Monday, September 16, 2013

IMF: Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy + Implementing Macroprudential Policy/Selected Legal Issues

Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy - Background Paper
IMF, June 10, 2013
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4804

Summary

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.


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IMF: Implementing Macroprudential Policy - Selected Legal Issues
IMF, June 10, 2013
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4802

Summary
As countries design and implement macroprudential policies, they face the challenge of determining what—if any—changes need to be made to their legal and institutional framework to ensure that these policies are effective. Based on a review of experience, it is clear that there are a variety of approaches that can be taken by members, in light of the legal constraints and institutional preferences of each country. Whichever approach is followed, a number of issues need to be addressed when designing legislation in this area, both with respect to the substantive legal provisions and the allocation of institutional responsibilities. As background to ”Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy“, this paper provides an overview of these legal and institutional issues, while recognizing that macroprudential policy is an area that is still evolving.

Friday, September 13, 2013

Financial Inclusion for Financial Stability: Improving Access to Deposits and Bank Resilience in Sync

Financial Inclusion for Financial Stability: Improving Access to Deposits and Bank Resilience in Sync. By Martin Melecky
World Bank Blogs
Tue, Sep 10, 2013
http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/financial-inclusion-financial-stability-improving-access-deposits-and-bank-resilience-sync

From 2006 to 2009, growth of bank deposits dropped by over 12 percentage points globally. The most affected by the 2008 global crisis were upper middle income countries that experienced a drop of 15 percentage points on average. Individual countries such as Azerbaijan, Botswana, Iceland, and Montenegro switched from deposit growth of 58 percent, 31 percent, 57 percent, and 94 percent in 2007 to deposit declines (or a complete stop in deposit growth) of -2 percent, 1 percent, -1 percent, -8 percent in 2009, respectively.

In times of financial stress, depositors get anxious, can run on banks, and withdraw their deposits (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Large depositors are usually the first ones to run (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011). By the law of large numbers, correlated deposit withdrawals could be mitigated if bank deposits are more diversified. Greater diversification of deposits could be achieved by enabling a broader access to and use of bank deposits, i.e. involving a greater share of adult population in the use of bank deposits (financial inclusion). Based on this assumption, broader financial inclusion in bank deposits could significantly improve resilience of banking sector funding and thus overall financial stability (Cull et al., 2012).

In the recent background paper for the World Development Report 2014 (Han and Melecky, 2013), we investigate the implications of a broader access to deposits for the dynamics of bank deposits during the global financial crisis. Namely, we analyze whether access to bank deposits by a larger share of a country’s population can help explain differences in the drop of deposit growth over 2007-2010 across our sample of 95 countries. We also separately estimate the differences in the relationship between the drop in deposit growth and access to deposits for low-income (LIC), middle-income (MIC), and high-income (HIC) countries.

Our paper responds to an existing gap in the empirical literature linking greater access to deposits with greater financial (banking sector) stability. While the literature postulates that an inclusive financial sector will have a more diversified, stable retail deposit base that can increase systemic stability, empirical research confirming existence of such a relationship, especially at the level of the financial system, is largely absent in the literature (Cull et al., 2012; Prasad, 2010).

We find that a broader access to and use of bank deposits can significantly mitigate bank deposit withdrawals or growth slowdowns in times of financial stress. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on the variables measuring access to deposits indicates that a 10 percent increase in the share of people that have access to bank deposits can mitigate the deposit growth drops (or deposit withdrawal rates) by about three to eight percentage points. While this finding holds for the entire sample of HICs, MICs, and LICs, it could be particularly strong in MICs, where a large share of population still lacks access to bank deposits, trust in banks is yet to be firmly established, and the integration in global financial flows is growing.

Our findings have important policy implications. Policy makers face tradeoffs when deciding whether to focus on reforms to promote financial development (financial inclusion, innovation, competition, etc.) or whether to focus on further improvements in financial stability (microprudential, macroprudential, business conduct supervision, etc.). However, synergies between promoting financial development and financial stability can also exist as shown in our paper.

We recommend that policy makers focus first on taking advantage of such synergies in their framework for financial sector policy. This framework is typically formulated in a national financial sector strategy which sets the development goals in finance, in view of systemic risk associated with achieving these goals and the risk preference of the country government. Namely, we argue that involving more people in the use of bank deposits could be beneficial for people, economic development, and stability of the financial system alike.

