From 2012, Status quo maintenance has several mechanisms; loss aversion, regret avoidance, repeated exposure, rationalization and assumption of goodness due to mere existence and longevity create a preference for existing states

From 2012: Bias in Favor of the Status Quo. Scott Eidelman, Christian S. Crandall. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00427.x

Abstract: People favor the existing and longstanding states of the world. Rational explanations for status quo maintenance are complemented by a number of non‐rational mechanisms; loss aversion, regret avoidance, repeated exposure, and rationalization create a preference for existing states. We show that the status quo also benefits from a simple assumption of goodness due to mere existence and longevity; people treat existence as a prima facie case for goodness, aesthetic and ethical Longevity increases this preference. These biases operate heuristically, forming barriers to cognitive and social change.

Check also  From 2010: The longer something is thought to exist, the better it is evaluated

From 2010: Longer is better. Scott Eidelman, Jennifer Pattershall, Christian S.Crandallb. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 46, Issue 6, November 2010, Pages 993-998. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/05/from-2010-longer-something-is-thought.html

From 2010: The longer something is thought to exist, the better it is evaluated

From 2010: Longer is better. Scott Eidelman, Jennifer Pattershall, Christian S.Crandallb. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 46, Issue 6, November 2010, Pages 993-998. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.07.008

Abstract: The longer something is thought to exist, the better it is evaluated. In Study 1, participants preferred an existing university requirement over an alternative; this pattern was more pronounced when the existing requirement was said to be in place for a longer period of time. In Study 2, participants rated acupuncture more favorably as a function of how old the practice was described. Aesthetic judgments of art (Study 3) and nature (Study 4) were also positively affected by time in existence, as were gustatory evaluations of an edible consumer good (Study 5). Features of the research designs argue against mere exposure, loss aversion, and rational inference as explanations for these findings. Instead, time in existence seems to operate as a heuristic; longer means better.

Yoga and meditation are highly popular. Purportedly, they foster well-being by “quieting the ego” or, more specifically, curtailing self-enhancement. We observed that, instead, they boost self-enhancement

Gebauer, Jochen, Nehrlich, A.D., Stahlberg, D., Sedikides, Constantine, Hackenschmidt, D, Schick, D, Stegmaie, C A, Windfelder, C. C, Bruk, A and Mander, J V (2018) Mind-body practices and the self: yoga and meditation do not quiet the ego, but instead boost self-enhancement. Psychological Science, 1-22. (In Press). https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/420273

Abstract: Mind-body practices enjoy immense public and scientific interest. Yoga and meditation are highly popular. Purportedly, they foster well-being by “quieting the ego” or, more specifically, curtailing self-enhancement. However, this ego-quieting effect contradicts an apparent psychological universal, the self-centrality principle. According to this principle, practicing any skill renders it self-central, and self-centrality breeds self-enhancement. We examined those opposing predictions in the first tests of mind-body practices’ self-enhancement effects. Experiment 1 followed 93 yoga students over 15 weeks, assessing self-centrality and self-enhancement after yoga practice (yoga condition, n = 246) and without practice (control condition, n = 231). Experiment 2 followed 162 meditators over 4 weeks (meditation condition: n = 246; control condition: n = 245). Self-enhancement was higher in the yoga (Experiment 1) and meditation (Experiment 2) conditions, and those effects were mediated by greater self-centrality. Additionally, greater self-enhancement mediated mind-body practices’ well-being benefits. Evidently, neither yoga nor meditation quiet the ego; instead, they boost self-enhancement.

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Supplemental

S1. We assessed agentic narcissism with the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988), the most widely used measure of agentic narcissism (Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Holland, 2012). We administered a 4-item short-form, analogous to our assessment of communal narcissism (see Experiment 1’s Method section in the main text). We selected items with a good item-total correlation, adequate content-breadth, and high face-validity. The four items were: “I like having authority over people,” “I am more capable than other people,” “I think I am a special person,” and “I like to be the center of attention” (1=does not apply at all, 7=applies completely) (.63≤ɑs≤.77, ɑ average=.71). We intermixed items assessing agentic and communal narcissism.
[...]
S2. In Experiment 1, we assessed self-centrality and self-enhancement with the following items.

Self-centrality: “Executing correctly the asanas (yoga positions) that we were taught is...,” “Focusing mindfully on the exercises across the whole yoga class is...,” “Holding the asanas (yoga positions) as long as we were taught is...,” and “Integrating the content taught in the yoga class into my everyday life is...” (1=not at all central to me, 11=central to me).

