China's Solyndra Economy. By Patrick Chovanec
Government subsidies to green energy and high-speed rail have led to mounting losses and costly bailouts. This is not a road the U.S. should travel.WSJ, September 11, 2012, 7:21 p.m. ET
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443686004577634220147568022.html
On Aug. 3, the owner of Chengxing Solar Company leapt from the sixth floor of his office building in Jinhua, China. Li Fei killed himself after his company was unable to repay a $3 million bank loan it had guaranteed for another Chinese solar company that defaulted. One local financial newspaper called Li's suicide "a sign of the imminent collapse facing the Chinese photovoltaic industry" due to overcapacity and mounting debts.
President Barack Obama has held up China's investments in green energy and high-speed rail as examples of the kind of state-led industrial policy that America should be emulating. The real lesson is precisely the opposite. State subsidies have spawned dozens of Chinese Solyndras that are now on the verge of collapse.
Unveiled in 2010, Beijing's 12th Five-Year Plan identified solar and wind power and electric automobiles as "strategic emerging industries" that would receive substantial state support. Investors piled into the favored sectors, confident the government's backing would guarantee success. Barely two years later, all three industries are in dire straits.
This summer, the NYSE-listed LDK Solar, the world's second largest polysilicon solar wafer producer, defaulted on $95 billion owed to over 20 suppliers. The company lost $589 million in the fourth quarter of 2011 and another $185 million in the first quarter of 2012, and has shed nearly 10,000 jobs. The government in LDK's home province of Jiangxi scrambled to pledge $315 million in public bailout funds, terrified that any further defaults could pull down hundreds of local companies.
Chinese solar companies blame many of their woes on the antidumping tariffs recently imposed by the U.S. and Europe. The real problem, however, is rampant overinvestment driven largely by subsidies. Since 2010, the price of polysilicon wafers used to make solar cells has dropped 73%, according to Maxim Group, while the price of solar cells has fallen 68% and the price of solar modules 57%. At these prices, even low-cost Chinese producers are finding it impossible to break even.
Wind power is seeing similar overcapacity. China's top wind turbine manufacturers, Goldwind and Sinovel, saw their earnings plummet by 83% and 96% respectively in the first half of 2012, year-on-year. Domestic wind farm operators Huaneng and Datang saw profits plunge 63% and 76%, respectively, due to low capacity utilization. China's national electricity regulator, SERC, reported that 53% of the wind power generated in Inner Mongolia province in the first half of this year was wasted. One analyst told China Securities Journal that "40-50% of wind power projects are left idle," with many not even connected to the grid.
A few years ago, Shenzhen-based BYD (short for "Build Your Dreams") was a media darling that brought in Warren Buffett as an investor. It was going to make China the dominant player in electric automobiles. Despite gorging on green energy subsidies, BYD sold barely 8,000 hybrids and 400 fully electric cars last year, while hemorrhaging cash on an ill-fated solar venture. Company profits for the first half of 2012 plunged 94% year-on-year.
China's high-speed rail ambitions put the Ministry of Railways so deeply in debt that by the end of last year it was forced to halt all construction and ask Beijing for a $126 billion bailout. Central authorities agreed to give it $31.5 billion to pay its state-owned suppliers and avoid an outright default, and had to issue a blanket guarantee on its bonds to help it raise more. While a handful of high-traffic lines, such as the Shanghai-Beijing route, have some prospect of breaking even, Prof. Zhao Jian of Beijing Jiaotong University compared the rest of the network to "a 160-story luxury hotel where only 11 stories are used and the occupancy rate of those floors is below 50%."
China's Railway Ministry racked up $1.4 billion in losses for the first six months of this year, and an internal audit has uncovered dangerous defects due to lax construction on 12 new lines, which will have to be repaired at the cost of billions more. Minister Liu Zhijun, the architect of China's high-speed rail system, was fired in February 2011 and will soon be prosecuted on corruption charges that reportedly include embezzling some $120 million. One of his lieutenants, the deputy chief engineer, is alleged to have funneled $2.8 billion into an offshore bank account.
Many in Washington have developed a serious case of China-envy, seeing it as an exemplar of how to run an economy. In fact, Beijing's mandarins are no better at picking winners, and just as prone to blow money on boondoggles, as their Beltway counterparts.
In his State of the Union address earlier this year, President Obama declared, "I will not cede the wind or solar or battery industry to China . . . because we refuse to make the same commitment here." Given what's really happening in China, he may want to think again.
Mr. Chovanec is an associate professor of practice at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing, China.
Showing posts with label political corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label political corruption. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
Quality of Government and Living Standards: Adjusting for the Efficiency of Public Spending
Quality of Government and Living Standards: Adjusting for the Efficiency of Public Spending. By Grigoli, Francesco; Ley, Eduardo
IMF Working Paper No. 12/182
Jul 2012
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26052.0
Summary: It is generally acknowledged that the government’s output is difficult to define and its value is hard to measure. The practical solution, adopted by national accounts systems, is to equate output to input costs. However, several studies estimate significant inefficiencies in government activities (i.e., same output could be achieved with less inputs), implying that inputs are not a good approximation for outputs. If taken seriously, the next logical step is to purge from GDP the fraction of government inputs that is wasted. As differences in the quality of the public sector have a direct impact on citizens’ effective consumption of public and private goods and services, we must take them into account when computing a measure of living standards. We illustrate such a correction computing corrected per capita GDPs on the basis of two studies that estimate efficiency scores for several dimensions of government activities. We show that the correction could be significant, and rankings of living standards could be re-ordered as a result.
Excerpts:
Despite its acknowledged shortcomings, GDP per capita is still the most commonly used summary indicator of living standards. Much of the policy advice provided by international organizations is based on macroeconomic magnitudes as shares of GDP, and framed on cross-country comparisons of per capita GDP. However, what GDP does actually measure may differ significantly across countries for several reasons. We focus here on a particular source for this heterogeneity: the quality of public spending. Broadly speaking, the ‘quality of public spending’ refers to the government’s effectiveness in transforming resources into socially valuable outputs. The opening quote highlights the disconnect between spending and value when the discipline of market transactions is missing.
Everywhere around the world, non-market government accounts for a big share of GDP and yet it is poorly measured—namely the value to users is assumed to equal the producer’s cost. Such a framework is deficient because it does not allow for changes in the amount of output produced per unit of input, that is, changes in productivity (for a recent review of this issue, see Atkinson and others, 2005). It also assumes that these inputs are fully used. To put it another way, standard national accounting assumes that government activities are on the best practice frontier. When this is not the case, there is an overstatement of national production. This, in turn, could result in misleading conclusions, particularly in cross-country comparisons, given that the size, scope, and performance of public sectors vary so widely.
Moreover, in the national accounts, this attributed non-market (government and non-profit sectors) “value added” is further allocated to the household sector as “actual consumption.” As Deaton and Heston (2008) put it: “[...] there are many countries around the world where government-provided health and education is inefficient, sometimes involving mass absenteeism by teachers and health workers [...] so that such ‘actual’ consumption is anything but actual. To count the salaries of AWOL government employees as ‘actual’ benefits to consumers adds statistical insult to original injury.” This “statistical insult” logically follows from the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) framework once ‘waste’ is classified as income—since national income must be either consumed or saved. Absent teachers and health care workers are all too common in many low-income countries (Chaudhury and Hammer, 2004; Kremer and others, 2005; Chaudhury and others, 2006; and World Bank, 2004). Beyond straight absenteeism, which is an extreme case, generally there are significant cross-country differences in the quality of public sector services. World Bank (2011) reports that in India, even though most children of primaryschool age are enrolled in school, 35 percent of them cannot read a simple paragraph and 41 percent cannot do a simple subtraction.
It must be acknowledged, nonetheless, that for many of government’s non-market services, the output is difficult to define, and without market prices the value of output is hard to measure. It is because of this that the practical solution adopted in the SNA is to equate output to input costs. This choice may be more adequate when using GDP to measure economic activity or factor employment than when using GDP to measure living standards.
Moving beyond this state of affairs, there are two alternative approaches. One is to try to find indicators for both output quantities and prices for direct measurement of some public outputs, as recommended in SNA 93 (but yet to be broadly implemented). The other is to correct the input costs to account for productive inefficiency, namely to purge from GDP the fraction of these inputs that is wasted. We focus here on the nature of this correction. As the differences in the quality of the public sector have a direct impact on citizens’ effective consumption of public and private goods and services, it seems natural to take them into account when computing a measure of living standards.
To illustrate, in a recent study, Afonso and others (2010) compute public sector efficiency scores for a group of countries and conclude that “[...] the highest-ranking country uses onethird of the inputs as the bottom ranking one to attain a certain public sector performance score. The average input scores suggest that countries could use around 45 per cent less resources to attain the same outcomes if they were fully efficient.” In this paper, we take such a statement to its logical conclusion. Once we acknowledge that the same output could be achieved with less inputs, output value cannot be equated to input costs. In other words, waste should not belong in the living-standards indicator—it still remains a cost of government but it must be purged from the value of government services. As noted, this adjustment is especially relevant for cross-country comparisons.
...
In this context, as noted, the standard practice is to equate the value of government outputs to its cost, notwithstanding the SNA 93 proposal to estimate government outputs directly. The value added that, say, public education contributes to GDP is based on the wage bill and other costs of providing education, such as outlays for utilities and school supplies. Similarly for public health, the wage bill of doctors, nurses and other medical staff and medical supplies measures largely comprises its value added. Thus, in the (pre-93) SNA used almost everywhere, non-market output, by definition, equals total costs. Yet the same costs support widely different levels of public output, depending on the quality of the public sector.
Note that value added is defined as payments to factors (labor and capital) and profits. Profits are assumed to be zero in the non-commercial public sector. As for the return to capital, in the current SNA used by most countries, public capital is attributed a net return of zero—i.e., the return from public capital is equated to its depreciation rate. This lack of a net return measure in the SNA is not due to a belief that the net return is actually zero, but to the difficulties of estimating the return.
Atkinson and others (2005, page 12) state some of the reasons behind current SNA practice: “Wide use of the convention that (output = input) reflects the difficulties in making alternative estimates. Simply stated, there are two major problems: (a) in the case of collective services such as defense or public administration, it is hard to identify the exact nature of the output, and (b) in the case of services supplied to individuals, such as health or education, it is hard to place a value on these services, as there is no market transaction.”
Murray (2010) also observes that studies of the government’s production activities, and their implications for the measurement of living standards, have long been ignored. He writes: “Looking back it is depressing that progress in understanding the production of public services has been so slow. In the market sector there is a long tradition of studying production functions, demand for inputs, average and marginal cost functions, elasticities of supply, productivity, and technical progress. The non-market sector has gone largely
unnoticed. In part this can be explained by general difficulties in measuring the output of services, whether public or private. But in part it must be explained by a completely different perspective on public and private services. Resource use for the production of public services has not been regarded as inputs into a production process, but as an end in itself, in the form of public consumption. Consequently, the production activity in the government sector has not been recognized.” (Our italics.)
The simple point that we make in this paper is that once it is recognized that the effectiveness of the government’s ‘production function’ varies significantly across countries, the simple convention of equating output value to input cost must be revisited. Thus, if we learn that the same output could be achieved with less inputs, it is more appropriate to credit GDP or GNI with the required inputs rather than with the actual inputs that include waste. While perceptions of government effectiveness vary widely among countries as, e.g., the World Bank’s Governance indicators attests (Kaufmann and others 2009), getting reliable measures of government actual effectiveness is a challenging task as we shall discuss below.
In physics, efficiency is defined as the ratio of useful work done to total energy expended, and the same general idea is associated with the term when discussing production. Economists simply replace ‘useful work’ by ‘outputs’ and ‘energy’ by ‘inputs.’ Technical efficiency means the adequate use of the available resources in order to obtain the maximum product. Why focus on technical efficiency and not other concepts of efficiency, such as price or allocative efficiency? Do we have enough evidence on public sector inefficiency to make the appropriate corrections?
The reason why we focus on technical efficiency in this preliminary inquiry is twofold. First, it corresponds to the concept of waste. Productive inefficiency implies that some inputs are wasted as more could have been produced with available inputs. In the case of allocative inefficiency, there could be a different allocation of resources that would make everyone better off but we cannot say that necessarily some resources are unused—although they are certainly not aligned with social preferences. Second, measuring technical inefficiency is easier and less controversial than measuring allocative inefficiency. To measure technical inefficiency, there are parametric and non-parametric methods allowing for construction of a best practice frontier. Inefficiency is then measured by the distance between this frontier and the actual input-output combination being assessed.
Indicators (or rather ranges of indicators) of inefficiency exist for the overall public sector and for specific activities such as education, healthcare, transportation, and other sectors. However, they are far from being uncontroversial. Sources of controversy include: omission of inputs and/or outputs, temporal lags needed to observe variations in the output indicators, choice of measures of outputs, and mixing outputs with outcomes. For example, many social and macroeconomic indicators impact health status beyond government spending (Spinks and Hollingsworth, 2009, and Joumard and others, 2010) and they should be taken into account. Most of the output indicators available show autocorrelation and changes in inputs typically take time to materialize into outputs’ variations. Also, there is a trend towards using outcome rather than output indicators for measuring the performance of the public sector. In health and education, efficiency studies have moved away from outputs (e.g., number of prenatal interventions) to outcomes (e.g., infant mortality rates). When cross-country analyses are involved, however, it must be acknowledged that differences in outcomes are explained not only by differences in public sector outputs but also differences in other environmental factors outside the public sector (e.g., culture, nutrition habits).
Empirical efficiency measurement methods first construct a reference technology based on observed input-output combinations, using econometric or linear programming methods. Next, they assess the distance of actual input-output combinations from the best-practice frontier. These distances, properly scaled, are called efficiency measures or scores. An inputbased efficiency measure informs us on the extent it is possible to reduce the amount of the inputs without reducing the level of output. Thus, an efficiency score, say, of 0.8 means that using best practices observed elsewhere, 80 percent of the inputs would suffice to produce the same output.
We base our corrections to GDP on the efficiency scores estimated in two papers: Afonso and others (2010) for several indicators referred to a set of 24 countries, and Evans and others (2000) focusing on health, for 191 countries based on WHO data. These studies employ techniques similar to those used in other studies, such as Gupta and Verhoeven (2001), Clements (2002), Carcillo and others (2007), and Joumard and others (2010).
? Afonso and others (2010) compute public sector performance and efficiency indicators (as performance weighted by the relevant expenditure needed to achieve it) for 24 EU and emerging economies. Using DEA, they conclude that on average countries could use 45 percent less resources to attain the same outcomes, and deliver an additional third of the fully efficient output if they were on the efficiency frontier. The study included an analysis of the efficiency of education and health spending that we use here.
? Evans and others (2000) estimate health efficiency scores for the 1993–1997 period for 191 countries, based on WHO data, using stochastic frontier methods. Two health outcomes measures are identified: the disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE) and a composite index of DALE, dispersion of child survival rate, responsiveness of the health care system, inequities in responsiveness, and fairness of financial contribution. The input measures are health expenditure and years of schooling with the addition of country fixed effects. Because of its large country coverage, this study is useful for illustrating the impact of the type of correction that we are discussing
here.
