Sideshow or Preview?, by Christian Whiton
Iran threatens two neighbors.
The Weekly Standard, Mar 04, 2009 12:00:00 AM
This year could go down is history as the one in which Iran either got the bomb or got close enough for government work. A report in early February by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that during 2009 Iran will probably reach the point at which it has produced enough low-enriched uranium to make a bomb if it took the simple step of further enrichment. CIA Director Leon Panetta recently said there is "no question" Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability. This refuted with finality a laughable 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that concluded the opposite in a chapter of Bush administration history that might be titled "Bureaucrats Gone Wild."
It is hard to overstate the negative consequences of a nuclear Iran. Doomsday scenarios like a nuclear assault on Israel or one of the other countries within range of Iran's delivery systems and terrorist networks come to mind. While this should be of immense concern, there are more probable consequences in store for the medium term that ought not to escape attention. Iranian aggression of a much more conventional nature is likely, and Tehran has been giving a telling preview of this in recent months.
Last week, the former speaker of Iran's parliament, who is close to the supreme leader, opined that Bahrain was once the 14th province of Iran. Connoisseurs of Saddam Hussein's threats will recall his assertion that Kuwait was Iraq's 19th province presaged his invasion of that country in 1990. In the Middle East, such historical claims are often threats--veiled thinly, if at all. Even if an invasion is unlikely given the presence of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, the threat serves to cow would-be allies of the United States and embolden local Islamists and fellow travelers.
The threat to Bahrain comes on the heels of a similar one levied against the United Arab Emirates, another strong U.S. ally and a driver of economic reform in the region. Iran's ongoing occupation of three Emirati islands in the Gulf's strategic Strait of Hormuz makes Tehran's threats seem real enough. On January 26, a member of the Iranian parliament reasserted Iran's claim to these islands, which is dubious for many reasons, including that historically they were used and overseen primarily by Arabs, not Persians. More alarmingly, the parliamentarian went a step further, saying all of the UAE belonged to Iran. The same week, a different parliamentarian warned that for the UAE even to assert its rights to the islands could lead to war. On February 3, an Iranian paper threatened the UAE's leaders with defeat, likening them to Saddam's surrendering troops.
This aggression fits a pattern of what repressive revolutionary countries tend to do, especially when unrest at home creates an impetus for a foreign distraction. Authoritarians have a penchant for inventing foreign enemies as a method of justifying their own rule and excusing their shortcomings. This incentive has grown for the Iranian ruling class as last year's high oil revenues are but a faint memory amid increasing economic malaise that includes inflation and unemployment running at about 25 percent each.
It is true that there are a number of reasons Iran might never actually strike Bahrain or the UAE due to nearby U.S. military assets and the economic drawbacks of disrupting its own trade. It also has other greener pastures in which to employ violence. But these same factors were in play in 1990 when Saddam nonetheless proceeded with an invasion of Kuwait. In addition, Iran is in a more powerful position than Saddam ever was. With a pending nuclear capability, Tehran believes it is on the verge of an insurance policy against any real military reckoning with the free world.
Absent an intervening event, a nuclear Tehran would have an even freer hand to expand its existing terror enterprises. As was the case in Iraq, Iranian made Explosively Formed Penetrators are one of the highest causes of mortality for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Tehran's clients have achieved great strides in Lebanon and Gaza in recent years, among other locales. Iran is also in the ideology export business--by violence when necessary. June elections in Iran are unlikely to change this, even if the "moderates" win, judging by their track record. Realistically, all of these activities will accelerate in immediate aftermath of an Iranian nuclear capability.
These activities can of course be countered, as they have in past instances, by an aggressive conventional military presence, a determination to undermine the enemy ideologically, and crack intelligence services that can put the subversives on the defense.
Unfortunately, of these three necessities, the United States possesses only the first at present.
President Obama was dealt a poor hand by his predecessor in the White House. Bush was known to promise concerned visitors that Iran would not be allowed to go nuclear, implying a military strike if other options failed. The basic components of his administration's efforts against Iran were smarter economic sanctions and other measures that may have delayed an Iranian bomb, but will not prevent its occurrence. Without a tough plan to check Iran on all fronts, the Obama administration may find itself dealing with an Iran that is not only nuclear, but on the march throughout the region.
Christian Whiton was a State Department official in the George W. Bush administration.
Showing posts with label iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label iran. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
WaPo: No deal on Iran and missile defense
No Deal. WaPo Editorial
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev offer welcome clarity on Iran and missile defense.
TWP, Wednesday, March 4, 2009; A14
PROPONENTS of a diplomatic "grand bargain" between the Obama administration and Russia -- by which the United States would obtain Russian cooperation in stopping Iran's nuclear program in exchange for concessions to what Moscow sees as its security interests in Europe -- got a double drenching of cold water yesterday. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a news conference that "any swaps" between action on Iran and a planned U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic "would not be productive." For his part, President Obama made clear that his administration's decisions on missile defense would be guided not by Russian behavior but by the threat from Iran.
As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton prepares for her first official meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Saturday, these were revealing and important clarifications. Vice President Biden's call for a "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations and long-standing questions about the efficacy and cost of missile defense may have encouraged Russian expectations that the new administration could be bluffed into retreating from the deals struck by the Bush administration with Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy missile interceptors and a radar station. If undertaken as a concession to Russia, any such move would have the effect of undermining the bonds between former Soviet bloc members and the United States and NATO -- which, of course, is Moscow's aim.
That's why it was important for Mr. Obama to say yesterday that his willingness to reconsider missile defense would be based on judgments about Iran, not about Russia -- and that any decision made in that context does not diminish "my commitment to making sure that Poland, the Czech Republic and other NATO members are fully enjoying the partnership, the alliance and U.S. support with respect to their security." One way to back up that principle is for the administration to make clear in public -- as it has in private -- that deployment of a U.S. Patriot missile defense battery to Poland, promised by the Bush administration, will go ahead regardless of what is ultimately decided about the larger missile defense system.
Such a statement might be somewhat out of sync with the honeymoonish tone of much of the public rhetoric between Moscow and Washington since Mr. Obama's inauguration. But as Mr. Medvedev made clear yesterday, so far there isn't much substance behind the cheery facade. He declared that Russia, which is about to complete a nuclear power plant for Iran and has repeatedly opposed tough sanctions, is "already working in close contact" with the United States on Iran. In other words, while Russia expects the new administration to "show common sense" on missile defense by proposing something that "would be acceptable to us," it shouldn't expect more help stopping an Iranian bomb. Perhaps the Kremlin leadership believes that "reset" is another way of saying "capitulate." If so, Ms. Clinton would do well to clarify the administration's policy when she meets Mr. Lavrov.
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev offer welcome clarity on Iran and missile defense.
TWP, Wednesday, March 4, 2009; A14
PROPONENTS of a diplomatic "grand bargain" between the Obama administration and Russia -- by which the United States would obtain Russian cooperation in stopping Iran's nuclear program in exchange for concessions to what Moscow sees as its security interests in Europe -- got a double drenching of cold water yesterday. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a news conference that "any swaps" between action on Iran and a planned U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic "would not be productive." For his part, President Obama made clear that his administration's decisions on missile defense would be guided not by Russian behavior but by the threat from Iran.
As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton prepares for her first official meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Saturday, these were revealing and important clarifications. Vice President Biden's call for a "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations and long-standing questions about the efficacy and cost of missile defense may have encouraged Russian expectations that the new administration could be bluffed into retreating from the deals struck by the Bush administration with Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy missile interceptors and a radar station. If undertaken as a concession to Russia, any such move would have the effect of undermining the bonds between former Soviet bloc members and the United States and NATO -- which, of course, is Moscow's aim.
That's why it was important for Mr. Obama to say yesterday that his willingness to reconsider missile defense would be based on judgments about Iran, not about Russia -- and that any decision made in that context does not diminish "my commitment to making sure that Poland, the Czech Republic and other NATO members are fully enjoying the partnership, the alliance and U.S. support with respect to their security." One way to back up that principle is for the administration to make clear in public -- as it has in private -- that deployment of a U.S. Patriot missile defense battery to Poland, promised by the Bush administration, will go ahead regardless of what is ultimately decided about the larger missile defense system.
Such a statement might be somewhat out of sync with the honeymoonish tone of much of the public rhetoric between Moscow and Washington since Mr. Obama's inauguration. But as Mr. Medvedev made clear yesterday, so far there isn't much substance behind the cheery facade. He declared that Russia, which is about to complete a nuclear power plant for Iran and has repeatedly opposed tough sanctions, is "already working in close contact" with the United States on Iran. In other words, while Russia expects the new administration to "show common sense" on missile defense by proposing something that "would be acceptable to us," it shouldn't expect more help stopping an Iranian bomb. Perhaps the Kremlin leadership believes that "reset" is another way of saying "capitulate." If so, Ms. Clinton would do well to clarify the administration's policy when she meets Mr. Lavrov.
Monday, March 2, 2009
Clinton says U.S. diplomacy unlikely to end Iran nuclear program
Clinton says U.S. diplomacy unlikely to end Iran nuclear program, by Paul Richter
In a Mideast meeting, the secretary of State says a rejection by Iran could strengthen the U.S. position.
Los Angeles Times, Mar 03, 2009
Reporting from Sharm El Sheik, Egypt -- The Obama administration has already concluded that a diplomatic overture to Iran, one of the central promises of the president's election campaign, is unlikely to persuade Tehran to give up its nuclear ambitions.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates in a private meeting Monday that it is "very doubtful" a U.S. approach will persuade Iran to relent, said a senior State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity under customary diplomatic rules.
But Clinton, in Egypt for a conference to raise money for the war-scarred Gaza Strip, said an Iranian rebuff could strengthen America's diplomatic position.
She told Foreign Minister Sheik Abdullah ibn Zayed al Nuhayyan that the move would quell complaints that the United States has not exhausted diplomatic routes. At the same time, it could help persuade U.S. allies to join it in increasing pressure on the Islamic regime.
Clinton said that Iran's "worst nightmare is an international community that is united and an American government willing to engage Iran," according to the State official. During the election campaign, President Obama made an overture to Iran one of his central foreign policy ideas, saying that engagement would be better than the Bush administration's policy of seeking to isolate adversary regimes. Bush refused to deal with Iran while the country's rulers pursued a nuclear program that they insist is intended for civilian energy but that U.S. officials and allies maintain is for producing the fuel for nuclear weapons.
Many foreign policy experts, including some in Democratic circles, have questioned whether talks alone would persuade Iran to give up its nuclear program.
Clinton's comments suggest that even as U.S. officials weigh a diplomatic overture, they have begun looking ahead to the next stage in dealing with Iran. The remarks also indicate that the administration believes it may need to press ahead with the diplomatic and economic pressures begun by the Bush administration.
The U.S. official said that Nuhayyan expressed concern over a U.S.-Iranian deal, which could leave Persian Gulf states with reduced Western support amid tensions with Tehran.
But he said Clinton assured the minister that the administration is "under no illusions" and would consult with allies in the region.
The new U.S. administration is considering several ways to try to engage Iran. Richard C. Holbrooke, the special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, has said that he would like to enlist Iranian help to stabilize its neighbor to the east, Afghanistan. And Clinton last month named veteran Mideast negotiator Dennis B. Ross as a special advisor, with Iran as part of his assignment.
U.S. officials elsewhere sought to rekindle progress on international disarmament. In Vienna on Monday, the Obama administration disclosed plans to reduce its nuclear arsenal as a way of persuading other nations, including Iran, to scale back their own ambitions.
U.S. envoy Gregory L. Schulte, speaking in a closed-door meeting of the International Atomic Energy Association's board of governors, noted the new administration's "readiness for direct engagement with Tehran."
Schulte also said the U.S. would resurrect nuclear disarmament efforts that fell by the wayside during the Bush administration, including "dramatic reductions" in U.S. and Russian stockpiles and a ban on production of "new nuclear weapons material," according to a copy of his prepared remarks.
"President Obama supports the goal of working toward a world without nuclear weapons," he said. "His administration intends to renew America's commitment to disarmament."
The statement came a day after U.S. Navy Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Iran had enough low-enriched uranium for a weapon, a conclusion also drawn by International Atomic Energy Agency officials last month.
An Iranian official Monday denied the claims as "baseless."