Drawing on our paper, the World Development Report 2014, in its chapter on the financial system, makes similar recommendations; namely, that countries should strive to promote a broader and responsible use of financial tools not only to aid economic development and poverty alleviation, but also to complement the mainstream (macroprudential) policies to enhance financial stability and prevent financial crises.

Again, these policy efforts, their synergetic effects, and the plan for their implementation, including the resulting responsibilities of different government agencies, should be clearly described in the national financial sector strategy. With proper regulation and oversight in place, initiatives such as Kenya’s M-PESA and M-KESHO projects (Demombynes and Thegeya, 2012) or South Africa’s Mzansi accounts (Bankable Frontier Associates, 2009) could serve as good examples of promoting a broader use of bank accounts (deposits) and enhancing the reliability of bank deposit funding at the same time.

References

  • Bankable Frontier Associates. 2009. "The Mzansi Bank Account Initiative in South Africa." Report commissioned by FinMark Trust. Bankable Frontier Associates, Somerville, MA.
  • Cull, Robert, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Timothy Lyman. 2012. "Financial Inclusion and Stability: What Does Research Show?" CGAP Brief 71305, CGAP, Washington, DC.
  • Demombynes, Gabriel and Aaron Thegeya. 2012. "Kenya's Mobile Revolution and the Promise of Mobile Savings." Policy Research Working Paper 5988. World Bank, Washington, DC.
  • Diamond, Douglas W. and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity." Journal of Political Economy 91(3): 401­–19.
  • Huang, Rocco, and Lev Ratnovski. 2011. "The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding." Journal of Financial Intermediation 20: 248–263.
  • Prasad, Eswar S. 2010. "Financial Sector Regulation and Reforms in Emerging Markets: An Overview." NBER Working Paper 16428, Cambridge, MA.

Monday, September 2, 2013

Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives - final report issued by the Basel Committee and IOSCO

Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives - final report issued by the Basel Committee and IOSCO
September 2, 2013

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) released today the final framework for margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. The framework is available on the websites of the Bank for International Settlements and IOSCO.

Under the globally agreed standards published today, all financial firms and systemically important non-financial entities that engage in non-centrally cleared derivatives will have to exchange initial and variation margin commensurate with the counterparty risks arising from such transactions. The framework has been designed to reduce systemic risks related to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, as well as to provide firms with appropriate incentives for central clearing while managing the overall liquidity impact of the requirements.

The final requirements have been developed taking into account feedback from two rounds of consultation (a July 2012 consultative paper and a February 2013 near-final proposal) as well as a quantitative impact study that helped inform the policy deliberations.

Compared with the near-final framework proposed earlier this year, the final set of requirements includes the following modifications:
  • The framework exempts physically settled foreign exchange (FX) forwards and swaps from initial margin requirements. Variation margin on these derivatives should be exchanged in accordance with standards developed after considering the Basel Committee supervisory guidance for managing settlement risk in FX transactions.
  • The framework also exempts from initial margin requirements the fixed, physically settled FX transactions that are associated with the exchange of principal of cross-currency swaps. However, the variation margin requirements that are described in the framework apply to all components of cross-currency swaps.
  • "One-time" re-hypothecation of initial margin collateral is permitted subject to a number of strict conditions. This should help to mitigate the liquidity impact associated with the requirements.
A number of other features of the framework are also intended to manage the liquidity impact of the margin requirements on financial market participants. In particular, the requirements allow for the introduction of a universal initial margin threshold of €50 million below which a firm would have the option of not collecting initial margin. The framework also allows for a broad array of eligible collateral to satisfy initial margin requirements, thus further reducing the liquidity impact.

Finally, the framework published today envisages a gradual phase-in period to provide market participants with sufficient time to adjust to the requirements. The requirement to collect and post initial margin on non-centrally cleared trades will be phased in over a four-year period, beginning in December 2015 with the largest, most active and most systemically important derivatives market participants.

The Basel Committee and IOSCO acknowledge that the margin requirements are new to the market and that their precise impact will depend on a number of factors and market conditions that will only be realised over time as the requirements are put into practice. Accordingly, the Basel Committee and IOSCO will monitor and assess the impact of the requirements as they are implemented globally.

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Review of Thomas Healy's The Great Dissent

What Democracy Requires. By Joshua
Review of Thomas Healy's The Great Dissent
Justice Holmes changed his mind about free speech—and rediscovered the original intent of the First Amendment.
The Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2013, on page C5
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324108204579022881137648134.html

In the working sections of the Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C., the quiet places where the justices have their chambers and the staffs go about their work, portraits of the former members of the court peer out from almost every room and hallway. I used to find myself, when I worked there some years ago, pausing beneath the past luminaries and wondering what they might have to say about the court's current cases.