We must note that ideally, we would like to base our corrections on input-based technical efficiency studies that deal exclusively with inputs and outputs, and do not bring outcomes into the analysis. The reason is that public sector outputs interact with other factors to produce outcomes, and here cross-country hetereogenity can play an important role driving cross-country differences in outcomes. Unfortunately, we have found no technical-efficiency studies covering a broad sample of countries that restrict themselves to input-output analysis. In particular, these two studies deal with a mix of outputs and outcomes. The results reported here should thus be seen as illustrative. Furthermore, it should be underscored that the level of “waste” that is identified for each particular country varies significantly across studies, which implies that any associated measures of GDP adjusting for this waste will also differ.
...
We have argued here that the current practice of estimating the value of the government’s non-market output by its input costs is not only unsatisfactory but also misleading in crosscountry comparisons of living standards. Since differences in the quality of the public sector have an impact on the population’s effective consumption and welfare, they must be taken into account in comparisons of living standards. We have performed illustrative corrections of the input costs to account for productive inefficiency, thus purging from GDP the fraction of these inputs that is wasted.
Our results suggest that the magnitude of the correction could be significant. When correcting for inefficiencies in the health and education sectors, the average loss for a set of 24 EU member states and emerging economies amounts to 4.1 percentage points of GDP. Sector-specific averages for education and health are 1.5 and 2.6 percentage points of GDP, implying that 32.6 and 65.0 percent of the inputs are wasted in the respective sectors. These corrections are reflected in the GDP-per-capita ranking, which gets reshuffled in 9 cases out of 24. In a hypothetical scenario where the inefficiency of the health sector is assumed to be representative of the public sector as a whole, the rank reordering would affect about 50 percent of the 93 countries in the sample, with 70 percent of it happening in the lower half of the original ranking. These results, however, should be interpreted with caution, as the purpose of this paper is to call attention to the issue, rather than to provide fine-tuned waste estimates.
A natural way forward involves finding indicators for both output quantities and prices for direct measurement of some public outputs. This is recommended in SNA 93 but has yet to be implemented in most countries. Moreover, in recent times there has been an increased interest in outcomes-based performance monitoring and evaluation of government activities (see Stiglitz and others, 2010). As argued also in Atkinson (2005), it will be important to measure not only public sector outputs but also outcomes, as the latter are what ultimately affect welfare. A step in this direction is suggested by Abraham and Mackie (2006) for the US, with the creation of “satellite” accounts in specific areas as education and health. These extend the accounting of the nation’s productive inputs and outputs, thereby taking into account specific aspects of non-market activities.
IMF Working Paper No. 12/182
Jul 2012
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26052.0
Summary: It is generally acknowledged that the government’s output is difficult to define and its value is hard to measure. The practical solution, adopted by national accounts systems, is to equate output to input costs. However, several studies estimate significant inefficiencies in government activities (i.e., same output could be achieved with less inputs), implying that inputs are not a good approximation for outputs. If taken seriously, the next logical step is to purge from GDP the fraction of government inputs that is wasted. As differences in the quality of the public sector have a direct impact on citizens’ effective consumption of public and private goods and services, we must take them into account when computing a measure of living standards. We illustrate such a correction computing corrected per capita GDPs on the basis of two studies that estimate efficiency scores for several dimensions of government activities. We show that the correction could be significant, and rankings of living standards could be re-ordered as a result.
Excerpts:
Despite its acknowledged shortcomings, GDP per capita is still the most commonly used summary indicator of living standards. Much of the policy advice provided by international organizations is based on macroeconomic magnitudes as shares of GDP, and framed on cross-country comparisons of per capita GDP. However, what GDP does actually measure may differ significantly across countries for several reasons. We focus here on a particular source for this heterogeneity: the quality of public spending. Broadly speaking, the ‘quality of public spending’ refers to the government’s effectiveness in transforming resources into socially valuable outputs. The opening quote highlights the disconnect between spending and value when the discipline of market transactions is missing.
Everywhere around the world, non-market government accounts for a big share of GDP and yet it is poorly measured—namely the value to users is assumed to equal the producer’s cost. Such a framework is deficient because it does not allow for changes in the amount of output produced per unit of input, that is, changes in productivity (for a recent review of this issue, see Atkinson and others, 2005). It also assumes that these inputs are fully used. To put it another way, standard national accounting assumes that government activities are on the best practice frontier. When this is not the case, there is an overstatement of national production. This, in turn, could result in misleading conclusions, particularly in cross-country comparisons, given that the size, scope, and performance of public sectors vary so widely.
Moreover, in the national accounts, this attributed non-market (government and non-profit sectors) “value added” is further allocated to the household sector as “actual consumption.” As Deaton and Heston (2008) put it: “[...] there are many countries around the world where government-provided health and education is inefficient, sometimes involving mass absenteeism by teachers and health workers [...] so that such ‘actual’ consumption is anything but actual. To count the salaries of AWOL government employees as ‘actual’ benefits to consumers adds statistical insult to original injury.” This “statistical insult” logically follows from the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) framework once ‘waste’ is classified as income—since national income must be either consumed or saved. Absent teachers and health care workers are all too common in many low-income countries (Chaudhury and Hammer, 2004; Kremer and others, 2005; Chaudhury and others, 2006; and World Bank, 2004). Beyond straight absenteeism, which is an extreme case, generally there are significant cross-country differences in the quality of public sector services. World Bank (2011) reports that in India, even though most children of primaryschool age are enrolled in school, 35 percent of them cannot read a simple paragraph and 41 percent cannot do a simple subtraction.
It must be acknowledged, nonetheless, that for many of government’s non-market services, the output is difficult to define, and without market prices the value of output is hard to measure. It is because of this that the practical solution adopted in the SNA is to equate output to input costs. This choice may be more adequate when using GDP to measure economic activity or factor employment than when using GDP to measure living standards.
Moving beyond this state of affairs, there are two alternative approaches. One is to try to find indicators for both output quantities and prices for direct measurement of some public outputs, as recommended in SNA 93 (but yet to be broadly implemented). The other is to correct the input costs to account for productive inefficiency, namely to purge from GDP the fraction of these inputs that is wasted. We focus here on the nature of this correction. As the differences in the quality of the public sector have a direct impact on citizens’ effective consumption of public and private goods and services, it seems natural to take them into account when computing a measure of living standards.
To illustrate, in a recent study, Afonso and others (2010) compute public sector efficiency scores for a group of countries and conclude that “[...] the highest-ranking country uses onethird of the inputs as the bottom ranking one to attain a certain public sector performance score. The average input scores suggest that countries could use around 45 per cent less resources to attain the same outcomes if they were fully efficient.” In this paper, we take such a statement to its logical conclusion. Once we acknowledge that the same output could be achieved with less inputs, output value cannot be equated to input costs. In other words, waste should not belong in the living-standards indicator—it still remains a cost of government but it must be purged from the value of government services. As noted, this adjustment is especially relevant for cross-country comparisons.
...
In this context, as noted, the standard practice is to equate the value of government outputs to its cost, notwithstanding the SNA 93 proposal to estimate government outputs directly. The value added that, say, public education contributes to GDP is based on the wage bill and other costs of providing education, such as outlays for utilities and school supplies. Similarly for public health, the wage bill of doctors, nurses and other medical staff and medical supplies measures largely comprises its value added. Thus, in the (pre-93) SNA used almost everywhere, non-market output, by definition, equals total costs. Yet the same costs support widely different levels of public output, depending on the quality of the public sector.
Note that value added is defined as payments to factors (labor and capital) and profits. Profits are assumed to be zero in the non-commercial public sector. As for the return to capital, in the current SNA used by most countries, public capital is attributed a net return of zero—i.e., the return from public capital is equated to its depreciation rate. This lack of a net return measure in the SNA is not due to a belief that the net return is actually zero, but to the difficulties of estimating the return.
Atkinson and others (2005, page 12) state some of the reasons behind current SNA practice: “Wide use of the convention that (output = input) reflects the difficulties in making alternative estimates. Simply stated, there are two major problems: (a) in the case of collective services such as defense or public administration, it is hard to identify the exact nature of the output, and (b) in the case of services supplied to individuals, such as health or education, it is hard to place a value on these services, as there is no market transaction.”
Murray (2010) also observes that studies of the government’s production activities, and their implications for the measurement of living standards, have long been ignored. He writes: “Looking back it is depressing that progress in understanding the production of public services has been so slow. In the market sector there is a long tradition of studying production functions, demand for inputs, average and marginal cost functions, elasticities of supply, productivity, and technical progress. The non-market sector has gone largely
unnoticed. In part this can be explained by general difficulties in measuring the output of services, whether public or private. But in part it must be explained by a completely different perspective on public and private services. Resource use for the production of public services has not been regarded as inputs into a production process, but as an end in itself, in the form of public consumption. Consequently, the production activity in the government sector has not been recognized.” (Our italics.)
The simple point that we make in this paper is that once it is recognized that the effectiveness of the government’s ‘production function’ varies significantly across countries, the simple convention of equating output value to input cost must be revisited. Thus, if we learn that the same output could be achieved with less inputs, it is more appropriate to credit GDP or GNI with the required inputs rather than with the actual inputs that include waste. While perceptions of government effectiveness vary widely among countries as, e.g., the World Bank’s Governance indicators attests (Kaufmann and others 2009), getting reliable measures of government actual effectiveness is a challenging task as we shall discuss below.
In physics, efficiency is defined as the ratio of useful work done to total energy expended, and the same general idea is associated with the term when discussing production. Economists simply replace ‘useful work’ by ‘outputs’ and ‘energy’ by ‘inputs.’ Technical efficiency means the adequate use of the available resources in order to obtain the maximum product. Why focus on technical efficiency and not other concepts of efficiency, such as price or allocative efficiency? Do we have enough evidence on public sector inefficiency to make the appropriate corrections?
The reason why we focus on technical efficiency in this preliminary inquiry is twofold. First, it corresponds to the concept of waste. Productive inefficiency implies that some inputs are wasted as more could have been produced with available inputs. In the case of allocative inefficiency, there could be a different allocation of resources that would make everyone better off but we cannot say that necessarily some resources are unused—although they are certainly not aligned with social preferences. Second, measuring technical inefficiency is easier and less controversial than measuring allocative inefficiency. To measure technical inefficiency, there are parametric and non-parametric methods allowing for construction of a best practice frontier. Inefficiency is then measured by the distance between this frontier and the actual input-output combination being assessed.
Indicators (or rather ranges of indicators) of inefficiency exist for the overall public sector and for specific activities such as education, healthcare, transportation, and other sectors. However, they are far from being uncontroversial. Sources of controversy include: omission of inputs and/or outputs, temporal lags needed to observe variations in the output indicators, choice of measures of outputs, and mixing outputs with outcomes. For example, many social and macroeconomic indicators impact health status beyond government spending (Spinks and Hollingsworth, 2009, and Joumard and others, 2010) and they should be taken into account. Most of the output indicators available show autocorrelation and changes in inputs typically take time to materialize into outputs’ variations. Also, there is a trend towards using outcome rather than output indicators for measuring the performance of the public sector. In health and education, efficiency studies have moved away from outputs (e.g., number of prenatal interventions) to outcomes (e.g., infant mortality rates). When cross-country analyses are involved, however, it must be acknowledged that differences in outcomes are explained not only by differences in public sector outputs but also differences in other environmental factors outside the public sector (e.g., culture, nutrition habits).
Empirical efficiency measurement methods first construct a reference technology based on observed input-output combinations, using econometric or linear programming methods. Next, they assess the distance of actual input-output combinations from the best-practice frontier. These distances, properly scaled, are called efficiency measures or scores. An inputbased efficiency measure informs us on the extent it is possible to reduce the amount of the inputs without reducing the level of output. Thus, an efficiency score, say, of 0.8 means that using best practices observed elsewhere, 80 percent of the inputs would suffice to produce the same output.
We base our corrections to GDP on the efficiency scores estimated in two papers: Afonso and others (2010) for several indicators referred to a set of 24 countries, and Evans and others (2000) focusing on health, for 191 countries based on WHO data. These studies employ techniques similar to those used in other studies, such as Gupta and Verhoeven (2001), Clements (2002), Carcillo and others (2007), and Joumard and others (2010).
? Afonso and others (2010) compute public sector performance and efficiency indicators (as performance weighted by the relevant expenditure needed to achieve it) for 24 EU and emerging economies. Using DEA, they conclude that on average countries could use 45 percent less resources to attain the same outcomes, and deliver an additional third of the fully efficient output if they were on the efficiency frontier. The study included an analysis of the efficiency of education and health spending that we use here.
? Evans and others (2000) estimate health efficiency scores for the 1993–1997 period for 191 countries, based on WHO data, using stochastic frontier methods. Two health outcomes measures are identified: the disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE) and a composite index of DALE, dispersion of child survival rate, responsiveness of the health care system, inequities in responsiveness, and fairness of financial contribution. The input measures are health expenditure and years of schooling with the addition of country fixed effects. Because of its large country coverage, this study is useful for illustrating the impact of the type of correction that we are discussing
here.
We must note that ideally, we would like to base our corrections on input-based technical efficiency studies that deal exclusively with inputs and outputs, and do not bring outcomes into the analysis. The reason is that public sector outputs interact with other factors to produce outcomes, and here cross-country hetereogenity can play an important role driving cross-country differences in outcomes. Unfortunately, we have found no technical-efficiency studies covering a broad sample of countries that restrict themselves to input-output analysis. In particular, these two studies deal with a mix of outputs and outcomes. The results reported here should thus be seen as illustrative. Furthermore, it should be underscored that the level of “waste” that is identified for each particular country varies significantly across studies, which implies that any associated measures of GDP adjusting for this waste will also differ.
...
We have argued here that the current practice of estimating the value of the government’s non-market output by its input costs is not only unsatisfactory but also misleading in crosscountry comparisons of living standards. Since differences in the quality of the public sector have an impact on the population’s effective consumption and welfare, they must be taken into account in comparisons of living standards. We have performed illustrative corrections of the input costs to account for productive inefficiency, thus purging from GDP the fraction of these inputs that is wasted.
Our results suggest that the magnitude of the correction could be significant. When correcting for inefficiencies in the health and education sectors, the average loss for a set of 24 EU member states and emerging economies amounts to 4.1 percentage points of GDP. Sector-specific averages for education and health are 1.5 and 2.6 percentage points of GDP, implying that 32.6 and 65.0 percent of the inputs are wasted in the respective sectors. These corrections are reflected in the GDP-per-capita ranking, which gets reshuffled in 9 cases out of 24. In a hypothetical scenario where the inefficiency of the health sector is assumed to be representative of the public sector as a whole, the rank reordering would affect about 50 percent of the 93 countries in the sample, with 70 percent of it happening in the lower half of the original ranking. These results, however, should be interpreted with caution, as the purpose of this paper is to call attention to the issue, rather than to provide fine-tuned waste estimates.
A natural way forward involves finding indicators for both output quantities and prices for direct measurement of some public outputs. This is recommended in SNA 93 but has yet to be implemented in most countries. Moreover, in recent times there has been an increased interest in outcomes-based performance monitoring and evaluation of government activities (see Stiglitz and others, 2010). As argued also in Atkinson (2005), it will be important to measure not only public sector outputs but also outcomes, as the latter are what ultimately affect welfare. A step in this direction is suggested by Abraham and Mackie (2006) for the US, with the creation of “satellite” accounts in specific areas as education and health. These extend the accounting of the nation’s productive inputs and outputs, thereby taking into account specific aspects of non-market activities.