Clinton's comments about Iran came on the sidelines of a gathering in this Sinai resort of more than 75 countries for a Gaza Strip donors conference. Clinton told the group, "We are committed to a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors, and we will pursue it on many fronts."
Her reference to a "comprehensive peace" hinted at U.S. interest in a deal between Israel and Syria, as well as between Israel and the Palestinians.
The Egyptian sponsors of the event said it brought pledges of $4.5 billion for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. But officials from Europe, Arab states and international organizations also demanded that Israel ease restrictions on border crossings to speed the delivery of relief supplies and rebuilding materials after a 22-day Israeli offensive aimed at stopping cross-border rocket fire from Gaza.
"The situation at the border crossings is intolerable," said United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
Officials at the conference also called for a settlement between the two rival Palestinian movements, Hamas and Fatah. Europeans warned they would not continue to fund reconstruction work unless Israelis and Palestinians tried to settle their differences.
"Will we once again reconstruct something that we built a few years ago and has now been hammered and flattened?" asked Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere. "Many donors, despite pledges, will wish to see political progress before they commit to infrastructure reconstruction."
In a Mideast meeting, the secretary of State says a rejection by Iran could strengthen the U.S. position.
Los Angeles Times, Mar 03, 2009
Reporting from Sharm El Sheik, Egypt -- The Obama administration has already concluded that a diplomatic overture to Iran, one of the central promises of the president's election campaign, is unlikely to persuade Tehran to give up its nuclear ambitions.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates in a private meeting Monday that it is "very doubtful" a U.S. approach will persuade Iran to relent, said a senior State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity under customary diplomatic rules.
But Clinton, in Egypt for a conference to raise money for the war-scarred Gaza Strip, said an Iranian rebuff could strengthen America's diplomatic position.
She told Foreign Minister Sheik Abdullah ibn Zayed al Nuhayyan that the move would quell complaints that the United States has not exhausted diplomatic routes. At the same time, it could help persuade U.S. allies to join it in increasing pressure on the Islamic regime.
Clinton said that Iran's "worst nightmare is an international community that is united and an American government willing to engage Iran," according to the State official. During the election campaign, President Obama made an overture to Iran one of his central foreign policy ideas, saying that engagement would be better than the Bush administration's policy of seeking to isolate adversary regimes. Bush refused to deal with Iran while the country's rulers pursued a nuclear program that they insist is intended for civilian energy but that U.S. officials and allies maintain is for producing the fuel for nuclear weapons.
Many foreign policy experts, including some in Democratic circles, have questioned whether talks alone would persuade Iran to give up its nuclear program.
Clinton's comments suggest that even as U.S. officials weigh a diplomatic overture, they have begun looking ahead to the next stage in dealing with Iran. The remarks also indicate that the administration believes it may need to press ahead with the diplomatic and economic pressures begun by the Bush administration.
The U.S. official said that Nuhayyan expressed concern over a U.S.-Iranian deal, which could leave Persian Gulf states with reduced Western support amid tensions with Tehran.
But he said Clinton assured the minister that the administration is "under no illusions" and would consult with allies in the region.
The new U.S. administration is considering several ways to try to engage Iran. Richard C. Holbrooke, the special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, has said that he would like to enlist Iranian help to stabilize its neighbor to the east, Afghanistan. And Clinton last month named veteran Mideast negotiator Dennis B. Ross as a special advisor, with Iran as part of his assignment.
U.S. officials elsewhere sought to rekindle progress on international disarmament. In Vienna on Monday, the Obama administration disclosed plans to reduce its nuclear arsenal as a way of persuading other nations, including Iran, to scale back their own ambitions.
U.S. envoy Gregory L. Schulte, speaking in a closed-door meeting of the International Atomic Energy Association's board of governors, noted the new administration's "readiness for direct engagement with Tehran."
Schulte also said the U.S. would resurrect nuclear disarmament efforts that fell by the wayside during the Bush administration, including "dramatic reductions" in U.S. and Russian stockpiles and a ban on production of "new nuclear weapons material," according to a copy of his prepared remarks.
"President Obama supports the goal of working toward a world without nuclear weapons," he said. "His administration intends to renew America's commitment to disarmament."
The statement came a day after U.S. Navy Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Iran had enough low-enriched uranium for a weapon, a conclusion also drawn by International Atomic Energy Agency officials last month.
An Iranian official Monday denied the claims as "baseless."
Clinton's comments about Iran came on the sidelines of a gathering in this Sinai resort of more than 75 countries for a Gaza Strip donors conference. Clinton told the group, "We are committed to a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors, and we will pursue it on many fronts."
Her reference to a "comprehensive peace" hinted at U.S. interest in a deal between Israel and Syria, as well as between Israel and the Palestinians.
The Egyptian sponsors of the event said it brought pledges of $4.5 billion for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. But officials from Europe, Arab states and international organizations also demanded that Israel ease restrictions on border crossings to speed the delivery of relief supplies and rebuilding materials after a 22-day Israeli offensive aimed at stopping cross-border rocket fire from Gaza.
"The situation at the border crossings is intolerable," said United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
Officials at the conference also called for a settlement between the two rival Palestinian movements, Hamas and Fatah. Europeans warned they would not continue to fund reconstruction work unless Israelis and Palestinians tried to settle their differences.
"Will we once again reconstruct something that we built a few years ago and has now been hammered and flattened?" asked Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere. "Many donors, despite pledges, will wish to see political progress before they commit to infrastructure reconstruction."
Saturday, February 14, 2009
State Dept On Persecution of Religious Minorities in Iran
Persecution of Religious Minorities in Iran. Robert Wood, Acting Department Spokesman
US State Dept, Washington, DC, February 13, 2009
The United States condemns the Iranian government’s decision to level baseless charges of espionage against seven leaders of the Iranian Baha’i community: Mrs. Fariba Kamalabadi, Mr. Jamaloddin Khanjani, Mr. Afif Naeimi, Mr. Saeid Rezaie, Mr. Behrouz Tavakkoli, Mr. Vahid Tizfahm and Mrs. Mahvash Sabet. Authorities have detained these Baha’i for more than nine months without access to legal counsel or making public any evidence against them. The accusations reported in Iranian and international media are part of the ongoing persecution of Baha’i in Iran. Thirty other Baha’i remain imprisoned in Iran solely on the basis of their religious belief.
Other religious minorities continue to be targeted solely on the basis of their beliefs. Last month authorities arrested three Christians: Jamal Ghalishorani, Nadereh Jamali and Hamik Khachikian. In addition, authorities detained several members of the Gonabadi Dervishes, followers of Sufism, on Kish Island in January.
We join the international community in urging the authorities to release all religious minorities who are currently in detention for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
US State Dept, Washington, DC, February 13, 2009
The United States condemns the Iranian government’s decision to level baseless charges of espionage against seven leaders of the Iranian Baha’i community: Mrs. Fariba Kamalabadi, Mr. Jamaloddin Khanjani, Mr. Afif Naeimi, Mr. Saeid Rezaie, Mr. Behrouz Tavakkoli, Mr. Vahid Tizfahm and Mrs. Mahvash Sabet. Authorities have detained these Baha’i for more than nine months without access to legal counsel or making public any evidence against them. The accusations reported in Iranian and international media are part of the ongoing persecution of Baha’i in Iran. Thirty other Baha’i remain imprisoned in Iran solely on the basis of their religious belief.
Other religious minorities continue to be targeted solely on the basis of their beliefs. Last month authorities arrested three Christians: Jamal Ghalishorani, Nadereh Jamali and Hamik Khachikian. In addition, authorities detained several members of the Gonabadi Dervishes, followers of Sufism, on Kish Island in January.
We join the international community in urging the authorities to release all religious minorities who are currently in detention for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
State Sec: The Czech Republic and the United States Share a Strong Commitment to Defense, Development, and Human Rights
The Czech Republic and the United States Share a Strong Commitment to Defense, Development, and Human Rights. By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State
Remarks With Czech Republic Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg After Their Meeting
Treaty room, Washington, DC, February 10, 2009
SECRETARY CLINTON: I am delighted today to welcome Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg to the Department of State. The minister and I just had a wide-ranging, good discussion about global, European, and bilateral issues. The Czech Republic is an important ally of the United States and, of course, our two nations share a strong commitment to defense, development, and human rights. And we are dedicated to strengthening our transatlantic alliance.
I also welcomed the foreign minister in his current European Union presidency role. The U.S. and Europe have great responsibilities in the world, especially at this time of global challenges and opportunities. And the United States appreciates Czech leadership on such key issues as Afghanistan, energy security, and the Middle East.
It was also a pleasure for me to particularly thank the Czech Republic for being at the forefront of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, with a commitment of 500 troops and leadership of the Logar Provincial Reconstruction Team. Europe and the United States, the Czech Republic and the United States, we have a big, important agenda before us. And I’m confident, as I told the minister, that our shared values, our common objectives, our commitment to freedom will continue to strengthen and deepen our partnership. So it’s a great personal pleasure for me to welcome the foreign minister here today.
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: Well, I would like to say that this is, for me, great honor and pleasure to be one of the first visits to Secretary Clinton. I do think we have a certain luck because it coincides that the new Administration started vigorously its work, and the Czech presidency of the European Union is at its beginning.
And the fact that at one side, the Czech Republic is probably the country that Americans have the most sympathies in all of Europe, and we are staunch allies of the United States on one side, as is American – your Administration changed not only America, but the world. It is an important start – motivation to work together to rejuvenate the process of (inaudible), which, after all – I mean, there are – NATO becomes 60 years old, we all became older, and we sometimes stuck too much to the routine. And now, there’s a change, a chance to make a real change, to rejuvenate the relation, to invigorate it, and to start together to tackle the enormous problems we have in the world. Some were mentioned by Secretary Clinton.
And of one thing – I’m sure that if we stick together, if the cooperation between the United States and the European Union goes with a new attitude (inaudible), we can really achieve something in the world to make it and to change it to the better. Thank you so much.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you, Minister.
QUESTION: Thank you, Madame Secretary, and Mr. Minister, if you want to jump in as well. On the Israeli elections, you’ve said you’re looking forward to working with the new government, but certainly some of the candidates would make it easier to advance some of the goals that you’ve been talking about on a deal with Israeli and Palestinians. Could you talk about what’s at stake at this election, in terms of U.S. and European foreign policy?
And on Iran, there does – there definitely seems to be an interesting dance going on between the U.S. and Iran. Last night, after President Obama’s comments about engaging Iran, President Ahmadinejad said that Iran would hold talks based on mutual respect. Your review notwithstanding, what do you think is going on here, and are you heartened by the Iranian messages that they’ve been trying to send to the U.S.?
Thank you.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as to the Israeli elections, I’m going to wait to find out what the people of Israel have decided.
As to Iran, we have been very clear that, as the Vice President discussed in Munich over the weekend, as the President said again last night, there is an opportunity for the Iranian Government to demonstrate a willingness to unclench their fist and to begin a serious and responsible discussion about a range of matters.
We still persist in our view that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons, that it would be a very unfortunate course for them to pursue. And we hope that there will be opportunities in the future for us to develop a better understanding of one another and to work out a way of talking that would produce positive results for the people of Iran.
QUESTION: Czech television. Madame Secretary, this is a question about missile defense. Does your Administration have a, kind of like, plan to be presented – a clear plan, including timeframe, to be presented at NATO summit?
And on both of you, is there still an option to abandon this project if there would be a kind of diplomatic agreement with Iran or with Russia?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as the Vice President also said in Munich, we are first and foremost very grateful to the Czech Republic, to the government and the people, for working with us to try to deter the threat from Iran. If we are able to deter that threat, it will be, in some measure, due to the courage of the Czech people in stepping up and being a partner to provide a strong defense in Europe against Iranian aggression that would certainly be present were they to obtain nuclear weapons.
There are technical issues concerning missile defense that you – that you know well. We had a very good discussion about our hopes to work together – the European Union and the United States – in dissuading the Iranians from pursuing nuclear weapons. But if the Iranians continue on this path, certainly one of the options for free countries like the Czech Republic, other Europeans, and the United States, is to defend ourselves. So this is one of those issues that really will rest with the decisions made by the Iranian Government.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, there is a prospect looming on the Korean Peninsula of possible military clashes between the two Koreas, as a result of some actions that the North has taken in the past couple of weeks. And there are some reports that Chinese fishing boats are being pulled out of the area in case something happens. You’re going to Asia next week.
