Wednesday, March 25, 2020

The Greek beautiful boy hovered between a female past and male future; dreamy and removed, oscillating between vigor and languor; synthesis of male and female beauties

The Greek beautiful boy hovered between a female past and male future; dreamy and removed, oscillating between vigor and languor; synthesis of male and female beauties. Camille Paglia's Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson, 1990.

The Athenian cult of beauty had a supreme theme: the beautiful boy. [...]

Though the homosexuality of Greek high culture has been perfectly obvious since Winckelmann, the facts have been suppressed or magnified, depending on period and point of view. Late nineteenth-century aestheticism, for example, was full of heady effusions about "Greek love." Yet Harvard’s green and red Loeb Library translations of classical literature, published early this century, are heavily censored. The pendulum has now swung toward realism. In Greek Homosexuality (1978), K. J. Dover wittily reconstructs from the evidence of vase painting the actual mechanics of sexual practice. But I depart from sociological rationales for Greek love. For me, aesthetics are primary. The Athenian turn away from women toward boys was a brilliant act of conceptualization. Unjust and ultimately self-thwarting, it was nevertheless a crucial movement in the formation of western culture and identity.

The Greek beautiful boy, as I remarked earlier, is one of the west’s great sexual personae. Like Artemis, he has no exact equivalent in other cultures. His cult returns whenever Apollonianism rebounds, as in Italian Renaissance art. The beautiful boy is an androgyne, luminously masculine and feminine. He has male muscle structure but a dewy girlishness. In Greece he inhabited the world of hard masculine action. His body was on view, striving nude in the palestra. Greek athletics, like Greek law, were theater, a public agon. They imposed mathematics on nature: how fast? how far? how strong? The beautiful boy was the focus of Apollonian space. All eyes were on him. His broad-shouldered, narrow-waisted body was a masterwork of Apollonian articulation, every muscle group edged and contoured. There was even a ropy new muscle, looping the hips and genitals. Classic Athens found the fatty female body unbeautiful, because it was not a visible instrument of action. The beautiful boy is Adonis, the Great Mother’s son-lover, now removed from nature and cleansed of the chthonian. Like Athena, he is reborn through males and clad in the Apollonian armour of his own hard body.

Major Greek art begins in the late seventh century B.C. with the Archaic kouros (“youth”), a more than life-size nude statue of a victorious athlete (fig. 12). He is monumental human assertion, imagined in Apollonian stillness. He stands like Pharaoh, fists clenched and one foot forward. But Greek artists wanted their work to breathe and move. What was unchanged for thousands of years in Egypt leaps to life in a single century. The muscles curve and swell; the heavy wiglike hair curls and tufts. The smiling kouros is the first fully free-standing sculpture in art. Strict Egyptian symmetry was preserved until the early classic Kritios Boy , who looks one way while shifting his weight to the opposite leg (fig. 13). In the broken record of Greek artifacts, the Kritios Boy is the last kouros. He is not a type but a real boy, serious and regal. His smooth, shapely body has a white sensuality. The Archaic kouros was always callipygian, the large buttocks more stressed and valued than the face. But the buttocks of the Kritios Boy have a feminine refinement, as erotic as breasts in Venetian painting. The contrapposto flexes one buttock and relaxes the other. The artist imagines them as apple and pear, glowing and compact.

For three hundred years, Greek art is filled with beautiful boys, in stone and bronze. We know the name of none of them. The old- fashioned generic term, “Apollo,” had a certain wisdom, for the solitary, self-supporting kouros was an Apollonian idea, a liberation of the eye. His nudity was polemical. The Archaic kore (“maiden”) was always clothed and utilitarian, one hand proffering a votive plate. The kouros stands heroically bare in Apollonian externality and visibility. Unlike two-dimensional pharaonic sculptures, he invites the strolling spectator to admire him in the round. He is not king or god but human youth. Divinity and stardom fall upon the beautiful boy. Epiphany is secularized and personality ritualized. The kouros records the first cult of personality in western history. It is an icon of the worship of beauty, a hierarchism self-generated rather than dynastic.