Friday, January 27, 2012
China's Cyber Thievery Is National Policy—And Must Be Challenged
China's Cyber Thievery Is National Policy—And Must Be Challenged. By MIKE MCCONNELL, MICHAEL CHERTOFF AND WILLIAM LYNN
It is more efficient for the Chinese to steal innovations and intellectual property than to incur the cost and time of creating their own.WSJ, Jan 27, 2012
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577178832338032176.html
Only three months ago, we would have violated U.S. secrecy laws by sharing what we write here—even though, as a former director of national intelligence, secretary of homeland security, and deputy secretary of defense, we have long known it to be true. The Chinese government has a national policy of economic espionage in cyberspace. In fact, the Chinese are the world's most active and persistent practitioners of cyber espionage today.
Evidence of China's economically devastating theft of proprietary technologies and other intellectual property from U.S. companies is growing. Only in October 2011 were details declassified in a report to Congress by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. Each of us has been speaking publicly for years about the ability of cyber terrorists to cripple our critical infrastructure, including financial networks and the power grid. Now this report finally reveals what we couldn't say before: The threat of economic cyber espionage looms even more ominously.
The report is a summation of the catastrophic impact cyber espionage could have on the U.S. economy and global competitiveness over the next decade. Evidence indicates that China intends to help build its economy by intellectual-property theft rather than by innovation and investment in research and development (two strong suits of the U.S. economy). The nature of the Chinese economy offers a powerful motive to do so.
According to 2009 estimates by the United Nations, China has a population of 1.3 billion, with 468 million (about 36% of the population) living on less than $2 a day. While Chinese poverty has declined dramatically in the last 30 years, income inequality has increased, with much greater benefits going to the relatively small portion of educated people in urban areas, where about 25% of the population lives.
The bottom line is this: China has a massive, inexpensive work force ravenous for economic growth. It is much more efficient for the Chinese to steal innovations and intellectual property—the source code of advanced economies—than to incur the cost and time of creating their own. They turn those stolen ideas directly into production, creating products faster and cheaper than the U.S. and others.
Cyberspace is an ideal medium for stealing intellectual capital. Hackers can easily penetrate systems that transfer large amounts of data, while corporations and governments have a very hard time identifying specific perpetrators.
Unfortunately, it is also difficult to estimate the economic cost of these thefts to the U.S. economy. The report to Congress calls the cost "large" and notes that this includes corporate revenues, jobs, innovation and impacts to national security. Although a rigorous assessment has not been done, we think it is safe to say that "large" easily means billions of dollars and millions of jobs.
So how to protect ourselves from this economic threat? First, we must acknowledge its severity and understand that its impacts are more long-term than immediate. And we need to respond with all of the diplomatic, trade, economic and technological tools at our disposal.
The report to Congress notes that the U.S. intelligence community has improved its collaboration to better address cyber espionage in the military and national-security areas. Yet today's legislative framework severely restricts us from fully addressing domestic economic espionage. The intelligence community must gain a stronger role in collecting and analyzing this economic data and making it available to appropriate government and commercial entities.
Congress and the administration must also create the means to actively force more information-sharing. While organizations (both in government and in the private sector) claim to share information, the opposite is usually the case, and this must be actively fixed.
The U.S. also must make broader investments in education to produce many more workers with science, technology, engineering and math skills. Our country reacted to the Soviet Union's 1957 launch of Sputnik with investments in math and science education that launched the age of digital communications. Now is the time for a similar approach to build the skills our nation will need to compete in a global economy vastly different from 50 years ago.
Corporate America must do its part, too. If we are to ever understand the extent of cyber espionage, companies must be more open and aggressive about identifying, acknowledging and reporting incidents of cyber theft. Congress is considering legislation to require this, and the idea deserves support. Companies must also invest more in enhancing their employees' cyber skills; it is shocking how many cyber-security breaches result from simple human error such as coding mistakes or lost discs and laptops.
In this election year, our economy will take center stage, as will China and its role in issues such as monetary policy. If we are to protect ourselves against irreversible long-term damage, the economic issues behind cyber espionage must share some of that spotlight.
Mr. McConnell, a retired Navy vice admiral and former director of the National Security Agency (1992-96) and director of national intelligence (2007-09), is vice chairman of Booz Allen Hamilton. Mr. Chertoff, a former secretary of homeland security (2005-09), is senior counsel at Covington & Burling. Mr. Lynn has served as deputy secretary of defense (2009-11) and undersecretary of defense (1997-2001).
It is more efficient for the Chinese to steal innovations and intellectual property than to incur the cost and time of creating their own.WSJ, Jan 27, 2012
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577178832338032176.html
Only three months ago, we would have violated U.S. secrecy laws by sharing what we write here—even though, as a former director of national intelligence, secretary of homeland security, and deputy secretary of defense, we have long known it to be true. The Chinese government has a national policy of economic espionage in cyberspace. In fact, the Chinese are the world's most active and persistent practitioners of cyber espionage today.
Evidence of China's economically devastating theft of proprietary technologies and other intellectual property from U.S. companies is growing. Only in October 2011 were details declassified in a report to Congress by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. Each of us has been speaking publicly for years about the ability of cyber terrorists to cripple our critical infrastructure, including financial networks and the power grid. Now this report finally reveals what we couldn't say before: The threat of economic cyber espionage looms even more ominously.
The report is a summation of the catastrophic impact cyber espionage could have on the U.S. economy and global competitiveness over the next decade. Evidence indicates that China intends to help build its economy by intellectual-property theft rather than by innovation and investment in research and development (two strong suits of the U.S. economy). The nature of the Chinese economy offers a powerful motive to do so.
According to 2009 estimates by the United Nations, China has a population of 1.3 billion, with 468 million (about 36% of the population) living on less than $2 a day. While Chinese poverty has declined dramatically in the last 30 years, income inequality has increased, with much greater benefits going to the relatively small portion of educated people in urban areas, where about 25% of the population lives.
The bottom line is this: China has a massive, inexpensive work force ravenous for economic growth. It is much more efficient for the Chinese to steal innovations and intellectual property—the source code of advanced economies—than to incur the cost and time of creating their own. They turn those stolen ideas directly into production, creating products faster and cheaper than the U.S. and others.
Cyberspace is an ideal medium for stealing intellectual capital. Hackers can easily penetrate systems that transfer large amounts of data, while corporations and governments have a very hard time identifying specific perpetrators.
Unfortunately, it is also difficult to estimate the economic cost of these thefts to the U.S. economy. The report to Congress calls the cost "large" and notes that this includes corporate revenues, jobs, innovation and impacts to national security. Although a rigorous assessment has not been done, we think it is safe to say that "large" easily means billions of dollars and millions of jobs.
So how to protect ourselves from this economic threat? First, we must acknowledge its severity and understand that its impacts are more long-term than immediate. And we need to respond with all of the diplomatic, trade, economic and technological tools at our disposal.
The report to Congress notes that the U.S. intelligence community has improved its collaboration to better address cyber espionage in the military and national-security areas. Yet today's legislative framework severely restricts us from fully addressing domestic economic espionage. The intelligence community must gain a stronger role in collecting and analyzing this economic data and making it available to appropriate government and commercial entities.
Congress and the administration must also create the means to actively force more information-sharing. While organizations (both in government and in the private sector) claim to share information, the opposite is usually the case, and this must be actively fixed.
The U.S. also must make broader investments in education to produce many more workers with science, technology, engineering and math skills. Our country reacted to the Soviet Union's 1957 launch of Sputnik with investments in math and science education that launched the age of digital communications. Now is the time for a similar approach to build the skills our nation will need to compete in a global economy vastly different from 50 years ago.
Corporate America must do its part, too. If we are to ever understand the extent of cyber espionage, companies must be more open and aggressive about identifying, acknowledging and reporting incidents of cyber theft. Congress is considering legislation to require this, and the idea deserves support. Companies must also invest more in enhancing their employees' cyber skills; it is shocking how many cyber-security breaches result from simple human error such as coding mistakes or lost discs and laptops.
In this election year, our economy will take center stage, as will China and its role in issues such as monetary policy. If we are to protect ourselves against irreversible long-term damage, the economic issues behind cyber espionage must share some of that spotlight.
Mr. McConnell, a retired Navy vice admiral and former director of the National Security Agency (1992-96) and director of national intelligence (2007-09), is vice chairman of Booz Allen Hamilton. Mr. Chertoff, a former secretary of homeland security (2005-09), is senior counsel at Covington & Burling. Mr. Lynn has served as deputy secretary of defense (2009-11) and undersecretary of defense (1997-2001).
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
What drives the global land rush?
What drives the global land rush? Authors: Arezki, Rabah; Deininger, Klaus; Selod, Harris
IMF Working Paper No. 11/251
Summary: This paper studies the determinants of foreign land acquisition for large-scale agriculture. To do so, gravity models are estimated using data on bilateral investment relationships, together with newly constructed indicators of agro-ecological suitability in areas with low population density as well as indicators of land rights security. Results confirm the central role of agro-ecological potential as a pull factor. In contrast to the literature on foreign investment in general, the quality of the business climate is insignificant whereas weak land governance and tenure security for current users make countries more attractive for investors. Implications for policy are discussed.
Introduction
After decades of stagnant or declining commodity prices when agriculture was considered a ‘sunset industry’, recent increases in the level and volatility of commodity prices and the resulting demand for land have taken many observers by surprise. This phenomenon has been accompanied by a rising interest in acquiring agricultural land by investors, including sovereign wealth and private equity funds, agricultural producers, and key players from the food and agri-business industry. Investors’ motivations include economic considerations, mistrust in markets and concern about political stability, or speculation on future demand for food and fiber, or future payment for environmental services including for carbon sequestration. Some stakeholders, including many host-country governments, welcome such investment as an opportunity to overcome decades of under-investment in the sector, create employment, and leapfrog and take advantage of recent technological development. Others denounce it as a ”land grab” (Zoomers 2010). They point to the irony of envisaging large exports of food from countries which in some cases depend on regular food aid. It is noted that specific projects’ speculative nature, questionable economic basis, or lack of consultation and compensation of local people calls for a global response (De Schutter 2011). In a context of diametrically opposite perceptions, the objective of the present paper is to provide greater clarity on the numbers involved and the factors driving such investment. This is done by quantifying demand for land deals, and exploring the determinants of foreign land acquisition for large-scale agriculture using data on bilateral investment relationships. This work is an important first step to assess potential long-term impacts and discuss policy implications.
The analysis of large-scale land deals is relevant for a number of key development issues. One such issue is the debate on the most appropriate structure of agricultural production. The exceptionally large poverty elasticity of growth in smallholder agriculture (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2010, Loayza and Raddatz 2010) that is reflected in rapid recent poverty reduction in Asian economies such as China, and the fact that the majority of poor are still located in rural areas led observers to highlight the importance of a smallholder structure for poverty reduction (Lipton 2009, World Bank 2007). At the same time, disillusion with the limited success of smallholder-based efforts to improve productivity in sub-Saharan Africa (Collier 2008) and apparent export competitiveness of “mega-farms” in Latin America or Eastern Europe during the 2007/8 global food crisis have led to renewed questions about whether, despite a mixed record, large scale agriculture can be a path out of poverty and to development.
Whatever the envisaged scenario, renewed pressure on land raises the issue of whether there is sufficient competition and transparency to ensure that land owners or users are able to either transfer their land at a fair price or hold on to it as opposed to having it taken away without their consent and in what may be perceived an unfair deal. This resonates with recent contributions to the literature that suggest that resource abundance can contribute to more broad-based development only if well-governed institutions to manage these resources exist (Oechslin 2010). This is borne out by empirical evidence both across countries (Cabrales and Hauk 2011) and within more specific country contexts where resource booms may have fuelled widespread rent-seeking and corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010) or even violence (Angrist and Kugler 2008) rather than economic development.
To better understand this phenomenon and its potential impact, an empirical analysis of the factors driving transnational land acquisition is needed. To this end, we constructed a global database with country-level information on both foreign demand for land and implemented projects as documented in international and local press reports. We complement it with country-specific assessments of the amount of potentially suitable land and other relevant variables. We then use bilateral investment relationships from the database to estimate gravity models that can help identify determinants of foreign land acquisition. Results confirm the central role of agro-ecological potential as a pull factor but suggest that, in contrast to what is found for foreign investment more generally, rule of law and good governance have no effect on the number of land-related investment. Moreover, and counterintuitively, we find that countries where governance of the land sector and tenure security are weak have been most attractive for investors. This finding, which resonates with concerns articulated by parts of civil society, suggests that, to minimize the risk that such investments fail to produce benefits for local populations , the micro-level and project-based approach that has dominated the global debate so far will need to be complemented with an emphasis and determined action to improve land governance, transparency and global monitoring. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 puts recent land demand into broader context, highlighting the importance of governance in attracting investments. It draws on an analysis of how foreign direct investment (FDI) is treated in the macro-literature to suggest a methodological approach, and outlines how we address specific data needs. Section 3 presents our cross-sectional data on land demand, outlines the econometric approach, and briefly discusses relevant descriptive statistics. Key econometric results in section 4 support the importance of food import demand as motivations for countries to seek out land abroad (‘push factors’) and of agro-ecological suitability as key determinants for the choice of destination (‘pull factors’). They also highlight the extent to which weak land governance seems to encourage rather than discourage transnational demand for land. Section 5 concludes by highlighting a number of implications for policy.
Buy the paper here: http://www.imfbookstore.org/ProdDetails.asp?ID=WPIEA2011251
IMF Working Paper No. 11/251
Summary: This paper studies the determinants of foreign land acquisition for large-scale agriculture. To do so, gravity models are estimated using data on bilateral investment relationships, together with newly constructed indicators of agro-ecological suitability in areas with low population density as well as indicators of land rights security. Results confirm the central role of agro-ecological potential as a pull factor. In contrast to the literature on foreign investment in general, the quality of the business climate is insignificant whereas weak land governance and tenure security for current users make countries more attractive for investors. Implications for policy are discussed.
Introduction
After decades of stagnant or declining commodity prices when agriculture was considered a ‘sunset industry’, recent increases in the level and volatility of commodity prices and the resulting demand for land have taken many observers by surprise. This phenomenon has been accompanied by a rising interest in acquiring agricultural land by investors, including sovereign wealth and private equity funds, agricultural producers, and key players from the food and agri-business industry. Investors’ motivations include economic considerations, mistrust in markets and concern about political stability, or speculation on future demand for food and fiber, or future payment for environmental services including for carbon sequestration. Some stakeholders, including many host-country governments, welcome such investment as an opportunity to overcome decades of under-investment in the sector, create employment, and leapfrog and take advantage of recent technological development. Others denounce it as a ”land grab” (Zoomers 2010). They point to the irony of envisaging large exports of food from countries which in some cases depend on regular food aid. It is noted that specific projects’ speculative nature, questionable economic basis, or lack of consultation and compensation of local people calls for a global response (De Schutter 2011). In a context of diametrically opposite perceptions, the objective of the present paper is to provide greater clarity on the numbers involved and the factors driving such investment. This is done by quantifying demand for land deals, and exploring the determinants of foreign land acquisition for large-scale agriculture using data on bilateral investment relationships. This work is an important first step to assess potential long-term impacts and discuss policy implications.
