We need to have a partner in order to show high levels of sex frequency; but once we got one, committing and living together reduces sex frequency significantly: Married people have relatively less sex, close to those without a partner

Which People Have the Most Sex? The sex frequency “billboard,” according to new research. Elyakim Kislev. Psychology Today, January 19, 2022. https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/happy-singlehood/202201/which-people-have-the-most-sex

[Excerpts, full text and references/links at the article]

In recent years, many studies have documented a decline in sexual activity.2, 7 For example, Twenge finds that Generation Y is on track to have fewer sex partners than members of the two preceding generations. In fact, her numbers show that those who identify as members of Generation Y are two-and-a-half times as likely to be abstinent as Gen Xers in their early 20s.8

According to an analysis of the General Social Survey, the percentage of 18-29-year-olds reporting no sex in the year preceding the survey increased from around 15% in 1990 to 23% in 2018. In addition, the average American adult went from having sex over 60 times a year 20 years ago, to around 50 times in 2018.9

The Implications for Sexual Satisfaction

These results also address a secondary-level question that was raised previously regarding the effect of sex frequency. The results clearly show that sex frequency significantly correlates with sexual satisfaction for men and women alike. The variance accounted for by sex frequency is 22.9% for men and 21.5% for women. This means that couples who are higher on sex frequency (those living apart) are likely to be higher on sexual satisfaction. Indeed, this was also found to be the case.

Married people, in any event, have relatively less sex, close to those without a partner. This makes one think about the reasons for the decline of marriage as an institution and why people choose to forgo wedlock.

Check also Does Marriage Really Improve Sexual Satisfaction? Evidence From the Pairfam Data Set. Elyakim Kislev. The Journal of Sex Research, May 3 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/05/marriage-is-not-determinant-for-sexual.html

Bank opacity: How much do investors know about the composition of banks' portfolios? It seems that investors were not fully informed about lending portfolios

Bank opacity - patterns and implications. Stefan Avdjiev and Maximilian Jager. BIS Working Papers  No 992, January 19 2022. https://www.bis.org/publ/work992.htm

Summary

Focus: How much do investors know about the composition of banks' portfolios? What parts of banks' balance sheets are least known to investors? What is the impact of public data releases on bank equity prices and CDS spreads? Do banks whose credit risk is underestimated by markets get cheaper funding and make riskier loans? We examine these questions by combining a novel event study methodology with a rich data set on the exposures of European banks.

Contribution: We calculate a new measure of bank risk using a rich data set on banks' exposures to individual countries and sectors. We employ a novel methodology, which allows us to evaluate the impact of public data releases on bank equity prices and CDS spreads. Our empirical framework allows us to identify two effects of new information: the reduction of overall uncertainty and the update of investors' estimates of bank risk. We also investigate the impact of bank opacity on bank funding, lending and profitability.

Findings: We find that investors were not fully informed about bank lending portfolios. Bank equity prices and CDS spreads reacted strongly to public releases of data on banks' exposures. The impact of new data was highest for European periphery banks' sovereign exposures and European core banks' private sector exposures. Banks with underestimated credit risk had lower funding costs and borrowed more. If they were from the European periphery, such banks also made riskier loans and had higher profits.

Abstract: We investigate the patterns and implications of bank opacity in Europe using a rich bank-level data set. Employing a novel event study methodology, we document that public data releases by the European Banking Authority (EBA) on banks' exposures to individual countries and sectors contained information that was not previously priced by equity and CDS markets. We demonstrate that the degree of bank opacity varied considerably across bank nationalities and counterparty sectors – it was highest for European periphery banks' sovereign exposures and European core banks' private sector exposures. Furthermore, we document that underestimations of banks' credit risk by markets were associated with lower funding costs and higher wholesale borrowing (for all banks) as well as with greater risk taking and higher profitability (for European periphery banks).

JEL classification: F34, G21, G28.

Keywords: bank opacity, asymmetric information, event study, credit risk, asset markets.

Check also Despite a more authoritarian personality, Republican CEOs, known to favor the avoidance of threats and ambiguity, tend to prefer a less asymmetric information environment; hence they make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures:

CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure. Md Noman Hossain et al. American Economic Ass'n Conference 'CEOs and Politics,' Jan 7 2022. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2022/01/despite-more-authoritarian-personality.html

Systematic country differences in the extent to which people believe that selfishness is a source of inequality, which sheds light on international differences in public morality, civic virtues, & redistributive policies

Global evidence on the selfish rich inequality hypothesis. Ingvild Almås et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 18, 2022 119 (3) e2109690119; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2109690119

Significance: People’s beliefs about why the rich are richer than the poor have the potential to affect both policy attitudes and economic development. We provide global evidence showing that where the fortunes of the rich are perceived to be the result of selfish behavior, inequality is viewed as unfair, and there is stronger support for income redistribution. However, we also observe that belief in selfish rich inequality is highly polarized in many countries and thus a source of political disagreement that might be detrimental to economic development. We find systematic country differences in the extent to which people believe that selfishness is a source of inequality, which sheds light on international differences in public morality, civic virtues, and redistributive policies.

