The "Idea of India" after Mumbai. By Apoorva Shah
AEI, Friday, April 24, 2009
India's founding ideal of multicultural democracy is critical to both domestic cohesion and geopolitical interest, and it has defined how the country confronts terrorism at home. Modern India has much experience with terrorism, but most attacks have been rooted in separatist and ethnic insurgencies in rural frontier provinces. In the last decade, however, India has seen a steep rise in the number of attacks in urban areas, aimed at civilians, and committed not by rural insurgents but by young, middle-class jihadists. These domestic threats, which expose fault lines in the "idea of India," have been welcomed and at times supported by Pakistan, whose existence is founded in opposition to India. In fact, the apparent paradox between Pakistan's tolerance of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group leading up to the November 26, 2008, attacks in Mumbai and Pakistan's internal struggle against extremists can be understood in the framework of these conflicting ideologies. For India, countering the threat of domestic jihadism is not only a security imperative; it is also a strategic necessity. This merits a new counterterrorism response by the Indian government and a renewed understanding of Indian Muslims and their place in India's pluralistic society.
Full outlook here.
Showing posts with label national security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label national security. Show all posts
Monday, April 27, 2009
Misconceptions About the Interrogation Memos
Misconceptions About the Interrogation Memos. By William M McSwain
Their goal was to allow the CIA and military to stay within the parameters of a murky area of the law.
WSJ, Apr 26, 2009
President Barack Obama has reinvigorated the critics of George W. Bush's antiterror policies by opening the door to prosecuting or sanctioning those who crafted interrogation policy in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These critics -- including the president -- are laboring under numerous misconceptions. Many of them have no experience with or understanding of military or CIA interrogation, the purpose of which is to gain actionable intelligence to safeguard our country. The recently released memos by lawyers in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel were written to assist interrogators in that critical mission. The memos cannot be fairly evaluated without that mission in mind.
Military and CIA interrogators are trained to use creative means of deception, and to play on detainee emotions and fears. This can be a nasty business. People unfamiliar with it, therefore, might even view a perfectly legitimate interrogation of a prisoner of war that is in full compliance with the Geneva Conventions as abhorrent by its very nature.
But military interrogation is not akin to a friendly chat across a conference table -- nor is it designed to gather evidence in a criminal trial, as an FBI interview might be. There is a fundamental distinction between law enforcement and military interrogations that we ignore at our peril.
Second-guessers can also fail to appreciate the increased importance of interrogation (and human intelligence in general) in the post 9/11 world. We face an enemy that wears no uniform, blends in with civilian populations, and operates in the shadows. This has made eliciting information from captured terrorists vital to the effort of finding other terrorists. As interrogation has become more important, drawing out useful information has become more difficult -- because hardened terrorists are often trained to resist traditional U.S. interrogation methods.
Fortunately, aggressive interrogation techniques like those outlined in the memos to the CIA are effective. As the memos explain, high-value detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, and Abu Zubaydah, one of Osama bin Laden's key lieutenants, provided no actionable intelligence when facing traditional U.S. methods. It is doubtful that any high-level al Qaeda operative would ever provide useful intelligence in response to traditional methods.
Yet KSM and Zubaydah provided critical information after being waterboarded -- information that, among other things, helped to prevent a "Second Wave" attack in Los Angeles, according to the memos. Similarly, the 2005 report by Vice Adm. Albert Church on Defense Department interrogation policies, the "Church Report" -- of which I served as the executive editor -- documented the success of aggressive techniques against high-value detainees like Mohamed al Kahtani, 9/11's "20th hijacker."
The aggressive techniques in the CIA memos are also undeniably safe, having been adopted from Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training used with our own troops.
I have personally been waterboarded, put into stress positions, sleep deprived, slapped in the face. While none of this was enjoyable, I am none the worse for wear.
While such techniques are used in U.S. military training, some apparently consider them too brutal, too abusive, too inhumane -- in short, too much like "torture" -- to be used on fanatics like KSM who are bent on the mass murder of innocent American civilians. And if legal advisers such as Steven G. Bradbury, Jay S. Bybee and John Yoo are to be prosecuted for having sanctioned their use under careful controls, who's next? Every commander who ever implemented a SERE course?
Many critics also play the Abu Ghraib "trump card": The abuses of prisoners at that facility in Iraq allegedly "prove" the Bush administration's supposed policy of abuse, first codified in its legal memos. This ignores all relevant evidence.
As the Church Report concluded, after a thorough review of all Defense Department interrogation policies, the pictured abuses at Abu Ghraib bore no resemblance to approved policies at any level, in any theater. The 2004 Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations -- whose four members included two former secretaries of defense under President Jimmy Carter -- also stated that "no approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities."
Similarly, the critics like to default to Guantanamo as a symbol of the kind of abuse that Mr. Bush's antiterror policies allowed. Yet, at the time of the Church Report, there had been more than 24,000 interrogation sessions at Guantanamo and only three cases of substantiated interrogation-related abuse. All of them consisted of minor assaults in which military interrogators had exceeded the bounds of approved interrogation policy. Notably, the Church Report found that detainees at Guantanamo were more likely to have been injured playing recreational sports than in confrontations with interrogators or guards.
Mr. Bush's advisers were public servants with the memory of 9/11 still fresh in their minds, doing their best to give legitimate legal advice in a murky, largely undefined area of the law. Is this the stuff of which federal prosecutions, or even sanctions, are made?
As a former federal prosecutor, I know a good case from a bad one. I know a case based on solid evidence and even-handed application of the law versus one based on scoring political points. Mr. Obama and his attorney general, Eric Holder, have professed their desire to take politics out of the Justice Department, to restore integrity to a department that they believe had gone astray under Mr. Bush. Their recent actions, however, speak otherwise.
The bottom line is that any attempt to prosecute or sanction lawyers such as Messrs. Bradbury, Bybee or Yoo would be a fool's errand. And whatever our new president and his attorney general are, they aren't fools. Or at least I don't think they are. For the good of the country, I hope they don't prove me wrong.
Mr. McSwain, a former scout/sniper platoon commander in the Marines and assistant U.S. attorney, was executive editor of the 2005 Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques (The Church Report). He is an attorney in private practice in Philadelphia.
Their goal was to allow the CIA and military to stay within the parameters of a murky area of the law.
WSJ, Apr 26, 2009
President Barack Obama has reinvigorated the critics of George W. Bush's antiterror policies by opening the door to prosecuting or sanctioning those who crafted interrogation policy in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These critics -- including the president -- are laboring under numerous misconceptions. Many of them have no experience with or understanding of military or CIA interrogation, the purpose of which is to gain actionable intelligence to safeguard our country. The recently released memos by lawyers in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel were written to assist interrogators in that critical mission. The memos cannot be fairly evaluated without that mission in mind.
Military and CIA interrogators are trained to use creative means of deception, and to play on detainee emotions and fears. This can be a nasty business. People unfamiliar with it, therefore, might even view a perfectly legitimate interrogation of a prisoner of war that is in full compliance with the Geneva Conventions as abhorrent by its very nature.
But military interrogation is not akin to a friendly chat across a conference table -- nor is it designed to gather evidence in a criminal trial, as an FBI interview might be. There is a fundamental distinction between law enforcement and military interrogations that we ignore at our peril.
Second-guessers can also fail to appreciate the increased importance of interrogation (and human intelligence in general) in the post 9/11 world. We face an enemy that wears no uniform, blends in with civilian populations, and operates in the shadows. This has made eliciting information from captured terrorists vital to the effort of finding other terrorists. As interrogation has become more important, drawing out useful information has become more difficult -- because hardened terrorists are often trained to resist traditional U.S. interrogation methods.
Fortunately, aggressive interrogation techniques like those outlined in the memos to the CIA are effective. As the memos explain, high-value detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, and Abu Zubaydah, one of Osama bin Laden's key lieutenants, provided no actionable intelligence when facing traditional U.S. methods. It is doubtful that any high-level al Qaeda operative would ever provide useful intelligence in response to traditional methods.
Yet KSM and Zubaydah provided critical information after being waterboarded -- information that, among other things, helped to prevent a "Second Wave" attack in Los Angeles, according to the memos. Similarly, the 2005 report by Vice Adm. Albert Church on Defense Department interrogation policies, the "Church Report" -- of which I served as the executive editor -- documented the success of aggressive techniques against high-value detainees like Mohamed al Kahtani, 9/11's "20th hijacker."
The aggressive techniques in the CIA memos are also undeniably safe, having been adopted from Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training used with our own troops.
I have personally been waterboarded, put into stress positions, sleep deprived, slapped in the face. While none of this was enjoyable, I am none the worse for wear.
While such techniques are used in U.S. military training, some apparently consider them too brutal, too abusive, too inhumane -- in short, too much like "torture" -- to be used on fanatics like KSM who are bent on the mass murder of innocent American civilians. And if legal advisers such as Steven G. Bradbury, Jay S. Bybee and John Yoo are to be prosecuted for having sanctioned their use under careful controls, who's next? Every commander who ever implemented a SERE course?
Many critics also play the Abu Ghraib "trump card": The abuses of prisoners at that facility in Iraq allegedly "prove" the Bush administration's supposed policy of abuse, first codified in its legal memos. This ignores all relevant evidence.
As the Church Report concluded, after a thorough review of all Defense Department interrogation policies, the pictured abuses at Abu Ghraib bore no resemblance to approved policies at any level, in any theater. The 2004 Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations -- whose four members included two former secretaries of defense under President Jimmy Carter -- also stated that "no approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities."
Similarly, the critics like to default to Guantanamo as a symbol of the kind of abuse that Mr. Bush's antiterror policies allowed. Yet, at the time of the Church Report, there had been more than 24,000 interrogation sessions at Guantanamo and only three cases of substantiated interrogation-related abuse. All of them consisted of minor assaults in which military interrogators had exceeded the bounds of approved interrogation policy. Notably, the Church Report found that detainees at Guantanamo were more likely to have been injured playing recreational sports than in confrontations with interrogators or guards.
Mr. Bush's advisers were public servants with the memory of 9/11 still fresh in their minds, doing their best to give legitimate legal advice in a murky, largely undefined area of the law. Is this the stuff of which federal prosecutions, or even sanctions, are made?
As a former federal prosecutor, I know a good case from a bad one. I know a case based on solid evidence and even-handed application of the law versus one based on scoring political points. Mr. Obama and his attorney general, Eric Holder, have professed their desire to take politics out of the Justice Department, to restore integrity to a department that they believe had gone astray under Mr. Bush. Their recent actions, however, speak otherwise.
The bottom line is that any attempt to prosecute or sanction lawyers such as Messrs. Bradbury, Bybee or Yoo would be a fool's errand. And whatever our new president and his attorney general are, they aren't fools. Or at least I don't think they are. For the good of the country, I hope they don't prove me wrong.
Mr. McSwain, a former scout/sniper platoon commander in the Marines and assistant U.S. attorney, was executive editor of the 2005 Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques (The Church Report). He is an attorney in private practice in Philadelphia.
Sunday, April 26, 2009
WaPo: What does the Obama administration hope to accomplish by publicly warning of a Pakistani collapse?
Sound the Alarm. WaPo Editorial
What does the Obama administration hope to accomplish by publicly warning of a Pakistani collapse?
WaPo: Sunday, April 26, 2009
THE TALIBAN raised fears in Pakistan last week by briefly seizing new territories near the capital, Islamabad. But in its own way, the Obama administration offered as much reason for panic about the deteriorating situation in that nuclear-armed Muslim country. In the course of just three days, the U.S. secretaries of State and Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the commanding general of American forces in the Middle East all publicly warned, in blunt and dire language, that Pakistan was facing an existential threat -- and that its government and Army were not facing it. "I think that the Pakistani government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists," said Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.
That they felt compelled to openly air such conclusions about a nominally close U.S. ally -- for which the administration is proposing billions in new aid dollars -- was a measure of the desperation that seems to have infected the Obama administration's dealings with Pakistan's weak civilian government and obtuse military leadership. In the months since the administration took office, as in the last months of the Bush administration, private cajoling of President Asif Ali Zardari and Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani to fight the Taliban has done little good. It's not yet clear whether the public campaign will have more effect -- but it is sure to get many in Washington stirred about what Ms. Clinton described as the "mortal threat" a Taliban regime armed with nuclear weapons could pose to the United States.
That threat is certainly real. The government's decision to tolerate what amounts to Taliban control of the Swat Valley northwest of Islamabad has emboldened the extremists, who now are seeking to infiltrate neighboring districts even closer to the capital. The Pakistani army, untrained in counterinsurgency and rigidly focused on India, is reluctant to take on the militants; when it has tried to fight them in areas near the Afghan border, it has been mostly ineffective. Though the vast majority of Pakistanis oppose the Taliban's fundamentalism, most also dislike Mr. Zardari's government and suspect that operations against the insurgents serve U.S. interests more Pakistan's.
The loud U.S. warnings did provoke the Zardari government and Gen. Kiyani to say that they would fight the Taliban if it continued to advance; the black-turbaned fighters subsequently withdrew from one district on Friday. Pakistani officials say that the public support needed for the military offensive Washington wants won't be forthcoming unless Pakistanis believe that their government has tried all peaceful options. It is certainly the case that Pakistanis as well as their government must embrace the fight against the Taliban as their own, and not as a proxy war for the United States. It is also true that, apart from mounting missile strikes by remote-controlled aircraft, there is little the United States can do directly to defeat the Pakistani Taliban; the administration must try to work through the government and army.
But the United States has leverage: Without the billons flowing into Pakistan in direct U.S. aid as well as from other donors marshaled by Washington, Pakistan's economy would collapse. Perhaps the dire U.S. warnings will galvanize the country's political class into demanding action from the army and government -- or replacing the latter. But shouts of '"fire" have risks: They can also cause panic, or go unheeded.
What does the Obama administration hope to accomplish by publicly warning of a Pakistani collapse?
WaPo: Sunday, April 26, 2009
THE TALIBAN raised fears in Pakistan last week by briefly seizing new territories near the capital, Islamabad. But in its own way, the Obama administration offered as much reason for panic about the deteriorating situation in that nuclear-armed Muslim country. In the course of just three days, the U.S. secretaries of State and Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the commanding general of American forces in the Middle East all publicly warned, in blunt and dire language, that Pakistan was facing an existential threat -- and that its government and Army were not facing it. "I think that the Pakistani government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists," said Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.