The analysis of large-scale land deals is relevant for a number of key development issues. One such issue is the debate on the most appropriate structure of agricultural production. The exceptionally large poverty elasticity of growth in smallholder agriculture (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2010, Loayza and Raddatz 2010) that is reflected in rapid recent poverty reduction in Asian economies such as China, and the fact that the majority of poor are still located in rural areas led observers to highlight the importance of a smallholder structure for poverty reduction (Lipton 2009, World Bank 2007). At the same time, disillusion with the limited success of smallholder-based efforts to improve productivity in sub-Saharan Africa (Collier 2008) and apparent export competitiveness of “mega-farms” in Latin America or Eastern Europe during the 2007/8 global food crisis have led to renewed questions about whether, despite a mixed record, large scale agriculture can be a path out of poverty and to development.
Whatever the envisaged scenario, renewed pressure on land raises the issue of whether there is sufficient competition and transparency to ensure that land owners or users are able to either transfer their land at a fair price or hold on to it as opposed to having it taken away without their consent and in what may be perceived an unfair deal. This resonates with recent contributions to the literature that suggest that resource abundance can contribute to more broad-based development only if well-governed institutions to manage these resources exist (Oechslin 2010). This is borne out by empirical evidence both across countries (Cabrales and Hauk 2011) and within more specific country contexts where resource booms may have fuelled widespread rent-seeking and corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010) or even violence (Angrist and Kugler 2008) rather than economic development.
To better understand this phenomenon and its potential impact, an empirical analysis of the factors driving transnational land acquisition is needed. To this end, we constructed a global database with country-level information on both foreign demand for land and implemented projects as documented in international and local press reports. We complement it with country-specific assessments of the amount of potentially suitable land and other relevant variables. We then use bilateral investment relationships from the database to estimate gravity models that can help identify determinants of foreign land acquisition. Results confirm the central role of agro-ecological potential as a pull factor but suggest that, in contrast to what is found for foreign investment more generally, rule of law and good governance have no effect on the number of land-related investment. Moreover, and counterintuitively, we find that countries where governance of the land sector and tenure security are weak have been most attractive for investors. This finding, which resonates with concerns articulated by parts of civil society, suggests that, to minimize the risk that such investments fail to produce benefits for local populations , the micro-level and project-based approach that has dominated the global debate so far will need to be complemented with an emphasis and determined action to improve land governance, transparency and global monitoring. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 puts recent land demand into broader context, highlighting the importance of governance in attracting investments. It draws on an analysis of how foreign direct investment (FDI) is treated in the macro-literature to suggest a methodological approach, and outlines how we address specific data needs. Section 3 presents our cross-sectional data on land demand, outlines the econometric approach, and briefly discusses relevant descriptive statistics. Key econometric results in section 4 support the importance of food import demand as motivations for countries to seek out land abroad (‘push factors’) and of agro-ecological suitability as key determinants for the choice of destination (‘pull factors’). They also highlight the extent to which weak land governance seems to encourage rather than discourage transnational demand for land. Section 5 concludes by highlighting a number of implications for policy.
Buy the paper here: http://www.imfbookstore.org/ProdDetails.asp?ID=WPIEA2011251
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
White House: Now is Not the Time to Wave the White Flag on Clean Energy Jobs
Now is Not the Time to Wave the White Flag on Clean Energy Jobs. Blog post from Dan Pfeiffer, White House Communications Director
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/10/04/now-not-time-wave-white-flag-clean-energy-jobs
October 04, 2011
This morning, Chairman Cliff Stearns, who leads the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, told NPR that "We can't compete with China to make solar panels and wind turbines."
This comment reflects exactly the sort of counterproductive defeatism that Energy Secretary Steven Chu warned against this weekend when he spoke to a group of America’s most promising young solar innovators:
“The United States faces a choice today: Will we sit on the sidelines and fall behind or will we play to win the clean energy race? Some say this is a race America can’t win. They’re ready to wave the white flag and declare defeat… Others say this is a race America shouldn’t even be in. They say we can’t afford to invest in clean energy. I say we can’t afford not to.
“It’s not enough for our country to invent clean energy technologies – we have to make them and use them too. Invented in America, made in America, and sold around the world – that’s how we’ll create good jobs and lead in the 21st century.”
The race for clean energy jobs and industries is on – and it is a race well worth winning. The International Energy Agency projects that in the coming decades, solar power could grow to more than 20 percent of the world’s electricity.
Conservatively, this means that there is an economic opportunity worth trillions of dollars for whichever countries claim the lead. The global market for wind turbines is also growing exponentially.
But it’s not just the vast potential of jobs tomorrow – these industries employ a growing number of Americans today. In fact, business groups estimate that America’s solar industry accounts for about 100,000 jobs and the wind industry employs 75,000. Should we simply tell those workers that we’ve given up on them?
A study released last month showed that, in spite of the intense global competition, the U.S. remains a net global exporter of solar technology – with $5.6 billion in exports and an overall positive trade balance of $1.8 billion.
It is certainly true that China is playing to win. Last year alone, China offered its solar manufacturers $30 billion in government financing, vastly exceeding the U.S. investment. And China has overtaken the United States market share in solar power – a technology we invented.
Chairman Stearns and other members of his party in Congress believe that America cannot, or should not, try to compete for jobs in a cutting edge and rapidly growing industry. We simply disagree: the answer to this challenge is not to wave the white flag and give up on American workers. America has never declared defeat after a single setback – and we shouldn’t start now.
America’s entrepreneurs and innovators are still the very best in the world. Our workers are second to none – and we have never been afraid of a challenge. It’s time to do what we’ve always done in the face of a tough competitor: roll up our sleeves and recapture the lead.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/10/04/now-not-time-wave-white-flag-clean-energy-jobs
October 04, 2011
This morning, Chairman Cliff Stearns, who leads the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, told NPR that "We can't compete with China to make solar panels and wind turbines."
This comment reflects exactly the sort of counterproductive defeatism that Energy Secretary Steven Chu warned against this weekend when he spoke to a group of America’s most promising young solar innovators:
“The United States faces a choice today: Will we sit on the sidelines and fall behind or will we play to win the clean energy race? Some say this is a race America can’t win. They’re ready to wave the white flag and declare defeat… Others say this is a race America shouldn’t even be in. They say we can’t afford to invest in clean energy. I say we can’t afford not to.
“It’s not enough for our country to invent clean energy technologies – we have to make them and use them too. Invented in America, made in America, and sold around the world – that’s how we’ll create good jobs and lead in the 21st century.”
The race for clean energy jobs and industries is on – and it is a race well worth winning. The International Energy Agency projects that in the coming decades, solar power could grow to more than 20 percent of the world’s electricity.
Conservatively, this means that there is an economic opportunity worth trillions of dollars for whichever countries claim the lead. The global market for wind turbines is also growing exponentially.
But it’s not just the vast potential of jobs tomorrow – these industries employ a growing number of Americans today. In fact, business groups estimate that America’s solar industry accounts for about 100,000 jobs and the wind industry employs 75,000. Should we simply tell those workers that we’ve given up on them?
A study released last month showed that, in spite of the intense global competition, the U.S. remains a net global exporter of solar technology – with $5.6 billion in exports and an overall positive trade balance of $1.8 billion.
It is certainly true that China is playing to win. Last year alone, China offered its solar manufacturers $30 billion in government financing, vastly exceeding the U.S. investment. And China has overtaken the United States market share in solar power – a technology we invented.
Chairman Stearns and other members of his party in Congress believe that America cannot, or should not, try to compete for jobs in a cutting edge and rapidly growing industry. We simply disagree: the answer to this challenge is not to wave the white flag and give up on American workers. America has never declared defeat after a single setback – and we shouldn’t start now.
America’s entrepreneurs and innovators are still the very best in the world. Our workers are second to none – and we have never been afraid of a challenge. It’s time to do what we’ve always done in the face of a tough competitor: roll up our sleeves and recapture the lead.
Friday, September 30, 2011
EPA Inspector General Statement on Greenhouse Gases Endangerment Finding Report - Data Quality Processes
EPA Inspector General Statement on Greenhouse Gases Endangerment Finding Report - Data Quality Processes
Press Statement - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
For Immediate Release
Office of Inspector General
Washington, D.C., September 28, 2011Contact: John Manibusan. Phone: (202) 566-2391
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011/IG_Statement_Greenhouse_Gases_Endangerment_Report.pdf
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Statement of Inspector General Arthur A. Elkins, Jr., on the Office of Inspector General (OIG) report Procedural Review of EPA’s Greenhouse Gases Endangerment Finding Data Quality Processes:
Press Statement - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
For Immediate Release
Office of Inspector General
Washington, D.C., September 28, 2011Contact: John Manibusan. Phone: (202) 566-2391
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011/IG_Statement_Greenhouse_Gases_Endangerment_Report.pdf
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Statement of Inspector General Arthur A. Elkins, Jr., on the Office of Inspector General (OIG) report Procedural Review of EPA’s Greenhouse Gases Endangerment Finding Data Quality Processes:
“The OIG evaluated EPA’s compliance with established policy and procedures in the development of the endangerment finding, including processes for ensuring information quality. We concluded that the technical support document that accompanied EPA’s endangerment finding is a highly influential scientific assessment and thus required a more rigorous EPA peer review than occurred. EPA did not certify whether it complied with OMB’s or its own peer review policies in either the proposed or final endangerment findings as required. While it may be debatable what impact, if any, this had on EPA’s finding, it is clear that EPA did not follow all required steps for a highly influential scientific assessment. We also noted that documentation of events and analyses could be improved.
We made no determination regarding the impact that EPA’s information quality control systems may have had on the scientific information used to support the finding. We did not test the validity of the scientific or technical information used to support the endangerment finding, nor did we evaluate the merit of EPA’s conclusions or analyses.
We make recommendations that we think will strengthen EPA’s control over data quality processes. EPA disagreed with our conclusions and did not agree to take any corrective actions in response to this report. All the report’s recommendations are unresolved.”
###
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
An IMF working paper by Xavier Debrun "illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing "commitment technologies" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline."
Introduction:
Concluding remarks:
Introduction:
The fiscal legacy of the economic and financial crisis of 2008-09 brought to the fore serious concerns about the capacity of governments to maintain sustainable public finances. Several vulnerable countries came under severe market pressure, while government bond yields in countries considered so far as safe havens also started rising. Of particular concern is the fact that the large fiscal deficits and ballooning government debts caused by the crisis came on top of already substantial inherited liabilities and ahead of intensifying demographic pressures on entitlement spending. These trends are on a collision course with the intertemporal budget constraint, making ambitious and sustained consolidations unavoidable. The challenge is formidable and markets are on the watch, pushing governments to look for ways to firm up the credibility of their commitments to sound public finances.
While formal fiscal policy rules have long been used to contain tendencies toward fiscal profligacy (e.g. Fabrizio and Mody, 2006; and Debrun and others, 2008), it has been argued that many of the limitations and failures associated with numerical rules—most notably their inflexibility in the face of unusual circumstances—could be overcome by establishing nonpartisan agencies. Through independent analysis, assessments, and forecasts, such bodies could enhance policymakers’ incentives to deliver sustainable policies.
Despite a fairly active public debate, no full-fledged theory has either established the desirability of such institutions or derived first-order principles likely to secure their effectiveness. In a sense, this is hardly surprising, as one can only theorize about a welldefined object. In reality, the literature on independent fiscal agencies covers a wide array of specific (and sometimes outlandish) academic proposals as well as a number of existing institutions, including the Central Planning Bureau in the Netherlands, the High Council of Finance in Belgium, and the more recent Swedish Fiscal Policy Council and United Kingdom’s Office of Budget Responsibility. At best, existing papers propose a taxonomy (Debrun and others, 2009; Calmfors, 2010), but there currently is no consensus on the tasks these agencies should be assigned, what institutional form they should take, and on whether they should complement or instead substitute for a rules-based framework.
Expositions of the rationale for non-partisan agencies nevertheless share a common thread, the canonical illustration of which is Wyplosz (2005). First, there is a review of the many reasons why fiscal policy tends to systematically deviate from a socially optimal solution, with often an emphasis on common pool problems, short-termism, and time-inconsistency. Second, the author(s) lament(s) the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy rules. It is argued that the main problem with the latter is that the simplicity required for their smooth operation limits their appropriateness outside normal circumstances, undermining their credibility as soon as uncommon conditions prevail. For example, deficit ceilings fail to trigger discipline in good times—when compliance is more likely to result from automatic stabilizers rather than conscious actions—but bind in bad times, forcing undesirable procyclical contractions. Third, the author(s) call(s) on our sense of déjà vu to draw a parallel with the case for central bank independence, which is also based on the idea of an expansive bias affecting unconstrained discretionary policies, and on the manifest failure of rigid rules (e.g. caps on the growth of certain monetary aggregates) to address that bias.
The aim of this paper is to assess the theoretical framework anchoring the policy debate on politically independent fiscal agencies. After setting-up a basic model of fiscal policy (Section II), I show that the parallel with independent central banks is theoretically flawed because most models of fiscal bias cannot demonstrate why elected officials would want to establish such institutions in the first place (Section III). In addition, the idea of fiscal delegation is misleading because the very fear of delegating may motivate principled, yet baseless opposition from politicians. I then suggest—still using simple formal illustrations— that any full-fledged theory of fiscal agencies should (1) incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy and the infeasibility of delegating policy instruments to unelected officials and (2) focus on characterizing mechanisms that encourage ex-post compliance with ex-ante commitments (“commitment technologies”) to fiscal discipline (Section IV). Some practical conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Concluding remarks:
The paper discussed from a theoretical perspective the role of independent fiscal agencies in enhancing fiscal discipline. The key point is that the effectiveness of such institutions depends on their capacity to deal with the root cause of deficit bias, including informational asymmetries between voters—the only legitimate principal in the policy game—and politicians. A number of practical implications emerge:You can order a print copy or ask us for a PDF copy.
1. The delegation of fiscal policy prerogatives to unelected officials is unworkable from a positive perspective, reinforcing the normative argument against fiscal delegation emanating from Alesina and Tabellini (2007). The model indeed illustrates that the very decision to delegate macro-relevant dimensions of fiscal policy—such as the level of the deficit, as suggested by Wyplosz (2005)—simply violates participation constraints of elected decisionmakers.
2. An independent fiscal agency is more likely to credibly enhance fiscal discipline if a broad mandate allows it to address the various manifestations of the deficit bias (from creative accounting to masking policy slippages or biasing revenue forecasts). This includes having the discretion to make normative assessments of the fiscal stance—albeit within the boundaries of elected politician’s own ex-ante commitments—in the light of cyclical conditions, public debt dynamics, and risks to public sector’s long-term solvency.
3. The agency’s effectiveness is likely to be greater if it receives specific instruments to trigger a public debate where elected officials would have to publicly explain slippages (with respect to ex-ante targets) deemed inappropriate by the agency. By becoming a reliable source on the overall quality of fiscal policy, the agency can help voters identify ex-post deviations related to “bad policies” (as opposed to “bad luck”) and hold policymakers accountable. This is a task that rules-based fiscal frameworks—bound to remain simple to be operational—cannot by themselves deliver. Indeed, mere deviations from preset benchmarks do not always signal policy mistakes.
4. As politicians may be reluctant to bear the short-term costs of deviations from ex-ante commitments, an effective fiscal agency ideally requires a degree of political independence enshrined in primary legislation (Constitutional or framework law) and guaranteed by ringfenced, multi-year budget appropriations or rules-based extra-budgetary financing (e.g. through a fixed transfer from the central bank) commensurate with the agency’s tasks.
