Tuesday, April 2, 2019

Comparing strategies for decreasing anxiety and increasing subjective well-being: downward social comparison, loving-kindness contemplations, and interconnectedness contemplation

Caring for Others Cares for the Self: An Experimental Test of Brief Downward Social Comparison, Loving-Kindness, and Interconnectedness Contemplations. Douglas A. Gentile, Dawn M. Sweet, Lanmiao He. Journal of Happiness Studies, Mar 21 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10902-019-00100-2

Abstract: Several strategies for decreasing anxiety and increasing subjective well-being have been tested and found to be useful, such as downward social comparison, loving-kindness contemplations, and interconnectedness contemplations. These, however, have not often been directly compared. Emerging adults contemplated one technique for 12 min while walking around a building. Those who wished others well (loving-kindness) had lower anxiety, greater happiness, greater empathy, and higher feelings of caring and connectedness than those in a control condition. The Interconnectedness condition resulted only in beneficial effects on social connection. Although social comparison theory suggests that downward social comparison should improve mood, this study found that it had no beneficial effects relative to the control condition and was significantly worse than the loving-kindness condition. This brief loving-kindness contemplation worked equally well across several measured individual differences, and is a simple intervention that can be used to reduce anxiety, increase happiness, empathy, and feelings of social connection.

Keywords: Happiness Well-being Social comparison Anxiety Intervention


Oral sex is associated with reduced incidence of recurrent miscarriage; maybe it induces maternal tolerance towards paternal antigens of the fetus

Oral sex is associated with reduced incidence of recurrent miscarriage. T. Meuleman et al. Journal of Reproductive Immunology, Mar 27 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jri.2019.03.005

Highlights
•    At population level, women with unexplained recurrent miscarriage had less oral sex
•    Oral sex seems to influence pregnancy outcome in a proportion of the women
•    Oral sex might induce maternal tolerance towards paternal antigens of the fetus

Abstract

A possible way of immunomodulation of the maternal immune system before pregnancy would be exposure to paternal antigens via seminal fluid to oral mucosa. We hypothesized that women with recurrent miscarriage have had less oral sex compared to women with uneventful pregnancy.

In a matched case control study, 97 women with at least three unexplained consecutive miscarriages prior to the 20th week of gestation with the same partner were included. Cases were younger than 36 years at time of the third miscarriage. The control group included 137 matched women with an uneventful pregnancy. The association between oral sex and recurrent miscarriage was assessed with conditional logistic regression, odds ratios (ORs) were estimated. Missing data were imputed using Imputation by Chained Equations.

In the matched analysis, 41 out of 72 women with recurrent miscarriage had have oral sex, whereas 70 out of 96 matched controls answered positive to this question (56.9% vs. 72.9%, OR 0.50 95%CI 0.25-0.97, p = 0.04). After imputation of missing exposure data (51.7%), the association became weaker (OR 0.67, 95%CI 0.36-1.24, p = 0.21).

In conclusion, this study suggests a possible protective role of oral sex in the occurrence of recurrent miscarriage in a proportion of the cases. Future studies in women with recurrent miscarriage explained by immune abnormalities should reveal whether oral exposure to seminal plasma indeed modifies the maternal immune system, resulting in more live births.

Nonsense Words Elicit Meaningful Drawings

Davis, Charles P., Hannah M. Morrow, and Gary Lupyan. 2019. “What Does a Horgous Look Like? Nonsense Words Elicit Meaningful Drawings.” PsyArXiv. April 2. doi:10.31234/osf.io/uve7d

Abstract: To what extent do people attribute meanings to “nonsense” words? How pervasive is such attribution? We used a set of seemingly meaningless words to elicit drawings of made-up creatures. Separate groups of participants rated the nonsense words and the drawings on several semantic dimensions, and were asked to choose a name for the drawn creatures. Nonsense words elicited a high level of consistency in the produced drawings. Meaning attributions made to nonsense words corresponded with meaning attributions made by separate people to drawings that were inspired by the name. Naïve participants were able to recover the name that inspired the drawing with greater-than-chance accuracy. These results suggest that people make liberal and consistent use of non-arbitrary relationships between forms and meanings.