Can you tell us what can you do to make sure that such a situation doesn’t occur? And more broadly, what is your expectation on that trip? What do you hope to – what message do you hope to convey to not only the government, but the people of Asia?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I am going to Asia to reassert our commitment to our allies and partners in Asia, to work on a range of issues with Japan and South Korea, China, and Indonesia, as well as reaching out to the rest of East Asia.
And clearly, with respect to North Korea, our position remains the same. We intend to pursue the Six-Party Talks. We expect that -- with our partners in those talks to continue a policy that would lead to the denuclearization of North Korea and the end of any proliferating activities by North Korea.
We are hopeful that some of the behavior that we have seen coming from North Korea in the last few weeks is, you know, not a precursor of any action that would up the ante, or threaten the stability and peace and security of the neighbors in the region.
But again, North Korea has to understand that all of the countries in East Asia have made it clear that its behavior is viewed as unacceptable. And there are opportunities for the government and people of North Korea were they to begin, once again, to engage through the Six-Party Talks, through other bilateral and multilateral forums. And we’re hopeful that we’ll see that in the weeks and months ahead. But I know of the continuing concern on the part of the other members of the Six-Party Talks with respect to North Korea’s attitude in the last weeks, and I’ll be talking with our counterparts to determine the most effective way forward. Thank you.
Last question?
QUESTION: Czech daily newspaper. Madame Secretary, do you think that the current financial crisis could anyhow delay the plans for development and deployment of the missile defense systems?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, our concerns about missile defense are primarily technical. There may be some economic factors. But we’ve always seen this as primarily a technical challenge. Obviously, we expect any system that we deploy to be able to operate effectively to achieve the goals that are set. And as I have said earlier, our concern, the concern of other nations within the broad geographic area that could be affected by an Iranian missile, you know, are looking for ways to deter and end that behavior.
But you know, we have to be realistic, you know. Our slogan can be “hope for the best, but plan for the worst.” I think that’s a realistic approach that we should be taking, and that’s why I admire the Czech Government. I know that that was a difficult decision. I understand that. But the Czech people won their freedom and do not want to be intimidated by the specter of, you know, nuclear weapons in the hands of unfriendly regimes. So I think that what the Czech Government and the Polish Government did in saying, you know, we want to be prepared in the event that we are unable to persuade, dissuade, deter, the Iranians from pursuing nuclear weapons makes a great deal of sense.
Now, the timing and the, you know, actual deployment, those are largely technical matters. And as the Vice President said, which I underscore, if we are able to see a change in behavior on the part of the Iranians with respect to what we believe to be their pursuit of nuclear weapons, you know, then – you know, we will reconsider where we stand. But we are a long, long way from seeing such evidence of any behavior change.
Mr. Minister, do you want to add anything?
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: No. I’d have to agree with what you have said. And I think the most necessary thing is that as with Iran, as to other dangers in this world, we need to stick together and we can rely on each other.
And just I would like to add one thing. It was a special pleasure for me – the meeting today with Secretary Clinton, whom I had the honor and pleasure to meet before already in Prague when she visit my former chief, President Havel. And I already was impressed by her great energy. Now to see her as Secretary of State of the United States is a special pleasure.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you. Thank you all very much. Thank you.
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: Thank you so much.
Remarks With Czech Republic Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg After Their Meeting
Treaty room, Washington, DC, February 10, 2009
SECRETARY CLINTON: I am delighted today to welcome Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg to the Department of State. The minister and I just had a wide-ranging, good discussion about global, European, and bilateral issues. The Czech Republic is an important ally of the United States and, of course, our two nations share a strong commitment to defense, development, and human rights. And we are dedicated to strengthening our transatlantic alliance.
I also welcomed the foreign minister in his current European Union presidency role. The U.S. and Europe have great responsibilities in the world, especially at this time of global challenges and opportunities. And the United States appreciates Czech leadership on such key issues as Afghanistan, energy security, and the Middle East.
It was also a pleasure for me to particularly thank the Czech Republic for being at the forefront of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, with a commitment of 500 troops and leadership of the Logar Provincial Reconstruction Team. Europe and the United States, the Czech Republic and the United States, we have a big, important agenda before us. And I’m confident, as I told the minister, that our shared values, our common objectives, our commitment to freedom will continue to strengthen and deepen our partnership. So it’s a great personal pleasure for me to welcome the foreign minister here today.
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: Well, I would like to say that this is, for me, great honor and pleasure to be one of the first visits to Secretary Clinton. I do think we have a certain luck because it coincides that the new Administration started vigorously its work, and the Czech presidency of the European Union is at its beginning.
And the fact that at one side, the Czech Republic is probably the country that Americans have the most sympathies in all of Europe, and we are staunch allies of the United States on one side, as is American – your Administration changed not only America, but the world. It is an important start – motivation to work together to rejuvenate the process of (inaudible), which, after all – I mean, there are – NATO becomes 60 years old, we all became older, and we sometimes stuck too much to the routine. And now, there’s a change, a chance to make a real change, to rejuvenate the relation, to invigorate it, and to start together to tackle the enormous problems we have in the world. Some were mentioned by Secretary Clinton.
And of one thing – I’m sure that if we stick together, if the cooperation between the United States and the European Union goes with a new attitude (inaudible), we can really achieve something in the world to make it and to change it to the better. Thank you so much.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you, Minister.
QUESTION: Thank you, Madame Secretary, and Mr. Minister, if you want to jump in as well. On the Israeli elections, you’ve said you’re looking forward to working with the new government, but certainly some of the candidates would make it easier to advance some of the goals that you’ve been talking about on a deal with Israeli and Palestinians. Could you talk about what’s at stake at this election, in terms of U.S. and European foreign policy?
And on Iran, there does – there definitely seems to be an interesting dance going on between the U.S. and Iran. Last night, after President Obama’s comments about engaging Iran, President Ahmadinejad said that Iran would hold talks based on mutual respect. Your review notwithstanding, what do you think is going on here, and are you heartened by the Iranian messages that they’ve been trying to send to the U.S.?
Thank you.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as to the Israeli elections, I’m going to wait to find out what the people of Israel have decided.
As to Iran, we have been very clear that, as the Vice President discussed in Munich over the weekend, as the President said again last night, there is an opportunity for the Iranian Government to demonstrate a willingness to unclench their fist and to begin a serious and responsible discussion about a range of matters.
We still persist in our view that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons, that it would be a very unfortunate course for them to pursue. And we hope that there will be opportunities in the future for us to develop a better understanding of one another and to work out a way of talking that would produce positive results for the people of Iran.
QUESTION: Czech television. Madame Secretary, this is a question about missile defense. Does your Administration have a, kind of like, plan to be presented – a clear plan, including timeframe, to be presented at NATO summit?
And on both of you, is there still an option to abandon this project if there would be a kind of diplomatic agreement with Iran or with Russia?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as the Vice President also said in Munich, we are first and foremost very grateful to the Czech Republic, to the government and the people, for working with us to try to deter the threat from Iran. If we are able to deter that threat, it will be, in some measure, due to the courage of the Czech people in stepping up and being a partner to provide a strong defense in Europe against Iranian aggression that would certainly be present were they to obtain nuclear weapons.
There are technical issues concerning missile defense that you – that you know well. We had a very good discussion about our hopes to work together – the European Union and the United States – in dissuading the Iranians from pursuing nuclear weapons. But if the Iranians continue on this path, certainly one of the options for free countries like the Czech Republic, other Europeans, and the United States, is to defend ourselves. So this is one of those issues that really will rest with the decisions made by the Iranian Government.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, there is a prospect looming on the Korean Peninsula of possible military clashes between the two Koreas, as a result of some actions that the North has taken in the past couple of weeks. And there are some reports that Chinese fishing boats are being pulled out of the area in case something happens. You’re going to Asia next week.
Can you tell us what can you do to make sure that such a situation doesn’t occur? And more broadly, what is your expectation on that trip? What do you hope to – what message do you hope to convey to not only the government, but the people of Asia?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I am going to Asia to reassert our commitment to our allies and partners in Asia, to work on a range of issues with Japan and South Korea, China, and Indonesia, as well as reaching out to the rest of East Asia.
And clearly, with respect to North Korea, our position remains the same. We intend to pursue the Six-Party Talks. We expect that -- with our partners in those talks to continue a policy that would lead to the denuclearization of North Korea and the end of any proliferating activities by North Korea.
We are hopeful that some of the behavior that we have seen coming from North Korea in the last few weeks is, you know, not a precursor of any action that would up the ante, or threaten the stability and peace and security of the neighbors in the region.
But again, North Korea has to understand that all of the countries in East Asia have made it clear that its behavior is viewed as unacceptable. And there are opportunities for the government and people of North Korea were they to begin, once again, to engage through the Six-Party Talks, through other bilateral and multilateral forums. And we’re hopeful that we’ll see that in the weeks and months ahead. But I know of the continuing concern on the part of the other members of the Six-Party Talks with respect to North Korea’s attitude in the last weeks, and I’ll be talking with our counterparts to determine the most effective way forward. Thank you.
Last question?
QUESTION: Czech daily newspaper. Madame Secretary, do you think that the current financial crisis could anyhow delay the plans for development and deployment of the missile defense systems?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, our concerns about missile defense are primarily technical. There may be some economic factors. But we’ve always seen this as primarily a technical challenge. Obviously, we expect any system that we deploy to be able to operate effectively to achieve the goals that are set. And as I have said earlier, our concern, the concern of other nations within the broad geographic area that could be affected by an Iranian missile, you know, are looking for ways to deter and end that behavior.
But you know, we have to be realistic, you know. Our slogan can be “hope for the best, but plan for the worst.” I think that’s a realistic approach that we should be taking, and that’s why I admire the Czech Government. I know that that was a difficult decision. I understand that. But the Czech people won their freedom and do not want to be intimidated by the specter of, you know, nuclear weapons in the hands of unfriendly regimes. So I think that what the Czech Government and the Polish Government did in saying, you know, we want to be prepared in the event that we are unable to persuade, dissuade, deter, the Iranians from pursuing nuclear weapons makes a great deal of sense.
Now, the timing and the, you know, actual deployment, those are largely technical matters. And as the Vice President said, which I underscore, if we are able to see a change in behavior on the part of the Iranians with respect to what we believe to be their pursuit of nuclear weapons, you know, then – you know, we will reconsider where we stand. But we are a long, long way from seeing such evidence of any behavior change.
Mr. Minister, do you want to add anything?
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: No. I’d have to agree with what you have said. And I think the most necessary thing is that as with Iran, as to other dangers in this world, we need to stick together and we can rely on each other.
And just I would like to add one thing. It was a special pleasure for me – the meeting today with Secretary Clinton, whom I had the honor and pleasure to meet before already in Prague when she visit my former chief, President Havel. And I already was impressed by her great energy. Now to see her as Secretary of State of the United States is a special pleasure.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you. Thank you all very much. Thank you.
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: Thank you so much.
Czech views: Russia Shouldn't Have a Veto on Missile Defense
Russia Shouldn't Have a Veto on Missile Defense, by Milan Vodicka
European leaders relied on U.S. commitments.
WSJ, Feb 11, 2009
Prague
If the United States builds a radar system in the Czech Republic as part of the missile defense program developed by the Bush administration, it's likely that the Russians will target the Czech Republic with their tactical nuclear missiles. But many Czechs are fearful of an even greater danger than Russia: The possibility that the U.S. may decide not to deploy the defense system. Unfortunately, Vice President Joseph Biden suggested this prospect last week in Munich when he said, "We will wait for what the experts say and then we will see."
Czech politicians and their Polish counterparts have invested a lot of political capital in the missile defense project. If the Obama administration doesn't follow through, supporters of the missile shield would feel abandoned by the U.S.
What's worse, Czech and Polish leaders would lose credibility among their opponents and, most importantly, Russia. Moscow would see the failure to build the radar system as proof of its influence over Central Europe, and as recognition of its veto power over European security policy.
Mr. Biden doesn't seem to appreciate that the missile defense project isn't just about American interests. It's about the Czechs and the Poles, too.
