Thursday, November 14, 2019

Surviving and Thriving: Fundamental Social Motives Provide Purpose in Life

Surviving and Thriving: Fundamental Social Motives Provide Purpose in Life. Matthew J. Scott, Adam B. Cohen. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, November 13, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219883604

Abstract: Purpose in life (PIL) is often associated with grand achievements and existential beliefs, but recent theory suggests that it might ultimately track gainful pursuit of basic evolved goals. Five studies (N = 1,993) investigated the relationships between fundamental social motives and PIL. In Study 1, attribution of a life goal pursuit to disease avoidance, affiliation, or kin care motives correlated with higher PIL. Studies 2 and 3 found correlations of self-protection, disease avoidance, affiliation, mate retention, and kin care motives with PIL after controlling for potential confounds. Study 4 showed that writing about success in the status, mating, and kin care domains increased PIL. Study 5 replicated the effect for mating and kin care, but not for status. Results imply that fundamental motives link to PIL through a sense of progress, rather than raw desire. Overall, this set of studies suggests that pursuit of evolved fundamental goals contributes to a purposeful life.

Keywords: motivation, purpose, meaning, well-being, evolution


General Discussion (excerpts)

The results of these studies present the first causal evidence
that thinking about satisfying at least some evolved social
goals increases PIL. Study 1 showed that the extent to which
individuals attributed their important goal pursuits to disease
avoidance, affiliation, and kin care motives predicted higher
PIL. Participants did not draw their own connections in
Studies 2 and 3, instead completing validated measures of
each construct. Study 2 showed that self-protection, affiliation,
status, mate retention, and kin care motives predicted
higher PIL among undergraduates, controlling for personality
and affect. Study 3 showed that affiliation, status, and kin
care motives predicted higher PIL, controlling for personality,
affect, regulatory focus, and approach/avoidance motivation.
Study 4 demonstrated that writing about accomplishment
of status, mating, or kin care goals increases PIL about
equally and that preexisting status and kin care motives made
the manipulations of those domains more effective in boosting
PIL. Study 5 replicated a causal effect of writing about
mating and kin care, but not status. Post-tests showed that the
manipulations did not affect amount of fundamental motivation
per se, suggesting that motive satisfaction feelings may
have increased PIL.
Previous work has shown that people with a tendency
toward goal locomotion endorse more PIL than those who
merely assess new goals (Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, Orehek, &
Scheier, 2017), leading researchers to theorize that working
toward goals increases PIL. The current work supports this
causal claim via two experiments.
The current findings both support and extend previous
work connecting fundamental social motives with purpose.
People not only believe that affiliation and kin care pursuits
lead to PIL but also people pursuing these motivations tend
to report higher PIL. Status motivations also predicted higher
PIL in Studies 2 and 3. Studies 4 and 5 showed that writing
about full accomplishment in mating, kin care, and sometimes
status domains increases PIL. Taken together, the moderation-
by-motivation finding of Study 4, the lack of motive
manipulation in Study 5, and the success-eliciting nature of
the writing prompts suggest that the feeling of progress or
satisfaction in a fundamental domain may be how fundamental
motives influence PIL.
Our work is also theoretically consistent with that of King
and colleagues, but a fuller integration with their perspective
will require more research. They make the important observation
that
the psychological approach to the experience of meaning in life
has focused on humanity’s search for an experience that seems
simultaneously ineffable yet vital, essential but somehow
potentially unattainable. Psychologists have often examined
what happens when meaning is absent: When experiences feel
senseless, when purpose is difficult to ascertain, when meaning
must be created. (King, Heintzelman, & Ward, 2016, p. 211)

In line with this expressed need for a new perspective,
we studied how everyday motives in everyday people foster
a sense of PIL. Future research should look at how
pursuing fundamental goals might influence the other facets
of MIL.
Some of the motives we studied overlap with those in
King and colleagues’ work, but not all of them. They note
that MIL is correlated with social integration (King et al.,
2016), which may be partially captured by the fundamental
motives mate acquisition, mate retention, or kin care as all
involve fostering social relationships. Ward and King (2016)
found a relationship of MIL with socioeconomic status,
which likely overlaps with the fundamental motive status.
Other predictors of MIL, such as religious faith (e.g., King
et al., 2016), likely correlate with kin care and affiliation
(e.g., Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004), but are far
more distinct from fundamental motives.
With regard to causal directions, there are multiple possible
perspectives. Kenrick and colleagues (Kenrick & Krems,
2018; Krems et al., 2017) have suggested that success in evolutionary
domains can lead to well-being, and our work here
shows fundamental motives influence PIL. However, it is
also possible that meaning and purpose influence evolutionary
success in ways that are not incompatible with what we
have shown, but which represent a causal direction we did
not focus on. King et al. (2016) proposed a
meaning-as-information Framework . . . [which] draws on the
feelings-as-information hypothesis, which suggests that
affective states provide information to direct behavior and
cognitive processing in adaptive ways . . . feelings of meaning
track the coherence of one’s environment to provide important
information to direct processing in a situationally appropriate
manner. This framework suggests that strong feelings of
meaning can be adaptive because they emerge when one inhabits
a stable environment that fosters positive functioning across
many domains of life. (p. 214)

Future research should consider the multiple theoretically
derived causal directions that may be possible.

The study also found that journalists score far lower in moral reasoning than they did 13 years ago

Journalists Primed: How Professional Identity Affects Moral Decision Making. Patrick Ferrucci, Edson C. Tandoc Jr. & Erin E. Schauster. Journalism Practice, Oct 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2019.1673202

ABSTRACT: This study examines whether professional journalists reason differently about moral problems when primed with their professional identity. This between-subjects experiment (N = 171) used the Defining Issues Test, a much-used and validated instrument that measures moral reasoning. The results show identity priming does not affect how journalists apply ethics. The study also found that journalists score far lower in moral reasoning than they did 13 years ago. These results are interpreted through the lens of social identity theory.

KEYWORDS: Journalism, identity, priming, ethics, experiment, moral development

Singles and Faces: High Recognition for Female Faces in Single Males, while males in a relationshiop didn't do better


Singles and Faces: High Recognition for Female Faces in Single Males. Mohamad El Haj, Ahmed A. Moustafa4, and Jean-Louis Nandrino. Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 2019 • volume 15(4) • 301-307. DOI • 10.5709/acp-0277-x

Abstract: A substantial body of research has assessed the effect of gender on face recognition; however, little is known about the effect of relationship status on face recognition. In this study, we assessed for the first time how relationship status impacts face recognition by asking 62 male and female participants to decide whether they had previously encountered faces of males and females. Participants were also asked to fill a socio-demographic variables questionnaire which included, among other information, question about their relationship status (i.e., single vs. in a relationship). A significant effect of relationship status on face recognition was observed only in males; namely, single males demonstrated higher face recognition than males in relationships, whereas similar face recognition was observed in single and in-relationship females. More specifically, single males demonstrated higher recognition for female than for male faces, whereas no differences were observed in single females, males in relationships, or in females in relationship. Single males seem to be motivated by mating opportunity and, thus, unlike single females or males and females in relationships, devote high attentional resources to processing faces of the opposite gender.


DISCUSSION

This study investigated the effect of gender and relationship status on
face recognition. Our analyses showed higher face recognition in female
than in male participants, regardless of their relationship status.
A significant effect of relationship status on face recognition was observed
only in males; specifically, single males demonstrated a higher
face recognition than males in relationships, whereas similar face
recognition was observed in single females and females in relationships.
More specifically, single males demonstrated higher recognition
for female than for male faces, whereas no differences were observed
in single females and both females and males in relationships. In addition,
higher episodic memory was observed in female than in male
participants, whereas no significant effect of relationship status was
observed on episodic memory. Together, relative to males in relationships,
single males demonstrated higher face recognition, especially
for female faces, but similar episodic memory, whereas females demonstrated
similar face recognition and episodic memory regardless of
their relationship status.