Better-than-average: “In comparison to the average participant of my yoga class, my ability to execute correctly the asanas (yoga positions) that we were taught is...,” “In comparison to the average participant of my yoga class, my ability to focus mindfully on the exercises across the whole yoga class is...,” “In comparison to the average participant of my yoga class, my ability to hold the asanas (yoga positions) as long as we were taught is...,” and “In comparison to the average participant of my yoga class, my ability to integrate the content taught in the yoga class into my everyday life is...” The rating-scale ranged from 1 (well below average) via 6 (average) to 11 (well above average).

Communal narcissism: “I have a very positive influence on others,” “I will be well known for the good deeds I will have done,” “I am the most caring person in my social surrounding,” and “I am going to bring peace and justice to the world” (1=does not apply at all, 7=applies completely).

Self-esteem: “At the moment, I have high self-esteem” (1=does not apply at all, 7=applies completely).
[...]
S7. In Experiment 2, we assessed self-centrality, self-enhancement, and well-being with the following items.

Self-centrality: The items started with the stem “How central is it for you...” and continued as follows: “...to be a loving person?,” “...to be free from hatred?,” “...to be a kindhearted person?,” “...to be free from greed?,” “...to be a caring person?,” “...to be free from bias?,” “...to be an understanding person?,” “...to be free from envy?,” “...to be a helpful person?,” “...to be free from egotism?” (1=not at all central me, 81=very central to me).

Better-than-average: The items started with the stem “In comparison to the average participant of this study,...” and continued as follows: “...I am a loving person,” “...I am free from hatred,” “...I am a kindhearted person,” “...I am free from greed,” “...I am a caring person,” “...I am free from bias,” “...I am an understanding person,” “...I am free from envy,” “...I am a helpful person,” “...I am free from egotism” (1=very much below average, 81=very much above average).

Communal narcissism: We used the full 16-item Communal Narcissism Inventory, which can be found in Gebauer et al. (2012).

Self-esteem: We used the full 10-item Self-Esteem Scale, which can be found in Rosenberg (1965).

Hedonic well-being: We used the following nine items to assess hedonic well-being’s affective component. “I am happy,” “I am anxious” (reverse-coded), “I feel satisfied,” “I am depressed” (reverse-coded), “I feel positive,” “I am frustrated” (reverse-coded), “I am cheerful,” “I am upset” (reverse-coded), and “I feel blue” (reverse-coded). We used the full 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale to assess hedonic well-being’s cognitive component (1=absolutely wrong, 81=absolutely right), and the items of that scale can be found in Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin (1985).

Eudemonic well-being: “I judge myself by what I think is important, not by the values of what others think is important,” “The demands of everyday life often get me down,” “For me, life has been a continuous process of learning, changing, and growth,” “Maintaining close relationships has been difficult and frustrating for me,” “Some people wander aimlessly through life, but I am not one of them,” “In many ways, I feel disappointed about my achievements in life,” “I tend to be influenced by people with strong opinions,” “In general, I feel I am in charge of the situation in which I live,” “I gave up trying to make big improvements or changes in my life a long time ago,” “People would describe me as a giving person, willing to share my time with others,” “I sometimes feel as if I’ve done all there is to do in life,” “I like most aspects of my personality” (1=absolutely wrong, 81=absolutely right).

Experiment 2 contained two additional dependent variables. We included them for a different project, and they are irrelevant to the present article (i.e., they did not tap into self-centrality, self-enhancement, or well-being). One measure was Neff’s (2003) Self-Compassion Scale in its 6-item short-form (Dyllick-Brenzinger, 2010). The other measure contained 10 vignettes. Each briefly described an ambiguous behavior that can be interpreted as a display of weakness or strength. For example, one vignette read: “If I am the first to apologize after a fight with my relationship partner, I display...” (1=weakness, 81=strength). Experiment 2 was the first study to administer this newly devised measure.
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S10. Parallel to Experiment 1 (see S5), we tested the alternative explanation that the findings are driven by meditation beginners, who may have not yet acquired the necessary experience and skill for meditation to unfold its ego-quieting effect. Hence, we examined the cross-level interactions between meditation (vs. control) expertise (i.e., years of practice) on self-centrality and on self-enhancement (g-factor). Expertise neither moderated the meditation effect on self-centrality, B=-.05, 95% CI [-.16, .05], SE=.05, t=-1.00, nor the meditation effect on self-enhancement, B=.001, 95% CI [-.09, .09], SE=.05, t=0.03. Once again, the results clearly favor the SCP-universal hypothesis over its alternative explanation.