That they felt compelled to openly air such conclusions about a nominally close U.S. ally -- for which the administration is proposing billions in new aid dollars -- was a measure of the desperation that seems to have infected the Obama administration's dealings with Pakistan's weak civilian government and obtuse military leadership. In the months since the administration took office, as in the last months of the Bush administration, private cajoling of President Asif Ali Zardari and Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani to fight the Taliban has done little good. It's not yet clear whether the public campaign will have more effect -- but it is sure to get many in Washington stirred about what Ms. Clinton described as the "mortal threat" a Taliban regime armed with nuclear weapons could pose to the United States.
That threat is certainly real. The government's decision to tolerate what amounts to Taliban control of the Swat Valley northwest of Islamabad has emboldened the extremists, who now are seeking to infiltrate neighboring districts even closer to the capital. The Pakistani army, untrained in counterinsurgency and rigidly focused on India, is reluctant to take on the militants; when it has tried to fight them in areas near the Afghan border, it has been mostly ineffective. Though the vast majority of Pakistanis oppose the Taliban's fundamentalism, most also dislike Mr. Zardari's government and suspect that operations against the insurgents serve U.S. interests more Pakistan's.
The loud U.S. warnings did provoke the Zardari government and Gen. Kiyani to say that they would fight the Taliban if it continued to advance; the black-turbaned fighters subsequently withdrew from one district on Friday. Pakistani officials say that the public support needed for the military offensive Washington wants won't be forthcoming unless Pakistanis believe that their government has tried all peaceful options. It is certainly the case that Pakistanis as well as their government must embrace the fight against the Taliban as their own, and not as a proxy war for the United States. It is also true that, apart from mounting missile strikes by remote-controlled aircraft, there is little the United States can do directly to defeat the Pakistani Taliban; the administration must try to work through the government and army.
But the United States has leverage: Without the billons flowing into Pakistan in direct U.S. aid as well as from other donors marshaled by Washington, Pakistan's economy would collapse. Perhaps the dire U.S. warnings will galvanize the country's political class into demanding action from the army and government -- or replacing the latter. But shouts of '"fire" have risks: They can also cause panic, or go unheeded.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Conservative about Dennis Blair memo on high-value information of coercive interrogation
Who's Politicizing Intelligence Now?, by Stephen F. Hayes
Obama's intelligence chief admits the value of tough interrogations.
The Weekly Standard, Apr 22, 2009
Admiral Dennis Blair, the top intelligence official in the United States, thanks to his nomination by Barack Obama, believes that the coercive interrogation methods outlawed by his boss produced "high-value information" and gave the U.S. government a "deeper understanding of the al Qaeda organization that was attacking this country." He included those assessments in a letter distributed inside the intelligence community last Thursday, the same day Obama declassified and released portions of Justice Department memos setting out guidelines for those interrogations.
That letter from Blair served as the basis for a public statement that his office put out that same day. But the DNI's conclusions about the results of coercive interrogations--in effect, that they worked--were taken out of Blair's public statement. A spokesman for the DNI told the New York Times that the missing material was cut for reasons of space, though the statement would be posted on DNI's website, where space doesn't seem to be an issue.
Curious.
There's more. Blair's public statement differed from his letter to colleagues in another way. The letter included this language: "From 2002 through 2006 when the use of these techniques ended, the leadership of the CIA repeatedly reported their activities both to Executive Branch policymakers and to members of Congress, and received permission to continue to use the techniques." Blair's public statement made no mention of the permission granted by "members of Congress"--permission that came from members of Obama's own party.
Odd.
And then there are the memos themselves. Sections of the memos that describe the
techniques have been declassified and released. But other sections of those same memos--the parts that describe, in some detail, the value of the program--have been redacted and remain hidden from public view.
Marc Thiessen, a speechwriter for George W. Bush, had access to the full memos and read them to prepare a speech for Bush in 2006. When Thiessen looked at the redacted version released by the White House last week, he noticed something strange.
He writes: "But just as the memo begins to describe previously undisclosed details of what enhanced interrogations achieved, the page is almost entirely blacked out. The Obama administration released pages of unredacted classified information on the techniques used to question captured terrorist leaders but pulled out its black marker when it came to the details of what those interrogations achieved."
It's not just those memos. Former Vice President Dick Cheney says he has read other memos that describe the intelligence obtained by using coercive interrogation and that demonstrate its value. He has asked for them to be declassified and made public.
It is possible, I suppose, that a series of fortunate coincidences has resulted in the public disclosure of only that information that will be politically helpful to the Obama administration. It is also possible that Dick Cheney has taken up synchronized swimming in his retirement.
It wouldn't be the first time the Obama administration has politicized intelligence. Back in the early days of the administration, the New Yorker's Jane Mayer wrote an article about Obama's decision to ban some of these interrogation techniques. She spoke with White House counsel Greg Craig, who described the deliberations.
Across the Potomac River, at the C.I.A.'s headquarters, in Langley, Virginia, however, there was considerably less jubilation. Top C.I.A. officials have argued for years that so-called "enhanced" interrogation techniques have yielded lifesaving intelligence breakthroughs. "They disagree in some respect," Craig admitted. Among the hard questions that Obama left open, in fact, is whether the C.I.A. will have to follow the same interrogation rules as the military. While the President has clearly put an end to cruel tactics, Craig said that Obama "is somewhat sympathetic to the spies' argument that their mission and circumstances are different."
Despite such sentiments, Obama's executive orders will undoubtedly rein in the C.I.A. Waterboarding, for instance, has gone the way of the rack, now that the C.I.A. is strictly bound by customary interpretations of the Geneva Conventions. This decision, too, was the result of intense deliberation. During the transition period, unknown to the public, Obama's legal, intelligence, and national-security advisers visited Langley for two long sessions with current and former intelligence-community members. They debated whether a ban on brutal interrogation practices would hurt their ability to gather intelligence, and the advisers asked the intelligence veterans to prepare a cost-benefit analysis. The conclusions may surprise defenders of harsh interrogation tactics. "There was unanimity among Obama's expert advisers," Craig said, "that to change the practices would not in any material way affect the collection of intelligence."
That's interesting: "top CIA officials have argued for years that so-called 'enhanced' interrogation techniques have yielded lifesaving intelligence breakthroughs," but the team of "expert advisers" from Obama's presidential campaign apparently knows better.
All of this leads to one obvious question: Who needs intelligence professionals when you have campaign advisers?
Stephen F. Hayes, a senior writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD, is the author of Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President (HarperCollins).
Obama's intelligence chief admits the value of tough interrogations.
The Weekly Standard, Apr 22, 2009
Admiral Dennis Blair, the top intelligence official in the United States, thanks to his nomination by Barack Obama, believes that the coercive interrogation methods outlawed by his boss produced "high-value information" and gave the U.S. government a "deeper understanding of the al Qaeda organization that was attacking this country." He included those assessments in a letter distributed inside the intelligence community last Thursday, the same day Obama declassified and released portions of Justice Department memos setting out guidelines for those interrogations.
That letter from Blair served as the basis for a public statement that his office put out that same day. But the DNI's conclusions about the results of coercive interrogations--in effect, that they worked--were taken out of Blair's public statement. A spokesman for the DNI told the New York Times that the missing material was cut for reasons of space, though the statement would be posted on DNI's website, where space doesn't seem to be an issue.
Curious.
There's more. Blair's public statement differed from his letter to colleagues in another way. The letter included this language: "From 2002 through 2006 when the use of these techniques ended, the leadership of the CIA repeatedly reported their activities both to Executive Branch policymakers and to members of Congress, and received permission to continue to use the techniques." Blair's public statement made no mention of the permission granted by "members of Congress"--permission that came from members of Obama's own party.
Odd.
And then there are the memos themselves. Sections of the memos that describe the
techniques have been declassified and released. But other sections of those same memos--the parts that describe, in some detail, the value of the program--have been redacted and remain hidden from public view.
Marc Thiessen, a speechwriter for George W. Bush, had access to the full memos and read them to prepare a speech for Bush in 2006. When Thiessen looked at the redacted version released by the White House last week, he noticed something strange.
He writes: "But just as the memo begins to describe previously undisclosed details of what enhanced interrogations achieved, the page is almost entirely blacked out. The Obama administration released pages of unredacted classified information on the techniques used to question captured terrorist leaders but pulled out its black marker when it came to the details of what those interrogations achieved."
It's not just those memos. Former Vice President Dick Cheney says he has read other memos that describe the intelligence obtained by using coercive interrogation and that demonstrate its value. He has asked for them to be declassified and made public.
It is possible, I suppose, that a series of fortunate coincidences has resulted in the public disclosure of only that information that will be politically helpful to the Obama administration. It is also possible that Dick Cheney has taken up synchronized swimming in his retirement.
It wouldn't be the first time the Obama administration has politicized intelligence. Back in the early days of the administration, the New Yorker's Jane Mayer wrote an article about Obama's decision to ban some of these interrogation techniques. She spoke with White House counsel Greg Craig, who described the deliberations.
Across the Potomac River, at the C.I.A.'s headquarters, in Langley, Virginia, however, there was considerably less jubilation. Top C.I.A. officials have argued for years that so-called "enhanced" interrogation techniques have yielded lifesaving intelligence breakthroughs. "They disagree in some respect," Craig admitted. Among the hard questions that Obama left open, in fact, is whether the C.I.A. will have to follow the same interrogation rules as the military. While the President has clearly put an end to cruel tactics, Craig said that Obama "is somewhat sympathetic to the spies' argument that their mission and circumstances are different."
Despite such sentiments, Obama's executive orders will undoubtedly rein in the C.I.A. Waterboarding, for instance, has gone the way of the rack, now that the C.I.A. is strictly bound by customary interpretations of the Geneva Conventions. This decision, too, was the result of intense deliberation. During the transition period, unknown to the public, Obama's legal, intelligence, and national-security advisers visited Langley for two long sessions with current and former intelligence-community members. They debated whether a ban on brutal interrogation practices would hurt their ability to gather intelligence, and the advisers asked the intelligence veterans to prepare a cost-benefit analysis. The conclusions may surprise defenders of harsh interrogation tactics. "There was unanimity among Obama's expert advisers," Craig said, "that to change the practices would not in any material way affect the collection of intelligence."
That's interesting: "top CIA officials have argued for years that so-called 'enhanced' interrogation techniques have yielded lifesaving intelligence breakthroughs," but the team of "expert advisers" from Obama's presidential campaign apparently knows better.
All of this leads to one obvious question: Who needs intelligence professionals when you have campaign advisers?
Stephen F. Hayes, a senior writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD, is the author of Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President (HarperCollins).
Monday, April 20, 2009
Americas Summit: Missed Opportunity
Americas Summit: Missed Opportunity. By Mary Anastasia O'Grady
WSJ, Apr 20, 2009
If President Barack Obama's goal at the fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago this weekend was to be better liked by the region's dictators and left-wing populists than his predecessor George W. Bush, the White House can chalk up a win.
If, on the other hand, the commander in chief sought to advance American ideals, things didn't go well. As the mainstream press reported, Mr. Obama seemed well received. But the freest country in the region took a beating from Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, and Nicaragua's Danny Ortega.
Ever since Bill Clinton organized the first Summit of the Americas in 1994 in Miami, this regional gathering has been in decline. It seemed to hit its nadir in 2005 in Mar del Plata, Argentina, when President Nestór Kirchner allowed Mr. Chávez and his revolutionary allies from around the region to hold a massive, American-flag burning hate-fest in a nearby stadium with the goal of humiliating Mr. Bush. This year things got even worse with the region's bullies hogging the limelight and Mr. Obama passing up a priceless opportunity to defend freedom.
Mr. Obama had to know that the meeting is used by the region's politicians to rally the base back home by showing that they can put Uncle Sam in his place. Realizing this, the American president might have arrived at the Port of Spain prepared to return their volley. They have, after all, tolerated and even encouraged for decades one of the most repressive regimes of the 20th century. In recent years, that repression has spread from Cuba to Venezuela, and today millions of Latin Americans live under tyranny. As the leader of the free world, Mr. Obama had the duty to speak out for these voiceless souls. In this he failed.
The subject of Cuba was a softball that the American president could have hit out of the park. He knew well in advance that his counterparts would pressure him to end the U.S. embargo. He even prepared for that fact a few days ahead of the summit by unconditionally lifting U.S. restrictions on travel and remittances to the island, and offering to allow U.S. telecom companies to bring technology to the backward island.The Americas in the News
Think that helped cast the U.S. in a better light in the region? Fat chance. Raúl Castro responded on Friday from Venezuela with a long diatribe against the Yankee oppressor and a cool offer to negotiate on "equal" terms. In case you don't speak Cuban, I'll translate: The Castro brothers want credit from U.S. banks because they have defaulted on the rest of the world, and no one will lend to them anymore. They also want foreign aid from the World Bank.
Anyone who thinks that Raúl is ruminating over free elections is dreaming. Nevertheless, the Cuba suggestion to put "everything" on the table became the "news" of the summit. And while it is true that Mr. Obama mentioned political prisoners in his list of items that U.S. wants to negotiate, he could have done much more. Indeed, he could have called Raúl's bluff by putting the spotlight on the prisoners of conscience, by naming names. He could have talked about men like Afro-Cuban pacifist Oscar Elias Biscet, who has written eloquently about his admiration for Martin Luther King Jr., and today sits in jail for the crime of dissent.
The first black U.S. president could have named hundreds of others being held in inhumane conditions by the white dictator. He could have also asked Brazil's President Lula da Silva, Chile's President Michelle Bachelet and Mexico's Felipe Calderón where they stand on human rights for all Cubans. Imagine if Mr. Obama asked for a show of hands to find out who believes Cubans are less deserving of freedom than, say, the black majority in South Africa under apartheid or Chileans during the Pinochet dictatorship. Then again, that would be no way to win a popularity contest or to ingratiate yourself with American supporters who are lining up to do business in Cuba.
Instead the U.S. president simply floated down the summit river passively bouncing off whatever obstacles he encountered. The Chávez "gift" of the 1971 leftist revolutionary handbook "Open Veins of Latin America" followed by a suggestion of renewing ambassadorial relations was an insult to the American people. Granted, giving the Venezuelan attention would have been counterproductive. But Mr. Obama ought to have complained loudly about that country's aggression. It has supported Colombian terrorists, drug trafficking and Iran's nuclear ambitions. As former CIA director Michael Hayden told Fox News Sunday, "the behavior of President Chávez over the past years has been downright horrendous -- both internationally and with regard to what he's done internally inside Venezuela."
Too bad Mr. Obama didn't have a copy of the late 1990s bestseller "The Perfect Latin American Idiot" as a gift for Mr. Chávez. Another way Mr. Obama could have neutralized the left would have been to announce a White House push for ratification of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. That didn't happen either. He only promised to talk some more, a strategy that will offend no one and accomplish nothing. It is a strategy that sums up, to date, Mr. Obama's foreign policy for the region.