Our findings replicate prior studies with regard to (a) higher general
face recognition and episodic memory in female participants and
(b) the own-gender bias in female participants, that is, the fact that
these participants demonstrated higher recognition for female than for
male faces. The finding of a higher general face recognition in these
participants mirrors studies demonstrating that females outperform
males in tasks involving face recognition, independent of face age
and ethnicity (Herlitz & Lovén, 2013; Herlitz et al., 2013; McBain et
al., 2009; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2006, 2007). This finding also mirrors
research demonstrating that females are better at recognizing and interpreting
emotional facial expressions (McClure, 2000) as that infant
girls spend more time looking at faces than boys (Connellan et al.,
2000). The advantage females have in face processing has been attributed
to a general greater interest in and knowledge of social aspects of
the world (Kaplan, 1978; Kimura, 1999; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007).
As for the high verbal episodic memory in our female participants,
studies suggest females tend to outperform males when the memory
material is verbal (Astur, Ortiz, & Sutherland, 1998; Lewin, Wolgers,
& Herlitz, 2001; Ruff, Light, & Quayhagen, 1989; Ullman et al., 2008).
This advantage is illustrated by a study in which females and males
were tested on a series of tasks involving the recall and recognition
of verbal material and abstract pictorial stimuli (Herlitz & Yonker,
2002). Herlitz and Yonker (2002) found that females outperformed
males on memory of verbal materials. The superiority of females in
verbal processing has been also observed for autobiographical memory
(Grysman, 2017; Grysman et al., 2016; Nahari & Pazuelo, 2015). Since
our episodic memory task implied processing verbal information, it is
not surprising that female participants in our study have outperformed
male participants. With regard to the own-gender bias in female
participants, research suggests that females perform at a higher level
on female than male faces (Cross et al., 1971; Lewin & Herlitz, 2002;
Wright & Sladden, 2003). In contrast, males do not appear to show
a corresponding own-gender bias for male faces. Several studies have
found that males perform at a similar level for both male and female
faces (Cross et al., 1971; Ino, Nakai, Azuma, Kimura, & Fukuyama,
2010; Lewin & Herlitz, 2002; Loven et al., 2011; Megreya et al., 2011;
Wright & Sladden, 2003), mirroring the performance of male participants
in our study. The own-gender bias, as observed in females, has
been interpreted as reflecting the fact that females’ greater social interest
is specifically directed towards other females (Loven et al., 2011).
According to another social account, females may be more interested
in female than in male faces due to the high value placed by society
on female attractiveness (Cross et al., 1971; Ellis, Shepherd, & Bruce,
1973). Taken together, our findings replicate previous studies with
regard to the higher general face recognition and episodic memory in
female participants, as well as with regard to their own-gender bias.
Compared to other investigations of face recognition, the originality
of our study lies in the assessment of relationship status. Our
findings demonstrate higher face recognition in single females than in
single males, as well as in females in relationships than males in relationships.
Accordingly, regardless of their relationship status, females
seem to outperform males on face recognition. The main finding of
our paper was the high face recognition in single male participants,
especially for female faces. Female participants, on the other hand,
demonstrated similar face recognition regardless of their relationship
status or the gender of faces. In our view, single males are specifically
motivated by mating opportunity, and thus, tend to pay more attention
to features of the opposite gender than single females do. On the
other hand, individuals in relationships may benefit from affective and
emotional comfort and stability, decreasing their motivation to process
physical features of the opposite gender, which may explain why similar
face recognition was observed in our female and male participants
in relationships.

This suggestion is supported by studies demonstrating that while
single individuals increase implicit attention to physically attractive
opposite gender targets, individuals in relationships are inattentive to
such stimuli (Maner et al., 2009; Maner et al., 2008). Our assumption
is additionally supported by the individuation motivation account
(Hugenberg, Wilson, See, & Young, 2013), which states that individuals
essentially process faces considered worthy of their attention. More
specifically, enhanced motivation triggers selective attention (and
deeper processing), which can facilitate face encoding. This model is
supported by research demonstrating bias toward low processing of female
faces when males consider a short-term mating strategy (Confer
et al., 2010; Lu & Chang, 2012; Wagstaff et al., 2015). Even though the
individuation motivation account does not take into account the effect
of relationship status, it does, however, provide support to the assumption
that single males are motivated by mating opportunity, resulting in
high memory for females faces.

The effect of motivation on face processing in single males can also
be interpreted from an evolutionary perspective. According to one
evolutionary account, humans possess fundamental social motives
shaped by natural selection to produce behaviors that increase reproductive
fitness (Kenrick, Neuberg, Griskevicius, Becker, & Schaller,
2010). Interestingly, mate-related motives have been considered as one
of fundamental social motives that exert important effects on social
behaviors (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Karremans et al.,
2011; Lydon et al., 1999; Maner et al., 2007; Maner et al., 2012; Ritter
et al., 2010). Further, attention is the first step in information processing
and in memory, and its evolutionary function is mainly related to
information relevant to survival and reproductive goals (Dunbar &
Barrett, 2007), siven the limited attentional capacity and the diverse
and complex social information that surrounds us. Hence, this attentional
selectivity may result in high processing of female faces in
single males. Single females, on the other hand, do not seem to demonstrate
such an attentional bias, probably due to their enhanced overall
memory for faces. That is, they process faces faster and more efficiently
than males (Bowles et al., 2009; Godard & Fiori, 2010, 2012; Megreya
et al., 2011; Sommer et al., 2013), or they simply do not seek mating
opportunities as much as males do.

One limitation of our study is the small sample size, which increases
the risk of Type II statistical errors. Another is that we did not consider
the duration of the relationship status of our participants. Future studies
should take into account the duration of relationship as individuals
in recently established relationships or those in open relationships
may have high mating motivation, and thus, may demonstrate high
face recognition. Another suggestion for future research is to explore
face recognition according to sexual orientation, as single homosexual
individuals may demonstrate higher face recognition for the same
rather than for the opposite gender. Finally, it would be of interest to
take response time into account, as this variable may provide better
insight into participants’ performance. This issue is important because
accuracy measures may not reflect attentional processes by themselves.
By addressing these limitations, future research may provide a comprehensive
picture of the effect of relationship status on face recognition.
Regardless of its potential limitations, this study shows, for the first
time, that relationship status does impact face recognition and not
episodic memory in general.

Desire for sexual attention is about the same in men and women, but for men could be explained primarily by narcissism and psychopathy; in women, Machiavellianism was the primary predictor

The desire for sexual attention: Relationship with dark triad traits and parental bonding factors. Peter J.O. Connor, Andrew Spark, Maria Kaya. Personality and Individual Differences, November 14 2019, 109685. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109685

Abstract: In this study we investigated individual differences in the desire for sexual attention. Although there is good evidence for the utility of this construct, little is known about its demographic, developmental, and psychological predictors. Using a representative sample of 200 Australians, we (1) developed a short measure of this construct and assessed its factor structure, (2) tested for age and sex differences, and (3) tested a set of hypotheses relating to predictors of this construct. We found that the desire for sexual attention peaked in young adults. We found no overall sex difference in the desire for sexual attention; however predictors of this construct differed across men and women. For men, the desire for sexual attention could be explained primarily by narcissism and psychopathy, with Machiavellianism explaining no unique variance. For women, Machiavellianism was the primary predictor, with narcissism and psychopathy playing only minor roles. Maladaptive paternal bonding was also associated with greater need for sexual attention in women but not men.

---
More recently, DelPriore, Schlomer and Ellis (2017) found strong empirical support for paternal investment theory (Draper & Harpending, 1982), which pro-poses that low quality fathering (i.e., lack of presence, warmth and involvement) provides daughters with information about the reliability of male investment and ultimately increases risky sexual behavior.

