Daily occurrence of laughter: Relationships with age, gender, and Type A personality. Rod A. Martin, Nicholas A. Kuiper. Humor - International Journal of Humor Research 12(4):355-384, January 1999. DOI 10.1515/humr.1999.12.4.355
Abstract: This study examined the circumstances surrounding the natural occurrence of laughter in everyday life. Eighty community participants (50 women and 30 men), ranging in age from 17 to 79, each completed a daily laughter record for three days, along with self-report measures of laughter responsiveness, coping humor, and Type A personality characteristics. Laughter incidents were coded according to time of day, source and initiator of laughter, and whether the individual was alone or with others. On average, participants reported approximately 18 daily incidents of laughter, but with wide individual variation being evident (0 to 89 incidents per day). Frequency of laughter also generally increased throughout the day, being most pronounced in the evenings. The most prominent source of daily laughter was spontaneous situational laughter, with "canned" jokes accounting for the least amount of naturally generated laughter. In accord with the primarily social nature of laughter, most incidents of laughter occurred in the presence of others, and were also initiated by others. Overall, men and women did not differ in the frequency with which they laughed. However, gender differences did emerge when age was taken into account. Older women tended to laugh less frequently than did younger women, but this age difference was not found in men. In addition, for both men and women, older individuals did not show the general increase in frequency of laughter during the evening. Gender differences also emerged in the correlations between total laughter frequency and personality variables. For example, a higher frequency of daily laughter was associated with greater Type A characteristics in men, but with fewer Type A characteristics in women. These findings are discussed in terms of possible gender differences in the meaning and function of laughter.
Thursday, October 24, 2019
Hi, My Name is Wealthy: Women’s Dating Behaviors in Relation to the Perceived Wealth of Perspective Mates
Hi, My Name is Wealthy: Women’s Dating Behaviors in Relation to the Perceived Wealth of Perspective Mates. Hunter, H., Benoit, T., Reid, G., Bourgeois, C., Tiller, A.,& Fisher, M. L. EvoS Journal, Vol. 10, Special Issue 1, Oct 2019. http://evostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Hunter_et-al_Vol10SpIss1.pdf
Abstract: It has been cross-culturally documented that women exhibit a preference for mates who possess resources or traits that signal potential wealth. The majority of this literature relies on self reported mate preferences. Here we report on two experiments to test whether women’s willingness to date men is actually influenced by their perceived wealth. Online dating profiles were created to present photographs of men and information about their current bank account status (Study 1), or to indirectly indicate their level of wealth (Study 2). In Study 1, the faces were presented with alternating high and low bank account balances. We hypothesized that women who viewed men with high bank account values would evaluate them as more desirable than women who viewed men with low bank account values. That is, they would be more likely to engage with him in an online conversation, meet with him for a casual coffee, accept an invitation of a date, consider him for a one-night stand, consider him for a short-term relationship, or consider him for a long-term relationship. It was also hypothesized that women would rate the men with high bank account balances as more physically attractive than the men with the low bank account balances. The results generally do not support the hypotheses. In Study 2, we replaced bank account balances with indirect indicators of wealth. Our results indicate that women were significantly less interested in wealthier men as compared to poorer men, possibly because the wealthy men may be perceived as bragging. Together, these studies suggest men’s wealth may not be as important to women as has been previously considered, but further research is needed.
Keywords: Dating, Wealth, Physical Attractiveness, Mate Preferences,Men
Abstract: It has been cross-culturally documented that women exhibit a preference for mates who possess resources or traits that signal potential wealth. The majority of this literature relies on self reported mate preferences. Here we report on two experiments to test whether women’s willingness to date men is actually influenced by their perceived wealth. Online dating profiles were created to present photographs of men and information about their current bank account status (Study 1), or to indirectly indicate their level of wealth (Study 2). In Study 1, the faces were presented with alternating high and low bank account balances. We hypothesized that women who viewed men with high bank account values would evaluate them as more desirable than women who viewed men with low bank account values. That is, they would be more likely to engage with him in an online conversation, meet with him for a casual coffee, accept an invitation of a date, consider him for a one-night stand, consider him for a short-term relationship, or consider him for a long-term relationship. It was also hypothesized that women would rate the men with high bank account balances as more physically attractive than the men with the low bank account balances. The results generally do not support the hypotheses. In Study 2, we replaced bank account balances with indirect indicators of wealth. Our results indicate that women were significantly less interested in wealthier men as compared to poorer men, possibly because the wealthy men may be perceived as bragging. Together, these studies suggest men’s wealth may not be as important to women as has been previously considered, but further research is needed.
Keywords: Dating, Wealth, Physical Attractiveness, Mate Preferences,Men
Hunger for Knowledge: How the Irresistible Lure of Curiosity is Generated in the Brain
Hunger for Knowledge: How the Irresistible Lure of Curiosity is Generated in the Brain. Johnny King L Lau, Hiroki Ozono, Kei Kuratomi, Asuka Komiya, Kou Murayama. bioRxiv, Oct 23 2019. https://doi.org/10.1101/473975
Abstract: Curiosity is often portrayed as a desirable feature of human faculty. However, curiosity may come at a cost that sometimes puts people in a harmful situation. Here, with a set of behavioural and neuroimaging experiments using stimuli that strongly trigger curiosity (e.g., magic tricks), we examined the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the irresistible lure of curiosity. We consistently demonstrated that across different samples, people were indeed willing to gamble, subjecting themselves to physical risks (i.e. electric shocks) in order to satisfy their curiosity for trivial knowledge that carries no apparent instrumental value. Also, this seductive power of curiosity shares common neural mechanisms with that of extrinsic incentives (i.e. hunger for food). In particular, we showed that acceptance (compared to rejection) of curiosity/incentive-driven gambles was accompanied by enhanced activity in the ventral striatum (when curiosity was elicited), which extended into the dorsal striatum (when participants made a decision).
Abstract: Curiosity is often portrayed as a desirable feature of human faculty. However, curiosity may come at a cost that sometimes puts people in a harmful situation. Here, with a set of behavioural and neuroimaging experiments using stimuli that strongly trigger curiosity (e.g., magic tricks), we examined the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the irresistible lure of curiosity. We consistently demonstrated that across different samples, people were indeed willing to gamble, subjecting themselves to physical risks (i.e. electric shocks) in order to satisfy their curiosity for trivial knowledge that carries no apparent instrumental value. Also, this seductive power of curiosity shares common neural mechanisms with that of extrinsic incentives (i.e. hunger for food). In particular, we showed that acceptance (compared to rejection) of curiosity/incentive-driven gambles was accompanied by enhanced activity in the ventral striatum (when curiosity was elicited), which extended into the dorsal striatum (when participants made a decision).
Big Surprise!!! Recent research has found that therapists lie to patients
Ethics of psychotherapist deception. Drew A. Curtis & Leslie J. Kelley. Ethics & Behavior, Oct 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10508422.2019.1674654
ABSTRACT: Since Tolman’s efforts to establish a code for psychologists, the American Psychological Association’s (APA) ethics code has been maintained and revised for over six decades. One of APA’s five core principles is honesty and integrity. Recent research has found that therapists lie to patients. The current project explored therapists’ and non-therapists’ beliefs about the ethics of therapist deception. We recruited 245 students and 38 therapists who read and rated vignettes of therapists lying or being honest. Overall, participants judged therapist deception as unacceptable and unethical. The results of therapist honesty perceived as most ethical and acceptable align with APA’s value of honesty and integrity for the profession. Given findings from previous research suggesting the use of deception by psychotherapists, psychologists’ ethics code would benefit by addressing honesty and integrity in more detail within the context of psychotherapy.
KEYWORDS: deception, honesty, therapists, ethics, psychotherapy
---
Discussion
The current study evaluated the ethics of psychotherapist deception from the perspectives ofpsychotherapists and non-therapists. Therapist honesty was perceived to be more ethical thantherapist deception when using an ethics scale to rate vignettes and when being asked to explicitlyrate therapist deception. Additionally, psychotherapists endorsed that they and other psychothera-pists would be most likely to act in accordance with the therapist’s actions in the honest vignettecompared to all the deceptive vignettes. Therefore, psychotherapists appear to follow the principle ofintegrity in their actions and believe that other practitioners act similarly.
Both psychotherapists and students indicated that lying to clients is unethical and unacceptable touse within therapy. Therapists’beliefs about the use of deception being unethical was not related totheir years of experience or the worldviews they held. This finding is not surprising given theprofessional values of integrity and honesty (APA,2017) and therapists’value of honesty (Curtis &Hart,2015). Honesty is often seen as virtuous in ethics (Aquinas,1947; Aristotle,1941; Kant,1997)and is viewed as part of a person’s moral identity (Strohminger & Nichols,2014). Lying on the otherhand, is generally costly (Bok,1978). Deception threatens the value of honesty within the profession.The use of deception may be viewed as unacceptable within psychotherapy because of attitudestoward people who use deception and its effects on relationships. Psychotherapists and otherprofessionals hold negative attitudes toward clients and patients who lie (Curtis,2015; Curtis &Hart,2015; Curtis, Huang, & Nicks,2018; Dickens & Curtis,2019). Additionally, the use ofdeception in relationships damages trust and is related to less satisfaction (Hart et al.,2014;Kaplar,2006; Möllering,2009).
Most psychotherapists indicated that the use of deception should never be used or used rarely(less than 10% of cases). This finding is interesting because research has revealed that mostpsychotherapists have lied to their clients or patients in therapy (Curtis & Hart,2015). However, while most therapists have been deceptive, it is unclear how often therapists use deception withintherapy. If psychotherapists employ deception as often as the general population (Serota et al.,2010)or clients (Curtis & Hart,2019), then most would not lie often. In the current study, over half ofpsychotherapists believed that the use of deception may be acceptable in less than 10 percent ofcases. Considering that previous research suggests that large percentage of psychotherapists admitthey have lied, while a large percentage of psychotherapists in the current study indicated thatdeception should rarely or never occur, perhaps there is a discrepancy between the values andactions of many psychotherapists. This discrepancy could be explained by moral disengagement(Bandura,2016) or moral hypocrisy (Batson & Thompson,2001; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, &Strongman,1999; Hart et al.,2014). Therefore, psychotherapists may strive for and value honestyand the ethical standards of the profession while sometimes engaging in deceptions.
Over half of psychotherapists believed that deceptive instructions contradict the informed consentprocess and violates APA’s ethical principles and code of conduct. Additionally, just under half ofthe psychotherapists believed that lying to clients is not permissible even if it maximizes benefits andminimizes harm, while about 29% affirmed this position and 24% held a neutral position. Aspreviously mentioned, the APA (2017) ethical principles and code of conduct states“In situationsin which deception may be ethically justifiable to maximize benefits and minimize harm, psychol-ogists have a serious obligation to consider the need for, the possible consequences of, and theirresponsibility to correct any resulting mistrust or other harmful effects that arise from the use ofsuch techniques”(¶ 4). Given the code, many psychotherapists appear to exercise caution whenconsidering the use of deception psychotherapy, while some affirm the use of deception when itbenefits the client and many remain neutral. This wide variety of perspectives provides some initialevidence that further guidance regarding the use of deception within therapeutic interactions may behelpful to psychotherapists. Additional guidelines to Section 10 of the APA (2017) code can helpbring uniformity of practice and training, with the potential of positively influencing the reputationof psychotherapeutic practice by decreasing the frequency of trust violations. Based on the currentfindings, guidelines in Section 10 may need to provide more coverage of the use of deception basedon the principle of integrity and with regards to the informed consent process (10.01).
