint session of Congress on March 4, making him only the fifth British prime minister to be given the honor.


A Shift Away from Britain?

The Brown–Obama meeting will be overshadowed by growing concerns about a possible weakening of the U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship, tensions over strategy in the war in Afghanistan, and the threat of a renewed American protectionism.

The Anglo-American alliance is being eroded on several fronts, from falling levels of U.K. defense spending and the gutting of Britain's armed forces by the Labour government to the gradual erosion of British sovereignty in Europe and the rise of a European Union defense identity now being backed by Washington. It is also threatened by the new U.S. Administration's apathy and indifference toward the U.K.

President Obama's surprise decision to remove a bust of Sir Winston Churchill from the Oval Office and return it to the British government sent an early signal to London that the new Administration will adopt a far less robust approach toward the historic Anglo-American alliance. The White House is already recalibrating the alliance as a "special partnership," —not a "special relationship"—a subtle play on words indicating a potential shift away from a decades-long policy of according Britain a unique status as America's most important ally.


U.S. Overtures to Europe

The Obama White House is keen to significantly strengthen America's relationship with both France and Germany, continental Europe's biggest powers, as well as with Brussels, the institutional heart of the European Union. This approach is partly the product of a distinctly pro-European outlook on the part of the new Administration following transatlantic tensions during the Bush Administration. It is also based on a naive belief that major European allies will actually increase defense spending and reduce the burden on America and that the EU will play a more supportive role in world affairs alongside the United States.

Washington is already making major concessions to France in the NATO alliance, with French officers reportedly in line to take two senior NATO command positions: Allied Command Transformation (one of NATO's two supreme commands, based in Norfolk, Virginia) and Joint Command Lisbon (one of NATO's three main operations headquarters, which also commands the NATO Rapid Reaction Force).

The White House is also sending clear signals that it supports a greater military and defense role for the European Union. In his speech at the Munich Security Conference in early February, Vice President Joe Biden made it clear that the United States will "support the further strengthening of European defense, an increased role for the European Union in preserving peace and security, [and] a fundamentally stronger NATO–EU partnership."


Anglo-American Leadership Is Needed

Since the Second World War, there has scarcely been a more important period for joint U.S.–British leadership. The Anglo-American Special Relationship would be imperiled if the new U.S. Administration looks to Brussels instead of London for its most important strategic partnership. Jeopardizing this relationship would be a huge mistake. The EU is obsessed with challenging American global leadership rather than working with it, and the European Project is ultimately all about building a counterweight to American power.

The Obama–Brown White House meeting will be an important opportunity for the President and the Prime Minister to establish a stronger framework for Anglo-American cooperation on the world stage, particularly in regard to key issues such as Afghanistan, the future of NATO, and the Iranian nuclear crisis.The War in Afghanistan

Despite all the fashionable rhetoric in European capitals about Iraq being a distraction from the war against the Taliban, on the battlefields of Afghanistan almost two-thirds of the 47,000 troops currently serving as part of the 40-nation NATO-led International Security Assistance Force are from the English-speaking countries of the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and Australia. These nations have also taken roughly 85 percent of the casualties. Britain has nearly as many troops in the country as all the other major European Union powers combined, some of whom, like Germany, cower under dozens of "caveats" aimed at keeping their troops out of harm's way. The United States has pledged to send an additional 17,000 troops, and the U.K. is also considering the deployment of further forces to boost the nearly 9,000 British soldiers already serving in Helmand province.

President Obama and Prime Minister Brown should directly challenge European complacency and indifference over Afghanistan and issue a strong statement calling on European allies to pull their weight in the conflict by sending more combat troops to the south of the country. NATO is a war-fighting alliance, not a peacekeeping organization. The stakes are extremely high, and there is a danger that the brutal Taliban, backed by al-Qaeda, will reassert control over vast swathes of the country.

Europe's NATO members must make a no-strings attached commitment to step up to the plate and bear a bigger part of the burden. If this does not happen, the consequences for the future of the alliance will be dire. European apathy over Afghanistan threatens to tear NATO apart, and an institution that has for decades succeeded as the most effective international organization of its time could become irrelevant. It is time for French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and other European leaders to roll up their sleeves and commit their troops and resources to winning the war against the Taliban.