It was suggested that ideological differences in genes are related to low-level sensory processing; we find that taste bud density predicts greater conservatism, and this relationship is partially mediated by disgust sensitivity

Taste Sensitivity Predicts Political Ideology. Benjamin C. Ruisch, Rajen A. Anderson, Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro. https://osf.io/fv436.

Abstract: Previous research has shown that political attitudes are highly heritable, but the proximal physiological mechanisms that shape ideology remain largely unknown. Based on work suggesting possible ideological differences in genes related to low-level sensory processing, we predicted that taste (i.e., gustatory) sensitivity would be associated with political ideology. In 4 studies (combined N= 1,610) we test this hypothesis and find robust support for this association. In Studies 1-3, we find that sensitivity to the chemicals PROP and PTC -two well established measures of taste sensitivity- are associated with greater political conservatism. In Study 4, we find that fungiform papilla density, a proxy for taste bud density, also predicts greater conservatism, and that this relationship is partially mediated by disgust sensitivity. This work suggests that low-level physiological differences in sensory processing may shape an individual's political attitudes.

Full text at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3afb/54b90c11b768e941a4ef5e2e0c56fffcc6b3.pdf

A considerable proportion of people in postindustrial societies experience difficulties in intimate relationships and spend considerable time being single


The Association Between Mating Performance, Marital Status, and the Length of Singlehood: Evidence From Greece and China. Menelaos Apostolou, Yan Wang. Evolutionary Psychology, November 13, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704919887706

Abstract: A considerable proportion of people in postindustrial societies experience difficulties in intimate relationships and spend considerable time being single. In the current research, we attempted to examine mating performance, and occurrence and length of singlehood in a Greek (N = 884) and a Chinese (N = 2,041) sample. We found that, in both samples, about half of the participants experienced difficulties in intimate relationships. In addition, more than half of the participants were single, and nearly one in four participants indicated that they were single because they faced difficulties attracting a partner. Moreover, more than one in five singles in the Greek sample were without a partner for more than 3 years, and almost half of the singles in the Chinese sample had never been in a relationship. Mating performance predicted marital status, with low scorers being more likely to be single because they faced difficulties in attracting a partner than high scorers. Mating performance predicted also the length of singlehood, with low scorers spending more time being single than high scorers. In addition, singles who faced difficulties in attracting partners experienced lengthier spells of singlehood than other categories of singles. Furthermore, there were significantly more participants who preferred to be single and who never had a relationship in the Chinese than in the Greek sample. Overall, in both samples, a considerable proportion of participants experienced low mating performance, which was associated with increased incidence of prolonged spells of singlehood.

Keywords: singlehood, involuntary singlehood, mating, mismatch problem

---
Causes of Poor Mating Performance

There are many reasons why people experience poor performance in the domain of mating, including stochastic ones such as accidents, genetic mutations, and illnesses (Apostolou, 2017b). For instance, individuals may experience a serious accident, which could result in disfigurement that in turn could impair their capacity to attract mates. Similarly, random genetic mutations may significantly affect the functioning of adaptations involved in mating, causing difficulties in this area. In the same vain, individuals may be affected by a serious disease, which could affect their mate value as well as their capacity to allocate resources in mate-seeking. However, serious accidents, random genetic mutations with a substantial phenotypic effect, and grave illnesses are rare and can consequently account only for a small percentage of people who face difficulties in mating.

It has been proposed that the main factor behind the high prevalence of poor mating performance has been the mismatch between ancestral and modern conditions (Apostolou, 2015). More specifically, selection forces shape adaptations to work optimally (i.e., to increase individuals’ surviving and reproductive success or fitness) in the specific environment they occupy. If this environment changes, selection forces would adjust these adaptations to work optimally in the new environment. Nevertheless, this process takes time, and in the interim, there would be many individuals with adaptations that do not work optimally, which is known as the mismatch problem (Crawford, 1998; Li, van Vugt, & Colarelli, 2017; Maner & Kenrick, 2010). The environment in which mating takes place has undergone substantial changes very recently in the evolutionary timescale, which means that the mismatch problem is likely to play a major role in explaining poor performance in mating.

More specifically, anthropological, historical, and phylogenetic evidence indicates that, until recently, the typical form of long-term mating has been arranged marriage (Broude & Greene, 1976; Coontz, 2006; Walker, Hill, Flinn, & Ellsworth, 2011). For instance, a study of 16 historical societies found that arranged marriage was the norm in 15 of them (Apostolou, 2012). Another study examined 190 contemporary hunting and gathering societies, whose way of life reflected the way of life of ancestral foragers and found that arranged marriage was the typical form of mating (Apostolou, 2007). Furthermore, men form male coalitions in order to monopolize the women of other men (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988). Historical, anthropological, and physiological evidence indicates that raids, wars, and conflicts, aiming also to obtain women, had been common in ancestral human societies (Bowles, 2009; Keegan, 2004; Puts, 2016). Such evidence indicates further that in ancestral human societies people could exercise free mate choice. For example, they could choose their own mates in later marriages that were less controlled by parents or in marriage in extramarital relationships (Apostolou, 2017a).

Following the industrial revolution in 18th century, most human societies transited to postindustrialism. In the postindustrial context, mate choice is freely exercised, while mating is not forced by coalitions of powerful men. Nevertheless, adaptations involved in mating have evolved in a context where mates were secured predominantly through parents or imposed by male coalitions. These adaptations may not work optimally in a context where individuals have to obtain mates on their own. For instance, a high level of aggression may have enabled ancestral men to obtain women by fighting other men, but it constitutes an obstacle in keeping a partner for men living in postindustrial societies. Consistent with this argument, one study identified 76 reasons that could lead people to be single, including poor flirting skills and interpersonal difficulties such as shyness and fear of commitment (Apostolou, 2017b). Another study analyzed 13,429 responses from a Reddit thread, asking the question why men were single (Apostolou, 2019). The responses were classified in 43 broader categories, with the most frequent ones being poor flirting skills, low self-confidence, poor looks, shyness, low effort, and bad experiences from previous relationships.

On this basis, it is predicted that a considerable proportion of the population today would experience poor performance in mating. In accordance with this prediction, a study which employed 1,894 Greek-speaking participants found that almost one in two experienced difficulties in attracting and/or keeping an intimate partner (Apostolou et al., 2018). A subsequent study which employed 1,358 Greek-speaking participants produced similar results (Apostolou et al., 2019). It could be further predicted that, due to difficulties in the domain of mating, there would be many people who are involuntarily single. Consistent with this prediction, one study estimated that, in the Greek cultural context, about half of the participants who were single were so because they faced difficulties in attracting a partner (Apostolou et al., 2019).


Check also Mating Performance: Assessing Flirting Skills, Mate Signal-Detection Ability, and Shyness Effects. Menelaos Apostolou et al. Evolutionary Psychology, September 22, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/09/more-than-40-of-our-participants.html

Six Things Wives Should Know About Mistresses

5 Things Wives Should Know About Mistresses. Michelle Zunter. Paired Life, August 9, 2019. https://pairedlife.com/problems/5-Things-Wives-Should-Know-About-Mistresses

Generally speaking, from the perspective of a wife that's been cheated on, it's usually the "other woman" who gets most - if not all - of the blame for an affair. She's often perceived as a wicked homewrecker with nothing on her mind except "stealing" someone's husband.

There is no excuse for getting involved with someone that you know to be married. We all know this. But, let's remember, people who get involved in affairs are human too. Many of them have made terrible decisions and will have to live with the consequences of that for the rest of their lives.

There aren't many pleasant descriptions that go along with being a mistress. But, in reality, mistresses are just ordinary women, not superhero villains intent on destroying the world and all the marriages in it.

Mistresses are your friends and neighbors, and many of them are maintaining secret affairs that no one knows about. We can judge them all we want, but at the end of the day, what's really going on with women who become mistresses?