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1. Introduction
Imagine a group of artists illustrating children’s books about made-up creatures with
names like “horgous” and “keex.” Will different artists create similar drawings for creatures that
have similar names? Will readers who encounter the drawing of a “horgous” expect this creature
to be named “horgous”? We show here that drawings elicited by certain “nonsense” words relate
in a systematic way to the form of these words. This relationship between nonce words and the
meanings they express is bidirectional: Certain word-forms lead people to infuse their drawings
with certain properties. Other people, looking at the drawings, match them back to the original
names at higher than chance levels.
The idea that certain words fit some meanings better than others has its roots in the
ancient world (Plato, 1999) but was all but excised by the ascendance of structural linguistics (de
Saussure, 1959) and its focus on the sharp boundary between the signifier and the signified. The
conventional wisdom has been that with the exception of words that directly imitate sounds, the
relationship between word-forms and meanings is arbitrary: “There is no reason for you to call a
dog ‘dog’ rather than ‘cat’ except for the fact that everyone else is doing it” (Pinker & Bloom,
1990). In the last several decades, iconicity—a resemblance between form and meaning—is
being recognized as one of the basic design features of natural language in both the signed and
spoken modalities (Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014, Dingemanse et al., 2015, Monaghan et al., 2014,
cf. Hockett, 1978). The idea that the auditory modality can convey meanings in an iconic way,
beyond simple imitation of sounds, is at first counterintuitive. For example, Hockett argued that
the relationships between spoken words and meanings is arbitrary because “When a
representation of some four-dimensional hunk of life has to be compressed into the single
dimension of speech, most iconicity is necessarily squeezed out” (Hockett, 1978 p. 274). We now know that speech is a richly multi-dimensional signal, and spoken languages make ample
use of this dimensionality to convey meanings in an iconic way. For example, consonant voicing
(/b/ vs. /p/, /d/ vs. /t/) is used to signal differences in mass: Siwu: tsratsra, ‘a light person walking
quickly’ vs. dzradzra, ‘a heavy person walking quickly’. Vowel quality is used to signal size:
Ewe: lɛgɛɛ : logoo, ‘slim : fat’. Vowel lengthening is used to signal duration and intensity:
Japanese:  piQ : piiQ, ‘tear short : long strip of cloth. And reduplication is used to signal
repetition: Tamil: curuk-nu : curukcuruk-nu, ‘a sharp prick : many sharp pricks’ (Dingemanse et
al., 2015; see also Perniss, Thompson, & Vigliocco, 2010). Although these specific form-to
meaning relationships are not found in all languages, examining statistical relationships between
forms and meanings across languages does reveal some more universal relationships (e.g., Blasi
et al., 2016).
What makes such examples especially interesting is that people appear to be extremely
sensitive to form–meaning relationships even when the specific relationship is not present in
their language. For example, monolingual English 3-year-olds are sensitive to Japanese form–
meaning relationships when learning novel words (Kantartzis, Imai, & Kita, 2011). In English,
there does not appear to be a systematic relationship between object size and vowel pitch. Yet
anyone who has read to a small child knows that there is something exceedingly natural about
saying “elephant” in a lower pitch than “mouse,” or using a higher pitch to refer to the baby
elephant compared to the mommy elephant.1 Similarly, in English, smaller objects do not as a
rule have shorter names than larger objects (indeed, the relative shortness of “whale” compared
to “micro-organism” is used by Hockett to illustrate the principle of arbitrariness; Hockett,
1978). And yet, when asked to select a nonce-word for a small object such as a pin, people not
only prefer shorter words, but justify their choices with statements like “a small item’s name
should be small” and “pins are sharp and simple, as is this word” (Lupyan & Casasanto, 2012).
Hearing adults with no sign language experience can also use iconicity to determine the
approximate meaning of a word (i.e., a word’s telic content—whether it refers to an event with a
finite end point or not) across a number of signed languages, even when the exact meaning of the
sign is not a response option. People are more likely to choose “believe” than “forget” when
presented with a sign for “think” (Strickland et al., 2015), perhaps because telic signs make event
boundaries salient, while atelic signs are characterized by repetition and a lack of such
boundaries.
In an early systematic investigation of what he called “phonetic symbolism,” Sapir
(1929) recruited over 500 participants of varying ages (mostly, but not exclusively, English
speakers) and presented them with dozens of short nonce words and asked to distinguish them on
size. For example, a participant may be told that “mal” and “mil” both mean table; they then had
to decide which would be a better word for a large table. The chosen answer, overwhelmingly
and largely independent of age and language background, was “mal.”2 Sapir concluded that most
people displayed a common “feeling-significance” toward vocalic and consonantal contrasts in
nonsense words and that it made “surprisingly little difference whether the phonetic contrast was
contained in a [phonotactically] ‘possible’ [i.e., attested in the subject’s language] or …
‘impossible’ context” (p. 228). Sapir did not know where these sound-to-meaning mappings
came from, but speculated that they may arise from people implicitly learning that producing
 certain vowels requires larger mouth cavities. This early speculation was greatly amplified by
Ramachandran and Hubbard’s (2001) replication of Sapir’s phonetic symbolism demonstration
(see also Kohler, 1929; Newman, 1931) giving us the well-known “bouba-kiki” effect wherein
people overwhelmingly match “bouba” to a round shape and “kiki” to an angular one (see also
e.g., Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006).
Contemporary investigations of sound symbolism have not settled the question of where
these associations between forms and meanings come from (but see e.g., Imai & Kita, 2014;
Sidhu & Pexman, 2018; Spence, 2011), but they have further demonstrated the varied way in
which iconicity plays a role in language learning and vocal communication. For example, Perry
et al. (2018) showed that more iconic words are learned earlier by children (adjusting for
numerous potential confounds like frequency, concreteness, and communicative need; see also
e.g., Imai, Kita, Nagumo, & Okada, 2008; Maurer et al., 2006; Peña, Mehler, & Nespor, 2011;
for further review, see Imai & Kita, 2014). Such apparent advantages of iconicity go beyond
word-learning. For example, people think that someone named Bob ought to have a round face
while a Mike should have a more angular one (Sidhu & Pexman, 2015). Further, Lupyan and
Casasanto (2015) had people learn to categorize two kinds of “aliens.” One of these contained
aliens that were subtly more round and the other subtly more pointy. When the categories were
labeled with the nonce words “foove” (which people tend to associate with being round and
friendly) and “crelch” (pointy and dangerous), people learned the category distinction itself (not
just the category names) better than when arbitrary or iconically incongruent labels were used.
When tasked with creating novel vocalizations to communicate a range of meanings (e.g., big,
small, high, low, smooth, rough, cook, fire, fruit, and many others), people not only converge on
surprisingly similar vocal forms, but when these vocalizations are played to naïve listeners
(including those from other language backgrounds), they are understood at levels well above
chance (Perlman & Lupyan, 2018).