I never got very far with Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935). His portrait didn't invite inquiry. He sat straight-backed in his judicial robes, his lips pursed beneath a virile white mustache, eyes boring directly ahead. He conveyed simultaneously grandeur and skepticism, as if he might interrupt you at any moment to say, "That's nonsense." This is Holmes in his Solomonic pose, the man hailed as the "Master of Sentences," lionized in an early biography as the "Yankee from Olympus," his life made the subject of a 1950s Hollywood film. It was an image that Holmes spent nearly the whole of his adult life cultivating, driven on by his galloping ambition. "I should like to be admitted," he told a correspondent in 1912, "as the greatest jurist in the world."

Holmes would surely have approved of Thomas Healy's "The Great Dissent." The subtitle conveys the narrative's gist: "How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in America." Mr. Healy recounts Holmes's emergence late in his career as a champion of free speech and tells the story of the coterie of young intellectuals, led by Felix Frankfurter and Harold Laski, who worked assiduously to shape Holmes's views. It is a fascinating tale—and a charming one, of an aging and childless Holmes befriended by a rising generation of legal thinkers, surrogate sons who persuade him over time to take up their cause.

Mr. Healy, a professor of law at Seton Hall, is at his best detailing the younger men's campaign to win Holmes to their view of the First Amendment. In March 1919, Holmes still believed that the government could punish "disloyal" speech and wrote an opinion supporting the 1917 Espionage Act, which made it illegal to criticize the draft or American involvement in World War I. In Debs v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the prosecution of Socialist Party leader Eugene Debs for his critical statements about the war. Less than nine months later, Holmes had changed his mind, dramatically. In Abrams v. United States, he broke with his colleagues and with his own earlier views and argued that the Constitution didn't permit the government to punish speech unless it posed a "clear and present danger" of public harm. Laws penalizing any other type of public speech were unconstitutional. Holmes's Abrams opinion is the "great dissent" of Mr. Healy's title.

The youthful acolytes had made the difference. As Mr. Healy elaborates, Holmes had developed a knack for collecting young admirers in his years on the Supreme Court (1902-32). In 1919, Holmes's circle included Frankfurter, a junior professor at Harvard Law School serving in the Wilson administration, and the Englishman Harold Laski, just 25 and like Frankfurter a Jew and a teacher at Harvard. Both men would go on to illustrious careers—Frankfurter on the Supreme Court and Laski as a political theorist and chairman of the British Labour Party. Both admired Holmes for his modernist intellectual outlook: for his skepticism about moral absolutes and dislike of formal legal doctrine; and for what they believed (mistakenly) to be Holmes's progressive political views.

Even before the Debs case, Laski had been plying Holmes with arguments about free speech. After Holmes's disappointing opinion in that case, Laski redoubled his efforts, assisted by letters from Frankfurter and well-timed essays from the pair's allies at the New Republic magazine. As it happened, both Laski and Frankfurter suffered professionally in 1919 for their sometimes outspoken political views—both were briefly in danger of being dismissed from Harvard. Mr. Healy implies that their ordeal may have heightened Holmes's appreciation for free speech. But the more likely turning point came in the summer of 1919, when Laski forwarded to Holmes an article defending freedom of speech for its social value and then introduced Holmes to its author, another young Harvard law professor named Zechariah Chafee Jr.

Chafee, who was no sort of progressive and whose specialty was business law, argued that free speech advanced a vital social interest by promoting the discovery and spread of truth, which in turn allowed democracy to function. Holmes had never been much of a proponent of individual liberty, but he was profoundly committed to majoritarian democracy. Free speech as a social good was a rationale he could buy. And in his Abrams dissent a few months later, he did. He would eventually conclude that the First Amendment shielded speech from both federal and state interference.

Mr. Healy tells this conversion story well, bringing the reader into Holmes's confidence and into the uneasy, war-weary milieu of 1919 America. "The Great Dissent" is compelling, too, for the glimpses it gives of the human Holmes rather than the Olympian public figure. Here is Holmes standing at his writing desk to compose his court opinions, keeping them brief lest his legs tire; waxing rhapsodic each spring about the bloodroot flowers in Rock Creek Park. He was unfailingly decorous to his colleagues—even as he was indifferent to his wife—but quivered and fumed at the merest hint of criticism, unable to acknowledge that he had ever been mistaken about anything of importance.