Abstract: We report on a study of whether people believe that the rich are richer than the poor because they have been more selfish in life, using data from more than 26,000 individuals in 60 countries. The findings show a strong belief in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis at the global level; in the majority of countries, the mode is to strongly agree with it. However, we also identify important between- and within-country variation. We find that the belief in selfish rich inequality is much stronger in countries with extensive corruption and weak institutions and less strong among people who are higher in the income distribution in their society. Finally, we show that the belief in selfish rich inequality is predictive of people’s policy views on inequality and redistribution: It is significantly positively associated with agreeing that inequality in their country is unfair, and it is significantly positively associated with agreeing that the government should aim to reduce inequality. These relationships are highly significant both across and within countries and robust to including country-level or individual-level controls and using Lasso-selected regressors. Thus, the data provide compelling evidence of people believing that the rich are richer because they have been more selfish in life and perceiving selfish behavior as creating unfair inequality and justifying equalizing policies.

Discussion

The present study reports from a global dataset on people’s beliefs about the extent to which selfishness among the rich has caused inequality. It shows substantial support among people for the hypothesis that the rich are richer than the poor because they have been more selfish in life. We find that people’s belief in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis is related both to societal circumstances—in particular, the corruption level in their country—and to their income rank in the country. Finally, we show that the belief in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis is predictive of people’s views on whether inequality in society is unfair and whether the government should aim to reduce inequality.

These findings contribute to a number of literatures. They highlight how people’s perception of the rich may affect the political economy of redistribution and economic development (30⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–37). If the fortunes of the rich are perceived to be the result of selfish behavior, then our evidence suggests that there will be substantial support for redistribution. However, we observe that the belief in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis is highly polarized in many countries and thus likely to be a source of political disagreements. In this respect, it is interesting to observe that the United States is one of the most polarized countries in our study and the country in which the belief in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis is most predictive of people’s attitudes toward inequality. Disagreement on the selfish rich inequality hypothesis among Americans may thus be a contributing factor to the present challenging political situation in the United States. More broadly, these beliefs may affect economic development by shaping the trust people have in the rich and in companies and other institutions often headed by people perceived to be among the rich.

This study further contributes to the important literature in psychology and economics on motivated beliefs, which has shown that people engage in self-enhancing attributions (27, 38⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–44). There is considerable evidence suggesting that people are predictably biased in how they gather and process information to preserve a self-image of being moral and not self-interested (43, 45⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–52). The present study provides evidence consistent with such a self-serving bias in beliefs, even though we cannot rule out that the observed association between income rank and the belief in selfish rich inequality may be driven by the rich and the poor having access to different information. Finally, the paper speaks to the large literature in moral psychology and behavioral economics studying the role of nonselfish motivation in explaining human behavior (23, 45, 53⇓–55). We provide large-scale evidence showing that people across the world believe there to be heterogeneity in the extent to which individuals behave nonselfishly.

An interesting question is how the belief in selfish rich inequality relates to the actual selfishness of the rich. To shed some light on this relationship, we use self-reported data from the 2018 Gallup World Poll on whether people last month donated money to a charity. In most countries, we find that the rich are more likely to have donated money than the poor, which is not surprising, given that the rich have more money than the poor. However, in SI Appendix, Fig. S8, we show that there is a negative relationship between the belief in selfish rich inequality and the extent to which donating money correlates with the income rank in society (β=−0.055, t57=−2.52$\beta =-0.055,\hspace{0.17em}{t}_{57}=-2.52$, P = 0.014). Hence, the data suggest that the rich are less willing to donate money in countries where people believe there to be selection of selfish people into becoming rich.

People’s beliefs in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis shed light on how we think society works and may shape the kind of life we want to live. These beliefs may also play a fundamental role in determining public morality and civic virtues (56) and therefore represent an essential ingredient in our understanding of human behavior and the organization of society.

Extent to which young people remove their pubic hair, by what means, how often, and reasons for such behavior; pubic hair removal by friends and sexual partners, as well as expectations of sexual partners was also explored

To Shave or Not to Shave: Exploring Pubic Hair Removal among College Students. Sandra L. Caron. American Journal of Sexuality Education, Jan 18 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/15546128.2021.2025182

Abstract: This exploratory study investigated pubic hair removal behavior among 295 college men and women. Survey questions explored the extent to which young people remove their pubic hair, by what means, how often, and reasons for such behavior. Pubic hair removal by friends and sexual partners, as well as expectations of sexual partners was also explored. Commonalities and differences in responses between college men and women were examined. Results revealed that pubic hair removal is extremely common in both men and women and typically begins in early adolescence. Reasons for pubic hair removal most frequently cited include cleanliness, comfort and appearance. Implications for sexuality education and future research are discussed.

