The Empirical Status of the Preparation Hypothesis: Explicating Women’s Genital Responses to Sexual Stimuli in the Laboratory. Martin L. Lalumière, Megan L. Sawatsky, Samantha J. Dawson & Kelly D. Suschinsky. Archives of Sexual Behavior, February 5 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-019-01599-5
Abstract: Research conducted in our laboratory and in other laboratories has revealed that (1) women’s genital responses to visual and auditory stimuli are strongly affected by the presence of sexual cues, but that (2) specific sexual cues (e.g., gender of actors, the presence of sexual violence) often have little impact on the magnitude of the responses—that is, similar genital responses are observed to very different sexual stimuli. In addition, (3) women’s genital responses do not strongly correspond with self-reported sexual partner and activity preferences, or (4) with self-reported sexual arousal during the presentation of sexual stimuli. Taken together, these facts represent a puzzle, especially considering that men’s genital responses are highly affected by specific sexual cues and strongly correspond to stated preferences and self-reported sexual arousal. One hypothesis to explain female low cue-specificity and low concordance (relative to men) is the preparation hypothesis: Women’s indiscriminate genital responses serve a protective function. That is, they do not indicate or necessarily promote sexual interest and motivation, but rather prepare the vaginal lumen for possible sexual activity and therefore prevent injuries that may occur as a result of penetration. We review evidence for and against this hypothesis. We conclude that the evidence is favorable but not entirely convincing, and more work is required to reach a firm conclusion. We offer directions for future research.
Thursday, February 6, 2020
Sexual Chemosignals: Evidence that Men Process Olfactory Signals of Women’s Sexual Arousal
Sexual Chemosignals: Evidence that Men Process Olfactory Signals of Women’s Sexual Arousal. Arnaud Wisman & Ilan Shrira. Archives of Sexual Behavior, February 5 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-019-01588-8
Abstract: Research suggests that humans can communicate emotional states (e.g., fear, sadness) via chemosignals. However, thus far little is known about whether sexual arousal can also be conveyed through chemosignals and how these signals might influence the receiver. In three experiments, and a subsequent mini meta-analysis, support was found for the hypothesis that men can process the scent of sexually aroused women and that exposure to these sexual chemosignals affect the subsequent perceptions and sexual motivation of men. Specifically, Experiment 1 revealed that men evaluate the axillary sweat of sexually aroused women as more attractive, compared to the scent of the same women when not sexually aroused. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that exposure to sexual chemosignals increased the men’s sexual arousal. Experiment 3 found support for the thesis that exposure to sexual chemosignals would increase sexual motivation. As predicted, men devoted greater attention to and showed greater interest in mating with women who displayed sexual cues (e.g., scantily dressed, in seductive poses). By contrast, exposure to the sexual chemosignals did not alter males’ attention and mating interest toward women who displayed no sexual cues. It is discussed how sexual chemosignals may function as an additional channel in the communication of sexual interest and how contextual factors can influence the dynamics of human sexual communication.
Abstract: Research suggests that humans can communicate emotional states (e.g., fear, sadness) via chemosignals. However, thus far little is known about whether sexual arousal can also be conveyed through chemosignals and how these signals might influence the receiver. In three experiments, and a subsequent mini meta-analysis, support was found for the hypothesis that men can process the scent of sexually aroused women and that exposure to these sexual chemosignals affect the subsequent perceptions and sexual motivation of men. Specifically, Experiment 1 revealed that men evaluate the axillary sweat of sexually aroused women as more attractive, compared to the scent of the same women when not sexually aroused. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that exposure to sexual chemosignals increased the men’s sexual arousal. Experiment 3 found support for the thesis that exposure to sexual chemosignals would increase sexual motivation. As predicted, men devoted greater attention to and showed greater interest in mating with women who displayed sexual cues (e.g., scantily dressed, in seductive poses). By contrast, exposure to the sexual chemosignals did not alter males’ attention and mating interest toward women who displayed no sexual cues. It is discussed how sexual chemosignals may function as an additional channel in the communication of sexual interest and how contextual factors can influence the dynamics of human sexual communication.
General Discussion
The
present studies provide support for the hypothesis that men are
sensitive to olfactory signals of sexual arousal released by women.
Overall, Experiments 1–3 and a subsequent mini meta-analysis found that
men evaluated the scent of sexually aroused women as relatively more
attractive. Experiment 2 showed that these sexual chemosignals increased
men’s self-reported sexual arousal. Finally, Experiment 3 found support
for the hypothesis that the sexual chemosignals increased men’s
attention to and interest in women who displayed sexual cues.
Specifically, men spent relatively more time looking at women who
displayed sexual cues, and were more motivated to mate with them. Taken
together, the current findings are among the first to show that that
women’s sexual arousal led to the release of a distinctive scent that
increases men’s sexual motivation.
These findings are consistent with numerous studies, showing that emotional states (e.g., fear, disgust, sadness) produce olfactory signals that orient nearby recipients to the immediate environment and sensitize them to emotionally consistent cues (de Groot et al., 2012; Gelstein et al., 2011; Pause, 2012; Zhou & Chen, 2008). Sexual arousal in particular is both socially and fitness-relevant states, and there are clear interpersonal benefits to its communication for both the sender and the recipient, such as the signaling and detection of mating opportunities, as well as synchronizing mating behavior between partners (Schaller, Park, & Kenrick, 2007). The current research expands on the existing literature by showing that olfactory messages may serve as an additional channel of communication between humans, and in relevant mating contexts, sexual chemosignals may be released along with corresponding visual and auditory expressions of sexual interest to produce a stronger overall signal.
Interestingly, recent research by Hoffmann (2019) also found support for the thesis that men can process the scent of sexually aroused women. Specifically, men were exposed to axillary sweat (collected from women who were sexually aroused vs. not aroused) while the men listened to erotic stories, and the findings showed that the sexual scents elicited greater genital arousal in the men. However, this effect was only detected in response to female scents collected during the luteal phase of their cycle, but not their follicular phase. In contrast to the current studies, Hoffmann (2019) did not find an effect of female scent on men’s self-reported sexual arousal and sexual interest. Those results may have diverged from the findings reported here because of several procedural differences between the two research paradigms. Notably, in our experiments, the scent samples were collected and presented to recipients under different conditions. For instance, the female scent donors in our studies briefly exercised at the start of the experiment to create a similar base rate of physiological arousal in both conditions, in order to control for physiological arousal that is also elevated during sexual arousal. Additionally, in Experiments 2 and 3, men’s sexual arousal was assessed after exposing them to a block of multiple scent samples from either scent condition, rather than each time after exposure to one scent sample. Finally, the current experiments did not present male recipients with any additional sexual stimuli (i.e., an erotic story) in conjunction with the chemosensory primes (Hoffmann, 2019). Whether or not any of these factors contributed to the different findings is an important empirical question that deserves future investigation.
Most studies have examined emotional chemosignals secreted by the axillary regions because they are dense with apocrine glands that produce sweat in response to activation of the sympathetic nervous system (de Groot, Semin, & Smeets, 2014). However, apart from perspiration, there are other volatile body fluids (e.g., urine, sperm, lacrimal fluid) that likely play roles in olfactory signaling (Pause, 2012). For instance, research has shown that exposure to scents from the vulvar area (collected during the periovulatory phase) can increase testosterone secretion and sexual interest in men (Cerda-Molina et al., 2013). In light of the current findings, it would therefore be worth testing whether women’s sexual arousal level moderates men’s responses to scents from the vulvar area.
Additionally, it would be interesting to examine the influence of the context in which men are exposed to female scents. For example, as mentioned earlier, some research paradigms have primed a sexual context when exposing recipients to the scent stimuli (Alves-Oliveira et al., 2018; Hoffmann, 2019). That is, male scent recipients listened to an erotic story or watched audiovisual stimuli (Alves-Oliveira et al., 2018) during exposure to the scents, before measuring the men’s sexual arousal. Thus, men’s reactions to the sexual scents in these studies were always a product of both the olfactory and audiovisual stimuli. In contrast, our experiments showed that the olfactory stimuli alone can elicit a sexual response in recipients, in the absence of a conceptually similar prime in a different sensory modality. Although our findings highlight that sexual chemosignals alone can prime male sexual motivation, it is unclear whether additional sexual priming via different sensory modalities can elicit stronger sexual responses in men. Thus, future research may wish to further investigate the role of priming multiple sensory modalities on how recipients are influenced by sexual chemosignals.
The current research is not without limitations. Although the indices of sexual arousal and sexual motivation used in Experiments 2 and 3 established that men respond to female chemosignals, future work would do well to examine a wider range of measurements of subjective and physiological sexual arousal (e.g., Ciardha, Attard-Johnson, & Bindemann, 2018; Janssen, Prause, & Geer, 2007; Kukkonen, Binik, Amsel, & Carrier, 2007; Laws, 2009; McPhail et al., 2019). In addition, while our studies did not take the donors’ menstrual cycle into account, the recent findings of Hoffmann (2019) highlight that there is scope to further investigate the interaction between menstrual cycle phase and women’s axillary chemosignals, and the influence of these signals on male sexual arousal (see Hoffmann, 2019, for a full discussion of the results). Additionally, future research in chemosignal research would benefit from considering procedural differences in order to understand which factors tend to enhance and mitigate the effects of sexual chemosignals on recipients (Pause, 2012). Moreover, it is perhaps worth considering how sexual arousal chemosignals interact with individual factors we did not specifically examine, such as testosterone levels (Gangestad, Thornhill, & Garver-Apgar, 2010; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999), or individual differences in disgust sensitivity (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Stevenson, Case, & Oaten, 2011). Finally, future work could include a wider range of measures to monitor the emotions of the scent donors and the scent recipients during the experiment (de Groot et al., 2015b; Mitchell, DiBartolo, Brown, & Barlow, 1998).