Monday, April 1, 2019

From 2015... The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template

From 2015... The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template. Chelsea Schein, Kurt Gray. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol 41, Issue 8, June 19, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215591501

Abstract: ­Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is “no.” Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition—in both liberals and conservatives—is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested—and confirmed—through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes—and overlaps with—diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.

Keywords: moral pluralism, values, culture, moral foundations, political psychology

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The existence of moral disagreement across the political spectrum is uncontroversial. One need only open a news-paper to see that liberals and conservatives are divided on many issues, including abortion, capital punishment, gay rights, women’s rights, gun ownership, environmentalism, euthanasia, and the justifiability of war. What is contro-versial is whether this disagreement reflects deep differ-ences in moral cognition. Do liberals and conservatives have fundamentally different moral minds? One popular theory of moral cognition argues that liberals and conser-vatives rely on different sets of moral mechanisms (or foundations; Haidt, 2012).In contrast, we suggest that liberals and conservatives fundamentally have the same moral mind. Rather than dis-tinct and differentially activated mechanisms, we suggest that moral judgment involves a common template grounded in perceived harm (the moral dyad; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). This template is not only consistent with categorization in non-moral domains but also reconciles modern moral pluralism with historic harm-centric accounts, and provides hope for bridging political differ-ences. In this article, we test six predictions of dyadic morality, which can be summarized as follows: Harm is central in moral cognition for both liberals and conservatives. 

Descriptive Diversity 
An important first step in science is collecting and cataloging diversity. Biology began with natural history, in which living organisms were collected from around the world and placed into taxonomies. The most famous biological taxonomy is Linnaean classification—proposed by Carl Linnaeus—which divides organisms into five different kingdoms based on their appearance.The new renaissance of moral psychology also began with collecting and taxonomizing moral diversity based on descriptive appearance, akin to Linnaean classification. Anthropological accounts of morality in rural India were divided into three content areas of autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). One later account inspired by American political disagree-ment—Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)—taxonomizes morality into the five content areas of harm, fairness, author-ity, in-group, and purity (Haidt, 2012).Beyond providing a moral taxonomy, MFT also suggests differences in morality across liberals and conservatives, with only conservatives being concerned with authority, in-group, and purity. The idea of differences between liberals and conservatives is not new, as decades of research reveal that conservatives are more tolerant of inequality, are more religious, and believe more in a just world (for review, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In particular, classic research on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) reveals that conservatives are more submissive to authority, more likely to use aggression to protect the in-group, and more conventional in terms of sexuality (Altemeyer, 1988).Given that RWA demonstrates the sensitivity of conserva-tives to authority, in-group, and sexual/religious convention-alism, it is safe for MFT to suggest the same—especially given that MFT questionnaires about authority, in-group, and purity correlate up to r = .70 with the RWA questionnaire (Graham etal., 2011, Table 7, p. 377). Moreover, as RWA fully accounts for liberal-conservative differences revealed by MFT (Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014), one may wonder about the novelty of MFT claims. However, MFT does make one bold, unique claim—that these political dif-ferences arise from deep differences in moral cognition. 

Moral Modules
 Inspired by theories of basic emotions, MFT suggests that harm, fairness, in-group, authority, and purity each represent a distinct functional moral mechanism or cognitive module(Haidt, 2012). MFT defines cognitive modules as “little switches in the brains of all animals” that are “triggered” by specific moral “inputs” (Haidt, 2012, p. 123). These modules are suggested to be ultimately distinct from each other, involving fundamentally “distinct cognitive computations” (Young & Saxe, 2011, p. 203), such that violations of one content area (e.g., harm) are processed differently from those of another (e.g., purity).This “distinct cognition” prediction is best explained by the MFT analogy of moral foundations as different “taste receptors” (e.g., purity as “saltiness”), such that each moral concern triggers only one specific receptor, which gives rise to a corresponding distinct moral experience. However, recent evidence casts doubt on claims of distinct cognition, as even harm and purity—often discussed as maximally dis-tinct (Haidt, 2012)—are highly correlated (r = .87; Gray & Keeney, 2015). Moreover, the apparent cognitive differ-ences between these two content areas stem from scenario sampling bias: MFT purity violations are weirder and less severe (e.g., necrophilia) than harm violations (e.g., mur-der), and it is these general differences that give the illusion of distinct cognition (Gray & Keeney, 2015).MFT also posits that moral modules are uniquely linked to specific emotions, such that harm is specially linked to anger and purity to disgust. Recent evidence also casts doubt on this claim, as links between moral content and emotion can be explained with broader affective and conceptual con-siderations (Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, in press; Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013). Studies that purport to find a unique effect of disgust on purity fail to control for other high arousal emotions, such as anger or fear, or use statistical pro-cedures that ignore substantial shared variance between anger and disgust (Cameron etal., in press).Despite the lack of evidence for cognitive distinctness, the idea of moral “foundations” is intuitively compelling because it aligns with psychological essentialism—provid-ing a deep mental/biological explanation for important polit-ical differences. However, descriptive differences between liberals and conservatives—whether in personality, music preferences, or the moralization of specific issues—need not reflect cognitive differences. Even incredible diversity can be underlain by a common process.