Are Sibship Characteristics Predictive of Same Sex Marriage? An Examination of Fraternal Birth Order and Female Fecundity Effects in Population-level Administrative Data from the Netherlands

Are Sibship Characteristics Predictive of Same Sex Marriage? An Examination of Fraternal Birth Order and Female Fecundity Effects in Population-level Administrative Data from the Netherlands. Christine Ablaza, Jan Kabátek & Francisco Perales. The Journal of Sex Research, Jan 18 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2021.1974330

Abstract: Despite historical increases in the number of individuals engaging in same-sex relations and entering same-sex unions, the causes of sexual orientation remain an open question. Two biological processes that have received some degree of empirical validation are the fraternal birth-order effect (FBOE) and the female-fecundity effect (FFE). Respectively, these processes posit that having a greater number of older brothers and being part of larger sibships independently increase the odds of male homosexuality. Nevertheless, previous studies have relied on suboptimal data and methods, including underpowered and selected samples, and models that fail to fully disentangle the two processes. In addition, they have rarely analyzed samples of women. We address these limitations using high-quality, population-level linked register data from the Netherlands (n = 9,073,496). Applying a novel multivariable approach, we jointly examine the FBOE and FFE by comparing the sibship characteristics of men (n = 26,542) and women (n = 33,534) who entered a same-sex union against those who did not (n = 4,607,785 men and 4,405,635 women). Our analyses yield robust evidence of an FBOE on both male and female homosexuality, but no support for the FFE. Additionally, we find that individuals’ birth order affects the probability of entering a same-sex union, regardless of the sex of older siblings.

The Guardian reported Stonewall’s statistic that “almost half” of young transgenders “have attempted to kill themselves”; real suicidality is 0.03pct (too high, 5.5 times greater than the suicide rate of all adolescents)

Suicide by Clinic-Referred Transgender Adolescents in the United Kingdom. Michael Biggs. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Jan 18 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-022-02287-7

Introduction: Surveys show that adolescents who identify as transgender are vulnerable to suicidal thoughts and self-harming behaviors (dickey & Budge, 2020; Hatchel et al., 2021; Mann et al., 2019). Little is known about death by suicide. This Letter presents data from the Gender Identity Development Service (GIDS), the publicly funded clinic for children and adolescents aged under 18 from England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. From 2010 to 2020, four patients were known or suspected to have died by suicide, out of about 15,000 patients (including those on the waiting list). To calculate the annual suicide rate, the total number of years spent by patients under the clinic’s care is estimated at about 30,000. This yields an annual suicide rate of 13 per 100,000 (95% confidence interval: 4–34). Compared to the United Kingdom population of similar age and sexual composition, the suicide rate for patients at the GIDS was 5.5 times higher. The proportion of patients dying by suicide was far lower than in the only pediatric gender clinic which has published data, in Belgium (Van Cauwenberg et al., 2021).

Suicidality in Transgender Adolescents

“About half of young trans people…attempt suicide,” declared the United Kingdom Parliament’s Women and Equalities Committee (2015). Similar figures are cited by news media and campaigning organizations. The Guardian reported Stonewall’s statistic that “almost half” of transgender young people “have attempted to kill themselves” (Weale, 2017). “Fifty percent of transgender youth attempt suicide before they are at age 21” stated the mother of the most famous transgender youth in the English-speaking world (Jennings & Jennings, 2016). As a transgender theologian has observed, “the statistic about suicide attempts has, in essence, developed a life of its own” (Tanis, 2016).

Representative surveys of students in high schools provide one source of evidence for this statistic. In New Zealand, 20% of transgender students reported attempting suicide in the past 12 months, compared to 4% of all students (Clark et al., 2014). In the United States, 15% of transgender students reported a suicide attempt requiring medical treatment in the last 12 months, compared to 3% of all students (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 2018; Jackman et al., 2021; Johns et al., 2019). In another American survey, 41% of transgender students reported having attempted suicide during their lifetime, compared to 14% of all students (Toomey et al., 2018).

To what extent are self-reported suicide attempts reflected in fatalities? The connection is not straightforward. Respondents who report suicide attempts are not necessarily indicating an intent to die. One survey of the American population found that almost half the respondents who reported attempting suicide subsequently stated that their action was a cry for help and not intended to be fatal (Nock & Kessler, 2006). In two small samples of non-heterosexual youth, half the respondents who initially reported attempting suicide subsequently clarified that they went no further than imagining or planning it; for the remainder who did actually attempt suicide, their actions were usually not life-threatening. To an extent, then, “the reports were attempts to communicate the hardships of lives or to identify with a gay community” (Savin-Williams, 2001). Although such elaborate survey methods have not been used to study transgender populations, there is anecdotal evidence for a similar disjuncture. The pediatric endocrinologist who established the first clinic for transgender children in the United States stated that “the majority of self-harmful actions that I see in my clinic are not real suicide attempts and are not usually life threatening” (Spack, 2009).

[...]