The Americans wanted the radar and the interceptors, and they wanted them within the borders of our countries. Our leaders went to great lengths to meet Washington's requests. They stood firm in the face of passionate protests at home and intimidation from Russia. Recently, Moscow backed down from its threat to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, but it stands ready to follow through if missile defense becomes a reality.
It's beginning to look as though the Americans were taking us for a ride. Now that there's a new driver in the White House, they think they can just drop us off at the curb.
Even if the Obama administration wants to backtrack on missile defense, doing so won't return relations with Russia to the status quo ante. This is because Russia has transformed the issue of the missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland into evidence of its growing influence. Russia has turned this into a question of its power beyond its borders.
If it weren't for Russia, there would be little difficulty in Washington's change of heart. Yet Russia's involvement makes the game a different one entirely. While several interceptors in Poland can stop individual missiles, they can't prevent a massive strike by a nuclear power like Russia. This is because the system is aimed at Iran, not Russia.
Moscow's rigid position has hardened the resolve of Prague and Warsaw, which fear that the Kremlin is attempting to dictate the limits of Czech and Polish sovereignty and foreign policy. We have experienced this before.
This, at least, is how the situation appears from the Czech point of view. I can already anticipate the Obama administration's conclusion: that missile defense is an expensive diversion with uncertain benefits and unpleasant side effects. Such an outcome is all the more likely given the global economic crisis and the difficult fiscal situation in the U.S.
There's no doubt that Russia would profit from a scenario in which the U.S. put the missile defense project on hold. Just consider the situation in Georgia last summer.
During the conflict in South Ossetia, it was alarming how many observers in the U.S. press implied that NATO enlargement was a mistake. The tone of these articles strongly suggested that expansion of the Atlantic alliance only caused the U.S. more trouble with Russia. They also implied that the U.S. and other Western powers were less than fully committed to their new eastern partners.
In this light, it's clear that American retreat on the missile defense program would hand Moscow a huge victory. Washington can't afford to leave the Czechs out in the cold.
Mr. Vodicka is senior writer for the Czech newspaper Mladá Fronta Dnes.
European leaders relied on U.S. commitments.
WSJ, Feb 11, 2009
Prague
If the United States builds a radar system in the Czech Republic as part of the missile defense program developed by the Bush administration, it's likely that the Russians will target the Czech Republic with their tactical nuclear missiles. But many Czechs are fearful of an even greater danger than Russia: The possibility that the U.S. may decide not to deploy the defense system. Unfortunately, Vice President Joseph Biden suggested this prospect last week in Munich when he said, "We will wait for what the experts say and then we will see."
Czech politicians and their Polish counterparts have invested a lot of political capital in the missile defense project. If the Obama administration doesn't follow through, supporters of the missile shield would feel abandoned by the U.S.
What's worse, Czech and Polish leaders would lose credibility among their opponents and, most importantly, Russia. Moscow would see the failure to build the radar system as proof of its influence over Central Europe, and as recognition of its veto power over European security policy.
Mr. Biden doesn't seem to appreciate that the missile defense project isn't just about American interests. It's about the Czechs and the Poles, too.
The Americans wanted the radar and the interceptors, and they wanted them within the borders of our countries. Our leaders went to great lengths to meet Washington's requests. They stood firm in the face of passionate protests at home and intimidation from Russia. Recently, Moscow backed down from its threat to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, but it stands ready to follow through if missile defense becomes a reality.
It's beginning to look as though the Americans were taking us for a ride. Now that there's a new driver in the White House, they think they can just drop us off at the curb.
Even if the Obama administration wants to backtrack on missile defense, doing so won't return relations with Russia to the status quo ante. This is because Russia has transformed the issue of the missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland into evidence of its growing influence. Russia has turned this into a question of its power beyond its borders.
If it weren't for Russia, there would be little difficulty in Washington's change of heart. Yet Russia's involvement makes the game a different one entirely. While several interceptors in Poland can stop individual missiles, they can't prevent a massive strike by a nuclear power like Russia. This is because the system is aimed at Iran, not Russia.
Moscow's rigid position has hardened the resolve of Prague and Warsaw, which fear that the Kremlin is attempting to dictate the limits of Czech and Polish sovereignty and foreign policy. We have experienced this before.
This, at least, is how the situation appears from the Czech point of view. I can already anticipate the Obama administration's conclusion: that missile defense is an expensive diversion with uncertain benefits and unpleasant side effects. Such an outcome is all the more likely given the global economic crisis and the difficult fiscal situation in the U.S.
There's no doubt that Russia would profit from a scenario in which the U.S. put the missile defense project on hold. Just consider the situation in Georgia last summer.
During the conflict in South Ossetia, it was alarming how many observers in the U.S. press implied that NATO enlargement was a mistake. The tone of these articles strongly suggested that expansion of the Atlantic alliance only caused the U.S. more trouble with Russia. They also implied that the U.S. and other Western powers were less than fully committed to their new eastern partners.
In this light, it's clear that American retreat on the missile defense program would hand Moscow a huge victory. Washington can't afford to leave the Czechs out in the cold.
Mr. Vodicka is senior writer for the Czech newspaper Mladá Fronta Dnes.
Saturday, January 17, 2009
US State Dept: Call for Iran to End Stoning
Call for Iran to End Stoning
Press Statement
US State Dept, Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
January 16, 2009
The United States joins the international community in expressing concern about the inhumane practice of stoning in the Islamic Republic of Iran. On January 13, an Iranian judiciary spokesman confirmed that two men had been stoned to death for the charge of adultery in the city of Mashhad. This cruel and unusual punishment is an inhumane practice that does not meet the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Iran has ratified. We call on Iran not only to permanently abolish the practice of stoning, but to offer all defendants fair and transparent trials.
2009/ 065
Press Statement
US State Dept, Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
January 16, 2009
The United States joins the international community in expressing concern about the inhumane practice of stoning in the Islamic Republic of Iran. On January 13, an Iranian judiciary spokesman confirmed that two men had been stoned to death for the charge of adultery in the city of Mashhad. This cruel and unusual punishment is an inhumane practice that does not meet the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Iran has ratified. We call on Iran not only to permanently abolish the practice of stoning, but to offer all defendants fair and transparent trials.
2009/ 065
Sunday, January 11, 2009
Conservative views on Hillary Clinton nomination
Key Questions for Senator Hillary Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State, by Steven Groves
Heritage, January 12, 2009WebMemo #2201
Excerpts:
On January 20, the incoming Administration will confront a multitude of international issues. The challenges facing the new secretary of state include intractable regional problems such as Iran, Pakistan, and the status of Taiwan; challenges to U.S. sovereignty posed by multilateral treaties and international organizations; and important national security issues such as NATO expansion and missile defense.
In order to determine where the next secretary of state stands on these crucial issues, the following questions should be put to the nominee during her confirmation hearing:
Question #1: American Sovereignty and International Organizations
What is your view regarding the status within the international system of the independent, sovereign state in general, and the importance of preserving and protecting American sovereignty in particular? Do you ascribe to traditional views of national sovereignty or to the theory of "global governance"?
Answer: There are two competing viewpoints regarding national sovereignty: The traditional view is that the sovereign state has been and should remain the basic operating entity within the international system[1] and that while states participate in international coalitions or organizations (such as the United Nations) in pursuit of goals that transcend their borders, those organizations are restricted to serving the goals of states, not governing them.[2] The competing view advocates "global governance," a system in which sovereignty is a passé notion in an increasingly interconnected world and where international organizations have the same, if not greater, authority to determine the policies of sovereign states. In fact, former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott once predicted that some day "nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single global authority."[3]
The United States should continue to act in concert with its allies to pursue ends of an international nature such as multilateral efforts to combat piracy on the high seas, stabilizing Afghanistan with our partners in NATO, maintaining open global markets, and interdicting banned weapons and technology through the Proliferation Security Initiative. The U.S. should not, however, cede to any nation, group of nations, or international organization the authority to bind the U.S. on matters relating to its national interests, including (but not limited to) nuclear arms,[4] humanitarian intervention,[5] "climate change,"[6] interpretation of the U.S. Constitution,[7] or any other matter that would erode American sovereignty.
Question #2: Pending and Proposed Multilateral Treaties
What are your views regarding several controversial multilateral treaties and efforts by the United Nations that, if supported or ratified by the United States, would erode American sovereignty?
Answer: The "international community," usually acting through the U.N. system, often seeks to influence U.S. foreign policy and constrain American power by enmeshing the U.S. in multilateral conventions such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposed U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. Similarly, international organizations and U.N. treaty committees often seek to impose upon America their collective views on controversial and personal matters such as the care and education of children, the death penalty, abortion rights, gun control, and any number of issues traditionally left to Congress, the President, and the American people.
Efforts by international organizations to shape U.S. domestic policy should be opposed, including attempts to modify U.S. law regarding the rights of women and children,[8] the criminal justice system,[9] free speech,[10] and other matters traditionally determined by domestic democratic processes. Moreover, the U.S. must reject attempts by the international community that would limit its options to navigate the high seas and explore the deep seabed,[11] as well as its ability to arm resistance movements against tyrannical regimes.
Question #3: Afghanistan and Pakistan
How will you deal with the threat from a resurgent Taliban that is undermining coalition efforts in Afghanistan and destabilizing parts of northwest Pakistan? How will you martial U.S. diplomatic resources and assistance programs to build up Afghan institutions and convince the Pakistani leadership to stiffen its resolve against the Taliban and other violent extremist groups finding refuge within its borders?
Answer:Sending new U.S. troops to Afghanistan is a welcome step that signals continuing U.S. commitment to the region. However, Washington must also convince its NATO allies to pull their weight in overcoming the terrorist challenge in Afghanistan, which threatens all civilized nations.[12]The U.S. also needs to be cautious in attempting to engage with Taliban elements. Political reconciliation is indeed necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal border areas. But Washington must avoid making statements that could embolden the Taliban leadership and dishearten the Afghan population, who do not support Taliban policies but are intimidated by their violent tactics. While the idea of peeling off lower-level Taliban who are not ideologically committed to the cause may be worthwhile, the U.S. should not overestimate the willingness of senior Taliban leaders to break ranks with their al-Qaeda allies.[13]
The U.S. should also better integrate its strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, focusing more attention on regional diplomacy and building bridges between the two nations.[14]It is essential that Pakistan and Afghanistan work together to combat terrorism, which constitutes an existential threat to both their countries. Washington needs to recalibrate its relationship with Pakistan in a way that draws the country back from the brink of political and financial collapse and convinces the military establishment that Pakistan's national security interests are no longer served by supporting extremists, whether they operate in Afghanistan or India.[15] This should be done through both a calibrated carrot-and-stick policy that targets the military's interests and through increased regional diplomacy.
The Obama Administration, however, should avoid falling into the trap of trying to "resolve" Kashmir. Any effort to inject a direct U.S. role in the Indo-Pakistani bilateral peace process risks encouraging both Pakistani adventurism and unrealistic expectations for a settlement in its favor.[16] Moreover, the Indians would be unreceptive to attempts at direct U.S. mediation and would assume that Washington is reverting back to policies that view India only through the South Asia lens, rather than as the emerging global power it has become.
Question #4: A Nuclear Iran
What is your view on how the United States can best take action to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program?
Answer: The U.S. should mobilize an international coalition to significantly boost the diplomatic, economic, domestic political, and potential military costs to Tehran of continuing on its present path toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. This coalition should seek to isolate Iran's radical theocratic regime, weaken it through targeted economic sanctions, explain to the Iranian people why their government's nuclear policies will impose growing economic costs and military risks on them, cooperate to contain and deter Iran's military power, encourage democratic change within Iran, and prepare for the use of military force as a last resort.[17]
Unfortunately, the U.N. Security Council is a diplomatic dead end whose actions will likely continue to be insufficient to stop Iran's drive for nuclear weapons.[18] Past U.S. and European efforts to ratchet up sanctions against Iran in the council have been blocked by Russia and China, which have lucrative trade relationships with, and strategic ties to, Tehran. Britain, Germany, and France have entered a diplomatic dialogue with Tehran to dissuade it from continuing its nuclear program by offering substantial economic and political incentives. But diplomatic carrots alone will not work because for Tehran, attaining a nuclear weapon is the biggest carrot of all.
