The Higher Power of Religiosity Over Personality on Political Ideology. Aleksander Ksiazkiewicz, Amanda Friesen. Political Behavior, August 29 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-019-09566-5
Abstract: Two streams of research, culture war and system justification, have proposed that religious orientations and personality, respectively, play critical roles in political orientations. There has been only limited work integrating these two streams. This integration is now of increased importance given the introduction of behavior-genetic frameworks into our understanding of why people differ politically. Extant research has largely considered the influence of personality as heritable and religiosity as social, but this view needs reconsideration as religiosity is also genetically influenced. Here we integrate these domains and conduct multivariate analyses on twin samples in the U.S. and Australia to identify the relative importance of genetic, environmental, and cultural influences. First, we find that religiosity’s role on political attitudes is more heritable than social. Second, religiosity accounts for more genetic influence on political attitudes than personality. When including religiosity, personality’s influence is greatly reduced. Our results suggest religion scholars and political psychologists are partially correct in their assessment of the “culture wars”—religiosity and ideology are closely linked, but their connection is grounded in genetic predispositions.
Keywords: Religion Religiosity Personality Ideology Attitudes Genetics
Thursday, August 29, 2019
Why attitude to good people is not always positive?
Why attitude to good people is not always positive: explanation based on
decision theory. Part 3 (Why Should We Play Down Emotions: A
Theoretical Explanation) of "How to Make Decisions: Consider Multiple
Scenarios, Consult Experts, Play Down Emotions– Quantitative Explanation
of Common sense Ideas", by Julio Urenda et al. Technical Report
UTEP-CS-19-94, August 2019, to appear in Journal of Uncertain Systems,
2020, Vol. 14. Check http://www.cs.utep.edu/vladik/2019/tr19-94.pdf for a mathematical derivation of the conclusions.
Formulation of the problem. There are very good people in this world, people who empathize with others, people who actively help others. Based onall the nice and helpful things that these good people do, one would expect that other people would appreciate them, cherish them, and that, in general, their attitude towards these good people would be positive. However, in real life,the attitude is often neutral or even negative. The resulting emotions hurt our ability to listen to their advice and thus, improve our decisions. Why? Is there a rational explanation for these emotions?
...
Common sense explanation. From the common sense viewpoint, the above mathematics makes perfect sense: A very good person is unhappy if other people are unhappy. If we empathize with this person, we become unhappy too, and since people do not want to be unhappy, they prefer (at best) to ignore others’ unhappiness – or even blame them for their own unhappiness.
Formulation of the problem. There are very good people in this world, people who empathize with others, people who actively help others. Based onall the nice and helpful things that these good people do, one would expect that other people would appreciate them, cherish them, and that, in general, their attitude towards these good people would be positive. However, in real life,the attitude is often neutral or even negative. The resulting emotions hurt our ability to listen to their advice and thus, improve our decisions. Why? Is there a rational explanation for these emotions?
...
Common sense explanation. From the common sense viewpoint, the above mathematics makes perfect sense: A very good person is unhappy if other people are unhappy. If we empathize with this person, we become unhappy too, and since people do not want to be unhappy, they prefer (at best) to ignore others’ unhappiness – or even blame them for their own unhappiness.
Why IQ Test Scores Are Slightly Decreasing: Possible System-Based Explanation for the Reversed Flynn Effect
Why IQ Test Scores Are Slightly Decreasing: Possible System-Based Explanation for the Reversed Flynn Effect. Griselda Acosta, Eric Smith, and Vladik Kreinovich. Technical Report UTEP-CS-19-61, July 2019. http://www.cs.utep.edu/vladik/2019/tr19-61.pdf
Abstract: Researchers who monitor the average intelligence of human population have reasonably recently made an unexpected observation: that aftermany decades in which this level was constantly growing (this is knownas the Flynn effect), at present, this level has started decreasing again. Inthis paper, we show that this reversed Flynn effect can be, in principle, explained in general system-based terms: namely, it is similar to the fact that a control system usually overshoots before stabilizing at the desiredlevel. A similar idea may explain another unexpected observation - that the Universe's expansion rate, which was supposed to be decreasing, isactually increasing.1 Formulation of the Problem IQ tests: a brief reminder.
For many decades, researchers have been using standardized test to measure Intelligent Quotient (IQ, for short), a numerical values that describes how smarter is a person that an average population:
.the IQ value of 100 means that this person has average intelligence,
.values above 100 means that this person's intelligence is above average,and
.values below 100 means that this person's intelligence is below average.1
Of course, this is a rough estimation. Researchers have known that there are different types of intelligence, and that it is therefore not possible to adequately characterize one person's intelligence by using a single number. However, the IQ test score remains a reasonable overall (approximate) measure both of the individual intelligence and of the relative intelligence of different population groups. For example, a recent study showed that non-violent criminals are,on average, smarter than violent ones; this makes sense, since it takes someintelligence (ill-used but still intelligence) to steal without using violence.Average IQ scores grow: Flynn's effect.
Since the IQ scores describethe relation of a tested person's intelligence to an average intelligence at thegiven moment of time, researchers periodically estimate this average level of intelligence.
Somewhat unexpectedly, it turned out that for almost 100 years, the averagelevel of intelligence has been growing; see, e.g., [2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15, 18, 21]. Specifically:
.if we give average current folks the test from the 1930s, they will, onaverage, score way above 100, and
.vice versa, if we measure the intelligence of the 1930s folks in a currentscale, their average intelligence will be way below 100, at about the 80-90level.
This steady increase in intelligence is known as the Flynn effect, after a scientist who actively promoted this idea.
Why IQ scores grow: possible explanation.
There are many explanations for the growth in intelligence. One of the natural ones is that, in contrastthe old days, when in many professions, physical force was all that is neededto earn a living, nowadays intelligence is very important . non-intelligent jobshave been mostly taken up by machines. No one needs a galley slave to rowa boat, no one needs a strong man to lift heavy things, etc. It is thereforereasonable that modern life requires more intelligent activities, and this increasein solving intelligent problems naturally leads to an increased intelligence . justlike exercising the muscles leads to an improved physique.
Reverse Flynn effect.
While the intelligence scores have been steadily risingfor several decades, lately, a reverse phenomenon has been observed, when theaverage scores no longer grow; instead, they decline. This decline is not as bigas to wipe out the results of the previous decades of growth, but it is big enoughto be statistically significant; see, e.g., [1, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20].
How can we explain the reverse Flynn effect?
There are many differentexplanations for the reverse Flynn effect: that it has been caused by pollution,that it has been caused by declining education standards, etc.In this paper, we analyze this phenomenon from the general systems view-point, and conclude that, from the system.s viewpoint, a current small decline isnatural - and that we therefore do not need to be unnecessarily alarmed by this2 decline. In other words, in spite of this decline, it is still reasonable to remain optimistic.
Abstract: Researchers who monitor the average intelligence of human population have reasonably recently made an unexpected observation: that aftermany decades in which this level was constantly growing (this is knownas the Flynn effect), at present, this level has started decreasing again. Inthis paper, we show that this reversed Flynn effect can be, in principle, explained in general system-based terms: namely, it is similar to the fact that a control system usually overshoots before stabilizing at the desiredlevel. A similar idea may explain another unexpected observation - that the Universe's expansion rate, which was supposed to be decreasing, isactually increasing.1 Formulation of the Problem IQ tests: a brief reminder.