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in Developing Oil-Producing Countries?
A new IMF working paper by Nese Erbil "examines the cyclicality of fiscal behavior in 28 developing oil-producing countries (OPCs) during 1990-2009. After testing five fiscal measures - government expenditure, consumption, investment, non-oil revenue, and non-oil primary balance - and correcting for reverse causality between non-oil output and fiscal variables, the results suggest that all of the five fiscal variables are strongly procyclical in the full sample. Also, the results are not uniform across income groups: expenditure is procyclical in the low and middle-income countries, while it is countercyclical in the high-income countries. Fiscal policy tends to be affected by the external financing constraints in the middle- and high-income groups. However, the quality of institutions and political structure appear to be more significant for the low-income group."
Excerpts (notes excluded):
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Excerpts (notes excluded):
Both the neoclassical and Keynesian theories support the idea that effective fiscal policy should smooth the volatility of output during the business cycle. Barro’s (1973) ―tax-smoothing‖ hypothesis of optimal fiscal policy suggests that, for a given path of government expenditure, tax rates should be held constant over the business cycle, and the budget surplus should move in a procyclical fashion. According to the Keynesian approach, however, if the economy is in recession, policy should increase government expenditure and lower taxes to help the economy out of the recession. During economic booms, the government should save the surpluses that emerge from the operation of automatic stabilizers and, if necessary, go further with discretionary tax increases or spending cuts. As a result, fiscal policies are expected to follow countercyclical patterns through automatic stabilizers and discretionary channels. In other words, one would expect a positive correlation between changes in output and changes in the fiscal balance or a negative correlation between changes in output and changes in government expenditure.
However, empirical studies show that fiscal policies are procyclical in developing countries and in OPCs.5 They increase spending with an increase in oil revenue during an oil price boom. They are forced to reduce spending because of a revenue decline as a result of a drop in oil prices. Since, in general, these countries are not able to accumulate savings in years with high oil revenues, they can only finance deficits by cutting expenditure during revenue shortfalls. Fouad and others (2007), Abdih and others (2010), and Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010) find that oil-producing countries followed procyclical fiscal policies during the recent oil price cycle. Baldini (2005) and De Cima (2003) also present evidence for the procyclicality of fiscal policies in two oil-producing countries, Venezuela and Mexico. More recent studies, e.g. Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), find, using instrumental variable regression, strong evidence of procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries.
Two broad arguments that have been proposed as an explanation for procyclical policies in developing counties also apply to OPCs: constraints on financing (or limited access to credit markets) and factors related to the structure of the economy ( the budget, political, power, and social structure, and weak institutions). In general, these factors are presented separately but they go together and are likely to reinforce each other. For example, weak institutions, the budget structure, or a corrupt government may hinder prudent fiscal policies, which may, in turn, affect fiscal sustainability and creditworthiness by amplifying the financing constraints.
Liquidity and borrowing constraints emerge when a developing country needs financing the most--during a downturn--and that is when it is least likely to be able to obtain it. Many countries do not have significant foreign assets or developed domestic financial markets to raise funds. When these countries face large terms of trade shocks (i.e., a sharp fall in oil prices in the case of OPCs), investors may lose confidence and be less likely to lend, because they fear that the lack of policy credibility and discipline may force the government to run up large budget deficits and to default.6 Governments in this situation will also experience recurring credit constraints in world capital markets (―sudden stops,‖ as explained in Calvo and Reinhart (2000)), which hamper their ability to conduct countercyclical policies.
Oil stabilization funds have been increasingly used by OPCs as an instrument to cope with oil revenue volatility. These funds are aimed at stabilizing budgetary revenues: when oil revenues are high, some portion of the revenue would be channeled to the stabilization fund; when oil revenues are low, the stabilization fund would finance the shortfall. However, the creation of such funds is found to have no impact on the relationship between oil export earnings and government expenditure in countries where no sound and transparent fiscal and macroeconomic policies were implemented.7 Moreover, some oil funds have operated outside existing budget systems and are often accountable to only a few political appointees. This makes such funds especially susceptible to abuse and political interference. Therefore, stabilization funds should not be regarded as a substitute for sound fiscal management.
The other argument proposed to explain the difficulty in implementing countercyclical policy focuses on procyclical government spending due to three aspects of the economy and the government: the budget structure, the weak political structure and institutions, and corruption in government.
First, developing countries run procyclical fiscal policies because of their budget structure. These countries have a few automatic stabilizers built into their budgets. As a result, government spending in developing and emerging countries displays less of a countercyclical pattern than in industrial countries. For example, Gavin and Perotti (1997) note that Latin American countries spend much less on transfers and subsidies than do richer OECD economies (24 percent of total government spending, compared with 42 percent in the industrial countries). Furthermore, most developing countries and OPCs cannot raise revenue effectively through taxes since they usually suffer from inefficient tax collection systems, owing to the low level of compliance with tax laws, insufficient political commitment, and a lack of capacity, expertise, and resources.8 Additionally, non-oil tax bases in these countries are in general very low.9
Second, weak institutions and political structure encourage multiple powerful groups in a society to attempt to grab a greater share of national wealth by demanding higher public spending on their behalf. This behavior, called the ―voracity effect‖ by Tornell and Lane (1999), results in fiscal procyclicality arising from common pool problems, whereby a positive shock to income leads to a more than proportional increase in public spending, even if the shock is expected to be temporary. This is discussed extensively in ―resource curse‖ literature as a reason for low economic growth in resource-rich countries.10 Moreover, fiscal policies are more intense in countries with political systems having multiple fiscal veto points and higher output volatility (Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti, 1998;and Talvi and Végh, 2000). Similarly, Lane (2003) and Fatas and Mihov (2001) find that countries with power dispersion are likely to experience volatile output and procyclical fiscal behavior.
Lastly, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) argue that a more corrupt government displays more procyclical fiscal policies as voters, who do not trust the government, demand higher utility when they see aggregate output rising. This behavior would be more prevalent in democracies since a corrupt government is accountable to the voters, whereas, in a dictatorship, the government would not be accountable and, even if corruption were widespread, voters could not influence fiscal policy. Alesina and Tabellini conclude that corrupt governments in democracies, rather than credit market imperfections, are the underlying cause of procyclical fiscal policy.
[...]
The results confirm that political and institutional factors, as well as financing constraints, play a role in the cyclicality of fiscal policies in the OPCs. Most of the variables on the quality of institutions and the political structure appear to be significant for the low- income group. Two of the variables are significant for the middle-income countries: the composite institution index and checks and balances. None of the institutional variables turns out to be significant for the high-income countries.21 Domestic financing constraints seem to matter for the low-income group. But fiscal policy is affected more by the external financing constraint in the middle- and high-income groups, as they may be more integrated into the global financial system than the low-income countries.
Despite their many differences, all the OPCs face volatile and unpredictable oil revenues, a situation that makes fiscal management challenging. For this reason, it is imperative for them to formulate effective countercyclical fiscal policies by which they can smooth government expenditure, decouple it from the volatile oil revenues, and prevent boom-and-bust cycles. Breaking away from a procyclical fiscal policy will enable them to sustain long-term growth and keep the safety net that the poor need. Sound fiscal policies and discipline require strong institutions, a higher-level bureaucracy, and more transparency. Strong institutions and transparency would also help reduce the ―voracity effect,‖ which, in turn, would facilitate the accumulation of financial assets and build up confidence among investors to raise funds when needed.
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You can also request a PDF from us for free.
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
“The Day of Rejection” in Mauritania
Kal posts this:
"For pictures, flyers, video and a summary of the 24 May youth demonstrations in Mauritania (The Day of Rejection), see here and here. The youth staged a mock funeral for democracy in Mauritania, marching on the Blokate square in Nouakchott. As in previous demonstrations, there was an emphasis on reducing the military’s role in politics, corruption and commodity prices. The demonstrators were met by plain cloths police and security men, who allegedly distributed knives to thugs. The demonstrations on 24 May were smaller than in April and saw less head on violence from the authorities. But the government does appear somewhat spooked by the youth movement: aside from the use of plain clothes police and agents provocateurs, it has used misinformation campaigns to confuse and hamper the protests with false flyers (and by setting up false Facebook accounts and pages, according to activists). Here is a link to an al-Akhbar article on the demonstration [Ar.]. For background on the youth protest movement see the previous posts on this blog and this writer’s recent article in the Arab Reform Bulletin."
Here is one flyer, "posted by organizers on Facebook and by this writer on Twitter last week (they are also in a gallery in the links above)":
There is a second flyer in Arabic at the original post.
"For pictures, flyers, video and a summary of the 24 May youth demonstrations in Mauritania (The Day of Rejection), see here and here. The youth staged a mock funeral for democracy in Mauritania, marching on the Blokate square in Nouakchott. As in previous demonstrations, there was an emphasis on reducing the military’s role in politics, corruption and commodity prices. The demonstrators were met by plain cloths police and security men, who allegedly distributed knives to thugs. The demonstrations on 24 May were smaller than in April and saw less head on violence from the authorities. But the government does appear somewhat spooked by the youth movement: aside from the use of plain clothes police and agents provocateurs, it has used misinformation campaigns to confuse and hamper the protests with false flyers (and by setting up false Facebook accounts and pages, according to activists). Here is a link to an al-Akhbar article on the demonstration [Ar.]. For background on the youth protest movement see the previous posts on this blog and this writer’s recent article in the Arab Reform Bulletin."
Here is one flyer, "posted by organizers on Facebook and by this writer on Twitter last week (they are also in a gallery in the links above)":
There is a second flyer in Arabic at the original post.
Thursday, June 17, 2010
Cisneros Rewriting HUD History
Cisneros Rewriting HUD History
Posted by Tad DeHaven, Cato, June 17, 2010 @ 1:50 pmIn a recent speech to real estate interests, former Clinton HUD secretary Henry Cisneros preposterously claimed that the recent housing meltdown “occurred not out of a governmental push, but out of a hijacking of the homeownership process by some unscrupulous interests.”
The only criticisms Cisneros could muster for the government’s housing policies over the past 20 years were that regulations weren’t tough enough and it should have focused more on rental subsidies.
The reality is that Cisneros-era HUD regulations and policies directly contributed to the housing bubble and subsequent burst as a Cato essay on HUD scandals illustrates:
- Cisneros’s HUD pursued legal action against mortgage lenders who supposedly declined higher percentages of loans for minorities than whites. As a result of such political pressure, lenders begin lowering their lending standards.
- On Cisneros’s watch, the Community Reinvestment Act was used to pressure lenders into making more loans to moderate-income borrowers by allowing regulators to deny merger approvals for banks with low CRA ratings. The result was that banks began issuing more loans to otherwise uncreditworthy borrowers, while purchasing more CRA mortgage-backed securities. More importantly, these lax standards quickly spread to prime and subprime mortgage markets.
- The Clinton administration’s National Homeownership Strategy, prepared under Cisneros’s direction, advocated “financing strategies, fueled by creativity and resources of the public and private sectors, to help homebuyers that lack cash to buy a home or income to make the payments.” In other words, his policies encouraged the behavior that he now calls “unscrupulous.”
- Cisneros’s HUD also put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under constant pressure to facilitate more lending to “underserved” markets. It was under Cisneros’s direction that HUD agreed to allow Fannie and Freddie credit toward its “affordable housing” targets by buying subprime mortgages. Fannie and Freddie are now under government conservatorship and will cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.
“Unscrupulous” would be a good word to describe the millions of dollars Cisneros has made in the real estate industry following his exit from government.
From the Cato essay:
In 2001, Cisneros joined the board of Fannie Mae’s biggest client: the now notorious Countrywide Financial, the company that was center stage in the subprime lending scandals of recent years. When the housing bubble was inflating, Countrywide and KB took full advantage of the liberalized lending standards fueled by Cisneros’s HUD. In addition to the money he received as a KB director, Cisneros’s company, in which he held a 65 percent stake, received $1.24 million in consulting fees from KB in 2002.
When Cisneros stepped down from Countrywide’s board in 2007, he called it a “well-managed company” and said that he had “enormous confidence” in its leadership. Clearly, those statements were baloney—Cisneros was trying to escape before the crash. Just days before his resignation, Countrywide announced a $1.2 billion loss, and reported that a third of its borrowers were late on mortgage payments. According to SEC records, Cisneros’s position at Countrywide had earned him a $360,000 salary in 2006 and $5 million in stock sales since 2001.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
The 'Disclose' Act would make election law even more incomprehensible and subject to selective enforcement for political gain
Chuck Schumer vs. Free Speech. By Joan Aikens, Lee Ann Elliott, Thomas Josefiak, David Mason, Bradley Smith, Hans A. von Spakovsky, Michael Toner and Darryl R. Wold
The 'Disclose' Act would make election law even more incomprehensible and subject to selective enforcement for political gain.
WSJ, May 19, 2010
Editor's note: The following article is co-authored by former Federal Election Commissioners Joan Aikens, Lee Ann Elliott, Thomas Josefiak, David Mason, Bradley Smith, Hans A. von Spakovsky, Michael Toner and Darryl R. Wold:
As former commissioners on the Federal Election Commission with almost 75 years of combined experience, we believe that the bill proposed on April 30 by Sen. Chuck Schumer and Rep. Chris Van Hollen to "blunt" the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC is unnecessary, partially duplicative of existing law, and severely burdensome to the right to engage in political speech and advocacy.
Moreover, the Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections Act, or Disclose Act, abandons the longstanding policy of treating unions and businesses equally, suggesting partisan motives that undermine respect for campaign finance laws.
At least one of us served on the FEC at all times from its inception in 1975 through August 2008. We are well aware of the practical difficulties involved in enforcing the overly complex Federal Election Campaign Act and the problems posed by additional laws that curtail the ability of Americans to participate in the political process.
As we noted in our amicus brief supporting Citizens United, the FEC now has regulations for 33 types of contributions and speech and 71 different types of speakers. Regardless of the abstract merit of the various arguments for and against limits on political contributions and spending, this very complexity raises serious concerns about whether the law can be enforced consistent with the First Amendment.
Those regulatory burdens often fall hardest not on large-scale players in the political world but on spontaneous grass-roots movements, upstart, low-budget campaigns, and unwitting volunteers. Violating the law by engaging in forbidden political speech can land you in a federal prison, a very un-American notion. The Disclose Act exacerbates many of these problems and is a blatant attempt by its sponsors to do indirectly, through excessively onerous regulatory requirements, what the Supreme Court told Congress it cannot do directly—restrict political speech.
Perhaps the most striking thing about the Disclose Act is that, while the Supreme Court overturned limits on spending by both corporations and unions, Disclose seeks to reimpose them only on corporations. The FEC must constantly fight to overcome the perception that the law is merely a partisan tool of dominant political interests. Failure to maintain an evenhanded approach towards unions and corporations threatens public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system.
For example, while the Disclose Act prohibits any corporation with a federal contact of $50,000 or more from making independent expenditures or electioneering communications, no such prohibition applies to unions. This $50,000 trigger is so low it would exclude thousands of corporations from engaging in constitutionally protected political speech, the very core of the First Amendment. Yet public employee unions negotiate directly with the government for benefits many times the value of contracts that would trigger the corporate ban.