WSJ, Apr 20, 2009
If President Barack Obama's goal at the fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago this weekend was to be better liked by the region's dictators and left-wing populists than his predecessor George W. Bush, the White House can chalk up a win.
If, on the other hand, the commander in chief sought to advance American ideals, things didn't go well. As the mainstream press reported, Mr. Obama seemed well received. But the freest country in the region took a beating from Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, and Nicaragua's Danny Ortega.
Ever since Bill Clinton organized the first Summit of the Americas in 1994 in Miami, this regional gathering has been in decline. It seemed to hit its nadir in 2005 in Mar del Plata, Argentina, when President Nestór Kirchner allowed Mr. Chávez and his revolutionary allies from around the region to hold a massive, American-flag burning hate-fest in a nearby stadium with the goal of humiliating Mr. Bush. This year things got even worse with the region's bullies hogging the limelight and Mr. Obama passing up a priceless opportunity to defend freedom.
Mr. Obama had to know that the meeting is used by the region's politicians to rally the base back home by showing that they can put Uncle Sam in his place. Realizing this, the American president might have arrived at the Port of Spain prepared to return their volley. They have, after all, tolerated and even encouraged for decades one of the most repressive regimes of the 20th century. In recent years, that repression has spread from Cuba to Venezuela, and today millions of Latin Americans live under tyranny. As the leader of the free world, Mr. Obama had the duty to speak out for these voiceless souls. In this he failed.
The subject of Cuba was a softball that the American president could have hit out of the park. He knew well in advance that his counterparts would pressure him to end the U.S. embargo. He even prepared for that fact a few days ahead of the summit by unconditionally lifting U.S. restrictions on travel and remittances to the island, and offering to allow U.S. telecom companies to bring technology to the backward island.The Americas in the News
Think that helped cast the U.S. in a better light in the region? Fat chance. Raúl Castro responded on Friday from Venezuela with a long diatribe against the Yankee oppressor and a cool offer to negotiate on "equal" terms. In case you don't speak Cuban, I'll translate: The Castro brothers want credit from U.S. banks because they have defaulted on the rest of the world, and no one will lend to them anymore. They also want foreign aid from the World Bank.
Anyone who thinks that Raúl is ruminating over free elections is dreaming. Nevertheless, the Cuba suggestion to put "everything" on the table became the "news" of the summit. And while it is true that Mr. Obama mentioned political prisoners in his list of items that U.S. wants to negotiate, he could have done much more. Indeed, he could have called Raúl's bluff by putting the spotlight on the prisoners of conscience, by naming names. He could have talked about men like Afro-Cuban pacifist Oscar Elias Biscet, who has written eloquently about his admiration for Martin Luther King Jr., and today sits in jail for the crime of dissent.
The first black U.S. president could have named hundreds of others being held in inhumane conditions by the white dictator. He could have also asked Brazil's President Lula da Silva, Chile's President Michelle Bachelet and Mexico's Felipe Calderón where they stand on human rights for all Cubans. Imagine if Mr. Obama asked for a show of hands to find out who believes Cubans are less deserving of freedom than, say, the black majority in South Africa under apartheid or Chileans during the Pinochet dictatorship. Then again, that would be no way to win a popularity contest or to ingratiate yourself with American supporters who are lining up to do business in Cuba.
Instead the U.S. president simply floated down the summit river passively bouncing off whatever obstacles he encountered. The Chávez "gift" of the 1971 leftist revolutionary handbook "Open Veins of Latin America" followed by a suggestion of renewing ambassadorial relations was an insult to the American people. Granted, giving the Venezuelan attention would have been counterproductive. But Mr. Obama ought to have complained loudly about that country's aggression. It has supported Colombian terrorists, drug trafficking and Iran's nuclear ambitions. As former CIA director Michael Hayden told Fox News Sunday, "the behavior of President Chávez over the past years has been downright horrendous -- both internationally and with regard to what he's done internally inside Venezuela."
Too bad Mr. Obama didn't have a copy of the late 1990s bestseller "The Perfect Latin American Idiot" as a gift for Mr. Chávez. Another way Mr. Obama could have neutralized the left would have been to announce a White House push for ratification of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. That didn't happen either. He only promised to talk some more, a strategy that will offend no one and accomplish nothing. It is a strategy that sums up, to date, Mr. Obama's foreign policy for the region.
WSJ Editorial Page: Susan Rice is confused about international law and North Korea
Spinning a U.N. Failure. WSJ Editorial
Susan Rice is confused about international law and North Korea.
WSJ, Apr 20, 2009
It's strange enough that the Obama Administration is hyping last week's toothless statement by the United Nations Security Council condemning North Korea's recent rocket launch. Even more amazing, it says the U.N. move is "legally binding" on member states.
Those were the words used by Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., and repeated by a State Department spokesman. Ms. Rice is badly misinformed. As she ought to know, a "presidential statement" issued by the Security Council is legally binding on no one.
A presidential statement is agreed to by all 15 members of the Security Council and issued by the rotating president. Invented in 1994, such statements aren't even mentioned in the Security Council's procedural rules and impose zero obligations on members. They are a last resort when the Security Council can't summon the will or agreement to pass a resolution.
That's what happened after North Korea's April 5 missile launch, when neither China nor Russia would agree to the U.S. wish for a resolution. Legal experts -- including the Permanent Five's attorneys in a 2005 memo -- agree that the only U.N. pronouncement that is legally binding is a Security Council resolution issued under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which sets out the Council's powers to maintain peace. Such resolutions can be enforced with sanctions or military action. Resolution 1718, passed in 2006 after North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, falls in this category.
The distinction between "Chapter VII resolutions" and other U.N. utterances is important -- as the example of Israel illustrates. Since the Jewish state has never been subject to a Chapter VII resolution, no Israeli "violation" of a U.N. pronouncement can give rise to sanctions. Even the famous Resolution 242, issued at the end of the 1967 Yom Kippur War, was not issued under Chapter VII. If the Obama Administration considers even U.N. presidential statements "legally binding," it's an invitation to the U.N. to ramp up its attacks on Israel.
Last week's statement on North Korea is binding only in the sense that it calls on member states "to comply fully" with their obligations under Resolution 1718, which bans sales of weapons, weapons parts and luxury goods to North Korea. Resolution 1718 is legally binding, but it has never been enforced. This speaks volumes about the sincerity of promises made at the U.N., and about the failure of the Obama Administration to win Security Council support for a serious response to North Korea's missile launch.
Susan Rice is confused about international law and North Korea.
WSJ, Apr 20, 2009
It's strange enough that the Obama Administration is hyping last week's toothless statement by the United Nations Security Council condemning North Korea's recent rocket launch. Even more amazing, it says the U.N. move is "legally binding" on member states.
Those were the words used by Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., and repeated by a State Department spokesman. Ms. Rice is badly misinformed. As she ought to know, a "presidential statement" issued by the Security Council is legally binding on no one.
A presidential statement is agreed to by all 15 members of the Security Council and issued by the rotating president. Invented in 1994, such statements aren't even mentioned in the Security Council's procedural rules and impose zero obligations on members. They are a last resort when the Security Council can't summon the will or agreement to pass a resolution.
That's what happened after North Korea's April 5 missile launch, when neither China nor Russia would agree to the U.S. wish for a resolution. Legal experts -- including the Permanent Five's attorneys in a 2005 memo -- agree that the only U.N. pronouncement that is legally binding is a Security Council resolution issued under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which sets out the Council's powers to maintain peace. Such resolutions can be enforced with sanctions or military action. Resolution 1718, passed in 2006 after North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, falls in this category.
The distinction between "Chapter VII resolutions" and other U.N. utterances is important -- as the example of Israel illustrates. Since the Jewish state has never been subject to a Chapter VII resolution, no Israeli "violation" of a U.N. pronouncement can give rise to sanctions. Even the famous Resolution 242, issued at the end of the 1967 Yom Kippur War, was not issued under Chapter VII. If the Obama Administration considers even U.N. presidential statements "legally binding," it's an invitation to the U.N. to ramp up its attacks on Israel.
Last week's statement on North Korea is binding only in the sense that it calls on member states "to comply fully" with their obligations under Resolution 1718, which bans sales of weapons, weapons parts and luxury goods to North Korea. Resolution 1718 is legally binding, but it has never been enforced. This speaks volumes about the sincerity of promises made at the U.N., and about the failure of the Obama Administration to win Security Council support for a serious response to North Korea's missile launch.
What happens when the president can no longer blame Bush for international strife?
A World Of Trouble For Obama. By Jackson Diehl
WaPo, Monday, April 20, 2009
New American presidents typically begin by behaving as if most of the world's problems are the fault of their predecessors -- and Barack Obama has been no exception. In his first three months he has quickly taken steps to correct the errors in George W. Bush's foreign policy, as seen by Democrats. He has collected easy dividends from his base, U.S. allies in Europe and a global following for not being "unilateralist" or war-mongering or scornful of dialogue with enemies.
Now comes the interesting part: when it starts to become evident that Bush did not create rogue states, terrorist movements, Middle Eastern blood feuds or Russian belligerence -- and that shake-ups in U.S. diplomacy, however enlightened, might not have much impact on them.
The first wake-up call has come from North Korea -- a state that, according to established Democratic wisdom, would have given up its nuclear weapons years ago if it had not been labeled "evil" by Bush, denied bilateral talks with Washington and punished with sanctions. Stephen Bosworth, the administration's new special envoy, duly tried to head off Pyongyang's latest illegal missile test by promising bilateral negotiations and offering "incentives" for good behavior.
North Korea fired the missile anyway. After a week of U.N. Security Council negotiations by the new, multilateralist U.S. administration produced the same weak statement that the Bush administration would have gotten, the Stalinist regime expelled U.N. inspectors and announced that it was returning to plutonium production.
When the inspectors were ousted in 2002, Democrats blamed Bush. Now Republicans blame Obama -- but North Korea's strategy hasn't changed in 15 years. It provokes a crisis, then demands bribes from the United States and South Korea in exchange for restoring the status quo. The Obama team now faces the same dilemma that bedeviled the past two administrations: It must judge whether to respond to the bad behavior by paying the bribe or by trying to squeeze the regime.
A second cold shower rained down last week on George Mitchell, Obama's special envoy to the Middle East. For eight years Democrats insisted that the absence of progress toward peace between Israel and its neighbors was due to the Bush administration's failure at "engagement." Mitchell embodies the correction. But during last week's tour of the region he encountered a divided Palestinian movement seemingly incapable of agreeing on a stance toward Israel and a new Israeli government that doesn't accept the goal of Palestinian statehood. Neither appeared at all impressed by the new American intervention -- or willing to offer even token concessions.
Those aren't the only signs that the new medicine isn't taking. Europeans commonly blamed Bush for Russia's aggressiveness -- they said he ignored Moscow's interests and pressed too hard for European missile defense and NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. So Hillary Clinton made a show of pushing a "reset" button, and Obama offered the Kremlin a new arms control agreement while putting missile defense and NATO expansion on a back burner. Yet in recent weeks Russia has deployed thousands of additional troops as well as tanks and warplanes to the two breakaway Georgian republics it has recognized, in blatant violation of the cease-fire agreement that ended last year's war. The threat of another Russian attack on Georgia seems to be going up rather than down.
Obama sent a conciliatory public message to Iranians, and the United States joined in a multilateral proposal for new negotiations on its nuclear program. The regime responded by announcing another expansion of its uranium enrichment facility and placing an American journalist on trial for espionage. Obama told Iraqis that he would, as long promised, use troop withdrawals to pressure the government to take over responsibility for the country. Since he made that announcement, violence in Iraq has steadily increased.
Obama is not the first president to discover that facile changes in U.S. policy don't crack long-standing problems. Some of his new strategies may produce results with time. Yet the real test of an administration is what it does once it realizes that the quick fixes aren't working -- that, say, North Korea and Iran have no intention of giving up their nuclear programs, with or without dialogue, while Russia remains determined to restore its dominion over Georgia. In other words, what happens when it's no longer George W. Bush's fault? That's what the next 100 days will tell us.
WaPo, Monday, April 20, 2009
New American presidents typically begin by behaving as if most of the world's problems are the fault of their predecessors -- and Barack Obama has been no exception. In his first three months he has quickly taken steps to correct the errors in George W. Bush's foreign policy, as seen by Democrats. He has collected easy dividends from his base, U.S. allies in Europe and a global following for not being "unilateralist" or war-mongering or scornful of dialogue with enemies.
Now comes the interesting part: when it starts to become evident that Bush did not create rogue states, terrorist movements, Middle Eastern blood feuds or Russian belligerence -- and that shake-ups in U.S. diplomacy, however enlightened, might not have much impact on them.
The first wake-up call has come from North Korea -- a state that, according to established Democratic wisdom, would have given up its nuclear weapons years ago if it had not been labeled "evil" by Bush, denied bilateral talks with Washington and punished with sanctions. Stephen Bosworth, the administration's new special envoy, duly tried to head off Pyongyang's latest illegal missile test by promising bilateral negotiations and offering "incentives" for good behavior.
North Korea fired the missile anyway. After a week of U.N. Security Council negotiations by the new, multilateralist U.S. administration produced the same weak statement that the Bush administration would have gotten, the Stalinist regime expelled U.N. inspectors and announced that it was returning to plutonium production.
When the inspectors were ousted in 2002, Democrats blamed Bush. Now Republicans blame Obama -- but North Korea's strategy hasn't changed in 15 years. It provokes a crisis, then demands bribes from the United States and South Korea in exchange for restoring the status quo. The Obama team now faces the same dilemma that bedeviled the past two administrations: It must judge whether to respond to the bad behavior by paying the bribe or by trying to squeeze the regime.
A second cold shower rained down last week on George Mitchell, Obama's special envoy to the Middle East. For eight years Democrats insisted that the absence of progress toward peace between Israel and its neighbors was due to the Bush administration's failure at "engagement." Mitchell embodies the correction. But during last week's tour of the region he encountered a divided Palestinian movement seemingly incapable of agreeing on a stance toward Israel and a new Israeli government that doesn't accept the goal of Palestinian statehood. Neither appeared at all impressed by the new American intervention -- or willing to offer even token concessions.
Those aren't the only signs that the new medicine isn't taking. Europeans commonly blamed Bush for Russia's aggressiveness -- they said he ignored Moscow's interests and pressed too hard for European missile defense and NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. So Hillary Clinton made a show of pushing a "reset" button, and Obama offered the Kremlin a new arms control agreement while putting missile defense and NATO expansion on a back burner. Yet in recent weeks Russia has deployed thousands of additional troops as well as tanks and warplanes to the two breakaway Georgian republics it has recognized, in blatant violation of the cease-fire agreement that ended last year's war. The threat of another Russian attack on Georgia seems to be going up rather than down.
