Sovereign Risk, Fiscal Policy, and Macroeconomic Stability

Sovereign Risk, Fiscal Policy, and Macroeconomic Stability. By Giancarlo Corsetti, Keith Kuester, Andre Meier, and Gernot J. Mueller
IMF Working Paper No. 12/33
January, 2012
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25681.0

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of strained government finances on macroeconomic stability and the transmission of fiscal policy. Using a variant of the model by Curdia and Woodford (2009), we study a “sovereign risk channel” through which sovereign default risk raises funding costs in the private sector. If monetary policy is constrained, the sovereign risk channel exacerbates indeterminacy problems: private-sector beliefs of a weakening economy may become self-fulfilling. In addition, sovereign risk amplifies the effects of negative cyclical shocks. Under those conditions, fiscal retrenchment can help curtail the risk of macroeconomic instability and, in extreme cases, even stimulate economic activity.

Conclusion

The present paper analyzes how the ”sovereign risk channel” affects macroeconomic dynamics and stabilization policy. Through this channel, rising sovereign risk drives up private-sector borrowing costs, unless higher risk premia are offset by looser monetary policy. If the central bank is constrained in counteracting higher risk premia, sovereign risk becomes a critical determinant of macroeconomic outcomes. Its implications for stabilization policy have not been fully appreciated in earlier formal analyses, although they are likely to be of great importance for many advanced economies currently facing intense fiscal strain.

Building on the model proposed by C´urdia and Woodford (2009), we show that the sovereign risk channel makes the economy (more) vulnerable to problems of indeterminacy. In particular, private-sector beliefs about a weakening economy can become self-fulfilling, driving up risk premia and choking off demand. In this environment, a procyclical fiscal stance—that is, tighter fiscal policy during economic downturns–can help to ensure determinacy.

Further, we find that sovereign risk tends to exacerbate the effects of negative cyclical shocks: recessionary episodes will be deeper the stronger the sovereign risk channel, which in our specification is a nonlinear function of public-sector indebtedness. Moreover, in deep recessions that force the central bank down to the zero lower bound (ZLB) for nominal interest rates, sovereign risk delays the exit from the ZLB, hence prolonging macroeconomic distress.  The sovereign risk channel also has a significant bearing on fiscal multipliers. Specifically, the effect of government spending on aggregate output hinges on (i) the responsiveness of private-sector risk premia to indicators of fiscal strain; and (ii) the length of time during which monetary policy is expected to be constrained. Our analysis suggests that upfront fiscal retrenchment is less detrimental to economic activity (i.e., multipliers are smaller) in the presence of significant sovereign risk, as lower public deficits improve private-sector financing conditions. In relatively extreme cases where fiscal strains are severe and monetary policy is constrained for an extended period, fiscal tightening may even exert an expansionary effect.  That being said, fiscal retrenchment is no miracle cure. Indeed, all our simulations feature a deep recession even if tighter fiscal policy, under the aforementioned conditions, may stimulate economic activity relative to an even bleaker baseline.

As an additional caveat, we note that our analysis has focused on fiscal multipliers under a go-it-alone policy that does not involve external financial support at below-market rates.  Availability of such support could allow countries to stretch out the necessary fiscal adjustment as they benefit from lower funding costs and, possibly, positive credibility effects. Indeed, if and where announcements of future fiscal adjustment are credible, delaying some of the planned spending cuts remains a superior strategy in terms of protecting short-term growth.  How countries end up dealing with the challenges summarized here may prove to be a defining feature of global economic developments over the coming years.

Bank Funding Structures and Risk: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis

Bank Funding Structures and Risk: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis. By Francisco Vazquez and Pablo Federico
IMF Working Paper WP/12/29
http://www.imfbookstore.org/ProdDetails.asp?ID=WPIEA2012029
Jan, 2012

Summary: This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.


Introduction

The global financial crisis raised questions on the adequacy of bank risk management practices and triggered a deep revision of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks governing bank liquidity risk and capital buffers. Regulatory initiatives at the international level included, inter alia, the introduction of liquidity standards for internationally-active banks, binding leverage ratios, and a revision of capital requirements under Basel III (BCBS 2009; and BCBS 2010 a, b).2 In addition to these micro-prudential measures, academics and policymakers argued for the introduction of a complementary macro-prudential framework to help safeguard financial stability at the systemic level (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2010).

This regulatory response was implicitly based on two premises. First, the view that individual bank decisions regarding the size of their liquidity and capital buffers in the run up to the crisis were not commensurate with their risk-taking—and were therefore suboptimal from the social perspective. Second, the perception that the costs of bank failures spanned beyond the interests of their direct stakeholders due, for example, to supply-side effects in credit markets, or network externalities in the financial sector (Brunnermeier, 2009).

The widespread bank failures in the U.S. and Europe at the peak of the global financial crisis provided casual support to the first premise. Still, empirical work on the connection between bank liquidity and capital buffers and their subsequent probability of failure is incipient.  Background studies carried out in the context of Basel III proposals, which are based on aggregate data, concluded that stricter regulations on liquidity and leverage were likely to ameliorate the probability of systemic banking crises (BCBS, 2010b).3 In turn, studies based on micro data for U.S. banks also support the notion that banks with higher asset liquidity, stronger reliance on retail insured deposits, and larger capital buffers were less vulnerable to failure during the global financial crisis (Berger and Bouwman, 2010; Bologna, 2011).  Broadly consistent results are reported in Ratnovski and Huang (2009), based on data for large banks from the OECD.

This paper makes two contributions to previous work. First, it measures structural liquidity and leverage in bank balance sheets in a way consistent with the formulations of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), and the leverage ratio (EQUITY) proposed in Basel III. Second, it explores for systematic differences in the relationship between structural liquidity, leverage, and subsequent probability of failure across bank types. In particular, we distinguish between large, internationally-active banks (henceforth Global banks), and (typically smaller) banks that focus on their domestic retail markets (henceforth Domestic banks).