The Future of NATO

In the lead-up to the NATO 60th anniversary summit, both the United States and Great Britain must take a step back and launch a fundamental, wide-ranging review of the long-term implications of French demands for the future of the alliance.

It would be a huge strategic error of judgment by the new U.S. Administration and the British government to support French ambitions for restructuring Europe's security architecture. This would ultimately weaken the Anglo-American Special Relationship as the engine of the transatlantic alliance and pave the way for the development of a separate European Union defense identity, which will ultimately undermine NATO.

Washington and London must also commit to advancing the expansion of the NATO alliance—specifically the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in the Membership Action Plan. The new U.S. Administration, together with Britain, should send a clear signal to Moscow that NATO expansion is an internal matter for the alliance and not open to Russian veto. A firm commitment must also be made by the Obama Administration to establish a third site missile defense system in Eastern and Central Europe, a vital part of a global defense shield that is needed to protect the West from rogue regimes such as Iran.


The Iranian Nuclear Threat

President Obama and Prime Minister Brown should issue a strong statement calling for the strengthening of both U.N. Security Council and European sanctions against Tehran. The U.S. and British leaders must push for European countries to support a complete investment freeze—including a ban on investment in Iranian liquefied natural gas operations—and the possible use of military force as a last resort against Iran's nuclear facilities. They should reject the idea of direct negotiations with a tyranny that has threatened to wipe a key ally, Israel, off the face of the earth. This is a time for tough resolve in the face of an extremely dangerous foe—a rogue state close to nuclear capability ruled by fanatical Islamists that will have no qualms about using their power to dominate the Middle East or to arm a wide array of proxy international terrorist groups.

The EU has tried to negotiate with Tehran for several years under the guise of "constructive engagement," an approach that has resulted in an emboldened Iran that grows closer by the day to building a nuclear weapon. The EU's policy toward Iran has been all carrot and no stick—a futile exercise that has achieved nothing but failure.


Great Britain Is America's Most Reliable Friend

The Special Relationship is vital to American and British interests on many levels, from military, diplomatic, and intelligence cooperation to transatlantic trading ties. If President Obama does not invest in its preservation, the end result will be a weaker United States that is less able to stand up to terrorism and tyranny, and project power and influence on the world stage.

Whether waging war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, standing up to the Russian bear, or halting Iran's nuclear ambitions, President Obama should maintain the Anglo-American Special Relationship as the centerpiece of the transatlantic alliance. As nearly every post-war President has found, when it comes to securing the free world, there is simply no alternative to U.S.–British leadership

Nile Gardiner is the Director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation. Erica Munkwitz assisted with research for this paper.

Eastern Europe Needs Our Help - We can't risk losing 20 years worth of gains in the region

Eastern Europe Needs Our Help. By John Kerry
We can't risk losing 20 years worth of gains in the region.
Wall Street Journal Europe, Feb 27, 2009

Twenty years ago, the Berlin Wall and the repressive Communist regimes of Eastern Europe came crashing down to usher in a new era of political and economic freedom. Today, it is Eastern Europe's banks and economies that are threatening to crash. The Polish zloty is down 38% against the dollar in the last six months alone. Hungary's forint is down 32%. Ukraine posted a staggering 34% drop in January industrial output from a year earlier. While the entire world is reeling, right now the eye of the global financial storm has moved to Central and Eastern Europe.

If Western nations do not act quickly to address the snowballing financial crisis that is brewing from Latvia to Hungary, we risk replacing an era of promise and progress in Eastern Europe with one of soaring unemployment, instability and a weakening of the influence and ideals we have spent decades building.

While many Americans are rightly focused on our domestic troubles, we must also recognize the global dimensions of the current crisis. Last week, Latvia became the second government, after Iceland, to collapse as a result of a financial crisis that has already sparked riots in the Baltics and Greece and is likely to be a driving geopolitical force for a long time.

Eastern Europe's currencies are plummeting as investors instead seek the safety of the dollar and the euro. This means that Eastern European countries, companies and individuals face increasing challenges to pay back their large foreign-currency loans -- which only deepens the currency problems to create a vicious circle.