Discussion

How reliable are these estimates? The chief uncertainty about the numerator is whether the fourth death will be ruled as suicide when the inquest is eventually held. It could be speculated that there were further suicides unknown to the Tavistock and to the National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Safety in Mental Health. All that can be said is that the single suicide by a GIDS patient from 2014 to 2016 is not out of line with comprehensive mortality data on suicides by transgender adolescents in the United Kingdom which counted five suicides in a longer age range and wider geographical area. The denominator for the annual suicide rate, however, is pieced together from various series and so is inevitably approximate. Statistics from the early 2010s are less reliable, though they make only a small contribution to the grand total; the last three years contribute more than half of the total number of patient-years. The most significant limitation is the lack of information on the age and sex of all the patients who committed suicide.

Direct comparison can be made with the Belgian pediatric gender clinic (Van Cauwenberg et al., 2021). Its annual suicide rate was about 70 times greater than the rate at the GIDS. This is especially puzzling because patients at the Belgian clinic scored better, on average, than those at the GIDS on tests of psychological functioning (de Graaf et al., 2018). The explanation for the huge disparity in suicide is not clear. The Amsterdam’s clinic annual suicide rate was four times greater than the rate at the GIDS. The higher rate is not surprising, however, because the Dutch clinical population was dominated by older adults: the median age at first visit was 25 (Wiepjes et al., 2020). Suicide rates peak in middle age, and so a population of older adults would be at higher risk than a population of adolescents.

The suicide rate of the GIDS patients is not necessarily indicative of the rate among all adolescents who identify as transgender. On the one hand, individuals with more serious problems (and their families) would be particularly motivated to seek referral and more likely to obtain it, and so the clinical subset would be more prone to suicide. One study suggests that a child who frequently attempted suicide was more readily referred to the GIDS (Carlile et al., 2021). On the other hand, young people facing hostility from their families would be less able to seek referral, and this hostility could make them especially vulnerable to suicide.

Taking into account these limitations, the estimated suicide rate at the GIDS provides the strongest evidence yet published that transgender adolescents are more likely to commit suicide than the overall adolescent population. The higher risk could have various causes: gender dysphoria, accompanying psychological conditions, and ensuing social disadvantages such as bullying. Studies of young people referred to the GIDS in 2012 and 2015 found a high prevalence of eating disorders, depression, and autism spectrum conditions (ASC) (Holt et al., 2016; Morandini et al., 2021)—all known to increase the probability of suicide (Simon & VonKorff, 1998; Smith et al., 2018). Eating disorders and depression could be consequences of transgender identity and its ensuing social repercussions, but this is implausible for ASC insofar as it originates in genes or the prenatal environment. From a sample of over 700 referrals to the GIDS in 2012 and 2015, 14–15% were diagnosed with ASC (Morandini et al., 2021). This compared to 0.8–1.1% of students in England (Department for Education, 2012, 2015). The association between autism and gender dysphoria is found in many populations (Socialstyrelsen, 2020; Warrier et al., 2020). Autism is known to increase the risk of suicide mortality, especially in females (Hirvikoski et al., 2016; Kirby et al., 2019; Socialstyrelsen, 2020). To some extent, therefore, the elevated suicide rate for transgender youth compared to their peers reflects the higher incidence of ASC. The same holds for other psychiatric disorders associated with gender dysphoria (Dhejne et al., 2016). Ideally, the suicide rate for patients of the GIDS would be compared to the suicide rate for patients in contact with other NHS mental health services, but the latter rate is not available.

One final caveat is that these data shed no light on the question of whether counseling or endocrinological interventions—gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonist or cross-sex hormones—affect the risk of suicide (Biggs, 2020; Turban et al., 2020). Although two out of the four suicides were of patients on the waiting list, and thus would not have obtained treatment, this is not disproportionate: the waiting list contributed nearly half of the total patient-years.

Hookups reflect extended sexual adolescence, an average of seven additional pre-marital years of youthful singlehood during which many young people are celibate while many others experiment with short-term pairings

Kettrey, HH and AD Johnson. “Hooking Up and Pairing Off: Correlates of College Students’ Interest in Subsequent Hookup and Romantic Relationships with Other-Sex and Same-Sex Hookup Partners,:” Journal of Sex Research (2021) 58:915. DOI: 10.1080/00224499.2020.1766403

Abstract: Contrary to popular media claims that college hookup culture has made romantic relationships obsolete, research indicates many college students see hookups as a pathway to relationships. However, relatively few college hookups actually produce relationships. This study used a sex market framework to explore correlates of college students’ interest in future hookups and relationships with hookup partners across other-sex and same-sex hookup markets. Using Online College Social Life Survey data (N = 10,141) we explored variables classified in the following contexts that may shape choices in a sex market: demographic characteristics, the hookup dyad, the hookup event, post-hookup reactions, attitudes toward hookup partners, and hookup opportunity structures. Logistic regression analyses indicated post-hookup reactions (e.g., satisfaction, emotional responses) explained the highest percentage of variance in interest in a subsequent hookup (56% to 61% across markets) and interest in a relationship (35% to 45% across markets). Although past research suggests there are different markets for other- and same-sex hookups, these findings suggest similarity in contexts that may shape interest in relationship formation among other-sex and same-sex hookup markets. Suggestions for fostering positive relationship development on campuses are discussed.