In order to provide additional specificity beyond deception being tacitly and explicitly rated asless ethical than honesty, we explored various types of deceptions. White lies were rated as the leastethical by the psychotherapists and blatant lies were rated as least ethical by students. Our hypothesiswas partially confirmed, in that students rated the blatant lie as the least ethical, however, therapistsrated the white lie as the least ethical. This finding is interesting because blatant lies are typicallyviewed as the least acceptable type of deception and white lies are often viewed as more acceptablethan other deceptions in similar vignette studies that have examined intimate relationships(Peterson,1996), parental relationships (Cargill & Curtis,2017), and in psychotherapy relationshipsfrom a client perspective (Curtis & Hart,2019). Curtis and Hart (2015) found that therapists weremost likely to lie to patients if they thought it protected patients. While white lies are generallyperceived to be more acceptable to tell, they are not as well received (Hart et al.,2014) and arenegatively correlated with relational satisfaction (Kaplar,2006). Further, when the norm of honestyis salient, white lies can lead to cognitive dissonance and produce negative affect (Argo & Shiv,2012). The reason for therapists rating the white lie as least ethical was not clearly identified in thecurrent study. One possibility is that the white lie vignette involved a deception to the patient abouthope of a treatment rather than a white lie based on a patient’s new haircut. Both lies carry an intentto maintain the therapeutic alliance but psychotherapists may have perceived the former as moreconsequential. Psychotherapists may have believed that a positive response to a patient asking abouttreatment, while it could foster a therapeutic alliance, may not protect the patient. Psychotherapistsalso indicated that they would be less likely than other therapists to use white lies. Interestingly, thestudents rated the white lie as more ethical than psychotherapists. Students may have focused moreon the hope that the therapist seems to instill in the patient compared to the concerns of treatment.
There was also a difference between students and psychotherapists with regard to the ethics ofthe failed deception, where students rated it higher than psychotherapists. A failed deceptioninvolves something actually occurring but the communicator still intentionally misleads another(Peterson,1996). Students may have rated this vignette as more ethical than psychotherapistsbecause of the result being congruent with what was initially stated, even with the intent tomislead. Psychotherapists may have viewed it as less ethical because it involves a psychologisttaking deceptive action against the patient. However, it is important to note that while differenceswere found between the samples, the failed deception vignette was significantly rated less ethicalthan the honest vignette. This finding, along with the white lie, suggests that psychotherapists andstudents or the general public may view the use of deceptions differently within psychotherapy.
While the current study is unique by its empirical approach to investigating ethical perceptions oftherapist deception, there are some limitations to note. The study used a response-driven samplingmethod for recruiting psychotherapists. This method can lead to a sampling bias, in that partici-pants are sharing the study with others who are like them or hold similar values. Another limitationof the study is the recruitment of undergraduate students to represent the general public. Whileundergraduate students represent the public by having attended psychotherapy or able to seektherapeutic services, they also may have different experiences and education that affect theirperceptions of psychotherapists. Another limitation is in the use of vignettes. Participants wereintentionally not given explicit instructions about whether the vignette was an honest exchange ordeceptive exchange so that they rated the deception without being primed. However, when usingvignettes, participants could be responding to a specific part or adding to the vignette. For example,the white lie vignette could have been viewed as holding more serious consequences for psy-chotherapists than students based on the white lie involving a response about treatment. Futurestudies could examine simplified vignettes or even ask therapists to indicate beliefs about theacceptability of using various types of deception with patients. The current study did not differ-entiate between everyday lies (DePaulo & Kashy,1998) and serious lies (DePaulo, Ansfield,Kirkendol, & Boden,2004). Future research may want to explore if therapist deception is vieweddifferently when the lies told are serious compared to everyday or social lies. Additionally, futurestudies could explore the nuances of telling white lies in therapy by measuring the ethics andacceptability of a white lie told for the sake of client, therapeutic relationship, or involving treatmentand outcome. Researchers may also explore the various situations and ethical decision-makingprocess of therapists when using deception within therapy. This is especially important to under-stand the attributions and biases that play into decisions to deceive (e.g., this will benefit the clientor the relationship). Bok (1978) claimed that“the most serious miscalculation people make whenweighing lies is to evaluate the costs and benefits of a particular lie in an isolated case, and then tofavor lies if the benefits seem to outweigh the costs”(p. xix). Bok (1978) suggested that these specificmiscalculations can impact a person’s integrity, self-respect, and endanger others. Lastly, it isunclear how often therapists use deception in psychotherapy. Given that therapists report deceptionshould rarely be used or never used, it would be important to discover the frequencies by whichtherapist use deception.
The use of deception in the practice of psychotherapy has been largely overlooked in literature.Medical ethics, specifically in the practice of medicine and nursing, has extensively addressed thevarious aspects of using deception in practice (Fallowfield, Jenkins, & Beveridge,2002; Fowler,2004;Hoppin,2011; Huddle,2012; Jackson,2001; Olsen,2012; Sade,2012; Tavaglione & Hurst,2012).Arguments for the use of deception have been that practitioners can game the system for the benefitof treating patients (Tavaglione & Hurst,2012) whereas it should be avoided because of the negativeeffects it has on the practitioners image and character (Sade,2012) and goes against the internalnorm of honesty (Huddle,2012). The current findings reveal that psychotherapists and the generalpublic believe that honesty in psychotherapy is the best practice. We hope that our findings stimulatecontinued discussion and research of the practice and ethics of using deception withinpsychotherapy.
Based on the current findings, there is a lack of clinical training in working with deception inpsychotherapy. The lack of training and exposure to deception in psychotherapy has been reportedin other studies (Curtis,2013; Curtis & Hart,2015; Dickens & Curtis,2019).The lack of clinicalexperience with deception is also found in other health care professions (Curtis,2015; Curtis et al.,2018). To remedy this, more clinical training in patient deception has been suggested, embedded inprogram curricula or through workshops (Curtis & Hart,2019; Dickens & Curtis,2019). Training inthe ethics of psychotherapist deception could also assume the format within continuing education(Curtis,2019). Along with consideration of additional training formats, we encourage therapists toconsider the use of deception through the application of ethical decision-making models (e.g.,Barnett & Johnson,2008; Knapp & VandeCreek,2012) within practice. Similar to developedguidelines regarding deception in research, we encourage practitioners, researchers, professors,supervisors, and ethics committee members to consider addressing the use of deception in psy-chotherapy within training, practice, continuing education, and the APA ethical principles and codeof conduct.
ABSTRACT: Since Tolman’s efforts to establish a code for psychologists, the American Psychological Association’s (APA) ethics code has been maintained and revised for over six decades. One of APA’s five core principles is honesty and integrity. Recent research has found that therapists lie to patients. The current project explored therapists’ and non-therapists’ beliefs about the ethics of therapist deception. We recruited 245 students and 38 therapists who read and rated vignettes of therapists lying or being honest. Overall, participants judged therapist deception as unacceptable and unethical. The results of therapist honesty perceived as most ethical and acceptable align with APA’s value of honesty and integrity for the profession. Given findings from previous research suggesting the use of deception by psychotherapists, psychologists’ ethics code would benefit by addressing honesty and integrity in more detail within the context of psychotherapy.
KEYWORDS: deception, honesty, therapists, ethics, psychotherapy
---
Discussion
The current study evaluated the ethics of psychotherapist deception from the perspectives ofpsychotherapists and non-therapists. Therapist honesty was perceived to be more ethical thantherapist deception when using an ethics scale to rate vignettes and when being asked to explicitlyrate therapist deception. Additionally, psychotherapists endorsed that they and other psychothera-pists would be most likely to act in accordance with the therapist’s actions in the honest vignettecompared to all the deceptive vignettes. Therefore, psychotherapists appear to follow the principle ofintegrity in their actions and believe that other practitioners act similarly.
Both psychotherapists and students indicated that lying to clients is unethical and unacceptable touse within therapy. Therapists’beliefs about the use of deception being unethical was not related totheir years of experience or the worldviews they held. This finding is not surprising given theprofessional values of integrity and honesty (APA,2017) and therapists’value of honesty (Curtis &Hart,2015). Honesty is often seen as virtuous in ethics (Aquinas,1947; Aristotle,1941; Kant,1997)and is viewed as part of a person’s moral identity (Strohminger & Nichols,2014). Lying on the otherhand, is generally costly (Bok,1978). Deception threatens the value of honesty within the profession.The use of deception may be viewed as unacceptable within psychotherapy because of attitudestoward people who use deception and its effects on relationships. Psychotherapists and otherprofessionals hold negative attitudes toward clients and patients who lie (Curtis,2015; Curtis &Hart,2015; Curtis, Huang, & Nicks,2018; Dickens & Curtis,2019). Additionally, the use ofdeception in relationships damages trust and is related to less satisfaction (Hart et al.,2014;Kaplar,2006; Möllering,2009).
Most psychotherapists indicated that the use of deception should never be used or used rarely(less than 10% of cases). This finding is interesting because research has revealed that mostpsychotherapists have lied to their clients or patients in therapy (Curtis & Hart,2015). However, while most therapists have been deceptive, it is unclear how often therapists use deception withintherapy. If psychotherapists employ deception as often as the general population (Serota et al.,2010)or clients (Curtis & Hart,2019), then most would not lie often. In the current study, over half ofpsychotherapists believed that the use of deception may be acceptable in less than 10 percent ofcases. Considering that previous research suggests that large percentage of psychotherapists admitthey have lied, while a large percentage of psychotherapists in the current study indicated thatdeception should rarely or never occur, perhaps there is a discrepancy between the values andactions of many psychotherapists. This discrepancy could be explained by moral disengagement(Bandura,2016) or moral hypocrisy (Batson & Thompson,2001; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, &Strongman,1999; Hart et al.,2014). Therefore, psychotherapists may strive for and value honestyand the ethical standards of the profession while sometimes engaging in deceptions.
Over half of psychotherapists believed that deceptive instructions contradict the informed consentprocess and violates APA’s ethical principles and code of conduct. Additionally, just under half ofthe psychotherapists believed that lying to clients is not permissible even if it maximizes benefits andminimizes harm, while about 29% affirmed this position and 24% held a neutral position. Aspreviously mentioned, the APA (2017) ethical principles and code of conduct states“In situationsin which deception may be ethically justifiable to maximize benefits and minimize harm, psychol-ogists have a serious obligation to consider the need for, the possible consequences of, and theirresponsibility to correct any resulting mistrust or other harmful effects that arise from the use ofsuch techniques”(¶ 4). Given the code, many psychotherapists appear to exercise caution whenconsidering the use of deception psychotherapy, while some affirm the use of deception when itbenefits the client and many remain neutral. This wide variety of perspectives provides some initialevidence that further guidance regarding the use of deception within therapeutic interactions may behelpful to psychotherapists. Additional guidelines to Section 10 of the APA (2017) code can helpbring uniformity of practice and training, with the potential of positively influencing the reputationof psychotherapeutic practice by decreasing the frequency of trust violations. Based on the currentfindings, guidelines in Section 10 may need to provide more coverage of the use of deception basedon the principle of integrity and with regards to the informed consent process (10.01).