At first glance this may seem like a traditional emerging-markets crisis like those we saw in the late 1990s. But in fact it's far worse. This is a truly global financial crisis in a highly connected financial world, and Eastern Europe is feeling the brunt. Many of the region's banks are foreign-owned -- in the case of Hungary, more than 80% -- and many of those banks are now contemplating unprecedented protectionist steps, pulling back lending operations to their home countries. Meanwhile, as larger countries consume more of the world's capital in refinancing their own debt, emerging markets like those of Eastern Europe are likely to find the bank windows closed to them.

The result is that the economies of Eastern Europe are already falling faster and further than anyone expected. There is a real danger that, if every country affected by this crisis defines its interests narrowly, several strategically vital countries could fall through the cracks. For example, Ukraine's dire situation could trigger a domino effect, not only destabilizing Western Europe banks with large exposure to East European markets, but actually changing the geopolitical map as well.

America should support World Bank President Robert Zoellick's call for the EU to lead a coordinated global effort, alongside the IMF, World Bank and other development banks, to support the economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Austria, too, deserves credit for trying to focus Europe's attention on the plight not just of eastern member states such as the Baltics, but also of non-EU neighbors like Ukraine.

But Eastern Europe will not be the last financial fire the world will have to help put out in this crisis. Nor will our problems be confined to traditionally unstable corners of the globe. Our oldest European allies are also in deepening financial trouble, and three of our most important partners in the Muslim world, Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan, today all face acute balance-of-payments crises.

We also need to ensure that the U.S. Treasury and State departments have the capacity to deal with these fast-moving crises in real time even as they turn our domestic economy around. That means the Senate must make clear its willingness to quickly confirm the Obama administration's nominees for posts vital to international economics and finance, such as the international staff at Treasury and the economic staff at the State Department, once the administration nominates them.

Our needs at home are urgent and great. We must put our own economic house in order and we will. But as we balance the domestic and global demands of this crisis, we should be warned that, in cutting corners today we risk incurring far greater costs down the road. A retreat into our domestic problems will not only leave us diminished on the world stage -- because our world is so economically and financially interconnected, it may well also worsen our own economic crisis.

Instead, as we restore confidence in our own markets, we will also need to find a strategy to project leadership, share burdens, build the capacity of institutions like the IMF and spread stability as this crisis continues to reverberate world-wide.

We have already lost a great deal in the last few months. But two decades of prosperity, democracy and institution-building in Eastern Europe is one investment that America must not allow to go up in smoke.

Mr. Kerry, a Democratic senator from Massachusetts, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Report: Italy's crime is the nation’s No. 1 business

Italian Mob Revenue Surges to $167 Billion From 2007. By Flavia Krause-Jackson
Bloomberg, Jan. 30, 2009

Revenue raked in by Italy’s mob surged 40 percent last year, turning crime into the nation’s No. 1 business, Eurispes said in its annual report.

Income increased to 130 billion euros ($167 billion), up from about 90 billion euros in 2007, according to figures supplied by Eurispes and SOS Impresa, an association of businessmen to protest against extortion. Drug trafficking remains the primary source of revenue, bringing in about 59 billion euros, and the mob earned 5.8 billion euros from selling arms, the Rome-based Eurispes research group said today.

“During a crisis, people lower their guard,” Roberto Saviano, who wrote the bestseller “Gomorrah” about the Camorra crime bosses, said in an interview. “Studies show the criminal market never suffers during a crisis. I’m convinced that this crisis is bringing huge advantages to criminal syndicates.”

Organized crime groups siphon 92 billion euros, about 6 percent of Italy’s gross domestic product, from Italian businesses a year through protection payments, usurious interest rates on loans and other forms of extortion, Eurispes estimates. That works out to 250 million euros a day and 10 million euros an hour, Eurispes said. Italians are struggling to make mortgage payments and support their families as the worst recession since 1975 threatens jobs and makes banks more reluctant lenders.

“With people more desperate, loan sharks thrive,” Amedeo Vitagliano, an Italian crime expert at Eurispses, said in a telephone interview. “While the country is on its knees, the mob rejoices.”


Tide Turning?