The kouros bore strange fruit. From its bold clarity and unity of design came all major Greek sculpture, by the fourth century female as well as male. Hellenic art spread throughout the eastern Mediterranean as Hellenistic art. From that grew medieval Byzantine art in Greece, Turkey, and Italy, with its dour mosaic icons of Christ, Virgin, and saint (fig. 14). The Italian Renaissance begins in the Byzantine style. Thus there is a direct artistic line from Archaic Greek kouroi to the standing saints of Italian altarpieces and the stained-glass windows of Gothic cathedrals. Homoerotic iconicism goes full circle in the popular Italian theme, St. Sebastian, a beautiful seminude youth pierced by phallic arrows (fig. 15). Those arrows are glances of the aggressive western eye, solar shafts of Apollo the archer. The Greek kouros, inheriting Egypt’s cold Apollonian eye, created the great western fusion of sex, power, and personality.

In Greece the beautiful boy was always beardless, frozen in time. At manhood, he became a lover of boys himself. The Greek boy, like the Christian saint, was a martyr, victim of nature’s tyranny. His beauty could not last and so was caught full-flower by Apollonian sculpture. There are hundreds of pots, shards, and graffiti hailing so-and-so kalos, “the beautiful,” flirtatious public praise of males by males. Dover demonstrates the criteria governing depiction of male genitalia, opposite to ours: a small thin penis was fashionable, a large penis vulgar and animalistic. Even brawny Hercules was shown with boy’s genitals.

Therefore, despite its political patriarchy, Athens cannot be considered—horrid word—a phallocracy. On the contrary, the Greek penis was edited down from an exclamation point to a dash. The beautiful boy was desired but not desiring. He occupied a presexual or suprasexual dimension, the Greek aesthetic ideal. In convention, his adult admirer could seek orgasm, while he remained unaroused.

The beautiful boy was an adolescent, hovering between a female past and male future. J. H. Van den Berg claims the eighteenth century invented adolescence. 10 It is true children once passed more directly into adult responsibilities than they do now. In Catholicism, for example, seven is the dawn of moral consciousness. After one’s First Communion, it’s hell or high water. Brooding identity crises were indeed the Romantic creations of Rousseau and Goethe. But Van den Berg is wrong to make adolescence entirely modem. The Greeks saw it and formalized it in art. Greek pederasty honored the erotic magnetism of male adolescents in a way that today brings the police to the door. Children are more conscious and perverse than parents like to think. I agree with Bruce Benderson that children can and do choose. The adolescent male, one step over puberty, is dreamy and removed, oscillating between vigor and languor. He is a girl-boy, masculinity shimmering and blurred, as if seen through a cloudy fragment of ancient glass. J. Z. Eglinton cites images of youthful “bloom” in Greek poetry: “The adolescent in bloom is a synthesis of male and female beauties.” 11 The slightly older ephebos gained in gravity but retained a half-feminine glamour. We see it in the pedimental Apollo, the Delphic Charioteer, the bronze Apollo at Chatsworth, the white-lekythos Eretrian warrior seated before a gravestone. These youths have a distinctly ancient Greek face: high brow, strong straight nose, girlishly fleshy cheeks, full petulant mouth, and short upper lip. It is the face of Elvis Presley, Lord Byron, and Bronzino’s glossy Mannerist blue boy. Freud saw the androgyny in the Greek adolescent: “Among the Greeks, where the most manly men were found among inverts, it is quite obvious that it was not the masculine character of the boy which kindled the love of man; it was his physical resemblance to woman as well as his feminine psychic qualities, such as shyness, demureness, and the need of instruction and help.” 12 Certain boys, especially blondes, seem to carry adolescent beauty into adulthood. They form an enduring class of homosexual taste that I call the Billy Budd topos, fresh, active, and ephebic.