For many decades, researchers have been using standardized test to measure Intelligent Quotient (IQ, for short), a numerical values that describes how smarter is a person that an average population:
.the IQ value of 100 means that this person has average intelligence,
.values above 100 means that this person's intelligence is above average,and
.values below 100 means that this person's intelligence is below average.1
Of course, this is a rough estimation. Researchers have known that there are different types of intelligence, and that it is therefore not possible to adequately characterize one person's intelligence by using a single number. However, the IQ test score remains a reasonable overall (approximate) measure both of the individual intelligence and of the relative intelligence of different population groups. For example, a recent study showed that non-violent criminals are,on average, smarter than violent ones; this makes sense, since it takes someintelligence (ill-used but still intelligence) to steal without using violence.Average IQ scores grow: Flynn's effect.
Since the IQ scores describethe relation of a tested person's intelligence to an average intelligence at thegiven moment of time, researchers periodically estimate this average level of intelligence.
Somewhat unexpectedly, it turned out that for almost 100 years, the averagelevel of intelligence has been growing; see, e.g., [2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15, 18, 21]. Specifically:
.if we give average current folks the test from the 1930s, they will, onaverage, score way above 100, and
.vice versa, if we measure the intelligence of the 1930s folks in a currentscale, their average intelligence will be way below 100, at about the 80-90level.
This steady increase in intelligence is known as the Flynn effect, after a scientist who actively promoted this idea.
Why IQ scores grow: possible explanation.
There are many explanations for the growth in intelligence. One of the natural ones is that, in contrastthe old days, when in many professions, physical force was all that is neededto earn a living, nowadays intelligence is very important . non-intelligent jobshave been mostly taken up by machines. No one needs a galley slave to rowa boat, no one needs a strong man to lift heavy things, etc. It is thereforereasonable that modern life requires more intelligent activities, and this increasein solving intelligent problems naturally leads to an increased intelligence . justlike exercising the muscles leads to an improved physique.
Reverse Flynn effect.
While the intelligence scores have been steadily risingfor several decades, lately, a reverse phenomenon has been observed, when theaverage scores no longer grow; instead, they decline. This decline is not as bigas to wipe out the results of the previous decades of growth, but it is big enoughto be statistically significant; see, e.g., [1, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20].
How can we explain the reverse Flynn effect?
There are many differentexplanations for the reverse Flynn effect: that it has been caused by pollution,that it has been caused by declining education standards, etc.In this paper, we analyze this phenomenon from the general systems view-point, and conclude that, from the system.s viewpoint, a current small decline isnatural - and that we therefore do not need to be unnecessarily alarmed by this2 decline. In other words, in spite of this decline, it is still reasonable to remain optimistic.
When their own payoff is unknown, all subjects prefer a more unequal distribution provided it makes everyone weakly better off; 25% burn money to make things less unequal, even when it does not make anyone better off
Preferences over income distribution: Evidence from a choice experiment. Sophie Cetre et al. Journal of Economic Psychology, August 28 2019, 102202. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.102202
Highlights
• We elicit subjects preferences over pairs of payoff distributions within small groups, in a firm-like setting.
• When they do not know what their own payoff will be, all subjects prefer the more unequal distribution provided it makes everyone weakly better off. This is true, no matter whether income positions will be based on merit or luck.
• People change their choice when they learn about their own payoff rank.
• Even then, 75% of subjects prefer Pareto-dominant distributions.
• However, 25% engage into money burning at the top in order to reduce inequality, even when it does not make anyone better off.
• Even when their own money is at stake, 20% of subjects are willing to pay just to reduce the degree of inequality.
Abstract: Using a choice experiment in the lab, we assess the relative importance of different attitudes to income inequality. We elicit subjects’ preferences regarding pairs of payoff distributions within small groups, in a firm-like setting. We find that distributions that satisfy the Pareto-dominance criterion attract unanimous suffrage: all subjects prefer larger inequality provided it makes everyone weakly better off. This is true no matter whether payoffs are based on merit or luck. Unanimity only breaks once subjects’ positions within the income distribution are fixed and known ex-ante. Even then, 75% of subjects prefer Pareto-dominant distributions, but 25% of subjects engage in money burning at the top in order to reduce inequality, even when it does not make anyone better off. A majority of subjects embrace a more equal distribution if their own income or overall efficiency is not at stake. When their own income is at stake and the sum of payoffs remains unaffected, 20% of subjects are willing to pay for a lower degree of inequality.
Highlights
• We elicit subjects preferences over pairs of payoff distributions within small groups, in a firm-like setting.
• When they do not know what their own payoff will be, all subjects prefer the more unequal distribution provided it makes everyone weakly better off. This is true, no matter whether income positions will be based on merit or luck.
• People change their choice when they learn about their own payoff rank.
• Even then, 75% of subjects prefer Pareto-dominant distributions.
• However, 25% engage into money burning at the top in order to reduce inequality, even when it does not make anyone better off.
• Even when their own money is at stake, 20% of subjects are willing to pay just to reduce the degree of inequality.
Abstract: Using a choice experiment in the lab, we assess the relative importance of different attitudes to income inequality. We elicit subjects’ preferences regarding pairs of payoff distributions within small groups, in a firm-like setting. We find that distributions that satisfy the Pareto-dominance criterion attract unanimous suffrage: all subjects prefer larger inequality provided it makes everyone weakly better off. This is true no matter whether payoffs are based on merit or luck. Unanimity only breaks once subjects’ positions within the income distribution are fixed and known ex-ante. Even then, 75% of subjects prefer Pareto-dominant distributions, but 25% of subjects engage in money burning at the top in order to reduce inequality, even when it does not make anyone better off. A majority of subjects embrace a more equal distribution if their own income or overall efficiency is not at stake. When their own income is at stake and the sum of payoffs remains unaffected, 20% of subjects are willing to pay for a lower degree of inequality.
Democrats tend to score higher than Republicans on open-minded cognitive style variables; but these partisan differences have very little relationships with how they assess the strength of arguments they disagree with
Differences that don’t make much difference: Party asymmetry in open-minded cognitive styles has little relationship to information processing behavior. April Eichmeier, Neil Stenhouse. Research & Politics, August 28, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019872045
Abstract: We investigated the link between party identification and several cognitive styles that are associated with open-minded thinking. We used a web-based survey which involved participants rating the strength of an argument they initially disagreed with. Results showed that Democrats tend to score higher and Republicans tend to score lower on open-minded cognitive style variables. However, mediation analyses showed that these partisan differences in cognitive style generally have negligible relationships with how individuals assess the strength of arguments they disagree with. In other words, partisan differences in cognitive style may often make little meaningful difference to information processing.
Keywords: Partisan bias, motivated social cognition, motivated reasoning, political psychology, partisan asymmetry, cognitive style
Check also Does Media Literacy Help Identification of Fake News? Information Literacy Helps, but Other Literacies Don’t. S. Mo Jones-Jang, Tara Mortensen, Jingjing Liu. American Behavioral Scientist, August 28, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/08/does-media-literacy-help-identification.html
Abstract: We investigated the link between party identification and several cognitive styles that are associated with open-minded thinking. We used a web-based survey which involved participants rating the strength of an argument they initially disagreed with. Results showed that Democrats tend to score higher and Republicans tend to score lower on open-minded cognitive style variables. However, mediation analyses showed that these partisan differences in cognitive style generally have negligible relationships with how individuals assess the strength of arguments they disagree with. In other words, partisan differences in cognitive style may often make little meaningful difference to information processing.