Common Cognition 
If science begins with cataloging diversity, its next step is often developing theories that explain this diversity with a common mechanism. In biology, Linnaeus and his contem-poraries believed that each species was distinct and immu-table, uniquely created by God. However, Darwin discovered that this incredible diversity stemmed from the simple algo-rithm of evolution. Could moral diversity also be underlain by a simple common mechanism? Could liberals and conser-vatives—despite their political disagreements—ultimately have the same moral cognition?Decades of research in cognitive psychology suggest that non-moral categorization decisions (is x a member of y cat-egory?) rely upon the process of template comparison. This template (or prototype) represents the most common, salient or important features across category instances (Murphy, 2004). Categorization decisions are made by comparing potential examples with this template, with closer matches being more robustly categorized as belonging to that cate-gory. For the category of “birds,” the template includes the features of “small,” “flying,” and “seed-eating,” which explains why sparrows are judged as more bird-like than penguins (Rosch, 1978). The same process occurs in social categorization, in which people are compared with cognitive templates called stereotypes (Smith & Zarate, 1990).The principle of parsimony suggests that moral judgments (is x act a member of the category immorality?) should also be made via template comparison. Acts should be compared to a moral template—or prototype—that extracts the most common, salient, and important elements across instances of immorality. Moral psychology suggests many potential can-didates for these elements, such as concerns about intention, causation, and outcome (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Malle, 2006); norm and affect (Nichols, 2002); and mind perception (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). The concept of harm is related to many of these elements, and we suggest it forms the basis of a cognitive moral template. 

Dyadic Morality 
Harm can manifest itself in different ways, but within moral contexts, it typically involves the intentional action of one person causing suffering to a second person—a perpetrator and a victim. More technically, harm involves the perception of two interacting minds, one mind (an agent) intentionally causing suffering to another mind (a patient)—what we call the moral dyad (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; see also Mikhail, 2007).The complementary roles of agent and patient stem from the two-dimensional nature of mind perception (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011) and the general dyadic structure of language (Brown & Fish, 1983) and action (Aristotle, BC350), in which agents act upon patients (Strickland, Fisher, & Knobe, 2012). The psychological power of a harm-based template stems not only from the presence of inten-tional harm in many canonical acts of immorality (e.g., murder, rape, assault, and abuse) but also from the affective potency of suffering victims (Blair, 1995), the hypersensitiv-ity of agency detection (Barrett, 2004), the early develop-ment of empathy and harm-based concerns (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Govrin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and the obvious evolutionary importance of harm (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013).It is clear that harm plays a key role in morality, helping to separate counter-normative acts into those that are immoral from those that are violations of mere social con-vention (Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Dyadic morality provides a mechanism for the role of harm. We suggest that a norm violation “xleads people to automatically ask “is x immoral?”—per-haps to the degree that x induces negative affect (Nichols, 2002)—which then activates the dyadic harm-based tem-plate. The more an act is inherently dyadic (i.e., harmful), the better the template matches, and the more robustly it is judged as immoral, explaining why murder is judged as more immoral than masturbation. Importantly, this process of dyadic comparison is intuitive and need not rely on effortful reason, like moral judgment in general (Haidt, 2001).Although a dyadic template should be reliably present during moral judgments, we acknowledge the influence of other domain-general psychological factors, such as misin-terpreting affective arousal (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) or rote learning (i.e., “the bible says abortion is wrong”). However, a dyadic template suggests that such misinterpretation and rote learning are easier with more harmful actions. Just as it is easier to rote-learn that a jerboa (a little desert kangaroo) is a mammal than a platypus (which non-prototypically lays eggs and has a bill), it should also be easier to rote-learn that abortion is immoral than to rote-learn that dropping the Torah is immoral.Importantly, we are not suggesting that moral cognition consists of only one moral module (i.e., a foundation) of harm. Dyadic morality, with its roots in psychological con-structionism (Cameron etal., in press), denies the very exis-tence of moral modules. This template is not an on-or-off “switch” but is instead a domain-general process that allows for gradations of harm. It is also activated no matter the con-tent of the norm violation—that is, even when an act initially seems harmless (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Because harm represents the essence of immorality, it serves as a con-stant backdrop in moral cognition—one that exerts a power-ful cognitive gravity (Schein & Gray, 2014).The Pluralism of Perceived HarmModular theories such as MFT have long argued against such a common template because of the ostensible existence of harmless wrongs. For example, scenarios of consensual incest carefully constructed to be “objectively harmless” are still rated as immoral by participants (Haidt, 2001). However, we argue against the very idea of “objective” harm. Harm, like morality, is in the eye of the beholder. In fact, both harm and morality are rooted in the ambiguous perceptions of other minds. Judgments of immorality require seeing a mind capable of doing evil, and judgments of harm require seeing a mind capable of suffering (i.e., an agent and a patient; Gray & Schein, 2012).The subjective nature of harm means that bizarre “harm-less” scenarios concocted by liberal researchers (e.g., mas-turbating with a dead chicken) may not seem harmless to their more conservative participants. Indeed, many studies document the perception of harm in “harmless” cases of reli-gious blasphemy, anti-patriotism, and aberrant sexuality (DeScioli, Gilbert, & Kurzban, 2012; Kahan, 2007; for a full treatment, see Gray etal., 2014).Consider a case described by anthropologist Richard Shweder (2012): Oriya Hindu Brahmans believe it is extremely immoral for the eldest son to eat chicken immedi-ately after his father’s death. Westerners fail to see this action as wrong—or harmful—viewing it as a mere matter of reli-gious protocol, whereas Hindus consider it the eldest son’s duty to process the father’s “death pollution” through a veg-etarian diet. When the son eats chicken, he “places the father’s spiritual transmigration in deep jeopardy” (Shweder, 2012, p. 96). By understanding the perceived harm in these actions, even Western liberals can understand its perceived immorality.1 Who can deny the immorality of condemning your father to eternal suffering? MFT interprets such perceived harm as mistaken, but dyadic morality sees these perceptions as legitimate. In the language of social anthropology, dyadic morality advocates for not only moral pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of dif-ferent perceptions of morality) but also harm pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of different perceptions of harm). Harm pluralism suggests that different moral content such as purity and loyalty are (less prototypical) varieties of per-ceived harm. In contrast, MFT endorses harm monism, rejecting the legitimacy of harm in anything but direct physi-cal or emotional suffering.Indeed, the very act of separating harm into a specific modular “foundation” denies its perceived existence in moral issues such as treason or sexual impropriety. The harm monism of MFT discounts the harm that conservatives see in matters of religious and sexual propriety (Gray etal., 2014). We suggest that this harm monism stems from the liberal bias in social psychology (Inbar & Lammers, 2012), which also once long denied the legitimacy of moral pluralism. Echoing the cries of moral anthropologists, we suggest that understanding harm requires cultural sensitivity (Shweder, 2012); moral psychol-ogy should prioritize the harm pluralist perceptions of partici-pants over the harm monist theories of researchers. 