Consistent with the growing evidence that emotional states can be communicated through scent, our findings provide evidence that humans can signal and process olfactory signals of sexual arousal. Importantly, the results showed that perceiving these sexual chemosignals alters the scent receiver’s sexual arousal and their interest and preference for potential mates. Informed by the present findings, we can envision a dynamic exchange of olfactory signals that, combined with corresponding visual and auditory expressions, are communicated between men and women during mating encounters. These encounters may thus entail more than meets the eye and we hope that the current findings encourage further research to examine the role of sexual olfactory signals in human communication.
These findings are consistent with numerous studies, showing that emotional states (e.g., fear, disgust, sadness) produce olfactory signals that orient nearby recipients to the immediate environment and sensitize them to emotionally consistent cues (de Groot et al., 2012; Gelstein et al., 2011; Pause, 2012; Zhou & Chen, 2008). Sexual arousal in particular is both socially and fitness-relevant states, and there are clear interpersonal benefits to its communication for both the sender and the recipient, such as the signaling and detection of mating opportunities, as well as synchronizing mating behavior between partners (Schaller, Park, & Kenrick, 2007). The current research expands on the existing literature by showing that olfactory messages may serve as an additional channel of communication between humans, and in relevant mating contexts, sexual chemosignals may be released along with corresponding visual and auditory expressions of sexual interest to produce a stronger overall signal.
Interestingly, recent research by Hoffmann (2019) also found support for the thesis that men can process the scent of sexually aroused women. Specifically, men were exposed to axillary sweat (collected from women who were sexually aroused vs. not aroused) while the men listened to erotic stories, and the findings showed that the sexual scents elicited greater genital arousal in the men. However, this effect was only detected in response to female scents collected during the luteal phase of their cycle, but not their follicular phase. In contrast to the current studies, Hoffmann (2019) did not find an effect of female scent on men’s self-reported sexual arousal and sexual interest. Those results may have diverged from the findings reported here because of several procedural differences between the two research paradigms. Notably, in our experiments, the scent samples were collected and presented to recipients under different conditions. For instance, the female scent donors in our studies briefly exercised at the start of the experiment to create a similar base rate of physiological arousal in both conditions, in order to control for physiological arousal that is also elevated during sexual arousal. Additionally, in Experiments 2 and 3, men’s sexual arousal was assessed after exposing them to a block of multiple scent samples from either scent condition, rather than each time after exposure to one scent sample. Finally, the current experiments did not present male recipients with any additional sexual stimuli (i.e., an erotic story) in conjunction with the chemosensory primes (Hoffmann, 2019). Whether or not any of these factors contributed to the different findings is an important empirical question that deserves future investigation.
Most studies have examined emotional chemosignals secreted by the axillary regions because they are dense with apocrine glands that produce sweat in response to activation of the sympathetic nervous system (de Groot, Semin, & Smeets, 2014). However, apart from perspiration, there are other volatile body fluids (e.g., urine, sperm, lacrimal fluid) that likely play roles in olfactory signaling (Pause, 2012). For instance, research has shown that exposure to scents from the vulvar area (collected during the periovulatory phase) can increase testosterone secretion and sexual interest in men (Cerda-Molina et al., 2013). In light of the current findings, it would therefore be worth testing whether women’s sexual arousal level moderates men’s responses to scents from the vulvar area.
Additionally, it would be interesting to examine the influence of the context in which men are exposed to female scents. For example, as mentioned earlier, some research paradigms have primed a sexual context when exposing recipients to the scent stimuli (Alves-Oliveira et al., 2018; Hoffmann, 2019). That is, male scent recipients listened to an erotic story or watched audiovisual stimuli (Alves-Oliveira et al., 2018) during exposure to the scents, before measuring the men’s sexual arousal. Thus, men’s reactions to the sexual scents in these studies were always a product of both the olfactory and audiovisual stimuli. In contrast, our experiments showed that the olfactory stimuli alone can elicit a sexual response in recipients, in the absence of a conceptually similar prime in a different sensory modality. Although our findings highlight that sexual chemosignals alone can prime male sexual motivation, it is unclear whether additional sexual priming via different sensory modalities can elicit stronger sexual responses in men. Thus, future research may wish to further investigate the role of priming multiple sensory modalities on how recipients are influenced by sexual chemosignals.
The current research is not without limitations. Although the indices of sexual arousal and sexual motivation used in Experiments 2 and 3 established that men respond to female chemosignals, future work would do well to examine a wider range of measurements of subjective and physiological sexual arousal (e.g., Ciardha, Attard-Johnson, & Bindemann, 2018; Janssen, Prause, & Geer, 2007; Kukkonen, Binik, Amsel, & Carrier, 2007; Laws, 2009; McPhail et al., 2019). In addition, while our studies did not take the donors’ menstrual cycle into account, the recent findings of Hoffmann (2019) highlight that there is scope to further investigate the interaction between menstrual cycle phase and women’s axillary chemosignals, and the influence of these signals on male sexual arousal (see Hoffmann, 2019, for a full discussion of the results). Additionally, future research in chemosignal research would benefit from considering procedural differences in order to understand which factors tend to enhance and mitigate the effects of sexual chemosignals on recipients (Pause, 2012). Moreover, it is perhaps worth considering how sexual arousal chemosignals interact with individual factors we did not specifically examine, such as testosterone levels (Gangestad, Thornhill, & Garver-Apgar, 2010; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999), or individual differences in disgust sensitivity (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Stevenson, Case, & Oaten, 2011). Finally, future work could include a wider range of measures to monitor the emotions of the scent donors and the scent recipients during the experiment (de Groot et al., 2015b; Mitchell, DiBartolo, Brown, & Barlow, 1998).
Consistent with the growing evidence that emotional states can be communicated through scent, our findings provide evidence that humans can signal and process olfactory signals of sexual arousal. Importantly, the results showed that perceiving these sexual chemosignals alters the scent receiver’s sexual arousal and their interest and preference for potential mates. Informed by the present findings, we can envision a dynamic exchange of olfactory signals that, combined with corresponding visual and auditory expressions, are communicated between men and women during mating encounters. These encounters may thus entail more than meets the eye and we hope that the current findings encourage further research to examine the role of sexual olfactory signals in human communication.
Wednesday, February 5, 2020
Investigating Google's suicide-prevention efforts in celebrity suicides: Celebrities who die by suicide can elicit relatively strong copycat effects, but Google never displayed preventive information in celebrity-suicide-related searches
Investigating Google's suicide-prevention efforts in celebrity suicides using agent-based testing: A cross-national study in four European countries. Florian Arendt, Mario Haim, Sebastian Scherr. Social Science & Medicine, February 5 2020, 112692. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.112692
Highlights
• Celebrities who die by suicide can elicit relatively strong copycat effects.
• Internet search engines may play an increasingly important role for suicide prevention.
• Google's suicide-prevention result (SPR) presents preventive information.
• Yet Google never displayed SPRs in celebrity-suicide-related searches.
• Higher SPR display rates may contribute to saving the lives of vulnerable users.
Abstract
Rationale Google can act as a “gatekeeper” for individuals who seek suicide-related information online (e.g., “how to kill oneself”). The search engine displays a “suicide-prevention result” (SPR) at the very top of some suicide-related search results. This SPR comes as an info box and contains supposedly helpful crisis help information such as references to a telephone counseling service.
Objective It remains unknown, however, how Google has implemented the SPR in the especially dangerous context of celebrity suicide for which imitational copycat suicides in vulnerable individuals are most likely.
Method Relying on agent-based testing, a computational social science method, we emulated a total of 137,937 Google searches in April 2019, using both general suicide-related and specific celebrity suicide-related search terms. Given the recently discovered language-based differences in SPR display rates, we held the language constant and focused on German-speaking populations in four European countries.
Results The SPR was never shown in searches for celebrities who died by suicide in all four countries. Furthermore, analyses indicated a digital divide in access to suicide-prevention information with moderately high SPR display rates in Germany and Switzerland, yet with no display in Austria and Belgium.
Conclusion Higher SPR display rates could support global suicide-prevention efforts at virtually no cost by providing preventive information to vulnerable users precisely at the moment when it is apparently needed.
Highlights
• Celebrities who die by suicide can elicit relatively strong copycat effects.
• Internet search engines may play an increasingly important role for suicide prevention.
• Google's suicide-prevention result (SPR) presents preventive information.
• Yet Google never displayed SPRs in celebrity-suicide-related searches.
• Higher SPR display rates may contribute to saving the lives of vulnerable users.
Abstract
Rationale Google can act as a “gatekeeper” for individuals who seek suicide-related information online (e.g., “how to kill oneself”). The search engine displays a “suicide-prevention result” (SPR) at the very top of some suicide-related search results. This SPR comes as an info box and contains supposedly helpful crisis help information such as references to a telephone counseling service.
Objective It remains unknown, however, how Google has implemented the SPR in the especially dangerous context of celebrity suicide for which imitational copycat suicides in vulnerable individuals are most likely.
Method Relying on agent-based testing, a computational social science method, we emulated a total of 137,937 Google searches in April 2019, using both general suicide-related and specific celebrity suicide-related search terms. Given the recently discovered language-based differences in SPR display rates, we held the language constant and focused on German-speaking populations in four European countries.
Results The SPR was never shown in searches for celebrities who died by suicide in all four countries. Furthermore, analyses indicated a digital divide in access to suicide-prevention information with moderately high SPR display rates in Germany and Switzerland, yet with no display in Austria and Belgium.
Conclusion Higher SPR display rates could support global suicide-prevention efforts at virtually no cost by providing preventive information to vulnerable users precisely at the moment when it is apparently needed.