Obama sent a conciliatory public message to Iranians, and the United States joined in a multilateral proposal for new negotiations on its nuclear program. The regime responded by announcing another expansion of its uranium enrichment facility and placing an American journalist on trial for espionage. Obama told Iraqis that he would, as long promised, use troop withdrawals to pressure the government to take over responsibility for the country. Since he made that announcement, violence in Iraq has steadily increased.
Obama is not the first president to discover that facile changes in U.S. policy don't crack long-standing problems. Some of his new strategies may produce results with time. Yet the real test of an administration is what it does once it realizes that the quick fixes aren't working -- that, say, North Korea and Iran have no intention of giving up their nuclear programs, with or without dialogue, while Russia remains determined to restore its dominion over Georgia. In other words, what happens when it's no longer George W. Bush's fault? That's what the next 100 days will tell us.
Sunday, April 19, 2009
WaPo on Iraq: How the Obama administration can respond to incipient signs of trouble
Iraq's Wobbles. WaPo Editorial
How the Obama administration can respond to incipient signs of trouble.
WaPo, Sunday, April 19, 2009
IT'S BEEN only seven weeks since President Obama outlined a strategy for Iraq aimed at withdrawing most U.S. troops by the end of next summer. But already there is cause for concern. During the past month security around the country has been slipping: At least 37 people have been killed in four major attacks on security forces in the past week alone, and there have been multiple car bombings in Baghdad and other cities. Those strikes have been claimed by al-Qaeda, which appears to be attempting a comeback. But there have also been new bursts of sectarian violence among Sunni and Shiite extremists.
Following successful local elections in January, Iraqi politicians are mired in backroom squabbling over the formation of provincial governments. The Shiite-led national government has made disturbing moves against some of the Sunni leaders who led the fight against al-Qaeda. Hamstrung by the fall in oil prices, the government is having trouble meeting commitments to pay former insurgents or expand the security forces. Normally the U.S. ambassador would be deeply involved in trying to smooth over such problems, but there has been no ambassador in Baghdad since February.
It's not time to panic: U.S. commanders point out that overall, violence in Iraq is at its lowest level since the first year of the war. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, bolstered by the election outcome, remains strong and confident. But the administration needs to be alert to what is happening in Iraq -- and ready to adjust political and military plans to prevent what could easily become a downward spiral.
One early decision point involves the withdrawal timetable, which calls for U.S. troops to leave all Iraqi cities by the end of June. That pullout is looking risky in a couple of places, including the northern city of Mosul, which has never been entirely cleansed of anti-government insurgents. The U.S. commander in the area told a Pentagon briefing last week that American troops could remain in the city if the Iraqi government requests it following an ongoing review; such flexibility should be extended to other areas, if necessary.
U.S. diplomats and commanders also need to make sure that Sunni leaders -- already under renewed attack by al-Qaeda -- are treated fairly by the government. It's hard to tell from Washington whether recent arrests of some tribal leaders were justified or prudent; that's one reason why the administration's chosen ambassador, Christopher Hill, needs to get to Baghdad as soon as possible. He should be confirmed when Congress returns this week.
Mr. Hill's main focus, once he arrives, ought to be helping to ensure that Iraq's national elections, expected next January, go smoothly. Judging from January's results, elections may be the best way to defuse sectarian tensions and resolve disputes among feuding factions. Al-Qaeda and other extremists will try to disrupt the democratic process, while Iran will seek to manipulate it. Though the new administration has minimized the promotion of democracy as a goal, both in Iraq and elsewhere, it offers perhaps the best means of enabling the troop withdrawal that Mr. Obama has promised for next year.
How the Obama administration can respond to incipient signs of trouble.
WaPo, Sunday, April 19, 2009
IT'S BEEN only seven weeks since President Obama outlined a strategy for Iraq aimed at withdrawing most U.S. troops by the end of next summer. But already there is cause for concern. During the past month security around the country has been slipping: At least 37 people have been killed in four major attacks on security forces in the past week alone, and there have been multiple car bombings in Baghdad and other cities. Those strikes have been claimed by al-Qaeda, which appears to be attempting a comeback. But there have also been new bursts of sectarian violence among Sunni and Shiite extremists.
Following successful local elections in January, Iraqi politicians are mired in backroom squabbling over the formation of provincial governments. The Shiite-led national government has made disturbing moves against some of the Sunni leaders who led the fight against al-Qaeda. Hamstrung by the fall in oil prices, the government is having trouble meeting commitments to pay former insurgents or expand the security forces. Normally the U.S. ambassador would be deeply involved in trying to smooth over such problems, but there has been no ambassador in Baghdad since February.
It's not time to panic: U.S. commanders point out that overall, violence in Iraq is at its lowest level since the first year of the war. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, bolstered by the election outcome, remains strong and confident. But the administration needs to be alert to what is happening in Iraq -- and ready to adjust political and military plans to prevent what could easily become a downward spiral.
One early decision point involves the withdrawal timetable, which calls for U.S. troops to leave all Iraqi cities by the end of June. That pullout is looking risky in a couple of places, including the northern city of Mosul, which has never been entirely cleansed of anti-government insurgents. The U.S. commander in the area told a Pentagon briefing last week that American troops could remain in the city if the Iraqi government requests it following an ongoing review; such flexibility should be extended to other areas, if necessary.
U.S. diplomats and commanders also need to make sure that Sunni leaders -- already under renewed attack by al-Qaeda -- are treated fairly by the government. It's hard to tell from Washington whether recent arrests of some tribal leaders were justified or prudent; that's one reason why the administration's chosen ambassador, Christopher Hill, needs to get to Baghdad as soon as possible. He should be confirmed when Congress returns this week.
Mr. Hill's main focus, once he arrives, ought to be helping to ensure that Iraq's national elections, expected next January, go smoothly. Judging from January's results, elections may be the best way to defuse sectarian tensions and resolve disputes among feuding factions. Al-Qaeda and other extremists will try to disrupt the democratic process, while Iran will seek to manipulate it. Though the new administration has minimized the promotion of democracy as a goal, both in Iraq and elsewhere, it offers perhaps the best means of enabling the troop withdrawal that Mr. Obama has promised for next year.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
Libertarian: A Bold Plan B for North Korea
A Bold Plan B for North Korea, by Ted Galen Carpenter
Cato, April 15, 2009
North Korea's announced withdrawal Tuesday from the six-party talks in response to the UN Security Council's tepid reaction to the April 5 missile test raises a disturbing possibility. The US and the governments of East Asia have proceeded on the assumption that a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear program is feasible. That settlement would entail Pyongyang's renunciation of its nuclear ambitions in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions.
But what if the underlying assumption is wrong?
What if, for six years, Kim Jong Il's regime has been merely stalling for time while building nuclear warheads and perfecting a reliable missile delivery system? It would have been relatively easy for Pyongyang to ignore the UN's condemnation and remain in the six-party talks. The Security Council's action Monday was utterly anemic, since the outcome was not even a binding resolution. It was merely a statement from the council president condemning the missile launch and admonishing member states to more effectively enforce the hardly robust sanctions imposed in 2006 following the North's nuclear test. Yet North Korea used the council's response as an excuse to quit the talks.
It is time to ask what the US and North Korea's neighbors in East Asia plan to do if Pyongyang is not willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In other words, what is "Plan B" if the six-party talks fail? Since military action against North Korea is far too dangerous, there appear to be only three other options, and none is entirely appealing or without risk.
The first option would be to follow the suggestion of former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton and other hard-liners to impose far stronger multilateral economic sanctions. That strategy has a big defect, however. Both Beijing and Moscow are vehemently opposed to enhanced sanctions. China's opposition is crucial because without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have little impact on Pyongyang. And given the dependence on Beijing's willingness to continue funding the soaring US treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions.
The second option would be to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and rely on deterrence to prevent aggressive behavior. There is a credible argument for that approach. After all, the US has deterred other nuclear bad actors in the past, most notably the Soviet Union and Maoist China, and the vast US strategic arsenal probably could deter the likes of Kim Jong Il.
But being able to deter an outright attack still leaves room for dangerous North Korean mischief. Pyongyang's proliferation activities are especially worrisome. North Korea's apparent nuclear assistance to Syria makes one wonder what other countries – or even more troubling, nonstate actors – might also be beneficiaries of such aid. Living with a nuclear-capable North Korea would be, at the least, a nerve-wracking experience.
There is a final option that deserves consideration. It would amount to inducing (bribing) China to remove Kim Jong Il's regime and install a more pragmatic government in Pyongyang, along with the explicit condition of keeping the country nonnuclear. Part of the bargain also ought to be a commitment from Beijing to promote the reunification of the two Koreas within the next generation. During my visit to China last year, policymakers there professed loyalty to Beijing's longtime ally, but there was also a distinct undertone of exasperation with Pyongyang.
If the price were right, Chinese leaders might be bold enough to topple Kim with a palace coup. But the price would certainly not be cheap. At the least, Beijing would want a commitment from the US to end its military presence on the Korean Peninsula and, probably, to phase out its security alliance with South Korea. In all likelihood, Chinese leaders also would want US concessions on the Taiwan issue.
Those steps might not be easy for US policymakers. But American – and East Asian – leaders must ask themselves whether such sacrifices might be a necessary price to end the North Korean nuclear threat.
In any case, US and East Asian officials need to be thinking about a Plan B now. It is not a prudent strategy simply to hope that the six-party talks will produce an enforceable, effective solution. Given North Korea's record, that is merely the triumph of hope over experience.
Cato, April 15, 2009
North Korea's announced withdrawal Tuesday from the six-party talks in response to the UN Security Council's tepid reaction to the April 5 missile test raises a disturbing possibility. The US and the governments of East Asia have proceeded on the assumption that a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear program is feasible. That settlement would entail Pyongyang's renunciation of its nuclear ambitions in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions.
But what if the underlying assumption is wrong?
What if, for six years, Kim Jong Il's regime has been merely stalling for time while building nuclear warheads and perfecting a reliable missile delivery system? It would have been relatively easy for Pyongyang to ignore the UN's condemnation and remain in the six-party talks. The Security Council's action Monday was utterly anemic, since the outcome was not even a binding resolution. It was merely a statement from the council president condemning the missile launch and admonishing member states to more effectively enforce the hardly robust sanctions imposed in 2006 following the North's nuclear test. Yet North Korea used the council's response as an excuse to quit the talks.
It is time to ask what the US and North Korea's neighbors in East Asia plan to do if Pyongyang is not willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In other words, what is "Plan B" if the six-party talks fail? Since military action against North Korea is far too dangerous, there appear to be only three other options, and none is entirely appealing or without risk.
The first option would be to follow the suggestion of former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton and other hard-liners to impose far stronger multilateral economic sanctions. That strategy has a big defect, however. Both Beijing and Moscow are vehemently opposed to enhanced sanctions. China's opposition is crucial because without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have little impact on Pyongyang. And given the dependence on Beijing's willingness to continue funding the soaring US treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions.
The second option would be to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and rely on deterrence to prevent aggressive behavior. There is a credible argument for that approach. After all, the US has deterred other nuclear bad actors in the past, most notably the Soviet Union and Maoist China, and the vast US strategic arsenal probably could deter the likes of Kim Jong Il.
But being able to deter an outright attack still leaves room for dangerous North Korean mischief. Pyongyang's proliferation activities are especially worrisome. North Korea's apparent nuclear assistance to Syria makes one wonder what other countries – or even more troubling, nonstate actors – might also be beneficiaries of such aid. Living with a nuclear-capable North Korea would be, at the least, a nerve-wracking experience.
There is a final option that deserves consideration. It would amount to inducing (bribing) China to remove Kim Jong Il's regime and install a more pragmatic government in Pyongyang, along with the explicit condition of keeping the country nonnuclear. Part of the bargain also ought to be a commitment from Beijing to promote the reunification of the two Koreas within the next generation. During my visit to China last year, policymakers there professed loyalty to Beijing's longtime ally, but there was also a distinct undertone of exasperation with Pyongyang.
If the price were right, Chinese leaders might be bold enough to topple Kim with a palace coup. But the price would certainly not be cheap. At the least, Beijing would want a commitment from the US to end its military presence on the Korean Peninsula and, probably, to phase out its security alliance with South Korea. In all likelihood, Chinese leaders also would want US concessions on the Taiwan issue.
Those steps might not be easy for US policymakers. But American – and East Asian – leaders must ask themselves whether such sacrifices might be a necessary price to end the North Korean nuclear threat.
In any case, US and East Asian officials need to be thinking about a Plan B now. It is not a prudent strategy simply to hope that the six-party talks will produce an enforceable, effective solution. Given North Korea's record, that is merely the triumph of hope over experience.
A weaker U.S. military will undermine stability in Asia
Coming to Asia's Defense. By Dan Blumenthal
A weaker U.S. military will undermine stability in the region.
WSJ, Apr 16, 2009
Former President George W. Bush's critics liked to say that during his term America was "getting its derriere kicked" by China. By this the critics presumably meant that the war in Iraq was a big distraction and that the United States was not attending enough Asian multilateral conferences and showing off its "soft power."
While the case was never overwhelming, it contained a kernel of truth. Beijing did gain regional influence at Washington's expense under former President Bush's watch. Now President Barack Obama is doing his predecessor one better: By imposing draconian defense cuts, heavily targeted on high-technology weapons systems and "power-projection" platforms essential to preserving U.S. military superiority in the Pacific, America may not have much of a derriere left in Asia at all.
Though "soft power" and "smart power" are all the rage in foreign-policy circles, Asia remains a dangerous place where good, old-fashioned "hard power" still matters. Certainly China and North Korea think so. Pyongyang poses a major conventional threat to South Korea and is inching closer to obtaining delivery systems for nuclear weapons that can pose a threat both to Japan and the continental U.S. Pyongyang's ballistic missile launch this month is only the latest sign of its growing threat to regional security.
China has built up its military across the board. Its submarine fleet has grown faster than any other in the world, it now has a large and lethal arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, and it has announced plans to deploy aircraft carriers. Worrying about China is far from a case of what Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls "next war-itis." The U.S. isn't in a war with China -- mercifully -- but there is a military competition. China has already changed the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region to the great consternation of America's key allies, such as Japan and India.
The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea and China. To the contrary, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region.