The Centrality of Harm for Liberals and Conservatives 
The diversity of harm provides the possibility for a unify-ing moral template in both liberals and conservatives. Rather than distinct moral mechanisms for each kind of moral content, dyadic morality suggests that immoral acts—even those of “authority” or “purity”—will activate a prototype of harm. Of course, some acts are more harmful than others, and dyadic morality predicts that increased harm (i.e., better template matches) will result in more severe judgments of immorality. Consistent with past research on RWA, we acknowledge political differences between liberals and conservative—and the possibility that these differences may translate to some differences in moral judgment. However, we predict that moral differences between liberals and conservatives have been greatly exag-gerated by MFT (a prediction consistent with Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Morgan, & Wisneski, in press).We suggest that liberals and conservatives share the same dyadic template, rather than categorically different moral minds. A harm-based moral template predicts that harm should be cen-tral in moral cognition across both moral diversity (i.e., many different moral acts) and political orientation (i.e., for both lib-erals and conservatives). Because centrality is a relatively broad concept, we operationalize it through six specific hypotheses:Hypothesis 1 (H1: Accessibility): Harm is most cogni-tively accessible across moral diversity and political ori-entation (Study 1).Hypothesis2(H2: Importance): Harm is most impor-tant across moral diversity and political orientation (Studies 2 and 3).Hypothesis3(H3: Organization): Harm organizes judg-ments of immorality across moral diversity and political orientation (Study 4).Hypothesis4(H4: Overlap): Harm overlaps substan-tially with other moral concerns across political orienta-tion (Study 5).Hypothesis5(H5: Translation): Harm is the best lingua franca for translating across moral diversity and political orientation (Study 6).Hypothesis6 (H6: Association): Harm is more implic-itly associated with moral diversity than descriptively similar concerns, across political orientation (Study 7).


Demonstrate the potential for population structure to create spurious results, especially when using methods that rely on the accumulation of large numbers of small effects

Population Genetics: Why structure matters. Nick Barton, Joachim Hermisson, Magnus Nordborg. eLIFE Sciences, Mar 21 2019. https://elifesciences.org/articles/45380

Abstract: Great care is needed when interpreting claims about the genetic basis of human variation based on data from genome-wide association studies.

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As the name suggests, GWAS scan the genome for variants – typically single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) – that are associated with a particular condition or trait (phenotype). The first GWAS for height found a small number of SNPs that jointly explained only a tiny fraction of the variation. Because this was in contrast with the high heritability seen in twin studies, it was dubbed ‘the missing heritability problem’ (reviewed in Yang et al., 2010). It was suggested that the problem was simply due to a lack of statistical power to detect polymorphisms of small effect. Subsequent studies with larger sample sizes have supported this explanation: more and more loci have been identified although most of the variation remains ‘unmappable’, presumably because sample sizes on the order of a million are still not large enough (Yengo et al., 2018).

One way in which the unmappable component of genetic variation can be included in a statistical measure is via so-called polygenic scores. These scores sum the estimated contributions to the trait across many SNPs, including those whose effects, on their own, are not statistically significant. Polygenic scores thus represent a shift from the goal of identifying major genes to predicting phenotype from genotype. Originally designed for plant and animal breeding purposes, polygenic scores can, in principle, also be used to study the genetic basis of differences between individuals and groups.