Adult Human Hippocampus: No New Neurons in Sight

Adult Human Hippocampus: No New Neurons in Sight. Jon I Arellano, Brian Harding, Jean-Leon Thomas. Cerebral Cortex, bhy106, https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhy106

Abstract: In this issue of Cerebral Cortex, Cipriani et al. are following up on the recent report of Sorrels et al. to add novel immunohistological observations indicating that, unlike rodents, adult and aging humans do not acquire new neurons in the hippocampus. The common finding emerging from these 2 different, but almost simultaneous studies is highly significant because the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus was, until recently, considered as the only structure in the human brain that may continue neurogenesis throughout the full life span.

Keywords: adult neurogenesis, dentate gyrus, human hippocampus

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During the lifetime of most vertebrate animals, there is continuous neuronal addition and/or turnover, but this seemingly useful capacity decreases drastically during evolution (e.g., Jacobson 1970). The classical neuroanatomists generally believed that, after the developmental period which ends after puberty or sometimes during adolescence, the human neuronal assembly becomes stabilized (e.g., Ramon y Cajal 1913-1914). However, a paper published 2 decades ago in Nature Medicine (Eriksson et al. 1998) reported the detection in brain neural cells of deoxybromouridine (BrdU) initially administered to cancer patients for diagnostic purposes. This finding convinced a great number of scientists and lay people that the hippocampus was not different in humans than in other mammalian species, as it seemed to also generate new neurons during the entire life span. This possibility has been considered by many as a promise for endogenous cell replacement therapies for aging and neurological diseases as well as for CNS injury repair.

Although some studies have suggested caution in the interpretation of BrdU, showing a toxic effect and its incorporation into non-dividing cells damaged by drugs or exposed to hypoxia/ ischemia (e.g., Kuan et al. 2004; Breunig et al. 2007; Spector and Johanson 2007; Duque and Rakic 2015), the report by Eriksson et al. sparkled the field, and was followed by a number of studies that tried to ratify those results using immunohistochemical methods to identify markers of neurogenesis in postmortem human tissue. Those markers were aimed to progenitors (GFAP, Nestin, vimentin, Sox2), proliferating cells (Ki67, MCM2, PCNA), and immature neurons (DCX, PSANCAM, Tuj1). However, those studies have produced heterogeneous, inconclusive, sometimes contradictory results. One important obstacle is the ability to obtain well-preserved human tissues with a short postmortem delay, that may allow to obtain clear, reliable immunostaining.  Another caveat is that many of those reports studied only one marker of neurogenesis, producing inconclusive results. For example, using only Ki67 or MCM2 to identify proliferating cells without further characterization, is not a reliable method to assess neurogenesis, as the labeled cells might be producing oligodendrocytes or microglial cells (Reif et al. 2006; Knoth et al.  2010). The use of PCNA has added a lot of confusion to the field, as it is an inconsistent and unreliable marker of proliferation (Reif et al. 2006; Sanai et al. 2007). Also, morphological analysis of the cells labeled is a must, as for example, the markers of progenitors are shared with reactive astrocytes. Also DCX and PSANCAM expression has been reported in small cells with scant cytoplasm (Knoth et al. 2010; Jin et al. 2004), a morphology that is not expected in immature, migratory neurons.

Spalding et al. (2013) used an alternative technique to assess cell renewal, the neuronal content of C14 in the hippocampus. The increased levels of C14 in hippocampal neurons were interpreted as the consequence of a high and sustained level of neurogenesis in the dentate gyrus along life, in spite of the difficulty to reconcile this data with other studies in human (Knoth et al. 2010) and rodents (Ben Abdallah et al. 2010) showing that hippocampal neurogenesis has an early exponential decline before reaching low, stable adult levels.
At the time of writing this commentary, a new report has been published supporting the model that neurogenesis in the human hippocampus persists throughout adulthood (Boldrini et al. 2018). The authors of this study have, however, based their conclusion on disputable interpretations of immunelabeled cell types: some of the DCX- and PSA-NCAM-positive entities shown belong to the category of small and rounded cells described before, far from the typical elongated morphology of newly generated neurons. Also, cells identified as neuronal progenitors are Nestin- and GFAP-positive cells that do not have the characteristic polarized, radial-like morphology of progenitors and rather look very much like astrocytes.