That is why the Obama administration's defense cuts are so detrimental to American strategy. The day after North Korea's long-range missile test, the U.S. announced deep cuts to missile defense and satellite programs. The Airborne Laser program that Mr. Obama axed is not only the most promising and immediate method for intercepting ballistic missiles in the early "boost" phase, shortly after launch, but also the first significant use of directed energy, a technology that may prove to be yet another revolutionary change in warfare sparked by American ingenuity.
There are further implications for Asia in the Obama defense cuts: The decision to reduce production of stealthy F-22s ends any hope that Japan can buy this air supremacy aircraft and add to its own deterrent. Nor can American dominance of the skies, historically the cornerstone of U.S. military superiority, be assured.
Also missing from the defense budget is any increase in the submarine or surface fleet. The Navy set a goal of a 313-ship fleet only a few years ago, up from around 280 today (roughly half of the total at the end of the Cold War), yet the Obama plan falls well short of that number.
Indeed, the yin of American cuts is almost perfectly reflected in the yang of China's skyrocketing investments in its own fleet. This will inevitably chip away at America's ability to track the Chinese deployment of submarines throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Just last month China demonstrated its newfound military muscle when its warships harassed an American surveillance vessel conducting lawful missions in the South China Sea.
Worse still, growing Chinese dominance of Pacific waterways will begin to affect maritime commerce and will soon become a factor in America's strategic calculus in the region. Chinese military attack boats and ballistic missile submarines that carry the means for nuclear attack cannot be easily dismissed if the U.S. is to maintain its status as keeper of the peace in the Pacific. And regional commanders, presented with the reality of this growing imbalance between the U.S. and China, will be forced to give up important regional missions, from presence and security cooperation in South East Asia to deterring aggression and defending allies in North Asia.
In announcing his defense cuts, Mr. Gates stated that he was making "a virtue of necessity," conceding that the Obama plan was an exercise in budget cutting to pay for favored domestic programs. Mr. Gates promises that he will explain his judgments about "balancing risks" sometime soon, but a risk assessment is no substitute for a strategy. If Mr. Obama wants to continue America's strategy of guaranteeing Asia's security, his defense plan will not give him the means.
In the near future, Mr. Obama will announce his policies toward China and North Korea and they will, in some way, continue those of his predecessors. He will undoubtedly want to "engage" China and "hedge" against a downturn in relations. He will pronounce a nuclear North Korea unacceptable to the U.S. The problem is that without the military power to back up America's diplomatic goals, these policy proclamations ring increasingly hollow. America's allies know it. And, even worse, China and North Korea know it. The question is, can Congress find the political will to stop these cuts and the blow they strike to U.S. objectives in Asia?
Mr. Blumenthal is a resident fellow in Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.
A weaker U.S. military will undermine stability in the region.
WSJ, Apr 16, 2009
Former President George W. Bush's critics liked to say that during his term America was "getting its derriere kicked" by China. By this the critics presumably meant that the war in Iraq was a big distraction and that the United States was not attending enough Asian multilateral conferences and showing off its "soft power."
While the case was never overwhelming, it contained a kernel of truth. Beijing did gain regional influence at Washington's expense under former President Bush's watch. Now President Barack Obama is doing his predecessor one better: By imposing draconian defense cuts, heavily targeted on high-technology weapons systems and "power-projection" platforms essential to preserving U.S. military superiority in the Pacific, America may not have much of a derriere left in Asia at all.
Though "soft power" and "smart power" are all the rage in foreign-policy circles, Asia remains a dangerous place where good, old-fashioned "hard power" still matters. Certainly China and North Korea think so. Pyongyang poses a major conventional threat to South Korea and is inching closer to obtaining delivery systems for nuclear weapons that can pose a threat both to Japan and the continental U.S. Pyongyang's ballistic missile launch this month is only the latest sign of its growing threat to regional security.
China has built up its military across the board. Its submarine fleet has grown faster than any other in the world, it now has a large and lethal arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, and it has announced plans to deploy aircraft carriers. Worrying about China is far from a case of what Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls "next war-itis." The U.S. isn't in a war with China -- mercifully -- but there is a military competition. China has already changed the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region to the great consternation of America's key allies, such as Japan and India.
The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea and China. To the contrary, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region.
That is why the Obama administration's defense cuts are so detrimental to American strategy. The day after North Korea's long-range missile test, the U.S. announced deep cuts to missile defense and satellite programs. The Airborne Laser program that Mr. Obama axed is not only the most promising and immediate method for intercepting ballistic missiles in the early "boost" phase, shortly after launch, but also the first significant use of directed energy, a technology that may prove to be yet another revolutionary change in warfare sparked by American ingenuity.
There are further implications for Asia in the Obama defense cuts: The decision to reduce production of stealthy F-22s ends any hope that Japan can buy this air supremacy aircraft and add to its own deterrent. Nor can American dominance of the skies, historically the cornerstone of U.S. military superiority, be assured.
Also missing from the defense budget is any increase in the submarine or surface fleet. The Navy set a goal of a 313-ship fleet only a few years ago, up from around 280 today (roughly half of the total at the end of the Cold War), yet the Obama plan falls well short of that number.
Indeed, the yin of American cuts is almost perfectly reflected in the yang of China's skyrocketing investments in its own fleet. This will inevitably chip away at America's ability to track the Chinese deployment of submarines throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Just last month China demonstrated its newfound military muscle when its warships harassed an American surveillance vessel conducting lawful missions in the South China Sea.
Worse still, growing Chinese dominance of Pacific waterways will begin to affect maritime commerce and will soon become a factor in America's strategic calculus in the region. Chinese military attack boats and ballistic missile submarines that carry the means for nuclear attack cannot be easily dismissed if the U.S. is to maintain its status as keeper of the peace in the Pacific. And regional commanders, presented with the reality of this growing imbalance between the U.S. and China, will be forced to give up important regional missions, from presence and security cooperation in South East Asia to deterring aggression and defending allies in North Asia.
In announcing his defense cuts, Mr. Gates stated that he was making "a virtue of necessity," conceding that the Obama plan was an exercise in budget cutting to pay for favored domestic programs. Mr. Gates promises that he will explain his judgments about "balancing risks" sometime soon, but a risk assessment is no substitute for a strategy. If Mr. Obama wants to continue America's strategy of guaranteeing Asia's security, his defense plan will not give him the means.
In the near future, Mr. Obama will announce his policies toward China and North Korea and they will, in some way, continue those of his predecessors. He will undoubtedly want to "engage" China and "hedge" against a downturn in relations. He will pronounce a nuclear North Korea unacceptable to the U.S. The problem is that without the military power to back up America's diplomatic goals, these policy proclamations ring increasingly hollow. America's allies know it. And, even worse, China and North Korea know it. The question is, can Congress find the political will to stop these cuts and the blow they strike to U.S. objectives in Asia?
Mr. Blumenthal is a resident fellow in Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
WaPo Editorial: A Solution for Somalia
A Solution for Somalia. WaPo Editorial
What it will take to stop the threats of piracy and terrorism
WaPo, Tuesday, April 14, 2009; Page A16
SKILLFUL SHOOTING by U.S. snipers rescued an American ship captain from Somali pirates Sunday -- along with an Obama administration facing its first foreign emergency. Unfortunately, no silver bullets are available for the growing threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean or the toxic anarchy that has spawned it.
President Obama said in a statement Sunday that "we must continue to work with our partners to prevent future attacks, be prepared to interdict acts of piracy and ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for those crimes." Those actions are certainly necessary, and they speak for themselves. But they don't begin to address the underlying problem, which is Somalia's long-standing status as a failed state and the desperation and extremism growing among its Muslim population.
Since the Clinton administration abandoned a U.N. mission in Somalia 15 years ago, the United States has tried ignoring the chaos there, using proxies to subdue it and targeting its worst elements with airstrikes. An international naval task force has been cruising along the coast for months to deter piracy. All along, the country's misery and the threat it poses to the United States and other Western countries have steadily worsened. It's not just the pirates, who have staged at least 66 assaults so far this year and hold more than a dozen ships and 200 foreign crew members hostage. As senior U.S. officials have repeatedly acknowledged, a radical Islamist militia that controls much of Somalia has ties to al-Qaeda, which has used its Somali base to stage attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets in Africa and is believed to be training foreign militants -- including some Somali Americans -- for future operations.
Again and again, mostly for political reasons, U.S. administrations have refused to absorb the lessons Somalia teaches, in tandem with pre-2001 Afghanistan and the tribal territories of present-day Pakistan. Those lessons are that stateless territories, particularly in the Muslim world, can pose a significant threat to U.S. interests and even homeland security, and that the danger can be adequately addressed only by helping a state authority emerge to fill the vacuum.
Last week's crisis offers the Obama administration an opportunity to avoid perpetuating past errors. No, we aren't advocating another massive U.N. intervention in the country backed by U.S. troops. As the Bush administration discovered late last year, there is no appetite among America's European or African allies for such an operation. But what would be possible is a concerted push to strengthen the most recent attempt at a Somali government -- a not-unpromising coalition between moderate Islamists and various clan-based factions. The government needs massive economic aid, training and equipment for an army and coast guard, and help in brokering political deals.
A coordinated international effort to build up a Somali government and security forces would cost many billions of dollars and take many years to pay off. It would consume U.S. diplomatic capital and be domestically controversial -- like the nation-building missions underway, at last, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also the only way to end the threats of piracy and terrorism from the Horn of Africa.
What it will take to stop the threats of piracy and terrorism
WaPo, Tuesday, April 14, 2009; Page A16
SKILLFUL SHOOTING by U.S. snipers rescued an American ship captain from Somali pirates Sunday -- along with an Obama administration facing its first foreign emergency. Unfortunately, no silver bullets are available for the growing threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean or the toxic anarchy that has spawned it.
President Obama said in a statement Sunday that "we must continue to work with our partners to prevent future attacks, be prepared to interdict acts of piracy and ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for those crimes." Those actions are certainly necessary, and they speak for themselves. But they don't begin to address the underlying problem, which is Somalia's long-standing status as a failed state and the desperation and extremism growing among its Muslim population.
Since the Clinton administration abandoned a U.N. mission in Somalia 15 years ago, the United States has tried ignoring the chaos there, using proxies to subdue it and targeting its worst elements with airstrikes. An international naval task force has been cruising along the coast for months to deter piracy. All along, the country's misery and the threat it poses to the United States and other Western countries have steadily worsened. It's not just the pirates, who have staged at least 66 assaults so far this year and hold more than a dozen ships and 200 foreign crew members hostage. As senior U.S. officials have repeatedly acknowledged, a radical Islamist militia that controls much of Somalia has ties to al-Qaeda, which has used its Somali base to stage attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets in Africa and is believed to be training foreign militants -- including some Somali Americans -- for future operations.
Again and again, mostly for political reasons, U.S. administrations have refused to absorb the lessons Somalia teaches, in tandem with pre-2001 Afghanistan and the tribal territories of present-day Pakistan. Those lessons are that stateless territories, particularly in the Muslim world, can pose a significant threat to U.S. interests and even homeland security, and that the danger can be adequately addressed only by helping a state authority emerge to fill the vacuum.
Last week's crisis offers the Obama administration an opportunity to avoid perpetuating past errors. No, we aren't advocating another massive U.N. intervention in the country backed by U.S. troops. As the Bush administration discovered late last year, there is no appetite among America's European or African allies for such an operation. But what would be possible is a concerted push to strengthen the most recent attempt at a Somali government -- a not-unpromising coalition between moderate Islamists and various clan-based factions. The government needs massive economic aid, training and equipment for an army and coast guard, and help in brokering political deals.
A coordinated international effort to build up a Somali government and security forces would cost many billions of dollars and take many years to pay off. It would consume U.S. diplomatic capital and be domestically controversial -- like the nation-building missions underway, at last, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also the only way to end the threats of piracy and terrorism from the Horn of Africa.
Monday, April 13, 2009
What Iran Really Thinks About Talks - It's a game of diplomacy without sincerity
What Iran Really Thinks About Talks. By Michael Rubin
It's a game of diplomacy without sincerity.
Apr 12, 2009
On Apr. 9, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's atomic energy agency, announced that the Islamic Republic had installed 7,000 centrifuges in its Natanz uranium enrichment facility. The announcement came one day after the U.S. State Department announced it would engage Iran directly in multilateral nuclear talks.
Proponents of engagement with Tehran say dialogue provides the only way forward. Iran's progress over the past eight years, they say, is a testament to the failure of Bush administration strategy. President Barack Obama, for example, in his Mar. 21 address to the Iranian government and people, declared that diplomacy "will not be advanced by threats. We seek engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect."
Thus our president fulfills a pattern in which new administrations place blame for the failure of diplomacy on predecessors rather than on adversaries. The Islamic Republic is not a passive actor, however. Quite the opposite: While President Obama plays checkers, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei plays chess. The enrichment milestone is a testament both to Tehran's pro-active strategy and to Washington's refusal to recognize it.
Iran's nuclear program dates back to 1989, when the Russian government agreed to complete the reactor at Bushehr. It was a year of optimism in the West: The Iran-Iraq War ended the summer before and, with the death of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, leadership passed to Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, both considered moderates.
At the beginning of the year, George H.W. Bush offered an olive branch to Tehran, declaring in his inaugural address, "Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on." The mood grew more euphoric in Europe. In 1992, the German government, ever eager for new business opportunities and arguing that trade could moderate the Islamic Republic, launched its own engagement initiative.
It didn't work. While U.S. and European policy makers draw distinctions between reformers and hard-liners in the Islamic Republic, the difference between the two is style, not substance. Both remain committed to Iran's nuclear program. Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, for example, called for a Dialogue of Civilizations. The European Union (EU) took the bait and, between 2000 and 2005, nearly tripled trade with Iran.
It was a ruse. Iranian officials were as insincere as European diplomats were greedy, gullible or both. Iranian officials now acknowledge that Tehran invested the benefits reaped into its nuclear program.
On June 14, 2008, for example, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Mr. Khatami's spokesman, debated advisers to current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the University of Gila in northern Iran. Mr. Ramezanzadeh criticized Mr. Ahmadinejad for his defiant rhetoric, and counseled him to accept the Khatami approach: "We should prove to the entire world that we want power plants for electricity. Afterwards, we can proceed with other activities," Mr. Ramezanzadeh said. The purpose of dialogue, he argued further, was not to compromise, but to build confidence and avoid sanctions. "We had an overt policy, which was one of negotiation and confidence building, and a covert policy, which was continuation of the activities," he said.
The strategy was successful. While today U.S. and European officials laud Mr. Khatami as a peacemaker, it was on his watch that Iran built and operated covertly its Natanz nuclear enrichment plant and, at least until 2003, a nuclear weapons program as well.