This, however, requires accurate and unbiased estimation of the effects of all SNPs included in the score, which is difficult in a structured (non-homogeneous) population when environmental differences cannot be controlled. To see why this is a problem, consider the classic example of chopstick-eating skills (Lander and Schork, 1994). While there surely are genetic variants affecting our ability to handle chopsticks, most of the variation for this trait across the globe is due to environmental differences (cultural background), and a GWAS would mostly identify variants that had nothing to do with chopstick skills, but simply happened to differ in frequency between East Asia and the rest of the world.

Several methods for dealing with this problem have been proposed. When a GWAS is carried out to identify major genes, it is relatively simple to avoid false positives by eliminating associations outside major loci regardless of whether they are due to population structure confounding or an unmappable polygenic background (Vilhjálmsson and Nordborg, 2013). However, if the goal is to make predictions, or to understand differences among populations (such as the latitudinal cline in height), we need accurate and unbiased estimates for all SNPs. Accomplishing this is extremely challenging, and it is also difficult to know whether one has succeeded.

One possibility is to compare the population estimates with estimates taken from sibling data, which should be relatively unbiased by environmental differences. In one of many examples of this, Robinson et al. used data from the GIANT Consortium (Wood et al., 2014) together with sibling data to estimate that genetic variation contributes significantly to height variation across Europe (Robinson et al., 2015). They also argued that selection must have occurred, because the differences were too large to have arisen by chance. Using estimated effect sizes provided by Robinson et al., a more sophisticated analysis by Field et al. found extremely strong evidence for selection for height across Europe (p=10−74; Field et al., 2016). Several other studies reached the same conclusion based on the GIANT data (reviewed in Berg et al., 2019; Sohail et al., 2019).

Berg et al. (who are based at Columbia University, Stanford University, UC Davis and the University of Copenhagen) and Sohail et al. (who are based at Harvard Medical School, the Broad Institute, and other institutes in the US, Finland and Sweden) now re-examine these conclusions using the recently released data from the UK Biobank (Sudlow et al., 2015). Estimating effect sizes from these data allows possible biases due to population structure confounding to be investigated, because the UK Biobank data comes from a (supposedly) more homogenous population than the GIANT data.

Using these new estimates, Berg et al. and Sohail et al. independently found that evidence for selection vanishes – along with evidence for a genetic cline in height across Europe. Instead, they show that the previously published results were due to the cumulative effects of slight biases in the effect-size estimates in the GIANT data. Surprisingly, they also found evidence for confounding in the sibling data used as a control by Robinson et al. and Field et al. This turned out to be due to a technical error in the data distributed by Robinson et al. after they published their paper.

This means we still do not know whether genetics and selection are responsible for the pattern of height differences seen across Europe. That genetics plays a major role in height differences between individuals is not in doubt, and it is also clear that the signal from GWAS is mostly real. The issue is that there is no perfect way to control for complex population structure and environmental heterogeneity. Biases at individual loci may be tiny, but they become highly significant when summed across thousands of loci – as is done in polygenic scores. Standard methods to control for these biases, such as principal component analysis, may work well in simulations but are often insufficient when confronted with real data. Importantly, no natural population is unstructured: indeed, even the data in the UK Biobank seems to contain significant structure (Haworth et al., 2019).

Berg et al. and Sohail et al. demonstrate the potential for population structure to create spurious results, especially when using methods that rely on large numbers of small effects, such as polygenic scores. Caution is clearly needed when interpreting and using the results of such studies. For clinical predictions, risks must be weighed against benefits (Rosenberg et al., 2019). In some cases, such as recommendations for more frequent medical checkups for patients found at higher ‘genetic’ risk of a condition, it may not matter greatly whether predictors are confounded as long as they work. By contrast, the results of behavioral studies of traits such as IQ and educational attainment (Plomin and von Stumm, 2018) must be presented carefully, because while the benefits are far from obvious, the risks of such results being misinterpreted and misused are quite clear. The problem is worsened by the tendency of popular media to ignore caveats and uncertainties of estimates.

Finally, although quantitative genetics has proved highly successful in plant and animal breeding, it should be remembered that this success has been based on large pedigrees, well-controlled environments, and short-term prediction. When these methods have been applied to natural populations, even the most basic predictions fail, in large part due to poorly understood environmental factors (Charmantier et al., 2014). Natural populations are never homogeneous, and it is therefore misleading to imply there is a qualitative difference between ‘within-population’ and ‘between-population’ comparisons – as was recently done in connection with James Watson’s statements about race and IQ (Harmon, 2019). With respect to confounding by population structure, the key qualitative difference is between controlling the environment experimentally, and not doing so. Once we leave an experimental setting, we are effectively skating on thin ice, and whether the ice will hold depends on how far out we skate.

The decline in adolescent substance use across Europe & North America in the early twenty-first century: Associated with declines in face-to-face contact, not with increases in use of electronic media

The decline in adolescent substance use across Europe and North America in the early twenty-first century: A result of the digital revolution? Margaretha De Looze et al. International Journal of Public Health, March 2019, Volume 64, Issue 2, pp 229–240. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00038-018-1182-7

Abstract
Objectives: Increases in electronic media communication (EMC) and decreases in face-to-face peer contact in the evening (FTF) have been thought to explain the recent decline in adolescent substance use (alcohol, tobacco, cannabis). This study addresses this hypothesis, by examining associations between (time trends in) EMC, FTF, and substance use in more than 25 mainly European countries.