In order to provide additional specificity beyond deception being tacitly and explicitly rated asless ethical than honesty, we explored various types of deceptions. White lies were rated as the leastethical by the psychotherapists and blatant lies were rated as least ethical by students. Our hypothesiswas partially confirmed, in that students rated the blatant lie as the least ethical, however, therapistsrated the white lie as the least ethical. This finding is interesting because blatant lies are typicallyviewed as the least acceptable type of deception and white lies are often viewed as more acceptablethan other deceptions in similar vignette studies that have examined intimate relationships(Peterson,1996), parental relationships (Cargill & Curtis,2017), and in psychotherapy relationshipsfrom a client perspective (Curtis & Hart,2019). Curtis and Hart (2015) found that therapists weremost likely to lie to patients if they thought it protected patients. While white lies are generallyperceived to be more acceptable to tell, they are not as well received (Hart et al.,2014) and arenegatively correlated with relational satisfaction (Kaplar,2006). Further, when the norm of honestyis salient, white lies can lead to cognitive dissonance and produce negative affect (Argo & Shiv,2012). The reason for therapists rating the white lie as least ethical was not clearly identified in thecurrent study. One possibility is that the white lie vignette involved a deception to the patient abouthope of a treatment rather than a white lie based on a patient’s new haircut. Both lies carry an intentto maintain the therapeutic alliance but psychotherapists may have perceived the former as moreconsequential. Psychotherapists may have believed that a positive response to a patient asking abouttreatment, while it could foster a therapeutic alliance, may not protect the patient. Psychotherapistsalso indicated that they would be less likely than other therapists to use white lies. Interestingly, thestudents rated the white lie as more ethical than psychotherapists. Students may have focused moreon the hope that the therapist seems to instill in the patient compared to the concerns of treatment.
There was also a difference between students and psychotherapists with regard to the ethics ofthe failed deception, where students rated it higher than psychotherapists. A failed deceptioninvolves something actually occurring but the communicator still intentionally misleads another(Peterson,1996). Students may have rated this vignette as more ethical than psychotherapistsbecause of the result being congruent with what was initially stated, even with the intent tomislead. Psychotherapists may have viewed it as less ethical because it involves a psychologisttaking deceptive action against the patient. However, it is important to note that while differenceswere found between the samples, the failed deception vignette was significantly rated less ethicalthan the honest vignette. This finding, along with the white lie, suggests that psychotherapists andstudents or the general public may view the use of deceptions differently within psychotherapy.
While the current study is unique by its empirical approach to investigating ethical perceptions oftherapist deception, there are some limitations to note. The study used a response-driven samplingmethod for recruiting psychotherapists. This method can lead to a sampling bias, in that partici-pants are sharing the study with others who are like them or hold similar values. Another limitationof the study is the recruitment of undergraduate students to represent the general public. Whileundergraduate students represent the public by having attended psychotherapy or able to seektherapeutic services, they also may have different experiences and education that affect theirperceptions of psychotherapists. Another limitation is in the use of vignettes. Participants wereintentionally not given explicit instructions about whether the vignette was an honest exchange ordeceptive exchange so that they rated the deception without being primed. However, when usingvignettes, participants could be responding to a specific part or adding to the vignette. For example,the white lie vignette could have been viewed as holding more serious consequences for psy-chotherapists than students based on the white lie involving a response about treatment. Futurestudies could examine simplified vignettes or even ask therapists to indicate beliefs about theacceptability of using various types of deception with patients. The current study did not differ-entiate between everyday lies (DePaulo & Kashy,1998) and serious lies (DePaulo, Ansfield,Kirkendol, & Boden,2004). Future research may want to explore if therapist deception is vieweddifferently when the lies told are serious compared to everyday or social lies. Additionally, futurestudies could explore the nuances of telling white lies in therapy by measuring the ethics andacceptability of a white lie told for the sake of client, therapeutic relationship, or involving treatmentand outcome. Researchers may also explore the various situations and ethical decision-makingprocess of therapists when using deception within therapy. This is especially important to under-stand the attributions and biases that play into decisions to deceive (e.g., this will benefit the clientor the relationship). Bok (1978) claimed that“the most serious miscalculation people make whenweighing lies is to evaluate the costs and benefits of a particular lie in an isolated case, and then tofavor lies if the benefits seem to outweigh the costs”(p. xix). Bok (1978) suggested that these specificmiscalculations can impact a person’s integrity, self-respect, and endanger others. Lastly, it isunclear how often therapists use deception in psychotherapy. Given that therapists report deceptionshould rarely be used or never used, it would be important to discover the frequencies by whichtherapist use deception.
The use of deception in the practice of psychotherapy has been largely overlooked in literature.Medical ethics, specifically in the practice of medicine and nursing, has extensively addressed thevarious aspects of using deception in practice (Fallowfield, Jenkins, & Beveridge,2002; Fowler,2004;Hoppin,2011; Huddle,2012; Jackson,2001; Olsen,2012; Sade,2012; Tavaglione & Hurst,2012).Arguments for the use of deception have been that practitioners can game the system for the benefitof treating patients (Tavaglione & Hurst,2012) whereas it should be avoided because of the negativeeffects it has on the practitioners image and character (Sade,2012) and goes against the internalnorm of honesty (Huddle,2012). The current findings reveal that psychotherapists and the generalpublic believe that honesty in psychotherapy is the best practice. We hope that our findings stimulatecontinued discussion and research of the practice and ethics of using deception withinpsychotherapy.
Based on the current findings, there is a lack of clinical training in working with deception inpsychotherapy. The lack of training and exposure to deception in psychotherapy has been reportedin other studies (Curtis,2013; Curtis & Hart,2015; Dickens & Curtis,2019).The lack of clinicalexperience with deception is also found in other health care professions (Curtis,2015; Curtis et al.,2018). To remedy this, more clinical training in patient deception has been suggested, embedded inprogram curricula or through workshops (Curtis & Hart,2019; Dickens & Curtis,2019). Training inthe ethics of psychotherapist deception could also assume the format within continuing education(Curtis,2019). Along with consideration of additional training formats, we encourage therapists toconsider the use of deception through the application of ethical decision-making models (e.g.,Barnett & Johnson,2008; Knapp & VandeCreek,2012) within practice. Similar to developedguidelines regarding deception in research, we encourage practitioners, researchers, professors,supervisors, and ethics committee members to consider addressing the use of deception in psy-chotherapy within training, practice, continuing education, and the APA ethical principles and codeof conduct.
Wednesday, October 23, 2019
Dishonesty out of lab, in subjects’ self-chosen environment, is greater than in the lab, with a considerable fraction of subjects cheating to the maximum extent possible
Self-portrayed honesty and behavioral dishonesty. Gideon Yaniv, Yossef Tobol & Erez Siniver. Ethics & Behavior, Oct 22 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10508422.2019.1678162
ABSTRACT: A common conclusion of lab dishonesty studies is that subjects cheat to a very modest extent even when they cannot get caught. The modest level of cheating is attributed to subjects’ moral feelings which restrict their cheating to a level that enables them to retain their self-image as honest individuals. The present paper questions this claim, reporting the results of two experiments which uncover a discrepancy between self-portrayed honesty and actual dishonest behavior. The experiments reveal, first, that self-portrayed honesty is stricter than practical honesty, suggesting that when facing an opportunity to benefit from dishonest behavior, subjects trade off some of their self-image as honest persons for dishonestly-generated payoffs. Secondly, dishonesty out of lab, in subjects’ self-chosen environment, is greater than in the lab, with a considerable fraction of subjects cheating to the maximum extent possible. We suggest that it is not a concern about their self-image that holds subjects back from cheating maximally, but rather a concern about their social image. The modest level of dishonesty observed in the lab presumably reflects caution subjects exercise in an unsafe setup. Given an environment where they feel safe to reap the fruits of dishonesty without compromising their image as honest persons in the eyes of others, the image they have of themselves hardly plays a role in curbing their unethical behavior.
KEYWORDS: self-portrayed honesty, self-image, behavioral dishonesty, social image
Check also Big Surprise!!! Recent research has found that therapists lie to patients:
Ethics of psychotherapist deception. Drew A. Curtis & Leslie J. Kelley. Ethics & Behavior, Oct 3 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/big-surprise-recent-research-has-found.html
Viral outrage: As more people expressed outrage, observers believed it was more normative to express condemnation but also felt the outrage more excessive, thus inspiring more sympathy too
Outraged but Sympathetic: Ambivalent Emotions Limit the Influence of Viral Outrage. Takuya Sawaoka, Benoît Monin. Social Psychological and Personality Science, October 23, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619853595
Abstract: Viral outrage—the piling up of online condemnation in response to offensive remarks—is a common expression of moral judgment in the digital age. We examined whether viral outrage is effective in convincing observers that an offender is blameworthy. Across seven studies, participants (N = 3,406) saw racist, sexist, or disrespectful posts with accompanying expressions of outrage and evaluated the offender. As more people expressed outrage, observers believed it was more normative to express condemnation but also felt that the outrage was more excessive, thus inspiring both more outrage and more sympathy toward the offender. Greater outrage increased condemnation toward the offender; greater sympathy decreased it. These two processes operated in opposition and suppressed one another. These findings held even when the offense was relatively benign and even when the offender was a high-status public figure. Overall, people’s ambivalent reactions of outrage and sympathy limit the influence of viral outrage in inspiring condemnation.
Keywords morality, outrage, social judgment, punishment, social influence
Abstract: Viral outrage—the piling up of online condemnation in response to offensive remarks—is a common expression of moral judgment in the digital age. We examined whether viral outrage is effective in convincing observers that an offender is blameworthy. Across seven studies, participants (N = 3,406) saw racist, sexist, or disrespectful posts with accompanying expressions of outrage and evaluated the offender. As more people expressed outrage, observers believed it was more normative to express condemnation but also felt that the outrage was more excessive, thus inspiring both more outrage and more sympathy toward the offender. Greater outrage increased condemnation toward the offender; greater sympathy decreased it. These two processes operated in opposition and suppressed one another. These findings held even when the offense was relatively benign and even when the offender was a high-status public figure. Overall, people’s ambivalent reactions of outrage and sympathy limit the influence of viral outrage in inspiring condemnation.