It is clear that, irrespective of the caveats, there is widespread enthusiasm by the prospect of adult neurogenesis in humans and its therapeutic possibilities. As far as we know, there has been only one report published in 2016 (Dennis et al.  2016) reporting that hippocampal neurogenesis in adult humans is negligible. The authors found only an insignificant number of proliferating progenitors that corresponded to microglial cells and scarce DCX-expressing cells in the adult human hippocampus.

It is therefore quite a coincidence that, almost simultaneously, 2 independent papers coming from different parts of the world have used a similar approach and methodology leading to converging results and the following similar conclusions: hippocampal neurogenesis in humans decays exponentially during childhood and is absent or negligible in the adult. Those 2 papers are Sorrells et al. (2018) from the lab of Alvarez-Buylla in USA published in March in Nature, and the study by Cipriani and coworkers from the Adle-Biassette’s lab in France published in this issue of Cerebral Cortex (2018; 27: 000–000).

Cipriani et al. used a large battery of antibodies to identify progenitors, cell proliferation and differentiating neurons as well as their glial and vascular environment in the human hippocampus from early gestation to aging adults. As expected, they found abundant proliferating progenitors and newly generated neurons in the hippocampus during gestation, but they also observed a sharp decline of all the neurogenic markers after birth. It is worth to note that the analysis of hippocampal tissues at gestational and perinatal stages clearly assessed the presence of numerous proliferating progenitors and immature neurons. But those numbers decreased rapidly in early infancy, and by the age of 7, the authors detected only a few progenitors without significant proliferation and no DCX+ and Tuj1+ colabeled cells. In adults, a single cell co-expressing Nestin and Ki67 was found out of 19 samples, and only a few cells expressing DCX displaying a non-neuronal morphology (small nucleus, scant cytoplasm) were detected.

Interestingly, Cipriani et al. show almost identical results to those of Sorrells, Paredes and coworkers. Both 2 papers provide a high quality analysis of developmental and adult neurogenesis in the human hippocampus, while Sorrells et al. performed an exhaustive analysis, including transcriptome data that is, without a doubt, the most comprehensive to date. They combined the use of well-preserved human postmortem material and surgically resected hippocampi to assess for possible postmortem effects, and of an extensive battery of antibodies completed by electron microscopy analyses. As a key condition to the reliability of their study, they followed stringent criteria to identify differentiating neurons, based on the cellular morphology and the colocalization of DCX and PSA-NCAM. According to both Cipriani et al. and Sorrells, Paredes et al., DCX+ differentiating neurons, were absent from adult hippocampus samples. Both found however, small DCX+ cells with scant cytoplasm in adult samples, that were found by Sorrells, Paredes et al. to express oligodendroglial and microglial markers, expanding previous data of DCX expression in glial cells (Verwer et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2014).  Additionally, they analyzed the formation of the subgranular zone (SGZ) in humans, but they concluded that actually there is no SGZ compartment in the human dentate gyrus comparable to the SGZ of rodents. The SGZ is an important player, as it is the specific niche where postnatal progenitors coalesce and proliferate in all other mammals exhibiting adult neurogenesis. Thus, the lack of SGZ may explain the lack of adult neurogenesis in the human dentate gyrus.

As pointed out by Cipriani and coworkers in this issue, the reasoning behind their study is to shed light on the neurogenic potential of the human hippocampus as “little information about human adult neurogenesis and neural stem/progenitor cells exists to justify the investment of resources in developing new treatments in humans, and most of the available evidence is inconclusive or contradictory.” Definitely, their study together with Sorrells’ and Dennis’ contributes to bring solid and consistent arguments to inform the field about a real possibility: the human species is once again different, and no significant neurogenesis occurs in the adult human hippocampus. This finding is in tune with the lack of subventricular neurogenesis and migration of new neurons to the olfactory bulb in the adult human, which has already been consistently reported (Sanai et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2011; Bergmann et al. 2012).

Finally, the absence of significant neurogenesis in normal adult humans poses a logical question: why would the human brain loose what seems to be a useful ability: to add, renew and regenerate neurons? As well formulated in the last sentence of the abstract of Sorrells’ paper: “The early decline in hippocampal neurogenesis raises questions about how the function of the dentate gyrus differs between humans and other species in which adult hippocampal neurogenesis is preserved.” However, as pointed out by Rakic (1985), there may be an advantage in keeping your old neurons without adding new ones, when the aim is to acquire and preserve complex knowledge during many decades of life. Stability in the neuronal population over a lifetime may not be a bad thing after all.