Methods: Using 2002–2014 data from the international Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study, we ran multilevel logistic regression analyses to investigate the above associations.

Results: National declines in substance use were associated with declines in FTF, but not with increases in EMC. At the individual level, both EMC and FTF related positively to substance use. For alcohol and cannabis use, the positive association with EMC was stronger in more recent years. Associations between EMC and substance use varied across countries, but this variation could not be explained by the proportion of young people using EMC within countries.

Conclusions: Our research suggests that the decrease in FTF, but not the increase in EMC, plays a role in the recent decrease in adolescent substance use.

Keywords: Adolescence Substance use Tobacco Alcohol Cannabis Electronic media communication Internet Trends over time Europe Time spent with friends

Women in Science preferred spatial toys in childhood more than women in Arts; they scored higher in mental rotation when they had preferred spatial toys; sport practice related with mental rotation performance

Childhood preference for spatial toys. Gender differences and relationships with mental rotation in STEM and non-STEM students. Angelica Moè, Petra Jansen, Stefanie Pietsch. Learning and Individual Differences, Volume 68, December 2018, Pages 108-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2018.10.003

Highlights
•    Women in Science preferred spatial toys in childhood more than women in Arts.
•    They scored higher in mental rotation when they had preferred spatial toys.
•    Sport practice related with mental rotation performance.

Abstract: Women tend not to choose STEM degrees, for a number of reasons associated with aptitudes, motivation and experience with certain spatial tasks such as mental rotation. This study considered an unexplored experiential factor: childhood preference for spatial toys and sports. It was predicted that the higher the preference for spatial activities in childhood, the higher the mental rotation performance and intrinsic motivation, and likewise the greater the probability of choosing a STEM degree. One hundred seventy-six Italian and German students attending the first year of either a STEM (n = 90) or a no STEM (n = 86) degree filled in the Mental Rotation Test, a self-report to assess intrinsic motivation, and two questionnaires to assess their actual practice with spatial sports and their childhood preference for either spatial or non-spatial toys and sports. The results showed that women in STEM degrees preferred spatial toys more than women in non-STEM degrees and performed better in mental rotation when preferred spatial toys in childhood. The discussion focuses on the relationship between childhood toy preferences and the choice of a STEM degree.

Girls read more than boys: It also happens with digital devices; cause is much bigger motivation to read

Gender gap in reading digitally? Examining the role of motivation and self-concept. Nele McElvany, Franziska Schwabe. Journal for Educational Research Online, Vol 11, No 1 (2019), http://www.j-e-r-o.com/index.php/jero/article/view/882

Abstract: Reading is a core prerequisite for educational success and participation in society. However, comprehensive empirical research is needed to understand how reading may differ in a digitalized world. The current study addressed the gender gap in reading digitally. It investigated competence scores along with information on (a) reading and (b) digital motivation and self-concept in 588 elementary school students. Results revealed a gender gap in reading digitally, in reading motivation and self-concept, and in motivation and self-concept in respect to working on digital devices. Only reading motivation variables predicted reading digitally, thereby providing important information on the validity of digitally based reading tests. Reading motivation was found to fully mediate the gender effect on reading digitally. Results have important implications for research and practice.

Keywords: Reading; Motivation; Digitalization; Elementary school
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Welfare implications of labor market power: Declining labor market concentration increase labor's share of income by 2.89 pct points 1976-2014, suggesting that labor market concentration is not the reason for a declining labor share

Labor Market Power. David W. Berger, Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey. NBER Working Paper No. 25719. March 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25719

Abstract: What are the welfare implications of labor market power? We provide an answer to this question in two steps: (1) we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market, (2) we estimate key parameters using within-firm-state, across-market differences in wage and employment responses to state corporate tax changes in U.S. Census data. We validate the model against recent evidence on productivity-wage pass-through, and new measurements of the distribution of local market concentration. The model implies welfare losses from labor market power that range from 2.9 to 8.0 percent of lifetime consumption. However, despite large contemporaneous losses, labor market power has not contributed to the declining labor share. Finally, we show that minimum wages can deliver moderate, and limited, welfare gains by reallocating workers from smaller to larger, more productive firms.


Tyler Cowen summarizing (Some implications of monopsony models, Mar 01 2019, https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/04/some-implications-of-monopsony-models.html):

More workers ought to be in larger firms, as those firms are afraid to hire more, knowing that bids up wages for everyone. Therefore (ceteris paribus) the large firms in the economy ought to be larger.
Raising the legal minimum wage also reallocates workers into larger firms, and again makes them larger.
Tough stuff if you worry a lot about both monopoly and monopsony at the same time -- choose your poison!
I have adapted those points from a recent paper by David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Simon Mongey, "Labor Market Power."  On the empirics, they conclude: "Our theory implies that this declining labor market concentration increase labor's share of income by 2.89 percentage points between 1976 and 2014, suggesting that labor market concentration is not the reason for a declining labor share."  So the paper makes no one happy (good!): monopsony is significant, but has been declining in import.