Keywords morality, outrage, social judgment, punishment, social influence
Unexpectedly, consciously perceptible hedonic qualities appear to play a less relevant, and mostly transient, role in food reinforcement; gut-brain reward pathways instead reinforce food intake
Rethinking Food Reward. Ivan E. de Araujo, Mark Schatzker, and Dana M. Small. Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 71, January 4, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011643
Abstract: The conscious perception of the hedonic sensory properties of caloric foods is commonly believed to guide our dietary choices. Current and traditional models implicate the consciously perceived hedonic qualities of food as driving overeating, whereas subliminal signals arising from the gut would curb our uncontrolled desire for calories. Here we review recent animal and human studies that support a markedly different model for food reward. These findings reveal in particular the existence of subcortical body-to-brain neural pathways linking gastrointestinal nutrient sensors to the brain's reward regions. Unexpectedly, consciously perceptible hedonic qualities appear to play a less relevant, and mostly transient, role in food reinforcement. In this model, gut-brain reward pathways bypass cranial taste and aroma sensory receptors and the cortical networks that give rise to flavor perception. They instead reinforce behaviors independently of the cognitive processes that support overt insights into the nature of our dietary decisions.
Abstract: The conscious perception of the hedonic sensory properties of caloric foods is commonly believed to guide our dietary choices. Current and traditional models implicate the consciously perceived hedonic qualities of food as driving overeating, whereas subliminal signals arising from the gut would curb our uncontrolled desire for calories. Here we review recent animal and human studies that support a markedly different model for food reward. These findings reveal in particular the existence of subcortical body-to-brain neural pathways linking gastrointestinal nutrient sensors to the brain's reward regions. Unexpectedly, consciously perceptible hedonic qualities appear to play a less relevant, and mostly transient, role in food reinforcement. In this model, gut-brain reward pathways bypass cranial taste and aroma sensory receptors and the cortical networks that give rise to flavor perception. They instead reinforce behaviors independently of the cognitive processes that support overt insights into the nature of our dietary decisions.
Men tip 12 pct more if their driver is a woman, but that’s entirely because they give more money to the youngest ones; the premium payed shrinks as the women get older
The Drivers of Social Preferences: Evidence from a Nationwide Tipping Field Experiment. Bharat Chandar, Uri Gneezy, John A. List, Ian Muir. NBER Working Paper No. 26380, October 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26380.pdf
Abstract: Even though social preferences affect nearly every facet of life, there exist many open questions on the economics of social preferences in markets. We leverage a unique opportunity to generate a large data set to inform the who’s, what’s, where’s, and when’s of social preferences through the lens of a nationwide tipping field experiment on the Uber platform. Our field experiment generates data from more than 40 million trips, allowing an exploration of social preferences in the ride sharing market using big data. Combining experimental and natural variation in the data, we are able to establish tipping facts as well as provide insights into the underlying motives for tipping. Interestingly, even though tips are made privately, and without external social benefits or pressure, more than 15% of trips are tipped. Yet, nearly 60% of people never tip, and only 1% of people always tip. Overall, the demand-side explains much more of the observed tipping variation than the supply-side.
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Washington Post: Men tip 12 percent more if their driver is a woman, but that’s entirely because they give more money to the youngest female drivers. The premium men pay to women behind the wheel shrinks as the women get older. By the time the drivers are age 65, it has virtually vanished. Women also tip other women more, but they don’t significantly change their tips based on the driver’s age.
Longer relationships, dating relationships, & greater subjective overall health predicted high emotional satisfaction for men; for women it was older age, married or cohabiting relationships, & frequent sexual communication
High Emotional and Sexual Satisfaction Among Partnered Midlife Canadians: Associations with Relationship Characteristics, Sexual Activity and Communication, and Health. Shari M. Blumenstock, Christopher Quinn-Nilas, Robin R. Milhausen, Alexander McKay. Archives of Sexual Behavior, October 22 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-019-01498-9
Abstract: Despite midlife adults accounting for a substantial and growing segment of the population, few large-scale studies have investigated factors which distinguish highly satisfying relationships from less satisfying ones in midlife. In a subsample of partnered 40–59-year-old Canadians (705 men, 743 women), relationship characteristics, sexual activity and communication, and health were investigated individually and simultaneously as predictors of high emotional and sexual satisfaction. Though the vast majority of participants reported being at least somewhat satisfied in their current relationship, less than half reported high satisfaction. For men and women, high emotional and sexual satisfactions were strongly linked. Logistic regressions indicated that longer relationships, dating relationships, and greater subjective overall health predicted high emotional satisfaction for men, whereas older age, married or cohabiting relationships, and frequent sexual communication predicted high emotional satisfaction for women. All types of sexual activities (minus penile–anal intercourse) were bivariately related to high emotional and sexual satisfaction. More frequent partnered sexual activity predicted high emotional and sexual satisfaction for men and women in regression analyses. More frequent sexual communication predicted high emotional satisfaction for women and high sexual satisfaction for both men and women. Newer relationships were more sexually satisfying for men. Postmenopausal women were less likely to be highly sexually satisfied. Findings suggest that physical health conditions are not generally related to high levels of satisfaction in midlife couples and that frequently discussing sex and engaging in (any) sexual activity with a partner are key components of highly satisfying relationships.
Keywords Emotional satisfaction Health Midlife relationships Sexual activity Sexual satisfaction
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Emotional Satisfaction
Models of emotional satisfaction indicated unique predictors for men and women. Men were slightly more likely to be highly emotionally satisfied as relationship length increased. This is similar to previous research associations found between relationship length and satisfaction in midlife men (Carpenter et al., 2009; Heiman et al., 2011). As relationships endure, partners may grow closer to each other, strengthening their bond. However, for women, those in shorter relationships were more likely to report high levels of emotional satisfaction. It is unclear why this association was found. It could be that women.s satisfaction levels were better accounted for by the relationship type variable, which indicated gender differences in likelihood of high emotional satisfaction. Women who were cohabiting or married were more than twice as likely to report being very emotionally satisfied compared to those in dating relationships. In contrast, men in cohabiting relationships were about half as likely to report high emotional satisfaction than those in dating relationships. Previous research in midlife populations had found no differences in high emotional satisfaction between those who were cohabiting/married (combined) and those who had a sexual relationship in the past year but were not cohabiting/ married (i.e., single, separated, or divorced) (Carpenter et al., 2009). The current research suggests that differences in these relationship types likely warrant analyzing them as separate categories, as the differences may be important for how satisfaction is experienced, particularly for men. The different relationship types may broadly indicate levels of commitment between partners, and perceptions of partner commitment has been important for relationship happiness. There are several reasons people may choose to move in with a partner outside of marriage. Indeed, cohabitation is becoming more commonplace, and could serve as a stepping stone on the way to marriage, as a compatibility test for those unsure about a longer commitment, or as an alternative to marriage altogether. The inconsistent findings could also be due to differences in how these relationships were classified in the studies.the Carpenter et al. study of a U.S. sample compared partners who were living together, 94% of whom were married, to those who had any sexual partner in the past year but were not living with them. In the current Canadian sample, cohabitation meant specifically living together and not married, in comparison to those who were married or in a serious dating relationship. Thus, among those who are in a committed romantic relationship of some sort, the type of that relationship may matter for high levels of emotional satisfaction and could reflect levels of partner commitment.
Frequent partnered sexual activity was a significant predictor in both bivariate and regression analyses. In bivariate analyses, engaging in partnered sex once per week or more was associated with increased likelihood of high emotional satisfaction for women and men. In logistic regression models, increases in frequency of any partnered sexual activity were associated with higher likelihood of being highly emotionally satisfied for women and men. This is notable, as the models accounted for sexual satisfaction, indicating physical intimacy could foster feelings of emotional connection and contribute to satisfying relationships beyond feelings of sexual satisfaction. Sex can be a very personal, intimate experience, and therefore has the potential to increase feelings of connection and intimacy when partners are responsive to one another and feel accepted and cared for during sexual activity (Laurenceau et al., 2005). While the exact mechanisms for this association cannot be gleaned from the current study, the findings support other research indicating the importance of sexual intimacy for fostering bonds between partners (Muise, Kim, McNulty, & Impett, 2016a). In the exploratory bivariate analyses of specific sexual behaviors, all of the sexual activities, when frequent, predicted higher likelihood of being very emotionally satisfied for women and men (except for penile.anal intercourse). These results indicate that frequently connecting with a partner physically may promote feelings of emotional satisfaction regardless of the actual activity. These exploratory findings indicate that more in-depth studies on various sexual activities could help elucidate the roles that physical intimacy may play in emotional satisfaction.
In bivariate analyses, more frequent sexual communication was associated with greater likelihood of women and men being emotionally satisfied, and this remained significant for women in the regression models, but not for men. More frequent sexual communication could be an indicator of overall closeness and comfort in the relationship. Disclosing vulnerabilities to a partner and perceiving the partner.s response to exhibit understanding, validation, and care, lay the foundation of emotional intimacy (Laurenceau et al., 2005; Reis & Shaver, 1988), and this extends into sexual aspects of the relationship. Being able to disclose sexual likes and dislikes may not only increase the likelihood of a partner.s sexual needs being met, it may also increase feelings of closeness and intimacy (Byers & Demmons, 1999; Coffelt & Hess, 2013; Montesi et al., 2011). In a path analysis study, the association between sexual self-disclosure and sexual satisfaction was fully mediated by relationship satisfaction in women, but only partially in men (MacNeil & Byers, 2009), suggesting that sexual satisfaction may be accounting for the relationship between communication and emotional satisfaction for men. In cross-sex relationships, women are far less likely to experience orgasm during sex with men than men are with women (Armstrong, England, & Fogarty, 2012; Frederick, John, Garcia, & Lloyd, 2018). Perhaps among women, talking about what will bring them pleasure or to orgasm, and the required comfort to do so, may be more important for experiencing sex as a display of, or conduit for, emotional intimacy.
Perceptions of overall health were associated with increased likelihood of high emotional satisfaction for men and women in bivariate analyses. Greater subjective overall health remained a significant predictor in the regression models for men, but not for women. Further, medical conditions were generally not related to high emotional satisfaction for men or women in the bivariate analyses or in the regression models. This was unexpected, given previously found associations between medical conditions and decreased relationship satisfaction (Schwartz et al., 2013). Having a medical condition may strain the couple relationship and result in declines in the emotional satisfaction partners may find within their relationship; however, some research suggests that non-chronic stressors such as illnesses present opportunities for couples to enhance closeness and possibly increase their relationship satisfaction if they successfully cope (Bodenmann, Pihet, & Kayser, 2006; Karney & Bradbury, 1995). While few participants indicated the presence of a medical condition and this study cannot determine exact reasons for these results, it does suggest several avenues for future research, particularly for oversampling participants with specific medical conditions. For example, those who experience a debilitating condition may receive increased support from their partner (Lister et al., 2013), which could result in feeling closer and more cared for within the relationship. Further, the timing of the diagnosis could play a role in its association with satisfaction in a relationship.a newer diagnosis may be more detrimental, but as couples live with the condition longer, they may grow more knowledgeable about the condition and how to cope with it. Indeed, it is likely that midlife couples who report being very emotionally satisfied in their relationships generally employ effective coping strategies for dealing with many stressors, such as a medical condition. It is also possible that the declines in satisfaction may be more significant for the partner than the person experiencing the medical condition (Fisher et al., 2014). These are all important directions for future research. Overall, while health factors could be associated with satisfaction, subjective overall health and medical conditions may not be important determining factors in the difference between a relationship that is somewhat satisfying (or less) versus one that is highly satisfying.