75 years ago… New York Times debunks (vs. foments) a health scare

75 years ago… New York Times debunks (vs. foments) a health scare.  By Steven Milloy

From the May 9, 1943 edition, the New York Times defuses a new claim that declining soil fertility is causing all sorts of human health problems by pointing out that chronic diseases like cancer, diabetes and heart disease are primarily diseases associated with aging — which is what wealthy and healthy populations in developed countries tend to do.

Junkscience, May 2018, https://junkscience.com/2018/05/75-years-ago-new-york-times-debunks-vs-foments-a-health-scare/

The sunk-cost fallacy—pursuing an inferior alternative merely because we have previously invested significant, but nonrecoverable, resources in it—, a striking violation of rational decision making, can appear when costs are borne by someone other than the decision maker

The Interpersonal Sunk-Cost Effect. Christopher Y. Olivola. Psychological Science, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617752641

Abstract: The sunk-cost fallacy—pursuing an inferior alternative merely because we have previously invested significant, but nonrecoverable, resources in it—represents a striking violation of rational decision making. Whereas theoretical accounts and empirical examinations of the sunk-cost effect have generally been based on the assumption that it is a purely intrapersonal phenomenon (i.e., solely driven by one’s own past investments), the present research demonstrates that it is also an interpersonal effect (i.e., people will alter their choices in response to other people’s past investments). Across eight experiments (N = 6,076) covering diverse scenarios, I documented sunk-cost effects when the costs are borne by someone other than the decision maker. Moreover, the interpersonal sunk-cost effect is not moderated by social closeness or whether other people observe their sunk costs being “honored.” These findings uncover a previously undocumented bias, reveal that the sunk-cost effect is a much broader phenomenon than previously thought, and pose interesting challenges for existing accounts of this fascinating human tendency.

Keywords: decision making, heuristics, preferences, social influence, open data, open materials, preregistered

Tools do not erase but rather extend our intrinsic physical and cognitive skills; this extension is task specific because we found no evidence for superusers, benefitting from the use of a tool irrespective of the task

Osiurak, F., Navarro, J., Reynaud, E., & Thomas, G. (2018). Tools don’t—and won’t—make the man: A cognitive look at the future. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(5), 782-788. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000432

Abstract: The question of whether tools erase cognitive and physical interindividual differences has been surprisingly overlooked in the literature. Yet if technology is profusely available in a near or far future, will we be equal in our capacity to use it? We sought to address this unexplored, fundamental issue, asking 200 participants to perform 3 physical (e.g., fine manipulation) and 3 cognitive tasks (e.g., calculation) in both non–tool-use and tool-use conditions. Here we show that tools do not erase but rather extend our intrinsic physical and cognitive skills. Moreover, this phenomenon of extension is task specific because we found no evidence for superusers, benefitting from the use of a tool irrespective of the task concerned. These results challenge the possibility that technical solutions could always be found to make people equal. Rather, technical innovation might be systematically limited by the user’s initial degree of knowledge or skills for a given task.

The Napoleon Complex: When Shorter Men Take More

The Napoleon Complex: When Shorter Men Take More. Jill E. P. Knapen, Nancy M. Blaker, Mark Van Vugt. Psychological Science, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618772822

Abstract: Inspired by an evolutionary psychological perspective on the Napoleon complex, we hypothesized that shorter males are more likely to show indirect aggression in resource competitions with taller males. Three studies provide support for our interpretation of the Napoleon complex. Our pilot study shows that men (but not women) keep more resources for themselves when they feel small. When paired with a taller male opponent (Study 1), shorter men keep more resources to themselves in a game in which they have all the power (dictator game) versus a game in which the opponent also has some power (ultimatum game). Furthermore, shorter men are not more likely to show direct, physical aggression toward a taller opponent (Study 2). As predicted by the Napoleon complex, we conclude that (relatively) shorter men show greater behavioral flexibility in securing resources when presented with cues that they are physically less competitive. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Keywords: Napoleon complex, human height, status, behavioral flexibility, indirect aggression, open data

China's Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control

Creemers, Rogier, China's Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control (May 9, 2018). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175792