This sample partition is suitable from the financial stability perspective. Global banks are systemically important and extremely challenging to resolve, due to the complexity of their business and legal structures, and because their operations span across borders, entailing differences in bank insolvency frameworks and difficult fiscal considerations. Furthermore, the relative role of liquidity and capital buffers for bank financial soundness is likely to differ systematically across these two types of banks. All else equal, Global banks benefit from the imperfect co-movement macroeconomic and monetary conditions across geographic regions (Griffith-Jones, Segoviano, and Spratt, 2002; Garcia-Herrero and Vazquez, 2007) and may exploit their internal capital markets to reshuffle liquidity and capital between business units.  In addition, Global banks tend to enjoy a more stable funding base than Domestic banks due to flight to safety, particularly during times of market distress. To the extent that these factors are incorporated in bank risk management decisions, optimal choices on structural liquidity and leverage are likely to differ across these two types of banks.

The paper exploits a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 U.S. and European banks during 2001-09. This sample coverage allows us to study bank dynamics leading to, and during, the global financial crisis. As a by-product, we document the evolution of structural liquidity and leverage in the pre-crisis period, and highlight some patterns across bank types to motivate further research. Contrary to expectations, the average structural liquidity in bank balance sheets in the run up to the global financial crisis (as measured by a proxy of the NSFR) was close to the target values proposed in Basel III recommendations.4 However, we find a wide dispersion in structural liquidity across banks. A mild (albeit sustained) increase in structural liquidity mismatches in the run up to the crisis was driven by banks located at the lower extreme of the distribution. Pre-crisis leverage was also widely uneven across banks, with the Global banks displaying thinner capital buffers and wider gaps between leverage ratios and Basel capital to risk-weighted assets.

In line with alleged deficiencies in bank risk management practices, we find that banks with weaker structural liquidity and banks with higher leverage ratios in the run up to the crisis were more vulnerable to failure, after controlling for their pre-crisis risk-taking. However, the average effects of stronger structural liquidity and capital buffers on the likelihood of bank failure are not large. On the other hand, there is evidence of substantial threshold effects, and the benefits of stronger buffers appear substantial for the banks located at the lower extremes of the distributions. In addition, we find systematic differences in the relative importance of liquidity and leverage for financial fragility across groups of banks. Global banks were more susceptible to failure on excessive leverage, while Domestic banks were more susceptible to failure on weak structural liquidity (i.e., excessive liquidity transformation) and overreliance on short-term wholesale funding. 

In the estimations, we include bank-level controls for pre-crisis risk taking, and for countryspecific macroeconomic conditions (i.e., common to all banks incorporated in a given country). The use of controls for pre-crisis risk-taking is critical to this study. To the extent that banks perform active risk management, higher risk-taking would tend to be associated with stronger liquidity and capital buffers, introducing a bias to the results. In fact, we find that banks engaging in more aggressive risk taking in the run-up to the crisis—as measured by the rate of growth of their credit portfolios and by their pre-crisis distance to default— were more likely to fail afterward. Macroeconomic conditions in the pre-crisis period are also found to affect bank probabilities of default, suggesting that banks may have failed to internalize risks stemming from overheated economic activity and exuberant asset prices.

All in all, these results provide support to the proposed regulations on liquidity and capital, as well as to the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to bank regulation. From the financial stability perspective, however, the evidence indicates that regulations on capital— particularly for the larger banking groups—are likely to be more relevant.

Concluding remarks

Overall, the findings of this paper provide broad support to Basel III initiatives on structural liquidity and leverage, and show the complementary nature of these two areas. Banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage before the global financial crisis were more vulnerable to subsequent failure. The results are driven by banks in the lower extremes of the distributions, suggesting the presence of threshold effects. In fact, the marginal stability gains associated with stronger liquidity and capital cushions do not appear to be large for the average bank, but seem substantial for the weaker institutions.

At the same time, there is evidence of systematic differences across bank types. The smaller banks were more susceptible to failure on liquidity problems, while the large cross-border banking groups typically failed on insufficient capital buffers. This difference is crucial from the financial stability perspective, and implies that regulatory and supervisory emphasis should be placed on ensuring that the capital buffers of the systemically important banks are commensurate with their risk-taking.

The evidence also indicates that bank risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis was associated with increased financial vulnerability, suggesting that bank decisions regarding the associated liquidity and capital buffers were not commensurate with the underlying risks, resulting in excessive hazard to their business continuity. Country-specific macroeconomic conditions also played a role in the likelihood of subsequent bank failure, implying that banks failed to properly internalize the associated risks in their individual decision-making processes. Thus, while more intrusive regulations entail efficiency costs, the results point to associated gains in terms of financial stability that have to be pondered. This also supports the introduction of a macro-prudential framework as a complement to traditional, microprudential approach. In this regard, further work is needed to deepen the understanding of the role of the macroeconomic environment on financial stability.

The Challenge of Public Pension Reform in Advanced and Emerging Economies

The Challenge of Public Pension Reform in Advanced and Emerging Economies. Prepared by the Fiscal Affairs Department

IMF
December 28, 2011

Summary: This paper reviews past trends in public pension spending and provides projections for 27 advanced and 25 emerging economies over 2011–2050. In constructing these projections, the paper incorporates the impact of recent pension reforms and highlights the key assumptions underlying these projections and associated risks. The paper also presents reform options to address future pension spending pressures in the advanced and emerging economies. These reforms—mainly increasing retirement ages, reducing replacement rates, or increasing payroll taxes—are discussed in the context of their role in fiscal consolidation, and their implications for both equity and economic growth. In addition, the paper examines the challenge of emerging economies of expanding coverage in a fiscally sustainable manner.