The beautiful boy is the Greek angel, a celestial visitor from the Apollonian realm. His purity is inadvertently revealed in Joseph Campbell’s negative critique of fifth-century Athens: “Everything that we read of it has a wonderful adolescent atmosphere of opalescent, timeless skies—untouched by the vulgar seriousness of a heterosexual commitment to mere life. The art, too, of the lovely standing nude, for all its grace and charm, is finally neuter—like the voice of a singing boy.” Campbell quotes Heinrich Zimmer’s praise of the “heterosexual flavor” and yogic awareness of Hindu sculpture: “Greek art was derived from experiences of the eye; Hindu from those of the circulation of the blood.” 13 Campbell’s “neuter” is a blank, a moral nothing. But the beautiful boy’s androgyny is visionary and exalted. Let us take Campbell’s own example, “the voice of a singing boy.” In a Seraphim recording of Faure’s Requiem that substitutes the King’s College choir for the usual women, the treble parts are taken by boys from eight to thirteen. Alec Robertson’s review seeks a tonality of emotion for which our only language is religious: boys’ voices “add an unforgettable radiance and serenity to their part, impossible to sopranos, however good”; the soloist’s singing has “an ethereal beauty that no words can describe.” 14 The rosy English or Austrian choirboy, disciplined, reserved, and heart- stoppingly beautiful, is a symbol of spiritual and sexual illumination, fused in the idealizing Greek manner. We see the same thing in Botticelli’s exquisite long-haired boy-angels. These days, especially in America, boy-love is not only scandalous and criminal but somehow in bad taste. On the evening news, one sees handcuffed teachers, priests, or Boy Scout leaders hustled into police vans. Therapists call them maladjusted, emotionally immature. But beauty has its own laws, inconsistent with Christian morality. As a woman, I feel free to protest that men today are pilloried for something that was rational and honorable in Greece at the height of civilization.

The Greek beautiful boy was a living idol of the Apollonian eye. As a sexual persona, the kouros represents that tense relation betweeen eye and object that I saw in Nefertiti and that was absent in the Venus of Willendorf, with her easy, forgiving, spongy female amplitude. Zimmer correctly opposes heterosexual Hindu “circulation of the blood” to Greek aesthetics of the eye. The beautiful boy is a rebuke to mother nature, an escape from the labyrinth of the body, with its murky womb and bowels. Woman is the Dionysian miasma, the world of fluids, the chthonian swamp of generation. Athens, says Campbell, was “untouched by the vulgar seriousness of a heterosexual commitment to mere life.” Yes, mere life is indeed rejected by the idealizing Apollonian mode. It is the divine human privilege to make ideas greater than nature. We are bom into the indignities of the body, with its relentless inner movements pushing us moment by moment toward death. Greek Apollonianism, freezing the human form into absolute male externality, is a triumph of mind over matter. Apollo, slaying the Python at Delphi, the navel of the world, halts the flood of time, for the coiled serpent we carry in our abdomen is the eternal wave-motion of female fluidity. Every beautiful boy is an Icarus seeking the Apollonian sun. He escapes the labyrinth only to fall into nature’s sea of dissolution.

Cults of beauty have been persistently homosexual from antiquity to today’s hair salons and houses of couture. Professional beautification of women by homosexual men is a systematic reconceptualizing of the brute facts of female nature. As at the nineteenth-century fin de siecle, the aesthete is always male, never female. There is no lesbian parallel to Greek worship of the adolescent. The great Sappho may have fallen in love with girls, but to all evidence she internalized rather than externalized her passions. Her most famous poem invents the hostile distance between sexual personae that will have so long a history in western love poetry. Gazing across a room at her beloved sitting with a man, she suffers a physical convulsion of jealousy, humiliation, and helpless resignation. This separation is not the aesthetic distance of Apollonian Athens but a desert of emotional deprivation. It is a gap that can be closed—as Aphrodite laughingly promises Sappho in another poem. Lascivious delectation of the eye is conspicuously missing in female eroticism. Visionary idealism is a male art form. The lesbian aesthete does not exist. But if there were one, she would have learned from the perverse male mind. The eye-intense pursuit of beauty is an Apollonian correction of life in our mother-born bodies.

The beautiful boy, suspended in time, is physicality without physiology. He does not eat, drink, or reproduce. Dionysus is deeply immersed in time—rhythm, music, dance, drunkenness, gluttony, orgy. The beautiful boy as angel floats above the turmoil of nature. Angels, in Judaism too, defy chthonian femaleness. This is why the angel, though sexless, is always a youthful male. Eastern religion does not have our angels of incorporeal purity, for two reasons. A “messenger” (angelos) or mediator between the divine and human is unnecessary, since the two realms are coexistent. Second, eastern femaleness is symbolically equivalent to and harmonious with maleness—though this has never improved real women’s social status.

The pink-cheeked beautiful boy is emotional vernality, spring only. He is a partial statement about reality. He is exclusive, a product of aristocratic taste. He flees the superfluity of matter, the womb of female nature devouring and spewing out creatures. Dionysus, we noted, is “the Many,” all-inclusive and ever-changing. Life’s totality is summer and winter, floridity and devastation. The Great Mother is both seasons in her benevolent and malevolent halves. If the beautiful boy is pink and white, she is the red and purple of her labial maw. The beautiful boy represents a hopeless attempt to separate imagination from death and decay. He is form seceding from form-making, natura naturata dreaming itself free of natura naturans. As an epiphany, eye-created, he binds up the many into a transient vision of the one, like art itself.