Popular version: New Insights Into Young Adult Casual Sex Hookups. Michael Castleman. Jan 15 2022. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/all-about-sex/202201/new-insights-young-adult-casual-sex-hookups

Discussion

In this study, we explored correlates of college students’ interest in a subsequent hookup or romantic relationship with their most recent hookup partner. We paid particular attention to the sex composition of hookup dyads and broke down findings as they applied to four different hookup markets: women with other-sex hookup partners, men with other-sex hookup partners, women with same-sex hookup partners, and men with same-sex hookup partners. Findings from this study are especially important because most research on college hookups has (1) employed a risk framework with minimal attention to positive outcomes of hookups and (2) focused on hookups among other-sex dyads, with the few studies that do exist on same-sex hookups suggesting these encounters are part of a distinct hookup culture (Pham, 2017; Watson et al., 2017).

We employed a sex market framework (Ellingson et al., 2004), to theorize different markets, or hookup cultures, for other-sex and same-sex hookup dyads. More specifically, we examined correlations between contexts that can shape preferences for subsequent hookups or relationships with hookup partners in a given hookup market. We examined the relationship between the following contexts and interest in a subsequent hookup or relationship with hookup partners: demographic characteristics, the hookup dyad, the hookup event, post-hookup reactions, attitudes toward hookup partners, and hookup opportunity structures.

Through this study, we sought to answer two main research questions. First, we asked which contexts were the strongest predictors of interest in a subsequent hookup or relationship with hookup partners. Second, we sought to explore the similarities and differences in predictors of interest in a subsequent hookup or relationship with hookup partners across hookup markets (i.e., women with other-sex hookup partners, men with other-sex hookup partners, women with same-sex hookup partners, men with same-sex hookup partners).

Although previous research suggests there are separate sex markets, or hookup cultures, for women and men with other-sex or same-sex partners, our analysis suggests there is great similarity in the degree to which the contexts that compose those markets may facilitate relationship formation. Across all four hookup markets, we found post-hookup reactions to be most strongly correlated with the two outcomes in our study (i.e., interest in a subsequent hookup and interest in a relationship with hookup partners). The variables in this context collectively explained between 35% and 62% of the variance in the two outcomes across the four hookup markets. The second strongest context to correlate with the outcomes across the four contexts was the hookup dyad. The variables in this context collectively explained between 12% and 22% of the variance in the two outcomes across markets.

These findings point to the importance of how college students feel about their hookups – as well as their history and familiarity with hookup partners – in facilitating future hookups and romantic relationships. That is, our findings suggest that being familiar with a specific hookup partner and experiencing positive feelings after a hookup are the best predictors of subsequent interest in that partner. This is the case for both men and women with other-sex and same-sex partners. In other words, the same contexts matter across markets. However, this is not meant to diminish variation within contexts across markets. For example, hookup enjoyment was a significant predictor of subsequent interest in hookup partners across all four markets; however, women with same-sex hookup partners reported the highest level of hookup enjoyment.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Findings from this study should be interpreted within the confines of important limitations pertinent to its theoretical conceptualization and methodological implementation. Regarding the conceptualization of the study, as previously noted, the hookup market contexts that we examined represents a classification of variables that the larger body of research indicates can shape interest in a future hookup or relationship with one’s partner. These contexts are not meant to be exhaustive, as it is not possible to account for every variable that might be associated with college students’ post-hookup interest in partners. Rather, it is meant to provide a rough template for understanding interest in the formation of romantic relationships among college students across hookup markets.

Additionally, a number of methodological limitations are worth noting. First, the sample for this study was nonrandom and composed of college students enrolled in sociology classes. Thus, respondents’ hookup preferences and behaviors may not be representative of those among general college students. Second, OCSLS data were collected at a single point in time and, thus, findings from this study are correlational. It is not clear whether the predictor variables (i.e., variables corresponding to each of the contexts) influenced participants’ post-hookup interest in their partners or whether post-hookup interest influenced participants’ reporting of these variables.

Relatedly, although the OCSLS dataset is widely used in analyses of college hookup attitudes and behaviors, readers should be mindful of the fact that the survey was administered between 2005 and 2011. Thus, findings from this analysis may not accurately represent the dynamics of relationship formation among current college students.

Finally, the outcome variables in this study measured respondents’ interest in a subsequent hookup or romantic relationship with their most recent hookup partner. They do not indicate whether the hookups in question actually resulted in a subsequent hookup or relationship. The OCSLS did not measure the actual incidence of future commitment from hookup partners and, even if it did, the numbers would presumably produce a much smaller number of positive cases for analysis.