Executive Summary

Public pension reform will be a key policy challenge in both advanced and emerging economies over coming decades. Many economies will need to achieve significant fiscal consolidation over the next two decades. Given high levels of taxation, particularly in advanced economies, fiscal consolidation will often need to focus on the expenditure side. As public pension spending comprises a significant share of total spending, and is projected to rise further, efforts to contain these increases will in most cases be a necessary part of fiscal consolidation packages. Pension reforms can also help avoid the need for even larger cuts in pro-growth spending, such as public investment, and help prevent the worsening of intergenerational equity caused by rising life expectancies (at a pace faster than expected) and longer periods of retirement. Finally, some pension reforms, such as increases in retirement ages, can raise potential growth. Thus, while the appropriate level of pension spending and the design of the pension system are ultimately matters of public preference, there are several potential benefits for countries that choose to undertake pension reform. Against this background, this paper provides: (i) an assessment of the main drivers underlying spending trends over recent decades; (ii) new projections for public pension spending in advanced and emerging economies over the next 20 to 40 years; (iii) an assessment of the sensitivity of the country projections to demographic and macroeconomic factors, and risks of reform reversal; and (iv) country-specific policy recommendations to respond to pension spending pressures.

Pension spending is projected to rise in advanced and emerging economies by an average of 1 and 2½ percentage points of GDP over the next two and four decades, respectively, and is subject to a number of risks. During 2010–2030, increases in spending in excess of 2 percentage points of GDP are projected in nine advanced and six emerging economies. There is considerable uncertainty with respect to these projections, but risks are on the upside for a number of countries. Under a scenario where life expectancy is higher than anticipated—life expectancy projections have in the past underestimated actual increases—pension spending would be over 1 percentage point of GDP higher than projected in 2030 in five economies.  Under a low labor productivity scenario, pension spending would be over ½ percentage point of GDP higher in three economies. Sizable risks are also associated with implementing enacted reforms as well as contingent fiscal risks if governments have to supplement private pensions should these fail to deliver adequate benefits.

The appropriate reform mix depends on country circumstances and preferences, although increasing retirement ages has many advantages. It is important that pension reforms do not undermine the ability of public pensions to alleviate poverty among the elderly.  Raising retirement ages avoids the need for further cuts in replacement rates on top of those already legislated, and in many countries the scope for raising contributions may be limited in light of high payroll tax burdens. Longer working lives also raise potential output over time. In many advanced economies there is room for more ambitious increases in statutory retirement ages in light of continued gains in life expectancy, but this should be accompanied by measures that protect the incomes of those who cannot continue to work. In emerging Europe, one possible strategy would be to equalize retirement ages of men and women. In other emerging economies, where pension coverage is low, expansion of non-contributory “social pensions” could be considered, combined with reforms that place pension systems on sound financial footing, including raising the statutory age of retirement. Where average pensions are high relative to average wages, efforts to increase statutory ages could be complemented by reductions in the generosity of pensions. Where taxes on labor income are relatively low, increasing revenues could be considered, and all countries should strive to improve the efficiency of payroll contribution collections.

PDF here: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/122811.pdf

Are Rating Agencies Powerful? An Investigation into the Impact and Accuracy of Sovereign Ratings

Are Rating Agencies Powerful? An Investigation into the Impact and Accuracy of Sovereign Ratings. By John Kiff, Sylwia Nowak, and Liliana Schumacher
IMF Working Paper WP/12/23
Jan 2012
http://www.imfbookstore.org/ProdDetails.asp?ID=WPIEA2012023

Abstract

We find that Credit Rating Agencies (CRA)’s opinions have an impact in the cost of funding of sovereign issuers and consequently ratings are a concern for financial stability. While ratings produced by the major CRAs perform reasonably well when it comes to rank ordering default risk among sovereigns, there is evidence of rating stability failure during the recent global financial crisis.  These failures suggest that ratings should incorporate the obligor’s resilience to stress scenarios. The empirical evidence also supports: (i) reform initiatives to reduce the impact of CRAs’ certification services; (ii) more stringent validation requirements for ratings if they are to be used in capital regulations; and (iii) more transparency with regard to the quantitative parameters used in the rating process.

Excerpts
I. INTRODUCTION

1. Recent rating activities by the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have induced some to ask whether ratings represent accurate risk assessments and to question how influential they are. The contention that ratings represent accurate default risk metrics was brought into question by the sheer volume and intensity of the multiple downgrades to U.S. mortgage-related structured finance securities in the wake of the crisis. Voices have also been raised against the timing of recent downgrades of European sovereigns amidst criticism that these downgrades promoted uncertainty in financial markets, leading to “cliff effects” and as a consequence affect their ability to funding themselves. Rating agencies have also been accused of behaving oligopolistically.

2. These criticisms are not new. CRAs’ downgrading actions have been accused before of not being timely but instead procyclical. It was argued that “the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 brought out that credit rating agencies, like almost anybody else, were reacting to events rather than anticipating them” (Reisen, 2003). During the late 1990s Asian crisis, CRAs were also blamed of downgrading East Asian countries too late and more than the worsening in these countries’ economic fundamentals justified, exacerbating the cost of borrowing.

3. The goal of this paper is to assess these concerns. We first examine CRAs’ role and whether CRAs are influential or just lag the market once new information is available and priced into fixed income securities. This is an important point. If CRAs influence the market, their opinions are important from a financial stability perspective. If they do not and just reflect information available to the market, their actions are not relevant and there is no policy concern.  In this regard, we test three hypotheses regarding the services that CRAs provide to the market: information, certification and monitoring. We find evidence that CRAs’ opinions are influential and favor the information and certification role. We then attempt to determine what ratings actually measure and how accurate they are. We conclude with some policy recommendations based on these findings. This study is limited to sovereign ratings (of emerging markets and advanced economies) and covers the period January 2005-June 2010.

4. Our analysis of the interaction between the market and CRAs indicates that ratings have information value beyond the information already publicly available to the market.  Specifically, the following results were evident:

• An event study shows that negative credit warnings (i.e., “reviews,” “watches,” and “outlooks”) have a significant impact on CDS spreads. This evidence is also supported by a Granger-causality test that finds that negative credit warnings Granger-cause changes in CDS spreads. These findings are consistent with the view that rating agencies do provide additional information to the markets, in addition to what is publicly available and used by markets to price fixed income securities.