Abstract: The Social Credit System (SCS) is perhaps the most prominent manifestation of the Chinese government's intention to reinforce legal, regulatory and policy processes through the application of information technology. Yet its organizational specifics have not yet received academic scrutiny. This paper will identify the objectives, perspectives and mechanisms through which the Chinese government has sought to realise its vision of "social credit". Reviewing the system's historical evolution, institutional structure, central and local implementation, and relationship with the private sector, this paper concludes that it is perhaps more accurate to conceive of the SCS as an ecosystem of initiatives broadly sharing a similar underlying logic, than a fully unified and integrated machine for social control. It also finds that, intentions with regards to big data and artificial intelligence notwithstanding, the SCS remains a relatively crude tool. This may change in the future, and this paper suggests the dimensions to be studied in order to assess this evolution.

School Progress Among Children of Same-Sex Couples

School Progress Among Children of Same-Sex Couples. Caleb S. Watkins. Demography, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-018-0678-3

Abstract: This study uses logit regressions on a pooled sample of children from the 2012, 2013, and 2014 American Community Survey to perform a nationally representative analysis of school progress for a large sample of 4,430 children who reside with same-sex couples. Odds ratios from regressions that compare children between different-sex married couples and same-sex couples fail to show significant differences in normal school progress between households across a variety of sample compositions. Likewise, marginal effects from regressions that compare children with similar family dynamics between different-sex married couples and same-sex couples fail to predict significantly higher probabilities of grade retention for children of same-sex couples. Significantly lower grade retention rates are sometimes predicted for children of same-sex couples than for different-sex married couples, but these differences are sensitive to sample exclusions and do not indicate causal benefits to same-sex parenting.

Despite being more egalitarian, men with more education are more likely to have careers that give them privileged status in their marriages and may have “more to lose” in their career by changing their name. Men with less education than their wives are less likely to change their surname

Emily Fitzgibbons Shafer et al, Flipping the (Surname) Script: Men's Nontraditional Surname Choice at Marriage, Journal of Family Issues (2018). DOI: 10.1177/0192513X18770218

Abstract: Using unique, nationally representative data that asks individuals about their surname choice in marriage, we explore heterosexual men’s nontraditional surname choice. We focus on how education—both absolute and relative to wives’—correlates with nontraditional surname choice. Following class-based masculinities theory, we find that men with more education are less likely to choose a nontraditional surname. Despite being more egalitarian in attitudes, men with more education are more likely to have careers that give them privileged status in their marriages and may have “more to lose” in their career by changing their name. In addition, men with less education than their wives are less likely to change their surnames. We argue that this is consistent with compensatory gender display theory. Men having less education in marriage may translate into having less earning power, which is gender nonnormative as men are culturally expected to be primary breadwinners in marriage.

Those applying for a qualified job emphasized their competence while downplaying their warmth; role-playing as crime witnesses, they attenuated their warmth relative to their competence; those in the role of suspects of a severe crime chose to downplay their competence

Lindholm, T. & Yzerbyt, V., (2018). When Being Nice or Being Smart Could Bring You Down: Compensatory Dynamics in Strategic Self-presentation. International Review of Social Psychology. 31(1) , p. 16. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.136

Abstract: Research shows that the two fundamental dimensions of social perception, warmth and competence, are often negatively related in our perceptions of others, the so-called compensation effect. The current experiments investigate people’s use of such compensation when self-presenting strategically to reach a desired goal. In Experiment 1, participants applying for a qualified job emphasized their competence while downplaying their warmth. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants role-playing as crime witnesses similarly attenuated their warmth relative to their competence. In contrast, in Experiment 3, participants in the role of suspects of a severe crime chose to downplay their competence. Results suggest that self-presenters are sensitive to warmth-competence dynamics in social perception as a means to promote the optimal self-image given their specific goals.

Keywords: Strategic self-presentation,  warmth,  competence,  social compensation

Age of Fathers, Mutation, and Reproduction

Age of Fathers, Mutation, and Reproduction. In Evolution and Human Reproduction. Martin Fieder and Susanne Huber. In the Oxford Handbook of Evolution, Biology, and Society, Edited by Rosemary L. Hopcroft. DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190299323.013.29