Therefore, tougher disincentives for Iran's suspected nuclear efforts are needed. When Tehran perceives the costs of a continued nuclear program to be very high, as it did after the overthrow of regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be more likely to make concessions and freeze its uranium enrichment program. The Obama Administration should press its European allies--particularly Germany, which is Iran's biggest trading partner--to increase economic sanctions outside the U.N. framework.[19] To give diplomacy a chance, the U.S. and its allies must credibly threaten to impose rising costs on Tehran, particularly in ways that endanger the regime's highest priority--its hold on power.
Question #5: The Visa Waiver Program
Please describe your views regarding the Visa Waiver Program's role in America's overall public diplomacy strategy, including ongoing efforts to strengthen the program. What opportunities and challenges do you see to its continuance in the next Administration?
[...]
Question #6: China and Taiwan
While you are secretary of state, will the Administration reaffirm that Taiwan's status remains unsettled and that the U.S. therefore does not accept the sovereign right of any third country to use force of any kind against Taiwan?
Answer: While current U.S. relations with China make it impossible to declare that Taiwan is a state, nothing can justify the assertion that Taiwan is not a state. Under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, Taiwan possesses all the attributes of a state, and under any interpretation the U.S. tacitly accepts that Taiwan functions in the international community as a sovereign state. All treaties in force between the U.S. and Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979, remain in force, and the U.S. continues to conduct defense and security affairs, including arms sales, with Taiwan as an entity wholly autonomous from the People's Republic of China.[30]
The U.S. must reaffirm that Taiwan's future rests on the assent of the Taiwanese people. While current U.S. diplomatic formulas include assertions that the Taiwan issue is a matter for "the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait" to resolve, the context of such positions must be clarified. As President Ronald Reagan pledged, the U.S. "will not ... prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan" about their future. As a reflection of America's democratic values, the U.S. must give preferential weight to the people of Taiwan in determining their own future.[31]
Question #7: Missile Defense
The NATO Alliance recently recognized in its Bucharest communiqué "the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets." Will you stand with our NATO allies and reaffirm the importance of missile defense?
Answer: At NATO's April 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders endorsed U.S. plans to install 10 long-range, ground-based missile defense interceptors in Poland and a mid-course radar in the Czech Republic--the "third site."[32] At NATO's December 2008 foreign ministerial summit in Brussels, all 26 members of the alliance re-endorsed the third site deployment. These endorsements represent a major success both for American diplomacy and transatlantic security.[33] If the United States abandons its Central and Eastern European allies as well as its obligations to NATO, it will not only make itself vulnerable to rogue nations and non-state actors seeking ballistic missile capabilities, but it will also reduce America's influence within the transatlantic alliance.
The threat of ballistic missile attack has grown exponentially, with 27 nations now possessing such capabilities, nearly double that of 15 years ago.[34] It is incumbent upon the United States to consider these growing threats seriously by taking steps to protect itself, its forward-deployed troops, and its friends and allies. As a purely defensive capability, U.S. missile defense plans for Europe will also act as a deterrent to bad actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the first place.
It is further incumbent upon the United States to stand by its existing commitments to Warsaw and Prague, as well as to the NATO alliance as a whole. Mr. Obama should begin his presidency by reaffirming the Bucharest communiqué, as well as his vow to rebuild a strong NATO.
Question #8: NATO Expansion
Do you support President-elect Barack Obama's statement that "Ukraine and Georgia ... have declared their readiness to advance a NATO Membership Action Plan. ... They should receive our help and encouragement as they continue to develop ties to Atlantic and European institutions"?[35]
[...]
Question #9: Public Diplomacy
How do you intend to improve the effectiveness of the United States's public diplomacy and strategic communication, and would you support the creation of a new government agency to take the lead on these issues?
[...]
Question #10: Durban II and the U.N. Human Rights Council
In its first few months, the Obama Administration will decide whether to change existing U.S. policy to attend the Durban Review Conference (Durban II) and fully participate in the United Nations Human Rights Council by seeking a seat in the upcoming May election. Would you recommend that the President continue current policy or reverse it?
[...]
[References can be seen at the original link]
Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The following Heritage Foundation analysts contributed to this report: Daniella Markheim, Lisa Curtis, James Phillips, Jena Baker McNeill, James Dean, John J. Tkacik, Jr., Sally McNamara, Helle C. Dale, Baker Spring, and Brett D. Schaefer.
Heritage, January 12, 2009WebMemo #2201
Excerpts:
On January 20, the incoming Administration will confront a multitude of international issues. The challenges facing the new secretary of state include intractable regional problems such as Iran, Pakistan, and the status of Taiwan; challenges to U.S. sovereignty posed by multilateral treaties and international organizations; and important national security issues such as NATO expansion and missile defense.
In order to determine where the next secretary of state stands on these crucial issues, the following questions should be put to the nominee during her confirmation hearing:
Question #1: American Sovereignty and International Organizations
What is your view regarding the status within the international system of the independent, sovereign state in general, and the importance of preserving and protecting American sovereignty in particular? Do you ascribe to traditional views of national sovereignty or to the theory of "global governance"?
Answer: There are two competing viewpoints regarding national sovereignty: The traditional view is that the sovereign state has been and should remain the basic operating entity within the international system[1] and that while states participate in international coalitions or organizations (such as the United Nations) in pursuit of goals that transcend their borders, those organizations are restricted to serving the goals of states, not governing them.[2] The competing view advocates "global governance," a system in which sovereignty is a passé notion in an increasingly interconnected world and where international organizations have the same, if not greater, authority to determine the policies of sovereign states. In fact, former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott once predicted that some day "nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single global authority."[3]
The United States should continue to act in concert with its allies to pursue ends of an international nature such as multilateral efforts to combat piracy on the high seas, stabilizing Afghanistan with our partners in NATO, maintaining open global markets, and interdicting banned weapons and technology through the Proliferation Security Initiative. The U.S. should not, however, cede to any nation, group of nations, or international organization the authority to bind the U.S. on matters relating to its national interests, including (but not limited to) nuclear arms,[4] humanitarian intervention,[5] "climate change,"[6] interpretation of the U.S. Constitution,[7] or any other matter that would erode American sovereignty.
Question #2: Pending and Proposed Multilateral Treaties
What are your views regarding several controversial multilateral treaties and efforts by the United Nations that, if supported or ratified by the United States, would erode American sovereignty?
Answer: The "international community," usually acting through the U.N. system, often seeks to influence U.S. foreign policy and constrain American power by enmeshing the U.S. in multilateral conventions such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposed U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. Similarly, international organizations and U.N. treaty committees often seek to impose upon America their collective views on controversial and personal matters such as the care and education of children, the death penalty, abortion rights, gun control, and any number of issues traditionally left to Congress, the President, and the American people.
Efforts by international organizations to shape U.S. domestic policy should be opposed, including attempts to modify U.S. law regarding the rights of women and children,[8] the criminal justice system,[9] free speech,[10] and other matters traditionally determined by domestic democratic processes. Moreover, the U.S. must reject attempts by the international community that would limit its options to navigate the high seas and explore the deep seabed,[11] as well as its ability to arm resistance movements against tyrannical regimes.
Question #3: Afghanistan and Pakistan
How will you deal with the threat from a resurgent Taliban that is undermining coalition efforts in Afghanistan and destabilizing parts of northwest Pakistan? How will you martial U.S. diplomatic resources and assistance programs to build up Afghan institutions and convince the Pakistani leadership to stiffen its resolve against the Taliban and other violent extremist groups finding refuge within its borders?
Answer:Sending new U.S. troops to Afghanistan is a welcome step that signals continuing U.S. commitment to the region. However, Washington must also convince its NATO allies to pull their weight in overcoming the terrorist challenge in Afghanistan, which threatens all civilized nations.[12]The U.S. also needs to be cautious in attempting to engage with Taliban elements. Political reconciliation is indeed necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal border areas. But Washington must avoid making statements that could embolden the Taliban leadership and dishearten the Afghan population, who do not support Taliban policies but are intimidated by their violent tactics. While the idea of peeling off lower-level Taliban who are not ideologically committed to the cause may be worthwhile, the U.S. should not overestimate the willingness of senior Taliban leaders to break ranks with their al-Qaeda allies.[13]
The U.S. should also better integrate its strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, focusing more attention on regional diplomacy and building bridges between the two nations.[14]It is essential that Pakistan and Afghanistan work together to combat terrorism, which constitutes an existential threat to both their countries. Washington needs to recalibrate its relationship with Pakistan in a way that draws the country back from the brink of political and financial collapse and convinces the military establishment that Pakistan's national security interests are no longer served by supporting extremists, whether they operate in Afghanistan or India.[15] This should be done through both a calibrated carrot-and-stick policy that targets the military's interests and through increased regional diplomacy.
The Obama Administration, however, should avoid falling into the trap of trying to "resolve" Kashmir. Any effort to inject a direct U.S. role in the Indo-Pakistani bilateral peace process risks encouraging both Pakistani adventurism and unrealistic expectations for a settlement in its favor.[16] Moreover, the Indians would be unreceptive to attempts at direct U.S. mediation and would assume that Washington is reverting back to policies that view India only through the South Asia lens, rather than as the emerging global power it has become.
Question #4: A Nuclear Iran
What is your view on how the United States can best take action to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program?
Answer: The U.S. should mobilize an international coalition to significantly boost the diplomatic, economic, domestic political, and potential military costs to Tehran of continuing on its present path toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. This coalition should seek to isolate Iran's radical theocratic regime, weaken it through targeted economic sanctions, explain to the Iranian people why their government's nuclear policies will impose growing economic costs and military risks on them, cooperate to contain and deter Iran's military power, encourage democratic change within Iran, and prepare for the use of military force as a last resort.[17]
Unfortunately, the U.N. Security Council is a diplomatic dead end whose actions will likely continue to be insufficient to stop Iran's drive for nuclear weapons.[18] Past U.S. and European efforts to ratchet up sanctions against Iran in the council have been blocked by Russia and China, which have lucrative trade relationships with, and strategic ties to, Tehran. Britain, Germany, and France have entered a diplomatic dialogue with Tehran to dissuade it from continuing its nuclear program by offering substantial economic and political incentives. But diplomatic carrots alone will not work because for Tehran, attaining a nuclear weapon is the biggest carrot of all.
Therefore, tougher disincentives for Iran's suspected nuclear efforts are needed. When Tehran perceives the costs of a continued nuclear program to be very high, as it did after the overthrow of regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be more likely to make concessions and freeze its uranium enrichment program. The Obama Administration should press its European allies--particularly Germany, which is Iran's biggest trading partner--to increase economic sanctions outside the U.N. framework.[19] To give diplomacy a chance, the U.S. and its allies must credibly threaten to impose rising costs on Tehran, particularly in ways that endanger the regime's highest priority--its hold on power.
Question #5: The Visa Waiver Program
Please describe your views regarding the Visa Waiver Program's role in America's overall public diplomacy strategy, including ongoing efforts to strengthen the program. What opportunities and challenges do you see to its continuance in the next Administration?
[...]
Question #6: China and Taiwan
While you are secretary of state, will the Administration reaffirm that Taiwan's status remains unsettled and that the U.S. therefore does not accept the sovereign right of any third country to use force of any kind against Taiwan?
Answer: While current U.S. relations with China make it impossible to declare that Taiwan is a state, nothing can justify the assertion that Taiwan is not a state. Under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, Taiwan possesses all the attributes of a state, and under any interpretation the U.S. tacitly accepts that Taiwan functions in the international community as a sovereign state. All treaties in force between the U.S. and Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979, remain in force, and the U.S. continues to conduct defense and security affairs, including arms sales, with Taiwan as an entity wholly autonomous from the People's Republic of China.[30]
The U.S. must reaffirm that Taiwan's future rests on the assent of the Taiwanese people. While current U.S. diplomatic formulas include assertions that the Taiwan issue is a matter for "the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait" to resolve, the context of such positions must be clarified. As President Ronald Reagan pledged, the U.S. "will not ... prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan" about their future. As a reflection of America's democratic values, the U.S. must give preferential weight to the people of Taiwan in determining their own future.[31]
Question #7: Missile Defense
The NATO Alliance recently recognized in its Bucharest communiqué "the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets." Will you stand with our NATO allies and reaffirm the importance of missile defense?