Abstract: Despite midlife adults accounting for a substantial and growing segment of the population, few large-scale studies have investigated factors which distinguish highly satisfying relationships from less satisfying ones in midlife. In a subsample of partnered 40–59-year-old Canadians (705 men, 743 women), relationship characteristics, sexual activity and communication, and health were investigated individually and simultaneously as predictors of high emotional and sexual satisfaction. Though the vast majority of participants reported being at least somewhat satisfied in their current relationship, less than half reported high satisfaction. For men and women, high emotional and sexual satisfactions were strongly linked. Logistic regressions indicated that longer relationships, dating relationships, and greater subjective overall health predicted high emotional satisfaction for men, whereas older age, married or cohabiting relationships, and frequent sexual communication predicted high emotional satisfaction for women. All types of sexual activities (minus penile–anal intercourse) were bivariately related to high emotional and sexual satisfaction. More frequent partnered sexual activity predicted high emotional and sexual satisfaction for men and women in regression analyses. More frequent sexual communication predicted high emotional satisfaction for women and high sexual satisfaction for both men and women. Newer relationships were more sexually satisfying for men. Postmenopausal women were less likely to be highly sexually satisfied. Findings suggest that physical health conditions are not generally related to high levels of satisfaction in midlife couples and that frequently discussing sex and engaging in (any) sexual activity with a partner are key components of highly satisfying relationships.
Keywords Emotional satisfaction Health Midlife relationships Sexual activity Sexual satisfaction
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Emotional Satisfaction
Models of emotional satisfaction indicated unique predictors for men and women. Men were slightly more likely to be highly emotionally satisfied as relationship length increased. This is similar to previous research associations found between relationship length and satisfaction in midlife men (Carpenter et al., 2009; Heiman et al., 2011). As relationships endure, partners may grow closer to each other, strengthening their bond. However, for women, those in shorter relationships were more likely to report high levels of emotional satisfaction. It is unclear why this association was found. It could be that women.s satisfaction levels were better accounted for by the relationship type variable, which indicated gender differences in likelihood of high emotional satisfaction. Women who were cohabiting or married were more than twice as likely to report being very emotionally satisfied compared to those in dating relationships. In contrast, men in cohabiting relationships were about half as likely to report high emotional satisfaction than those in dating relationships. Previous research in midlife populations had found no differences in high emotional satisfaction between those who were cohabiting/married (combined) and those who had a sexual relationship in the past year but were not cohabiting/ married (i.e., single, separated, or divorced) (Carpenter et al., 2009). The current research suggests that differences in these relationship types likely warrant analyzing them as separate categories, as the differences may be important for how satisfaction is experienced, particularly for men. The different relationship types may broadly indicate levels of commitment between partners, and perceptions of partner commitment has been important for relationship happiness. There are several reasons people may choose to move in with a partner outside of marriage. Indeed, cohabitation is becoming more commonplace, and could serve as a stepping stone on the way to marriage, as a compatibility test for those unsure about a longer commitment, or as an alternative to marriage altogether. The inconsistent findings could also be due to differences in how these relationships were classified in the studies.the Carpenter et al. study of a U.S. sample compared partners who were living together, 94% of whom were married, to those who had any sexual partner in the past year but were not living with them. In the current Canadian sample, cohabitation meant specifically living together and not married, in comparison to those who were married or in a serious dating relationship. Thus, among those who are in a committed romantic relationship of some sort, the type of that relationship may matter for high levels of emotional satisfaction and could reflect levels of partner commitment.
Frequent partnered sexual activity was a significant predictor in both bivariate and regression analyses. In bivariate analyses, engaging in partnered sex once per week or more was associated with increased likelihood of high emotional satisfaction for women and men. In logistic regression models, increases in frequency of any partnered sexual activity were associated with higher likelihood of being highly emotionally satisfied for women and men. This is notable, as the models accounted for sexual satisfaction, indicating physical intimacy could foster feelings of emotional connection and contribute to satisfying relationships beyond feelings of sexual satisfaction. Sex can be a very personal, intimate experience, and therefore has the potential to increase feelings of connection and intimacy when partners are responsive to one another and feel accepted and cared for during sexual activity (Laurenceau et al., 2005). While the exact mechanisms for this association cannot be gleaned from the current study, the findings support other research indicating the importance of sexual intimacy for fostering bonds between partners (Muise, Kim, McNulty, & Impett, 2016a). In the exploratory bivariate analyses of specific sexual behaviors, all of the sexual activities, when frequent, predicted higher likelihood of being very emotionally satisfied for women and men (except for penile.anal intercourse). These results indicate that frequently connecting with a partner physically may promote feelings of emotional satisfaction regardless of the actual activity. These exploratory findings indicate that more in-depth studies on various sexual activities could help elucidate the roles that physical intimacy may play in emotional satisfaction.
In bivariate analyses, more frequent sexual communication was associated with greater likelihood of women and men being emotionally satisfied, and this remained significant for women in the regression models, but not for men. More frequent sexual communication could be an indicator of overall closeness and comfort in the relationship. Disclosing vulnerabilities to a partner and perceiving the partner.s response to exhibit understanding, validation, and care, lay the foundation of emotional intimacy (Laurenceau et al., 2005; Reis & Shaver, 1988), and this extends into sexual aspects of the relationship. Being able to disclose sexual likes and dislikes may not only increase the likelihood of a partner.s sexual needs being met, it may also increase feelings of closeness and intimacy (Byers & Demmons, 1999; Coffelt & Hess, 2013; Montesi et al., 2011). In a path analysis study, the association between sexual self-disclosure and sexual satisfaction was fully mediated by relationship satisfaction in women, but only partially in men (MacNeil & Byers, 2009), suggesting that sexual satisfaction may be accounting for the relationship between communication and emotional satisfaction for men. In cross-sex relationships, women are far less likely to experience orgasm during sex with men than men are with women (Armstrong, England, & Fogarty, 2012; Frederick, John, Garcia, & Lloyd, 2018). Perhaps among women, talking about what will bring them pleasure or to orgasm, and the required comfort to do so, may be more important for experiencing sex as a display of, or conduit for, emotional intimacy.
Perceptions of overall health were associated with increased likelihood of high emotional satisfaction for men and women in bivariate analyses. Greater subjective overall health remained a significant predictor in the regression models for men, but not for women. Further, medical conditions were generally not related to high emotional satisfaction for men or women in the bivariate analyses or in the regression models. This was unexpected, given previously found associations between medical conditions and decreased relationship satisfaction (Schwartz et al., 2013). Having a medical condition may strain the couple relationship and result in declines in the emotional satisfaction partners may find within their relationship; however, some research suggests that non-chronic stressors such as illnesses present opportunities for couples to enhance closeness and possibly increase their relationship satisfaction if they successfully cope (Bodenmann, Pihet, & Kayser, 2006; Karney & Bradbury, 1995). While few participants indicated the presence of a medical condition and this study cannot determine exact reasons for these results, it does suggest several avenues for future research, particularly for oversampling participants with specific medical conditions. For example, those who experience a debilitating condition may receive increased support from their partner (Lister et al., 2013), which could result in feeling closer and more cared for within the relationship. Further, the timing of the diagnosis could play a role in its association with satisfaction in a relationship.a newer diagnosis may be more detrimental, but as couples live with the condition longer, they may grow more knowledgeable about the condition and how to cope with it. Indeed, it is likely that midlife couples who report being very emotionally satisfied in their relationships generally employ effective coping strategies for dealing with many stressors, such as a medical condition. It is also possible that the declines in satisfaction may be more significant for the partner than the person experiencing the medical condition (Fisher et al., 2014). These are all important directions for future research. Overall, while health factors could be associated with satisfaction, subjective overall health and medical conditions may not be important determining factors in the difference between a relationship that is somewhat satisfying (or less) versus one that is highly satisfying.
Tuesday, October 22, 2019
Inter-subject representational similarity analysis reveals individual variations in affective experience when watching erotic movies
Inter-subject representational similarity analysis reveals individual variations in affective experience when watching erotic movies. Pin-Hao A. Chen, Eshin Jolly, Jin Hyun Cheong, Luke J. Chang. bioRxiv, Aug 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1101/726570
Abstract: We spend much of our life pursuing or avoiding affective experiences. However, surprisingly little is known about how these experiences are represented in the brain and if they are shared across individuals. Here, we explore variations in the construction of an affective experience during a naturalistic viewing paradigm based on subjective preferences in sociosexual desire and self-control using intersubject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA). We found that when watching erotic movies, intersubject variations in sociosexual desire preferences of 26 heterosexual males were associated with similarly structured fluctuations in the cortico-striatal reward, default mode, and mentalizing networks. In contrast, variations in the self-control preferences were associated with shared dynamics in the fronto-parietal executive control and cingulo-insula salience networks. Importantly, these results were specific to the affective experience, as we did not observe any relationship with variation in preferences when individuals watched neutral movies. Moreover, these results appear to require multivariate representations of preferences as we did not observe any significant results using single summary scores. Our findings demonstrate that multidimensional variations in individual preferences can be used to uncover unique dimensions of an affective experience, and that IS-RSA can provide new insights into the neural processes underlying psychological experiences elicited through naturalistic experimental designs.
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Discussion
In this study, we used brain imaging to explore the affective experience of heterosexual male participants. We used a naturalistic experimental design (Hasson et al., 2004; Haxby et al., 2011), in which participants watched short clips of erotic and neutral movies in the MRI scanner. These types of designs are ideal for eliciting powerful psychological experiences and creating strong variation in brain activity underlying the experience (Jolly and Chang, 2019). In contrast to the standard practices in emotion research, we did not examine affective experience using self-reported feelings or videos selected to elicit specific emotional states (Coan et al., 2007; Lench et al., 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012; Quigley et al., 2014). Instead, we explored how variation in two distinct preferences (i.e., sociosexual desires and self-control) mapped onto individual variation in brain dynamics while watching the videos using intersubject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA).