Keywords: Partisan bias, motivated social cognition, motivated reasoning, political psychology, partisan asymmetry, cognitive style
Check also Does Media Literacy Help Identification of Fake News? Information Literacy Helps, but Other Literacies Don’t. S. Mo Jones-Jang, Tara Mortensen, Jingjing Liu. American Behavioral Scientist, August 28, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/08/does-media-literacy-help-identification.html
We sought to test whether stereotypes that women have better language skills than men would make men to underperform in language tests; found little evidence for stereotype threat effects on men in language tasks
Chaffee, Kathryn E., Nigel M. Lou, and Kimberly A. Noels. 2019. “Does Stereotype Threat Affect Men in Language Domains?.” PsyArXiv. August 28. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jzhuk
Abstract: Currently, boys and men tend to underperform in language domains in school and on standardized tests, and they are also underrepresented in language-related fields of study. Stereotype threat is one way in which psychologists have found that stereotypes can affect students’ performance and sense of belonging in academic subjects and test settings Researchers have traditionally found that when girls and women are reminded of stereotypes that math is for boys, girls and women tend to underperform on math tests. Stereotype threat has also been found to affect women’s sense of belonging in math settings. We sought to test whether stereotypes that women have better language skills than men would affect men in the same way. We conducted a series of four experiments (N=542) testing the effect of explicit stereotype threats on men’s performance in language-related tasks, and their sense of belonging to language-related domains. We found little evidence for stereotype threat effects on men in language tasks. Mini-meta analyses revealed aggregate effect sizes indistinguishable from zero across our studies, and Bayesian analysis suggested that the null hypothesis was consistently more likely than the alternative. Future research should explore other explanations for gender gaps in language.
Abstract: Currently, boys and men tend to underperform in language domains in school and on standardized tests, and they are also underrepresented in language-related fields of study. Stereotype threat is one way in which psychologists have found that stereotypes can affect students’ performance and sense of belonging in academic subjects and test settings Researchers have traditionally found that when girls and women are reminded of stereotypes that math is for boys, girls and women tend to underperform on math tests. Stereotype threat has also been found to affect women’s sense of belonging in math settings. We sought to test whether stereotypes that women have better language skills than men would affect men in the same way. We conducted a series of four experiments (N=542) testing the effect of explicit stereotype threats on men’s performance in language-related tasks, and their sense of belonging to language-related domains. We found little evidence for stereotype threat effects on men in language tasks. Mini-meta analyses revealed aggregate effect sizes indistinguishable from zero across our studies, and Bayesian analysis suggested that the null hypothesis was consistently more likely than the alternative. Future research should explore other explanations for gender gaps in language.
Are Humans Prepared to Detect, Fear, and Avoid Snakes? The Mismatch between Laboratory and Ecological Evidence
Are Humans Prepared to Detect, Fear, and Avoid Snakes? The Mismatch between Laboratory and Ecological Evidence. Carlos M. Coelho et al. Front. Psychol. Aug 28 2019, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02094
Abstract: Since Seligman's 1971 statement that the vast majority of phobias are about objects essential to the survival of a species, a multitude of laboratory studies followed, supporting the finding that humans learn to fear and detect snakes (and other animals) faster than other stimuli. Most of these studies used schematic drawings, images, or pictures of snakes, and only a small amount of fieldwork in naturalistic environments was done. We address fear preparedness theories, and automatic fast detection data from mainstream laboratory data and compares it with ethobehavioural information relative to snakes, predator-prey interaction, and snakes’ defensive kinematics strikes in order to analyse their potential matching. From this analysis four main findings arose, namely that: 1) Snakebites occur when people are very close to the snake and are unaware or unable to escape the bite; 2) Human visual detection and escape response is slow compared to the speed of snake strikes; 3) In natural environments, snake experts are often unable to see snakes existing nearby; 4) animate objects in general capture more attention over other stimuli and dangerous but recent objects in evolutionary terms are also able to be detected fast. The issues mentioned above pose several challenges to evolutionary psychology-based theories expecting to find special-purpose neural modules. The older selective habituation hypothesis (Schleidt, 1961), that prey animals start with a rather general predator image from which specific harmless cues are removed by habituation might deserve reconsideration.
Keywords: General feature detection, modular theory, snake bite kinematics, selective habituation hypothesis, evolutionary psychology
Abstract: Since Seligman's 1971 statement that the vast majority of phobias are about objects essential to the survival of a species, a multitude of laboratory studies followed, supporting the finding that humans learn to fear and detect snakes (and other animals) faster than other stimuli. Most of these studies used schematic drawings, images, or pictures of snakes, and only a small amount of fieldwork in naturalistic environments was done. We address fear preparedness theories, and automatic fast detection data from mainstream laboratory data and compares it with ethobehavioural information relative to snakes, predator-prey interaction, and snakes’ defensive kinematics strikes in order to analyse their potential matching. From this analysis four main findings arose, namely that: 1) Snakebites occur when people are very close to the snake and are unaware or unable to escape the bite; 2) Human visual detection and escape response is slow compared to the speed of snake strikes; 3) In natural environments, snake experts are often unable to see snakes existing nearby; 4) animate objects in general capture more attention over other stimuli and dangerous but recent objects in evolutionary terms are also able to be detected fast. The issues mentioned above pose several challenges to evolutionary psychology-based theories expecting to find special-purpose neural modules. The older selective habituation hypothesis (Schleidt, 1961), that prey animals start with a rather general predator image from which specific harmless cues are removed by habituation might deserve reconsideration.
Keywords: General feature detection, modular theory, snake bite kinematics, selective habituation hypothesis, evolutionary psychology
Wednesday, August 28, 2019
A difficult conversation: Delivering news of a fatal illness to one's own wife
A Difficult Conversation. Martin B. Wice. August 27, 2019. JAMA. 2019;322(8):727-728. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.11757
[Full text, references, etc., at the journal above]
In her late 50s, Cathy developed fatigue. Over the course of a few months, she began to take afternoon naps and fall asleep earlier than normal. Then, over a 2-week period, she gained 15 pounds. Overnight, her belly swelled full of fluid, and she appeared 7 months pregnant. The next day, Cathy's primary care physician sent her to the hospital emergency department for a CT scan of her abdomen and pelvis. As a physician myself seeing patients at another nearby hospital, I logged into the network computer and, with Cathy’s permission, reviewed her scan results with the emergency department physician over the phone. Cathy's imaging and subsequent peritoneal fluid were consistent with advanced ovarian cancer—to me, a death sentence. I had delivered poor prognoses many times during my career, so I took it upon myself to give Cathy the bad news and ensure that I would be with her during this difficult conversation. This was especially challenging because Cathy was no ordinary patient—she was my wife of 31 years.
I finished my rounds and quickly drove to the emergency department where Cathy was waiting. On the drive, questions rushed through my head. How do you tell the woman you love that this disease can be only temporarily contained with surgery and chemotherapy? How do you tell her that she will never see her children graduate from their respective professional schools, will never watch her children get married, will never meet her grandchildren, and will never enjoy her golden years? How do you tell your children that their mother will be gone in a few short years? How do I as a husband cope with the stress of caring for a wife severely compromised not only from her cancer but from the cancer treatments? How do I cope knowing that soon I will need to learn to live without my life partner, the love of my life, the person whom I and others consistently relied on for support?