Answer: At NATO's April 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders endorsed U.S. plans to install 10 long-range, ground-based missile defense interceptors in Poland and a mid-course radar in the Czech Republic--the "third site."[32] At NATO's December 2008 foreign ministerial summit in Brussels, all 26 members of the alliance re-endorsed the third site deployment. These endorsements represent a major success both for American diplomacy and transatlantic security.[33] If the United States abandons its Central and Eastern European allies as well as its obligations to NATO, it will not only make itself vulnerable to rogue nations and non-state actors seeking ballistic missile capabilities, but it will also reduce America's influence within the transatlantic alliance.
The threat of ballistic missile attack has grown exponentially, with 27 nations now possessing such capabilities, nearly double that of 15 years ago.[34] It is incumbent upon the United States to consider these growing threats seriously by taking steps to protect itself, its forward-deployed troops, and its friends and allies. As a purely defensive capability, U.S. missile defense plans for Europe will also act as a deterrent to bad actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the first place.
It is further incumbent upon the United States to stand by its existing commitments to Warsaw and Prague, as well as to the NATO alliance as a whole. Mr. Obama should begin his presidency by reaffirming the Bucharest communiqué, as well as his vow to rebuild a strong NATO.
Question #8: NATO Expansion
Do you support President-elect Barack Obama's statement that "Ukraine and Georgia ... have declared their readiness to advance a NATO Membership Action Plan. ... They should receive our help and encouragement as they continue to develop ties to Atlantic and European institutions"?[35]
[...]
Question #9: Public Diplomacy
How do you intend to improve the effectiveness of the United States's public diplomacy and strategic communication, and would you support the creation of a new government agency to take the lead on these issues?
[...]
Question #10: Durban II and the U.N. Human Rights Council
In its first few months, the Obama Administration will decide whether to change existing U.S. policy to attend the Durban Review Conference (Durban II) and fully participate in the United Nations Human Rights Council by seeking a seat in the upcoming May election. Would you recommend that the President continue current policy or reverse it?
[...]
[References can be seen at the original link]
Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The following Heritage Foundation analysts contributed to this report: Daniella Markheim, Lisa Curtis, James Phillips, Jena Baker McNeill, James Dean, John J. Tkacik, Jr., Sally McNamara, Helle C. Dale, Baker Spring, and Brett D. Schaefer.
Saturday, January 10, 2009
U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site
U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site, by David E Sanger
TNYT, January 11, 2009
WASHINGTON — President Bush deflected a secret request by Israel last year for specialized bunker-busting bombs it wanted for an attack on Iran’s main nuclear complex and told the Israelis that he had authorized new covert action intended to sabotage Iran’s suspected effort to develop nuclear weapons, according to senior American and foreign officials.
White House officials never conclusively determined whether Israel had decided to go ahead with the strike before the United States protested, or whether Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel was trying to goad the White House into more decisive action before Mr. Bush left office. But the Bush administration was particularly alarmed by an Israeli request to fly over Iraq to reach Iran’s major nuclear complex at Natanz, where the country’s only known uranium enrichment plant is located.
The White House denied that request outright, American officials said, and the Israelis backed off their plans, at least temporarily. But the tense exchanges also prompted the White House to step up intelligence-sharing with Israel and brief Israeli officials on new American efforts to subtly sabotage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a major covert program that Mr. Bush is about to hand off to President-elect Barack Obama.
This account of the expanded American covert program and the Bush administration’s efforts to dissuade Israel from an aerial attack on Iran emerged in interviews over the past 15 months with current and former American officials, outside experts, international nuclear inspectors and European and Israeli officials. None would speak on the record because of the great secrecy surrounding the intelligence developed on Iran.
Several details of the covert effort have been omitted from this account, at the request of senior United States intelligence and administration officials, to avoid harming continuing operations.
The interviews also suggest that while Mr. Bush was extensively briefed on options for an overt American attack on Iran’s facilities, he never instructed the Pentagon to move beyond contingency planning, even during the final year of his presidency, contrary to what some critics have suggested.
The interviews also indicate that Mr. Bush was convinced by top administration officials, led by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, that any overt attack on Iran would probably prove ineffective, lead to the expulsion of international inspectors and drive Iran’s nuclear effort further out of view. Mr. Bush and his aides also discussed the possibility that an airstrike could ignite a broad Middle East war in which America’s 140,000 troops in Iraq would inevitably become involved.
Instead, Mr. Bush embraced more intensive covert operations actions aimed at Iran, the interviews show, having concluded that the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies were failing to slow the uranium enrichment efforts. Those covert operations, and the question of whether Israel will settle for something less than a conventional attack on Iran, pose immediate and wrenching decisions for Mr. Obama.
The covert American program, started in early 2008, includes renewed American efforts to penetrate Iran’s nuclear supply chain abroad, along with new efforts, some of them experimental, to undermine electrical systems, computer systems and other networks on which Iran relies. It is aimed at delaying the day that Iran can produce the weapons-grade fuel and designs it needs to produce a workable nuclear weapon.
Knowledge of the program has been closely held, yet inside the Bush administration some officials are skeptical about its chances of success, arguing that past efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear program have been detected by the Iranians and have only delayed, not derailed, their drive to unlock the secrets of uranium enrichment.
Late last year, international inspectors estimated that Iran had 3,800 centrifuges spinning, but American intelligence officials now estimate that the figure is 4,000 to 5,000, enough to produce about one weapon’s worth of uranium every eight months or so.
While declining to be specific, one American official dismissed the latest covert operations against Iran as “science experiments.” One senior intelligence official argued that as Mr. Bush prepared to leave office, the Iranians were already so close to achieving a weapons capacity that they were unlikely to be stopped.
Others disagreed, making the point that the Israelis would not have been dissuaded from conducting an attack if they believed that the American effort was unlikely to prove effective.
Since his election on Nov. 4, Mr. Obama has been extensively briefed on the American actions in Iran, though his transition aides have refused to comment on the issue.
Early in his presidency, Mr. Obama must decide whether the covert actions begun by Mr. Bush are worth the risks of disrupting what he has pledged will be a more active diplomatic effort to engage with Iran.
Either course could carry risks for Mr. Obama. An inherited intelligence or military mission that went wrong could backfire, as happened to President Kennedy with the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. But a decision to pull back on operations aimed at Iran could leave Mr. Obama vulnerable to charges that he is allowing Iran to speed ahead toward a nuclear capacity, one that could change the contours of power in the Middle East.
An Intelligence Conflict
Israel’s effort to obtain the weapons, refueling capacity and permission to fly over Iraq for an attack on Iran grew out of its disbelief and anger at an American intelligence assessment completed in late 2007 that concluded that Iran had effectively suspended its development of nuclear weapons four years earlier.
That conclusion also stunned Mr. Bush’s national security team — and Mr. Bush himself, who was deeply suspicious of the conclusion, according to officials who discussed it with him.
The assessment, a National Intelligence Estimate, was based on a trove of Iranian reports obtained by penetrating Iran’s computer networks.
Those reports indicated that Iranian engineers had been ordered to halt development of a nuclear warhead in 2003, even while they continued to speed ahead in enriching uranium, the most difficult obstacle to building a weapon.
The “key judgments” of the National Intelligence Estimate, which were publicly released, emphasized the suspension of the weapons work.
The public version made only glancing reference to evidence described at great length in the 140-page classified version of the assessment: the suspicion that Iran had 10 or 15 other nuclear-related facilities, never opened to international inspectors, where enrichment activity, weapons work or the manufacturing of centrifuges might be taking place.
The Israelis responded angrily and rebutted the American report, providing American intelligence officials and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with evidence that they said indicated that the Iranians were still working on a weapon.
While the Americans were not convinced that the Iranian weapons development was continuing, the Israelis were not the only ones highly critical of the United States report. Secretary Gates, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said the report had presented the evidence poorly, underemphasizing the importance of Iran’s enrichment activity and overemphasizing the suspension of a weapons-design effort that could easily be turned back on.
In an interview, Mr. Gates said that in his whole career he had never seen “an N.I.E. that had such an impact on U.S. diplomacy,” because “people figured, well, the military option is now off the table.”
Prime Minister Olmert came to the same conclusion. He had previously expected, according to several Americans and Israeli officials, that Mr. Bush would deal with Iran’s nuclear program before he left office. “Now,” said one American official who bore the brunt of Israel’s reaction, “they didn’t believe he would.”
Attack Planning
Early in 2008, the Israeli government signaled that it might be preparing to take matters into its own hands. In a series of meetings, Israeli officials asked Washington for a new generation of powerful bunker-busters, far more capable of blowing up a deep underground plant than anything in Israel’s arsenal of conventional weapons. They asked for refueling equipment that would allow their aircraft to reach Iran and return to Israel. And they asked for the right to fly over Iraq.
Mr. Bush deflected the first two requests, pushing the issue off, but “we said ‘hell no’ to the overflights,” one of his top aides said. At the White House and the Pentagon, there was widespread concern that a political uproar in Iraq about the use of its American-controlled airspace could result in the expulsion of American forces from the country.
The Israeli ambassador to the United States, Sallai Meridor, declined several requests over the past four weeks to be interviewed about Israel’s efforts to obtain the weapons from Washington, saying through aides that he was too busy.
Last June, the Israelis conducted an exercise over the Mediterranean Sea that appeared to be a dry run for an attack on the enrichment plant at Natanz. When the exercise was analyzed at the Pentagon, officials concluded that the distances flown almost exactly equaled the distance between Israel and the Iranian nuclear site.
“This really spooked a lot of people,” one White House official said. White House officials discussed the possibility that the Israelis would fly over Iraq without American permission. In that case, would the American military be ordered to shoot them down? If the United States did not interfere to stop an Israeli attack, would the Bush administration be accused of being complicit in it?
Admiral Mullen, traveling to Israel in early July on a previously scheduled trip, questioned Israeli officials about their intentions. His Israeli counterpart, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, argued that an aerial attack could set Iran’s program back by two or three years, according to officials familiar with the exchange. The American estimates at the time were far more conservative.
Yet by the time Admiral Mullen made his visit, Israeli officials appear to have concluded that without American help, they were not yet capable of hitting the site effectively enough to strike a decisive blow against the Iranian program.
The United States did give Israel one item on its shopping list: high-powered radar, called the X-Band, to detect any Iranian missile launchings. It was the only element in the Israeli request that could be used solely for defense, not offense.
Mr. Gates’s spokesman, Geoff Morrell, said last week that Mr. Gates — whom Mr. Obama is retaining as defense secretary — believed that “a potential strike on the Iranian facilities is not something that we or anyone else should be pursuing at this time.”
A New Covert Push
Throughout 2008, the Bush administration insisted that it had a plan to deal with the Iranians: applying overwhelming financial pressure that would persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear program, as foreign enterprises like the French company Total pulled out of Iranian oil projects, European banks cut financing, and trade credits were squeezed.
But the Iranians were making uranium faster than the sanctions were making progress. As Mr. Bush realized that the sanctions he had pressed for were inadequate and his military options untenable, he turned to the C.I.A. His hope, several people involved in the program said, was to create some leverage against the Iranians, by setting back their nuclear program while sanctions continued and, more recently, oil prices dropped precipitously.
There were two specific objectives: to slow progress at Natanz and other known and suspected nuclear facilities, and keep the pressure on a little-known Iranian professor named Mohsen Fakrizadeh, a scientist described in classified portions of American intelligence reports as deeply involved in an effort to design a nuclear warhead for Iran.
Past American-led efforts aimed at Natanz had yielded little result. Several years ago, foreign intelligence services tinkered with individual power units that Iran bought in Turkey to drive its centrifuges, the floor-to-ceiling silvery tubes that spin at the speed of sound, enriching uranium for use in power stations or, with additional enrichment, nuclear weapons.
A number of centrifuges blew up, prompting public declarations of sabotage by Iranian officials. An engineer in Switzerland, who worked with the Pakistani nuclear black-marketeer Abdul Qadeer Khan, had been “turned” by American intelligence officials and helped them slip faulty technology into parts bought by the Iranians.
What Mr. Bush authorized, and informed a narrow group of Congressional leaders about, was a far broader effort, aimed at the entire industrial infrastructure that supports the Iranian nuclear program. Some of the efforts focused on ways to destabilize the centrifuges. The details are closely held, for obvious reasons, by American officials. One official, however, said, “It was not until the last year that they got really imaginative about what one could do to screw up the system.”