Consistent with our predictions, we found that when individuals watched erotic movies, individuals with similar sociosexual desire preferences showed higher similarities in patterns of neural dynamics in brain regions within the cortico-striatal reward and default mode and mentalizing networks than those with different preferences. In contrast, as individuals became closer in their self-control preferences, we observed greater similarities in patterns of neural dynamics in brain regions within the fronto-parietal executive control and cingulo-insula salience networks. Importantly, when individuals watched neutral movies, inter-subject similarities in sociosexual desire and self-control preferences played no prominent role in accounting for the similarities in patterns of neural dynamics. We used meta-analytic decoding to provide a crude reverse inference of the possible psychological states contributing to the affective experience. Consistent with our expectations, variations in sociosexual desire preferences revealed stronger associations with social and social judgment topics, whereas variations in self-control preferences revealed stronger associations with the executive control, cognitive control, error monitoring and conflict. Together, our results support our hypothesis that variation in individual preferences can be used to explore affective experiences. Though we only specifically examined preferences for sociosexual desire and self-control, we do not believe this to be an exhaustive list of possible preferences and speculate that many other potential measures might also provide insight into this experience. This study provides important conceptual and methodological advances to the investigation of affective experiences. Because there currently exists no objective measure of affective experiences (Chang et al., 2015), the field of emotion has a long history of grappling with measurement issues and has largely relied on self-report (Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999). One issue with trying to have participants map an experience into a high dimensional space of self-reported feelings is that this process requires both introspection (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and verbally labeling feelings using shared concepts (Lindquist et al., 2015). It’s possible that this verbal labeling process necessarily reduces the dimensionality of the representational space of the experience by filtering out processes that cannot be measured using this approach, which is why many studies find that 2-5 dimensions can explain the majority of the emotion rating variance (Chikazoe et al., 2014; Kragel and LaBar, 2015; Skerry and Saxe, 2015). In addition, most studies select a few stimuli to elicit a finite set of emotional states. However, this approach assumes that all participants will have a similar experience (Chang et al. 2018) and limits the variation in the emotional experiences (Cowen and Keltner, 2017), which can provide a statistical bias towards a low dimensional representation (Jolly and Chang, 2019). Our study provides an alternative approach to exploring affective experiences. Rather than assuming that participants will have the same response, which provides the basic premise of intersubject correlation (Hasson et al., 2004) and also functional alignment techniques (Guntupalli et al., 2016; Haxby et al., 2011), we assume that participants will have strong variations in their experience, which should correspond to structured variations in measures related to the experience. Importantly, we do not attempt to reduce the dimensionality of these measures to a single summary score, instead, we represent each item from the measure as a separate axis in a multiple-dimensional space and calculated the pairwise distance of each participant in this high-dimensional space. We believe that preserving the richness and complexity of all features in a high-dimensional space is important as there are many ways to answer a questionnaire that will produce an identical single summary score. Consistent with this intuition, we find that our IS-RSA results only hold when using a high dimensional representation and are not present when mapping participants’ distances using summary scores.
Though we believe this IS-RSA approach to be promising, there are several important limitations that should be acknowledged. First, we are using all of the features of each preference measure as an axis to map each participant and weighting the contribution of each feature equally. This means that we currently are unable to determine which features are specifically contributing to the experience. In addition, some of these features could be reflecting pure noise, which would be weighted equally as features that contain pure signal. It’s possible that this might be addressed with future work using multivariate regression techniques (e.g., partial least squares). Second, we are mapping individual position in this multidimensional space to intersubject dynamics of brain activity. This means that we do not know when in time processes specific to the experience occurred. It is possible to use similarity in spatial representations (van Baar et al., 2019), which might provide a way to extend this to which time points show a similar intersubject structure (Chang et al. 2018). However, this will also require accounting for multiple comparisons as well as non-independence in the time-series signals resulting from autocorrelation.
In summary, we have provided a demonstration of how variations in participants’ preferences can be used to uncover unique dimensions of an affective experience based on similarity in the intersubject structure of brain dynamics measured during the experience. This technique has the potential to provide a new approach to studying the neural processes underlying psychological experiences elicited through naturalistic experimental designs. Though this study provides a simple proof of concept, we hope that this work will inspire future innovations in analyzing naturalistic experimental designs, affective science, and psychological experiences.
Abstract: We spend much of our life pursuing or avoiding affective experiences. However, surprisingly little is known about how these experiences are represented in the brain and if they are shared across individuals. Here, we explore variations in the construction of an affective experience during a naturalistic viewing paradigm based on subjective preferences in sociosexual desire and self-control using intersubject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA). We found that when watching erotic movies, intersubject variations in sociosexual desire preferences of 26 heterosexual males were associated with similarly structured fluctuations in the cortico-striatal reward, default mode, and mentalizing networks. In contrast, variations in the self-control preferences were associated with shared dynamics in the fronto-parietal executive control and cingulo-insula salience networks. Importantly, these results were specific to the affective experience, as we did not observe any relationship with variation in preferences when individuals watched neutral movies. Moreover, these results appear to require multivariate representations of preferences as we did not observe any significant results using single summary scores. Our findings demonstrate that multidimensional variations in individual preferences can be used to uncover unique dimensions of an affective experience, and that IS-RSA can provide new insights into the neural processes underlying psychological experiences elicited through naturalistic experimental designs.
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Discussion
In this study, we used brain imaging to explore the affective experience of heterosexual male participants. We used a naturalistic experimental design (Hasson et al., 2004; Haxby et al., 2011), in which participants watched short clips of erotic and neutral movies in the MRI scanner. These types of designs are ideal for eliciting powerful psychological experiences and creating strong variation in brain activity underlying the experience (Jolly and Chang, 2019). In contrast to the standard practices in emotion research, we did not examine affective experience using self-reported feelings or videos selected to elicit specific emotional states (Coan et al., 2007; Lench et al., 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012; Quigley et al., 2014). Instead, we explored how variation in two distinct preferences (i.e., sociosexual desires and self-control) mapped onto individual variation in brain dynamics while watching the videos using intersubject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA).
Consistent with our predictions, we found that when individuals watched erotic movies, individuals with similar sociosexual desire preferences showed higher similarities in patterns of neural dynamics in brain regions within the cortico-striatal reward and default mode and mentalizing networks than those with different preferences. In contrast, as individuals became closer in their self-control preferences, we observed greater similarities in patterns of neural dynamics in brain regions within the fronto-parietal executive control and cingulo-insula salience networks. Importantly, when individuals watched neutral movies, inter-subject similarities in sociosexual desire and self-control preferences played no prominent role in accounting for the similarities in patterns of neural dynamics. We used meta-analytic decoding to provide a crude reverse inference of the possible psychological states contributing to the affective experience. Consistent with our expectations, variations in sociosexual desire preferences revealed stronger associations with social and social judgment topics, whereas variations in self-control preferences revealed stronger associations with the executive control, cognitive control, error monitoring and conflict. Together, our results support our hypothesis that variation in individual preferences can be used to explore affective experiences. Though we only specifically examined preferences for sociosexual desire and self-control, we do not believe this to be an exhaustive list of possible preferences and speculate that many other potential measures might also provide insight into this experience. This study provides important conceptual and methodological advances to the investigation of affective experiences. Because there currently exists no objective measure of affective experiences (Chang et al., 2015), the field of emotion has a long history of grappling with measurement issues and has largely relied on self-report (Larsen and Fredrickson, 1999). One issue with trying to have participants map an experience into a high dimensional space of self-reported feelings is that this process requires both introspection (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and verbally labeling feelings using shared concepts (Lindquist et al., 2015). It’s possible that this verbal labeling process necessarily reduces the dimensionality of the representational space of the experience by filtering out processes that cannot be measured using this approach, which is why many studies find that 2-5 dimensions can explain the majority of the emotion rating variance (Chikazoe et al., 2014; Kragel and LaBar, 2015; Skerry and Saxe, 2015). In addition, most studies select a few stimuli to elicit a finite set of emotional states. However, this approach assumes that all participants will have a similar experience (Chang et al. 2018) and limits the variation in the emotional experiences (Cowen and Keltner, 2017), which can provide a statistical bias towards a low dimensional representation (Jolly and Chang, 2019). Our study provides an alternative approach to exploring affective experiences. Rather than assuming that participants will have the same response, which provides the basic premise of intersubject correlation (Hasson et al., 2004) and also functional alignment techniques (Guntupalli et al., 2016; Haxby et al., 2011), we assume that participants will have strong variations in their experience, which should correspond to structured variations in measures related to the experience. Importantly, we do not attempt to reduce the dimensionality of these measures to a single summary score, instead, we represent each item from the measure as a separate axis in a multiple-dimensional space and calculated the pairwise distance of each participant in this high-dimensional space. We believe that preserving the richness and complexity of all features in a high-dimensional space is important as there are many ways to answer a questionnaire that will produce an identical single summary score. Consistent with this intuition, we find that our IS-RSA results only hold when using a high dimensional representation and are not present when mapping participants’ distances using summary scores.
Though we believe this IS-RSA approach to be promising, there are several important limitations that should be acknowledged. First, we are using all of the features of each preference measure as an axis to map each participant and weighting the contribution of each feature equally. This means that we currently are unable to determine which features are specifically contributing to the experience. In addition, some of these features could be reflecting pure noise, which would be weighted equally as features that contain pure signal. It’s possible that this might be addressed with future work using multivariate regression techniques (e.g., partial least squares). Second, we are mapping individual position in this multidimensional space to intersubject dynamics of brain activity. This means that we do not know when in time processes specific to the experience occurred. It is possible to use similarity in spatial representations (van Baar et al., 2019), which might provide a way to extend this to which time points show a similar intersubject structure (Chang et al. 2018). However, this will also require accounting for multiple comparisons as well as non-independence in the time-series signals resulting from autocorrelation.
In summary, we have provided a demonstration of how variations in participants’ preferences can be used to uncover unique dimensions of an affective experience based on similarity in the intersubject structure of brain dynamics measured during the experience. This technique has the potential to provide a new approach to studying the neural processes underlying psychological experiences elicited through naturalistic experimental designs. Though this study provides a simple proof of concept, we hope that this work will inspire future innovations in analyzing naturalistic experimental designs, affective science, and psychological experiences.
Intellectual Humility and Perceptions of Political Opponents
Seli, Paul, Ph.D. 2019. “Intellectual Humility and Perceptions of Political Opponents.” PsyArXiv. October 22. psyarxiv.com/h8fy9
Abstract: The epistemic virtue of intellectual humility (IH) refers to the recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. In four initial studies, we examined the role of IH in predicting how people perceive their sociopolitical opponents, and the role of IH in people’s willingness to befriend their sociopolitical opponents. We found that people lower in IH are more likely to derogate and less likely to befriend their opponents. In two additional studies, we experimentally explored a possible method with which to make people less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend them. After informing participants about the results of our existing studies showing that people who hold opposing positions do not differ in IH, participants were less likely to derogate opponents and somewhat more willing to befriend them. We discuss the implications of these results for sincere, open discussion, and for reducing social extremism and polarization.
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General Discussion
In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigated a possible way in which people who are low in IH might be overconfident in their beliefs and particularly unwilling to seriously engage with opponents’ views. For five of the six sociopolitical issues examined, we found that participants lower in IH tended to derogate the intellectual capabilities and moral character of sociopolitical opponents more than participants higher in IH. By believing that opponents are unintelligent and unethical, it may become easier to dismiss others’ views and to believe in the superiority of one’s own views. Studies 2a and 2b examined whether participants lower in IH are less willing to befriend people with opposing views. For both highly-contentious, polarized issues, and less-contentious, polarized issues, those lower in IH were indeed less willing than those higher in IH to befriend people who hold opposing positions. Then, in Studies 3a and 3b, we introduced an experimental manipulation to explore a possible way to render participants less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend opponents. We informed participants that there are actually no differences in IH between people who hold opposing positions on the issues, and we tested whether this information influenced their perceptions of their opponents. For both issues examined, informing participants that opponents do not actually differ on IH made participants derogate opponents less. Moreover, for the standardized testing issue, but not for the concealed carry issue, informing participants that those who hold opposing positions do not differ on IH made them more willing to befriend those with opposing views. The results from these two final studies provide experimental evidence for a simple and effective means of reducing the tendency for people to derogate others who hold different sociopolitical views.