Dissatisfaction with breast size affects 70.7 % of women sampled: linked to greater Neuroticism, lower Conscientiousness, lower Western media exposure, greater local media exposure, lower financial security, & younger age
The Breast Size Satisfaction Survey (BSSS): Breast size dissatisfaction and its antecedents and outcomes in women from 40 nations. Viren Swami et al. Body Image, Volume 32, March 2020, Pages 199-217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bodyim.2020.01.006
Highlights
• Majority of women sampled (70.7 %) were dissatisfied with their breast size.
• A number of significant antecedents and outcomes of breast size dissatisfaction were identified.
• Relationships with antecedents and outcomes were stable across 40 nations.
Abstract: The Breast Size Satisfaction Survey (BSSS) was established to assess women’s breast size dissatisfaction and breasted experiences from a cross-national perspective. A total of 18,541 women were recruited from 61 research sites across 40 nations and completed measures of current-ideal breast size discrepancy, as well as measures of theorised antecedents (personality, Western and local media exposure, and proxies of socioeconomic status) and outcomes (weight and appearance dissatisfaction, breast awareness, and psychological well-being). In the total dataset, 47.5 % of women wanted larger breasts than they currently had, 23.2 % wanted smaller breasts, and 29.3 % were satisfied with their current breast size. There were significant cross-national differences in mean ideal breast size and absolute breast size dissatisfaction, but effect sizes were small (η2 = .02–.03). The results of multilevel modelling showed that greater Neuroticism, lower Conscientiousness, lower Western media exposure, greater local media exposure, lower financial security, and younger age were associated with greater breast size dissatisfaction across nations. In addition, greater absolute breast size dissatisfaction was associated with greater weight and appearance dissatisfaction, poorer breast awareness, and poorer psychological well-being across nations. These results indicate that breast size dissatisfaction is a global public health concern linked to women’s psychological and physical well-being.
4. Discussion
Women’s breasts – particularly breast size – play an important role in shaping body and appearance anxieties (e.g., Lee, 1997; Millsted & Frith, 2003; Swami, Cavelti et al., 2015),
yet comparatively little research has considered these issues from a
cross-national perspective. Even less research has examined antecedents
and outcomes of breast size dissatisfaction across nations, which is
important because it is unclear to what extent women’s breasted
experiences in WEIRD nations can be generalised to women in other
cultural and national contexts. The BSSS was set up to address these
gaps in the literature: through analyses of our data from 18,541 women
in 40 nations, we are able to draw a number of important conclusions
about cross-national differences and similarities in breast size ideals
and dissatisfaction, as well as antecedents and outcomes of breast size
dissatisfaction in diverse national contexts. Below, we provide a
summary of the main findings of the BSSS before considering implications
of our work.
4.1. Breast size ideals and dissatisfaction across nations
The
BSSS dataset suggests that breast size ideals were relatively
homogeneous across nations. Although there was a significant
cross-national difference in ideal breast size, the effect size of the
difference was small and suggestive of only minor cross-national
variation. In fact, ideal breast size ratings were relatively
homogeneous, with mean values falling between figures 6 through 8 in the
BSRS. This is consistent with the suggestion that, despite historical
differences across nations, breast size ideals have become largely
homogenous in nations sampled in the BSSS. Just as there now appears to
be a near-global idealisation of thinness in sites of high socioeconomic
status (Swami, 2015; Swami, Frederick et al., 2010),
the BSSS data indicate a similar homogenisation of breast size ideals
in women. This finding is important because it suggests that the
objectification of medium-to-large breasts is now a global phenomenon,
including in parts of the world that may have historically de-emphasised
breast aesthetics (Miller, 2003, 2006).
It should also be noted that, partially consistent with our hypothesis,
greater rurality (but not financial security) was associated with the
idealisation of larger breasts, although effect sizes were weak and
likely a reflection of sampling issues – a concern we return to below.
Importantly,
mean ideal breast size ratings were higher than mean current breast
size ratings in the vast majority that we sampled, although the
magnitude of the difference varied. In the total dataset, just under a
majority of women (i.e., 47.5 %) that were sampled indicated a
preference for larger breasts than they currently had, while just under a
quarter (i.e., 23.2 %) desired smaller breasts and under a third (i.e.,
29.3 %) reported no discrepancy between their ideal and current breast
sizes. This is consistent with existing research in WEIRD nations
suggesting that a majority (Swami, Cavelti et al., 2015) or close to a majority of women (Lombardo et al., 2019; Swami & Furnham, 2018)
wanted larger breasts than they currently had. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that there was some cross-national variation in (absolute)
breast size dissatisfaction ratings, with a small effect size. Of note,
larger breast size dissatisfaction in some nations (particularly the
United Kingdom, Egypt, China, Japan, and Brazil) appeared to be
primarily driven by smaller current breast size; that is, while ideal
breast size was largely homogeneous across nations, greater breast size
dissatisfaction was found in nations where women reported smaller mean
current breast sizes.
4.2. Antecedents of breast size dissatisfaction
4.2.1. Socioeconomic status
In
the BSSS, we also examined a number of potential antecedents of breast
size dissatisfaction, but our results were inconsistent with our
hypotheses. That is, we hypothesised that greater financial security and
urbanicity (i.e., proxies for higher socioeconomic status),
respectively, would be associated with greater breast size
dissatisfaction. However, our results suggested that urbanicity was not
significantly associated with breast size dissatisfaction (except in
women who desired larger breasts than they currently had), whereas lower
rather than higher financial security was associated with greater
breast size dissatisfaction. One possibility here is that, unlike body
dissatisfaction (Swami, Frederick et al., 2010),
increasing financial security affords women greater opportunities to
negotiate breasted experiences by, for instance, de-emphasising the
importance of breast size, de-coupling the breasts from an aesthetic
gaze, or (re-)defining breast size ideals in a manner that is healthier
in terms of one’s body image. Conversely, the pressure to view the
breasts in purely aesthetic terms or to internalise a male gaze of
breasts as providers of gratification for men may be heightened for
women who are less financially secure, precisely because their financial
insecurity affords fewer opportunities to negotiate breasted
experiences. That is, among financially insecure women, there may be
greater pressure to treat the breasts as assets that play performative
roles, such as in terms of attracting potential partners or to attain
material benefits (see Edmonds, 2010).
Of
course, it should be noted that the weak relationships between proxies
of socioeconomic status and breast size dissatisfaction likely reflect
the fact that participants in the BSSS were all recruited from largely
urbanised sites. That is, we did not include samples from explicitly
rural research sites, which means there was limited within-nation
variation in actual socioeconomic status to warrant a fuller test of our
hypotheses. It may also reflect the fact that both urbanicity and
perceived financial security are imprecise indices of socioeconomic
status (Braveman et al., 2005).
The most direct way of examining this issue in further research would
be to sample participants from the same nation but from sites varying in
socioeconomic status (e.g., Swami & Tovée, 2005b, 2005b). Although such studies have previously examined breast size ideals within a single nation (Swami & Tovée, 2013a),
it is noteworthy that no previous study has extended this to include
examinations of breast size dissatisfaction. Doing so would provide a
fuller understanding of the relationships between socioeconomic status
and breast size dissatisfaction and also help clarify some of our
explanations above.
4.2.2. Personality
Consistent
with our hypothesis, we found that higher Neuroticism was significantly
associated with greater breast size dissatisfaction. This corroborates
previous work indicating that Neuroticism is associated with more
negative body image generally (for a review, see Allen & Walter, 2016)
and may reflect the fact that individuals who score highly on this
trait are more likely to experience negative emotional states and become
dissatisfied more easily. In addition, individuals who score highly on
Neuroticism may also be more sensitive to appearance evaluation and
rejection, which heightens breast size dissatisfaction. There is also
some evidence that women scoring higher on Neuroticism are more likely
to misperceive their body size as larger than they actually are (Hartmann & Siegrist, 2015; Sutin & Terracciano, 2016), and it might be suggested that these individuals are also more likely to misperceive their current breast size.
Beyond
Neuroticism, our results also indicated that lower Conscientiousness
was significantly associated with greater breast size dissatisfaction.
Although this result was unexpected, one recent review concluded that
there was a negative relationship between Conscientiousness and negative
body image, but only in studies classified as having low risk of bias (Allen & Walter, 2016; see also Allen, Vella, Swann, & Laborde, 2018).
Examining associations between facets of Conscientiousness and breast
size dissatisfaction may help scholars to better understand this
relationship. For example, there is evidence that lower scores on some
Conscientiousness facets – primarily low self-control (i.e., greater
impulsivity, spontaneity, and carelessness) – are associated with
greater body preoccupation (Ellickson-Larew, Naragon-Larew, & Watson, 2013). Facet-level analyses may also be useful in terms of other personality dimensions (Roberts & Good, 2010), as it may help to more accurately determine personality traits that shape breast size dissatisfaction.
4.2.3. Media exposure
In
contrast to our hypothesis, we found that exposure to Western media was
negatively, rather than positively, associated with greater breast size
dissatisfaction. This finding stands in marked contrast to the extant
literature indicating that exposure to Western media is associated with
more negative body image (e.g., Swami, Frederick et al., 2010; Swami, Mada, & Tovée, 2012).
Interpreting the present finding is complicated by the fact that we
were working with the total BSSS dataset, which may obscure the meaning,
importance, and impact of Western media in specific national and
cultural contexts (Anderson-Fye, 2004; Becker, 2004; Swami, 2020). It should also be noted that these analyses are limited by the focus on media exposure per se,
rather than perceived pressure from, and the internalisation of, breast
size ideals that are communicated through Western media. In addition,
there were likely ceiling effects in mean Western media exposure across
nations (a reflection of the fact that all research sites were largely
urbanised), as well as limited variation in breast size dissatisfaction
scores that any predictor could account for.