There are signs that the tide could turn against the mob. Italy’s biggest employers’ group, Confindustria, a year ago took its strongest stance against organized crime in its 98-year history, announcing that any members found to have paid the Sicilian Cosa Nostra an extortion payment, known as the “pizzo,” would be expelled. Still, when the new rule was announced, only five members of the association admitted having received mob threats.

The country’s main criminal syndicates are the Mafia in Sicily, the Camorra based around Naples and the ‘Ndrangheta that operates from Calabria, the region located at Italy’s southern toe.

Eurispes estimates that the Italian authorities confiscated 5.2 billion euros in assets from the mob last year. The Camorra had 2.9 billion euros seized, the report says. The Sicilian Mafia had 1.4 billion euros sequestered and ‘Ndrangheta, 231 million euros, Eurispes said.

U.S. Congratulates Kosovo on One Year of Independence

U.S. Congratulates Kosovo on One Year of Independence. By Gordon Duguid, Acting Deputy Department Spokesman, Office of the Spokesman
US State Dept, Public Affairs, Washington, DC, February 17, 2009

The United States congratulates the people of the Republic of Kosovo as they celebrate the first anniversary of Kosovo’s historic Declaration of Independence. One year ago today Kosovo became a sovereign and independent state.

Over the past year, Kosovo has moved quickly to build democratic institutions and to implement the principles of UN Special Envoy and Nobel Laureate Martti Ahtisaari’s Plan, including strong constitutional protections for minority rights and religious and cultural heritage. Fifty-four countries from every continent have recognized Kosovo, including an overwhelming majority of EU, NATO and OSCE members. As an independent state, Kosovo has welcomed and is coordinating effectively with the EU-led EULEX rule of law mission, NATO, the EU-led International Civilian Office and other representatives of the international community, to build a sound and sustainable economy, a single and transparent rule of law system, and other institutions of a modern, multi-ethnic, European democracy.

The United States commends the efforts of the people and Government of Kosovo to promote stability in the region and work cooperatively across ethnic and religious lines to develop a secure and prosperous future. The Secretary of State looks forward to welcoming the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo to the State Department on February 26 to reaffirm our pledge of friendship and support for Kosovo.

PRN: 133

Germany, Russia, and US foreign policy

The New Ostpolitik, by Melana K. Zyla
America's German problem.
The Weekly Standard, Feb 16, 2009, Volume 014, Issue 21

No sooner had Russia turned off the gas flowing through Ukrainian pipelines in the first days of the new year, sending tens of thousands of Europeans into a deep freeze, than German economy minister Michael Glos pointed out that "if we already had the Nord Stream pipeline," which would bypass Ukraine, flowing from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea, "then we in Germany, at least, would be a little more reassured."

The official desire to replace the current Russia-Ukraine pipeline with a Russia-Germany pipeline says a great deal about how Germany sees the gas dispute, and other global issues as well: Get the small fry--Balts, Poles, Ukrainians, and other former Russian suzerainties--out of the way and let Moscow and Berlin restore some Ordnung to things. In the January crisis, Russia cut off gas heading west to Ukrainian pipelines after Ukraine and Russia disagreed over what penalty Ukraine owes Russia for disputed late payment fees, and what the price of the gas should be now that global prices have fallen.

Glos's comment underscores to what degree Berlin has entered a new era of shared interests with Moscow and divergence from Washington. Incoming administration officials would be wise to recognize that on issues ranging from the gas dispute to Eastern Europe to Afghanistan and Iran, the Germany of today is not the partner the United States once had.

President Bush learned that lesson the hard way. His administration at first hailed Germany's Christian Democratic Union chancellor, Angela Merkel, as a foreign-policy soulmate, akin to France's Nicolas Sarkozy. But on issue after issue, she fell short of expectations.

Consider Bush's efforts to expand NATO. In the run-up to a NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels in early December, Merkel publicly torpedoed Ukraine and Georgia's chances to proceed towards membership. Her government did the same last spring, ahead of the Bucharest NATO meeting. Both times, news of Germany's opposition coincided with Merkel's visits with Russian leaders, who vociferously oppose Ukraine and Georgia's inclusion in NATO.