To address these limitations, future research should include qualitative investigations that capture narrative accounts of college students’ hookup experiences – as well as their longitudinal trajectories with particular hookup partners (e.g., how and under what conditions hookups yield relationships). This could involve recruiting a sample of college students who are asked to complete journals chronicling their hookup experiences across an academic year. Those who report hookups with serial partners could be invited to participate in follow-up interviews to discuss emerging interests in these partners. Ideally, some of these interviews should include participants’ partners, as the body of research would benefit from studies that use hookup partner dyads (instead of individual college students) as the unit of analysis.

Women, sexual minorities, and people 18–29 years old exhibited significantly higher rejection sensitivity levels than men, heterosexuals, and people 30–36 years old, respectively

Maiolatesi, A. J., Clark, K. A., & Pachankis, J. E. (2022). Rejection sensitivity across sex, sexual orientation, and age: Measurement invariance and latent mean differences. Psychological Assessment, Jan 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0001109

Abstract: Intergroup differences in personality might be determined by systematic variation in social status and social experiences across groups. Because of its close association with social experiences, rejection sensitivity (RS)—a tendency toward anxious expectations of, and hypersensitivity to, interpersonal rejection—represents one such personality disposition that might differ across social groups, with implications for understanding mental health disparities. After first evaluating measurement invariance of the Adult Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (A-RSQ), the present research sought to assess whether latent mean differences in RS emerged across sex, sexual orientation, and age in a population-based sample of Swedish young adults (age 18–36; N = 1,679). Analyses revealed that the scale achieved full configural, metric, and scalar invariance across sex and sexual orientation and partial scalar invariance across age. As expected, tests of latent mean differences indicated that women, sexual minorities, and people 18–29 years old exhibited significantly higher RS levels than men, heterosexuals, and people 30–36 years old, respectively. Findings from the present research highlight the utility of attending to group differences in maladaptive personality dispositions and information processing styles and their potential role in contributing to persistent mental health hardships uniquely affecting women, sexual minorities, and younger people. Implications for scale administration and future research into the social causes and consequences of RS are discussed.

We measure a spatial region of the face upon which gaze can elicit a sense of eye contact in the viewer; this ‘zone of eye contact’ tends to peak between the two eyes, and extend across the face further in height than in width

Is there a ‘zone of eye contact’ within the borders of the face? Colin J. Palmer et al. Cognition, Volume 220, March 2022, 104981. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104981

Highlights

•We measure a spatial region of the face upon which gaze can elicit a sense of eye contact in the viewer

•This ‘zone of eye contact’ tends to peak between the two eyes, and extend across the face further in height than in width

•Eye contact judgements are more precise than the sense that one's face is being looked at

•These features are similar across Australian and Japanese university students

•Eye contact depends on recent experience: judgements about eye contact are influenced by adaptation and serial dependence

Abstract: Eye contact is a salient feature of everyday interactions, yet it is not obvious what the physical conditions are under which we feel that we have eye contact with another person. Here we measure the range of locations that gaze can fall on a person's face to elicit a sense of eye contact. Participants made judgements about eye contact while viewing rendered images of faces with finely-varying gaze direction at a close interpersonal distance (50 cm). The ‘zone of eye contact’ tends to peak between the two eyes and is often surprisingly narrower than the observer's actual eye region. Indeed, the zone tends to extend further across the face in height than in width. This shares an interesting parallel with the ‘cyclopean eye’ of visual perspective – our sense of looking out from a single point in space despite the physical separation of our two eyes. The distribution of eye-contact strength across the face can be modelled at the individual-subject level as a 2D Gaussian function. Perception of eye contact is more precise than the sense of having one's face looked at, which captures a wider range of gaze locations in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions, at least at the close viewing distance used in the present study. These features of eye-contact perception are very similar cross-culturally, tested here in Australian and Japanese university students. However, the shape and position of the zone of eye contact does vary depending on recent sensory experience: adaptation to faces with averted gaze causes a pronounced shift and widening of the zone across the face, and judgements about eye contact also show a positive serial dependence. Together, these results provide insight into the conditions under which eye contact is felt, with respect to face morphology, culture, and sensory context.

Under efficiency and redistribution channels and Utilitarian social welfare weights the optimal minimum wage is $15; under only the efficiency channel, the optimal minimum wage is narrowly around $8, robust to social welfare weights

Minimum Wages, Efficiency and Welfare. David W. Berger, Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Simon Mongey. NBER Working Paper 29662. Jan 2022. DOI 10.3386/w29662

Abstract: It has long been argued that a minimum wage could alleviate efficiency losses from monopsony power. In a general equilibrium framework that quantitatively replicates results from recent empirical studies, we find higher minimum wages can improve welfare, but most welfare gains stem from redistribution rather than efficiency. Our model features oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms and yields analytical expressions that characterize the mechanisms by which minimum wages can improve efficiency, and how these deteriorate at higher minimum wages. We provide a method to separate welfare gains into two channels: efficiency and redistribution. Under both channels and Utilitarian social welfare weights the optimal minimum wage is $15, but alternative weights can rationalize anything from $0 to $31. Under only the efficiency channel, the optimal minimum wage is narrowly around $8, robust to social welfare weights, and generates small welfare gains that recover only 2 percent of the efficiency losses from monopsony power.