• Although upgrades and downgrades in general do not have a significant impact on CDS spreads, upgrades and downgrades in and out of investment grade categories are statistically significant. This supports the view that the certification services provided by rating agencies do matter and likely create a purely liquidity effect (e.g.  purchases and sales of assets forced by regulations or other formal mandates and not based on the additional information already in the market).

• We do not find evidence in favor of the most important testable implication of the monitoring services theory. The impact of downgrades preceded by an outlook review in the same direction is not statistically significant. 

• From an informational point of view, the market appears to discriminate more than rating agencies among different kinds of issuers—in particular at lower rating grades and during crisis periods. This finding may indicate that ratings need to incorporate more granularity and leads to the second question of what ratings measure and how accurate they are.

• A common element among ratings by the major CRAs is that they represent a rank ordering of credit risk. This ordering is based on qualitative and quantitative inputs such as default probabilities, expected losses, and downgrade risk. However, there is no oneto- one mapping between any of these quantitative measures of credit risk and credit ratings. There is also no disclosure of the quantitative parameters that characterize each rating grade. For this reason, validation tests undertaken by outsiders can only apply to the ability of ratings to differentiate potential defaulters and non defaulters, but not to estimating cardinal measures such as default probabilities.

• The point highlighted above implies that—in spite of playing a similar role to internal ratings in the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) approach—ratings produced by the CRAs are subject to lower validation standards than are the banks using the IRB approach. In the Basel II IRB approach, financial institutions use measures of default probabilities (PD), losses given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) to produce their internal ratings and are subject to calibration tests.  Although validation is foremost the responsibility of banks, both bank risk managers and bank supervisors need to develop a thorough understanding of validation methods in evaluating whether banks’ rating systems comply with the operating standards set forth by Basel II.

• Ratings produced by the major CRAs perform reasonably well when it comes to rank ordering default risk among sovereigns, i.e. defaults tend to take place among the lowest rated issuers. Accuracy ratios (AR) indicate that agencies are more successful at sorting out potential defaulters among sovereign issuers (average ARs in the 80 to 90 percent range) than among corporate and structured finance issuers (average ARs in the 63 to 87 percent range), the latter ones having suffered a strong deterioration over the global financial crisis. For all classes of products though, the ARs indicate that sovereign rating accuracy deteriorates as the evaluation horizon increases.

• In general, long-term credit transition matrices show that higher ratings are more stable than lower ones, and tend to remain unchanged. But this was not the case during the global crisis period, when there has been a tendency to see heavier downgrade activity among higher-rated sovereigns than among lower-rated ones. There has been evidence of significant rating failure (defined here as three or more rating changes in one year) during the recent global financial crisis, although less than in the Asian crisis.

IV. SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

• Based on the evidence of the impact of the CRA’s certification services, the removal of the excessive reliance of regulations on ratings is warranted. This will not affect the information value of ratings—that appears to work mostly through outlook reviews—and will help lessen the additional liquidity impact due to the need to meet regulations, reducing potential cliff effects.

• To the extent that ratings continue to play a significant role in regulations, an issue arises as to whether CRAs should be more transparent about the quantitative measures they calibrate in the rating process (PDs, LGD, and stability assumptions), how these measures are mapped into ratings, and whether the final ratings can be used to infer the parameters used to obtain these measures. This is particularly relevant in the use of external ratings by banks employing the standardized approach in Basel II since internal ratings systems are subject to rigorous back testing.

• Moreover, recent heavy downgrade activity suggests that ratings should embed the notion that risk is a forward looking dimension conditional on the macroeconomic scenario. In this regard, ratings should be better tied to macroeconomic conditions, including their resilience to stress scenarios.

PDF here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1223.pdf

Some Root Causes of the Arab Revolution: Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate (due to the first)

A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution. Spiegel interview with Emannuel Todd
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763537,00.html
May 20, 2011

Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate

Excerpts:

SPIEGEL: Aren't poverty or affluence also crucial? Tunisia, Syria, Egypt and Yemen don't have bubbling oil revenues.

Todd: Of course, one can placate the people with bread and money, but only for a while. Revolutions usually erupt during phases of cultural growth and economic downturn. For me, as a demographer, the key variable is not the per capita gross domestic product but the literacy rate. The British historian Lawrence Stone pointed out this relationship in his study of the English revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries. He saw the critical threshold at 40 to 60 percent.

SPIEGEL: Well, most young Arabs can now read and write, but how is the birth rate actually developing? The population in Arab countries is extremely young, with half of its citizens younger than 25.

Todd: Yes, but that's because the previous generation had so many children. In the meantime, however, the birth rate is falling dramatically in some cases. It has fallen by half in the Arab world in just one generation, from 7.5 children per woman in 1975 to 3.5 in 2005. The birth rate among female university graduates is just below 2.1, the level needed to maintain a population. Tunisia now has a birth rate similar to that of France. In Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, it has dropped below the magic threshold of three children per woman. This means that young adults constitute the majority of the population and, unlike their fathers and mothers, they can read and write, and they also practice contraception. But they suffer from unemployment and social frustration. It isn't surprising that unrest was inevitable in this part of world.

[...]

SPIEGEL: Why has it taken so long for the values of the modern age to reach the Islamic world? After all, the golden age of Arab civilization ended in the 13th century.

Todd: There is a simple explanation, which has the benefit of also being applicable to northern India and China, that is, to three completely differently religious communities: Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism. It has to do with the structure of the traditional family in these regions, with its debasement and with the disenfranchisement of women. And in Mesopotamia, for example, it extends well into the pre-Islamic world. Mohammed, the founder of Islam, granted women far more rights than they have had in most Arab societies to this day.