All too often, however, Mr. Healy lapses into hagiography and an annoyingly Whiggish mode of storytelling, in which our modern free-speech doctrine —which protects the right of individuals and corporations to speak on most any topic at most any time—is portrayed as the Inevitable Truth toward which constitutional history has been marching all along. In this story, Holmes's embrace of free speech emerges as the very culmination of his life's work and its linchpin. "It was almost as if Holmes had been working toward this moment his entire career," Mr. Healy says triumphantly.

Not quite. Holmes's endorsement of free speech as a constitutional principle was far more ambivalent than Mr. Healy lets on and in considerable tension with the rest of his jurisprudence. This is precisely what makes it so interesting. Holmes's struggle to reconcile freedom of speech with his other legal ideas helped him to see connections that contemporary Americans are apt to miss.

Holmes made his name on the court as an advocate of judicial restraint. He thought courts should overturn the judgment of democratic legislatures in only the most extraordinary of circumstances. He was a skeptic. He believed law didn't have much to do with morality—"absolute truth is a mirage," he once said—or even logic. As he saw it, law was nothing more than "the dominant opinion of society." The Constitution placed no firm bounds on the right of the majority to do as it pleased. It was "made for people of fundamentally differing views," he said. The majority could choose the view and pursue the policies it wanted, for the reasons it wanted.

All this being true, the judiciary had no business substituting its views for those of the public. If law was based merely on opinion and raw preference, the people's preferences should count, not judges'.

How then did Holmes come to hold that the First Amendment could be used to strike down laws of Congress and even of the states? The answer is that Holmes came to see the principle of free speech as an essential part of majority rule; it was valuable because it helped majorities get their way.

Mr. Healy notes the influence on Holmes of Chafee's "social argument" for free speech but fails to explain just how central it was to his conversion experience. In his dissenting opinion in Abrams, Holmes wrote: "The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Truth was whatever the majority thought it was, but if the majority was going to make up its mind in a sensible way, it needed to have as many options before it as possible. Then too, majorities changed their minds, and protecting speech that was unpopular now preserved opinions that the majority might come to favor in the future. "The only meaning of free speech," Holmes wrote in 1925, is that every idea "be given a chance" to become in time the majority creed.

Such reasoning tethered free speech to majority rule, but it was less than perfectly consistent. Even as he valorized the right to speak, Holmes continued to insist that "the dominant forces in the community" must get what they wanted. Yet if free speech were to mean anything at all as a constitutional right, it would mean that majorities could not get their way in all circumstances. From time to time, Holmes recognized as much; in one of his last opinions he wrote that the "principle of free thought" means at bottom "freedom for the thought we hate." How forcing the majority to tolerate speech it hated facilitated that same majority's right to have its way is a formula Holmes never quite explained.

Mr. Healy suggests that with Holmes's dissent in Abrams, the modern era of First Amendment law had arrived. But Holmes's majoritarianism didn't prevail as the principal rationale for free speech at the Supreme Court, which has instead emphasized individuals' right to speak regardless of the social interests involved. Still, for all its internal tensions, Holmes's unfinished view—he continued to puzzle over the problem right through his retirement from the court in 1932—captures something that the contemporary adulation of free speech has hidden.

Holmes saw that the Constitution's commitment to freedom of speech is inextricably bound up with the project of self-government that the Constitution was designed to make possible. That project depends on an open exchange of ideas, on discussion between citizens and their representatives, on the ability of everyday Americans to talk and reason together.

This sort of government is a way of life, and the First Amendment helps makes it possible by prohibiting the state from censoring the organs of social communication. The government may not control newspapers or printing presses or stop citizens from stating their views. Government may not halt the dissemination of ideas.

In the past half-century, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly spoken of the right to free speech as a right to free expression. Under that rubric, it has expanded the First Amendment to cover all manner of things unconnected to public life, be it art or pornography or commercial advertising. This trend has been even more pronounced in popular culture, where the right to express oneself is now widely regarded as the essence of the freedom to speak.