There are several issues that could be going on inside of a mistresses life and mind. Some of them are rarely talked about. Many people won't read this because they'll say, "Why should I care about a homewrecker?" Well, simply put, anyone you know or love could be someone's mistress, so it does matter. Here are 5 things wives should know about the mistress:

1. She Feels Guilty

Yes, believe it or not, a mistress does feel guilt. If she is aware of the fact that her lover is married, she goes through all the normal emotions associated with guilt on a daily basis, such as sadness, depression, and hopelessness.

Unless a woman is a sociopath, she feels guilty for crossing the line, just like any normal human being would.

A mistress feels guilty when her lover chooses to spend time with her on a weekend, knowing there is a wife and possibly children waiting at home. She feels guilty when she hears other people talk about cheating spouses. She feels guilty when she watches movies about adultery. Guilt is the permanent ghost that accompanies a mistress throughout the entire affair and afterward.

That said, many mistresses are totally unaware that their lover is married. Many men go to great lengths to hide the fact that they are married. If a husband can have an affair and betray the woman he married, then he is capable of telling multiple lies, both to the wife and mistress.

2. She Probably Never Planned On Being A Mistress

Most little girls do not fantasize about becoming someone's mistress when they grow up. Every adult is accountable for their own actions - of that there is no doubt. Unfortunately, sometimes circumstances and poor decisions can lead to affairs.

It's not likely on the goal list of any woman to get wrapped up in an affair with a married man and potentially lose her own career, credibility, friends, or even - in some extreme cases - her own life because of it. Not to mention, some women who have affairs are also married and have families of their own that they are jeopardizing by getting involved in an affair.

Many women end up being the other woman by having a "fling" with a man with whom they never intended on being with on a regular basis. They may or may not have known the man was married but they went ahead anyway, ending up infatuated or in love.

There are women out there that don't have a problem dating married men and have little regret, but generally speaking, this is not usually the case.

Many times the husband will make promises that can string a mistress along until so much time passes that it becomes difficult for her to break it off. If she is in love, she may not want to end it, even if she knows it's wrong.

3. She Gets Jealous

If a woman has become a mistress and if she knows that her lover is married, then most certainly she feels jealous. She feels jealousy every time he walks out the door, because she knows he is going home to another woman, and most likely a family. She knows her lover has another life at his home which she will never be a part of.

Unless she has a family of her own, a mistress's life is usually pretty lonely, emphasized by the fact that her heart probably sinks just thinking of what her lover is doing at home with his wife and family.

A mistress definitely feels jealous of the time a husband spends with his wife and family. She feels jealous that he has children with his wife, and she feels jealous that he shares a bed with his wife. Some mistresses even have children with their married lovers. Imagine what a complicated web that must be.

There's no doubt that mistress feels envious that her lover's relationship with his wife is not a secret to the world like hers is. One thing that many mistresses crave more than anything is validation that her relationship with her lover is real. Sneaking around in secrecy is not the ideal for having a healthy, long-term relationship.

A mistress, like any other woman, wants her lover to be proud of her, to tell their friends about her, and for them to have the desire to tell the whole world how much they love her.

4. She Fell In Love With The Wrong Person

Well, this is a no-brainer, but unfortunately, love and lust are blind. A woman who ignores repeated red flags because of love or lust will eventually find out she has picked the wrong man.

A mistress is bound to come to this realization sooner or later. She may choose to stay in the affair long after she's realized her mistake for any number of reasons including denial, fear, and, of course, love.

Falling for the wrong person happens to all of us. It happens to single women dating single men. It happens to women who fall in love with married men. It happens to the wife of a husband who is having an affair.

The point is, most likely the mistress already knows she has made a huge mistake and only stays in the affair because she thinks her lover wants to be with her and she loves him. Of course, some women may not be that emotionally attached to their lovers, but I would guess that most are - especially in long-term affairs that carry on for years.

5. She May Believe There's A Future

How many women fall for a man and believe most of what he says? We've all done it at some point or another. If a woman knows her lover is married or found out at some point after she already fell for him, then there is no doubt she has been sweet-talked and promised to hundreds of times.

It's fairly common for a cheating husband to tell his mistress that he is miserable in his marriage and wants to get out. This may or may not be true, but whether or not he does get out of the marriage is another thing. If there are children involved or if the husband does truly want to be with his wife, then he won't make the steps to leave the marriage

A mistress has already placed herself in a vulnerable position, so if she is in love with the man she is having the affair with, she will make excuses for him, and probably suffers from deep denial. It may take months or even years for a mistress to realize that a man is not going to leave his wife for her. If he was, he would have done it sooner than later.


131

    PairedLife»Relationship Problems»Cheating

5 Things Wives Should Know About Mistresses
Updated on August 9, 2019
Farawaytree profile image
Michelle Zunter more

Michelle writes about relationships, self-improvement, life lessons & attitude to both inspire & relate to her readers
Contact Author
They are women we know and love.
They are women we know and love. | Source

Generally speaking, from the perspective of a wife that's been cheated on, it's usually the "other woman" who gets most - if not all - of the blame for an affair. She's often perceived as a wicked homewrecker with nothing on her mind except "stealing" someone's husband.

There is no excuse for getting involved with someone that you know to be married. We all know this. But, let's remember, people who get involved in affairs are human too. Many of them have made terrible decisions and will have to live with the consequences of that for the rest of their lives.

There aren't many pleasant descriptions that go along with being a mistress. But, in reality, mistresses are just ordinary women, not superhero villains intent on destroying the world and all the marriages in it.

Mistresses are your friends and neighbors, and many of them are maintaining secret affairs that no one knows about. We can judge them all we want, but at the end of the day, what's really going on with women who become mistresses?

There are several issues that could be going on inside of a mistresses life and mind. Some of them are rarely talked about. Many people won't read this because they'll say, "Why should I care about a homewrecker?" Well, simply put, anyone you know or love could be someone's mistress, so it does matter. Here are 5 things wives should know about the mistress:
1. She Feels Guilty

Yes, believe it or not, a mistress does feel guilt. If she is aware of the fact that her lover is married, she goes through all the normal emotions associated with guilt on a daily basis, such as sadness, depression, and hopelessness.

Unless a woman is a sociopath, she feels guilty for crossing the line, just like any normal human being would.

A mistress feels guilty when her lover chooses to spend time with her on a weekend, knowing there is a wife and possibly children waiting at home. She feels guilty when she hears other people talk about cheating spouses. She feels guilty when she watches movies about adultery. Guilt is the permanent ghost that accompanies a mistress throughout the entire affair and afterward.

That said, many mistresses are totally unaware that their lover is married. Many men go to great lengths to hide the fact that they are married. If a husband can have an affair and betray the woman he married, then he is capable of telling multiple lies, both to the wife and mistress.

"...in reality, mistresses are just ordinary women, not super hero villains intent on destroying the world and all the marriages in it."
Being "the mistress" is not exactly what people may think
Being "the mistress" is not exactly what people may think | Source
2. She Probably Never Planned On Being A Mistress

Most little girls do not fantasize about becoming someone's mistress when they grow up. Every adult is accountable for their own actions - of that there is no doubt. Unfortunately, sometimes circumstances and poor decisions can lead to affairs.

It's not likely on the goal list of any woman to get wrapped up in an affair with a married man and potentially lose her own career, credibility, friends, or even - in some extreme cases - her own life because of it. Not to mention, some women who have affairs are also married and have families of their own that they are jeopardizing by getting involved in an affair.

Many women end up being the other woman by having a "fling" with a man with whom they never intended on being with on a regular basis. They may or may not have known the man was married but they went ahead anyway, ending up infatuated or in love.

There are women out there that don't have a problem dating married men and have little regret, but generally speaking, this is not usually the case.