Sunday, March 31, 2019

It is possible that in the past, marriage led to increased levels of happiness and better health, but modern, sophisticated research is proving contrary today

Does Marriage Make You Happier in the Long Term? Studies show that marriage loses steam quite quickly. Elyakim Kislev. Psychology Today, Mar 31, 2019, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/happy-singlehood/201903/does-marriage-make-you-happier-in-the-long-term

Marriage has been woven into the fabric of society throughout history. The idea has been: Find your “soulmate,” marry that individual, and you will be infinitely happy. Numerous studies in the 20th and early 21st centuries have glorified and portrayed marriage as benevolent and beneficial to all, and have stigmatized what it means to be single. [...]

However, newer studies are proving that married people are not happier and healthier as was previously believed.

An award-winning study (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.119.9139) on more than 24,000 German adults found that people who got married tended to be a bit happier in the year of the wedding, but eventually their happiness returned to where it was prior. [...]

Another study (http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0055), based on data from a national, 17-year, 5-wave panel sample, finds declines in happiness levels at all marital durations with no support for an upturn in marital happiness in later years. It is striking to see that this finding has a biological basis in the brain chemical phenylethylamine (or PEA), which associates with feelings of well-being. The researchers of the latter study argue that the decline in happiness (and the frequency of sexual activity) may occur either because neurons become habituated to the effects of PEA or because of a decline in the levels of PEA over time.

Yet another study (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/86ad/6cb6604b5ea809f803c37788d97e7dec039a.pdf) of data from the 1984-2004 German Socio-Economic Panel supports the conclusions of the previous studies. In this study, the authors also find no evidence that children affect life satisfaction. The authors state that the typical explanation for the benefits of marriage is the “social support” that people derive from their partner. There is a positive effect of companionship, emotional support, and sustained sexual intimacy. However, these benefits dwindle after time, [...].

Even other studies that show a slight, lasting happiness advantage conferred by marriage admit that this uptick is partly due to the selection effect (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/happy-singlehood/201901/are-married-people-happier-think-again) whereby happier people tend to marry rather than marriage bringing happiness to the ones who were less happy to begin with.

It is therefore possible that in the past, marriage led to increased levels of happiness and better health. But modern, sophisticated research is proving contrary. Society must catch up and begin to dissolve the generations’ long misconception of marriage as the societal ideal. Single people can and do live happy lives. If you are looking to live a fulfilling and happy life, thinking long term shows that marriage should not be the most important factor.

This article was written with Lindsay Workman, UC Berkeley.

Optimism increased throughout early & middle adulthood before plateauing at age 55; experience of positive events was associated with optimism development across adulthood; negative life events were not associated with development

Optimism Development Across Adulthood and Associations With Positive and Negative Life Events. Ted Schwaba et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, March 21, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619832023

Abstract: Numerous studies have demonstrated long-term benefits of optimism for physical and mental health. However, little research has examined how optimism develops across the life span and how it is shaped by positive and negative life experiences. In this study, we examined the normative trajectory of optimism development from ages 26 to 71 in a longitudinal sample (N = 1,169) of Mexican-origin couples assessed 4 times across 7 years. Latent growth curve analyses indicated that optimism increased throughout early and middle adulthood before plateauing at age 55, with significant individual differences in change. Furthermore, the experience of positive events was associated with optimism development across adulthood, but negative life events were not associated with development. Men and women developed similarly in optimism, while U.S.-born participants developed differently from Mexican-born participants. We discuss how these findings inform our understanding of optimism as a dynamic, adaptive construct.

Keywords: optimism/pessimism, personality development, adult personality development

Adolescent Norwegian rats show prosocial behavior even when they can escape without helping

Carvalheiro, J., Seara-Cardoso, A., Mesquita, A. R., de Sousa, L., Oliveira, P., Summavielle, T., & Magalhães, A. (2019). Helping behavior in rats (Rattus norvegicus) when an escape alternative is present. Journal of Comparative Psychology, Mar 2019.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000178

Abstract: Prosocial behavior in rats is known to occur in response to a familiar rat’s distress, but the motivations underlying prosocial behavior remain elusive. In this study, we adapted the experimental setting of Ben-Ami Bartal, Decety, and Mason (2011) to explore different motivations behind helping behavior in adolescent rats. In the original setting, a free rat is placed in an arena where a cagemate is trapped inside a restrainer that can only be opened from the outside by the free rat. Here we added a dark compartment to the experimental setting that allowed the free rat to escape the arena and the distress evoked by the trapped cagemate, based on rodents’ aversion to bright areas. As a control, we tested rats in the same arena but with the door to the dark area closed. Our results showed that all free rats, except one in the escape condition, learned to open the restrainer’s door. However, in the escape condition, rats took significantly longer to open the restrainer to the cagemates when compared with rats that could not escape. To further explore the motivations underlying these group differences in door-opening latencies, we measured both rats’ behavior. We found that struggling behavior (i.e., distress) in the trapped rat did not affect door-opening, whereas exploratory behavior (i.e., proactive/positive behavior) in both rats contributed to shorter times. Our results highlight that adolescent rats show prosocial behavior even when they can escape without helping and contribute to demonstrate the role of positive emotional states in prosocial behavior.