Russia's influence "is unfortunate because all of us have said no third party gets a veto" in NATO matters, says Daniel Fata, deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy during Bush's second term. As for Afghanistan, Germany in October announced the withdrawal of its only combat troops there--some 100 special operations soldiers. It plans to expand only its NATO peacekeeping force, to 4,500, and thereby add to the risk of creating what Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called a "two-tier alliance," in which only the United States and a few other NATO countries do the fighting. Germany's own soldiers don't think much of their restricted, noncombat missions, with Ger-many's top special operations general, Hans-Christoph Ammon, calling his country's training of an Afghan police force a "miserable failure" and adding that at Germany's current rate of effort and financing, "it would take 82 years to have a properly trained Afghan police force." Indeed, the United States has had to take over Germany's police-training mission.

Merkel supporters try to explain her weakness as a result of her sharing power with the left-leaning Social Democratic party. Yet Labour-led Britain has 8,050 troops in Afghanistan, many of them in combat roles.

Which raises the question: With German conservatives like these, who needs Socialist pacifists? In 2006, after a newly elected Merkel gave a tough speech on making the trans-Atlantic relationship her priority, "we had hoped that we would see a big change" from the anti-American politics of the outgoing Social Democratic chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, says Fata. Instead, "there was a lot of disappointment on our side."

And there's the prospect of more disappointment to come. Merkel is now in an election year in which she will face off against Frank-Walter Steinmeier, her foreign minister and vice-chancellor from the Social Democratic party. Until the September vote, she's likely to channel Steinmeier's views, particularly the pro-Moscow ones. That's because she wants "to avoid having Russia [be] a topic of the election campaign," says Joerg Himmelreich, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

German voters don't like Vladimir Putin, says Himmelreich, a former policy-planning staffer at the German foreign ministry and banker in Moscow. But as Fata puts it, "Germany and Russia are always going to have a special relationship," not least because of Germany's dependency on Russian energy and large amounts of trade with Russia.

Of course, Germany's Christian Democrats often showed great solidarity with Washington, even in the face of solicitousness from Moscow, during the Cold War. But even if Merkel's party regains a majority in 2009, that tradition may be gone for good. For one thing, the party's base is German industry, which is now heavily invested in Russia and dependent on Russian gas. Germany gets one-third of its gas from Russia, and will be dependent on that source for years--even if it does develop alternatives. Moreover, German companies and the political class are heavily tied to the Nord Stream pipeline project, which is controlled by Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom.

Indeed, gas is the leading means through which Moscow manipulates Berlin. Gazprom's gas cutoffs this January, like those in 2006, prompted Germans and other West Europeans to see Ukraine as an unstable partner that gets in the way of their economic needs: Cut Ukraine out of the relationship, and things will be golden is the message from Moscow.

In Russia's gas politics with Germany, the most powerful connection of all is between Gazprom and former chancellor Schröder. He chairs the $16 billion Nord Stream project, which is 51 percent owned by Gazprom. Schröder's service to Gazprom may be the most disturbing illustration of Moscow's influence on German elites ("It has never happened in German history that a chancellor acts as an agent of a foreign company that doesn't always follow the interests of Germany," says Himmelreich), but it's hardly the only one. Himmelreich says Berlin's foreign policy think tanks are pressured by Moscow. Even the prestigious German Council on Foreign Relations, he says, has been pressed not to invite Putin critics or Russian opposition voices to its events.

The head of the Council's Russia program, Alexander Rahr, confirmed that there have been occasions when "official Russia criticized us," but added, "we never adjusted our themes and seminars to their wishes."

Beyond Russia, there's a gap between Germany's tough rhetoric and action on Iran as well. While Merkel and Steinmeier have been critical of Iran's nuclear ambitions and blocked Germany's biggest banks from doing business there, Germany's economic relations with Iran continue to grow. With annual trade between the two now over $7 billion, Germany is Iran's biggest EU trading partner.

Berlin's interests now diverge from Washington's on several key issues. The new administration's best chance to lead on issues of concern to Europe will therefore be to play Europeans off each other the way Moscow does, Himmelreich says. For example, "German policy towards Russia will be considerably weakened if the United States succeeds in getting Sarkozy onboard for a new Russia policy." The United States should support energy transport routes for Europe that bypass Russia, such as those that tap Central Asian energy, and be wary of Gazprom's efforts to gain control of gas interests in North Africa, which remain an alternative source for Western Europe. Himmelreich says the United States should also push Europeans to improve their military capabilities.