Many times the husband will make promises that can string a mistress along until so much time passes that it becomes difficult for her to break it off. If she is in love, she may not want to end it, even if she knows it's wrong.

3. She Gets Jealous

If a woman has become a mistress and if she knows that her lover is married, then most certainly she feels jealous. She feels jealousy every time he walks out the door, because she knows he is going home to another woman, and most likely a family. She knows her lover has another life at his home which she will never be a part of.

Unless she has a family of her own, a mistress's life is usually pretty lonely, emphasized by the fact that her heart probably sinks just thinking of what her lover is doing at home with his wife and family.

A mistress definitely feels jealous of the time a husband spends with his wife and family. She feels jealous that he has children with his wife, and she feels jealous that he shares a bed with his wife. Some mistresses even have children with their married lovers. Imagine what a complicated web that must be.

There's no doubt that mistress feels envious that her lover's relationship with his wife is not a secret to the world like hers is. One thing that many mistresses crave more than anything is validation that her relationship with her lover is real. Sneaking around in secrecy is not the ideal for having a healthy, long-term relationship.

A mistress, like any other woman, wants her lover to be proud of her, to tell their friends about her, and for them to have the desire to tell the whole world how much they love her.

"One thing that many mistresses crave more than anything is validation that her relationship with her lover is real. Sneaking around in secrecy is not the ideal for having a healthy, long-term relationship."

4. She Fell In Love With The Wrong Person

Well, this is a no-brainer, but unfortunately, love and lust are blind. A woman who ignores repeated red flags because of love or lust will eventually find out she has picked the wrong man.

A mistress is bound to come to this realization sooner or later. She may choose to stay in the affair long after she's realized her mistake for any number of reasons including denial, fear, and, of course, love.

Falling for the wrong person happens to all of us. It happens to single women dating single men. It happens to women who fall in love with married men. It happens to the wife of a husband who is having an affair.

The point is, most likely the mistress already knows she has made a huge mistake and only stays in the affair because she thinks her lover wants to be with her and she loves him. Of course, some women may not be that emotionally attached to their lovers, but I would guess that most are - especially in long-term affairs that carry on for years.

5. She May Believe There's A Future

How many women fall for a man and believe most of what he says? We've all done it at some point or another. If a woman knows her lover is married or found out at some point after she already fell for him, then there is no doubt she has been sweet-talked and promised to hundreds of times.

It's fairly common for a cheating husband to tell his mistress that he is miserable in his marriage and wants to get out. This may or may not be true, but whether or not he does get out of the marriage is another thing. If there are children involved or if the husband does truly want to be with his wife, then he won't make the steps to leave the marriage

A mistress has already placed herself in a vulnerable position, so if she is in love with the man she is having the affair with, she will make excuses for him, and probably suffers from deep denial. It may take months or even years for a mistress to realize that a man is not going to leave his wife for her. If he was, he would have done it sooner than later.

Hanging on to an affair in hopes that a man will leave his wife is something many mistresses do and if there are years that pass by, she becomes more invested in the relationship and also more comfortable within the lie. The affair becomes her normal. The secrecy becomes her normal. In many cases, she will self-medicate or behave destructively to alleviate the guilt and shame.

Being the mistress is not glamorous. An affair may start out as a thrilling, romantic whirlwind, but it almost always ends up a depressing, disheartening situation. Mistresses are just like any other woman in the world. They don't necessarily need to be vilified.

[and this is the six thing, IMHO:] At the end of the day, women who become mistresses are our daughters, sisters, aunts, mothers, wives and neighbors.

Are entrepreneurs born or made? The influence of personality

Are entrepreneurs born or made? The influence of personality. M.I. López-Núñez et al. Personality and Individual Differences, Available online 13 November 2019, 109699. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109699

Abstract: Currently, entrepreneurship is of great importance to economic growth and reduced unemployment. Since entrepreneurial behaviour is multidimensional, interest in understanding the roles of individual variables has increased significantly. The present study uses the theoretical and empirical framework of entrepreneurship research to explain the existence of the psychological profile of an entrepreneur, the impact of the psychological variables of personality on behaviour and entrepreneurial intention, and the relationship between personality traits and other specific traits frequently related to entrepreneurship. A sample of 337 participants composed of real entrepreneurs (n = 83) and university students (n = 254) with high scores in entrepreneurial intention were evaluated in personality (Big Five) and other specific traits: ambiguity tolerance, emotional intelligence and coping and problem solving. The results showed that both groups share the same profile in these variables once adjustments were made for the effects of sex and age. A target profile and a preliminary evaluation of its best possible accuracy are provided.

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

People generally view others' “true selves” as good; however, people may show promiscuous condemnation and often judge acts as immoral when they are ambiguous

Promiscuous condemnation: People assume ambiguous actions are immoral. Neil Hester, B. Keith Payne, Kurt Gray. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 86, January 2020, 103910. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103910

Highlights
• Mixed evidence exists for whether people generally view others as good or evil.
• People generally view others' “true selves” as good.
• However, people may show promiscuous condemnation and often judge ambiguous acts as immoral.
• Nine experiments using ambiguous acts support promiscuous condemnation.
• We consider cognitive and functional reasons for promiscuous condemnation.

Abstract: Do people view others as good or evil? Although people generally cooperate with others and view others' “true selves” as intrinsically good, we suggest that they are likely to assume that the actions of others are evil—at least when they are ambiguous. Nine experiments provide support for promiscuous condemnation: the general tendency to assume that ambiguous actions are immoral. Both cognitive and functional arguments support the idea of promiscuous condemnation. Cognitively, dyadic completion suggests that when the mind perceives some elements of immorality (or harm), it cannot help but perceive other elements of immorality. Functionally, assuming that ambiguous actions are immoral helps people quickly identify potential harm and provide aid to others. In the first seven experiments, participants often judged neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John pelled”) as immoral, especially when the context surrounding these nonsense actions included elements of immorality (e.g., intentionality and suffering). In the last two experiments, participants showed greater promiscuous condemnation under time pressure, suggesting an automatic tendency to assume immorality that people must effortfully control.

Keywords: Moral judgmentsSuspicionAmbiguityAltruismDual process models

---

1. Introduction

Morality often seems black and white. After all, most people agree that cheating, lying, and murder are wrong. Although this consensus suggests that judging others' actions is easy, real life is rife with ambiguous cases in which people's actions are unclear. Consider these examples:
A man walks behind a woman on a dark city street.
A girl screams in your neighbor's basement.
A teenager looks around with their hands in their pockets before leaving a store.

In each of these examples, the most likely explanation is relatively benign: A man and a woman are walking home from work and happen to live on the same block. A girl moves a box and discovers a cockroach. A surly teenager looks around for her friends. Despite these innocuous explanations, people may not be able to resist assuming something more nefarious—a nighttime predator, a kidnapping victim, or a shoplifter. Of course, these are only a few carefully selected examples, but we suggest that the human mind has a general tendency to jump to conclusions of immorality. When judging ambiguous actions—that is, actions that have unclear intents and/or outcomes—we propose that people demonstrate promiscuous condemnation and assume that these acts are immoral. Promiscuous condemnation is not only consistent with the functional and cognitive underpinnings of morality, but also provides perspective on an emerging idea that people view others as intrinsically good.