Besides the Kritios Boy , the preeminent examples of this persona are the bronze Benevento Boy of the Louvre (fig. 16), the Antinous sculptures commissioned by the emperor Hadrian (fig. 17), Donatello’s David, and Thomas Mann’s Tadzio in Death in Venice. The Apollonian is a mode of silence, suppressing rhythm to focus the eye. The beautiful boy, sexually self-complete, is sealed in silence, behind a wall of aristocratic disdain. The adolescent dreaminess of the Antinous sculptures is not true inwardness but a melancholy premonition of death. Antinous drowned, like Icarus. The beautiful boy dreams but neither thinks nor feels. His eyes fix on nothing. His face is a pale oval upon which nothing is written. A real person could not remain at this stage without decadence and mummification. The beautiful boy is cruel in his indifference, remoteness, and serene self-containment. We rarely see these things in a girl, but when we do, as in the magnificent portrait photographs of the young Virginia Woolf, we sense catatonia and autism. Narcissistic beauty in a postadolescent (like Hitchcock’s Mamie) may mean malice and ruthlessness, a psychopathic amorality. There is danger in beauty.

The beautiful boy has flowing or richly textured hyacinthine hair, the only luxuriance in this chastity. Long male hair, sometimes wrapped round the head, was an aristocratic fashion in Athens. Antinous’ thick hair is crisply layered, as in Van Dyck’s silky princes or Seventies rock stars. In its artful negligence and allure, the hair traps the beholder’s eye. It is a nimbus, a pre-Christian halo, scintillating with fiery flakes of stars. The beautiful boy, glittering with charisma, is matter transformed, penetrated by Apollonian light. Greek visionary materialism makes hard crystal of our gross fleshiness. The beautiful boy is without motive force or deed; hence he is not a hero. Because of his emotional detachment, he is not a heroine. He occupies an ideal space between male and female, effect and affect. Like the Olympians, he is an objet d'art , which also affects without acting or being acted upon. The beautiful boy is the product of chance or destiny, a sport thrown up by the universe. He is, I suggested, a secular saint. Light makes beautiful boys incandescent. Divinity swoops down to ennoble them, like the eagle falling upon Ganymede, who is kidnapped to Olympus, unlike the pack of female lovers like Leda whom Zeus casually abandons as types of the generative mother.

In the Phaedrus, Plato sets forth Greek homosexuality’s ritualization of the eye. Socrates says the man who gazes upon “a god-like countenance or physical form,” a copy of “true beauty,” is overcome by a shudder of awe, “an unusual fever and perspiration”: “Beholding it, he reverences it as he would a god; and if he were not afraid of being accounted stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to the beloved as to a holy image of divinity.” 15 Beauty is the first step of a ladder leading to God. Writing in the fourth century about memories of the fifth, Plato is already postclassical. He is suspicious of art, which he banishes from his ideal republic. Visionary materialism has failed. In the Phaedrus, however, we still see the aesthetic distance vibrating between Greek personae. Plato has Sappho’s fever, but it is cooled by the dominating and dominated western eye. In Greece, beauty was sacred and ugliness or deformity hateful. When Odysseus bludgeons Thersites, a lame, hunchback commoner, Homer’s heroes laugh. Christ’s ministry to the lepers was unthinkable in Greek terms. In the Greek cult of beauty, there was mystical elevation and hierarchical submission, but significantly without moral obligation.

Mental Time Travel: Thoughts about the present (on average highly happy & pleasant but low in meaningfulness) were frequent, thoughts about the future also were common, thoughts about the past were rare

Everyday Thoughts in Time: Experience Sampling Studies of Mental Time Travel. Roy F. Baumeister et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, March 25, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220908411

Abstract: Time is among the most important yet mysterious aspects of experience. We investigated everyday mental time travel, especially into the future. Two community samples, contacted at random points for 3 (Study 1; 6,686 reports) and 14 days (Study 2; 2,361 reports), reported on their most recent thought. Both studies found that thoughts about the present were frequent, thoughts about the future also were common, whereas thoughts about the past were rare. Thoughts about the present were on average highly happy and pleasant but low in meaningfulness. Pragmatic prospection (thoughts preparing for action) was evident in thoughts about planning and goals. Thoughts with no time aspect were lower in sociality and experiential richness. Thoughts about the past were relatively unpleasant and involuntary. Subjective experiences of thinking about past and future often were similar—while both differed from present focus, consistent with views that memory and prospection use similar mental structures.