In
contrast to the effects of exposure to Western media, our results
indicated that greater exposure to local media was significantly and
positively associated with breast size dissatisfaction. Indeed, the
strength of the relationship between local media exposure and breast
size dissatisfaction was stronger than that of Western media exposure.
Thus, it would seem that local media play an important role in
engendering breast size dissatisfaction, possibly through the
communication of breast size narratives that are “tailored” for local
populations (Swami, 2020).
A good example of such local transmission is Latin American
telenovelas, which idealise larger breast sizes though in ways that are
often specific to local socio-political and gendered narratives (Edmonds, 2010; Smith, 2017).
More generally, it has been reported that local (Asian) media play a
more important role than Western media in predicting appearance concerns
in Chinese women (Jackson, Jiang, & Chen, 2016).
The BSSS results fit this broader perspective and suggests that local
media may play a crucial role in communicating narratives about ideal
breast size, which in turn pressure women to attain
culturally-sanctioned ideals.
4.2.4. Age
The
results of our analyses also indicated that age was inversely related
to breast size dissatisfaction. Previous studies have neglected to
explore associations between breast size dissatisfaction and participant
age, whereas the broader literature examining associations between
negative body and age have returned equivocal results, with large-sample
studies indicating a positive relationship (Frederick et al., 2008; Swami, Frederick et al., 2010; Swami, Tran, Stieger, Voracek, & The YouBeauty.com Team, 2015), a negative relationship (Frederick et al., 2016), or no significant association (Runfola et al., 2013).
In terms of breast size dissatisfaction specifically, it is possible
that breast objectification pressures decline with age (see Tiggemann & Lynch, 2001),
such that older women experience less pressure to attain breast size
ideals or develop embodiment practices that challenge constraining
appearance ideals (Piran, 2016).
Older age may also be associated with lifespan experiences, such as the
transition to motherhood and breastfeeding, that help focus women’s
attention on breast functionality (e.g., a maternal view of breasts that
emphasises nurturing; Chang, Chao, & Kenney, 2006; Earle, 2003) and reduces preoccupation with the sexual uses of breasts (Bojorquez-Chapela, Unikel, Mendoza, & de Lachica, 2013; Harrison, Obeid, Haslett, McLean, & Clarkin, 2019; Lombardo et al., 2019), though it should also be noted that midlife breast changes may also impact sexual satisfaction (Thomas, Hamm, Borrero, Hess, & Thurston, 2019).
4.3. Outcomes of breast size dissatisfaction
4.3.1. Body image and psychological well-being
As
hypothesised, greater breast size dissatisfaction was significantly and
positively associated with both weight and appearance dissatisfaction.
This is consistent with previous work showing that greater breast size
dissatisfaction is significantly associated with higher scores on a
range of indices of negative body image (Forbes & Frederick, 2008; Frederick et al., 2008; Junqueira et al., 2019; Swami & Furnham, 2018).
The most straightforward interpretation of the present finding is that
breast size dissatisfaction is an important facet of global negative
body image (Swami, Tran et al., 2015).
Importantly, the BSSS data also indicated that greater breast size
dissatisfaction was significantly associated with lower self-esteem and
subjective happiness. The former finding corroborates previous research
showing that breast size dissatisfaction is associated with lower
self-esteem (Koff & Benavage, 1998; Swami, Tran et al., 2015).
Taken together, the present results suggest that breast size
dissatisfaction may have substantive and detrimental links to both
global body image and psychological well-being.
4.3.2. Breast awareness
Partially consistent with our hypothesis and previous research with British women (Swami & Furnham, 2018),
analysis of the BSSS dataset indicated that greater breast size
dissatisfaction was associated with poorer breast awareness, as indexed
through lower breast self-examination frequency and lower confidence in
detecting breast change, though not greater estimated delay in seeking
professional help upon discovering breast change. These effects appeared
to be primarily driven by participants who desired larger breasts than
they currently had, whereas associations in participants who desired
smaller breasts were not significant. These findings nevertheless remain
important: breast cancer is the leading cause of cancer-related
mortality in women worldwide (Torre, Siegel, Ward, & Jemal, 2016) and poor survival rates are reliably associated with poorer breast awareness (for a review, see Richards, Westcombe, Love, Littlejohns, & Ramirez, 1999). Conversely, more positive breast awareness is associated with improved efficacy in breast cancer detection (Harmer, 2011; Mant, 1991; World Health Organization, 2017) and early diagnosis (Gadgil et al., 2017), but our results suggest that breast size dissatisfaction may act as a barrier to optimal breast awareness. As discussed by Swami and Furnham (2018),
breast size dissatisfaction may result in avoidance behaviours and
cognitions (i.e., avoiding or distrusting one’s breasts) that reduce
breast awareness, particularly if one’s breasts trigger feelings of
anxiety, shame, and embarrassment. Importantly, our results indicated
that the negative association between breast size dissatisfaction and
self-examination frequency and confidence in detecting breast change,
respectively, was stable across nations sampled in the BSSS, which
requires urgent public health intervention.
4.4. Implications
The
results of the BSSS suggest a relatively homogenised idealisation of
medium-to-large breasts, in tandem with similar levels of breast size
dissatisfaction across all sites that were sampled. Indeed, over
two-thirds of women sampled in the BSSS reported some form of breast
size dissatisfaction, with most of these women indicating that they
wanted larger breasts than they currently had. Just as a thin ideal for
women’s bodily attractiveness is now dominant across many nations (Swami, 2015; Swami, Frederick et al., 2010),
our results point to the homogenisation of breast size ideals, which in
turn may shape women’s breasted experiences. Perhaps most importantly,
greater breast size dissatisfaction was robustly associated with poorer
psychological well-being and lower breast awareness. Based on these
results, one conclusion we might draw is that breast size
dissatisfaction represents a global public health, with important
consequences for the psychological and physical well-being of women in
many places.
Most immediately, we urge greater
scholarly attention to issues related to breast size dissatisfaction
and, concomitantly, the development of targeted interventions aimed at
reducing breast size dissatisfaction. Various techniques – such as
cognitive restructuring, changing negative body language, and
size-estimate exercises – have been shown to successfully promote
healthier body image (for a meta-analysis, see Alleva, Sheeran, Webb, Martijn, & Miles, 2015),
but it will be important to determine the extent to which such methods
are efficacious at reducing breast size dissatisfaction specifically. Of
course, it is possible that reducing breast size dissatisfaction will
require more tailored interventions. Such a tailored approach might
involve interventionist and therapeutic techniques designed to reduce
self-objectification of one’s breasts and effective negotiations of
sociocultural contexts that value idealised feminine embodiment (see Roberts & Waters, 2004; Tylka & Augustus-Horvath, 2011).
In addition, interventions that promote greater appreciation of the
functional value of women’s breasts (e.g., their role in nurturing and
sustenance) may be vital to shift attention away from unrealistic and
unattainable beauty ideals, though this should not come at the expense
of women’s own needs (Piran, 2016; Schmied & Lupton, 2001).
Such interventions may be particularly valuable if they also promote
better breast awareness, which could empower women to take a more active
role in breast cancer practices (Anastasi & Lusher, 2019).
Importantly, whatever intervention methods are developed will need to
be sensitive to national contexts and meet the informational,
healthcare, and corporeal needs of women.
Depolarizing American voters: Democrats and Republicans are equally susceptible to false attitude feedback
Depolarizing American voters: Democrats and Republicans are equally susceptible to false attitude feedback. Thomas Strandberg et al. PLOS, February 5, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226799
Abstract: American politics is becoming increasingly polarized, which biases decision-making and reduces open-minded debate. In two experiments, we demonstrate that despite this polarization, a simple manipulation can make people express and endorse less polarized views about competing political candidates. In Study 1, we approached 136 participants at the first 2016 presidential debate and on the streets of New York City. Participants completed a survey evaluating Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump on various personality traits; 72% gave responses favoring a single candidate. We then covertly manipulated their surveys so that the majority of their responses became moderate instead. Participants only noticed and corrected a few of these manipulations. When asked to explain their responses, 94% accepted the manipulated responses as their own and rationalized this neutral position accordingly, even though they reported more polarized views moments earlier. In Study 2, we replicated the experiment online with a more politically diverse sample of 498 participants. Both Clinton and Trump supporters showed nearly identical rates of acceptance and rationalization of their manipulated-to-neutral positions. These studies demonstrate how false feedback can powerfully shape the expression of political views. More generally, our findings reveal the potential for open-minded discussion even in a fundamentally divided political climate.
To contribute to this effort, we tested the choice blindness paradigm [26] with American voters just before the 2016 American general election. Our aim was to investigate whether participants could become less polarized in their political views. Study 1 was conducted during the week of the first presidential debate; Study 2 was conducted online with a larger and more representative sample. Participants responded to a survey comparing Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump on various leadership traits. In both studies, the participants in our sample were clearly polarized when entering the study. Participants that favored either of the candidates had on average only 2 to 3 “open-minded” responses out of 12, defined by a response in the middle 30% of the visual analog scales. Participants then received false feedback about their responses: we nearly doubled the number of items that participants had in the open-minded category. Only a few of these manipulations were detected and corrected, which resulted in an overall score that made it appear as if the participants were more open-minded in their views towards the candidates. When asked to explain their score, the great majority of the participants accepted and justified their apparent open-mindedness, even though they had reported more polarized views moments earlier.