Problems replication traditional mortality salience effect on national patriotism, democratic values, processing speed, psychophysiological responses, ingroup identification, and pro-sociality; effect of death reminders is less robust than assumed

Mortality salience effects fail to replicate in traditional and novel measures. Bjørn Sætrevik, Hallgeir Sjåstad. Meta-Psychology, Vol 6, Jan 17 2022. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8730-1038

Abstract: Mortality salience (MS) effects, where death reminders lead to ingroup-bias and defensive protection of one’s world-view, have been claimed to be a fundamental human motivator. MS phenomena have ostensibly been identified in several hundred studies within the “terror management theory” framework, but transparent and high-powered replications are lacking. Experiment 1 (N = 101 Norwegian lab participants) aimed to replicate the traditional MSeffect on national patriotism, with additional novel measures of democratic values and pro-sociality. Experiment2 (N = 784 US online participants) aimed to replicate the MS effect on national patriotism in a larger sample, with ingroup identification and pro-sociality as additional outcome measures. The results showed that neither experiment replicated the traditional MS effect on national patriotism. The experiments also failed to support conceptual replications and underlying mechanisms on democratic values, processing speed, psychophysiological responses, ingroup identification, and pro-sociality. This indicates that the effect of death reminders is less robust and generalizable than previously assumed.

Keywords: Mortality salience , death reminders, worldview defence , terror management , replication

Customers are more likely to tip when paying by cash rather than by credit; customers dining alone are less likely to tip than customers in a group; men are more likely to tip relative to women when paying by cash

Cash or Card? Impression Management and Restaurant Tipping Behavior. Vikas Kakkar, King King Li. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, January 17 2022, 101837. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101837

Highlights

•Customers are more likely to tip when paying by cash rather than by credit.

•Customers dining alone are less likely to tip than customers in a group.

•Men are more likely to tip relative to women when paying by cash.

•The visibility of cash tips is exploited for impression management by customers.

Abstract: Existing literature in economics and psychology has documented that impression management is an important motivator of human behavior. However, most of the existing evidence is based on laboratory experiments, where the concern for impression management is artificially induced. We hand-collect a unique data set on restaurant tipping and use the mode of payment to discriminate between impression management and other possible motivations for tipping in a naturally occurring environment. The impression management hypothesis predicts that consumers will tip more frequently when paying by cash, relative to paying by a credit card, because their tipping behavior can be publicly observed and enables them to foster a positive social image. Our three main findings are that (a) the probability of tipping is significantly higher when paying by cash; (b) customers dining alone are significantly less likely to tip and tip significantly lower amounts when paying by cash; and (c) men are significantly more likely to tip and tip larger amounts relative to women. These results are broadly consistent with the impression management hypothesis.

Keywords: Social imageimpression managementmode of payment

Staggered termination of compulsory religious education across German states reduced religiosity, led to more equalized gender roles, fewer marriages & children, higher labor-market participation & earnings; no effect in ethical & political values

Can Schools Change Religious Attitudes? Evidence from German State Reforms of Compulsory Religious Education Benjamin W. Arold, Ludger Woessmann, Larissa Zierow. Ludwigs-Maximilians University’s Center for Economic Studies, working paper 9504-2022. https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp9504.pdf

Abstract: We study whether compulsory religious education in schools affects students’ religiosity as adults. We exploit the staggered termination of compulsory religious education across German states in models with state and cohort fixed effects. Using three different datasets, we find that abolishing compulsory religious education significantly reduced religiosity of affected students in adulthood. It also reduced the religious actions of personal prayer, church-going, and church membership. Beyond religious attitudes, the reform led to more equalized gender roles, fewer marriages and children, and higher labor-market participation and earnings. The reform did not affect ethical and political values or non-religious school outcomes.

JEL-Codes: Z120, I280, H750.

Keywords: religious education, religiosity, school reforms

'Assholes' described by participants were typically middle-aged, predominantly male, and included romantic partners, coworkers, bosses, family members, and friends

Sharpe, Brinkley M., Courtland Hyatt, Donald Lynam, and Josh Miller. 2022. “"they Are Such an Asshole": Describing the Targets of a Common Insult Among English-speakers in the United States.” PsyArXiv. January 16. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7vpx8

Abstract: Insults convey information about the speaker’s perception of the target’s personality. Previous research has found that several commonly used insults (“asshole,” “dick,” “bitch”) are uniformly associated with self- and other-reported antagonism (or low Agreeableness). We aimed to replicate and extend these findings by focusing on the insult “asshole,” a common insult used to refer to both men and women. In the present study, participants (n = 397) described the “biggest assholes” in their lives using a measure of the Five-Factor Model of personality. “Assholes” described by participants were typically middle-aged, predominantly male, and included romantic partners, coworkers, bosses, family members, and friends. Results showed that “assholes” were perceived to be characterized by interpersonally relevant traits (i.e., low Agreeableness, high Anger). The consensus Five Factor Model profile for target “assholes” was similar to expert profiles of psychopathic, antisocial, and narcissistic personality disorders. Exploratory analyses conducted on open-ended descriptions of nominated bothersome “asshole-related” behaviors revealed common themes including manipulation, aggression, irresponsibility, and entitlement.