Cathy would have known the answers to these questions. She was the one to whom friends, children of friends, and even her own children's classmates came for unbiased and compassionate advice. As a wife, she always provided support and direction. If I ever questioned her, she reminded me that agreeing with her demonstrated good judgment.
As a mother of twin boys, Cathy guided our children on their journey to becoming kind, giving, and productive adults. She was also their advocate. One of our sons struggled in school from a “central processing” hearing disorder because of which he could hear the sounds of speech but could not distinguish their meaning. Cathy supported him through a grueling therapy program and installed sound amplification systems in each of his classrooms so that he could hear his teachers' voices over the background noise. Cathy then went on to advocate for better diagnosis and treatment of all hearing impaired children in our community and had great success advocating for proper acoustics in each K-12 classroom in our area.
Cathy also supported my parents as if she were their own daughter. When my father developed Alzheimer disease, she helped care for him until his death. With our local Alzheimer Association, she created a handbook for hospitals on how to interact with patients with dementia, an endeavor that earned her the volunteer of the year award. When my mother had a stroke, Cathy cared for her in our home. Now, it was our turn to support, advocate for, and care for Cathy.
Once I arrived at the emergency department, I pulled myself together to have the most difficult conversation of my life. I called upon my training as a physician to deliver bad news: you assess the patient's medical, functional, emotional, and spiritual needs, as well as the patient’s family's needs. After weighing the pros and cons of each option, you determine the best approach to address these needs. You then sit down with the patient and family members and have a private, nonjudgmental, and supportive conversation. Speaking at eye level, you discuss the situation as partners. You pause and allow the information to sink in. You have a box of tissues at the ready. You offer a calming touch as appropriate. If and when the patient and family members are able to continue the discussion, you outline the various scenarios and the best outcomes. You pause again. You allow the patient and family to respond further. You address their concerns and questions. I had done this many times but never as both the doctor guiding the conversation and the family taking it in.
I sat at Cathy's side and held her hand. I called upon my extensive training to navigate this conversation, and then delivered the horrible news. “Your abdomen is filled with abnormal cells, cells that are from advanced ovarian cancer,” I said, still overwhelmed and trying to contain my own shock. I paused to give both her and me time to process the information. As husband and wife, we shed tears together. I promised to always advocate for her, always seek out the best possible care for her, and always be there for her. The gynecologic oncologist arrived, and we discussed the treatment plan. I vacillated between 2 worlds: at times, a physician; at times, a worried husband and now caregiver. This would be a twilight zone I would never leave. We shared the initial shock of her diagnosis the remainder of the night. Neither one of us had much sleep. We did what we always did in a crisis: we held each other tight for mutual support.
The next day, we celebrated our wedding anniversary with Cathy undergoing a bowel prep for the imminent tumor debulking procedure. Being board-certified in both internal medicine as well as physical medicine and rehabilitation and with official orders from her oncologist, I organized a customized cancer rehabilitation program for Cathy. And I kept my promise. I supported Cathy through her initial surgery and then through her multiple cycles of chemotherapy and its debilitating consequences: the fatigue, low blood counts and multiple transfusions, pneumonias and urinary tract infections, recurrent nausea and vomiting, hair loss, painful peripheral neuropathy, edema, and “chemo brain.” She lost strength, balance, hearing, renal function, mobility, and she lost her way of life.
As a husband, I provided her emotional support to counteract her frustrations, fears, and depression. I provided physical support when necessary, helping her bathe, dress, stand, and walk. When I could, I took her to chemotherapy. When others took her, I would visit her in the outpatient cancer center. When she was hospitalized, I would spend the night with her. Later, when she lost all bowel function, I connected her to intravenous fluids each morning and night. When her liver stopped working altogether, I took her home to die in a familiar setting, surrounded by her immediate family. Cathy passed away 2 days later, 3 and a half years after her initial diagnosis, with her sons and me at her bedside.
In this time of challenge, I found inspiration in these words by philosopher John O’Donohue1:
When the reverberations of shock subside in you,
May grace come to restore you to balance.
May it shape a new space in your heart
To embrace this illness as a teacher
Who has come to open your life to new worlds.
I have grown a great deal in my “new world.” I rebalanced my life during Cathy’s illness and after her death. She and I spent our remaining time together to the fullest, and I have since continued living each day as if it is my last. I developed a better appreciation for relationships, the wonders of nature, and my connection to the rest of the world. There is new space in my heart that has allowed me to deepen established and new relationships. My love and support for our children increased, as I did my best to compensate for the love and support that Cathy had so generously given in life. In her final days, Cathy told me to find someone new to share my life, and I did. Cathy’s illness taught me that the challenges of disease can enhance people’s lives, and I am grateful for this lesson in my own.
On a professional level, Cathy’s illness strengthened my empathy for and commitment to patients and their families at intense times of need. Each time I give bad news, I am transported back to the emergency department with Cathy. I not only relive the delivery of Cathy’s cancer diagnosis; I relive the shock of just having received it. I will never forget being caught in the world of a physician, a loving husband, and a caregiver. My new tripartite identity may not be a perspective I anticipated but is one that has enhanced the quality of care I provide.
With her diagnosis, Cathy and I were forced to acknowledge that life is limited, which gave our lives and the lives around us so much more meaning. This is a legacy Cathy gave to me. No difficult conversation can ever replace this.
...
Additional Information: I thank Elizabeth Mueller, BS, Elise Alspach, PhD, and Kathleen Schoch, PhD, for editorial assistance and feedback in association with InPrint: A Scientific Editing Network at Washington University in St Louis. None were compensated beyond their usual salary. I also thank my son for allowing me to share this story.
[Full text, references, etc., at the journal above]
In her late 50s, Cathy developed fatigue. Over the course of a few months, she began to take afternoon naps and fall asleep earlier than normal. Then, over a 2-week period, she gained 15 pounds. Overnight, her belly swelled full of fluid, and she appeared 7 months pregnant. The next day, Cathy's primary care physician sent her to the hospital emergency department for a CT scan of her abdomen and pelvis. As a physician myself seeing patients at another nearby hospital, I logged into the network computer and, with Cathy’s permission, reviewed her scan results with the emergency department physician over the phone. Cathy's imaging and subsequent peritoneal fluid were consistent with advanced ovarian cancer—to me, a death sentence. I had delivered poor prognoses many times during my career, so I took it upon myself to give Cathy the bad news and ensure that I would be with her during this difficult conversation. This was especially challenging because Cathy was no ordinary patient—she was my wife of 31 years.
I finished my rounds and quickly drove to the emergency department where Cathy was waiting. On the drive, questions rushed through my head. How do you tell the woman you love that this disease can be only temporarily contained with surgery and chemotherapy? How do you tell her that she will never see her children graduate from their respective professional schools, will never watch her children get married, will never meet her grandchildren, and will never enjoy her golden years? How do you tell your children that their mother will be gone in a few short years? How do I as a husband cope with the stress of caring for a wife severely compromised not only from her cancer but from the cancer treatments? How do I cope knowing that soon I will need to learn to live without my life partner, the love of my life, the person whom I and others consistently relied on for support?