The effectiveness of choice blindness in the political domain distinguishes it from many other forms of persuasion, such as perspective-taking [55–56]. In a recent study, Catapano and colleagues [57] found that such methods are less effective for deep-seated attitudes, such as those relating to politics. In fact, imagining the perspectives of out-group members can even backfire and hinder subsequent attitude change. This could partially be explained by the fact that in those paradigms, participants are fully aware that the perspective they consider is not their own and that the arguments they express are hypothetical. In choice blindness experiments, however, participants often believe that the response they are asked to explain reflects their own true attitude.
Another explanation might be the difference between verbally explaining versus silently revising the manipulations. While participants in Experiment 2 were also confronted with the manipulations, they did not have to engage in the mental task of having to recall or generate arguments for them. On the face of it, one might expect this additional reasoning process to generate more corrections, presumably by helping participants think more deeply about the issue and discovering that they do not agree with the manipulated position. However, if deliberation serves not as attitudinal fact-checking but as a way for participants to further commit to and defend their own ostensible attitudes, the reasoning process might lead to fewer corrections [53–54]. A third explanation could be simply that Experiment 2 was conducted closer to the election compared to Experiment 1, and that a larger proportion of the participants in Experiment 2 had firmly decided who they would vote for. Finally, it could also have been that the cover story in Experiment 2—telling participants to check their responses in case they had been affected by presentation order—may have primed participants be more attentive and to search for inconsistencies.
Prior to the current study, choice blindness had only been used to study what might be called “repolarization”—for example by shifting people from agreeing to disagreeing with a statement. Here, for the first time, we show that it is possible to use the same methodology to depolarize people, by making them adopt the idea that they are more “open-minded”.
In future studies, we could also explore more global attitude shifts. In the two experiments presented here, the manipulations did not influence the candidate competency/favorability ratings. Had this been found, it would have been a unique case of attitude generalization where manipulation on some character judgments would bleed over and affect another more general trait. Perhaps political competency is judged somewhat independently of the specific traits in our survey.
Abstract: American politics is becoming increasingly polarized, which biases decision-making and reduces open-minded debate. In two experiments, we demonstrate that despite this polarization, a simple manipulation can make people express and endorse less polarized views about competing political candidates. In Study 1, we approached 136 participants at the first 2016 presidential debate and on the streets of New York City. Participants completed a survey evaluating Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump on various personality traits; 72% gave responses favoring a single candidate. We then covertly manipulated their surveys so that the majority of their responses became moderate instead. Participants only noticed and corrected a few of these manipulations. When asked to explain their responses, 94% accepted the manipulated responses as their own and rationalized this neutral position accordingly, even though they reported more polarized views moments earlier. In Study 2, we replicated the experiment online with a more politically diverse sample of 498 participants. Both Clinton and Trump supporters showed nearly identical rates of acceptance and rationalization of their manipulated-to-neutral positions. These studies demonstrate how false feedback can powerfully shape the expression of political views. More generally, our findings reveal the potential for open-minded discussion even in a fundamentally divided political climate.
Discussion
There is an ongoing quest to create a less polarized and more open-minded political climate in the United States [2, 23–25]. We believe this to be an important effort for several reasons. Studies show that polarization can bias information processing and decision making in detrimental ways [5–6, 48]. As a result, it often leads to fear, anger, and animosity towards the opposition [1, 9–10]. Polarization is also associated with dogmatic intolerance, which in turn increases the propensity to behave antisocially and to deny free speech [49]. Furthermore, polarization erodes central parts of civic society, such as trust in the government and media [50]. However, for a depolarization movement to be effective, we need to advance our theories on political attitude change and better understand the mechanisms underlying depolarization.To contribute to this effort, we tested the choice blindness paradigm [26] with American voters just before the 2016 American general election. Our aim was to investigate whether participants could become less polarized in their political views. Study 1 was conducted during the week of the first presidential debate; Study 2 was conducted online with a larger and more representative sample. Participants responded to a survey comparing Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump on various leadership traits. In both studies, the participants in our sample were clearly polarized when entering the study. Participants that favored either of the candidates had on average only 2 to 3 “open-minded” responses out of 12, defined by a response in the middle 30% of the visual analog scales. Participants then received false feedback about their responses: we nearly doubled the number of items that participants had in the open-minded category. Only a few of these manipulations were detected and corrected, which resulted in an overall score that made it appear as if the participants were more open-minded in their views towards the candidates. When asked to explain their score, the great majority of the participants accepted and justified their apparent open-mindedness, even though they had reported more polarized views moments earlier.
Supporters of Clinton and Trump are similarly susceptible to false feedback
In Experiment 2, both Clinton and Trump supporters behaved similarly on the experimental measures: they had similar correction rates to the choice blindness manipulations and justified their open-minded score to similar degrees. This is the first study we are aware of that demonstrates that liberals and conservatives are equally susceptible to false feedback about their own attitudes. Given previous findings that acceptance and justification of false survey feedback can lead to lasting changes in political attitudes [30], we see the lack of difference between Trump supporters and Clinton supporters as contributing to the ongoing research on the psychology of ideology. So far, this line of research indicates that liberals and conservatives are different in some aspects, such as personality [33], values [35–36], and thinking styles [38–39]. However, they are both similarly susceptible to cognitive biases [42–43]. Our findings show that choice blindness applies equally to conservatives and liberals. More generally, choice blindness offers a useful tool to test how liberals and conservatives reason—or rationalize—when presented with false information.Choice blindness as a method to study depolarization
The current study was not intended as a practical method to influence voters but rather as a novel investigation of experimental depolarization in the political domain. We find that giving people false feedback can be an effective way to, at least momentarily, make them perceive themselves as more open towards competing candidates. This shows that even deeply held beliefs depend on situational factors and can be flexible under certain circumstances. From a theoretical perspective, we believe that participants interpret their own behavior—in this case their survey responses—and infer the reasons behind these responses [51–54]. Choice blindness could therefore be useful to study the depolarization of extreme views. For example, we could measure how susceptibility to choice blindness and confabulation are affected by the direction of the manipulation, such as going from polarized to moderate, or vice versa. This could help us understand whether being moderate or undecided is a distinct pole of its own. If so, we could explore whether these moderate views are more or less susceptible to false information. Here, the framing of moderate views may play an important role. In our studies, participants received positive false feedback about their survey responses. Instead of suggesting to people that they are open-minded, we might have found different results if participants had been told that they were “wishy-washy”, “flip-flopping”, “uncertain”, “centrist”, or even “moderate”. Future work could examine how participants behave when they are given false negative or more neutral feedback as well.The effectiveness of choice blindness in the political domain distinguishes it from many other forms of persuasion, such as perspective-taking [55–56]. In a recent study, Catapano and colleagues [57] found that such methods are less effective for deep-seated attitudes, such as those relating to politics. In fact, imagining the perspectives of out-group members can even backfire and hinder subsequent attitude change. This could partially be explained by the fact that in those paradigms, participants are fully aware that the perspective they consider is not their own and that the arguments they express are hypothetical. In choice blindness experiments, however, participants often believe that the response they are asked to explain reflects their own true attitude.
Limitations and future studies
In Experiment 1, only 12% of all manipulations were corrected, but in Experiment 2, 41% of them were. The reasons behind this difference are difficult to isolate given the variation in design between the two studies (such as the number of manipulations, the instructions for revisiting their responses, and verbal versus written explanations). One potential explanation is the plausibility of the manipulation. In Experiment 1, the manipulations were performed using a magic trick, which is extremely improbable in the context of a typical political opinion survey. Likely none of the participants had ever filled out a pen-and-paper survey that changed seconds later. Thus, if the participants lack perfect access to their own attitudes (or if political attitudes are not stored for us to access; [58–59]), then the manipulated survey responses ought to function as a prime source of evidence about their own attitudes [51–52]. The (presumably non-conscious) inference may look something like: “I wrote these responses, so either they must be my true attitudes, or else I made several large errors”. So, if people see themselves as competent at answering a simple questionnaire, making a series of large errors would seem less plausible. In contrast, in Experiment 2, even though we attempted to replicate the general procedure of the original trick, participants were faced with a far less magical procedure. People are familiar with malfunctioning computer programs and websites, and thus our participants would have had little difficulty in concluding that there may have simply been a software error when saving their responses that needs correcting.Another explanation might be the difference between verbally explaining versus silently revising the manipulations. While participants in Experiment 2 were also confronted with the manipulations, they did not have to engage in the mental task of having to recall or generate arguments for them. On the face of it, one might expect this additional reasoning process to generate more corrections, presumably by helping participants think more deeply about the issue and discovering that they do not agree with the manipulated position. However, if deliberation serves not as attitudinal fact-checking but as a way for participants to further commit to and defend their own ostensible attitudes, the reasoning process might lead to fewer corrections [53–54]. A third explanation could be simply that Experiment 2 was conducted closer to the election compared to Experiment 1, and that a larger proportion of the participants in Experiment 2 had firmly decided who they would vote for. Finally, it could also have been that the cover story in Experiment 2—telling participants to check their responses in case they had been affected by presentation order—may have primed participants be more attentive and to search for inconsistencies.
Prior to the current study, choice blindness had only been used to study what might be called “repolarization”—for example by shifting people from agreeing to disagreeing with a statement. Here, for the first time, we show that it is possible to use the same methodology to depolarize people, by making them adopt the idea that they are more “open-minded”.
In future studies, we could also explore more global attitude shifts. In the two experiments presented here, the manipulations did not influence the candidate competency/favorability ratings. Had this been found, it would have been a unique case of attitude generalization where manipulation on some character judgments would bleed over and affect another more general trait. Perhaps political competency is judged somewhat independently of the specific traits in our survey.