This prohibition is supposedly needed to address concerns that government contractors might use the political process to steer contracts their way; but unions have exactly the same conflict of interest. So do other recipients of federal funds, such as nonprofit organizations that receive federal grants and earmarks. Yet there is no ban on their independent political expenditures.
Disclose also bans expenditures on political advocacy by American corporations with 20% or more foreign ownership, but there is no such ban on unions—such as the Service Employees International Union, or the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers—that have large numbers of foreign members and foreign nationals as directors.
Existing law already prohibits foreign nationals, including corporations headquartered or incorporated outside of the U.S., from participating in any U.S. election. Thus Disclose does not ban foreign speech but speech by American citizen shareholders of U.S. companies that have some element of foreign ownership, even when those foreigners have no control over the decisions made by the Americans who run the company.
For example, companies such as Verizon Wireless, a Delaware corporation headquartered in New Jersey with 83,000 U.S. employees and 91 million U.S. customers, would be silenced because of the British Vodafone's minority ownership in the corporation. But competing telecommunications companies could spend money to influence elections or issues being debated in Congress.
The new disclosure requirements are unnecessary, duplicating information already available to the public or providing information of low value at a significant cost in reduced clarity for grass-roots political speech. In many 30-second ads, Disclose would require no fewer than six statements as to who is paying for the ad (the current law already requires one such statement). These disclaimers would take up as much as half of every ad.
The Disclose Act also creates new disclosure requirements for nonprofit advocacy groups that speak out. These groups already have to disclose their sponsorship, but Disclose requires them to go further and provide the government with a membership list. This infringes on the First Amendment rights of private associations recognized by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama. Groups can avoid this only by creating a new type of political action committee called a "campaign related activities account."
The result of these overly complex and unnecessary provisions is to force nonprofits to choose between two options that have each been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court: Either disclose their members to the government or restrict their political spending to the campaign related activities account. This runs contrary to the explicit holding in Citizens United that corporations (and unions) may engage in political speech using their general treasuries.
These requirements will be especially burdensome to small businesses and grass-roots organizations, which typically lack the resources for compliance. So the end effect of all of this "enhanced disclosure" will be to ensure that only large corporations, unions and advocacy groups can make political expenditures—the exact opposite of what the sponsors claim to desire.
While the Disclose Act does include an exemption for major media corporations, it does not include websites or the Internet, which means the government can regulate (and potentially censor) political dialogue on the Web. Additionally, the law would require any business or organization making political expenditures to create and maintain an extensive, highly sophisticated website with advanced search features to track its political activities.
As a result, small businesses, grass-roots organizations, and union locals that maintain only basic websites would be discouraged from making any expenditures for political advocacy, because doing so would require them to spend thousands of dollars to upgrade their websites and purchase software to report information that is already readily available to the public from the FEC. Large companies and unions could probably meet this requirement, so once again the bill benefits large, institutional players over small businesses and grass-roots organizations.
The Disclose Act's abandonment of the historical matching treatment of unions and corporations will cause a substantial portion of the public to doubt the law's fairness and impartiality. It makes election law even more complex, more incomprehensible to ordinary voters, and more open to subjective enforcement by those seeking partisan gain.
The 'Disclose' Act would make election law even more incomprehensible and subject to selective enforcement for political gain.
WSJ, May 19, 2010
Editor's note: The following article is co-authored by former Federal Election Commissioners Joan Aikens, Lee Ann Elliott, Thomas Josefiak, David Mason, Bradley Smith, Hans A. von Spakovsky, Michael Toner and Darryl R. Wold:
As former commissioners on the Federal Election Commission with almost 75 years of combined experience, we believe that the bill proposed on April 30 by Sen. Chuck Schumer and Rep. Chris Van Hollen to "blunt" the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC is unnecessary, partially duplicative of existing law, and severely burdensome to the right to engage in political speech and advocacy.
Moreover, the Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections Act, or Disclose Act, abandons the longstanding policy of treating unions and businesses equally, suggesting partisan motives that undermine respect for campaign finance laws.
At least one of us served on the FEC at all times from its inception in 1975 through August 2008. We are well aware of the practical difficulties involved in enforcing the overly complex Federal Election Campaign Act and the problems posed by additional laws that curtail the ability of Americans to participate in the political process.
As we noted in our amicus brief supporting Citizens United, the FEC now has regulations for 33 types of contributions and speech and 71 different types of speakers. Regardless of the abstract merit of the various arguments for and against limits on political contributions and spending, this very complexity raises serious concerns about whether the law can be enforced consistent with the First Amendment.
Those regulatory burdens often fall hardest not on large-scale players in the political world but on spontaneous grass-roots movements, upstart, low-budget campaigns, and unwitting volunteers. Violating the law by engaging in forbidden political speech can land you in a federal prison, a very un-American notion. The Disclose Act exacerbates many of these problems and is a blatant attempt by its sponsors to do indirectly, through excessively onerous regulatory requirements, what the Supreme Court told Congress it cannot do directly—restrict political speech.
Perhaps the most striking thing about the Disclose Act is that, while the Supreme Court overturned limits on spending by both corporations and unions, Disclose seeks to reimpose them only on corporations. The FEC must constantly fight to overcome the perception that the law is merely a partisan tool of dominant political interests. Failure to maintain an evenhanded approach towards unions and corporations threatens public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system.
For example, while the Disclose Act prohibits any corporation with a federal contact of $50,000 or more from making independent expenditures or electioneering communications, no such prohibition applies to unions. This $50,000 trigger is so low it would exclude thousands of corporations from engaging in constitutionally protected political speech, the very core of the First Amendment. Yet public employee unions negotiate directly with the government for benefits many times the value of contracts that would trigger the corporate ban.
This prohibition is supposedly needed to address concerns that government contractors might use the political process to steer contracts their way; but unions have exactly the same conflict of interest. So do other recipients of federal funds, such as nonprofit organizations that receive federal grants and earmarks. Yet there is no ban on their independent political expenditures.
Disclose also bans expenditures on political advocacy by American corporations with 20% or more foreign ownership, but there is no such ban on unions—such as the Service Employees International Union, or the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers—that have large numbers of foreign members and foreign nationals as directors.
Existing law already prohibits foreign nationals, including corporations headquartered or incorporated outside of the U.S., from participating in any U.S. election. Thus Disclose does not ban foreign speech but speech by American citizen shareholders of U.S. companies that have some element of foreign ownership, even when those foreigners have no control over the decisions made by the Americans who run the company.
For example, companies such as Verizon Wireless, a Delaware corporation headquartered in New Jersey with 83,000 U.S. employees and 91 million U.S. customers, would be silenced because of the British Vodafone's minority ownership in the corporation. But competing telecommunications companies could spend money to influence elections or issues being debated in Congress.
The new disclosure requirements are unnecessary, duplicating information already available to the public or providing information of low value at a significant cost in reduced clarity for grass-roots political speech. In many 30-second ads, Disclose would require no fewer than six statements as to who is paying for the ad (the current law already requires one such statement). These disclaimers would take up as much as half of every ad.
The Disclose Act also creates new disclosure requirements for nonprofit advocacy groups that speak out. These groups already have to disclose their sponsorship, but Disclose requires them to go further and provide the government with a membership list. This infringes on the First Amendment rights of private associations recognized by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama. Groups can avoid this only by creating a new type of political action committee called a "campaign related activities account."
The result of these overly complex and unnecessary provisions is to force nonprofits to choose between two options that have each been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court: Either disclose their members to the government or restrict their political spending to the campaign related activities account. This runs contrary to the explicit holding in Citizens United that corporations (and unions) may engage in political speech using their general treasuries.
These requirements will be especially burdensome to small businesses and grass-roots organizations, which typically lack the resources for compliance. So the end effect of all of this "enhanced disclosure" will be to ensure that only large corporations, unions and advocacy groups can make political expenditures—the exact opposite of what the sponsors claim to desire.
While the Disclose Act does include an exemption for major media corporations, it does not include websites or the Internet, which means the government can regulate (and potentially censor) political dialogue on the Web. Additionally, the law would require any business or organization making political expenditures to create and maintain an extensive, highly sophisticated website with advanced search features to track its political activities.
As a result, small businesses, grass-roots organizations, and union locals that maintain only basic websites would be discouraged from making any expenditures for political advocacy, because doing so would require them to spend thousands of dollars to upgrade their websites and purchase software to report information that is already readily available to the public from the FEC. Large companies and unions could probably meet this requirement, so once again the bill benefits large, institutional players over small businesses and grass-roots organizations.
The Disclose Act's abandonment of the historical matching treatment of unions and corporations will cause a substantial portion of the public to doubt the law's fairness and impartiality. It makes election law even more complex, more incomprehensible to ordinary voters, and more open to subjective enforcement by those seeking partisan gain.
Sunday, May 2, 2010
Free Speech for Some - Unions get a pass from new campaign finance disclosure rules
Free Speech for Some. WSJ Editorial
Unions get a pass from new campaign finance disclosure rules.WSJ, May 03, 2010
Democrats in Congress last week introduced White House-backed legislation that would indirectly reinstate free-speech restrictions that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in January. Backers say the measure will force disclosure of corporate money in politics, but the real goal is to muzzle criticism—at least from some people.
The legislation, sponsored by Democrats Charles Schumer in the Senate and Chris Van Hollen in the House, would prevent government contractors and corporate beneficiaries of the Troubled Asset Relief Program from spending money on U.S. elections. It would also ban U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies from making political contributions if a foreign national owns 20% or more of the voting shares in the company, or if foreign nationals comprise a majority of the board of directors.
The provisions are designed to undermine this year's landmark Supreme Court Citizens United decision, which held that limits on independent campaign expenditures by corporations or unions violate First Amendment free speech guarantees. But, under the bill, unions with government contracts would not be subject to the same restrictions as corporations.
If, as proponents claim, their worry is that a company will use campaign contributions to win government contracts (pay-to-play), why does their bill not show equal concern that labor unions will support candidates with the goal of getting government contracts driven to union companies? The legislation also fails to impose limits on the foreign involvement of unions with global reach, such as the Service Employees International Union or the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
It's no coincidence that the lead authors of these bills are the current head of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (Mr. Van Hollen) and the immediate past head of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (Mr. Schumer). And it's no surprise that Republicans have been reluctant to sign on. The House bill has two GOP sponsors and the Senate bill has none.
When President Obama berated the High Court earlier this year for its free speech ruling, he was very specific about whose free speech he opposed. "This is a major victory for Big Oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and other powerful interests," said Mr. Obama of the decision, suggesting that despite the good governance rhetoric, this legislation is not about muzzling spenders generally so much as specific spenders who don't always salute the Democratic agenda.
Unions get a pass from new campaign finance disclosure rules.WSJ, May 03, 2010
Democrats in Congress last week introduced White House-backed legislation that would indirectly reinstate free-speech restrictions that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in January. Backers say the measure will force disclosure of corporate money in politics, but the real goal is to muzzle criticism—at least from some people.
The legislation, sponsored by Democrats Charles Schumer in the Senate and Chris Van Hollen in the House, would prevent government contractors and corporate beneficiaries of the Troubled Asset Relief Program from spending money on U.S. elections. It would also ban U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies from making political contributions if a foreign national owns 20% or more of the voting shares in the company, or if foreign nationals comprise a majority of the board of directors.
The provisions are designed to undermine this year's landmark Supreme Court Citizens United decision, which held that limits on independent campaign expenditures by corporations or unions violate First Amendment free speech guarantees. But, under the bill, unions with government contracts would not be subject to the same restrictions as corporations.
If, as proponents claim, their worry is that a company will use campaign contributions to win government contracts (pay-to-play), why does their bill not show equal concern that labor unions will support candidates with the goal of getting government contracts driven to union companies? The legislation also fails to impose limits on the foreign involvement of unions with global reach, such as the Service Employees International Union or the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
It's no coincidence that the lead authors of these bills are the current head of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (Mr. Van Hollen) and the immediate past head of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (Mr. Schumer). And it's no surprise that Republicans have been reluctant to sign on. The House bill has two GOP sponsors and the Senate bill has none.
When President Obama berated the High Court earlier this year for its free speech ruling, he was very specific about whose free speech he opposed. "This is a major victory for Big Oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and other powerful interests," said Mr. Obama of the decision, suggesting that despite the good governance rhetoric, this legislation is not about muzzling spenders generally so much as specific spenders who don't always salute the Democratic agenda.
Friday, April 30, 2010
Ironing Out the Kinks in the Dodd Bill - Killing the $50 billion bailout fund would be a good start
Ironing Out the Kinks in the Dodd Bill. By PHILLIP SWAGEL
Killing the $50 billion bailout fund would be a good startWSJ, Apr 30, 2010
Imagine a future in which Sen. Chris Dodd's financial reform bill was law and a firm like AIG or Lehman Brothers failed. Without a vote of Congress, the government could guarantee the firm's debts or put money into the failing firm to keep it afloat and reduce the hit taken by creditors such as banks and pension funds that lent the firm money.
The temptation will be huge; after all, no government official will want to be blamed for allowing another post-Lehman meltdown. But so is the danger that risky behavior and bailouts will become more common.
This scenario is a key defect in the Dodd bill that the Senate has begun to debate. True, the shareholders of a failed financial firm would be wiped out, but creditors—the people who lent it the money that got it in trouble in the first place—will be bailed out. And this has real consequences, because if market participants know they can be rescued for imprudent behavior, they will likely behave more imprudently.
In coming days and weeks, as amendments to the Dodd bill are publicly offered and private negotiations proceed, removing the $50 billion bailout fund would be a good start. A more important way to address the problem of "too big to fail" is to have a resolution process centered on bankruptcy—and in which bailouts would require a vote of Congress. Bankruptcy would make it more likely that the division of resources would be in the hands of judges, not political officials using public money to support favored creditors. When GM and Chrysler were failing, the two firms were used as conduits for a transfer of TARP money to the auto unions.
Other aspects of the Dodd proposal are worrisome. One need not think too creatively to imagine a media-obsessed head of a new consumer financial protection agency looking to impose her will across all aspects of commerce, with attendant hits to lending for consumers and businesses, small and large. The idea of a systemic risk council empowered to gather data and ensure that no firm slips between regulatory cracks is useful—and on this there is bipartisan agreement. Yet regulators and bank supervisors have considerable power already and were not able to head off the recent crisis. Giving more power to a new regulatory agency is not a sure-fire solution and could have unintended negative consequences for jobs and growth.
The bill's approach to taking derivatives trading out of banks is similarly problematic. This trading takes place in large financial institutions for a reason: These are the firms with the expertise and large balance sheets needed to carry it out. And while derivatives can be misused, the bottom line is that they have socially useful purposes, including for financial firms. A community bank, for example, might legitimately want to use derivatives to offset some of the risk it faces from its lending for housing and commercial real estate in a local community. By hobbling this activity, the approach espoused by Sen. Dodd and Sen. Blanche Lincoln threatens to increase rather than limit risk.
Administration officials dissolve into mumbles when asked about the derivatives piece of the bill, suggesting that they recognize the problem. Hopefully they will have the courage to fix this even if it gives the appearance of seeming to "weaken" the bill.
Finally, financial regulatory reform will not be complete without addressing the awkward status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) whose loan guarantees contributed to the housing bubble behind the crisis. It was appropriate to take over Fannie and Freddie to avoid further risk to the financial sector, but the continued conservatorship of the two firms means that taxpayers remain on the hook for their losses, including losses suffered intentionally to support the administration's public policy goals such as reducing foreclosures.