1.1. Do people view others as generally evil or good?

People have long disagreed about whether humans are generally evil or good. Advocating for “generally evil” was Thomas Hobbes, who wrote that people were intrinsically evil and that, without some absolute and authoritarian government, the life of man would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1651, pp. i. xiii. 9). In contrast, Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that people were born good and instinctively compassionate (Rousseau, 1750). Social psychology long seemed to side with Hobbes, revealing the darker side of human nature. Humans show callous obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963) and easily form into combative groups that distrust each other (Sherif, 1961). Large groups of people fail to help others in need (LatanĂ© & Darley, 1968) and even supposedly good people ignore suffering when they are in a rush (Darley & Batson, 1973). Many people willingly express prejudice toward other races and religions (e.g., Allport, 1954), which in extreme cases has devastating consequences such as genocide and slavery.
The implicit negativity in early social psychological work was so strong that “positive psychology” arose explicitly as a counterpoint (Sheldon & King, 2001). Accordingly, recent work on the moral nature of humans has arced toward Rousseau. People often endorse that the “true self” of humans is good (De Freitas, Cikara, Grossmann, & Schlegel, 2017Newman, De Freitas, & Knobe, 2015). In situations involving cooperation, people appear motivated to act prosocially, even toward non-relatives; they contribute their resources to help others and sacrifice resources to punish wrongdoers (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003Fehr & Gächter, 2000Gintis, 2003Van Vugt & Van Lange, 2006). Of course, there are questions about how well these structured economic games translate to the real world. How do we square these tightly-controlled situations with real-world tragedies, such as when George Zimmerman fatally shot Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black teenager? Although Martin was simply walking to the store to get some Skittles, Zimmerman assumed that the hoodie-wearing student was engaging in criminal activity.
The Trayvon Martin case does not stand alone. Police often stop, frisk, and attack unarmed suspects who are acting innocently. One explanation for these assumptions of evil is prejudice: white people may just assume the worst when interacting with black people, and numerous other forms of prejudice may account for other cases. However, even within their own groups, people readily suspect others of cheating or lying given minimal evidence of infidelity (Shackelford & Buss, 1997) or deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). In these ambiguous situations, a mere cue suggesting foul play may be enough to invite assumptions of immorality.
The idea of promiscuous condemnation is that people are quick to assume that others are acting immorally. This idea might seem to contradict people's altruistic actions and belief that others are intrinsically good. However, judgments of the “true self” differ from judgments of individual acts. Even if people believe that others are generally virtuous and cooperative, individual acts might still seem suspicious. Furthermore, people's generous or penny-pinching decisions in economic games need not translate to real-world examples of immorality, such as murder, fraud, and abuse. These games are unambiguous and leave little room for one's partner to cause “harm” in the common sense. When people talk about moral decay, they likely refer to the spread of crime and the corruption of children, not uncooperative decisions in anonymous economic games.
People seem to have a rosy outlook on people's deep-seated goodness; and, people generally seem to trust and cooperate with others in economic games. However, as soon as people judge an ambiguous action that might be immoral based on contextual cues, we suggest that people assume wrongdoing—that is, show promiscuous condemnation. We draw on recent research and theory in morality to consider the contextual cues that might make an ambiguous action seem immoral.

1.2. Cognitive elements of morality

Moral psychologists have long debated what basic elements constitute moral judgment and how they combine with each other (Cushman, 2013Haidt, 2012Mikhail, 2007Schein & Gray, 2018). Though different theoretical perspectives disagree on some aspects of moral cognition, the influence of certain elements on moral judgments—such as intentional action and suffering—is relatively undisputed. Intentionally killing someone is murder, whereas accidentally killing them is manslaughter and elicits less blame (Cushman, 2008Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). Attempted assault is a crime, but successful assault elicits more blame and punishment because it actually causes physical suffering (Cushman, 2008Young & Saxe, 2010).
One theory of morality--the theory of dyadic morality--posits that people rely on a harm-based cogntive template when making moral judgments across diverse domains (Schein & Gray, 2018). This template is called the "moral dyad" because it involves two interacting people, an intentional actor (i.e., agent) causing damage to a suffering target(i.e., patient). Studies suggest that the moral dyad exerts a kind of cognitive gravity, such that the hint of immorality--through the implied presence of intention and/or suffering--leads people to infer the presence of other elements of immorality. This phenomena is called "dyadic completion" because people cognitively complete an incomplete dyad, seeing evidence of suffering when presented with intentional counternormative acts. This is why people see “victimless wrongs” such as defiling a holy book or watching animals as nevertheless having victims and causing suffering (especially under time pressure (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Another example of dyadic completion includes when someone with bad intentions (e.g., a drug dealer) is assigned greater causal responsibility for crashing into someone's car and causing them to suffer (Alicke, 2000). Also consistent with this idea is when, in the wake of suffering, people look for agents to blame, often turning to powerful entities such CEOs (Knobe, 2003) or God (Gray & Wegner, 2010).
Dyadic completion suggests that promiscuous condemnation should be appear more when more of these moral elements are present. As a bystander, it should seem more likely that an action is immoral if it is directed toward someone rather than performed alone? Likewise, people should assume more immorality when an action is done intentionally versus accidentally, and when an action seems to involve suffering versus not. Conversely, when people receive clear cues suggesting otherwise (e.g., the act is clearly performed alone or accidentally), we expect people to adjust their perceptions accordingly, only rarely judging these actions as immoral.

1.3. Differentiating between immorality and negativity

Manipulating these important elements of morality—the dyad (presence of both agent and patient), the agent's intention, and the patient's suffering—serves the key purpose of differentiating promiscuous condemnation from a more general “valence effect” in which people tend to rate ambiguous actions as negative instead of positive (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). We expect large effects of these morality-specific elements on participants' judgments—effects that we would not expect if people tend to assume negativity more broadly. In particular, we expect people to mostly assume that accidental actions are not immoral in their responses, because immorality typically requires intention (Schein & Gray, 2018). Finding this effect would help differentiate between immorality and negativity as the “driving force”, as accidents can still be quite negative.
To further clarify that our effects pertain to judgments of immorality, we also include experiments that ask about the actor's positive and negative character traits. If ambiguous actions are simply seen as more negative, rather than more immoral, then these actions should have limited influence on participants' evaluations of character. However, if participants show promiscuous condemnation and assume immoral actions, then these actions should strongly influence their judgments of character, as moral character is a powerful driver of global evaluations (e.g., Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015).

1.4. The prosociality of promiscuous condemnation

At first glance, promiscuous condemnation appears to be an antisocial tendency: is it really fair to assume someone is acting immorally if he or she is parked in front of the neighbor's driveway or hanging out near the playground? In these situations, the base rate for immorality seems quite low: the strange car might just an unexpected visit from a friend, and the person at the playground might just be waiting for his wife and kids to arrive. However, showing promiscuous condemnation might actually be a prosocial tendency in these cases—not necessarily at odds with the altruistic cooperation and punishment observed in economic games (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Promiscuous condemnation prepares bystanders to quickly provide aid if needed, preserving the well-being of family members, friends, and others (Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995). Providing this aid not only protects others but also enhances one's own moral character, which is valuable for maintaining a good reputation (Brambilla & Leach, 2014Goodwin et al., 2014). Even when it is not feasible to provide help, quickly identifying immorality can make it easier to avoid guilt-by-association (Fortune & Newby-Clark, 2008Walther, 2002), also maintaining one's moral reputation.

Romantic partners who offer unique treatment are highly desired and people are willing to make significant sacrifices in partner attractiveness to receive unique treatment

One of a kind: The strong and complex preference for unique treatment from romantic partners. Lalin Anik, Ryan Hauser. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 86, January 2020, 103899. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103899

Abstract: Individuals prefer romantic partners who universally treat others well (i.e., partners who exhibit trait-level generosity) and also prefer partners who treat them uniquely. Previous work supports both preferences, yet the literature has largely ignored what happens when these preferences conflict. In the present work, we compare these two preferences in romantic relationships by pitting people's preference for trait-level generosity from their partner against their preference for unique treatment from their partner. Across 10 studies, we observe a strong, multifaceted, and somewhat selfish preference for unique treatment that often overwhelms the preference for trait-level generosity. People generally want their partner to offer them relatively better treatment than they offer to others (e.g., their partner orders a larger bouquet for their birthday than for the neighbor's birthday). However, in specific domains and situations, individuals are satisfied with receiving treatment from their partner that is the same as—or slightly worse than—the treatment their partner offers to others, so long as the treatment is unique (e.g., their partner sends everyone a text containing a special inside joke). Further, using a conjoint-analysis approach novel to studying partner selection, we find that partners who offer unique treatment are highly desired and that people are willing to make significant sacrifices in partner attractiveness to receive unique treatment. This preference also impacts how people evaluate and interact with their romantic partners and how satisfied they feel with their relationships.