There has been a recent surge of research on IH, much of which has been devoted to IH scale development and validation (e.g., Haggard et al., 2018; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Leary et al., 2017). By most psychological accounts, IH is fundamentally a cognitive intrapersonal construct reflecting people’s private assessments of their beliefs and attitudes (Leary et al., 2017). There are, however, important interpersonal consequences of differences in IH. Other research has found that those higher in IH tend to be more forgiving (Lavelock et al., 2014), generous (Exline & Hill, 2012), and empathic (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016). Our research expands upon these findings by identifying an interpersonal consequence of differences in IH, namely that those low in IH tend to both derogate sociopolitical opponents and express an unwillingness to befriend people with opposing sociopolitical views.
Our finding that IH predicts the degree to which people derogate sociopolitical opponents and express an unwillingness to befriend them may have significant implications for social extremism and political polarization. Derogating opponents and being unwilling to befriend them might create cliques of people, with the same views, who collectively seek out and share information that reinforces their shared views (i.e., “echo chambers”). With contemporary social media, there is no shortage of opportunities for people to create and find their desired echo chambers. In fact, echo chambers comprised of people discussing sociopolitical issues and events have been identified on Twitter (Barberá, et al., 2015; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Lambert, 2015), Facebook (Del Vicario, et al., 2016), and various blogs (Suhay, Blackwell, Roche, & Bruggeman, 2015). Critically, the results of our final two studies suggest that informing people about actual psychological research on IH has the potential to make them less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend them. This kind of simple intervention might help to minimize social extremism and political polarization—especially for low-IH individuals.
Disagreements over sociopolitical issues can be useful and fruitful. Such disagreements offer the potential for understanding the perspectives of others, generating creative solutions to significant problems, and growing intellectually. However, the extent to which disagreements are useful depends on the willingness of opposing sides to try to understand opposing positions (de Wied, Branje, & Meeus, 2007; Stone, Patton, & Heen, 2010). Promoting IH as an epistemic virtue worth cultivating and informing the public about research on IH has the potential to reduce social extremism, polarization, and the frequency of unresolvable disagreements over time.
Abstract: The epistemic virtue of intellectual humility (IH) refers to the recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. In four initial studies, we examined the role of IH in predicting how people perceive their sociopolitical opponents, and the role of IH in people’s willingness to befriend their sociopolitical opponents. We found that people lower in IH are more likely to derogate and less likely to befriend their opponents. In two additional studies, we experimentally explored a possible method with which to make people less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend them. After informing participants about the results of our existing studies showing that people who hold opposing positions do not differ in IH, participants were less likely to derogate opponents and somewhat more willing to befriend them. We discuss the implications of these results for sincere, open discussion, and for reducing social extremism and polarization.
---
General Discussion
In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigated a possible way in which people who are low in IH might be overconfident in their beliefs and particularly unwilling to seriously engage with opponents’ views. For five of the six sociopolitical issues examined, we found that participants lower in IH tended to derogate the intellectual capabilities and moral character of sociopolitical opponents more than participants higher in IH. By believing that opponents are unintelligent and unethical, it may become easier to dismiss others’ views and to believe in the superiority of one’s own views. Studies 2a and 2b examined whether participants lower in IH are less willing to befriend people with opposing views. For both highly-contentious, polarized issues, and less-contentious, polarized issues, those lower in IH were indeed less willing than those higher in IH to befriend people who hold opposing positions. Then, in Studies 3a and 3b, we introduced an experimental manipulation to explore a possible way to render participants less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend opponents. We informed participants that there are actually no differences in IH between people who hold opposing positions on the issues, and we tested whether this information influenced their perceptions of their opponents. For both issues examined, informing participants that opponents do not actually differ on IH made participants derogate opponents less. Moreover, for the standardized testing issue, but not for the concealed carry issue, informing participants that those who hold opposing positions do not differ on IH made them more willing to befriend those with opposing views. The results from these two final studies provide experimental evidence for a simple and effective means of reducing the tendency for people to derogate others who hold different sociopolitical views.
There has been a recent surge of research on IH, much of which has been devoted to IH scale development and validation (e.g., Haggard et al., 2018; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Leary et al., 2017). By most psychological accounts, IH is fundamentally a cognitive intrapersonal construct reflecting people’s private assessments of their beliefs and attitudes (Leary et al., 2017). There are, however, important interpersonal consequences of differences in IH. Other research has found that those higher in IH tend to be more forgiving (Lavelock et al., 2014), generous (Exline & Hill, 2012), and empathic (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016). Our research expands upon these findings by identifying an interpersonal consequence of differences in IH, namely that those low in IH tend to both derogate sociopolitical opponents and express an unwillingness to befriend people with opposing sociopolitical views.
Our finding that IH predicts the degree to which people derogate sociopolitical opponents and express an unwillingness to befriend them may have significant implications for social extremism and political polarization. Derogating opponents and being unwilling to befriend them might create cliques of people, with the same views, who collectively seek out and share information that reinforces their shared views (i.e., “echo chambers”). With contemporary social media, there is no shortage of opportunities for people to create and find their desired echo chambers. In fact, echo chambers comprised of people discussing sociopolitical issues and events have been identified on Twitter (Barberá, et al., 2015; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Lambert, 2015), Facebook (Del Vicario, et al., 2016), and various blogs (Suhay, Blackwell, Roche, & Bruggeman, 2015). Critically, the results of our final two studies suggest that informing people about actual psychological research on IH has the potential to make them less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend them. This kind of simple intervention might help to minimize social extremism and political polarization—especially for low-IH individuals.
Disagreements over sociopolitical issues can be useful and fruitful. Such disagreements offer the potential for understanding the perspectives of others, generating creative solutions to significant problems, and growing intellectually. However, the extent to which disagreements are useful depends on the willingness of opposing sides to try to understand opposing positions (de Wied, Branje, & Meeus, 2007; Stone, Patton, & Heen, 2010). Promoting IH as an epistemic virtue worth cultivating and informing the public about research on IH has the potential to reduce social extremism, polarization, and the frequency of unresolvable disagreements over time.
On average, men have higher humor production ability than women; the effect is small to moderate; the difference may reflect both evolutionary and environmental influences
Sex differences in humor production ability: A meta-analysis. Gil Greengross, Paul J. Silvi, Emily C.Nusbaum. Journal of Research in Personality, October 22 2019, 103886. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2019.103886
Highlights
• On average, men have higher humor production ability than women.
• Effect is small to moderate.
• Humor was rated by independent judges assessing the humor produced by both sexes.
• Difference may reflect both evolutionary and environmental influences.
Abstract: We offer the first systematic quantitative meta-analysis on sex differences in humor production ability. We included studies where participants created humor output that was assessed for funniness by independent raters. Our meta-analysis includes 36 effect sizes from 28 studies published between 1976 and 2018 (N = 5057, 67% women). Twenty of the 36 effect sizes, accounting for 61% of the participants, were not previously published. Results based on random-effects model revealed that men's humor output was rated as funnier than women's, with a combined effect size d = 0.321. Results were robust across various moderators and study characteristics, and multiple tests indicated that publication bias is unlikely. Both evolutionary and cultural explanations were considered and discussed.
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4.3. Conclusion
The research presented here focused on one specific aspect of humor that is largely under-investigated in humor research, humor production ability. Despite finding men to have higher humor creation abilities than women on verbal humor, this difference should not be seen as representative of other types of humor, including non-verbal humor production ability. In fact, for most aspects of humor, men and women seem to exhibit many similarities, with relatively few differences (Martin, 2014). In regard to humor 41production abilities, the topic of sex differences is often reduced to blunt assertions such as that “Women are not funny” (e.g.,Hitchens, 2007). We hope that our meta-analysis will help advance a more nuanced discussion on the topic based on a systematic evaluation of the available scientific data. Examination of such data suggest that regardless of the underlying source of variability, men exhibit higher humor ability than women on the kinds of verbal tasks included in our sample of studies. It is important to remember that though robust, these differences are small to medium in size, and are based on averages. They do not reflect individual abilities, as both men and women vary largely in their abilities to produce humor. We tried to illuminate possible sources for the differences in HPA, what they might mean, theoretical implications, considerations for future research, and limitations. Humor is an important experience for most people, one that is largely unique to humans. We hope that our results will further foster the study of humor, advance theories pertaining to understanding and explaining sex differences in humor and other cognitive abilities, as well as foster research on humor ability.
Highlights
• On average, men have higher humor production ability than women.
• Effect is small to moderate.
• Humor was rated by independent judges assessing the humor produced by both sexes.
• Difference may reflect both evolutionary and environmental influences.
Abstract: We offer the first systematic quantitative meta-analysis on sex differences in humor production ability. We included studies where participants created humor output that was assessed for funniness by independent raters. Our meta-analysis includes 36 effect sizes from 28 studies published between 1976 and 2018 (N = 5057, 67% women). Twenty of the 36 effect sizes, accounting for 61% of the participants, were not previously published. Results based on random-effects model revealed that men's humor output was rated as funnier than women's, with a combined effect size d = 0.321. Results were robust across various moderators and study characteristics, and multiple tests indicated that publication bias is unlikely. Both evolutionary and cultural explanations were considered and discussed.
---
4.3. Conclusion
The research presented here focused on one specific aspect of humor that is largely under-investigated in humor research, humor production ability. Despite finding men to have higher humor creation abilities than women on verbal humor, this difference should not be seen as representative of other types of humor, including non-verbal humor production ability. In fact, for most aspects of humor, men and women seem to exhibit many similarities, with relatively few differences (Martin, 2014). In regard to humor 41production abilities, the topic of sex differences is often reduced to blunt assertions such as that “Women are not funny” (e.g.,Hitchens, 2007). We hope that our meta-analysis will help advance a more nuanced discussion on the topic based on a systematic evaluation of the available scientific data. Examination of such data suggest that regardless of the underlying source of variability, men exhibit higher humor ability than women on the kinds of verbal tasks included in our sample of studies. It is important to remember that though robust, these differences are small to medium in size, and are based on averages. They do not reflect individual abilities, as both men and women vary largely in their abilities to produce humor. We tried to illuminate possible sources for the differences in HPA, what they might mean, theoretical implications, considerations for future research, and limitations. Humor is an important experience for most people, one that is largely unique to humans. We hope that our results will further foster the study of humor, advance theories pertaining to understanding and explaining sex differences in humor and other cognitive abilities, as well as foster research on humor ability.
Fruit flies: Sexual conflict is common and sometimes results in sexual aggression; found significant genetic variation in forced copulation success
Genetic variation in sexual aggression and the factors that determine forced copulation success. Carling M. Baxter, Janice L. Yan, Reuven Dukas. Animal Behaviour, October 22 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2019.09.015
Highlights
• Sexual conflict is common in nature and sometimes results in sexual aggression.
• We found significant genetic variation in forced copulation success.
• We compared behaviour of males from low and high forced copulation success genotypes.
• High-success males were more persistent in pursuit and mounting of teneral females.