Our DNA consists of roughly 3.2 billion base pairs (i.e., 3.2 billion pairs of adenine–thymine and guanine–cytosine covering the genomic information of humans, most of (p. 486) whose functions we do not yet understand) that, together with epigenetic signature, make us different from each other. Currently, we have only a relatively limited understanding of the phenotypical outcomes of our genetic makeup (Jobling, Hurles, & Tyler-Smith, 2013). Clearly, human genetics is extraordinarily complex. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these variations in the DNA make some of us better adapted than others to certain environments. Those better adapted individuals (in the respective environments) eventually end up with more descendants. Due to the reproductive benefits for those better adapted individuals, the genetic information associated with this beneficial phenotype will spread in a population. Adaptation, however, always refers to the current environment. If the environmental conditions change, then a successful adaptation to the original environment may have no or even negative consequences on fertility. Such a maladaptive condition decreases the reproductive success of its carrier or, in the worst-case scenario, causes that lineage to die out.

Most mutations are thought to be neutral—that is, exerting no or hardly detectable effects on the phenotype—and therefore have no immediate adaptive value. Other mutations are harmful, especially if they occur in protein-encoding DNA sequences leading to an altered protein. A small number of mutations, however, may ultimately lead to a phenotype better adapted than others to its current environment. Such a phenotype will be favored by selection. The actual rate of harmful, neutral, or positive mutations, however, remains difficult to estimate (Keightley, 2012), particularly the rate of mutations that are positively selected for. In two Drosophila populations, Schneider, Charlesworth, Eyre-Walker, and Keightley (2011) estimated the rate of positive selected mutations for amino acid coding sequences (i.e., non-synonymous mutations) to be between 1% and 2% of all occurring mutations.

Where do most of the mutations come from? The very recently discovered answer in humans is impressive—from the age of the father (Kong et al., 2012). According to Kong et al., the father’s age explains nearly all newly occurring (i.e., de novo) mutations in a child. Correspondingly, detrimental parental age effects have been demonstrated for a variety of Mendelian and mental disorders and even for educational attainment (for a review, see D’Onofrio et al., 2014). The reason is that in contrast to women, in whom all cell divisions in the egg are completed before birth, men continue producing sperm throughout their reproductive lives. Consequently, the number of cell divisions and chromosome replications that a sperm cell has gone through increases with the age at which the sperm is produced. This increases the risk that “errors” occur in terms of mutations (Crow, 2000).

Because the mutations induced by male age occur randomly in the human genome, the probability that they directly affect reproductive functioning is relatively low because a detrimental mutation occurring somewhere in our genome does not necessarily affect reproductive functioning. In such cases, an individual could still reproduce normally even if he or she carries a potentially harmful mutation. It would pass those harmful mutations on to the next generation, which may then accumulate over generations. It is thus conceivable that a mechanism may exist that helps avoid excessive mutation loads in future generations. We suggest that mate selection may provide such a mechanism to (p. 487) prevent too high mutation load. This view is supported by our recent findings based on a US sample (Wisconsin Longitudinal Study), in which we demonstrated that children of older fathers are less attractive (Huber & Fieder, 2014). Moreover, offspring of older fathers face a higher risk of remaining unmarried and therefore remaining childless (Fieder & Huber, 2015). Marriage was obligatory in the previously mentioned sample, thereby providing a good indicator for mating success. Comparable findings based on large human data sets have confirmed our results (Hayward, Lummaa, & Bazykin, 2015; Arslan et al., 2016). Similar effects of paternal age have also been reported in animal species ranging from bulb mites (Prokop, Stuglik, Żabińska, & Radwan, 2007) to house sparrows (Schroeder, Nakagawa, Rees, Mannarelli, & Burke, 2015). We therefore suggest that this phenomenon is a more fundamental biological principle: An individual’s mutation load could affect mate selection, thus helping to reduce the mutation load of the progeny.

This view is also in line with the mutation–selection balance theory, proposing that a balance of forces between constantly arising, mildly harmful mutations and selection causes variation in genetic quality and phenotypic condition (Miller, 2000; Keller, 2008). This makes it unlikely that the accumulation of new deleterious mutations leads to a detectable fitness decline in current human populations (Keightley, 2012). The mutation–selection balance is assumed to be particularly important in traits influenced by many genetic loci (multigenic, such as human reproduction), providing a large target size for mutations (Keller, 2008).