On NATO, the United States will need to continue to push to bring Georgia and Ukraine into the fold. Otherwise, Russia will control the issue, using Germany to represent its interests. How strongly Berlin will ultimately embrace Moscow isn't clear. But as the gas and NATO disputes show, the two are now more tightly linked than they have been in decades.

Melana K. Zyla is a reporter in Washington.

Taxing fuels, vehicles, and passengers: EEA’s vision of ’sustainable’ transport

Taxing fuels, vehicles, and passengers: EEA’s vision of ’sustainable’ transport. By Marlo Lewis
Master Resource, Feb 10, 2009
http://masterresource.org/?p=817

Europe taxes gasoline at $3-4 a gallon, imposes the world’s most stringent fuel economy standards, and mandates the blending of biofuels into the region’s motor fuel supply. Yet European Union (EU) transport-sector greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increased by 26 percent from 1990 to 2006, according to “Beyond Transport Policy,” a recent European Environment Agency (EEA) report. Why have these policies failed to reduce GHG transport-sector emissions?

The EEA report spotlights the unheard-of fact that the “key drivers” of demand for transport services are “external” to the transport sector. So despite what you’ve been told, people don’t drive around just for the heck of it, buy airplane tickets for the sheer thrill of flying, ship products or order deliveries just to make work for truckers, sailors, and airmen. No, most people use transport vehicles to shop, work, educate their children, vacation, or supply products to customers. And—horrors—they do these things “without considering the consequences on transport demand and greenhouse gas emissions”!

What this implies, of course, is that we cannot have what the EEA calls a “sustainable transport system” until politicians and bureaucrats control those pesky “external drivers”—the other economic sectors that generate the demand for transport services.

The EEA report provides detailed case studies on how three external drivers—food production and consumption, short-haul air travel for business and leisure travel, and education—increase emissions by increasing the demand for transport. Each study reveals what every sober adult should already know. Work causes emissions. Play causes emissions. Wealth causes emissions. Trade causes emissions.

In short, life causes emissions, especially where people are prosperous and free to work and play.

Let’s begin with food. Do grapes cause global warming? According to the EEA, importing a kilogram of grapes from Chile to Austria emits 7,410.8 grams of carbon dioxide (CO2), compared to only 8.8 grams for grapes grown closer to home. So if you’re an Austrian and you eat Chilean grapes, your carbon foot print is 842 times bigger than if you eat locally-grown grapes. But Europeans like fresh produce, and they can afford to import it year-round. How decadent! Why can’t they live like their noble ancestors and eat canned fruit in the winter, or simply abstain?

To counter the fresh produce peril, the EEA calls for a labeling program alerting consumers to the transport-based carbon-intensity of the food they eat. However, that would hardly be enough to instill in Austrians, for example, an aversion to Chilean grapes, South African apples, Spanish strawberries, Dutch tomatoes, or Israeli peppers. The logical next step—which the EEA recommends—is to impose carbon taxes “to internalize the external costs of transport.” Such tariffs would also keep lots of developing country produce out of European markets. The EEA proposal is protectionism by another name.

The EEA also bemoans the vicious circle created by prosperity and air travel. As Europe becomes wealthier, more economically integrated, and more connected to the global economy, more Europeans want to fly for both business and pleasure. This has led to an expansion of aviation facilities and infrastructure, with airports functioning not only as transport hubs but also as retail centers, conference and meeting venues, and accommodation facilities. By making flying more convenient and useful, these developments further increase demand for air travel. When will the flying end!

To mitigate this dastardly trend (never mind that accelerating the movement of goods, persons, and ideas enhances wealth creation—the foundation of all environmental improvement), the EEA recommends new carbon-based aviation fuel taxes, passenger duties, and landing fees. Well, what else did you expect?