Cathy would have known the answers to these questions. She was the one to whom friends, children of friends, and even her own children's classmates came for unbiased and compassionate advice. As a wife, she always provided support and direction. If I ever questioned her, she reminded me that agreeing with her demonstrated good judgment.
As a mother of twin boys, Cathy guided our children on their journey to becoming kind, giving, and productive adults. She was also their advocate. One of our sons struggled in school from a “central processing” hearing disorder because of which he could hear the sounds of speech but could not distinguish their meaning. Cathy supported him through a grueling therapy program and installed sound amplification systems in each of his classrooms so that he could hear his teachers' voices over the background noise. Cathy then went on to advocate for better diagnosis and treatment of all hearing impaired children in our community and had great success advocating for proper acoustics in each K-12 classroom in our area.
Cathy also supported my parents as if she were their own daughter. When my father developed Alzheimer disease, she helped care for him until his death. With our local Alzheimer Association, she created a handbook for hospitals on how to interact with patients with dementia, an endeavor that earned her the volunteer of the year award. When my mother had a stroke, Cathy cared for her in our home. Now, it was our turn to support, advocate for, and care for Cathy.
Once I arrived at the emergency department, I pulled myself together to have the most difficult conversation of my life. I called upon my training as a physician to deliver bad news: you assess the patient's medical, functional, emotional, and spiritual needs, as well as the patient’s family's needs. After weighing the pros and cons of each option, you determine the best approach to address these needs. You then sit down with the patient and family members and have a private, nonjudgmental, and supportive conversation. Speaking at eye level, you discuss the situation as partners. You pause and allow the information to sink in. You have a box of tissues at the ready. You offer a calming touch as appropriate. If and when the patient and family members are able to continue the discussion, you outline the various scenarios and the best outcomes. You pause again. You allow the patient and family to respond further. You address their concerns and questions. I had done this many times but never as both the doctor guiding the conversation and the family taking it in.
I sat at Cathy's side and held her hand. I called upon my extensive training to navigate this conversation, and then delivered the horrible news. “Your abdomen is filled with abnormal cells, cells that are from advanced ovarian cancer,” I said, still overwhelmed and trying to contain my own shock. I paused to give both her and me time to process the information. As husband and wife, we shed tears together. I promised to always advocate for her, always seek out the best possible care for her, and always be there for her. The gynecologic oncologist arrived, and we discussed the treatment plan. I vacillated between 2 worlds: at times, a physician; at times, a worried husband and now caregiver. This would be a twilight zone I would never leave. We shared the initial shock of her diagnosis the remainder of the night. Neither one of us had much sleep. We did what we always did in a crisis: we held each other tight for mutual support.
The next day, we celebrated our wedding anniversary with Cathy undergoing a bowel prep for the imminent tumor debulking procedure. Being board-certified in both internal medicine as well as physical medicine and rehabilitation and with official orders from her oncologist, I organized a customized cancer rehabilitation program for Cathy. And I kept my promise. I supported Cathy through her initial surgery and then through her multiple cycles of chemotherapy and its debilitating consequences: the fatigue, low blood counts and multiple transfusions, pneumonias and urinary tract infections, recurrent nausea and vomiting, hair loss, painful peripheral neuropathy, edema, and “chemo brain.” She lost strength, balance, hearing, renal function, mobility, and she lost her way of life.
As a husband, I provided her emotional support to counteract her frustrations, fears, and depression. I provided physical support when necessary, helping her bathe, dress, stand, and walk. When I could, I took her to chemotherapy. When others took her, I would visit her in the outpatient cancer center. When she was hospitalized, I would spend the night with her. Later, when she lost all bowel function, I connected her to intravenous fluids each morning and night. When her liver stopped working altogether, I took her home to die in a familiar setting, surrounded by her immediate family. Cathy passed away 2 days later, 3 and a half years after her initial diagnosis, with her sons and me at her bedside.
In this time of challenge, I found inspiration in these words by philosopher John O’Donohue1:
When the reverberations of shock subside in you,
May grace come to restore you to balance.
May it shape a new space in your heart
To embrace this illness as a teacher
Who has come to open your life to new worlds.
I have grown a great deal in my “new world.” I rebalanced my life during Cathy’s illness and after her death. She and I spent our remaining time together to the fullest, and I have since continued living each day as if it is my last. I developed a better appreciation for relationships, the wonders of nature, and my connection to the rest of the world. There is new space in my heart that has allowed me to deepen established and new relationships. My love and support for our children increased, as I did my best to compensate for the love and support that Cathy had so generously given in life. In her final days, Cathy told me to find someone new to share my life, and I did. Cathy’s illness taught me that the challenges of disease can enhance people’s lives, and I am grateful for this lesson in my own.
On a professional level, Cathy’s illness strengthened my empathy for and commitment to patients and their families at intense times of need. Each time I give bad news, I am transported back to the emergency department with Cathy. I not only relive the delivery of Cathy’s cancer diagnosis; I relive the shock of just having received it. I will never forget being caught in the world of a physician, a loving husband, and a caregiver. My new tripartite identity may not be a perspective I anticipated but is one that has enhanced the quality of care I provide.
With her diagnosis, Cathy and I were forced to acknowledge that life is limited, which gave our lives and the lives around us so much more meaning. This is a legacy Cathy gave to me. No difficult conversation can ever replace this.
...
Additional Information: I thank Elizabeth Mueller, BS, Elise Alspach, PhD, and Kathleen Schoch, PhD, for editorial assistance and feedback in association with InPrint: A Scientific Editing Network at Washington University in St Louis. None were compensated beyond their usual salary. I also thank my son for allowing me to share this story.
Proximity (Mis)perception: Public Awareness of Nuclear, Refinery, and Fracking Sites
Proximity (Mis)perception: Public Awareness of Nuclear, Refinery, and
Fracking Sites. Benjamin A. Lyons, Heather Akin, Natalie Jomini Stroud.
Risk Analysis, August 27 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13387
Abstract: Whether on grounds of perceived safety, aesthetics, or overall quality of life, residents may wish to be aware of nearby energy sites such as nuclear reactors, refineries, and fracking wells. Yet people are not always accurate in their impressions of proximity. Indeed, our data show that only 54% of Americans living within 25 miles of a nuclear site say they do, and even fewer fracking‐proximal (30%) and refinery‐proximal (24%) residents respond accurately. In this article, we analyze factors that could either help people form more accurate perceptions or distort their impressions of proximity. We evaluate these hypotheses using a large national survey sample and corresponding geographic information system (GIS) data. Results show that among those living in close proximity to energy sites, those who perceive greater risk are less likely to report living nearby. Conversely, social contact with employees of these industries increases perceived proximity regardless of actual distance. These relationships are consistent across each site type we examine. Other potential factors—such as local news use—may play a role in proximity perception on a case‐by‐case basis. Our findings are an important step toward a more generalizable understanding of how the public forms perceptions of proximity to risk sites, showing multiple potential mechanisms of bias.