SPIEGEL: Does that mean that the Arabs conformed to older local circumstances and spread them across the entire Middle East?

Todd: Yes. The patrilinear, patrilocal system, in which only male succession is considered valid and newlyweds, preferably cousins in the ideal Arab marriage, live under the roof and authority of the father, inhibits all social progress. The disenfranchisement of women deprives them of the ability to raise their children in a progressive, dynamic fashion. Society calcifies and, in a sense, falls asleep. The powers of the individual cannot develop. The bourgeois achievement of marriage for love, and the free choice of one's partner, replaced the hierarchies of honor in Europe in the 19th century and reinforced the desire for freedom.

SPIEGEL: Is female emancipation the prerequisite for modernization in the Arab world?

Todd: It's in full swing. The headscarf debate is missing the point. The number of marriages between cousins is dropping just as spectacularly as the birth rate, thereby blasting away a barrier. The free individual or active citizen can enter the public arena. When more than 90 percent of young people can read and write and have a modicum of education, no traditional authoritarian regime will last for long. Have you noticed how many women are marching along in the protests? Even in Yemen, the most backward country in the Arab world, thousands of women were among the protesters.

SPIEGEL: The family is the private sphere par excellence. Why do changes in its structure necessarily spread to the political sphere?

Todd: The relationship between those at the top and those at the bottom is changing. When the authority of fathers begins to falter, political power generally collapses, as well. This is because the system of the patrilinear, endogamous extended family has been reproduced within the leadership of nations. The family patriarch as head of state places his sons and other male relatives in positions of power. Political dynasties develop, as in the case of the senior and junior Assad in Syria. Corruption flourishes because the clan runs things for its own benefit. The state is of course privatized as a family business. The power of obedience is based on a combination of loyalty, repression and political economics.

h/t ‘A Convergence of Civilizations’, http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2011/11/02/a-convergence-of-civilizations

Francis Fukuyama said very much this same thing in 1999, The Great Disruption. I don't know if he did it independently.

Under Sec for Internt'l Affairs Lael Brainard Testimony on the U.S.-China Economic Relationship

Under Secretary for International Affairs Dr. Lael Brainard Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the U.S.-China Economic Relationship

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1336.aspx

Oct 25, 2011

Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Levin, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our economic relationship with China.


Challenges and Opportunities
Since the outset, President Obama has placed a high priority on pursuing a more balanced and fair economic relationship with China.  This is central to our goal of doubling exports in five years and supporting several million U.S. jobs.  And, indeed, since 2009, U.S. exports to China have grown by 61 percent, nearly twice as fast as our exports to the rest of the world.  Despite this progress, the playing field is still uneven.  To secure the future for our children, the Administration will continue working hard to get the economic relationship right.

China needs to take action at an accelerated rate, so that the potential of our relationship translates into real near-term benefits for our companies and workers.  China’s leaders understand that China must shift to domestic consumption-led growth, provide a secure environment for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, level the playing field between state-owned and private enterprises—domestic and foreign, and liberalize the exchange rate and financial markets.  China needs to take these actions to sustain its own growth, as well as to address the concerns of its trade partners.  On these issues, we have actively pressed China to accelerate the pace of reform in order to achieve more balanced growth and create fairer competition, and there has been some progress, but there are strong interests within China that favor a go-slow approach.   

In the wake of the financial crisis, with American households saving more and demand weak in Europe and Japan, our exports increasingly will be directed at the fast-growing emerging markets if we are to create the good jobs with good wages that we need to grow our economy.  For the next decade, China is expected to be the biggest source of demand growth in the global economy.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts that China’s growth will average 9.4 percent per year over the next five years, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that China’s share of global imports will increase from six percent in 2008, to over nine percent in 2012.  This is a market opportunity that we must seize.

Foreign investment also is playing an increasingly important role in supporting jobs in the United States, and we expect this trend to continue.  In 2009, majority-owned U.S. affiliates of foreign companies were an important contributor to U.S. economic activity, employing approximately five percent of the U.S. private workforce and 17 percent in the U.S. manufacturing sector.  In the decade ahead, China will be a fast-growing source of foreign direct investment among major economies.  Indeed, the stock of Chinese foreign investment in the United States more than doubled last year alone.  Protecting national security is always our first concern, but where Chinese investment does not affect national security, we should welcome it.  To create jobs here at home, it matters whether Chinese investment ultimately ends up in Anhui province, Argentina, or Alabama.

In order to derive a better balance of benefits from trade and investment opportunities with China, we need to see progress on three key challenges.  First, in many sectors in which the United States is competitive globally, China must address a range of discriminatory policies, including those that favor domestic state-owned enterprises through barriers to foreign goods, services, and investment, as well as the provision of subsidies and preferential access to raw materials, land, credit, and government procurement.  Second, rampant theft of intellectual property in China lowers the return to investments in research and development and innovation that represent a fundamental source of our country’s national competitive edge.  Third, China must shift to a pattern of growth that can be sustained, drawing on home-grown demand rather than excessive dependence on exports.  This requires that China bring its exchange rate into alignment with market fundamentals.


China’s Reforms
China’s current headline growth rate may look enviable right now, but China will face daunting challenges in coming years.  We have a tremendous stake in ensuring that China deals with those challenges in a way that fundamentally reorients its growth pattern through greater balance and fairer competition.

China has had remarkable success in lifting hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty.  But it has come at some cost, including large-scale environmental degradation and an economy that spends much more on investment than goods and services for its people.  Chinese leaders understand that, with per capita income of around one-tenth of that of the United States in 2011,[1] and per capita household spending less than one-twentieth of that in the United States, the way China grew in the last two decades will not get them to the next stage of development.  Instead, China will face what economists call the “middle income trap.”