Although most of the mutations induced by the age of the father are considered neutral or may be harmful, a small proportion of them are advantageous and provide fitness benefits. This raises an interesting question: Are we able to detect potentially promising mutations in a mate that may be adaptive in the long term? Detecting mutations that in the future may lead to an adaptive phenotype is unlikely. We therefore assume that this is probably a random process. Nevertheless, one can speculate that individuals choose extraordinary traits in potential mates—that is, traits that may be associated with newly induced mutations. The numerous examples include the peacock’s tail (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999), bower birds (Uy & Borgia, 2000), as well as height (Stulp, Barrett, Tropf, & Mills, 2015) and social status in men (Fieder & Huber, 2007; Nettle & Pollet, 2008; Barthold, Myrskylä, & Jones, 2012; Hopcroft, 2015). If such traits carry adaptive benefits outweighing potentially negative impacts, then selection would favor both the carrier of those mutations and the carrier’s mating partners. Accordingly, mutations induced by a father’s age can also be viewed as a “driving force” of evolution. The reason is that without mutations, evolution would not have taken place at all, and without mutations introduced into the population by male age, evolution would at least have been much slower. The positive mutations induced by age might thus be considered an “engine of evolution,” leading to new phenotypes that could potentially be selected for.

Together with the usually higher status of older men, this positive effect might partially explain women’s preference for somewhat older men (Buss, 1989). Basically, this preference reflects a trade-off between benefits associated with higher status and possible detrimental mutations caused by higher paternal age that may be passed to (p. 488) the offspring. However, because some mutations may be adaptive, overall the benefits may outweigh the costs, at least if the age difference between spouses is not too large. Accordingly, women usually prefer men who are only moderately older than themselves (Buss, 1989; Buunk, Dijkstra, Fetchenhauer, & Kenrick, 2002; Schwarz & Hassebrauck, 2012).

Future studies may aim to measure the impact of mutations directly and not just indirectly via the age of fathers, examining, for instance, if there is any evidence for a potential link between father’s age, mutation rate, marriage fertility, and social status. According to D’Onofrio et al. (2014), higher paternal age is associated with lower educational attainment in the offspring. This finding suggests a possible association between de novo mutation rate and educational attainment, leading to the question whether social status goes beyond being solely culturally determined to also contain an inherited component. At least for educational attainment, this has recently been shown (Rietveld et al., 2013).

An empirical, 21st century evaluation of phrenology: The most rigorous evaluation to date says it is bogus

An empirical, 21st century evaluation of phrenology. O. Parker Jones, F. Alfaro-Almagro, S. Jbabdi. Cortex, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.04.011

Abstract: Phrenology was a nineteenth century endeavour to link personality traits with scalp morphology, which has been both influential and fiercely criticised, not least because of the assumption that scalp morphology can be informative of underlying brain function. Here we test the idea empirically rather than dismissing it out of hand. Whereas nineteenth century phrenologists had access to coarse measurement tools (digital technology referring then to fingers), we were able to re-examine phrenology using 21st century methods and thousands of subjects drawn from the largest neuroimaging study to date. High-quality structural MRI was used to quantify local scalp curvature. The resulting curvature statistics were compared against lifestyle measures acquired from the same cohort of subjects, being careful to match a subset of lifestyle measures to phrenological ideas of brain organisation, in an effort to evoke the character of Victorian times. The results represent the most rigorous evaluation of phrenological claims to date.

Keywords: phrenology; MRI

Participants had to make the real-life decision to administer an electroshock to a single mouse or allow five other mice to receive the shock. Responses to hypothetical dilemmas are not predictive of real-life dilemma behavior

Of Mice, Men, and Trolleys: Hypothetical Judgment Versus Real-Life Behavior in Trolley-Style Moral Dilemmas. Dries H. Bostyn, Sybren Sevenhant, Arne Roets. Psychological Science, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617752640

Abstract: Scholars have been using hypothetical dilemmas to investigate moral decision making for decades. However, whether people’s responses to these dilemmas truly reflect the decisions they would make in real life is unclear. In the current study, participants had to make the real-life decision to administer an electroshock (that they did not know was bogus) to a single mouse or allow five other mice to receive the shock. Our results indicate that responses to hypothetical dilemmas are not predictive of real-life dilemma behavior, but they are predictive of affective and cognitive aspects of the real-life decision. Furthermore, participants were twice as likely to refrain from shocking the single mouse when confronted with a hypothetical versus the real version of the dilemma. We argue that hypothetical-dilemma research, while valuable for understanding moral cognition, has little predictive value for actual behavior and that future studies should investigate actual moral behavior along with the hypothetical scenarios dominating the field.

Keywords: morality, utilitarianism, trolley, consequentialism, open data, open materials