Keywords: time, prospection, social cognition, future

Check also  The major purpose that episodic counterfactual thinking serves is mood regulation: to daydream and to feel better
Branch, Jared. 2020. “Involuntary Mental Time Travel into the Episodic Future, Episodic Past, and Episodic Counterfactual Past in Everyday Life.” PsyArXiv. January 27. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/01/the-major-purpose-that-episodic.html

“Fake news” sharing is fueled by the same psychological motivations that drive other forms of partisan behavior, including sharing partisan news from traditional and credible news sources

Osmundsen, Mathias, Alexander Bor, Peter B. Vahlstrup, Anja Bechmann, and Michael Bang Petersen. 2020. “Partisan Polarization Is the Primary Psychological Motivation Behind “fake News” Sharing on Twitter” PsyArXiv. March 25. doi:10.31234/osf.io/v45bk

Abstract: The rise of “fake news” is a major concern in contemporary Western democracies. Yet, research on the psychological motivations behind the spread of “fake news” on social media is surprisingly limited. Are citizens who share fake news ignorant and lazy? Are they fueled by sinister motives, seeking to disrupt the social status quo? Or do they seek to attack partisan opponents in an increasingly polarized political environment? This manuscript is the first to test these competing hypotheses based on a careful mapping of psychological profiles linked to behavioral data and a sentiment analysis of shared news headlines from over 2,300 American Twitter users. The findings contradict the ignorance perspective, but provide some support for the disruption perspective and strong support for the partisan polarization perspective. Thus, individuals who report hating their political opponents are the most likely to share “fake news.” Overall, our findings demonstrate that “fake news” sharing is fueled by the same psychological motivations that drive other forms of partisan behavior, including sharing partisan news from traditional and credible news sources.


Moral preference for agents acting with well-understood motives performing an additional immoral act compared to agents performing an action in an unusual way (e.g., striking a man with a frozen fish)

Walker, Alexander C., Martin H. Turpin, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Igor Grossmann, and Michal Bialek. 2020. “Better the Two Devils You Know, Than the One You Don’t: Predictability Influences Moral Judgment.” PsyArXiv. March 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/w4y8f

Abstract: Across four studies (N = 1,806), we demonstrate the role that perceptions of predictability play in judgments of moral character, finding that participants judged agents they perceived as less predictable to also be less moral. In Studies 1-3, participants judged hypothetical agents performing an immoral action (e.g., assault) for an unintelligible reason as less predictable and less moral than agents performing the same immoral action for a well-understood yet immoral reason. Notably, we observed a moral preference for agents acting with well-understood motives despite these agents performing an additional immoral act (e.g., theft) compared to their unpredictable counterparts. In Study 4 we find that agents performing an action in an unusual way (e.g., striking a man with a frozen fish) are judged as less predictable and less moral compared to agents performing the same action in a common manner (e.g., striking a man with their fist). These results challenge dominant monist theories of moral psychology, which reduce morality to a single dimension (e.g., harm) as well as pluralist accounts which fail to consider the role predictability plays in moral judgments. We propose that predictability contributes to judgments of moral character for its ultimate role in facilitating cooperation and discuss how the present findings may be accommodated by theories of morality-as-cooperation.

Tuesday, March 24, 2020

People exhibit exponential-growth bias, overconfidence in calculating exponential growth, overconfidence in ability to use spreadsheets, & low demand for tools/services that improve financial decisions

Exponential-growth bias and overconfidence. Matthew R. Levy, Joshua Tasoff. Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 58, February 2017, Pages 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.11.001

Highlights
• We measure exponential-growth bias and overconfidence in a laboratory experiment.
• People exhibit exponential-growth bias.
• People exhibit overconfidence in their ability to calculate exponential growth.
• People exhibit overconfidence in their ability to use a spreadsheet.
• The results suggest insufficient demand for help and tools.