Obesity: Limited trend data covering recent decades support significant growth of BMI ≥40 population since the 1980s
Rising prevalence of BMI ≥40 kg/m2: A high‐demand epidemic needing better documentation. Kath Williamson, Amy Nimegeer, Michael Lean. Obesity Reviews, February 4 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/obr.12986
Summary: Whilst previously rare, some surveys indicate substantial increases in the population with body mass index (BMI) ≥40 kg/m2 since the 1980s. Clinicians report emerging care challenges for this population, often with high resource demands. Accurate prevalence data, gathered using reliable methods, are needed to inform health care practice, planning, and research. We searched digitally for English language sources with measured prevalence data on adult BMI ≥40 collected since 2010. The search strategy included sources identified from recent work by NCD‐RisC (2017), grey sources, a literature search to find current sources, and digital snowball searching. Eighteen countries, across five continents, reported BMI ≥40 prevalence data in surveys since 2010: 12% of eligible national surveys examined. Prevalence of BMI ≥40 ranged from 1.3% (Spain) to 7.7% (USA) for all adults, 0.7% (Serbia) to 5.6% (USA) for men, and 1.8% (Poland) to 9.7% (USA) for women. Limited trend data covering recent decades support significant growth of BMI ≥40 population. Methodological limitations include small samples and data collection methods likely to exclude people with very high BMIs. BMI ≥40 data are not routinely reported in international surveys. Lack of data impairs surveillance of population trends, understanding of causation, and societal provision for individuals living with higher weights.
Applying a lower threshold of BMI ≥35 would have broadened the available data, whilst potentially weakening the focus on the highest BMI category, where costs and clinical complexity is greatest. Some studies report the lower threshold of BMI ≥35 particularly those examining Asian populations where different BMI cut‐offs relating to overweight and obesity are often applied.98
Limiting the review to the English language prevented examination of some original data sources, which could only be located in their native language, for example, Spanish for Chile and Mexico. It was not possible to locate English versions of these, and resources did not allow for translation. The OECD reports these original sources in English in its database, but only at BMI thresholds of 25.0 to 29.9 and BMI ≥30, with prevalence for Chile and Mexico the highest in the world, above even those of the United States.99 Thus, they are likely to have significant BMI ≥40 prevalence. Additionally, whilst the search processes were broad, encompassing a variety of sources and used systematic methods, they were not exhaustive, as might be expected from a formal systematic literature review or meta‐analysis. We believe that they represent a reliable summary of the current evidence base on BMI ≥40, as it is available to decision makers. Some individual sources have not been included, notably those from non‐English publications, but they are unlikely to alter the very consistent conclusions.
Summary: Whilst previously rare, some surveys indicate substantial increases in the population with body mass index (BMI) ≥40 kg/m2 since the 1980s. Clinicians report emerging care challenges for this population, often with high resource demands. Accurate prevalence data, gathered using reliable methods, are needed to inform health care practice, planning, and research. We searched digitally for English language sources with measured prevalence data on adult BMI ≥40 collected since 2010. The search strategy included sources identified from recent work by NCD‐RisC (2017), grey sources, a literature search to find current sources, and digital snowball searching. Eighteen countries, across five continents, reported BMI ≥40 prevalence data in surveys since 2010: 12% of eligible national surveys examined. Prevalence of BMI ≥40 ranged from 1.3% (Spain) to 7.7% (USA) for all adults, 0.7% (Serbia) to 5.6% (USA) for men, and 1.8% (Poland) to 9.7% (USA) for women. Limited trend data covering recent decades support significant growth of BMI ≥40 population. Methodological limitations include small samples and data collection methods likely to exclude people with very high BMIs. BMI ≥40 data are not routinely reported in international surveys. Lack of data impairs surveillance of population trends, understanding of causation, and societal provision for individuals living with higher weights.
4.3 Strengths and limitations
This review has concentrated on robustly measured data to establish the international prevalence rates for BMI ≥40. Whilst the rationale for exclusion of self‐report data is sound, in that it commonly underestimates BMI, the exclusion also acts as a limitation, for example, by excluding EHIS data, which covers many European countries. The sample sizes possible with measured data are reduced by the need for resources to make measurements, and there is potential bias against including very heavy individuals whose mobility is impaired. In some cases, the upper limit of scales excluded the heaviest individuals. These limitations would tend to underestimate the true prevalence of the highest BMI categories, not overestimate.Applying a lower threshold of BMI ≥35 would have broadened the available data, whilst potentially weakening the focus on the highest BMI category, where costs and clinical complexity is greatest. Some studies report the lower threshold of BMI ≥35 particularly those examining Asian populations where different BMI cut‐offs relating to overweight and obesity are often applied.98
Limiting the review to the English language prevented examination of some original data sources, which could only be located in their native language, for example, Spanish for Chile and Mexico. It was not possible to locate English versions of these, and resources did not allow for translation. The OECD reports these original sources in English in its database, but only at BMI thresholds of 25.0 to 29.9 and BMI ≥30, with prevalence for Chile and Mexico the highest in the world, above even those of the United States.99 Thus, they are likely to have significant BMI ≥40 prevalence. Additionally, whilst the search processes were broad, encompassing a variety of sources and used systematic methods, they were not exhaustive, as might be expected from a formal systematic literature review or meta‐analysis. We believe that they represent a reliable summary of the current evidence base on BMI ≥40, as it is available to decision makers. Some individual sources have not been included, notably those from non‐English publications, but they are unlikely to alter the very consistent conclusions.
An Excess of Positive Results in Psychology: The large gap betwwen standard reports and registered reports suggests that authors underreport negative results to an extent that threatens cumulative science
Scheel, Anne M., Mitchell Schijen, and Daniel Lakens. 2020. “An Excess of Positive Results: Comparing the Standard Psychology Literature with Registered Reports.” PsyArXiv. February 5. doi:10.31234/osf.io/p6e9c
Abstract: When studies with positive results that support the tested hypotheses have a higher probability of being published than studies with negative results, the literature will give a distorted view of the evidence for scientific claims. Psychological scientists have been concerned about the degree of distortion in their literature due to publication bias and inflated Type-1 error rates. Registered Reports were developed with the goal to minimise such biases: In this new publication format, peer review and the decision to publish take place before the study results are known. We compared the results in the full population of published Registered Reports in Psychology (N = 71 as of November 2018) with a random sample of hypothesis-testing studies from the standard literature (N = 152) by searching 633 journals for the phrase ‘test* the hypothes*’ (replicating a method by Fanelli, 2010). Analysing the first hypothesis reported in each paper, we found 96% positive results in standard reports, but only 44% positive results in Registered Reports. The difference remained nearly as large when direct replications were excluded from the analysis (96% vs 50% positive results). This large gap suggests that psychologists underreport negative results to an extent that threatens cumulative science. Although our study did not directly test the effectiveness of Registered Reports at reducing bias, these results show that the introduction of Registered Reports has led to a much larger proportion of negative results appearing in the published literature compared to standard reports.
Abstract: When studies with positive results that support the tested hypotheses have a higher probability of being published than studies with negative results, the literature will give a distorted view of the evidence for scientific claims. Psychological scientists have been concerned about the degree of distortion in their literature due to publication bias and inflated Type-1 error rates. Registered Reports were developed with the goal to minimise such biases: In this new publication format, peer review and the decision to publish take place before the study results are known. We compared the results in the full population of published Registered Reports in Psychology (N = 71 as of November 2018) with a random sample of hypothesis-testing studies from the standard literature (N = 152) by searching 633 journals for the phrase ‘test* the hypothes*’ (replicating a method by Fanelli, 2010). Analysing the first hypothesis reported in each paper, we found 96% positive results in standard reports, but only 44% positive results in Registered Reports. The difference remained nearly as large when direct replications were excluded from the analysis (96% vs 50% positive results). This large gap suggests that psychologists underreport negative results to an extent that threatens cumulative science. Although our study did not directly test the effectiveness of Registered Reports at reducing bias, these results show that the introduction of Registered Reports has led to a much larger proportion of negative results appearing in the published literature compared to standard reports.
Check also Researchers frequently make inappropriate requests to statisticians: Removing/altering data to support the hypothesis; interpreting the findings on the basis of expectation, not results; not reporting the presence of key missing data; & ignoring violations of assumptions
Researcher Requests for Inappropriate Analysis and Reporting: A U.S. Survey of Consulting Biostatisticians. Min Qi Wang, Alice F. Yan, Ralph V. Katz. Annals of Internal Medicine, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/researchers-frequently-make.htmlAnd How to crack pre-registration: There are methods for camouflaging a registered study as successful
How to crack pre-registration: Toward transparent and open science. Yuki Yamada. Front. Psychol. Sep 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/how-to-crack-pre-registration-there-are.htmlAnd Questionable Research Practices prevalence in ecology: cherry picking statistically significant results 64%, p hacking 42%, and hypothesising after the results are known (HARKing) 51%. Such practices have been directly implicated in the low rates of reproducible results
Questionable research practices in ecology and evolution. Hannah Fraser et al. PLOS One, Jul 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/07/questionable-research-practices.htmlAnd The scientific practices of experimental psychologists have improved dramatically:
Psychology's Renaissance. Leif D. Nelson, Joseph P. Simmons, and Uri Simonsohn. Annual Review of Psychology, forthcoming. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/11/the-scientific-practices-of.html
From 2015... Increasingly rational choice theory is viewed as a normative theory of rationality: what economic agents ought to do in order to be rational
Hands, D. Wade, Normative Rational Choice Theory: Past, Present, and Future (March 2015). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1738671
Abstract: The economics profession has traditionally viewed rational choice theory as a positive scientific theory. Normative economics was associated exclusively with ethics and should be kept strictly separate from positive scientific economics. This paper argues that the profession is changing in this regard. Increasingly rational choice theory is viewed as a normative theory of rationality: what economic agents ought to do in order to be rational. It is argued that the change initiated from within a community of critics – experimental psychologists – but it has now become widely accepted within many areas of economics. The paper explains this change and examines some of the possible causes and consequences of this development.