Then, he cautioned, “none of these are game-changers,” meaning that the efforts would not necessarily cripple the Iranian program. Others in the administration strongly disagree.
In the end, success or failure may come down to how much pressure can be brought to bear on Mr. Fakrizadeh, whom the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate identifies, in its classified sections, as the manager of Project 110 and Project 111. According to a presentation by the chief inspector of the International Atomic Energy Agency, those were the names for two Iranian efforts that appeared to be dedicated to designing a warhead and making it work with an Iranian missile. Iranian officials say the projects are a fiction, made up by the United States.
While the international agency readily concedes that the evidence about the two projects remains murky, one of the documents it briefly displayed at a meeting of the agency’s member countries in Vienna last year, from Mr. Fakrizadeh’s projects, showed the chronology of a missile launching, ending with a warhead exploding about 650 yards above ground — approximately the altitude from which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was detonated.
The exact status of Mr. Fakrizadeh’s projects today is unclear. While the National Intelligence Estimate reported that activity on Projects 110 and 111 had been halted, the fear among intelligence agencies is that if the weapons design projects are turned back on, will they know?
David E. Sanger is the chief Washington correspondent for The New York Times. Reporting for this article was developed in the course of research for “The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power,” to be published Tuesday by Harmony Books.
TNYT, January 11, 2009
WASHINGTON — President Bush deflected a secret request by Israel last year for specialized bunker-busting bombs it wanted for an attack on Iran’s main nuclear complex and told the Israelis that he had authorized new covert action intended to sabotage Iran’s suspected effort to develop nuclear weapons, according to senior American and foreign officials.
White House officials never conclusively determined whether Israel had decided to go ahead with the strike before the United States protested, or whether Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel was trying to goad the White House into more decisive action before Mr. Bush left office. But the Bush administration was particularly alarmed by an Israeli request to fly over Iraq to reach Iran’s major nuclear complex at Natanz, where the country’s only known uranium enrichment plant is located.
The White House denied that request outright, American officials said, and the Israelis backed off their plans, at least temporarily. But the tense exchanges also prompted the White House to step up intelligence-sharing with Israel and brief Israeli officials on new American efforts to subtly sabotage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a major covert program that Mr. Bush is about to hand off to President-elect Barack Obama.
This account of the expanded American covert program and the Bush administration’s efforts to dissuade Israel from an aerial attack on Iran emerged in interviews over the past 15 months with current and former American officials, outside experts, international nuclear inspectors and European and Israeli officials. None would speak on the record because of the great secrecy surrounding the intelligence developed on Iran.
Several details of the covert effort have been omitted from this account, at the request of senior United States intelligence and administration officials, to avoid harming continuing operations.
The interviews also suggest that while Mr. Bush was extensively briefed on options for an overt American attack on Iran’s facilities, he never instructed the Pentagon to move beyond contingency planning, even during the final year of his presidency, contrary to what some critics have suggested.
The interviews also indicate that Mr. Bush was convinced by top administration officials, led by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, that any overt attack on Iran would probably prove ineffective, lead to the expulsion of international inspectors and drive Iran’s nuclear effort further out of view. Mr. Bush and his aides also discussed the possibility that an airstrike could ignite a broad Middle East war in which America’s 140,000 troops in Iraq would inevitably become involved.
Instead, Mr. Bush embraced more intensive covert operations actions aimed at Iran, the interviews show, having concluded that the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies were failing to slow the uranium enrichment efforts. Those covert operations, and the question of whether Israel will settle for something less than a conventional attack on Iran, pose immediate and wrenching decisions for Mr. Obama.
The covert American program, started in early 2008, includes renewed American efforts to penetrate Iran’s nuclear supply chain abroad, along with new efforts, some of them experimental, to undermine electrical systems, computer systems and other networks on which Iran relies. It is aimed at delaying the day that Iran can produce the weapons-grade fuel and designs it needs to produce a workable nuclear weapon.
Knowledge of the program has been closely held, yet inside the Bush administration some officials are skeptical about its chances of success, arguing that past efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear program have been detected by the Iranians and have only delayed, not derailed, their drive to unlock the secrets of uranium enrichment.
Late last year, international inspectors estimated that Iran had 3,800 centrifuges spinning, but American intelligence officials now estimate that the figure is 4,000 to 5,000, enough to produce about one weapon’s worth of uranium every eight months or so.
While declining to be specific, one American official dismissed the latest covert operations against Iran as “science experiments.” One senior intelligence official argued that as Mr. Bush prepared to leave office, the Iranians were already so close to achieving a weapons capacity that they were unlikely to be stopped.
Others disagreed, making the point that the Israelis would not have been dissuaded from conducting an attack if they believed that the American effort was unlikely to prove effective.
Since his election on Nov. 4, Mr. Obama has been extensively briefed on the American actions in Iran, though his transition aides have refused to comment on the issue.
Early in his presidency, Mr. Obama must decide whether the covert actions begun by Mr. Bush are worth the risks of disrupting what he has pledged will be a more active diplomatic effort to engage with Iran.
Either course could carry risks for Mr. Obama. An inherited intelligence or military mission that went wrong could backfire, as happened to President Kennedy with the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. But a decision to pull back on operations aimed at Iran could leave Mr. Obama vulnerable to charges that he is allowing Iran to speed ahead toward a nuclear capacity, one that could change the contours of power in the Middle East.
An Intelligence Conflict
Israel’s effort to obtain the weapons, refueling capacity and permission to fly over Iraq for an attack on Iran grew out of its disbelief and anger at an American intelligence assessment completed in late 2007 that concluded that Iran had effectively suspended its development of nuclear weapons four years earlier.
That conclusion also stunned Mr. Bush’s national security team — and Mr. Bush himself, who was deeply suspicious of the conclusion, according to officials who discussed it with him.
The assessment, a National Intelligence Estimate, was based on a trove of Iranian reports obtained by penetrating Iran’s computer networks.
Those reports indicated that Iranian engineers had been ordered to halt development of a nuclear warhead in 2003, even while they continued to speed ahead in enriching uranium, the most difficult obstacle to building a weapon.
The “key judgments” of the National Intelligence Estimate, which were publicly released, emphasized the suspension of the weapons work.
The public version made only glancing reference to evidence described at great length in the 140-page classified version of the assessment: the suspicion that Iran had 10 or 15 other nuclear-related facilities, never opened to international inspectors, where enrichment activity, weapons work or the manufacturing of centrifuges might be taking place.
The Israelis responded angrily and rebutted the American report, providing American intelligence officials and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with evidence that they said indicated that the Iranians were still working on a weapon.
While the Americans were not convinced that the Iranian weapons development was continuing, the Israelis were not the only ones highly critical of the United States report. Secretary Gates, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said the report had presented the evidence poorly, underemphasizing the importance of Iran’s enrichment activity and overemphasizing the suspension of a weapons-design effort that could easily be turned back on.
In an interview, Mr. Gates said that in his whole career he had never seen “an N.I.E. that had such an impact on U.S. diplomacy,” because “people figured, well, the military option is now off the table.”
Prime Minister Olmert came to the same conclusion. He had previously expected, according to several Americans and Israeli officials, that Mr. Bush would deal with Iran’s nuclear program before he left office. “Now,” said one American official who bore the brunt of Israel’s reaction, “they didn’t believe he would.”
Attack Planning
Early in 2008, the Israeli government signaled that it might be preparing to take matters into its own hands. In a series of meetings, Israeli officials asked Washington for a new generation of powerful bunker-busters, far more capable of blowing up a deep underground plant than anything in Israel’s arsenal of conventional weapons. They asked for refueling equipment that would allow their aircraft to reach Iran and return to Israel. And they asked for the right to fly over Iraq.
Mr. Bush deflected the first two requests, pushing the issue off, but “we said ‘hell no’ to the overflights,” one of his top aides said. At the White House and the Pentagon, there was widespread concern that a political uproar in Iraq about the use of its American-controlled airspace could result in the expulsion of American forces from the country.
The Israeli ambassador to the United States, Sallai Meridor, declined several requests over the past four weeks to be interviewed about Israel’s efforts to obtain the weapons from Washington, saying through aides that he was too busy.
Last June, the Israelis conducted an exercise over the Mediterranean Sea that appeared to be a dry run for an attack on the enrichment plant at Natanz. When the exercise was analyzed at the Pentagon, officials concluded that the distances flown almost exactly equaled the distance between Israel and the Iranian nuclear site.
“This really spooked a lot of people,” one White House official said. White House officials discussed the possibility that the Israelis would fly over Iraq without American permission. In that case, would the American military be ordered to shoot them down? If the United States did not interfere to stop an Israeli attack, would the Bush administration be accused of being complicit in it?
Admiral Mullen, traveling to Israel in early July on a previously scheduled trip, questioned Israeli officials about their intentions. His Israeli counterpart, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, argued that an aerial attack could set Iran’s program back by two or three years, according to officials familiar with the exchange. The American estimates at the time were far more conservative.
Yet by the time Admiral Mullen made his visit, Israeli officials appear to have concluded that without American help, they were not yet capable of hitting the site effectively enough to strike a decisive blow against the Iranian program.
The United States did give Israel one item on its shopping list: high-powered radar, called the X-Band, to detect any Iranian missile launchings. It was the only element in the Israeli request that could be used solely for defense, not offense.
Mr. Gates’s spokesman, Geoff Morrell, said last week that Mr. Gates — whom Mr. Obama is retaining as defense secretary — believed that “a potential strike on the Iranian facilities is not something that we or anyone else should be pursuing at this time.”
A New Covert Push
Throughout 2008, the Bush administration insisted that it had a plan to deal with the Iranians: applying overwhelming financial pressure that would persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear program, as foreign enterprises like the French company Total pulled out of Iranian oil projects, European banks cut financing, and trade credits were squeezed.
But the Iranians were making uranium faster than the sanctions were making progress. As Mr. Bush realized that the sanctions he had pressed for were inadequate and his military options untenable, he turned to the C.I.A. His hope, several people involved in the program said, was to create some leverage against the Iranians, by setting back their nuclear program while sanctions continued and, more recently, oil prices dropped precipitously.
There were two specific objectives: to slow progress at Natanz and other known and suspected nuclear facilities, and keep the pressure on a little-known Iranian professor named Mohsen Fakrizadeh, a scientist described in classified portions of American intelligence reports as deeply involved in an effort to design a nuclear warhead for Iran.
Past American-led efforts aimed at Natanz had yielded little result. Several years ago, foreign intelligence services tinkered with individual power units that Iran bought in Turkey to drive its centrifuges, the floor-to-ceiling silvery tubes that spin at the speed of sound, enriching uranium for use in power stations or, with additional enrichment, nuclear weapons.
A number of centrifuges blew up, prompting public declarations of sabotage by Iranian officials. An engineer in Switzerland, who worked with the Pakistani nuclear black-marketeer Abdul Qadeer Khan, had been “turned” by American intelligence officials and helped them slip faulty technology into parts bought by the Iranians.
What Mr. Bush authorized, and informed a narrow group of Congressional leaders about, was a far broader effort, aimed at the entire industrial infrastructure that supports the Iranian nuclear program. Some of the efforts focused on ways to destabilize the centrifuges. The details are closely held, for obvious reasons, by American officials. One official, however, said, “It was not until the last year that they got really imaginative about what one could do to screw up the system.”
Then, he cautioned, “none of these are game-changers,” meaning that the efforts would not necessarily cripple the Iranian program. Others in the administration strongly disagree.
In the end, success or failure may come down to how much pressure can be brought to bear on Mr. Fakrizadeh, whom the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate identifies, in its classified sections, as the manager of Project 110 and Project 111. According to a presentation by the chief inspector of the International Atomic Energy Agency, those were the names for two Iranian efforts that appeared to be dedicated to designing a warhead and making it work with an Iranian missile. Iranian officials say the projects are a fiction, made up by the United States.
While the international agency readily concedes that the evidence about the two projects remains murky, one of the documents it briefly displayed at a meeting of the agency’s member countries in Vienna last year, from Mr. Fakrizadeh’s projects, showed the chronology of a missile launching, ending with a warhead exploding about 650 yards above ground — approximately the altitude from which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was detonated.