Abstract: There is increasing evidence that people underestimate the magnitude of compounding interest. However, if people were aware of their inability to make such calculations they should demand services to ameliorate the consequences of such deficiencies. In a laboratory experiment, we find that people exhibit substantial exponential-growth bias but, more importantly, that they are overconfident in their ability to answer questions that involve exponential growth. They also exhibit overconfidence in their ability to use a spreadsheet to answer these questions. This evidence explains why a market solution to exponential-growth bias has not been forthcoming. Biased individuals have suboptimally low demand for tools and services that could improve their financial decisions.

Keywords: Exponential-growth biasOverconfidenceFinancial literacyOverestimationOverprecision
JEL classification D03 D14 D18



The COVID-2019 Outbreak: Amplification of Public Health Consequences by Media Exposure

Garfin, D. R., Silver, R. C., & Holman, E. A. (2020). The novel coronavirus (COVID-2019) outbreak: Amplification of public health consequences by media exposure. Health Psychology. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hea0000875

Abstract: The 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-2019) has led to a serious outbreak of often severe respiratory disease, which originated in China and has quickly become a global pandemic, with far-reaching consequences that are unprecedented in the modern era. As public health officials seek to contain the virus and mitigate the deleterious effects on worldwide population health, a related threat has emerged: global media exposure to the crisis. We review research suggesting that repeated media exposure to community crisis can lead to increased anxiety, heightened stress responses that can lead to downstream effects on health, and misplaced health-protective and help-seeking behaviors that can overburden health care facilities and tax available resources. We draw from work on previous public health crises (i.e., Ebola and H1N1 outbreaks) and other collective trauma (e.g., terrorist attacks) where media coverage of events had unintended consequences for those at relatively low risk for direct exposure, leading to potentially severe public health repercussions. We conclude with recommendations for individuals, researchers, and public health officials with respect to receiving and providing effective communications during a public health crisis.

Greater catastrophising in individuals who report a psychiatric diagnosis or use of psychiatric medication

Pike, Alexandra C., Jade Serfaty, and Oliver J. Robinson. 2020. “The Development and Psychometric Properties of a Self-report Catastrophising Questionnaire.” PsyArXiv. March 24

Abstract: Catastrophising can be defined as imagining or predicting the worst possible outcome. It has been shown to be related to psychiatric symptoms such as depression and anxiety, yet there are no self-report questionnaires specifically measuring it outside the context of pain research. Here, we therefore develop the Catastrophising Questionnaire, a comprehensive self-report measure of general catastrophising. Across four experiments (total n=734), using a combination of exploratory then confirmatory factor analysis, we conclude 1) that our questionnaire is best fit by a single factor structure; and that 2) catastrophising is independent from other self-reported psychiatric symptoms. Moreover, we demonstrate 3) greater catastrophising in individuals who report a psychiatric diagnosis (t139.12=8.54, p<.001) or use of psychiatric medication (t67.44=7.53, p<.001). Finally, we demonstrate that 4) our Catastrophising Questionnaire has good test-retest reliability (ICC(A,1)=0.77, p<.001). Critically, we can now, for the first time, measure aspects of this debilitating psychiatric symptom.

Multiple asymmetries in the way people endorse positive and negative "belief in a just world" statements for the past and the future that concern the self or other people

Symmetries and asymmetries in the belief in a just world. Mariia Kaliuzhna. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 161, July 15 2020, 109940. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109940

Abstract: Despite evidence to the contrary, people have a need to represent the world as a just and fair place where prosocial behaviour is rewarded and negative acts are punished. This cognitive bias is termed the Belief in a Just World (BJW). Previous research assumes the BJW to be symmetrical, i.e., one believes to the same extent that a negative action will be punished and that negative events in one's life are punishments for previous negative actions. Similarly, good deeds are expected to be rewarded and positive events are interpreted as rewards for previous positive actions. The present work tests this symmetry assumption. We show multiple asymmetries in the way people endorse positive and negative BJW statements for the past and the future that concern the self or other people. The results are discussed in terms of the interaction of BJW with other cognitive biases.