Keywords: rational choice theory, expected utility theory, demand theory, methodology, normative economics
JEL Classification: B2, B4
… psychological theories of intuitive thinking cannot match the elegance
and precision of formal normative models of belief and choice, but this is
just another way of saying that rational models are psychologically
unrealistic. (Daniel Kahneman, 2003, p. 1449)
0. Introduction
A specter is haunting microeconomics: the specter of normativity. Rational choice is the core theory of modern microeconomics and as such economists have traditionally considered it – in both its risky (expected utility) and risk-free (ordinal utility) instantiations – to be a positive scientific theory. In fact, for the majority of mainstream economists since the 1940s, rational choice was not only a positive-scientific theory, it was also a very powerful and successful scientific theory (at least when compared to the available alternatives from nonmainstream economics and/or the other social sciences). Although it was common to admit that real agents might not possess stable well-ordered preferences and/or to be able to complete the necessary computations in the way the theory asserts, such methodological foibles were considered relatively minor and did not undermine the economics profession's general support of rational choice theory. The consensus was that rational choice was a powerful theory that provided empirically supported and practically reliable predictions of, and explanations for, the behavior of economic agents: both individuals and more aggregate agents such as households, firms, and nations.
Of course while the majority of economists supported rational choice theory, there were also critics who strongly denied that it "provided empirically supported and practically reliable predictions of, and explanations for, the behavior of economic agents." Although such critics came in many different varieties and political-economic positions – from those inspired by Institutionalism or Marxism, to various Austrian positions – for the most part they also viewed rational choice theory as a positive scientific theory; they just thought it was not a very good scientific theory and that better alternatives were available. They argued either that rational choice theory did not accurately characterize (even approximately) the decision-making processes of real economic agents, or that it failed to accurately predict the observable behavior of such agents, or both; but for both the critics as well as the defenders within economics, rational choice theory was an attempt to provide a positive scientific theory of economic behavior.
This paper will argue that the economics profession has changed in this regard. Although the transformation is far from complete, the tendency during the last few years has been for economists to increasingly view rational choice theory (hereafter RCT) as a normative rather than a positive theory about the behavior of economic agents. The relevant normativity involves rationality, not morality – what one ought to do in order to be rational, not what one ought to do in order to be moral, good, etc. – but it is a normative interpretation and thus constitutes a radical departure from the way that RCT has traditionally been perceived among economists. It will be argued that this change initiated from within a community of critics – contemporary behavioral economics and associated work in experimental psychology – but it has increasingly spread to the wider community of economists. Although this interpretation of RCT is relatively new among economists, it has a long history in experimental psychology, decision theory, and various branches of philosophy. The paper discusses the history of the normative interpretation, the recent change within economics, and examines some of the possible causes and consequences of this development.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to explain the normative turn in recent experimental and behavioral economics, to suggest that it is beginning to be accepted more widely among economists, and to raise some questions about the causes and consequences of this change. Section two discussed the various arguments that philosophers have offered for the normativity of RCT – a theory of what one ought to do in order to be rational – and used the Friedman-Savage work on EUT during the 1950s as an example of the differences between the way that economists and philosophers have viewed RCT. Section two also made the case that economists have traditionally equated the normative exclusively with the ethically normative. Section three examined the results of the experimental and behavioral economics literature of the last few decades with a particular emphasis on the influence of experimental psychology. The many empirical anomalies of RCT were discussed and it was argued that the recently emerging heuristics-and-biases tradition in economics – like many philosophers, but unlike most economists (at least traditionally) – tend to view RCT as a normative theory of rationality. The case was also made in section three that economists seem to be changing their view of RCT in the direction of philosophers and those in the psychological tradition; this may be the case for economists more generally, but it is clearly the case for experimental and behavioral economists, even those who are not necessarily sympathetic to ideas from experimental psychology. The tendency for economists to view RCT as a normative theory of rationality and to separate the normative from the ethical was called the normative turn. The last section examined four of the many possible questions/concerns raised by the normative turn. The introduction of these four topics was intended to raise questions and further discussion on these various issues, not to defend a particular position regarding either the causes or the consequences of the normative turn. There seems to be little doubt about the presence of the normative interpretation of RCT within experimentally-based areas of economics and if the change is becoming more widespread, as it was suggested here, the impact will be quite significant. It is too early to tell what all this might eventually mean, but this paper has been an attempt to make the reader aware of the change and to draw attention to some of the possible consequences.
Abstract: The economics profession has traditionally viewed rational choice theory as a positive scientific theory. Normative economics was associated exclusively with ethics and should be kept strictly separate from positive scientific economics. This paper argues that the profession is changing in this regard. Increasingly rational choice theory is viewed as a normative theory of rationality: what economic agents ought to do in order to be rational. It is argued that the change initiated from within a community of critics – experimental psychologists – but it has now become widely accepted within many areas of economics. The paper explains this change and examines some of the possible causes and consequences of this development.
Keywords: rational choice theory, expected utility theory, demand theory, methodology, normative economics
JEL Classification: B2, B4
… psychological theories of intuitive thinking cannot match the elegance
and precision of formal normative models of belief and choice, but this is
just another way of saying that rational models are psychologically
unrealistic. (Daniel Kahneman, 2003, p. 1449)
0. Introduction
A specter is haunting microeconomics: the specter of normativity. Rational choice is the core theory of modern microeconomics and as such economists have traditionally considered it – in both its risky (expected utility) and risk-free (ordinal utility) instantiations – to be a positive scientific theory. In fact, for the majority of mainstream economists since the 1940s, rational choice was not only a positive-scientific theory, it was also a very powerful and successful scientific theory (at least when compared to the available alternatives from nonmainstream economics and/or the other social sciences). Although it was common to admit that real agents might not possess stable well-ordered preferences and/or to be able to complete the necessary computations in the way the theory asserts, such methodological foibles were considered relatively minor and did not undermine the economics profession's general support of rational choice theory. The consensus was that rational choice was a powerful theory that provided empirically supported and practically reliable predictions of, and explanations for, the behavior of economic agents: both individuals and more aggregate agents such as households, firms, and nations.
Of course while the majority of economists supported rational choice theory, there were also critics who strongly denied that it "provided empirically supported and practically reliable predictions of, and explanations for, the behavior of economic agents." Although such critics came in many different varieties and political-economic positions – from those inspired by Institutionalism or Marxism, to various Austrian positions – for the most part they also viewed rational choice theory as a positive scientific theory; they just thought it was not a very good scientific theory and that better alternatives were available. They argued either that rational choice theory did not accurately characterize (even approximately) the decision-making processes of real economic agents, or that it failed to accurately predict the observable behavior of such agents, or both; but for both the critics as well as the defenders within economics, rational choice theory was an attempt to provide a positive scientific theory of economic behavior.
This paper will argue that the economics profession has changed in this regard. Although the transformation is far from complete, the tendency during the last few years has been for economists to increasingly view rational choice theory (hereafter RCT) as a normative rather than a positive theory about the behavior of economic agents. The relevant normativity involves rationality, not morality – what one ought to do in order to be rational, not what one ought to do in order to be moral, good, etc. – but it is a normative interpretation and thus constitutes a radical departure from the way that RCT has traditionally been perceived among economists. It will be argued that this change initiated from within a community of critics – contemporary behavioral economics and associated work in experimental psychology – but it has increasingly spread to the wider community of economists. Although this interpretation of RCT is relatively new among economists, it has a long history in experimental psychology, decision theory, and various branches of philosophy. The paper discusses the history of the normative interpretation, the recent change within economics, and examines some of the possible causes and consequences of this development.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to explain the normative turn in recent experimental and behavioral economics, to suggest that it is beginning to be accepted more widely among economists, and to raise some questions about the causes and consequences of this change. Section two discussed the various arguments that philosophers have offered for the normativity of RCT – a theory of what one ought to do in order to be rational – and used the Friedman-Savage work on EUT during the 1950s as an example of the differences between the way that economists and philosophers have viewed RCT. Section two also made the case that economists have traditionally equated the normative exclusively with the ethically normative. Section three examined the results of the experimental and behavioral economics literature of the last few decades with a particular emphasis on the influence of experimental psychology. The many empirical anomalies of RCT were discussed and it was argued that the recently emerging heuristics-and-biases tradition in economics – like many philosophers, but unlike most economists (at least traditionally) – tend to view RCT as a normative theory of rationality. The case was also made in section three that economists seem to be changing their view of RCT in the direction of philosophers and those in the psychological tradition; this may be the case for economists more generally, but it is clearly the case for experimental and behavioral economists, even those who are not necessarily sympathetic to ideas from experimental psychology. The tendency for economists to view RCT as a normative theory of rationality and to separate the normative from the ethical was called the normative turn. The last section examined four of the many possible questions/concerns raised by the normative turn. The introduction of these four topics was intended to raise questions and further discussion on these various issues, not to defend a particular position regarding either the causes or the consequences of the normative turn. There seems to be little doubt about the presence of the normative interpretation of RCT within experimentally-based areas of economics and if the change is becoming more widespread, as it was suggested here, the impact will be quite significant. It is too early to tell what all this might eventually mean, but this paper has been an attempt to make the reader aware of the change and to draw attention to some of the possible consequences.
The effect of U.S. aid on growth is positive, but military and food iad have no effect; the effect is smaller for countries that are well endowed with natural resources, less ethnically polarized, and more aligned with the U.S.