1 INTRODUCTION
Living near sites such as nuclear reactors, refineries, and fracking wells can cause anxiety. Sites like these can pose high‐magnitude risks to human health, although the likelihood is low (e.g., Bertazzi, Pesatori, Zocchetti, & Latocca, 1989; Mitka, 2012; Vesely & Rasmuson, 1984). The proximity of such sites to one's residence can factor into important life decisions like home ownership or beginning a family (Boyle & Kiel, 2001; Doyle et al., 2000). The not‐in‐my‐backyard (NIMBYism) phenomenon, in which locals oppose new development, is a manifestation of such concerns (Lima, 2004; Lima & Marques, 2005). In addition, living near these sites may be undesirable to some solely on aesthetic grounds (Kiel & McClain, 1995). There also are desirable consequences from knowing that one lives near a particular site. For instance, this knowledge can lead residents to develop plans of action in case of complications or emergencies (Cuite, Schwom, & Hallman, 2016; Perko, Železnik, Turcanu, & Thijssen, 2012; Zeigler, Brunn, & Johnson, 1981).
However, people are not always correct in their impressions of whether they live near energy sites. Indeed, our data show that only 54% of Americans living within 25 miles of a nuclear site say they do, and even fewer fracking‐proximal (30%) and refinery‐proximal (24%) residents respond accurately. There is ample evidence that factors beyond reality affect beliefs about one's surroundings, and of proximity, in particular (Cesario & Navarrete, 2014; Craun, 2010; Giordano, Anderson, & He, 2010; Howe, 1988). In this article, we analyze what factors correlate with perceived proximity to three distinct types of sites: nuclear sites, refineries, and fracking wells. We model how orientations toward information (risk perception, general science knowledge) and access to sources of information (news consumption, social contact) relate with perceptions of proximity.
As outlined shortly, each of these factors can lead to correct beliefs about one's proximity to energy sites. At the same time, they also can have a distorting effect, making people believe that they live closer (or farther) than they do in actuality. Watching local news, for instance, could yield a better understanding of where these sites exist, or could correlate with the belief that these sites are more proximate than they are in reality. We evaluate perceived proximity using a large national survey sample and corresponding GIS data that allow us to know exactly how proximate each respondent is from one of these sites.
Examining perceived proximity across three different types of sites allows us to move research on proximity perception forward. We find that risk perception and social contact are consistently associated with proximity misperception. However, our results show that it is not the case that these factors solely promote correct or incorrect beliefs. Rather, context—in this case, actual distance—is key. Dependent on actual distance, factors like risk perception and social contact can increase the probability that one's reported proximity is accurate for some, but increase the probability that one inaccurately reports that one lives nearby for others. Ultimately, our findings illuminate barriers to successful information campaigns, and potential ways to overcome them.
Abstract: Whether on grounds of perceived safety, aesthetics, or overall quality of life, residents may wish to be aware of nearby energy sites such as nuclear reactors, refineries, and fracking wells. Yet people are not always accurate in their impressions of proximity. Indeed, our data show that only 54% of Americans living within 25 miles of a nuclear site say they do, and even fewer fracking‐proximal (30%) and refinery‐proximal (24%) residents respond accurately. In this article, we analyze factors that could either help people form more accurate perceptions or distort their impressions of proximity. We evaluate these hypotheses using a large national survey sample and corresponding geographic information system (GIS) data. Results show that among those living in close proximity to energy sites, those who perceive greater risk are less likely to report living nearby. Conversely, social contact with employees of these industries increases perceived proximity regardless of actual distance. These relationships are consistent across each site type we examine. Other potential factors—such as local news use—may play a role in proximity perception on a case‐by‐case basis. Our findings are an important step toward a more generalizable understanding of how the public forms perceptions of proximity to risk sites, showing multiple potential mechanisms of bias.
1 INTRODUCTION
Living near sites such as nuclear reactors, refineries, and fracking wells can cause anxiety. Sites like these can pose high‐magnitude risks to human health, although the likelihood is low (e.g., Bertazzi, Pesatori, Zocchetti, & Latocca, 1989; Mitka, 2012; Vesely & Rasmuson, 1984). The proximity of such sites to one's residence can factor into important life decisions like home ownership or beginning a family (Boyle & Kiel, 2001; Doyle et al., 2000). The not‐in‐my‐backyard (NIMBYism) phenomenon, in which locals oppose new development, is a manifestation of such concerns (Lima, 2004; Lima & Marques, 2005). In addition, living near these sites may be undesirable to some solely on aesthetic grounds (Kiel & McClain, 1995). There also are desirable consequences from knowing that one lives near a particular site. For instance, this knowledge can lead residents to develop plans of action in case of complications or emergencies (Cuite, Schwom, & Hallman, 2016; Perko, Železnik, Turcanu, & Thijssen, 2012; Zeigler, Brunn, & Johnson, 1981).
However, people are not always correct in their impressions of whether they live near energy sites. Indeed, our data show that only 54% of Americans living within 25 miles of a nuclear site say they do, and even fewer fracking‐proximal (30%) and refinery‐proximal (24%) residents respond accurately. There is ample evidence that factors beyond reality affect beliefs about one's surroundings, and of proximity, in particular (Cesario & Navarrete, 2014; Craun, 2010; Giordano, Anderson, & He, 2010; Howe, 1988). In this article, we analyze what factors correlate with perceived proximity to three distinct types of sites: nuclear sites, refineries, and fracking wells. We model how orientations toward information (risk perception, general science knowledge) and access to sources of information (news consumption, social contact) relate with perceptions of proximity.
As outlined shortly, each of these factors can lead to correct beliefs about one's proximity to energy sites. At the same time, they also can have a distorting effect, making people believe that they live closer (or farther) than they do in actuality. Watching local news, for instance, could yield a better understanding of where these sites exist, or could correlate with the belief that these sites are more proximate than they are in reality. We evaluate perceived proximity using a large national survey sample and corresponding GIS data that allow us to know exactly how proximate each respondent is from one of these sites.
Examining perceived proximity across three different types of sites allows us to move research on proximity perception forward. We find that risk perception and social contact are consistently associated with proximity misperception. However, our results show that it is not the case that these factors solely promote correct or incorrect beliefs. Rather, context—in this case, actual distance—is key. Dependent on actual distance, factors like risk perception and social contact can increase the probability that one's reported proximity is accurate for some, but increase the probability that one inaccurately reports that one lives nearby for others. Ultimately, our findings illuminate barriers to successful information campaigns, and potential ways to overcome them.
Science teams' impact is predicted more by the lower-citation rather than the higher-citation members; teams tend to assemble among individuals with similar citation impact in all fields of science and patenting
Decoding team and individual impact in science and invention. Mohammad Ahmadpoor and Benjamin F. Jones. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, July 9, 2019 116 (28) 13885-13890. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1812341116
Significance: Scientists and inventors increasingly work in teams. We track millions of individuals across their collaboration networks to help inform fundamental features of team science and invention and help solve the challenge of assessing individuals in the team production era. We find that in all fields of science and patenting, team impact is weighted toward the lower-impact rather than higher-impact team members, with implications for the output of specific teams and team assembly. In assessing individuals, our index substantially outperforms existing measures, including the h index, when predicting paper and patent outcomes or when characterizing eminent careers. The findings provide guidance to research institutions, science funders, and scientists themselves in predicting team output, forming teams, and evaluating individual impact.