---
Specifically, Studies 1A–C suggest that individuals have a strong preference for unique treatment from their romantic partner that (a) extends above and beyond their preference for unique treatment from acquaintances and even close friends, and that (b) can foster a desire for their partner to offer objectively worse treatment to other people, even when equal treatment is possible. Then, using a conjoint-analysis approach novel to studying partner selection, we find that offering unique treatment is a highly desired partner dimension and that people are willing to make significant sacrifices in other aspects of partner attractiveness to receive unique treatment (Study 2).

We then attempt to unpack the type of “unique treatment” that individuals desire from their romantic partners. In Studies 3A–C, we try to decouple the preference for being treated uniquely well (i.e., receiving relatively better treatment) from the preference for being treated like a unique individual (i.e., receiving different treatment unique to oneself that is not necessarily better). We find that both preferences are at play in romantic relationships; in fact, individuals often prefer receiving objectively worse—but unique—treatment (e.g., a less-desirable birthday message [Study 3B] or a lower-quality gift [Study 3C] over superior treatment that their partner offers universally). We then show the consequences of desiring, offering, and receiving unique treatment: these preferences and behaviors significantly affect both the way couples interact on social media (Study 4) and the relationship satisfaction of real couples (Study 5). Finally, we demonstrate that the preference for unique treatment does not persist in the negative domain (Study 6), suggesting that there are boundary conditions to this preference.

12.1. Theoretical implications

First, we contribute to the literature on mate value judgments by revealing that people have a strong preference for unique treatment from romantic partners. Specifically, we take a sparsely examined relational perspective, which contrasts existing work on mate value (i.e., the classic perspective) that has focused almost exclusively on target effects (i.e., how others generally see a given person). Instead, we examine relationship effects (i.e., how someone views another person above and beyond their target and perceiver effects). As we compare this relational perspective with the classic view, we make a clear distinction between a person who treats everyone well—including the perceiver (target effect)—and a person who displays favorable treatment toward the perceiver over and above the treatment they offer others (relationship effect).

While there is ample past work suggesting (a) that individuals prefer romantic partners who exhibit trait-level generosity (i.e., are warm, kind, and affectionate in general) and (b) that receiving unique treatment is pleasurable and plays a significant role in close relationships, uniqueness has been greatly underemphasized in work on mate value judgments. By taking a relational perspective, we show that people make important tradeoffs between trait-level generosity and unique treatment. In practical terms, this means that when forced to choose between a partner who offers favorable treatment (e.g., is kind, warm, and generous) toward everyone and a partner who offers less-favorable treatment but is more exclusive with their treatment, people often prefer the latter.

Our work also supports previous work affirming that people have a strong desire to feel unique and different (Fromkin, 1972), especially in relationships (Finkenauer, Engels, Branje, & Meeus, 2004; Miller, 1990). Moreover, the evidence presented here suggests that this desire is even stronger than previously thought. The fact that people are willing to compromise their own treatment (Studies 3B and 3C), make significant tradeoffs in other partner criteria (Study 2), and even desire worse treatment for others (Studies 1A–C) in order to feel unique serves as a testament to the strength of this preference. Moreover, we find that unique treatment is positively associated with real relationship satisfaction (Study 5). These results support previous work positing compatibility (i.e., a unique connection with another) as an essential factor for forming satisfying relationships (e.g., Carter & Buckwalter, 2009; Sprecher, 2011). Further, we add that the desire to be treated uniquely only persists in the positive domain. When receiving negative treatment from their partner, people more often prefer to receive the same treatment as others (Study 6).

We also add to the literature on partner selection. While a large body of work has looked at the personality traits that people prefer in romantic partners and mates (Buss, 1989; Buss & Barnes, 1986; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Hill, 1945; Hoyt & Hudson, 1981; Hudson & Henze, 1969; McGinnis, 1958), this field has largely ignored the quality of treating one's partner differently than one treats others. As it turns out, offering unique treatment is one of the most highly sought-after partner dimensions, on par with essential personality traits such as honesty, trustworthiness, and having values similar to those of one's potential partner (Study 2). Furthermore, we offer a new methodological approach for studying partner selection: using a conjoint analysis featuring headshots and personality descriptions to pit personality traits against physical attractiveness. Through this method, we find that people are willing to make major sacrifices in partner attractiveness in order to be with someone who treats them uniquely.

Finally, we make a significant contribution by shedding light on what “uniqueness” means in the romantic domain and clarifying what type of unique treatment people desire from romantic partners. While much work suggests that individuals want special treatment from their partners (e.g., Carter & Buckwalter, 2009; Sprecher, 2011; Tidwell et al., 2013), it is not clear whether this treatment must be relatively better than the treatment others receive or just different from the treatment others receive. Our results show that both types of treatment are relevant. While people do enjoy when their partner treats them relatively better than others, they are often satisfied with being treated like a unique individual, even if the resulting treatment is objectively worse than other, universally offered treatments.

12.2. Practical implications

The degrees to which individuals desire, offer, and receive unique treatment affect how they interact with their romantic partners and feel about their relationships. While individuals are reasonably well calibrated to others' desire for unique treatment over non-unique treatment, they are not perfect forecasters. Specifically, people seem to underestimate the degree to which unique treatment would boost their partner's reply likelihood and overestimate the emotional benefit of supplying favorable treatment that was not unique (Study 4). A mentioned, these prediction errors could foster suboptimal communication habits and confusion about a partner's behavior—especially for partners without an established history. Furthermore, since people vary in the degree to which they desire unique treatment from their romantic partner, misunderstandings and conflict may arise if an individual's preference is not known or fully appreciated by their partner. Thus, in romantic relationships it is crucial for individuals to understand their partner's preferences surrounding unique treatment (including how much they desire such treatment), think about instances in their daily life where relative treatment is salient and could affect their partner (e.g., on social media), and take time to consider their own treatment preferences. If partners discuss these preferences and feelings openly, they can work to find compromises in their expectations of each other's behavior, and likely have healthier, more satisfying relationships as a result.

“Take care, honey!”: People are more anxious about their significant others' risk behavior than about their own

“Take care, honey!”: People are more anxious about their significant others' risk behavior than about their own. Mirjam Ghassemi, Katharina Bernecker, Veronika Brandstätter. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 86, January 2020, 103879. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103879

Abstract: This research investigated people's affective reaction to and cognitive evaluation of risks taken by close others. Five experimental studies showed that individuals were more anxious when a significant other (e.g., their partner) intended to engage in behavior implying risk to health or safety than when they intended to engage in the same behavior themselves. This discrepancy did not emerge if the other was emotionally distant (e.g., an acquaintance), suggesting that the self-other discrepancy in anxiety is moderated by the quality of the relationship. Neither a perceived higher personal control, nor a perceived lower probability of encountering negative events, as suggested by research on self-other biases in risk assessment, accounted for the effect. However, it was partially mediated by individuals' tendency to imagine more severe consequences of others' (vs. own) risk behavior. Results are discussed with regard to their theoretical implications for the study of risk taking and close relationships.