Education is the third and last “external driver” examined in the report. Here’s the gist. Millions of parents would rather drive their kids to safe, high-quality schools across town than make the children walk or bicycle to underperforming, bully-infested schools nearby. The EEA report offers several antidotes to this malady, including cycle lanes, car pooling, “walking buses,” car-free action days (or weeks), consumer information, and improvements in public transport. Well, I don’t know about you, but if my son can get beat up and have his lunch money stolen at a school with a “walking bus” program, then I’m definitely going to enroll him there rather than drive him to a good school a few miles further from home.

Although the report doesn’t specifically mention taxes in this context, it states that “revenues from a carbon-based tax can be used to cover costs of cycling and walking infrastructure,” and opines that “people may be more favorable if they are given adequate information about what would happen without the tax increase.” Sure they will! ‘Monsieur Blanc, please fork over an additional €1,000 in motor fuel taxes or the Greenland Ice Sheet will collapse.” That doesn’t sound like a winning sales pitch.

Here’s the bottom line the EEA doesn’t want to face. Until somebody mass produces electric vehicles or alternative fuels that outcompete combustion engines or petroleum-based fuels, transport-sector CO2 emissions will continue to increase along with demand for transport services.

Although transport demand comes from “external drivers” on which transport policies have had little impact, the EEA report tries but fails to go “beyond transport policy.” The EEA’s default solution to the alleged problem of too many people driving, flying, shipping, and importing is the most boringly familiar transport policy of all–increase taxes on fuels, goods, passengers, and vehicles.

Conservative views: The U.S. and U.K. Must Oppose French Plans to Weaken NATO

The U.S. and U.K. Must Oppose French Plans to Weaken NATO. By Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., and Sally McNamara
Heritage, Feb 10, 2009

Full article w/references here.

The Obama Administration has announced it will back the full reintegration of France into the NATO command structure, with French officers reportedly in line to take two senior Alliance command positions: Allied Command Transformation (one of NATO's two supreme commands, based in Norfolk, Virginia) and Joint Command Lisbon (one of NATO's three main operations headquarters, which also commands the NATO Rapid Reaction Force).[1]

This is a highly significant development that would put France at the heart of NATO military planning and reform proposals and represents an ill-thought-out and risky concession by Washington to the Sarkozy administration.

In a major speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 7,[2] Vice President Joe Biden welcomed France's decision "to fully participate in NATO structures" and also made it clear that the United States will "support the further strengthening of European defense, an increased role for the European Union in preserving peace and security, [and] a fundamentally stronger NATO-EU partnership." Biden's remarks echoed the views of British Defence Secretary John Hutton, who recklessly backed French plans for a European Union army last October.[3]

Both the United States and Great Britain must take a step back and launch a fundamental, wide-ranging review of the long-term implications of French demands for the future of NATO. The U.S. Congress should hold hearings to assess the new Administration's strategy with regard to French reintegration in order to highlight any dangers posed to U.S. interests.
It would be a huge strategic error of judgment by the new U.S. Administration and the British government to continue supporting French ambitions for restructuring Europe's security architecture. Such acquiescence would hand Paris an extraordinary degree of power and influence within NATO--power and influence well out of proportion to France's actual military role in Alliance operations.

Providing France with such influence would also ultimately weaken the Anglo-American Special Relationship, shifting power away from Washington and London and toward continental Europe while paving the way for the development of a separate European Union defense identity--all of which will undermine NATO.

French Reintegration into NATO

When President Sarkozy first floated the idea of French reintegration into NATO's military command in June 2007, he outlined two preconditions: guaranteed senior command posts for French officers within the Alliance, and American endorsement of an increased EU defense identity (the latter of which he emphasized as the more important of the two).[4] To formally establish the principle of reintegration, Sarkozy commissioned an influential "White Paper on Defense and National Security," which was published in March 2008.

Designed to promote an independent European defense identity, the French White Paper on Defense and National Security clearly states:

The European ambition stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our security policy. France wants Europe to be equipped with the corresponding military and civilian capability.[5]

The paper endorses several key principles:

• Redefinition of responsibility-sharing between America and Europe;
• An explicit rejection of the idea that the EU act as a civilian complement to NATO; and
• A strong preference for buying European defense technologies.