China’s excessive dependence on growth driven by exports to advanced economies and investment will need to change.  During the 2008-2009 global crisis, China was able to sustain growth through a massive credit-fueled investment boom.  This will leave a financial hangover for years.  China risks repeating the experience of other fast growing Asian economies that experienced sharp falls in growth soon after their investment-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios peaked.  With investment reaching an all-time high of almost 48 percent of GDP, however, China’s peak is higher than other Asian economies.

China already is seeing rapidly slowing labor force growth, and the number of workers in China soon will be on the decline.  While China maintains many advantages, a study by KPMG concluded that rising labor costs in China are shifting a rising market share of light manufactured goods to other producers in Asia.[2]  A recent study by the Boston Consulting Group similarly concluded that China’s cost advantage is rapidly eroding.[3]

In the face of overinvestment and rising wages, China will need to move up the value chain.  But China’s weak protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights threaten to retard the development of Chinese innovation and Chinese brands.

And the adjustment process – whether to greater consumption-led growth, higher value services, or innovation-intensive activities – is hampered by China’s continued excessive reliance on administrative controls, such as credit quotas to maintain price stability and intervention to temper exchange rate adjustment, that are subject to political determinations and thus leave policy making behind the curve.  These controls are reflected in a financial system that fails to offer Chinese households financial assets that keeps up with inflation, let alone economic growth, and starves China’s most innovative firms and sectors of capital, despite massive domestic savings, while also depriving foreign competitors of the opportunity to offer a full range of products and services.  Relying more on market-based prices, such as exchange and interest rates that facilitate adjustment to changing conditions, would make China’s growth more resilient, and avoid an excessive build-up of foreign exchange reserves. 

For sustained growth, China wants greater access to U.S. technologies and high-tech dual use exports, to make progress on bilateral investment, and wants their exports to be accorded the same terms of access as exports from other market economies.  We are willing to make progress on these issues, but our ability to move will depend in part on how much progress we see from China on issues that are important to us.


U.S. Engagement and Enforcement
We have worked tirelessly across the Administration to pursue a tight set of priorities with China – using the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), as well as the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT).  And since many other countries share our concerns, we also pursue these issues through multilateral channels, such as the G-20, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which are critical complements to our bilateral engagement.  To advance our goals, whether it is faster appreciation of the exchange rate or reduced barriers to U.S. exports, we need to work smartly with our partners around the world and with China.  And when engagement proves insufficient, this Administration will continue to be more aggressive than any of its predecessors in using all appropriate tools to address the particular problem, such as going after China’s unfair trade practices by taking China to the WTO and vigorously applying U.S. trade remedy laws.

While we face substantial challenges, and our job is far from finished, we have made important progress towards leveling the playing field and making the bilateral relationship more beneficial for American companies and workers.  China’s trade surplus has declined from 7.7 percent of GDP in 2008, to 3.9 percent in 2010, and has declined further in the first half of this year compared to the same period last year, though an important part of the decline was due to slower growth in China’s export markets.  In both its latest Five-Year Plan and the recent S&ED, China committed to targets to promote consumption-led growth, including raising household incomes, increasing minimum wages, and increasing services relative to GDP.

On the exchange rate, since China resumed exchange rate adjustment in June 2010, the renminbi has appreciated about seven percent against the U.S. dollar and about ten percent taking into account China’s higher rate of inflation relative to inflation in the United States.  China’s currency has appreciated nearly forty percent against the dollar over the past five years in real terms.  But the continued rapid pace of foreign reserve accumulation and the ongoing decline in the share of Chinese consumption in GDP indicate that the real exchange rate of the renminbi remains misaligned despite recent movement, and a faster pace of appreciation is needed. 

Renminbi appreciation on its own will not erase our trade deficit.  But allowing the exchange rate to adjust fully to reflect market forces is the most powerful near-term tool available to the Chinese government to achieve two of its top economic goals:  combating inflation and shifting the composition of demand towards domestic consumption.  By contrast, persistent misalignment holds back the rebalancing in demand needed to sustain the global recovery both in China and the world, and gives rise to substantial international concerns and ultimately to trade frictions.  Further, emerging markets that compete with China resist appreciation of their own currencies to maintain their competitiveness vis-à-vis China. 

At the G-20 earlier this month, surplus emerging markets such as China committed to accelerate the rebalancing of demand towards domestic consumption, and to move toward more market-determined exchange rates through greater exchange rate flexibility.

We also are making progress on our bilateral trade and investment priorities, in close collaboration with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce.  At the most recent S&ED, after commitments made during the January state visit of President Hu and the prior December JCCT, China pledged to rescind all of its government procurement indigenous innovation catalogues, including by provincial and municipal governments.  So far, the Central government has repealed four key measures that underpinned the indigenous innovation product accreditation system, and a number of local governments have taken positive steps.  China also pledged to increase inspections of government computers to ensure that agencies use legitimate software, and to improve its high-level government coordination and leadership mechanisms to enhance long-term protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.  And last year, China met its S&ED pledge to raise the threshold for central government review of foreign investments from $100 to $300 million, leaving more foreign investment approvals to the mayors and governors who better understand the benefits of foreign direct investment.

Reforming and opening up China’s financial sector also remains a key priority.  This not only would provide Chinese households with savings and insurance products to meet their financial goals without having to save so much of their income, but also would level the playing field with China’s state-owned enterprises for access to credit.  We will continue pushing hard to address market access barriers in China’s financial sector, and we are seeing modest signs of progress.  China now allows foreign banks to underwrite corporate bonds and is creating more opportunities for our financial services firms to manage investments in China as well as manage Chinese investments abroad.  At the most recent S&ED, China committed to allow foreign firms to sell mutual funds, provide custody services, and sell mandatory auto liability insurance.

In short, while we will stand up to unfair and discriminatory practices and demand change, we will continue to engage with and encourage China as it pursues its reforms.  And to meet this generational challenge, we must continue to work to strengthen the multilateral system that governs trade and finance, and not turn away from it.  I believe this is the best way to promote American interests.

Thank you.


References
[1] September 2011 IMF World Economic Outlook Database, using market exchange rates.