Legitimizing marital infidelity thru the diffusion of responsibility, the attribution of blame on the cheated partner, advantageous comparisons with other immoral acts, justifying infidelity through certain benefits, and minimizing its negative consequences

Lisman, Carmen, and Andrei C. Holman. 2022. “Innocent Cheaters: A New Scale Measuring the Moral Disengagement of Marital Infidelity.” PsyArXiv. January 16. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pbc49

Abstract: Marital infidelity is both socially perceived as immoral and very frequent. This contradiction might be explained through the process of moral disengagement, specifically by the use of certain socially shared moral justifications of infidelity, which consequently foster unfaithful behavior. This research developed and examined the Infidelity Moral Disengagement Scale (IMDS), aiming to capture the strategies of morally legitimizing infidelity used among people engaged in marital relationships. Across two studies (total N = 609 married participants) we investigated the dimensions and psychometric properties of the IMDS. Results showed that the dominant strategies of legitimizing marital infidelity are the diffusion of responsibility, the attribution of blame on the cheated partner, advantageous comparisons with other immoral acts, justifying infidelity through certain benefits, and minimizing its negative consequences. The IMDS emerged as negatively related to moral identity and strongly associated to people’s past infidelity and to their tendency to engage in unfaithful behaviors.

Underestimating Others’ Desire for Constructive Feedback: In this study, only 2.6% of individuals provided feedback to survey administrators that the administrators had food or marker on their faces

“Just Letting You Know…”: Underestimating Others’ Desire for Constructive Feedback. Nicole Abi-Esber, Jennifer Abel, Juliana Schroeder, Francesca Gino. Harvard Business School, Working Paper 22-009. https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/22-009_f209da0a-61ff-4594-ac18-2e84d142159c.pdf

Abstract: People often avoid giving feedback to others even when it would help fix a problem immediately. Indeed, in a pilot field study (N=155), only 2.6% of individuals provided feedback to survey administrators that the administrators had food or marker on their faces. Five experiments (N=1,984) identify a possible reason for the lack of feedback: people underestimate how much others want to receive constructive feedback. We examine two reasons why people might underestimate others’ desire for feedback: considerations about their own experience (e.g., anticipating discomfort giving feedback or a harmed relationship with the receiver) and/or considerations about the receiver’s experience (e.g., anticipating discomfort receiving feedback or the feedback not being valuable). In Experiment 1, participants underestimated others’ desire for feedback across multiple situations. This underestimation persisted when participants recalled giving feedback (Experiment 2) and when participants gave live feedback to their relationship partners in the laboratory (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 tests two interventions to make feedback-givers more accurate: taking the receiver’s perspective (making feedback-givers consider the receiver’s experience more) or having someone else provide the feedback (making feedback-givers consider their own experience less). Both interventions led to more accurate estimates of receivers’ desire for feedback, but the perspective-taking intervention increased accuracy most. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that underestimating others’ desire for feedback was associated with giving less feedback in a public speaking contest and less improvement in the feedback-receiver’s performance. People’s tendency to underestimate others’ desire for feedback can lead them to withhold feedback that could be helpful.

Keywords: feedback; help; prosocial; relationships; misprediction

Protestant activities in China since 1870s contributed to long-run economic growth; the missionaries’ endeavors persisted in China through human capital channel

The long-term effects of protestant activities in China. Yuyu Chen, Hui Wang, Se Yan. Journal of Comparative Economics, January 13 2022. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.12.002

Research highlights

• Protestant activities in China since 1870s contributed to long-run economic growth

• Missionaries conducted disaster relief to effectively convert local people

• Missionaries promoted Western education and health care in China since 1870s

• The missionaries’ endeavors persisted in China through human capital channel

Abstract: Combining China's county-level data on Protestant density before 1920 and socioeconomic indicators in 2000, we find persistent positive effects of historical missionary activities on contemporary growth. Using disaster frequency as an instrument for Protestant distribution, we find stronger IV results. We further find that although improvements in education and health care account for a sizable portion of the total effects, other channels such as transformed social values may also matter. Our findings acknowledge the pioneering effects of missionary work in China's modernization, and imply that China's recent growth may benefit from of human capital and social values acquired in history.

Keywords: Chinese economyProtestant activitiesEconomic GrowthEducation