In June 2008, President Sarkozy circulated an additional document outlining Paris's policy initiatives for European military integration. It presents the major elements of what an EU defense identity will entail, including:

• A permanent operation headquarters in Brussels;
• Common EU funding for military operations; and
• European exchange programs for military personnel.[6]

America Has Little to Gain--and a Lot to Lose

It is likely that the Obama Administration will regard France's reintegration into NATO as a diplomatic masterstroke. The Administration will claim that it has rebuilt the Franco-American relationship in a mutually beneficial way, and Sarkozy will in turn claim that it tangibly demonstrates France's commitment to standing alongside America.

However, the Administration must ask itself what the U.S. actually gains from such a quid pro quo. Such reintegration may extract a few hundred additional French troops for eastern Afghanistan and generate stronger French public support for the Afghan mission. But President Obama will find that he has rescued the furniture only to give away the house. Not only is France already able to commit as many troops as it wishes to NATO missions (as it proved last year when 700 additional French troops were sent to Afghanistan), but 10 years of EU security initiatives have actually seen a decrease in European defense spending.

Washington continues to argue that supporting the European Security and Defense Policy is a means toward improving European defense spending and military capabilities. But after 10 years, such improvement has yet to occur and is not reflected in the projected defense budgets of any major European power. Since the EU and NATO operate in the same areas both militarily and geographically, the competition for resources will become fiercer, and Washington is likely to see its requests for military help increasingly rebuffed as France demands European commitments to EU missions.[7] Once the United States gives its blessing to the creation of a separate European defense structure, it will have no grounds to compel Europe to choose NATO over EU requests in the future.

A Parisian Power Play

Rather than genuinely attempting to increase Europe's contribution to defense on the international stage, France is seeking to expand both Paris's and the EU's power base. Sarkozy's proposal is largely political, not military. In practice, France is already involved with almost all of NATO's structures and operations, including all political bodies and the NATO Response Force. It also partakes in joint training exercises.

French reintegration into NATO command structures offers little additional value to Washington but gives immense momentum to French ambitions for an autonomous EU foreign and defense policy. When French presidents talk about European foreign policy, they more often than not mean French foreign policy. Equally, when Sarkozy talks about increasing European security capabilities, he means decreasing American involvement in Europe.

For instance, in January 2007 the EU established a military operations center in Brussels, which later that year conducted "a nine-day exercise involving the virtual deployment of 2,000 European soldiers to deal with a crisis in the fictional country of Alisia."[8] The operational center is without doubt a fledgling EU military headquarters that duplicates and will eventually compete with the NATO command.

The French proposal for an independent European defense structure will build upon the foundations laid by this new EU military headquarters. If the United States agrees to the French plan, it will represent yet another reversal of the Berlin Plus arrangements and a further erosion of the supremacy of NATO in Europe.

No Quid Pro Quo with France

If the Obama Administration agrees to support an independent EU defense structure as part of the French plan for rejoining NATO's command, such backing would represent a major transformation in U.S. strategic thinking that would have a dramatic, negative impact on the future of the alliance. It would shift the political balance of power within NATO away from Washington and London toward the main centers of power within the European Union: Paris, Berlin, and Brussels. Far from encouraging European countries to spend more on defense, it would foster an even greater dependency culture within continental Europe upon NATO resources. Such a shift would also lead to a duplication of the NATO command structure without a doubling of manpower or materiel.

It is vital that both the U.S. and U.K. reject any French proposal predicated on American and British support for an independent European defense organization. Paris should be welcomed back into NATO's leadership club only on terms that are acceptable to all NATO members, and without the doling out of powerful command positions to a country that is at best a half-hearted member of the alliance.

Simply Unacceptable

It is difficult to see how a greater EU defense capability will actually strengthen the NATO mission or the broader transatlantic alliance. Indeed, encouraging a bigger military role for the EU can only make NATO's task more complicated.

NATO has been the most successful post-war multilateral organization precisely because it is a truly transatlantic defense and security alliance of independent nation-states with a single command. The French proposal to build up a separate EU defense structure--i.e., a competitor to NATO sucking up valuable NATO resources--is simply unacceptable and should be firmly rejected.

Nile Gardiner Ph.D. is the Director of, and Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in, the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation. Erica Munkwitz assisted with research for this paper.