Abstract: Scientists and inventors increasingly work in teams, raising fundamental questions about the nature of team production and making individual assessment increasingly difficult. Here we present a method for describing individual and team citation impact that both is computationally feasible and can be applied in standard, wide-scale databases. We track individuals across collaboration networks to define an individual citation index and examine outcomes when each individual works alone or in teams. Studying 24 million research articles and 3.9 million US patents, we find a substantial impact advantage of teamwork over solo work. However, this advantage declines as differences between the team members’ individual citation indices grow. Team impact is predicted more by the lower-citation rather than the higher-citation team members, typically centering near the harmonic average of the individual citation indices. Consistent with this finding, teams tend to assemble among individuals with similar citation impact in all fields of science and patenting. In assessing individuals, our index, which accounts for each coauthor, is shown to have substantial advantages over existing measures. First, it more accurately predicts out-of-sample paper and patent outcomes. Second, it more accurately characterizes which scholars are elected to the National Academy of Sciences. Overall, the methodology uncovers universal regularities that inform team organization while also providing a tool for individual evaluation in the team production era.
Keywords: team science collaboration prediction team organization
Significance: Scientists and inventors increasingly work in teams. We track millions of individuals across their collaboration networks to help inform fundamental features of team science and invention and help solve the challenge of assessing individuals in the team production era. We find that in all fields of science and patenting, team impact is weighted toward the lower-impact rather than higher-impact team members, with implications for the output of specific teams and team assembly. In assessing individuals, our index substantially outperforms existing measures, including the h index, when predicting paper and patent outcomes or when characterizing eminent careers. The findings provide guidance to research institutions, science funders, and scientists themselves in predicting team output, forming teams, and evaluating individual impact.
Abstract: Scientists and inventors increasingly work in teams, raising fundamental questions about the nature of team production and making individual assessment increasingly difficult. Here we present a method for describing individual and team citation impact that both is computationally feasible and can be applied in standard, wide-scale databases. We track individuals across collaboration networks to define an individual citation index and examine outcomes when each individual works alone or in teams. Studying 24 million research articles and 3.9 million US patents, we find a substantial impact advantage of teamwork over solo work. However, this advantage declines as differences between the team members’ individual citation indices grow. Team impact is predicted more by the lower-citation rather than the higher-citation team members, typically centering near the harmonic average of the individual citation indices. Consistent with this finding, teams tend to assemble among individuals with similar citation impact in all fields of science and patenting. In assessing individuals, our index, which accounts for each coauthor, is shown to have substantial advantages over existing measures. First, it more accurately predicts out-of-sample paper and patent outcomes. Second, it more accurately characterizes which scholars are elected to the National Academy of Sciences. Overall, the methodology uncovers universal regularities that inform team organization while also providing a tool for individual evaluation in the team production era.
Keywords: team science collaboration prediction team organization
Does Media Literacy Help Identification of Fake News? Information Literacy Helps, but Other Literacies Don’t
Does Media Literacy Help Identification of Fake News? Information Literacy Helps, but Other Literacies Don’t. S. Mo Jones-Jang, Tara Mortensen, Jingjing Liu. American Behavioral Scientist, August 28, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764219869406
Abstract: Concerns over fake news have triggered a renewed interest in various forms of media literacy. Prevailing expectations posit that literacy interventions help audiences to be “inoculated” against any harmful effects of misleading information. This study empirically investigates such assumptions by assessing whether individuals with greater literacy (media, information, news, and digital literacies) are better at recognizing fake news, and which of these literacies are most relevant. The results reveal that information literacy—but not other literacies—significantly increases the likelihood of identifying fake news stories. Interpreting the results, we provide both conceptual and methodological explanations. Particularly, we raise questions about the self-reported competencies that are commonly used in literacy scales.
Keywords: fake news, media literacy, information literacy, digital literacy, news literacy, misinformation, disinformation
Abstract: Concerns over fake news have triggered a renewed interest in various forms of media literacy. Prevailing expectations posit that literacy interventions help audiences to be “inoculated” against any harmful effects of misleading information. This study empirically investigates such assumptions by assessing whether individuals with greater literacy (media, information, news, and digital literacies) are better at recognizing fake news, and which of these literacies are most relevant. The results reveal that information literacy—but not other literacies—significantly increases the likelihood of identifying fake news stories. Interpreting the results, we provide both conceptual and methodological explanations. Particularly, we raise questions about the self-reported competencies that are commonly used in literacy scales.
Keywords: fake news, media literacy, information literacy, digital literacy, news literacy, misinformation, disinformation
Gangestad et al. (this issue) recently published alternative analyses of our open data & state that women show ovulatory shifts in preferences for men’s bodies; we think the results are not robust
Penke, Lars, Julia Stern, Ruben C. Arslan, and Tanja M. Gerlach. 2019.
“No Robust Evidence for Cycle Shifts in Preferences for Men's Bodies in a
Multiverse Analysis: A Response to Gangestad Et Al. (2019).” PsyArXiv.
August 28. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pdsuy
Abstract: Gangestad et al. (this issue) recently published alternative analyses of our open data to investigate whether women show ovulatory shifts in preferences for men’s bodies. They argue that a significant three-way interaction between log-transformed hormones, a muscularity component, and women’s relationship status provides evidence for the ovulatory shift hypothesis. Their conclusion is opposite to the one we previously reported (Jünger et al., 2018). Here, we provide evidence that Gangestad et al.’s differing conclusions are contaminated by overfitting, clarify reasons for deviating from our preregistration in some aspects, discuss the implications of data-dependent re-analysis, and report a multiverse analysis which provides evidence that their reported results are not robust. Further, we use the current debate to contrast the risk of prematurely concluding a null effect against the risk of shielding hypotheses from falsification. Finally, we discuss the benefits and challenges of open scientific practices, as contested by Gangestad et al., and conclude with implications for future studies.
No Robust Evidence for Cycle Shifts in Preferences for Men's Bodies in a Multiverse Analysis
Abstract: Gangestad et al. (this issue) recently published alternative analyses of our open data to investigate whether women show ovulatory shifts in preferences for men’s bodies. They argue that a significant three-way interaction between log-transformed hormones, a muscularity component, and women’s relationship status provides evidence for the ovulatory shift hypothesis. Their conclusion is opposite to the one we previously reported (Jünger et al., 2018). Here, we provide evidence that Gangestad et al.’s differing conclusions are contaminated by overfitting, clarify reasons for deviating from our preregistration in some aspects, discuss the implications of data-dependent re-analysis, and report a multiverse analysis which provides evidence that their reported results are not robust. Further, we use the current debate to contrast the risk of prematurely concluding a null effect against the risk of shielding hypotheses from falsification. Finally, we discuss the benefits and challenges of open scientific practices, as contested by Gangestad et al., and conclude with implications for future studies.
No Robust Evidence for Cycle Shifts in Preferences for Men's Bodies in a Multiverse Analysis
Results bolster the small body of literature showing that flashbulb memories are subject to reconstructive processes & suggest that memories decay further between 3 & 5 months after events
Krackow, E., Deming, E., Longo, A., & DiSciullo, V. (2019). Memories of learning the news of the 2016 U.S. presidential election results. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000201
Abstract: The current study examined the consistency of flashbulb memories for the 2016 U.S. presidential election outcome by comparing a Time 1 memory that was obtained after the expected point of memory consolidation to a Time 2 memory obtained within a delay in which memories were expected to remain consistent based on the majority of literature. Despite expected consistency, narrative reports showed substantial change and several specific question responses showed a substantial range of change from Time 1 to Time 2. Changes in response to specific questions correlated significantly with the tendency to provide new information in the Time 2 narrative. Emotional determinants (feelings about the election result outcome) and emotion regulation abilities did not predict consistency of memories. Participant stress ratings showed a small but significant negative correlation with change in memory (greater stress = greater omission of information). These results bolster the small body of literature showing that flashbulb memories are subject to reconstructive processes and combined with other results (Krackow, Lynn, & Payne, 2005), they suggest that memories may decay further between 3 and 5 months following an event.