[2] KPMG International, Product Sourcing in Asia Pacific 2011, pp. 7-9.

[3] Boston Consulting Group, Made in America, Again, August 2011, p. 5.

Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It?

Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It?
Authors: Chow, Julian T.S. ; Surti, Jay 
IMF Working Paper
October 01, 2011

Summary: This paper assesses proposals to redefine the scope of activities of systemically important financial institutions. Alongside reform of prudential regulation and oversight, these have been offered as solutions to the too-important-to-fail problem. It is argued that while the more radical of these proposals such as narrow utility banking do not adequately address key policy objectives, two concrete policy measures - the Volcker Rule in the United States and retail ring-fencing in the United Kingdom - are more promising while still entailing significant implementation challenges. A risk factor common to all the measures is the potential for activities identified as too risky for retail banks to migrate to the unregulated parts of the financial system. Since this could lead to accumulation of systemic risk if left unchecked, it appears unlikely that any structural engineering will lessen the policing burden on prudential authorities and on the banks.


Section I, Why redefine scope?

The business of banking involves leveraged intermediation managed by people subject to limited liability and, typically, to profit sharing contracts. This combination is well-known to generate incentives for risk-taking that may be excessive from the perspective of bank creditors. Creditor guarantees such as deposit insurance are known to exacerbate this incentive problem because they weaken creditors’ incentive to monitor and discipline management.

These issues are magnified in the case of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Owing to their size, interconnectedness, or complexity, the negative externalities emanating from financial distress at SIFIs makes them a source of systemic risk, leading to them being perceived to be too-important-to-fail (TITF). Consequently, the market implicitly—and often correctly—assumes that apart from explicit deposit insurance, creditor guarantees of a much wider nature would be extended when such firms are threatened by imminent failure.

This serves to weaken the mitigating force of market discipline. Prior to the crisis, the high likelihood of public support assumed in a distress situation contributed to the ability of SIFIs to carry thinner capital buffers at lower cost, acquire complex business models, and accumulate systemic risk. This trend was reinforced by the diversification premier attributed to universal banks by market participants and prudential authorities, enabling them to integrate the provision of retail, investment, and wholesale banking services without erecting the necessary firewalls there-between. These developments resulted in networks of financial interconnections within and across internationally active SIFIs that proved to be difficult, time consuming and costly to unravel. This made it seemingly less costly, during the crisis, to allocate tax payer resources to preventing SIFI failures than to allowing them, with subsequent resolution and restructuring of their businesses.

Diversification of business lines could serve to better protect a universal bank against idiosyncratic shocks that adversely impact individual lines of business. At the same time, the free flow of capital and liquidity and the associated growth in intra-group exposures would also increase the likelihood of intra-firm contagion in the event of an exogenous shock.  Unlike investment banking clients, retail banking customers typically have few options other than their banks for conducting vital financial transactions. Ensuring business continuity of services to such clients, therefore, serves a clear and important social welfare objective. But, complex business models and high levels of intra-group exposures present a barrier to quickly spinning off the retail parts of a universal bank which can ensure such business continuity.

Restricting the scope of a regulated bank’s business activities could, therefore, serve a number of important policy objectives. From a financial stability perspective, it could limit contagion within and across firms. From the perspective of consumer protection, it could ensure a more efficient provision of assurance of the continuity of retail banking services.  And, by more credibly restricting the ambit of tax-payer funded creditor guarantees to depositors it could furnish these benefits more efficiently and cheaply from a social cost perspective.

Accordingly, the official response to the crisis has, besides recognizing the need for strengthened regulation and oversight of SIFIs, also included complementary proposals to redesign and refocus their business activities. A number of concrete proposals have been made, including:

• Narrow Utility Banking—essentially a reversion of deposit-funded banks into traditional payment function outfits with lending (and investment banking) being carried out by independent finance companies funded by non-deposit means.  
• The Volcker Rule—prohibiting banks from carrying out certain types of investment banking activities if they are to continue to seek deposit funding and to retain banking licenses.  
• A Retail Ring-fence—that, while not prohibiting banking groups from providing both retail and wholesale banking services, mandates legal subsidiarization of certain retail activities, prohibits this subsidiary from undertaking other businesses and risks, and establishes minimum capital and liquidity standards for it on a solo basis. While not limiting capital and liquidity benefits to the retail subsidiary from other affiliates when necessary, the ring-fence limits capital and liquidity transfers in the opposite direction, to non-ring-fenced affiliates. Such functional subsidiarization could enable continuation of retail operations under distress or failure of a SIFI’s other businesses.

This paper focuses on the motivation, content, operational challenges, and potential costs of these proposals to narrow the scope of banking business. The more radical proposals discussed under the narrow banking umbrella involve strict limits on what retail banks’ permissible activities ought to be and could entail significant dead-weight costs if implemented as recommended. By contrast, the design and motivation for the Volcker rule and retail ring-fence are more precisely targeted at the problems arising from the integrated business models used by SIFIs before the crisis.

The challenge facing these latter proposals lies in the feasibility and cost of their implementation. In the case of the Volcker rule, for example, it will be challenging for prudential authorities to tell apart permissible activities (market making and underwriting) from prohibited ones (proprietary trading) when assessing banks’ exposures to securities markets. Similar difficulties will be faced by supervisors assessing the nature of and purpose of hedging tools and contracts utilized by ring-fenced banks. This presents policy makers with a dilemma. Should they invest the financial cost and time towards gathering more contemporaneous information in order to create better filters and limit loopholes? Or, if this is viewed as being too costly or simply inefficient, should they move to outright prohibition of all activities related to securities markets?