An appropriate future for Fannie and Freddie would focus them on the socially useful function of securitizing mortgages and thereby fostering housing liquidity. There might still be a role for a government backstop against another catastrophic decline in housing prices, but this public support should be made explicit and the GSEs should pay for it.
With the government standing behind Fannie and Freddie, their huge portfolios of mortgage-backed securities are no longer needed as a buyer of last resort for bundled mortgages to ensure that funding is available for housing. The portfolios were the channel through which Fannie and Freddie enjoyed private gains while imposing risks on taxpayers, and they were the source of systemic risk posed by the firms. The financial regulatory reform bill should ensure a new and sustainable model for Fannie and Freddie that makes explicit any public support for the firms and limits taxpayer exposure to future losses.
There is bipartisan agreement that financial reform is needed. But the details matter. On nonbank resolution, derivatives and consumer protection, the approach in the Dodd bill could well increase financial risks to the economy rather than heading them off. Fixing these issues, along with addressing the risks posed by Fannie and Freddie, will yield a reform that truly learns the lessons from the financial crisis.
Mr. Swagel is a visiting professor at the McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, and nonresident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He was assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from December 2006 to January 2009.
Killing the $50 billion bailout fund would be a good startWSJ, Apr 30, 2010
Imagine a future in which Sen. Chris Dodd's financial reform bill was law and a firm like AIG or Lehman Brothers failed. Without a vote of Congress, the government could guarantee the firm's debts or put money into the failing firm to keep it afloat and reduce the hit taken by creditors such as banks and pension funds that lent the firm money.
The temptation will be huge; after all, no government official will want to be blamed for allowing another post-Lehman meltdown. But so is the danger that risky behavior and bailouts will become more common.
This scenario is a key defect in the Dodd bill that the Senate has begun to debate. True, the shareholders of a failed financial firm would be wiped out, but creditors—the people who lent it the money that got it in trouble in the first place—will be bailed out. And this has real consequences, because if market participants know they can be rescued for imprudent behavior, they will likely behave more imprudently.
In coming days and weeks, as amendments to the Dodd bill are publicly offered and private negotiations proceed, removing the $50 billion bailout fund would be a good start. A more important way to address the problem of "too big to fail" is to have a resolution process centered on bankruptcy—and in which bailouts would require a vote of Congress. Bankruptcy would make it more likely that the division of resources would be in the hands of judges, not political officials using public money to support favored creditors. When GM and Chrysler were failing, the two firms were used as conduits for a transfer of TARP money to the auto unions.
Other aspects of the Dodd proposal are worrisome. One need not think too creatively to imagine a media-obsessed head of a new consumer financial protection agency looking to impose her will across all aspects of commerce, with attendant hits to lending for consumers and businesses, small and large. The idea of a systemic risk council empowered to gather data and ensure that no firm slips between regulatory cracks is useful—and on this there is bipartisan agreement. Yet regulators and bank supervisors have considerable power already and were not able to head off the recent crisis. Giving more power to a new regulatory agency is not a sure-fire solution and could have unintended negative consequences for jobs and growth.
The bill's approach to taking derivatives trading out of banks is similarly problematic. This trading takes place in large financial institutions for a reason: These are the firms with the expertise and large balance sheets needed to carry it out. And while derivatives can be misused, the bottom line is that they have socially useful purposes, including for financial firms. A community bank, for example, might legitimately want to use derivatives to offset some of the risk it faces from its lending for housing and commercial real estate in a local community. By hobbling this activity, the approach espoused by Sen. Dodd and Sen. Blanche Lincoln threatens to increase rather than limit risk.
Administration officials dissolve into mumbles when asked about the derivatives piece of the bill, suggesting that they recognize the problem. Hopefully they will have the courage to fix this even if it gives the appearance of seeming to "weaken" the bill.
Finally, financial regulatory reform will not be complete without addressing the awkward status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) whose loan guarantees contributed to the housing bubble behind the crisis. It was appropriate to take over Fannie and Freddie to avoid further risk to the financial sector, but the continued conservatorship of the two firms means that taxpayers remain on the hook for their losses, including losses suffered intentionally to support the administration's public policy goals such as reducing foreclosures.
An appropriate future for Fannie and Freddie would focus them on the socially useful function of securitizing mortgages and thereby fostering housing liquidity. There might still be a role for a government backstop against another catastrophic decline in housing prices, but this public support should be made explicit and the GSEs should pay for it.
With the government standing behind Fannie and Freddie, their huge portfolios of mortgage-backed securities are no longer needed as a buyer of last resort for bundled mortgages to ensure that funding is available for housing. The portfolios were the channel through which Fannie and Freddie enjoyed private gains while imposing risks on taxpayers, and they were the source of systemic risk posed by the firms. The financial regulatory reform bill should ensure a new and sustainable model for Fannie and Freddie that makes explicit any public support for the firms and limits taxpayer exposure to future losses.
There is bipartisan agreement that financial reform is needed. But the details matter. On nonbank resolution, derivatives and consumer protection, the approach in the Dodd bill could well increase financial risks to the economy rather than heading them off. Fixing these issues, along with addressing the risks posed by Fannie and Freddie, will yield a reform that truly learns the lessons from the financial crisis.
Mr. Swagel is a visiting professor at the McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, and nonresident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He was assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from December 2006 to January 2009.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Attacking the motives of critics is not presidential
It's Only Called the Bully Pulpit. By Karl Rove
Attacking the motives of critics is not presidential.
WSJ, Apr 29, 2010
President Barack Obama's speech last week at New York Cooper's Union showcased two unattractive verbal leitmotifs. The first was the president's reliance on straw-man arguments. America, he said, need not "choose between two extremes . . . markets that are unfettered by even modest protections against crisis, or markets that are stymied by onerous rules."
Mr. Obama was right in calling this "a false choice." Who is suggesting that Wall Street should not be regulated?
The other, more troubling rhetorical device was Mr. Obama's labeling his opponents as "special interests," and demanding that they stop disagreeing with him and get on board his legislative express. Speaking to bank executives, he decried the "furious effort of industry lobbyists to shape" financial regulation legislation—a barb aimed at the investment bankers in the audience who have hired lobbyists. The president urged "the titans of industry" to whom he was speaking "to join us, instead of fighting us."
While criticizing political opponents is standard operating White House procedure, the practice of summoning critics to bully them in public is unpresidential and worrisome.
Before his health-care bill passed, Mr. Obama sent a tough letter to health-insurance CEOs and then castigated them 22 times in a follow-up prime-time televised speech. This is behavior worthy of a Third World dictator—not the head of a vibrant democracy.
Mr. Obama has also excoriated drug and health-insurance companies, while remaining content to have them spend tens of millions of dollars on ads supporting his health-care bill. This smacked of Chicago-style shake-down politics.
Too often, Mr. Obama disparages those who disagree with him as having venal, illegitimate motivations. In his Cooper Union speech he berated the "battalions of financial industry lobbyists" for their "misleading arguments and attacks." He blamed their "withering forces" for buckling "a bipartisan process" that had "produced . . . a common-sense, reasonable, non-ideological approach."
Maybe the renowned lecturer of constitutional law at the University of Chicago should reacquaint himself with Federalist No. 10. James Madison, a father of the Constitution, suggested that there are "two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction."
One was to destroy "the liberty which is essential to its existence"—something that is anathema to our democratic system. The other was to give "to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests," which is impossible.
"The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man," Madison wrote. Recognizing this led the Founders to create a system in which competition between interests restrains government, cools passions, and forces political compromise. This has kept our politics floating around the center.
Mr. Obama's attacks on his critics are not only unbecoming; they undermine a political process that would otherwise trend toward occasional bipartisan compromise. They are also hypocritical. Mr. Obama said in New York last week that "a lack of consumer protections and . . . accountability" created the credit crisis. As a senator in 2005, he joined Sen. Chris Dodd (D., Conn.) to threaten to filibuster a GOP effort to rein in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it was still possible to diminish the role those companies would play in the financial crisis. He later voted for the Fannie and Freddie reforms after the two went belly up in 2008.
But it is the president's intimidation that is most troubling. Mr. Obama has the disturbing tendency to question the motives of those who disagree with him, often making them the objects of ad hominem attacks. His motives, on the other hand, are pure.
Mr. Obama often makes it seem illegitimate to challenge his views, and he isn't content to argue issues on the merits. Instead, he wants to make opponents into pariahs. And it's not just business executives who are on the receiving end. We've also seen this pattern with the administration's attacks on the tea party movement and those who attended town-hall meetings last summer on health care.
This is a bad habit—and a dangerous one. The presidency is a very powerful office, and presidents need to be careful not to use it to silence dissenting voices.
Mr. Obama will learn these efforts don't work. In a big, free nation like ours, people want to debate the issues. They don't take kindly to arrogant leaders who believe it is their right to silence the opposition—by either driving them out of the legislative process or pushing them out of the public debate with fiery rhetoric. Through the anonymity of a ballot box and beyond the power of presidential intimidation, voters can express their discontent and they will.
Mr. Rove, the former senior adviser and deputy chief of staff to President George W. Bush, is the author of "Courage and Consequence" (Threshold Editions, 2010).
Attacking the motives of critics is not presidential.
WSJ, Apr 29, 2010
President Barack Obama's speech last week at New York Cooper's Union showcased two unattractive verbal leitmotifs. The first was the president's reliance on straw-man arguments. America, he said, need not "choose between two extremes . . . markets that are unfettered by even modest protections against crisis, or markets that are stymied by onerous rules."
Mr. Obama was right in calling this "a false choice." Who is suggesting that Wall Street should not be regulated?
The other, more troubling rhetorical device was Mr. Obama's labeling his opponents as "special interests," and demanding that they stop disagreeing with him and get on board his legislative express. Speaking to bank executives, he decried the "furious effort of industry lobbyists to shape" financial regulation legislation—a barb aimed at the investment bankers in the audience who have hired lobbyists. The president urged "the titans of industry" to whom he was speaking "to join us, instead of fighting us."
While criticizing political opponents is standard operating White House procedure, the practice of summoning critics to bully them in public is unpresidential and worrisome.
Before his health-care bill passed, Mr. Obama sent a tough letter to health-insurance CEOs and then castigated them 22 times in a follow-up prime-time televised speech. This is behavior worthy of a Third World dictator—not the head of a vibrant democracy.
Mr. Obama has also excoriated drug and health-insurance companies, while remaining content to have them spend tens of millions of dollars on ads supporting his health-care bill. This smacked of Chicago-style shake-down politics.
Too often, Mr. Obama disparages those who disagree with him as having venal, illegitimate motivations. In his Cooper Union speech he berated the "battalions of financial industry lobbyists" for their "misleading arguments and attacks." He blamed their "withering forces" for buckling "a bipartisan process" that had "produced . . . a common-sense, reasonable, non-ideological approach."
Maybe the renowned lecturer of constitutional law at the University of Chicago should reacquaint himself with Federalist No. 10. James Madison, a father of the Constitution, suggested that there are "two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction."
One was to destroy "the liberty which is essential to its existence"—something that is anathema to our democratic system. The other was to give "to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests," which is impossible.
"The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man," Madison wrote. Recognizing this led the Founders to create a system in which competition between interests restrains government, cools passions, and forces political compromise. This has kept our politics floating around the center.
Mr. Obama's attacks on his critics are not only unbecoming; they undermine a political process that would otherwise trend toward occasional bipartisan compromise. They are also hypocritical. Mr. Obama said in New York last week that "a lack of consumer protections and . . . accountability" created the credit crisis. As a senator in 2005, he joined Sen. Chris Dodd (D., Conn.) to threaten to filibuster a GOP effort to rein in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it was still possible to diminish the role those companies would play in the financial crisis. He later voted for the Fannie and Freddie reforms after the two went belly up in 2008.
But it is the president's intimidation that is most troubling. Mr. Obama has the disturbing tendency to question the motives of those who disagree with him, often making them the objects of ad hominem attacks. His motives, on the other hand, are pure.
Mr. Obama often makes it seem illegitimate to challenge his views, and he isn't content to argue issues on the merits. Instead, he wants to make opponents into pariahs. And it's not just business executives who are on the receiving end. We've also seen this pattern with the administration's attacks on the tea party movement and those who attended town-hall meetings last summer on health care.
This is a bad habit—and a dangerous one. The presidency is a very powerful office, and presidents need to be careful not to use it to silence dissenting voices.
Mr. Obama will learn these efforts don't work. In a big, free nation like ours, people want to debate the issues. They don't take kindly to arrogant leaders who believe it is their right to silence the opposition—by either driving them out of the legislative process or pushing them out of the public debate with fiery rhetoric. Through the anonymity of a ballot box and beyond the power of presidential intimidation, voters can express their discontent and they will.
Mr. Rove, the former senior adviser and deputy chief of staff to President George W. Bush, is the author of "Courage and Consequence" (Threshold Editions, 2010).
Saturday, April 24, 2010
Miss Me Yet? The Freedom Agenda After George W. Bush
Miss Me Yet? The Freedom Agenda After George W. Bush. By Bari Weiss
Dissidents in the world's most oppressive countries aren't feeling the love from President Obama.WSJ, Apr 24, 2010
Dallas
No one seems to know precisely who is behind the "Miss Me Yet?" billboard—the cheeky one featuring a grinning George W. Bush that looks out over I-35 near Wyoming, Minn. But Syrian dissident Ahed Al-Hendi sympathizes with the thought.
In 2006, Mr. Hendi was browsing pro-democracy Web sites in a Damascus Internet café when plainclothes cops carrying automatic guns swooped in, cuffed him, and threw him into the trunk of a car. He spent over a month in prison, some of it alone in a 5-by-3 windowless basement cell where he listened to his friend being tortured in the one next door. Those screams, he says, were cold comfort—at least he knew his friend hadn't been killed.
Mr. Hendi was one of the lucky ones: He's now living in Maryland as a political refugee where he works for an organization called Cyberdissidents.org. And this past Monday, he joined other international dissidents at a conference sponsored by the Bush Institute at Southern Methodist University to discuss the way digital tools can be used to resist repressive regimes.
He also got to meet the 43rd president. In a private breakfast hosted by Mr. and Mrs. Bush, Mr. Hendi's message to the former president was simple: "We miss you." There have been "a lot of changes" under the current administration, he added, and not for the better.
Adrian Hong, who was imprisoned in China in 2006 for his work helping North Koreans escape the country (a modern underground railroad), echoed that idea. "When I was released [after 10 days] I was told it was because of very strong messaging from the White House and the culture you set," he told Mr. Bush.
The former president, now sporting a deep tan, didn't mention President Obama once on or off the record. The most he would say was, "I'm really concerned about an isolationist mentality . . . I don't think it lives up to the values of our country." The dissidents weren't so diplomatic.
Mr. Hendi elaborated on the policy changes he thinks Mr. Obama has made toward his home country. "In Syria, when a single dissident was arrested during the administration of George W. Bush, at the very least the White House spokesman would condemn it. Under the Obama administration: nothing."
Nor is Mr. Hendi a fan of this administration's efforts to engage the regime, most recently by deciding to send an ambassador to Damascus for the first time since 2005. "This gives confidence to the regime," he says. "They are not capable of a dialogue; they don't believe in it. They believe in force."