• Low- and high-success males differed in their response to female rejection.
Abstract: Sexual conflict is common in nature and sometimes results in sexual aggression. An extreme case is forced copulation, where one individual forcibly mates with another individual who resists the mating. To understand what makes some males sexually aggressive, we established an experimental system that allowed us to quantify the characteristics that contribute to males' forced copulation success. In fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster), sexually mature females can choose to accept or reject courting males; however, males can forcibly copulate with newly eclosed, sexually immature, teneral females. We tested males from 59 genotypes and found significant genetic variation in forced copulation success, with a broad-sense heritability of 0.16. We then chose three genotypes with the lowest and three genotypes with the highest forced copulation success rates and compared the behaviour of males from these two groups. Males from genotypes with high forced copulation success were more persistent in their pursuit of teneral females and mounted them more frequently than did males from the low-success genotypes. Males of the two categories, however, were similar in their attractiveness to both teneral and sexually mature females. Our results suggest that males vary in their pursuit strategies. Some males respond to female rejection signals by giving up and searching for receptive females, while other males persist in pursuit and coercion in spite of female objection. Our work highlights the practicality of using forced copulation in fruit flies as a model for further research on the mechanisms affecting variation in sexual coercion and forced copulation success and their evolutionary consequences.
Keywords aggressioncoercionDrosophila melanogasterforced copulationfruit flygenetic variationheritabilitysexual conflict
Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object’s size is familiar to the observer; authors find that familiarity does not serve as a cue for depth
Mischenko, Elizaveta, Ippei Negishi, Elena Gorbunova, and Tadamasa Sawada. 2019. “Examining the Role of Familiarity in the Perception of Depth.” PsyArXiv. October 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/wxn4s
Downloadable as a pre-print: https://psyarxiv.com/wxn4s/
Abstract: Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object’s size is familiar to the observer. The distance can be computed by comparing the size of the retinal image of the object to the memorized size of the object. It has been suggested that humans can perceive the distance of the object by using such “familiarity” information. However, prior experiments looking for an effect of familiarity had not been designed to minimize, or eliminate potential influences of: (i) higher cognitive factors on the observers' responses, or (ii) the influences of low-level image features in the visual stimuli. We tested the familiarity effect in two psychophysical experiments that were conducted both in Russia and in Japan. Forty Russian students and forty Japanese students participated in these experiments. The visual stimuli used were images of three coins in Russia and in Japan. The participants' depth perception was measured with a multiple-choice task testing the perceived depth-order of the coins. Our expectation was that any effect of “familiarity” on depth perception would only be observed with the coins of the participant's country. We expected a substantial effect of familiarity based on our meta-analysis of the "familiarity" effects observed in prior experiments. But, our results in both experiments showed that the familiarity effect on depth perception was virtually zero. Our experiments clearly show that familiarity, studied for the first time without any obvious confounds, does not serve as a cue for depth.
Downloadable as a pre-print: https://psyarxiv.com/wxn4s/
Abstract: Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object’s size is familiar to the observer. The distance can be computed by comparing the size of the retinal image of the object to the memorized size of the object. It has been suggested that humans can perceive the distance of the object by using such “familiarity” information. However, prior experiments looking for an effect of familiarity had not been designed to minimize, or eliminate potential influences of: (i) higher cognitive factors on the observers' responses, or (ii) the influences of low-level image features in the visual stimuli. We tested the familiarity effect in two psychophysical experiments that were conducted both in Russia and in Japan. Forty Russian students and forty Japanese students participated in these experiments. The visual stimuli used were images of three coins in Russia and in Japan. The participants' depth perception was measured with a multiple-choice task testing the perceived depth-order of the coins. Our expectation was that any effect of “familiarity” on depth perception would only be observed with the coins of the participant's country. We expected a substantial effect of familiarity based on our meta-analysis of the "familiarity" effects observed in prior experiments. But, our results in both experiments showed that the familiarity effect on depth perception was virtually zero. Our experiments clearly show that familiarity, studied for the first time without any obvious confounds, does not serve as a cue for depth.
Our results also replicated Iyer et al. (2012) previous finding that libertarians think more analytically than both liberals and conservatives
Are neo-liberals more intuitive? Undetected libertarians confound the relation between analytic cognitive style and economic conservatism. Onurcan Yilmaz, S. Adil Saribay, Ravi Iyer. Current Psychology, February 14 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-019-0130-x
Abstract: Previous studies consistently showed that analytic cognitive style (ACS) is negatively correlated with social conservatism, but there are mixed findings concerning its relation with economic conservatism. Most tests have relied on a unidimensional (liberal-conservative) operationalization of political orientation. Libertarians tend not only to identify themselves as conservative on this scale but also to score higher on ACS than liberals and conservatives. The presence of libertarians might be the reason for the above-mentioned mixed findings. We investigated the relation between social and economic conservatism and ACS (operationalized using the Cognitive Reflection Test; CRT) in a large, web-based sample. There was a negative correlation between CRT and social conservatism both when libertarians were included and excluded. However, the correlation between CRT and economic conservatism was significantly reduced in magnitude and became non-significant when libertarians were excluded. The results support the argument that the undetected presence of libertarians may confound the ACS-economic conservatism relation.
Keywords: Analytic cognitive style Libertarians Liberals Conservatives Cognitive reflection test
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Discussion
We argued that if a study includes a non-negligible proportion of libertarians and measures political orientation on the single-item self-placement scale, then it might produce misleading results regarding the relationship between cognitive style and economic conservatism. Specifically, such a procedure may produce misleading results because the libertarians tend to score relatively higher on both variables (i.e., ACS and economic conservatism) and they also tend to self-place toward the conservative end of the political spectrum (see Iyer et al. 2012; Talhelm et al. 2015). In other words, the existence of different proportions of libertarians might produce mixed findings across those samples. The current effort is a demonstration of the importance of considering political affiliation (e.g., libertarian) beyond self-placement on the liberal-conservative continuum and, specifically, of the utility of repeating analyses including and excluding libertarians.
The results suggested that the negative (but small) correlation between ACS and social conservatism holds whether libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) are included or excluded. This is consistent with the previous literature showing that there is a negative correlation between social conservatism and ACS (Deppe et al. 2015; Saribay and Yilmaz 2017; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b, 2018). This finding also supports the social orientation hypothesis suggesting that social political orientation is a better predictor of cognitive style differences than economic political orientation (Talhelm et al. 2015). However, our finding also suggests that this relation is weak.
On the other hand, the relation between ACS and economic conservatism differs depending on the inclusion versus exclusion of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups). The positive correlation between CRT and economic conservatism in the whole dataset lost its significance and was reduced to virtually zero when the non-liberal and non-conservative participants were excluded. The results remained constant when we only excluded libertarian participants (instead of all nonliberals and non-conservatives including BDon’t know/not political,^ and BOther^). Thus, the current findings suggest that the presence of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) confounds the relation between ACS and economic conservatism. They clarify why previous findings regarding this relation were mixed. As noted earlier, some previous findings suggested a non-significant relation (Deppe et al. 2015; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b), some others showed a negative relation (Sterling et al. 2016), and some others even showed a positive relation (e.g., one of four studies of Deppe et al. 2015). Jost et al. (2017) meta-analyzed these findings and showed a negative—albeit weak—correlation between ACS and economic conservatism (unweighted average r = −.08). Our contention that different proportions of libertarians might determine the direction and size of the correlation regarding ACS-economic conservatism relation is compatible with these findings since the Study 2 of Deppe et al. (2015), where the correlation between ACS and economic conservatism is positive, was arguably the most-representative sample of American population (see Baron 2015). Our results also replicated Iyer et al. (2012) previous finding that libertarians think more analytically than both liberals and conservatives, however, there were no such differences between self-reported liberals and conservatives.
Abstract: Previous studies consistently showed that analytic cognitive style (ACS) is negatively correlated with social conservatism, but there are mixed findings concerning its relation with economic conservatism. Most tests have relied on a unidimensional (liberal-conservative) operationalization of political orientation. Libertarians tend not only to identify themselves as conservative on this scale but also to score higher on ACS than liberals and conservatives. The presence of libertarians might be the reason for the above-mentioned mixed findings. We investigated the relation between social and economic conservatism and ACS (operationalized using the Cognitive Reflection Test; CRT) in a large, web-based sample. There was a negative correlation between CRT and social conservatism both when libertarians were included and excluded. However, the correlation between CRT and economic conservatism was significantly reduced in magnitude and became non-significant when libertarians were excluded. The results support the argument that the undetected presence of libertarians may confound the ACS-economic conservatism relation.
Keywords: Analytic cognitive style Libertarians Liberals Conservatives Cognitive reflection test
---
Discussion
We argued that if a study includes a non-negligible proportion of libertarians and measures political orientation on the single-item self-placement scale, then it might produce misleading results regarding the relationship between cognitive style and economic conservatism. Specifically, such a procedure may produce misleading results because the libertarians tend to score relatively higher on both variables (i.e., ACS and economic conservatism) and they also tend to self-place toward the conservative end of the political spectrum (see Iyer et al. 2012; Talhelm et al. 2015). In other words, the existence of different proportions of libertarians might produce mixed findings across those samples. The current effort is a demonstration of the importance of considering political affiliation (e.g., libertarian) beyond self-placement on the liberal-conservative continuum and, specifically, of the utility of repeating analyses including and excluding libertarians.
The results suggested that the negative (but small) correlation between ACS and social conservatism holds whether libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) are included or excluded. This is consistent with the previous literature showing that there is a negative correlation between social conservatism and ACS (Deppe et al. 2015; Saribay and Yilmaz 2017; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b, 2018). This finding also supports the social orientation hypothesis suggesting that social political orientation is a better predictor of cognitive style differences than economic political orientation (Talhelm et al. 2015). However, our finding also suggests that this relation is weak.
On the other hand, the relation between ACS and economic conservatism differs depending on the inclusion versus exclusion of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups). The positive correlation between CRT and economic conservatism in the whole dataset lost its significance and was reduced to virtually zero when the non-liberal and non-conservative participants were excluded. The results remained constant when we only excluded libertarian participants (instead of all nonliberals and non-conservatives including BDon’t know/not political,^ and BOther^). Thus, the current findings suggest that the presence of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) confounds the relation between ACS and economic conservatism. They clarify why previous findings regarding this relation were mixed. As noted earlier, some previous findings suggested a non-significant relation (Deppe et al. 2015; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b), some others showed a negative relation (Sterling et al. 2016), and some others even showed a positive relation (e.g., one of four studies of Deppe et al. 2015). Jost et al. (2017) meta-analyzed these findings and showed a negative—albeit weak—correlation between ACS and economic conservatism (unweighted average r = −.08). Our contention that different proportions of libertarians might determine the direction and size of the correlation regarding ACS-economic conservatism relation is compatible with these findings since the Study 2 of Deppe et al. (2015), where the correlation between ACS and economic conservatism is positive, was arguably the most-representative sample of American population (see Baron 2015). Our results also replicated Iyer et al. (2012) previous finding that libertarians think more analytically than both liberals and conservatives, however, there were no such differences between self-reported liberals and conservatives.
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