The danger with the second option lies in generating incentives to push risk taking beyond the borders of the regulated financial system. If there are indeed no direct financial linkages between retail financial firms and such shadow banking entities, such risk taking may cease being a problem of regulation. However, systemic risk will continue to accumulate in the shadow banks, and since the participants in the regulated and shadow systems are the same, or are, in general linked, a crisis in that sector will continue to exercise a contagion impact on the regulated banking sector.

http://www.imfbookstore.org/IMFORG/WPIEA2011236

Global Poverty Estimates: A Sensitivity Analysis

Global Poverty Estimates: A Sensitivity Analysis. By Shatakshee Dhongde & Camelia Minoiu
IMF Working Paper
Oct 13, 2011

Summary: Current estimates of global poverty vary substantially across studies. In this paper we undertake a novel sensitivity analysis to highlight the importance of methodological choices in estimating global poverty. We measure global poverty using different data sources, parametric and nonparametric estimation methods, and multiple poverty lines. Our results indicate that estimates of global poverty vary significantly when they are based alternately on data from household surveys versus national accounts but are relatively consistent across different estimation methods. The decline in poverty over the past decade is found to be robust across methodological choices.

Introduction
Global poverty monitoring has been brought to the forefront of the international policy arena with the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by the United Nations. The first MDG proposes reducing global poverty by the year 2015 and is stated as “halving the proportion of people with an income level below $1/day between 1990 and 2015” (United Nations, 2000). Progress towards attaining this MDG is monitored using global poverty estimates published by the World Bank and a number of independent scholars. The process is not only expensive (Moss, 2010) but also mired with conceptual, methodological, and datarelated problems (Klasen, 2009).

Current estimates of global poverty proposed in the literature differ in magnitude as well as in the rate of change in poverty. Consider, for instance, Chen and Ravallion (2010) and Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009)—two studies that estimate global poverty using the international poverty line of $1/day (see Figure 1). Chen and Ravallion (2010) estimate that in 2005 nearly 26 percent of the population in the developing countries was poor, and the global poverty count fell by 520 million individuals since 1981. By contrast, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009) estimate poverty to have been ten times lower in 2005, which implies a reduction of almost 350 million individuals since 1981. Although there is general agreement that global poverty has declined over the years, the estimated level of poverty and rate of poverty decline vary substantially across studies.




This paper aims to contribute to the debate on global poverty not by providing a new set of estimates, but by addressing two important questions. First, we ask why estimates from different studies differ so much. As we unravel the various assumptions made by researchers, we show that global poverty estimates are simply not comparable across studies. For instance, they differ in terms of underlying data sources, number of countries included, welfare metric, adjustments to mean incomes, and statistical methods employed to estimate the income distribution. Given this variety of methodological choices, we arrive at our second question: Can we assess the impact of different approaches on the resulting poverty estimates? Since global poverty estimation requires making multiple assumptions simultaneously, we aim to isolate and assess separately the relative importance of each such assumption by undertaking a novel sensitivity analysis.

An important hurdle in estimating long-term trends in global poverty is the lack of high-quality, consistent survey data. The poor are those individuals whose income is less than or equal to some threshold set by the poverty line. If countries had complete information on every individual’s income then with an agreed-upon global poverty line, identifying the poor would be a straightforward exercise. However, there are severe data limitations.

Data on income is typically collected through household surveys (HS) of nationally representative samples. However, survey data are often available for periods far apart and suffer from a number of inconsistencies (regarding sampling and interviewing techniques, definitions of variables, and coverage) that render them incomparable across countries. Nonetheless, they are the sole source of information on the relative distribution of incomes in a country—that is, the shares of national income possessed by different population groups (quintiles, deciles). HS also provide estimates of mean income/consumption which are used to scale the income shares to obtain mean incomes by population group. A more readilyaccessible and consistently-recorded source of information are national account statistics (NAS) which also provide aggregate income or consumption estimates and are available for most countries on a yearly basis.

A key methodological choice in estimating global poverty is whether to use data on mean income/consumption from HS or NAS or whether to combine data from the two sources. Some studies in the literature analyzed the sources of discrepancies between the levels and growth rates of income/consumption data from HS and NAS (Ravallion, 2003; Deaton, 2005). However these studies did not measure the precise effect of using HS and NAS data on global poverty levels and trends. In order to determine how sensitive global poverty estimates are to alternate data sources, we estimate global poverty by anchoring relative distributions alternately to HS and NAS estimates of mean income and consumption. This is our first sensitivity exercise.

The second sensitivity exercise concerns the choice of statistical method used to estimate income distributions from grouped data, that is, data on mean income or consumption for population groups (quintiles, deciles). We estimate global poverty by estimating each country’s distribution using different methods. These include the General Quadratic (GQ) and the Beta Lorenz curve, and the lognormal and Singh-Maddala functional forms for the income density function.2 In addition to these parametric specifications, we also consider the nonparametric kernel density method whose performance we assess in conjunction with four different bandwidths—a parameter that controls the smoothness of the income distribution.

As a benchmark, we follow the World Bank methodology to the extent possible and estimate global poverty in 1995 and 2005—the latest year for which data is available for many countries. Data on the relative distribution of income across population deciles is collected for 65 countries from the World Bank’s poverty monitoring website PovcalNet. Our sample covers more than 70 percent of the total world population and includes all countries for which both HS and NAS data are available in both years. Global poverty is estimated using international poverty lines ranging from $1/day to $2.5/day to provide further insight into how methodological choices impact poverty rates at different income cutoffs.

Our results are twofold. First, a large share of the variation in estimated poverty levels and trends can be attributed to the choice between HS and NAS as the source of data. Global poverty estimates vary not only in terms of the proportion of the poor, and correspondingly the number of poor, but also in terms of the rates of decline in poverty. Poverty estimates based on HS and NAS do not tend to converge in higher income countries. Second, the choice of statistical method used to estimate the income distribution affects poverty levels to a lesser extent. A comparison of poverty estimates across parametric and nonparametric techniques reveals that the commonly used lognormal specification consistently underestimates poverty levels. While there is little doubt that the proportion of poor declined between 1995 and 2005, our results underscore the fact that global poverty counts are highly sensitive to methodological approach.

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