Mr. Hong put things this way: "When you look at the championing of dissidents . . . and even the rhetoric, it's dropped off sharply." Under Mr. Bush, he says, there were many high-profile meetings with North Korean dissidents. "They went out of their way to show this was a priority."
Then there is Marcel Granier, the president of RCTV, Venezuela's oldest and most popular television station. He employs several thousand people—or at least he did until Hugo Chávez cancelled the network's license in 2007. Now, he's struggling to maintain an independent channel on cable: Mr. Chávez ordered the cable networks not to carry his station in January. Government supporters have attacked his home with tear gas twice, yet he remains in the country, tirelessly advocating for media freedom.
Like many of the democrats at the conference, Mr. Granier was excited by Mr. Obama's historic election, and inspired by the way he energized American voters. But a year and a half later, he's disturbed by the administration's silence as his country slips rapidly towards dictatorship. "In Afghanistan," he quips, "at least they know that America will be involved for the next 18 months."
This sense of abandonment has been fueled by real policy shifts. Just this week word came that the administration cut funds to promote democracy in Egypt by half. Programs in countries like Jordan and Iran have also faced cuts. Then there are the symbolic gestures: letting the Dalai Lama out the back door, paltry statements of support for Iranian demonstrators, smiling and shaking hands with Mr. Chávez, and so on.
Daniel Baer, a representative from the State Department who participated in the conference, dismissed the notion that the White House has distanced itself from human-rights promotion as a baseless "meme" when I raised the issue. But in fact all of this is of a piece of Mr. Obama's overarching strategy to make it abundantly clear that he is not his predecessor.
Mr. Bush is almost certainly aware that the freedom agenda, the centerpiece of his presidency, has become indelibly linked to the war in Iraq and to regime change by force. Too bad. The peaceful promotion of human rights and democracy—in part by supporting the individuals risking their lives for liberty—are consonant with America's most basic values. Standing up for them should not be a partisan issue.
Yet for now Mr. Bush is simply not the right poster boy: He can't successfully rebrand and depoliticize the freedom agenda. So perhaps he hopes that by sitting back he can let Americans who remain wary of publicly embracing this cause become comfortable with it again. For the sake of the courageous democrats in countries like Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Colombia, China and Russia, let's hope so.
Ms. Weiss is an assistant editorial features editor at the Journal.
Dissidents in the world's most oppressive countries aren't feeling the love from President Obama.WSJ, Apr 24, 2010
Dallas
No one seems to know precisely who is behind the "Miss Me Yet?" billboard—the cheeky one featuring a grinning George W. Bush that looks out over I-35 near Wyoming, Minn. But Syrian dissident Ahed Al-Hendi sympathizes with the thought.
In 2006, Mr. Hendi was browsing pro-democracy Web sites in a Damascus Internet café when plainclothes cops carrying automatic guns swooped in, cuffed him, and threw him into the trunk of a car. He spent over a month in prison, some of it alone in a 5-by-3 windowless basement cell where he listened to his friend being tortured in the one next door. Those screams, he says, were cold comfort—at least he knew his friend hadn't been killed.
Mr. Hendi was one of the lucky ones: He's now living in Maryland as a political refugee where he works for an organization called Cyberdissidents.org. And this past Monday, he joined other international dissidents at a conference sponsored by the Bush Institute at Southern Methodist University to discuss the way digital tools can be used to resist repressive regimes.
He also got to meet the 43rd president. In a private breakfast hosted by Mr. and Mrs. Bush, Mr. Hendi's message to the former president was simple: "We miss you." There have been "a lot of changes" under the current administration, he added, and not for the better.
Adrian Hong, who was imprisoned in China in 2006 for his work helping North Koreans escape the country (a modern underground railroad), echoed that idea. "When I was released [after 10 days] I was told it was because of very strong messaging from the White House and the culture you set," he told Mr. Bush.
The former president, now sporting a deep tan, didn't mention President Obama once on or off the record. The most he would say was, "I'm really concerned about an isolationist mentality . . . I don't think it lives up to the values of our country." The dissidents weren't so diplomatic.
Mr. Hendi elaborated on the policy changes he thinks Mr. Obama has made toward his home country. "In Syria, when a single dissident was arrested during the administration of George W. Bush, at the very least the White House spokesman would condemn it. Under the Obama administration: nothing."
Nor is Mr. Hendi a fan of this administration's efforts to engage the regime, most recently by deciding to send an ambassador to Damascus for the first time since 2005. "This gives confidence to the regime," he says. "They are not capable of a dialogue; they don't believe in it. They believe in force."
Mr. Hong put things this way: "When you look at the championing of dissidents . . . and even the rhetoric, it's dropped off sharply." Under Mr. Bush, he says, there were many high-profile meetings with North Korean dissidents. "They went out of their way to show this was a priority."
Then there is Marcel Granier, the president of RCTV, Venezuela's oldest and most popular television station. He employs several thousand people—or at least he did until Hugo Chávez cancelled the network's license in 2007. Now, he's struggling to maintain an independent channel on cable: Mr. Chávez ordered the cable networks not to carry his station in January. Government supporters have attacked his home with tear gas twice, yet he remains in the country, tirelessly advocating for media freedom.
Like many of the democrats at the conference, Mr. Granier was excited by Mr. Obama's historic election, and inspired by the way he energized American voters. But a year and a half later, he's disturbed by the administration's silence as his country slips rapidly towards dictatorship. "In Afghanistan," he quips, "at least they know that America will be involved for the next 18 months."
This sense of abandonment has been fueled by real policy shifts. Just this week word came that the administration cut funds to promote democracy in Egypt by half. Programs in countries like Jordan and Iran have also faced cuts. Then there are the symbolic gestures: letting the Dalai Lama out the back door, paltry statements of support for Iranian demonstrators, smiling and shaking hands with Mr. Chávez, and so on.
Daniel Baer, a representative from the State Department who participated in the conference, dismissed the notion that the White House has distanced itself from human-rights promotion as a baseless "meme" when I raised the issue. But in fact all of this is of a piece of Mr. Obama's overarching strategy to make it abundantly clear that he is not his predecessor.
Mr. Bush is almost certainly aware that the freedom agenda, the centerpiece of his presidency, has become indelibly linked to the war in Iraq and to regime change by force. Too bad. The peaceful promotion of human rights and democracy—in part by supporting the individuals risking their lives for liberty—are consonant with America's most basic values. Standing up for them should not be a partisan issue.
Yet for now Mr. Bush is simply not the right poster boy: He can't successfully rebrand and depoliticize the freedom agenda. So perhaps he hopes that by sitting back he can let Americans who remain wary of publicly embracing this cause become comfortable with it again. For the sake of the courageous democrats in countries like Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Colombia, China and Russia, let's hope so.
Ms. Weiss is an assistant editorial features editor at the Journal.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Federal Prez: "What is not legitimate is to suggest that we're enabling or encouraging future taxpayer bailouts, as some have claimed."
The New Master of Wall Street. WSJ Editorial
Obama surveys the financial kingdom that may soon be his.WSJ, Apr 23, 2010
President Obama is a gifted man, but until yesterday we hadn't known that his achievements include having predicted the financial panic of 2008. It was a "failure of responsibility that I spoke about when I came to New York more than two years ago—before the worst of the crisis had unfolded," Mr. Obama said yesterday in a speech on financial reform at Cooper Union in New York City. "I take no satisfaction in noting that my comments have largely been borne out by the events that followed."
We wish for the sake of our 401(k) we had noticed this Delphic call, not least when Senator Obama was opposing the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. But let's not fight over history. The current reality is that the President had better be very, very smart because the reform bill he is stumping for would give him and his regulators vast new sway over financial markets and risk-taking.
This is the most important fact to understand about the current financial reform debate. While the details matter a great deal, the essence of the exercise is to transfer more control over credit allocation and the financial industry to the federal government. The industry was heavily regulated before—not that it stopped the mania and panic—but if anything close to the current bills pass, the biggest banks will become the equivalent of utilities.
The irony is that this may, or may not, reduce the risk of future financial meltdowns and taxpayer bailouts. A new super council of regulators will be created with vast new powers to determine which firms pose a "systemic" financial risk, to set high capital and margin levels, to veto certain kinds of business for certain firms, and even to set guidelines for banker compensation—or maybe not. The point is that these crucial questions will be settled not by statute, but by regulatory discretion after the law passes.
If you think Wall Street beats a path to the Beltway now, wait until the banks seek to influence how regulators will define, say, "proprietary trading." Whatever its flaws, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 clearly defined the difference between a commercial and investment bank. This time, the rules will be written by regulators at Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the CFTC, SEC and FDIC, among others. As he so often does, Mr. Obama yesterday denounced "the furious efforts of industry lobbyists to shape" the bill "to their special interests." But if his reform passes, this lobbying is certain to continue, more furiously.
Consider the esoteric matter of derivatives, most of which seem headed for daily settlement on exchanges and a clearinghouse if the bill passes. But not all derivatives. The new master of this universe would be Gary Gensler, a Goldman Sachs alumnus who now chairs the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Under the bill moving through the Senate, he would decide which derivative transactions must be "cleared" and traded via electronic exchanges, and which can continue to be traded over-the-counter.
Perhaps Mr. Gensler is as wise as King Solomon, or at least John Paulson. Perhaps, like Mr. Obama in 2008, he—and his successors—will be able to foresee the next crisis and determine the derivatives contracts that pose the most future risk. He will need to be, because under such a reform some of the risk of a transaction moves from the two financial parties (say, J.P. Morgan and Goldman) to the clearinghouse—which will almost certainly be "too big to fail" if enough trades go awry in the next crisis.
Or consider the Senate provision, too little discussed, to let the SEC give shareholders more clout over corporate board elections. This would federalize what has long been state predominance in corporate law, while giving the largest and most activist investors far more leverage to impose their agendas on business.
In practice, this means giving more influence over corporate decisions to labor unions and their political surrogates who run the large public pension funds. Their goals are as likely as not to include political causes such as easier unionization, cap-and-trade regulation, or disinvestment in this or that unpopular business or country. This, too, comes down to giving more power to the political class to run business—in this case, even nonfinancial businesses.
The people who oppose these and other provisions do so for a variety of reasons, some principled, some self-interested. But they have every right to fight them. Yet Mr. Obama once again yesterday cast such opposition as dishonest: "What is not legitimate is to suggest that we're enabling or encouraging future taxpayer bailouts, as some have claimed. That may make for a good sound bite, but it's not factually accurate," he said. "A vote for reform is a vote to put a stop to taxpayer-funded bailouts. That's the truth."
Perhaps Mr. Obama should consult Democrat Ted Kaufman of Delaware, who said recently on the Senate floor that "by expanding the [federal] safety net—as we did in response to the last crisis—to cover ever larger and more complex institutions heavily engaged in speculative activities, I fear that we may be sowing the seeds for an even bigger crisis in only a few years or a decade." Mr. Kaufman wants to break up the biggest banks, which may well be preferable to making them wards of the Treasury. Is he lying too?
As in health care, Democrats are intent on ramming this reform through Congress, and Republicans ought to summon the will to resist. Absent that, the only certain result is that Washington will be the new master of the financial universe.
Obama surveys the financial kingdom that may soon be his.WSJ, Apr 23, 2010
President Obama is a gifted man, but until yesterday we hadn't known that his achievements include having predicted the financial panic of 2008. It was a "failure of responsibility that I spoke about when I came to New York more than two years ago—before the worst of the crisis had unfolded," Mr. Obama said yesterday in a speech on financial reform at Cooper Union in New York City. "I take no satisfaction in noting that my comments have largely been borne out by the events that followed."
We wish for the sake of our 401(k) we had noticed this Delphic call, not least when Senator Obama was opposing the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. But let's not fight over history. The current reality is that the President had better be very, very smart because the reform bill he is stumping for would give him and his regulators vast new sway over financial markets and risk-taking.
This is the most important fact to understand about the current financial reform debate. While the details matter a great deal, the essence of the exercise is to transfer more control over credit allocation and the financial industry to the federal government. The industry was heavily regulated before—not that it stopped the mania and panic—but if anything close to the current bills pass, the biggest banks will become the equivalent of utilities.
The irony is that this may, or may not, reduce the risk of future financial meltdowns and taxpayer bailouts. A new super council of regulators will be created with vast new powers to determine which firms pose a "systemic" financial risk, to set high capital and margin levels, to veto certain kinds of business for certain firms, and even to set guidelines for banker compensation—or maybe not. The point is that these crucial questions will be settled not by statute, but by regulatory discretion after the law passes.
If you think Wall Street beats a path to the Beltway now, wait until the banks seek to influence how regulators will define, say, "proprietary trading." Whatever its flaws, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 clearly defined the difference between a commercial and investment bank. This time, the rules will be written by regulators at Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the CFTC, SEC and FDIC, among others. As he so often does, Mr. Obama yesterday denounced "the furious efforts of industry lobbyists to shape" the bill "to their special interests." But if his reform passes, this lobbying is certain to continue, more furiously.
Consider the esoteric matter of derivatives, most of which seem headed for daily settlement on exchanges and a clearinghouse if the bill passes. But not all derivatives. The new master of this universe would be Gary Gensler, a Goldman Sachs alumnus who now chairs the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Under the bill moving through the Senate, he would decide which derivative transactions must be "cleared" and traded via electronic exchanges, and which can continue to be traded over-the-counter.
Perhaps Mr. Gensler is as wise as King Solomon, or at least John Paulson. Perhaps, like Mr. Obama in 2008, he—and his successors—will be able to foresee the next crisis and determine the derivatives contracts that pose the most future risk. He will need to be, because under such a reform some of the risk of a transaction moves from the two financial parties (say, J.P. Morgan and Goldman) to the clearinghouse—which will almost certainly be "too big to fail" if enough trades go awry in the next crisis.
Or consider the Senate provision, too little discussed, to let the SEC give shareholders more clout over corporate board elections. This would federalize what has long been state predominance in corporate law, while giving the largest and most activist investors far more leverage to impose their agendas on business.
In practice, this means giving more influence over corporate decisions to labor unions and their political surrogates who run the large public pension funds. Their goals are as likely as not to include political causes such as easier unionization, cap-and-trade regulation, or disinvestment in this or that unpopular business or country. This, too, comes down to giving more power to the political class to run business—in this case, even nonfinancial businesses.
The people who oppose these and other provisions do so for a variety of reasons, some principled, some self-interested. But they have every right to fight them. Yet Mr. Obama once again yesterday cast such opposition as dishonest: "What is not legitimate is to suggest that we're enabling or encouraging future taxpayer bailouts, as some have claimed. That may make for a good sound bite, but it's not factually accurate," he said. "A vote for reform is a vote to put a stop to taxpayer-funded bailouts. That's the truth."
Perhaps Mr. Obama should consult Democrat Ted Kaufman of Delaware, who said recently on the Senate floor that "by expanding the [federal] safety net—as we did in response to the last crisis—to cover ever larger and more complex institutions heavily engaged in speculative activities, I fear that we may be sowing the seeds for an even bigger crisis in only a few years or a decade." Mr. Kaufman wants to break up the biggest banks, which may well be preferable to making them wards of the Treasury. Is he lying too?
As in health care, Democrats are intent on ramming this reform through Congress, and Republicans ought to summon the will to resist. Absent that, the only certain result is that Washington will be the new master of the financial universe.
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