Iran's responsiveness to diplomacy is a mirage. After two years of talks following exposure of its Natanz facility, Tehran finally acquiesced to a temporary enrichment suspension, a move which Secretary of State Colin Powell called "a little bit of progress," and the EU hailed.
But, just last Sunday, Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator at the time, acknowledged his government's insincerity. The Iranian leadership agreed to suspension, he explained in an interview with the government-run news Web site, Aftab News, "to counter global consensus against Iran," adding, "We did not accept suspension in construction of centrifuges and continued the effort. . . . We needed a greater number." What diplomats considered progress, Iranian engineers understood to be an opportunity to expand their program.
In his March 24 press conference, Mr. Obama said, "I'm a big believer in persistence." Making the same mistake repeatedly, however, is neither wise nor realism; it is arrogant, naïve and dangerous.
When Mr. Obama declared on April 5 that "All countries can access peaceful nuclear energy," the state-run daily newspaper Resalat responded with a front page headline, "The United States capitulates to the nuclear goals of Iran." With Washington embracing dialogue without accountability and Tehran embracing diplomacy without sincerity, it appears the Iranian government is right.
Mr. Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
It's a game of diplomacy without sincerity.
Apr 12, 2009
On Apr. 9, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's atomic energy agency, announced that the Islamic Republic had installed 7,000 centrifuges in its Natanz uranium enrichment facility. The announcement came one day after the U.S. State Department announced it would engage Iran directly in multilateral nuclear talks.
Proponents of engagement with Tehran say dialogue provides the only way forward. Iran's progress over the past eight years, they say, is a testament to the failure of Bush administration strategy. President Barack Obama, for example, in his Mar. 21 address to the Iranian government and people, declared that diplomacy "will not be advanced by threats. We seek engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect."
Thus our president fulfills a pattern in which new administrations place blame for the failure of diplomacy on predecessors rather than on adversaries. The Islamic Republic is not a passive actor, however. Quite the opposite: While President Obama plays checkers, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei plays chess. The enrichment milestone is a testament both to Tehran's pro-active strategy and to Washington's refusal to recognize it.
Iran's nuclear program dates back to 1989, when the Russian government agreed to complete the reactor at Bushehr. It was a year of optimism in the West: The Iran-Iraq War ended the summer before and, with the death of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, leadership passed to Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, both considered moderates.
At the beginning of the year, George H.W. Bush offered an olive branch to Tehran, declaring in his inaugural address, "Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on." The mood grew more euphoric in Europe. In 1992, the German government, ever eager for new business opportunities and arguing that trade could moderate the Islamic Republic, launched its own engagement initiative.
It didn't work. While U.S. and European policy makers draw distinctions between reformers and hard-liners in the Islamic Republic, the difference between the two is style, not substance. Both remain committed to Iran's nuclear program. Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, for example, called for a Dialogue of Civilizations. The European Union (EU) took the bait and, between 2000 and 2005, nearly tripled trade with Iran.
It was a ruse. Iranian officials were as insincere as European diplomats were greedy, gullible or both. Iranian officials now acknowledge that Tehran invested the benefits reaped into its nuclear program.
On June 14, 2008, for example, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Mr. Khatami's spokesman, debated advisers to current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the University of Gila in northern Iran. Mr. Ramezanzadeh criticized Mr. Ahmadinejad for his defiant rhetoric, and counseled him to accept the Khatami approach: "We should prove to the entire world that we want power plants for electricity. Afterwards, we can proceed with other activities," Mr. Ramezanzadeh said. The purpose of dialogue, he argued further, was not to compromise, but to build confidence and avoid sanctions. "We had an overt policy, which was one of negotiation and confidence building, and a covert policy, which was continuation of the activities," he said.
The strategy was successful. While today U.S. and European officials laud Mr. Khatami as a peacemaker, it was on his watch that Iran built and operated covertly its Natanz nuclear enrichment plant and, at least until 2003, a nuclear weapons program as well.
Iran's responsiveness to diplomacy is a mirage. After two years of talks following exposure of its Natanz facility, Tehran finally acquiesced to a temporary enrichment suspension, a move which Secretary of State Colin Powell called "a little bit of progress," and the EU hailed.
But, just last Sunday, Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator at the time, acknowledged his government's insincerity. The Iranian leadership agreed to suspension, he explained in an interview with the government-run news Web site, Aftab News, "to counter global consensus against Iran," adding, "We did not accept suspension in construction of centrifuges and continued the effort. . . . We needed a greater number." What diplomats considered progress, Iranian engineers understood to be an opportunity to expand their program.
In his March 24 press conference, Mr. Obama said, "I'm a big believer in persistence." Making the same mistake repeatedly, however, is neither wise nor realism; it is arrogant, naïve and dangerous.
When Mr. Obama declared on April 5 that "All countries can access peaceful nuclear energy," the state-run daily newspaper Resalat responded with a front page headline, "The United States capitulates to the nuclear goals of Iran." With Washington embracing dialogue without accountability and Tehran embracing diplomacy without sincerity, it appears the Iranian government is right.
Mr. Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Sunday, April 12, 2009
CIA has been ordered to get rid of contract interrogators and secret locations overseas
Blame The Messenger
Strategy Page, Apr 11, 2009
The CIA has been ordered to get rid of contract interrogators, and secret locations overseas where terrorist suspects were imprisoned and interrogated. This is all because, during the past eight years, opposition politicians in the U.S. accused the CIA of torturing terrorist suspects, to obtain information about attacks being planned. The interrogations worked, and there was very little of what one could call torture. However, the matter became a political issue, and the definition of torture was broadened to include things that are done regularly by Western police, including those in the United States.
The contract interrogators were people who had special language, cultural awareness and interrogation skills needed to get the job done. Most were former military, CIA or police interrogators, and a few were from foreign countries. These skills were particularly useful, because most of the terrorist suspects were from exotic, for most American interrogators, cultures. Having specialized knowledge was key to getting information out of many of these terrorists.
The CIA has put a brave, and career preserving, face on all this and declared that they have sufficient CIA employees to replace all the contract interrogators. They don't, and are hoping they can quietly slip into Congress or the White House and, in a classified briefing, scare the politicians sufficiently to bring in a contract interrogator for crucial situations. If not, and there's another attack in the United States that could have been provided by a competent interrogation, the blame will be shifted or, as a last resort, the CIA will have to take the blame. Thus the cycle that began in the 1940s when, right after World War II, the predecessor of the CIA, the wartime OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was disbanded for being politically incorrect and stepping on the wrong toes, repeats itself. When the Soviet threat was realized shortly thereafter, the OSS was quickly resurrected as the CIA. But it all happened again in the 1970s, when the CIA was punished and reformed for real or imagined misbehavior during the Vietnam war.
In the aftermath of these cleansing events, competent people stay away from the CIA, more problems arise, and desperate politicians demand something be done, no questions asked. But many potential espionage professionals will remember, and only the most courageous and self-sacrificing will step forward.
Strategy Page, Apr 11, 2009
The CIA has been ordered to get rid of contract interrogators, and secret locations overseas where terrorist suspects were imprisoned and interrogated. This is all because, during the past eight years, opposition politicians in the U.S. accused the CIA of torturing terrorist suspects, to obtain information about attacks being planned. The interrogations worked, and there was very little of what one could call torture. However, the matter became a political issue, and the definition of torture was broadened to include things that are done regularly by Western police, including those in the United States.
The contract interrogators were people who had special language, cultural awareness and interrogation skills needed to get the job done. Most were former military, CIA or police interrogators, and a few were from foreign countries. These skills were particularly useful, because most of the terrorist suspects were from exotic, for most American interrogators, cultures. Having specialized knowledge was key to getting information out of many of these terrorists.
The CIA has put a brave, and career preserving, face on all this and declared that they have sufficient CIA employees to replace all the contract interrogators. They don't, and are hoping they can quietly slip into Congress or the White House and, in a classified briefing, scare the politicians sufficiently to bring in a contract interrogator for crucial situations. If not, and there's another attack in the United States that could have been provided by a competent interrogation, the blame will be shifted or, as a last resort, the CIA will have to take the blame. Thus the cycle that began in the 1940s when, right after World War II, the predecessor of the CIA, the wartime OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was disbanded for being politically incorrect and stepping on the wrong toes, repeats itself. When the Soviet threat was realized shortly thereafter, the OSS was quickly resurrected as the CIA. But it all happened again in the 1970s, when the CIA was punished and reformed for real or imagined misbehavior during the Vietnam war.
In the aftermath of these cleansing events, competent people stay away from the CIA, more problems arise, and desperate politicians demand something be done, no questions asked. But many potential espionage professionals will remember, and only the most courageous and self-sacrificing will step forward.
Saturday, April 11, 2009
China's Naval Gambit - A challenge to America's dominance of the seas
China's Naval Gambit, by Michael Mazza
A challenge to America's dominance of the seas.
Weekly Standard, Mar 08, 2009 12:00:00 AM
The future of America's long-running dominance of the seas is under threat. The Department of Defense reported recently that the Chinese navy is continuing to modernize at a rapid clip. It is adding guided missile destroyers and nuclear and diesel-electric attack submarines to its fleet, and is developing over-the-horizon radars and next-generation anti-ship cruise missiles, and possibly even the first ever anti-ship ballistic missile. Not only have Chinese ships recently harassed unarmed U.S. naval vessels in the South China Sea, but according to reports emanating from Japan, China will likely complete construction on two conventional aircraft carriers by 2015, and will begin construction on two more nuclear carriers in 2020.
Recently, an influential People's Liberation Army (PLA) publication put these power projection plans in context. The newspaper described the concept of a "national interest frontier": national defense will be extended to include all areas of the globe where China has interests.
Unfortunately, these developments have received little attention in the United States. China, the thinking goes, presents only a potential long-term threat and its efforts to build carriers are not as frightening as North Korean and Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons arsenals. But China is already a nuclear power, and its ambitions far outreach those of its erstwhile friends in Pyongyang or its newfound friends in Iran.
Indeed, while the prospect of nuclear-armed rogues is alarming, China's rise provides a great threat to broader U.S. interests and to global stability and security. As a country whose "behavior as a responsible stakeholder has yet to be consistently demonstrated," as PACOM commander Admiral Timothy Keating has said, China's plan to acquire carriers should be raising alarm bells.
To be sure, China's efforts to develop a modernized, deployable fleet are not entirely unreasonable. China's economy is heavily dependent on maritime trade, and thus the safeguarding of shipping lanes is critical to Chinese security. One cannot fault China for sending destroyers to East African waters to protect its merchant fleet.
But given the many divergent U.S.-Chinese interests, it is important to consider the downsides of China's future naval plans. Protection of China's merchant fleet is certainly not the PLA Navy's only reason for building carriers and deploying ships far outside its territorial waters. China is acting to alter the balance of power in Asia and working to diminish U.S. presence in the region. The PLA has engaged in a significant build-up over the past twenty years. China's Air Force is on pace to have the largest air fleet in the region within the next decade. Their navy is developing blue-water capabilities, deploying new submarines at an unparalleled rate, and, now, is determined to add aircraft carriers to its fleet. And the PLA has modernized and grown its strategic conventional and nuclear missile force. In short, China is developing considerable power projection capabilities at a time when it faces no discernable external threats. Its cutting edge cyber and space weaponry are explicitly aimed at attacking American vulnerabilities. While China's strategic plans are not made public, the nature of its military build-up suggests that China is intent on reasserting itself as the dominant power in Asia. Only the United States stands in its way.
The forthcoming construction of Chinese carriers is thus not a welcome development. China has not shied away from gunboat diplomacy in the past, and the harassment of the USNS Impeccable, for example, shows that a growing Chinese naval presence in Asia is not a stabilizing force. "The Impeccable incident," Admiral Keating said, "is certainly a troubling indicator that China, particularly in the South China Sea, is behaving in an aggressive, troublesome manner, and they're not willing to abide by acceptable standards of behavior or rules of the road." The American navy must keep a close eye on its Chinese counterpart.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been responsible for securing the seas in the Asia-Pacific. The presence of PLA Navy carriers will significantly complicate that mission. The idea that Chinese carriers will some day soon patrol the Asian seas is causing heartburn in Taiwan, Japan, Southeast Asia, and India as well. India is already concerned about China's increasing reach into the Indian Ocean; carriers in those waters would almost certainly spark a more spirited naval arms race. It is the U.S. Navy's security guarantee that has prevented such arms races since World War II, and has allowed the region to grow increasingly peaceful; this is why Asia is home to so many economic success stories, China included. Chinese carriers, and advancing "national frontier interests," can only destabilize the Asia-Pacific and lead it down a path that no state--save perhaps the People's Republic--wants to follow.
China's acquisition of carriers will not only destabilize the Asia-Pacific. Once the PLA Navy has deployed nuclear carrier battle groups, other regions could be within reach. China's naval capabilities could complicate the U.S. ability to take military action, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. Should the time ever come, for example, when Washington must seriously contemplate military action against Iran or terrorist training camps in Africa, how will the calculus change if there is a Chinese carrier in the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean?
Given China's massive military build-up, its lack of military transparency, and its often provocative external behavior, Beijing simply cannot be counted on to act responsibly as a global power. China's neighbors are right to view its actions, its motives, and its explanations with suspicion, and America must do the same. A world in which Chinese carrier battle groups roam the seas is a less stable, less secure world. Unfortunately, there is likely little that can be done to prevent this eventuality. As the Defense Department has reported, the Chinese shipbuilding industry's ability to produce carriers is not in doubt, and the PLA has already begun training navy pilots to operate carrier-borne aircraft.
Fortunately, we do still have time to prepare countermeasures. It will be at least six years until China has carriers that are ready to sail, and longer still until they are operationally effective. Eleven more years will pass before construction on nuclear carriers even begins. But America cannot be lax in preparing for this eventual challenge. U.S. military planners must now determine what is needed to counter the threat posed by Chinese carriers.
President Obama must not allow short-term economic and security interests to blind him to long-term defense needs. We all hope China will prove itself to be a responsible great power in the years to come. But hope is no basis for policy.
Michael Mazza is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute.
A challenge to America's dominance of the seas.
Weekly Standard, Mar 08, 2009 12:00:00 AM
The future of America's long-running dominance of the seas is under threat. The Department of Defense reported recently that the Chinese navy is continuing to modernize at a rapid clip. It is adding guided missile destroyers and nuclear and diesel-electric attack submarines to its fleet, and is developing over-the-horizon radars and next-generation anti-ship cruise missiles, and possibly even the first ever anti-ship ballistic missile. Not only have Chinese ships recently harassed unarmed U.S. naval vessels in the South China Sea, but according to reports emanating from Japan, China will likely complete construction on two conventional aircraft carriers by 2015, and will begin construction on two more nuclear carriers in 2020.