And to be sure, individual expression is a valuable thing. The danger is in coming to think of free speech as merely expression. That reductionism encourages Americans to see freedom of speech, and freedom generally, as mainly about the pursuit of private aims. But in the end, such thinking represents a loss of confidence, or worse, a loss of interest in the way of living that is self-government—in the shared decisions and mutual persuasion that is how a free people makes a life together. Ours is a country saturated with talk and shouted opinions and personal exhibitionism but one less and less interested in the shared civil discourse that democracy requires.

Holmes wouldn't have described free speech or self-government in such elevated terms. He was too much the skeptic for that. But he came to understand, in his own way, the profound value of free speech to a free people. The story of this discovery is worth revisiting.

—Mr. Hawley, an associate professor of law at the University of Missouri and former judicial clerk to Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts Jr., is the author of "Theodore Roosevelt: Preacher of Righteousness" (2008).

Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms report issued by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives

Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms report issued by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD)
August 26, 2013
www.bis.org/press/p130826.htm

The Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD) today published a report on the macroeconomic effects of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms.

In this report, the MAGD focuses on the effects of (i) mandatory central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives, (ii) margin requirements for non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives and (iii) bank capital requirements for derivatives-related exposures. In its preferred scenario, the Group found economic benefits worth 0.16% of GDP per year from avoiding financial crises.

It also found economic costs of 0.04% of GDP per year from institutions passing on the expense of holding more capital and collateral to the broader economy. This results in net benefits of 0.12% of GDP per year. These are estimates of the long-run consequences of the reforms, which are expected to apply once they have been fully implemented and had their full economic effects.

The MAGD was set up by the OTC Derivatives Coordination Group (ODCG), comprised of the Chairs of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). It comprises financial and economic modelling experts from 29 central banks and other authorities, chaired by Stephen Cecchetti, Economic Adviser of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).


Executive summary (excerpts)

In February 2013, the Over-the-counter Derivatives Coordination Group (ODCG) commissioned a quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic implications of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulatory reforms to be undertaken by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD), chaired by Stephen G Cecchetti of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The Group comprised 29 member institutions of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), working in close collaboration with the IMF. Guided by academics and other official sector working groups, and in consultation with private sector OTC derivatives users and infrastructure providers, the Group developed and employed models that provide an estimate of the benefits and costs of the proposed reforms. This report presents those findings.

Counterparty exposures related to derivatives traded bilaterally in OTC markets helped propagate and amplify the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008. Many of these exposures were not collateralised, so OTC derivatives users recorded losses as counterparty defaults became more likely or, as in the case of Lehman Brothers, were realised. Furthermore, since third parties had little information about the bilateral exposures among derivatives users, they became less willing to provide credit to institutions that might face such losses.

In response, policymakers have developed and are implementing reforms aimed at reducing counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives market. These include requirements for standardised OTC derivatives to be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs), requirements for collateral to be posted against both current and potential future counterparty exposures, whether centrally cleared or non-centrally cleared, and requirements that banks hold additional capital against their uncollateralised derivative exposures.

While these reforms have clear benefits, they do entail costs. Requiring OTC derivatives users to hold more high-quality, low-yielding assets as collateral lowers their income. Similarly, holding more capital means switching from lower-cost debt to higher-cost equity financing. Although these balance sheet changes reduce risk to debt and equity investors, risk-adjusted returns may still fall. As a consequence, institutions may pass on higher costs to the broader economy in the form of increased prices.

This report assesses and compares the economic benefits and costs of the planned OTC derivatives regulatory reforms. The focus throughout is on the consequences for output in the long run, ie when the reforms have been fully implemented and their full economic effects realised. The main beneficial effect is a reduction in forgone output resulting from a lower frequency of financial crises propagated by OTC derivatives exposures, while the main cost is a reduction in economic activity resulting from higher prices of risk transfer and other financial services.

These long-run benefits and costs depend on how the reforms interact with derivatives portfolios and affect the structure of the derivatives market more broadly, as this can significantly alter the amount of netting obtainable from gross counterparty exposures. In response, the Group analysed three scenarios that differ mainly in terms of the assumed degree of netting. [...]

Briefly, the main benefit of the reforms arises from reducing counterparty exposures, both through netting as central clearing becomes more widespread and through more comprehensive collateralisation. The Group estimates that in the central scenario this lowers the annual probability of a financial crisis propagated by OTC derivatives by 0.26 percentage points. With the present value of a typical crisis estimated to cost 60% of one year’s GDP, this means that the reforms help avoid losses equal to (0.26 x 60% =) 0.16% of GDP per year. The benefit is balanced against the costs to derivatives users of holding more capital and collateral. Assuming this is passed on to the broader economy, the Group estimates that the cost is equivalent to a 0.08 percentage point increase in the cost of outstanding credit. Using a suite of macroeconomic models, the Group estimates that this will lower annual GDP by 0.04%. Taken together, this leads to the Group’s primary result: the net benefit of reforms is roughly 0.12% of GDP per year.