Help or hindrance? U.S. aid on growth. Myongjin Kim & Leilei Shen. Applied Economics Letters, Jan 27 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2020.1720902
ABSTRACT: We distinguish between U.S. aid and non-U.S. aid and study the effects on growth in recipient countries. Our analysis exploits time variation in aid due to changes in the supply of U.S. aid and cross-sectional variation in a country’s tendency to receive any U.S. aid. We find that U.S. aid has a positive effect on growth. In particular, U.S. economic aid has a positive effect on growth while U.S. military and food aid have no effect on growth. There is also no evidence of U.S. aid crowding out aid from other countries. The effect of U.S. aid on growth is smaller for countries that are well endowed with natural resources, less ethnically polarized, and more aligned with the U.S.
KEYWORDS: U.S. aid, growth
JEL CLASSIFICATION: F35, O10, O40
From the 2017 version:
4 Results
We begin our analysis by rst reporting the OLS estimates of equation (2), which are presented
in columns 1 to 4 in Table 2. Columns 1 to 4 report estimates of correlation between U.S. aid
and annual real GDP per capita growth. The correlation between total U.S. aid and growth is
close to zero and statistically insigni cant. U.S. economic aid is pro-cyclical and only marginally
signi cant at 10%. U.S. food aid is counter-cyclical and signi cant at 1%. Column (5) reports the
correlation between non-U.S. aid and growth and it is close to zero and insigni cant.
Columns 6 to 9 report 2SLS estimates of equation (2). According to the estimates using the full
set of controls reported in column 6, a one percentage point increase in U.S. aid increases GDP
per capita growth by 0.19 standard deviation, or 1.7 percentage points on average. This e ect is
statistically signi cant at ve percent level. Column 7-9 suggest that the e ect of U.S. economic
aid is also positive on growth, however, U.S. military aid and food aid have no signi cant impact
on growth. Column 10 suggests that the e ect of non-U.S. aid is negative but it is statistically
insigni cant.
To assess the plausibility of the positive e ect U.S. aid on growth, it is useful to compare the
magnitude to estimates from other studies. The recent study by Arndt and Jones (2015) suggests
that one percentage point increase in all aid received is expected to boost real GDP per capita
growth rate by 0.30 percentage points in the long run. The comparison shows that the e ect of
U.S. aid on growth in our context is bigger than the e ect of total aid received on growth. Thus,
it is important to distinguish sources of aid by donor countries and types of aid when studying the
e ffects of aid on growth.
We interpret our estimates as showing that U.S. aid increases growth in recipient countries, an
alternative explanation is that U.S. aid crowds out other types of aid. For example, donor countries
may respond to an increase in U.S. aid by reducing their own aid provisions. If these other forms
of aid reduce growth, then U.S. aid crowd-out can explain why U.S. aid increases growth. It is
also possible that an increase in U.S. aid could actually cause total aid received by a country to
decline. We examine the e ect of U.S. aid on non-U.S. aid received by a country and report the
estimates in Table 3. The estimates show that U.S. aid does not crowd out aid from other donor
countries. U.S. military and food aid have no e ect on the provision of aid from non-U.S. donor
countries, and U.S. economic aid has a positive e ffect.
We also consider the influences of other factors that may contribute to growth. We nd the
e ects of U.S. aid on growth are not heterogeneous across the following factors: income, political
institutions, ethnic diversity, alignment with the U.S., and natural resource dependence.
ABSTRACT: We distinguish between U.S. aid and non-U.S. aid and study the effects on growth in recipient countries. Our analysis exploits time variation in aid due to changes in the supply of U.S. aid and cross-sectional variation in a country’s tendency to receive any U.S. aid. We find that U.S. aid has a positive effect on growth. In particular, U.S. economic aid has a positive effect on growth while U.S. military and food aid have no effect on growth. There is also no evidence of U.S. aid crowding out aid from other countries. The effect of U.S. aid on growth is smaller for countries that are well endowed with natural resources, less ethnically polarized, and more aligned with the U.S.
KEYWORDS: U.S. aid, growth
JEL CLASSIFICATION: F35, O10, O40
From the 2017 version:
4 Results
We begin our analysis by rst reporting the OLS estimates of equation (2), which are presented
in columns 1 to 4 in Table 2. Columns 1 to 4 report estimates of correlation between U.S. aid
and annual real GDP per capita growth. The correlation between total U.S. aid and growth is
close to zero and statistically insigni cant. U.S. economic aid is pro-cyclical and only marginally
signi cant at 10%. U.S. food aid is counter-cyclical and signi cant at 1%. Column (5) reports the
correlation between non-U.S. aid and growth and it is close to zero and insigni cant.
Columns 6 to 9 report 2SLS estimates of equation (2). According to the estimates using the full
set of controls reported in column 6, a one percentage point increase in U.S. aid increases GDP
per capita growth by 0.19 standard deviation, or 1.7 percentage points on average. This e ect is
statistically signi cant at ve percent level. Column 7-9 suggest that the e ect of U.S. economic
aid is also positive on growth, however, U.S. military aid and food aid have no signi cant impact
on growth. Column 10 suggests that the e ect of non-U.S. aid is negative but it is statistically
insigni cant.
To assess the plausibility of the positive e ect U.S. aid on growth, it is useful to compare the
magnitude to estimates from other studies. The recent study by Arndt and Jones (2015) suggests
that one percentage point increase in all aid received is expected to boost real GDP per capita
growth rate by 0.30 percentage points in the long run. The comparison shows that the e ect of
U.S. aid on growth in our context is bigger than the e ect of total aid received on growth. Thus,
it is important to distinguish sources of aid by donor countries and types of aid when studying the
e ffects of aid on growth.
We interpret our estimates as showing that U.S. aid increases growth in recipient countries, an
alternative explanation is that U.S. aid crowds out other types of aid. For example, donor countries
may respond to an increase in U.S. aid by reducing their own aid provisions. If these other forms
of aid reduce growth, then U.S. aid crowd-out can explain why U.S. aid increases growth. It is
also possible that an increase in U.S. aid could actually cause total aid received by a country to
decline. We examine the e ect of U.S. aid on non-U.S. aid received by a country and report the
estimates in Table 3. The estimates show that U.S. aid does not crowd out aid from other donor
countries. U.S. military and food aid have no e ect on the provision of aid from non-U.S. donor
countries, and U.S. economic aid has a positive e ffect.
We also consider the influences of other factors that may contribute to growth. We nd the
e ects of U.S. aid on growth are not heterogeneous across the following factors: income, political
institutions, ethnic diversity, alignment with the U.S., and natural resource dependence.
Skin colour, prostitution, Mexico: A one standard deviation increase in darkness reduces an escort’s price by approximately 10 pct
The higher price of whiter skin: an analysis of escort services. Raymundo M. Campos-Vazquez. Applied Economics Letters, Feb 4 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2020.1725229
Abstract: How much are people willing to pay extra for sexual services with a white woman instead of one with darker skin? Skin colour assessed from photographs of women on escort websites in Mexico was compared with price information to answer this question. Women with darker skin were found to be underrepresented, consistent with self-selection into other occupations with an expectation of higher wages. Lighter-skinned escorts also charge more than darker women. Controlling for estimated age and physical measures like weight, hair colour, and body type, a one standard deviation increase in darkness reduces an escort’s price by approximately 10 percent.
Keywords: Wage differentials, skin colour, prostitution, Mexico
JEL Classification: C80, J16, J30, J70, O54
---
Abstract: How much are people willing to pay extra for sexual services with a white woman instead of one with darker skin? Skin colour assessed from photographs of women on escort websites in Mexico was compared with price information to answer this question. Women with darker skin were found to be underrepresented, consistent with self-selection into other occupations with an expectation of higher wages. Lighter-skinned escorts also charge more than darker women. Controlling for estimated age and physical measures like weight, hair colour, and body type, a one standard deviation increase in darkness reduces an escort’s price by approximately 10 percent.
Keywords: Wage differentials, skin colour, prostitution, Mexico
JEL Classification: C80, J16, J30, J70, O54
---
Conclusions
The demand for sexual services affects the relative returns for specific traits and the
self-selection patterns into that labor market. Using a sample of women from internet escort
services, this paper finds two key results. First, white and dark brown skin colors are
underrepresented in this market as compared with the national population and the escort sample is whiter than the population of Mexican women. Second, there is a penalty for darker
skin color in the hourly price women charge: approximately 10 percent for an increase in
skin color of one standard deviation. Weight, skin color, and bust size have the largest effect
on the price charged. In order to measure attractiveness, future studies focusing on the sexual
services market need to account for at least these three variables.
American elections & perceptions of electoral integrity: Citizens’ electoral mistrust is due to conspiratorial beliefs & populist values, irrespective of partisan identification, partisan strength, or affiliation with the losing side
The paranoid style of American elections: explaining perceptions of electoral integrity in an age of populism. Pippa Norris, Holly Ann Garnett & Max Grömping. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, Volume 30, 2020 - Issue 1, Pages 105-125. Jan 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2019.1593181
ABSTRACT: Polls report that, contrary to the evidence, one quarter of Americans believe that millions of illegal votes were cast in the 2016 elections. What explains these types of beliefs? This article tests the predictors of public evaluations of electoral integrity in the 2016 American Presidential election, as measured by judgements about the fairness of the voting processes in the 2016 American National Election Study. We demonstrate that conspiratorial beliefs and populist values contribute towards citizens’ electoral mistrust. The results suggest that the paranoid style of American politics is alive and well in contemporary US elections.
ABSTRACT: Polls report that, contrary to the evidence, one quarter of Americans believe that millions of illegal votes were cast in the 2016 elections. What explains these types of beliefs? This article tests the predictors of public evaluations of electoral integrity in the 2016 American Presidential election, as measured by judgements about the fairness of the voting processes in the 2016 American National Election Study. We demonstrate that conspiratorial beliefs and populist values contribute towards citizens’ electoral mistrust. The results suggest that the paranoid style of American politics is alive and well in contemporary US elections.
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