Recently, an influential People's Liberation Army (PLA) publication put these power projection plans in context. The newspaper described the concept of a "national interest frontier": national defense will be extended to include all areas of the globe where China has interests.
Unfortunately, these developments have received little attention in the United States. China, the thinking goes, presents only a potential long-term threat and its efforts to build carriers are not as frightening as North Korean and Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons arsenals. But China is already a nuclear power, and its ambitions far outreach those of its erstwhile friends in Pyongyang or its newfound friends in Iran.
Indeed, while the prospect of nuclear-armed rogues is alarming, China's rise provides a great threat to broader U.S. interests and to global stability and security. As a country whose "behavior as a responsible stakeholder has yet to be consistently demonstrated," as PACOM commander Admiral Timothy Keating has said, China's plan to acquire carriers should be raising alarm bells.
To be sure, China's efforts to develop a modernized, deployable fleet are not entirely unreasonable. China's economy is heavily dependent on maritime trade, and thus the safeguarding of shipping lanes is critical to Chinese security. One cannot fault China for sending destroyers to East African waters to protect its merchant fleet.
But given the many divergent U.S.-Chinese interests, it is important to consider the downsides of China's future naval plans. Protection of China's merchant fleet is certainly not the PLA Navy's only reason for building carriers and deploying ships far outside its territorial waters. China is acting to alter the balance of power in Asia and working to diminish U.S. presence in the region. The PLA has engaged in a significant build-up over the past twenty years. China's Air Force is on pace to have the largest air fleet in the region within the next decade. Their navy is developing blue-water capabilities, deploying new submarines at an unparalleled rate, and, now, is determined to add aircraft carriers to its fleet. And the PLA has modernized and grown its strategic conventional and nuclear missile force. In short, China is developing considerable power projection capabilities at a time when it faces no discernable external threats. Its cutting edge cyber and space weaponry are explicitly aimed at attacking American vulnerabilities. While China's strategic plans are not made public, the nature of its military build-up suggests that China is intent on reasserting itself as the dominant power in Asia. Only the United States stands in its way.
The forthcoming construction of Chinese carriers is thus not a welcome development. China has not shied away from gunboat diplomacy in the past, and the harassment of the USNS Impeccable, for example, shows that a growing Chinese naval presence in Asia is not a stabilizing force. "The Impeccable incident," Admiral Keating said, "is certainly a troubling indicator that China, particularly in the South China Sea, is behaving in an aggressive, troublesome manner, and they're not willing to abide by acceptable standards of behavior or rules of the road." The American navy must keep a close eye on its Chinese counterpart.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been responsible for securing the seas in the Asia-Pacific. The presence of PLA Navy carriers will significantly complicate that mission. The idea that Chinese carriers will some day soon patrol the Asian seas is causing heartburn in Taiwan, Japan, Southeast Asia, and India as well. India is already concerned about China's increasing reach into the Indian Ocean; carriers in those waters would almost certainly spark a more spirited naval arms race. It is the U.S. Navy's security guarantee that has prevented such arms races since World War II, and has allowed the region to grow increasingly peaceful; this is why Asia is home to so many economic success stories, China included. Chinese carriers, and advancing "national frontier interests," can only destabilize the Asia-Pacific and lead it down a path that no state--save perhaps the People's Republic--wants to follow.
China's acquisition of carriers will not only destabilize the Asia-Pacific. Once the PLA Navy has deployed nuclear carrier battle groups, other regions could be within reach. China's naval capabilities could complicate the U.S. ability to take military action, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. Should the time ever come, for example, when Washington must seriously contemplate military action against Iran or terrorist training camps in Africa, how will the calculus change if there is a Chinese carrier in the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean?
Given China's massive military build-up, its lack of military transparency, and its often provocative external behavior, Beijing simply cannot be counted on to act responsibly as a global power. China's neighbors are right to view its actions, its motives, and its explanations with suspicion, and America must do the same. A world in which Chinese carrier battle groups roam the seas is a less stable, less secure world. Unfortunately, there is likely little that can be done to prevent this eventuality. As the Defense Department has reported, the Chinese shipbuilding industry's ability to produce carriers is not in doubt, and the PLA has already begun training navy pilots to operate carrier-borne aircraft.
Fortunately, we do still have time to prepare countermeasures. It will be at least six years until China has carriers that are ready to sail, and longer still until they are operationally effective. Eleven more years will pass before construction on nuclear carriers even begins. But America cannot be lax in preparing for this eventual challenge. U.S. military planners must now determine what is needed to counter the threat posed by Chinese carriers.
President Obama must not allow short-term economic and security interests to blind him to long-term defense needs. We all hope China will prove itself to be a responsible great power in the years to come. But hope is no basis for policy.
Michael Mazza is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute.
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
Japan warns against U.N. inaction on N Korea rocket launch
Japan warns against U.N. inaction on N Korea rocket launch
Japan Today, Wednesday 08th April, 06:30 AM JST
TOKYO — Japan’s foreign minister warned Tuesday that the U.N. Security Council must give a strong response to North Korea’s recent rocket launch or risk losing its authority.
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone said a failure to respond to the North’s Sunday launch could hurt multilateral talks aimed at getting the communist nation to halt its nuclear programs.
“If violations are allowed, the U.N. Security Council’s authority would be threatened and trust placed upon it would be impaired,” Nakasone told a news conference. “The U.N. Security Council should respond properly and teach North Korea a lesson that it has to pay for the act of provocation.”
He said the lack of a strong response to the rocket launch—seen by many as a cover for testing long-range missile technology—would send the wrong message to the North.
Security Council diplomats were mired in squabbles over how, or even whether, to punish North Korea for Sunday’s launch. World leaders, including President Barack Obama, called it a provocative act and a violation of previous sanctions, imposed after the North’s underground nuclear test in 2006.
Japan said Monday that while it was trying to lobby China and Russia, which are reluctant to punish the North, it would extend sanctions against North Korea for another year in response to the launch.
Japan imposed tight trade sanctions against the North in 2006 following Pyongyang’s missile and atomic tests that year. The ongoing sanctions, which ban North Korean ships from entering Japan and prohibit imports of North Korean goods, have been renewed every six months since and were to expire on April 13.
Pyongyang continued to claim it put a communications satellite into orbit and is now transmitting data and patriotic songs. But Japan joined the rest of the world in saying that it appeared to be a failure.
Nakasone said Japan has yet to determine whether North Korea launched a satellite or a missile, but either way the launch violated the Security Council ban because it used missile technology.
The international community will allow North Korea to engage in space development “only if the North fulfilled its obligation to abandon all nuclear programs and no longer poses a threat to Japan and the rest of the world,” he said.
Japan Today, Wednesday 08th April, 06:30 AM JST
TOKYO — Japan’s foreign minister warned Tuesday that the U.N. Security Council must give a strong response to North Korea’s recent rocket launch or risk losing its authority.
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone said a failure to respond to the North’s Sunday launch could hurt multilateral talks aimed at getting the communist nation to halt its nuclear programs.
“If violations are allowed, the U.N. Security Council’s authority would be threatened and trust placed upon it would be impaired,” Nakasone told a news conference. “The U.N. Security Council should respond properly and teach North Korea a lesson that it has to pay for the act of provocation.”
He said the lack of a strong response to the rocket launch—seen by many as a cover for testing long-range missile technology—would send the wrong message to the North.
Security Council diplomats were mired in squabbles over how, or even whether, to punish North Korea for Sunday’s launch. World leaders, including President Barack Obama, called it a provocative act and a violation of previous sanctions, imposed after the North’s underground nuclear test in 2006.
Japan said Monday that while it was trying to lobby China and Russia, which are reluctant to punish the North, it would extend sanctions against North Korea for another year in response to the launch.
Japan imposed tight trade sanctions against the North in 2006 following Pyongyang’s missile and atomic tests that year. The ongoing sanctions, which ban North Korean ships from entering Japan and prohibit imports of North Korean goods, have been renewed every six months since and were to expire on April 13.
Pyongyang continued to claim it put a communications satellite into orbit and is now transmitting data and patriotic songs. But Japan joined the rest of the world in saying that it appeared to be a failure.
Nakasone said Japan has yet to determine whether North Korea launched a satellite or a missile, but either way the launch violated the Security Council ban because it used missile technology.
The international community will allow North Korea to engage in space development “only if the North fulfilled its obligation to abandon all nuclear programs and no longer poses a threat to Japan and the rest of the world,” he said.
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
U.S.-New Zealand Arrangement For Cooperation On Nonproliferation Assistance to Kazakhstan
U.S.-New Zealand Arrangement For Cooperation On Nonproliferation Assistance
Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman, US State Dept
Washington, DC, April 7, 2009
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully signed on April 7, 2009, an arrangement for cooperation on nonproliferation assistance. This arrangement supports collaborative work between the United States and New Zealand to secure nuclear and radioactive materials that could be used in a nuclear or radiological weapon and to detect and deter illicit trafficking in these materials by improving monitoring capabilities at priority border crossings, airports, and seaports.
Through this arrangement, New Zealand has pledged to provide NZ$685,000 (approximately US$350,000) to support the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s Second Line of Defense program in equipping Kazakhstan’s borders with radiation monitors and providing related infrastructure and training. This contribution builds on the success of a similar arrangement signed in May 2007, through which New Zealand contributed similar assistance to help secure Ukraine’s border.
This arrangement reflects the common conviction on the part of the Governments of the United States and New Zealand that nuclear smuggling is a global threat that requires a coordinated, global response. Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister McCully have agreed to sign this document today because of the high priority that the United States and New Zealand both place on nonproliferation cooperation.
This contribution results from the efforts of the U.S. Government’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), a Department of State-led program that also involves the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and several other U.S. agencies. NSOI engages nations most at risk of nuclear smuggling to jointly identify steps to improve their capabilities to combat that threat. NSOI then works with international donors to identify and coordinate funding to help the vulnerable countries address their needs. New Zealand is one of eleven partners that has joined the United States in supporting anti-nuclear smuggling projects through NSOI. For more information on the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, go to www.nsoi-state.net.
Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman, US State Dept
Washington, DC, April 7, 2009
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully signed on April 7, 2009, an arrangement for cooperation on nonproliferation assistance. This arrangement supports collaborative work between the United States and New Zealand to secure nuclear and radioactive materials that could be used in a nuclear or radiological weapon and to detect and deter illicit trafficking in these materials by improving monitoring capabilities at priority border crossings, airports, and seaports.
Through this arrangement, New Zealand has pledged to provide NZ$685,000 (approximately US$350,000) to support the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s Second Line of Defense program in equipping Kazakhstan’s borders with radiation monitors and providing related infrastructure and training. This contribution builds on the success of a similar arrangement signed in May 2007, through which New Zealand contributed similar assistance to help secure Ukraine’s border.
This arrangement reflects the common conviction on the part of the Governments of the United States and New Zealand that nuclear smuggling is a global threat that requires a coordinated, global response. Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister McCully have agreed to sign this document today because of the high priority that the United States and New Zealand both place on nonproliferation cooperation.
This contribution results from the efforts of the U.S. Government’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), a Department of State-led program that also involves the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and several other U.S. agencies. NSOI engages nations most at risk of nuclear smuggling to jointly identify steps to improve their capabilities to combat that threat. NSOI then works with international donors to identify and coordinate funding to help the vulnerable countries address their needs. New Zealand is one of eleven partners that has joined the United States in supporting anti-nuclear smuggling projects through NSOI. For more information on the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, go to www.nsoi-state.net.
Monday, April 6, 2009
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nuclear threat from Tehran
Warnings on Iran. WSJ Editorial
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nuclear threat from Tehran.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
Benjamin Netanyahu formally became Israel's Prime Minister last week, and he could not have been blunter about the strategic challenge ahead: "It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust the world's response to the calls by Iran's leader to destroy the state of Israel is weak, there is no condemnation and decisive measures -- almost as if dismissed as routine." He added, "We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants who threaten to annihilate us."
Americans in key positions have noticed this Israeli message. In a meeting Thursday at the Journal, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told us that "there is a leadership in Israel that is not going to tolerate" a nuclear Iran. Tehran's atomic designs, he said, were a matter of "life or death" for the Jewish state. "The operative word is 'existential.'" When we asked him whether Israel was capable of inflicting meaningful damage to Iran's nuclear installations, his answer was a simple "Yes."
The Admiral was also clear about Iran's challenge to the U.S. "I think we've got a problem now. . . . I think the Iranians are on a path to building nuclear weapons." For the time being his counsel is diplomacy, noting that "Even in the darkest days of the Cold War we talked to the Soviets." But, he added, "we don't have a lot of time."
If Israel decides to strike Iran the consequences -- intended and unintended -- will be felt far and wide, including in Iraq where, Admiral Mullen says, Iran's ability to cause mayhem "has not maxed out at all." We thought readers might like to know how the Chairman sees the threat, and how well he appreciates Israel's peril.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nuclear threat from Tehran.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
Benjamin Netanyahu formally became Israel's Prime Minister last week, and he could not have been blunter about the strategic challenge ahead: "It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust the world's response to the calls by Iran's leader to destroy the state of Israel is weak, there is no condemnation and decisive measures -- almost as if dismissed as routine." He added, "We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants who threaten to annihilate us."
Americans in key positions have noticed this Israeli message. In a meeting Thursday at the Journal, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told us that "there is a leadership in Israel that is not going to tolerate" a nuclear Iran. Tehran's atomic designs, he said, were a matter of "life or death" for the Jewish state. "The operative word is 'existential.'" When we asked him whether Israel was capable of inflicting meaningful damage to Iran's nuclear installations, his answer was a simple "Yes."
The Admiral was also clear about Iran's challenge to the U.S. "I think we've got a problem now. . . . I think the Iranians are on a path to building nuclear weapons." For the time being his counsel is diplomacy, noting that "Even in the darkest days of the Cold War we talked to the Soviets." But, he added, "we don't have a lot of time."
If Israel decides to strike Iran the consequences -- intended and unintended -- will be felt far and wide, including in Iraq where, Admiral Mullen says, Iran's ability to cause mayhem "has not maxed out at all." We thought readers might like to know how the Chairman sees the threat, and how well he appreciates Israel's peril.