7. General discussion

This series of studies points to the existence of a self-other discrepancy
in people's affective reaction to risk that has received little
attention to date. In five experimental studies involving hypothetical
risks, and in an event-sampling study in the field involving actual risk,
individuals reported more anxiety in response to a behavior implying
risk to health or safety when it was intended by a close other than when
it was intended by themselves. This discrepancy seems to be specific for
close relationships: Across studies, individuals expressed increased anxiety
about the risk behavior of a significant other (like the partner, a
family member, or close friend), but not the risk behavior of a distant
other (like an acquaintance). This result emerged equally for men and
women, speaking to the generalizability of the effect.
We tested several variables in their potential to account for the effect.
Neither self-other discrepancies in the perceived probability of
experiencing aversive consequences of risk, nor self-other discrepancies
in the capacity to exert control reliably mediated the effect. In fact,
there was only relatively weak evidence for self-other biases in risk
assessment in our studies. Already previous studies have pointed out
that the emergence of biases such as unrealistic comparative optimism
is tied to specific circumstances, for instance, that participants think of
a non-specified compared to a specified other, or that studies use a
particular type of answer scale (Lermer, Streicher, Sachs, & Frey, 2013).
Our studies methodologically deviated from studies on unrealistic
comparative optimism in an important way. Whereas these studies typically
ask participants to rate their probability of experiencing an
event relative to the probability of the average person of their gender
and age (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001; Shepperd et al., 2013), our
participants either rated their own or another person's risk. Our findings
were highly consistent with those reported by Klein and Ferrer (2018),
who did not find self-other discrepancies in deliberate, but in affective
and experiential perceptions of risk.
In two studies, we assessed participants' deliberate perceptions of
the severity of consequences of engaging in risk, and did not find discrepancies
in appraisals made for self and others. However, when
asking participants to think of three consequences that might result
from taking the risk, participants stated less severe consequences for
their own (vs. others') risk taking. This difference partly explained their
increased anxiety about their significant other's risk taking. To note,
that individuals also thought of more severe consequences of a nonsignificant
other's than their own risk taking suggests that additional
factors need to be involved in explaining a discrepancy in anxiety that
emerges specifically between self and close others. A likely candidate
for this is the personal relevance of the others' outcomes, which varies
with closeness of the relationship. Thus, we assume the discrepancy in
anxiety to be driven by two factors: That more severe outcomes come to
mind for others' (vs. own) risk taking, and that these outcomes are affectively
relevant.
How can the difference in results based on the way that severity of
consequences was measured be explained? It seems that when being
asked to think deliberately about the likelihood and severity of consequences,
people evaluate risk similarly for self and others. However,
when being asked to freely list three potential consequences, the ones
that come to mind when thinking about others' (vs. own) risk taking are
more severe. This might suggest that the ease of retrieving severe
consequences differs. This discrepancy between deliberate judgments
and intuitive responses reminds us of previous work pointing out that
risk can be apprehended in two different ways, one analytical and one
experiental (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004).
Notably, it is possible that thoughts of more severe consequences of
others' (vs. own) risk taking are a consequence, rather than a predictor
of higher anxiety; future studies need to clarify causality (Fiedler,
Harris, & Schott, 2018). What follows is the question why individuals
think of more aversive consequences for others' risk taking than for
their own. Though speculative at this point, one reason might be a
systematic difference in perspective; studies suggest that visualizing
action from a first-person perspective emphasizes agency and control to
a stronger extent than visualizing it from a third-person perspective
(Kokkinara, Kilteni, Blom, & Slater, 2016). Another reason might be
that participants are more aware of the benefits associated with their
own (vs. others') risk taking, and the resulting feeling of positivity
might interfere with thoughts of aversive consequences. Indeed, research
shows that people like to conclude that an action is not risky
when it seems beneficial to them, as they use their feeling of “goodness”
or “badness” as a heuristic for their judgment of risk (Finucane,
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic et al., 2004). Both explanations
point to implicit, automatic processes, which are unlikely to
be accessible via participants' deliberate evaluations of risk.

7.1. Strengths, limitations, and future directions

A strength of these studies is their experimental design, precluding
that the hypothesized effect is based on individual differences (e.g., risk
taking propensity). A further strength concerns the fact that we verified
the effect across a range of health and safety risks. In future research, it
would be interesting to investigate affective reactions to other kinds of
risks. We do not expect that a discrepancy in affective reactions
emerges in response to all kinds of risks (e.g., social, financial), but this
is a question that needs to be answered empirically. Such investigations
would not only provide evidence on the scope of the effect, but would
also provide insight into its cause of occurrence.
Limitations of our studies are the use of single-item measures, the
reliance on non-representative samples with an over-proportion of
women, and the assessment of anxiety by means of self-report. Affective
states are highly subjective, pointing to the validity and relevance of
studying individuals' experience. However, this form of assessment can
be prone to bias, for instance, when individuals change their answer to
be consistent with societal norms or their ideal self (Van de Mortel,
2008). We tried to minimize these biases by controlling for trait social
desirability, which we did not find to have an effect, and by using between-
subjects designs, avoiding direct comparisons between self and
others. Nevertheless, future studies should complement self-reports by
physiological assessments or observer ratings of anxiety.
An endeavor for future research will be to investigate the implications
of the effect for close relationships. Our studies show that, as a
result of increased anxiety, individuals think that their significant other
should engage in the same risk less than they should themselves.
Starting from this, it would be worth investigating if and how the discrepancy
in anxiety influences the way dyads communicate in the
prospect of risk. When intending a behavior that contains risk, it might
often be the partner, parent, or best friend that expresses worry, or even
tries to convince the individual not to take the risk. Worry communicated
by a significant other may alert a person to existing threats
(Parkinson, Phiri, & Simons, 2012; Parkinson & Simons, 2012; Van
Kleef, 2009). Beyond a situational appraisal inherent in an affective
display, relational information is conveyed that might motivate the
acting person to behave with caution out of a sense of responsibility
(Parkinson & Simons, 2012). In this way, the effect might have a protective
function for close relationships. However, if the “worrier” later
intends to engage in risk him or herself, these differing standards may
likewise become a source of conflict.
Differing standards, or more specifically, people giving (good) advice
to others that they fail to live up to themselves, has been researched
under the term action hypocrisy (Howell, Sweeny, &
Shepperd, 2014). While the here studied effect might evoke interpersonal
behavior that looks like action hypocrisy, we assume the underlying
processes to differ. Action hypocrisy denotes a discrepancy
between advice giving and action in a context where action is a desirable
response. It results from varying psychological distance to own and
others' actions, and accordingly, the decision problem being construed
on different levels of abstraction. Due to higher psychological distance
to others' versus own actions, recommendations to others are to a
higher degree based on idealistic concerns (salient at a high-level
construal), while personal decisions are to a higher degree based on
pragmatic considerations (salient at a low-level construal). Two
predictions can be derived from this: First, intentions for distant (i.e.,
future vs. present) personal actions should, due to higher psychological
distance, be more similar to recommendations made to others. Second,
recommendations to close others should be more similar to personal
decisions than recommendations to distant others (Howell et al., 2014).
The second prediction stands in contrast to the here reported findings
that speak to a discrepancy between self and close, but not distant
others. Thus, different psychological processes seem to yield in the
observation that people's recommendations do not match their own
actions.
An applied context in which a gap between recommendations and
personal decisions as a result of differing levels in anxiety might be
particularly relevant to study is that of medical decision making. When
faced with an important medical decision, individuals typically turn to
their partner or close family members for consultation. Despite the
important role that companions play in health decisions, only few
studies have examined decision patterns made by patient-companionphysician
triads (Clayman & Morris, 2013; Laidsaar-Powell et al.,
2013). Based on our findings, it could be expected that companions
systematically favor less risky treatments (e.g., in terms of mortality
rate) than patients themselves (for a similar finding with physicians, see
Ubel, Angott, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2011).
To sum, this research adds an interpersonal perspective to the study
of risk that may contribute to our understanding of how people deal
with and affectively respond to risk. Further research is needed for a
complete understanding of the proccesses underlying the described
discrepancy in affective reaction towards own and close others' risk.
Based on the present findings, we suspect that people experiencing risk
differently for close others than for themselves may have implications
for the dynamics in close relationships.