The exact status of Mr. Fakrizadeh’s projects today is unclear. While the National Intelligence Estimate reported that activity on Projects 110 and 111 had been halted, the fear among intelligence agencies is that if the weapons design projects are turned back on, will they know?
David E. Sanger is the chief Washington correspondent for The New York Times. Reporting for this article was developed in the course of research for “The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power,” to be published Tuesday by Harmony Books.
Friday, January 2, 2009
Relax: British Embassy Breach Is an Iranian InfoOp
Relax: British Embassy Breach Is an Iranian InfoOp. By Steve Schippert
Folks, the "storming" of the British Embassy in Tehran by "a large group of people and students" is an Iranian Information Operation (IO) intended to be perceived (by you) as just an impromptu gaggle of angry Iranian citizens expressing rage at Israel's operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is, never forget, the newest Iranian satellite and client.
The British Embassy was not stormed by angry everyday Iranian citizens, folks. You are looking at a coordinated event staged by the regime employing the Basij (see here for a lightweight, digestible introduction), which is the mullah regime equivalent to the Hitler Youth. These embassy stormers, it should be noted, are the same regime Basij youth corps that is unleashed on Iranian people who dare defy the regime. And we are supposed to believe that those who beseiged (pardoning the aural pun) the British embassy are those same defiant Iranians. Don't. They aren't.
At least this early story from the UK's Telegraph eventually hits the target — but only after first playing up the alarm. (Wrong way to counter clear IO, but what should we expect journalists to know?):
Look carefully at the AFP/Getty image included in the story. Couple things to make note of.
First, just as the "storming" begins (both gates are not even open yet, just one), a photographer just happened to be ahead of the wave to take a very convenient snap of "The Breach." These are the things that Pulitzers are made of, what with these zany photographers who just happen to be in the right spot for the money shot, no? Bilal Hussein, anyone?
Second, note that there are two members of Iranian security (cough) in riot gear in the photo.
First thought: It's "The Breach" and there are but two near the gates.
Second thought: Iranian crowd control is not known for their tepid restraint. If the regime wanted to control the situation, they would be outside the gates and not inside, and there would be a general beatdown with injury and immediate dispersal by the "large group of people and students" in reaction.
Third thought: Similarly, average Iranians do not defy regime (read: Revolutionary) thugs enforcing "security." That is a precious rarity, plain and simple. This group of Basij members knows full well that the "security force" is part of the IO Dog & Pony Show and not a bodily injury risk. Who, in defiance of regime thugs, smiles as they run past the "riot police" and toward the waiting photographer(s) but fellow regime thugs? Answer: In Iran, no one. These "people and students" are the Basij, whose role and embrace has been renewed and reinvigorated under Ahmadinejad, himself a former commander in the "all grown up" Basij, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
So sit back and enjoy the show, folks. Staged Iranian information operations are best enjoyed with a spot of tea, a few biscuits and a touch of jam. Their inherent inferiority complex causes the Iranian regime to do the most bizarre things, sometimes entertaining and sometimes dangerous and deadly. This one falls on the entertaining side.
Accept this one for what it is, an amusing sideshow, and be sure to play your part of the alarmed and impacted IO target.
Folks, the "storming" of the British Embassy in Tehran by "a large group of people and students" is an Iranian Information Operation (IO) intended to be perceived (by you) as just an impromptu gaggle of angry Iranian citizens expressing rage at Israel's operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is, never forget, the newest Iranian satellite and client.
The British Embassy was not stormed by angry everyday Iranian citizens, folks. You are looking at a coordinated event staged by the regime employing the Basij (see here for a lightweight, digestible introduction), which is the mullah regime equivalent to the Hitler Youth. These embassy stormers, it should be noted, are the same regime Basij youth corps that is unleashed on Iranian people who dare defy the regime. And we are supposed to believe that those who beseiged (pardoning the aural pun) the British embassy are those same defiant Iranians. Don't. They aren't.
At least this early story from the UK's Telegraph eventually hits the target — but only after first playing up the alarm. (Wrong way to counter clear IO, but what should we expect journalists to know?):
Iran’s official news agency said: “A large group of people and students entered the Gulhak Gardens, which are occupied by the British embassy to protest at Britain’s policies in supporting the Zionist regime and put up the Palestinian flag there.”
The demonstrators had torched the British, US and Israeli flags, other Iranian media reports said.
There appears to be little doubt that the Iranian regime orchestrated or at least inspired the attack on Gulhak. Just days ago Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggested his force should facilitate “revolutionary action” similar to the capture of the “Den of Spies” – the US embassy — on November 4, 1979.
The remarks, made in a speech to hardline university students from a large paramilitary vigilante organisation under his control, were seen as a thinly-veiled threat against the British embassy which has become of the main focus of ire against the West since the American embassy became defunct.
Look carefully at the AFP/Getty image included in the story. Couple things to make note of.
First, just as the "storming" begins (both gates are not even open yet, just one), a photographer just happened to be ahead of the wave to take a very convenient snap of "The Breach." These are the things that Pulitzers are made of, what with these zany photographers who just happen to be in the right spot for the money shot, no? Bilal Hussein, anyone?
Second, note that there are two members of Iranian security (cough) in riot gear in the photo.
First thought: It's "The Breach" and there are but two near the gates.
Second thought: Iranian crowd control is not known for their tepid restraint. If the regime wanted to control the situation, they would be outside the gates and not inside, and there would be a general beatdown with injury and immediate dispersal by the "large group of people and students" in reaction.
Third thought: Similarly, average Iranians do not defy regime (read: Revolutionary) thugs enforcing "security." That is a precious rarity, plain and simple. This group of Basij members knows full well that the "security force" is part of the IO Dog & Pony Show and not a bodily injury risk. Who, in defiance of regime thugs, smiles as they run past the "riot police" and toward the waiting photographer(s) but fellow regime thugs? Answer: In Iran, no one. These "people and students" are the Basij, whose role and embrace has been renewed and reinvigorated under Ahmadinejad, himself a former commander in the "all grown up" Basij, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
So sit back and enjoy the show, folks. Staged Iranian information operations are best enjoyed with a spot of tea, a few biscuits and a touch of jam. Their inherent inferiority complex causes the Iranian regime to do the most bizarre things, sometimes entertaining and sometimes dangerous and deadly. This one falls on the entertaining side.
Accept this one for what it is, an amusing sideshow, and be sure to play your part of the alarmed and impacted IO target.
Sunday, December 21, 2008
WSJ editorial: A Middle East Arms Race
A Middle East Arms Race
The Arabs respond to the likelihood of the Iranian bomb
Dec 20, 2008
Hosni Mubarak is no one's idea of a visionary, but in sensing the Middle East's political winds he has few equals. So when Egypt's president-for-life warned his ruling party last week that "the Persians are trying to devour the Arab states," it's worth paying attention.The immediate cause of the remarks is a war of words by Iran that led Mr. Mubarak to recall an envoy from Tehran last week. Among other provocations was the recent release of an Iranian film celebrating the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat, Mr. Mubarak's predecessor. A Tehran demonstration late last month also called for Mr. Mubarak's execution, on the grounds of his alleged "subservience to the Zionists."
But the broader context of the friction is its steady progress toward a nuclear weapon and the encroachment by Iran into the Arab world -- principally through Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Mahdists in Iraq. States like Egypt and Saudi Arabia watched with dismay in the summer of 2006 as Israel failed to deliver a knockout blow against Hezbollah. Now they calculate that the U.S. lacks the will to prevent a nuclear Iran. As for Barack Obama's promise of "tough diplomacy," we suspect the Arab states take him about as seriously as they would a tourist who thinks he knows how to bargain at an oriental bazaar.
Little wonder, then, that the Arab states are taking a keen interest in acquiring nuclear capabilities of their own. The latest is the United Arab Emirates, which hopes to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. before the Bush Administration leaves office. Saudi Arabia is seeking a similar deal, while Egypt, Algeria, Turkey and even Yemen are also in the market for reactors.
The ostensible rationale for these reactors varies from place to place, from energy-intensive water desalination schemes to reliable electricity supply. Under the terms of the agreement being proposed for the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia, neither country would enrich its own uranium and both would put their facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Still, it's difficult to see what use oil giants like the Saudis or Algerians would have for nuclear power except as a hedge against an Iranian bomb. IAEA safeguards or not, possession of "civilian" nuclear technology served India and Israel as the crucial first step to getting a bomb. It gave local scientists first-hand experience with the technologies and allowed opportunities for the covert diversion of key nuclear materials. Reports have circulated for years that the Saudis have pursued a secret nuclear program with help from Pakistan, though the Saudis deny this. Egypt has also been cited by the IAEA for undeclared nuclear work.
All this is a useful reminder that the threat of Iran's nuclear programs lies not only in whether it will acquire a bomb. It's also a question of how Iran's neighbors will react. The Israelis have said publicly that a nuclear Iran is an intolerable threat, a view many Arab states share privately. If neither Israel nor the U.S. act, they will be tempted to seek their security by acquiring their own nuclear deterrents. A Middle East in which Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt have the bomb -- in addition to Israel and Pakistan -- is possible within a decade.
Maybe there's someone at the Council on Foreign Relations who can explain why this isn't such a terrible scenario, what with everyone pointing a gun at everyone else's head. Our view is that this is a recipe for global instability, if not catastrophe, and a reminder of why no one should be complacent at the looming prospect of an Iranian bomb.
The Arabs respond to the likelihood of the Iranian bomb
Dec 20, 2008
Hosni Mubarak is no one's idea of a visionary, but in sensing the Middle East's political winds he has few equals. So when Egypt's president-for-life warned his ruling party last week that "the Persians are trying to devour the Arab states," it's worth paying attention.The immediate cause of the remarks is a war of words by Iran that led Mr. Mubarak to recall an envoy from Tehran last week. Among other provocations was the recent release of an Iranian film celebrating the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat, Mr. Mubarak's predecessor. A Tehran demonstration late last month also called for Mr. Mubarak's execution, on the grounds of his alleged "subservience to the Zionists."
But the broader context of the friction is its steady progress toward a nuclear weapon and the encroachment by Iran into the Arab world -- principally through Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Mahdists in Iraq. States like Egypt and Saudi Arabia watched with dismay in the summer of 2006 as Israel failed to deliver a knockout blow against Hezbollah. Now they calculate that the U.S. lacks the will to prevent a nuclear Iran. As for Barack Obama's promise of "tough diplomacy," we suspect the Arab states take him about as seriously as they would a tourist who thinks he knows how to bargain at an oriental bazaar.
Little wonder, then, that the Arab states are taking a keen interest in acquiring nuclear capabilities of their own. The latest is the United Arab Emirates, which hopes to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. before the Bush Administration leaves office. Saudi Arabia is seeking a similar deal, while Egypt, Algeria, Turkey and even Yemen are also in the market for reactors.
The ostensible rationale for these reactors varies from place to place, from energy-intensive water desalination schemes to reliable electricity supply. Under the terms of the agreement being proposed for the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia, neither country would enrich its own uranium and both would put their facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Still, it's difficult to see what use oil giants like the Saudis or Algerians would have for nuclear power except as a hedge against an Iranian bomb. IAEA safeguards or not, possession of "civilian" nuclear technology served India and Israel as the crucial first step to getting a bomb. It gave local scientists first-hand experience with the technologies and allowed opportunities for the covert diversion of key nuclear materials. Reports have circulated for years that the Saudis have pursued a secret nuclear program with help from Pakistan, though the Saudis deny this. Egypt has also been cited by the IAEA for undeclared nuclear work.
All this is a useful reminder that the threat of Iran's nuclear programs lies not only in whether it will acquire a bomb. It's also a question of how Iran's neighbors will react. The Israelis have said publicly that a nuclear Iran is an intolerable threat, a view many Arab states share privately. If neither Israel nor the U.S. act, they will be tempted to seek their security by acquiring their own nuclear deterrents. A Middle East in which Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt have the bomb -- in addition to Israel and Pakistan -- is possible within a decade.
Maybe there's someone at the Council on Foreign Relations who can explain why this isn't such a terrible scenario, what with everyone pointing a gun at everyone else's head. Our view is that this is a recipe for global instability, if not catastrophe, and a reminder of why no one should be complacent at the looming prospect of an Iranian bomb.
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