Ukraine Powers Chinese Carriers
Ukraine Powers Chinese Carriers
Strategy Page, April 6, 2009
China is working closely with Ukraine to supply key components for the aircraft carriers China is building. Ukraine supplied many components for Russian carriers back in the days of the Soviet Union (which Ukraine was a part of). Now independent, Ukraine is eager to find customers for local manufacturers that can produce carrier components. Russia is no longer building carriers, despite talk of restarting that program.
Last year, Chinese officials visited Ukraine and inspected the naval aviation training facilities that were built there before the Soviet Union dissolved. Ukraine wants to use those facilities to establish an international center for training carrier aviators.
A major Ukrainian product the Chinese are interested in are ship engines, especially the large ones a carrier would require. Chinese gas turbines are not all that efficient and reliable. The Ukrainian UGT-16000 and UGT-25000 turbines, developed from the DT-59 they have been making since 1975, are major competitors for General Electric models used in large ships. Ukrainian firms build a number of other world class components for large ships, and China is looking to acquire equipment, and technology. Ukraine is aware of the fact that the Chinese steal technology, but right now Ukraine needs the business, and China needs the turbines.
Strategy Page, April 6, 2009
China is working closely with Ukraine to supply key components for the aircraft carriers China is building. Ukraine supplied many components for Russian carriers back in the days of the Soviet Union (which Ukraine was a part of). Now independent, Ukraine is eager to find customers for local manufacturers that can produce carrier components. Russia is no longer building carriers, despite talk of restarting that program.
Last year, Chinese officials visited Ukraine and inspected the naval aviation training facilities that were built there before the Soviet Union dissolved. Ukraine wants to use those facilities to establish an international center for training carrier aviators.
A major Ukrainian product the Chinese are interested in are ship engines, especially the large ones a carrier would require. Chinese gas turbines are not all that efficient and reliable. The Ukrainian UGT-16000 and UGT-25000 turbines, developed from the DT-59 they have been making since 1975, are major competitors for General Electric models used in large ships. Ukrainian firms build a number of other world class components for large ships, and China is looking to acquire equipment, and technology. Ukraine is aware of the fact that the Chinese steal technology, but right now Ukraine needs the business, and China needs the turbines.
WSJ Editorial Page on North Korea's Launch: The condemnations will probably soon become concessions
The Song of Kim Jong Il. WSJ Editorial
The condemnations will probably soon become concessions.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
A few hours after the launch Sunday of a long-range multistage rocket, North Korea's state media proclaimed that a communications satellite was in orbit and transmitting "immortal revolutionary paeans" back to Earth. The U.S. military, which apparently had trouble tuning in the "Song of General Kim Il Sung," announced that the satellite had fallen into the Pacific somewhere between Japan and Hawaii.
The technology may have failed to put a satellite into space, but North Korea's launch has succeeded in getting the world's attention. Most of the civilized world spent yesterday denouncing dictator Kim Jong Il's latest provocation, which violated a United Nations Security Council resolution barring the North from testing ballistic missile technology. However, if the international response keeps with past practice, the condemnations will soon give way to concessions. No wonder Kim keeps launching missiles.
The launch was a success, too, as a global advertisement to those in the market for vehicles to deliver weapons of mass destruction. That includes the North's No. 1 customer, Iran, which in February launched a small satellite thanks in part to North Korean missile technology. Iranian observers were reportedly on hand over the weekend at the launch site.
Sunday's fizzle doesn't mean the North didn't learn anything useful for the future of its long-range ballistic missile program. As learning tools, failures can be more instructive than successes, and the Taepodong-2 missile under development has the potential to reach the U.S. West Coast.
Pyongyang's action ought to prompt the Obama Administration to advance the fledgling missile defense system started by President Bush. Instead, the White House reportedly has told the Pentagon to cut spending on missile defense by $2 billion, or about 20%. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is expected to announce these and other budget cuts today.
Programs in jeopardy include the Airborne Laser, a modified 747 designed to take out ballistic missiles seconds after liftoff; expansion of the ground-based interceptor program in Alaska and California; and space-based missile surveillance and tracking. All three are part of the vision for a layered defense, in which the U.S. has several chances to destroy incoming missiles. The Obama Administration has already indicated it wants to go slow in building the "third site," the Europe-based radar and interceptors that would provide another layer of defense from Iranian missiles for the U.S. East Coast.
In 2006, Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice squandered the moment after the North's nuclear test when China was ready to apply serious pressure. Instead, they bought Kim's promise to give up his weapons, then let him delay and renegotiate the terms as he went, including agreeing to Kim's demand to take North Korea off the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring nations. Now he's playing the same brinksmanship with the Obama Administration.
This is Mr. Obama's chance to do better. But based on his comments during the campaign, as well as his statement yesterday urging renewed efforts through the Six Party Talks, the President seems unlikely to change course. Kim has every reason to expect that he will eventually get what he wants -- more recognition, more money and energy supplies from the U.S., China and South Korea, and a high likelihood that he'll get to keep his nukes and missiles too.
The condemnations will probably soon become concessions.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
A few hours after the launch Sunday of a long-range multistage rocket, North Korea's state media proclaimed that a communications satellite was in orbit and transmitting "immortal revolutionary paeans" back to Earth. The U.S. military, which apparently had trouble tuning in the "Song of General Kim Il Sung," announced that the satellite had fallen into the Pacific somewhere between Japan and Hawaii.
The technology may have failed to put a satellite into space, but North Korea's launch has succeeded in getting the world's attention. Most of the civilized world spent yesterday denouncing dictator Kim Jong Il's latest provocation, which violated a United Nations Security Council resolution barring the North from testing ballistic missile technology. However, if the international response keeps with past practice, the condemnations will soon give way to concessions. No wonder Kim keeps launching missiles.
The launch was a success, too, as a global advertisement to those in the market for vehicles to deliver weapons of mass destruction. That includes the North's No. 1 customer, Iran, which in February launched a small satellite thanks in part to North Korean missile technology. Iranian observers were reportedly on hand over the weekend at the launch site.
Sunday's fizzle doesn't mean the North didn't learn anything useful for the future of its long-range ballistic missile program. As learning tools, failures can be more instructive than successes, and the Taepodong-2 missile under development has the potential to reach the U.S. West Coast.
Pyongyang's action ought to prompt the Obama Administration to advance the fledgling missile defense system started by President Bush. Instead, the White House reportedly has told the Pentagon to cut spending on missile defense by $2 billion, or about 20%. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is expected to announce these and other budget cuts today.
Programs in jeopardy include the Airborne Laser, a modified 747 designed to take out ballistic missiles seconds after liftoff; expansion of the ground-based interceptor program in Alaska and California; and space-based missile surveillance and tracking. All three are part of the vision for a layered defense, in which the U.S. has several chances to destroy incoming missiles. The Obama Administration has already indicated it wants to go slow in building the "third site," the Europe-based radar and interceptors that would provide another layer of defense from Iranian missiles for the U.S. East Coast.
In 2006, Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice squandered the moment after the North's nuclear test when China was ready to apply serious pressure. Instead, they bought Kim's promise to give up his weapons, then let him delay and renegotiate the terms as he went, including agreeing to Kim's demand to take North Korea off the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring nations. Now he's playing the same brinksmanship with the Obama Administration.
This is Mr. Obama's chance to do better. But based on his comments during the campaign, as well as his statement yesterday urging renewed efforts through the Six Party Talks, the President seems unlikely to change course. Kim has every reason to expect that he will eventually get what he wants -- more recognition, more money and energy supplies from the U.S., China and South Korea, and a high likelihood that he'll get to keep his nukes and missiles too.
Obama's NK Reaction: More Talks
Obama's NK Reaction: More Talks. By John Bolton
The president sends the wrong messages to Israel and Iran.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
Prior to North Korea's launch yesterday of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, President Barack Obama declared that such an action would be "provocative." This public statement was an attempt to reinforce the administration's private efforts to urge the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) not to fire the missile.
That effort failed, as have countless other attempts to deal softly with Pyongyang. Incredibly, U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Stephen Bosworth revealed -- just a few days before the launch -- that he was ready to visit Pyongyang and resume the six-party talks once the "dust from the missiles settles." It is no wonder the North fired away.
Once the missile shot was complete, the administration's answer was hand-wringing, more rhetoric and, oh yes, the obligatory trip to the U.N. Security Council so that it could scold the defiant DPRK. Beyond whatever happens in the Security Council, Mr. Obama seems to have no plan whatever.
In 2006, when Pyongyang last lit off a volley of missiles and then exploded a nuclear device, the Security Council responded unanimously with Resolutions 1695 and 1718, which imposed extensive military and some economic sanctions. Unfortunately, the impact of these resolutions was dramatically undercut by subsequent Bush administration diplomacy, which effectively let North Korea off the hook. By re-engaging Pyongyang diplomatically rather than increasing the external pressure, George W. Bush relegitimized the North and gave it yet more time to bargain.
Yesterday's launch is attributable to prior failures, but the global consequences now unfolding are Mr. Obama's responsibility. In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is expected to announce today deep cuts in the U.S. missile defense program, an extraordinarily ill-advised step.
The initial draft Security Council resolution responding to yesterday's missile launch, written by Japan and the U.S., is weak. It essentially only reaffirms Resolutions 1695 and 1718, and minimally tightens existing enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, China and Russia made it plain before the launch they had no interest in stricter sanctions -- even arguing with a straight face that Pyongyang was only interested in peaceful satellite communications.
What the Security Council will ultimately produce is of course uncertain -- but resolutions almost never get tougher as the drafting and negotiations proceed. Even worse than a weak resolution would be a "presidential statement," a toothless gesture of the Council's opinion. Either way, North Korea has again defied the Security Council, gotten away with its launch with the support of Russia and China, and now will likely confront only pleas by Mr. Obama and others to return to the six-party talks.
Those talks are exactly where North Korea wants to be. From them ever greater material and political benefits will flow to Pyongyang, in exchange for ever more hollow promises to dismantle its nuclear program.
So far, therefore, the missile launch is an unambiguous win for North Korea. (Although not orbiting a satellite, all three rocket stages apparently fired, achieving Pyongyang's longest missile flight yet.) But the negative repercussions will extend far beyond Northeast Asia.
Iran has carefully scrutinized the Obama administration's every action, and Tehran's only conclusion can be: It is past time to torque up the pressure on this new crowd in Washington. Not only is Iran's back now covered by its friends Russia, China and others on the U.N. Security Council, but it sees an American president so ready to bend his knee for public favor in Europe that the mullahs' wish list for U.S. concessions will grow by the minute.
Israel must also be carefully considering how the U.S. watched North Korea rip through "the international community." The most important lesson the new government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should draw is: Look out for No. 1. If Israel isn't prepared to protect itself, including using military force, against Iran's nuclear weapons program, it certainly shouldn't be holding its breath for Mr. Obama to do anything.
Russia and China must also be relishing this outcome. They will have faced down Mr. Obama in his first real crisis, having provided Security Council cover for a criminal regime, and emerged unscathed. They will conclude that achieving their large agendas with the new administration can't be too hard. That conclusion may be unfair to the new American president; but it will surely color how Moscow and Beijing structure their policies and their diplomacy until proven otherwise. That alone is bad news for Washington and its allies.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
The president sends the wrong messages to Israel and Iran.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009
Prior to North Korea's launch yesterday of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, President Barack Obama declared that such an action would be "provocative." This public statement was an attempt to reinforce the administration's private efforts to urge the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) not to fire the missile.
That effort failed, as have countless other attempts to deal softly with Pyongyang. Incredibly, U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Stephen Bosworth revealed -- just a few days before the launch -- that he was ready to visit Pyongyang and resume the six-party talks once the "dust from the missiles settles." It is no wonder the North fired away.
Once the missile shot was complete, the administration's answer was hand-wringing, more rhetoric and, oh yes, the obligatory trip to the U.N. Security Council so that it could scold the defiant DPRK. Beyond whatever happens in the Security Council, Mr. Obama seems to have no plan whatever.
In 2006, when Pyongyang last lit off a volley of missiles and then exploded a nuclear device, the Security Council responded unanimously with Resolutions 1695 and 1718, which imposed extensive military and some economic sanctions. Unfortunately, the impact of these resolutions was dramatically undercut by subsequent Bush administration diplomacy, which effectively let North Korea off the hook. By re-engaging Pyongyang diplomatically rather than increasing the external pressure, George W. Bush relegitimized the North and gave it yet more time to bargain.
Yesterday's launch is attributable to prior failures, but the global consequences now unfolding are Mr. Obama's responsibility. In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is expected to announce today deep cuts in the U.S. missile defense program, an extraordinarily ill-advised step.
The initial draft Security Council resolution responding to yesterday's missile launch, written by Japan and the U.S., is weak. It essentially only reaffirms Resolutions 1695 and 1718, and minimally tightens existing enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, China and Russia made it plain before the launch they had no interest in stricter sanctions -- even arguing with a straight face that Pyongyang was only interested in peaceful satellite communications.
What the Security Council will ultimately produce is of course uncertain -- but resolutions almost never get tougher as the drafting and negotiations proceed. Even worse than a weak resolution would be a "presidential statement," a toothless gesture of the Council's opinion. Either way, North Korea has again defied the Security Council, gotten away with its launch with the support of Russia and China, and now will likely confront only pleas by Mr. Obama and others to return to the six-party talks.
Those talks are exactly where North Korea wants to be. From them ever greater material and political benefits will flow to Pyongyang, in exchange for ever more hollow promises to dismantle its nuclear program.
So far, therefore, the missile launch is an unambiguous win for North Korea. (Although not orbiting a satellite, all three rocket stages apparently fired, achieving Pyongyang's longest missile flight yet.) But the negative repercussions will extend far beyond Northeast Asia.
Iran has carefully scrutinized the Obama administration's every action, and Tehran's only conclusion can be: It is past time to torque up the pressure on this new crowd in Washington. Not only is Iran's back now covered by its friends Russia, China and others on the U.N. Security Council, but it sees an American president so ready to bend his knee for public favor in Europe that the mullahs' wish list for U.S. concessions will grow by the minute.
Israel must also be carefully considering how the U.S. watched North Korea rip through "the international community." The most important lesson the new government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should draw is: Look out for No. 1. If Israel isn't prepared to protect itself, including using military force, against Iran's nuclear weapons program, it certainly shouldn't be holding its breath for Mr. Obama to do anything.
Russia and China must also be relishing this outcome. They will have faced down Mr. Obama in his first real crisis, having provided Security Council cover for a criminal regime, and emerged unscathed. They will conclude that achieving their large agendas with the new administration can't be too hard. That conclusion may be unfair to the new American president; but it will surely color how Moscow and Beijing structure their policies and their diplomacy until proven otherwise. That alone is bad news for Washington and its allies.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