Abstract: The current study examined the consistency of flashbulb memories for the 2016 U.S. presidential election outcome by comparing a Time 1 memory that was obtained after the expected point of memory consolidation to a Time 2 memory obtained within a delay in which memories were expected to remain consistent based on the majority of literature. Despite expected consistency, narrative reports showed substantial change and several specific question responses showed a substantial range of change from Time 1 to Time 2. Changes in response to specific questions correlated significantly with the tendency to provide new information in the Time 2 narrative. Emotional determinants (feelings about the election result outcome) and emotion regulation abilities did not predict consistency of memories. Participant stress ratings showed a small but significant negative correlation with change in memory (greater stress = greater omission of information). These results bolster the small body of literature showing that flashbulb memories are subject to reconstructive processes and combined with other results (Krackow, Lynn, & Payne, 2005), they suggest that memories may decay further between 3 and 5 months following an event.
Tuesday, August 27, 2019
Understanding hostility in online political discussions: Non-hostile people opt out of the discussions, individuals prone to hostility could be more likely to participate in online than offline discussions
Why so angry? Understanding hostility in online political discussions. Alexander Bor &Michael Bang Petersen. Online disinformation: an integrated view conference 2019. Aarhus University. https://nordis.research.it.uu.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Online-Disinformation-Conference-Abstracts.pdf
Most US citizens consider online political discussions to be uncivil, aggressive and hostile. Although political discussions can get heated by their very nature, the available data suggests that online discussions are seen as much worse than offline discussions. Yet, while a range of studies has documented the existence of widespread perceptions of online political hostility, our understanding of the causes of these perceptions are limited. The aim of the present paper is to provide the first comprehensive review and empirical test of the potential mechanisms that could cause widespread online political hostility.
As our theoretical starting point, we distinguish between two broad factors: the messages sent and the message received. Two potential explanations relate to the first factor. The first explanation proposes negative behavioral changes. This suggests that people are more likely to send hostile messages online than offline. Anonymity is a frequently blamed culprit of online hostility, but online environments have several other unique features too; for example, people are often distracted or tired while crafting their messages. Such characteristics may undermine people’s emotion regulation mechanisms and may lead to increased hostility on online platforms. The second explanation proposes that online environments attract particular individuals and, thereby, change the composition of people participating in political discussions. Through such sorting, individuals prone to hostility could be more likely to participate in online than offline discussions. It is possible that whereas social defense mechanisms effectively guard offline discussions against hostile intruders, it is more difficult to exclude hostile parties from online discussions.
It is also important to consider whether the perceived hostility is exacerbated on the receivers’ end too. A third explanation suggests that the density of communication networks in online environments may also contribute to higher perceived hostility, even if the same messages are being sent by the same people. Whereas offline political discussions typically involve only a handful of people and rarely more than a few dozen, in online discussions hundreds can participate. In other words, any hostile message is likely to be received by many more people inan online discussion. Computer algorithms prioritizing comments with attention grabbing or controversial content likely intensify this effect. Finally, the perception effect proposes that even if none of the explanations above were true, it is possible that the same messages are perceived as more hostile online than in face-to-face interactions. People may have a harder time judging the hostility of messages they receive and may make more false-positive mistakes online, where they lack non-verbal cues, lack reputational information about the sender, and often see only fragments of a conversation thread. We test observable implications for these explanations relying on an original online survey of US citizens (N = 1500), conducted by YouGov on an approximately representative sample. The survey includes measures of political participation and hostility online and offline, perceptions of these environments as well as a wide array of personality measures.
Against common predictions, we find little evidence for behavior being corrupted by online environments or for sorting effects revealing the entry of new, hostile parties to online discussions. Our data shows very high correlations between online and offline behaviors including hostility (rs> 0.8). Moreover, personality measures, which indicate a general tendency for hostile political behavior(such as need for chaos, trait aggression, status driven risk-seeking and difficulties in emotion regulation), correlate highly with both online and offline hostility (0.4 < rs <0.6). We do find firm evidence for sorting caused by hostile individuals being more active onlinethan non-hostile individuals. According to our data, people who self-report sending hostile messages 1) spend more time on social media (but less time on other parts of the internet) and 2) discuss politics more than non-hostile individuals. These differences are particularly large when it comes to discussing politics with strangers.
We find suggestive evidence that perception and network effects also increase perceived hostility. Discussions with strangers correlate with negative impressions of online discussions. Importantly, this is not true for offline discussions: the more people discuss politics with strangers face-to-face, the more positive their evaluations get. Furthermore, due to the density of online communication networks, discussions with strangers are more frequent both in absolute and relative terms online than offline. The paper concludes with discussing the implications of these findings.
Lifting short-sale constraints leads to a decrease in stock price crash risk; effect is more pronounced for firms whose managers are more likely to hoard bad news & obfuscate financial information; & for those with more severe overinvestment
Short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk: Causal evidence from a natural experiment. Xiaohu Deng, Lei Gao, Jeong-Bon Kim. Journal of Corporate Finance, August 20 2019, 101498. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101498
Highlights
• We study the causal relation between short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk.
• Lifting short-sale constraints leads to a decrease in stock price crash risk.
• The effect is more pronounced for firms whose managers are more likely to hoard bad news and obfuscate financial information.
• The effect is more pronounced for firms with more severe overinvestment problems.
• Short sellers play important roles in monitoring managerial disclosure strategies and real investment decisions.
Abstract: We examine the relation between short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk. To establish causality, we take advantage of a regulatory change from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation SHO pilot program, which temporarily lifted short-sale constraints for randomly designated stocks. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment setting in which to apply a difference-in-differences research design, we find that the lifting of short-sale constraints leads to a significant decrease in stock price crash risk. We further investigate the possible underlying mechanisms through which short-sale constraints affect stock price crash risk. We provide evidence suggesting that lifting of short-sale constraints reduces crash risk by constraining managerial bad news hoarding and improving corporate investment efficiency. The results of our study shed new light on the cause of stock price crash risk as well as the roles that short sellers play in monitoring managerial disclosure strategies and real investment decisions.
Highlights
• We study the causal relation between short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk.
• Lifting short-sale constraints leads to a decrease in stock price crash risk.
• The effect is more pronounced for firms whose managers are more likely to hoard bad news and obfuscate financial information.
• The effect is more pronounced for firms with more severe overinvestment problems.
• Short sellers play important roles in monitoring managerial disclosure strategies and real investment decisions.
Abstract: We examine the relation between short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk. To establish causality, we take advantage of a regulatory change from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation SHO pilot program, which temporarily lifted short-sale constraints for randomly designated stocks. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment setting in which to apply a difference-in-differences research design, we find that the lifting of short-sale constraints leads to a significant decrease in stock price crash risk. We further investigate the possible underlying mechanisms through which short-sale constraints affect stock price crash risk. We provide evidence suggesting that lifting of short-sale constraints reduces crash risk by constraining managerial bad news hoarding and improving corporate investment efficiency. The results of our study shed new light on the cause of stock price crash risk as well as the roles that short sellers play in monitoring managerial disclosure strategies and real investment decisions.
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