As one would expect, for the scenarios with higher and lower netting these net benefits are respectively slightly higher and slightly lower. Importantly, the Group concludes that the economic benefits are essentially constant across scenarios because the reforms demand collateralisation of the vast majority of net counterparty exposures, whatever their size. But shifting between netting and collateralisation does affect the estimated costs and hence the net benefits.

Uncertainties arising from a combination of modelling limitations and data scarcity were handled in a variety of ways. First, examining a variety of macroeconomic models helped the Group to improve the precision of estimates of the impact of the reforms’ direct costs on the real economy. Second, by varying the structure of the network of bilateral OTC derivatives exposures within feasible limits as well as the strength of the relationship between losses on these exposures and the creditworthiness of the institution incurring them, the Group managed two other potentially large uncertainties. And finally, while some assumptions bias the results towards higher net benefits, many deliberately bias them in the other direction. For example, the funding costs of increased collateral and capital holdings were based on historical prices, rather than prices that reflect improvements in credit quality associated with these balance sheet changes.

In the course of completing the analysis reported here, the Group encountered a number of technical challenges. One related to a shortage of information about the structure of the OTC derivatives exposure network. In the absence of data on bilateral exposures, these were estimated using aggregate data and distributional assumptions. Conversations with derivatives users, infrastructure providers and regulators then helped to validate the estimated network. More generally, the Group found little prior analysis of how derivatives can affect the economy.

Despite statistical uncertainty and the need to make various modelling assumptions and to employ only the limited data available, the group concludes that the economic benefits of reforms are likely to exceed their costs, especially in the scenarios with more netting. Therefore, to maximise the net benefit of the reforms, regulators and market participants must work to make as many OTC derivatives as possible safely centrally clearable, with either a modest number of central counterparties or with central counterparties that interoperate. This should include efforts to harmonise the rules governing cross-border transactions, so that market participants have equal access to CCPs.

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Mortgage insurance: market structure, underwriting cycle and policy implications

Mortgage insurance: market structure, underwriting cycle and policy implications
Joint Forum, Aug 20, 2013
http://www.bis.org/press/p130820.htm

The Joint Forum released today its final report on Mortgage insurance: market structure, underwriting cycle and policy implications.   

The events of the last few years, particularly those in the global financial crisis that began in 2007, demonstrate that mortgage insurance is subject to significant stress in the worst tail events. This report examines the interaction of mortgage insurers with mortgage originators and underwriters. It makes the following set of recommendations directed at policymakers and supervisors which aim at reducing the likelihood of mortgage insurance stress and failure in such tail events:
  1. Policymakers should consider requiring that mortgage originators and mortgage insurers align their interests;
  2. Supervisors should ensure that mortgage insurers and mortgage originators maintain strong underwriting standards;
  3. Supervisors should be alert to - and correct for - deterioration in underwriting standards stemming from behavioural incentives influencing mortgage originators and mortgage insurers;
  4. Supervisors should require mortgage insurers to build long-term capital buffers and reserves during the troughs of the underwriting cycle to cover claims during its peaks;
  5. Supervisors should be aware of and take action to prevent cross-sectoral arbitrage which could arise from differences in the accounting between insurers' technical reserves and banks' loan loss provisions, and from differences in the capital requirements for credit risk between banks and insurers;
  6. Supervisors should be alert to potential cross-sectoral arbitrage resulting from the use of alternatives to traditional mortgage insurance; and
  7. Supervisors should apply the FSB Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices to mortgage insurers noting that proper supervisory implementation necessitates both insurance and banking expertise.
The Joint Forum based its recommendations on an analysis of existing mortgage underwriting standards and the underwriting cycle.

Thomas Schmitz-Lippert, Chairman of the Joint Forum and Executive Director International Policy at the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, BaFin, said: "Mortgage origination and mortgage insurance were at the very core of the financial crisis. The Joint Forum Recommendations on Mortgage Insurance provide guidance to national policymakers and supervisors in order to avoid mistakes of the past and strengthen resilience in the future."

An earlier version of this report was issued for consultation in February 2013.