Keywords: Belief in a Just WorldJust dessertsKarmaOptimism biasSelf-serving bias


11. Discussion

In the present paper we explored the symmetry of the Belief in a Just World, summarised by the assertion that people not only get what they deserve but also deserve what they get (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019Hafer & Sutton, 2016Lerner, 19651980Lerner & Miller, 1978Sabag & Schmitt, 2016Schindler et al., 2019). In four surveys, we studied BJW about positive and negative events in the past and in the future for self and others.
One robust finding across all the surveys is the asymmetry between negative prospective and retrospective questions. Thus, participants more readily made the connection between doing a bad deed and getting retribution than between a negative event in one's life and a previous bad deed. Previous research shows that recollected memories are more detailed than imagined events (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004Johnson et al., 1988), and that imagining the future requires a constructive and, possibly effortful, process (Schacter & Addis, 2007Szpunar et al., 2007). One could thus hypothesise that the retrospective link would be easier to construct and we would observe the opposite pattern. However, when making the prospective link (i.e., do a bad deed – be punished) one does not necessarily have to imagine specific details for the future (i.e., what kind of punishment one would incur as a result of a negative deed), thus no additional cognitive effort is solicited. When in the retrospective condition, on the other hand, one needs to make a link between a negative event and a specific negative act that could have caused it (i.e. go through memories of one's behaviour). It is then possible that the cognitive load of recollecting instances of past behaviour and their differing accessibility resulted in participants’ judging the retrospective condition as less plausible. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, previous research shows that ease of information retrieval and processing fluency lead to higher statement endorsement and confidence in them (Bonnefond et al., 2014Cummins, 1995Oppenheimer, 2008Weingarten & Hutchinson, 2018).
The retrospective/prospective asymmetry for negative events could additionally reflect a self-serving bias. Previous research shows that positive autobiographical memories are reported twice as often as negative autobiographical memories (Berntsen et al., 2011Seidlitz & Diener, 1993Walker et al., 2003). This memory bias could result in a representation of oneself as a positive person, making it difficult to recollect (or imagine, as in our task) a negative deed in the past. Thus, one would more readily concede that a negative deed could bring about a negative event, than that negative events represent one's past negative acts, as the person represents themselves as a good person. The impact of the self-serving bias is particularly evident when comparing baseline positive and negative questions (questions 5 & 6 in Experiment 1 & 3, and questions 3 in Experiment 2). Indeed, participants rated the probability of positive events as higher than that of negative events, and this distinction was even more pronounced when the questions were framed in terms of deservingness – a result consistent with the optimism bias (Sharot, 2011Sharot & Garrett, 2016).
These interpretations, however, do not appear plausible for our Experiment 4, where specific negative deeds and events were presented to participants, precluding memory search, and we still observed the same asymmetry. Similarly, Experiment 3 which tapped into BJW for others, should not have triggered a self-serving bias. However, the wording of the questions in Experiment 3 (“somebody”, “this person”) might have led participants to include themselves in the interpretation, engaging the self-serving bias (thus the only “clean” other BJW condition would be in Experiment 4). Similar ambiguity has been reported for BJW-general vs BJW-self questionnaires, as the general BJW includes both oneself and other people (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019Lipkusa et al., 1996Wenzel et al., 2017).
The second result of the present experiments concerns the symmetry between positive prospective and retrospective conditions. Similar to the negative asymmetry, across experiments participants tended to give higher scores in the prospective than in the retrospective condition. This result, however, was less pronounced and consistent than for negative asymmetry: a significant difference in the mentioned direction was only observed in Experiment 2 and 3. A similar explanation as for the negative asymmetry could be invoked: the cognitive load of retrieving past instances of good behaviour that could be rewarded resulted in lower endorsement ratings for the retrospective condition, compared to the prospective condition. This result might be less pronounced than for the negative questions because the self-serving bias is not involved – that is, the questions did not provoke a need to foster a positive image of oneself (Bradley, 1978Mezulis et al., 2004).
The third asymmetry we observed showed that participants tended to give higher scores for positive than negative statements (especially retrospective questions), a result that could again be due to the self-serving bias (i.e., the desire for a positive representation of oneself (Bradley, 1978Mezulis et al., 2004), as well as the optimism bias – the overestimation of the probability of encountering positive events (Morewedge et al., 2005Sharot, 2011Sharot & Garrett, 2016) and biased recollection of positive events (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992Mischel et al., 1976Seidlitz & Diener, 1993). Interestingly, this result was absent in Experiment 4. We believe this result might highlight the implicit (irrational, preconscious)/explicit (rational, conscious) distinction in the BJW literature. Lerner (1998) draws this distinction emphasising that most adults do not actually believe that the world is just, but have the need to reduce the anxiety of living in an unpredictable world by re-establishing justice through cognitive scripts (Lerner, 1998). Thus, when the impact of the self-serving bias (implicit effect) is reduced (due to the use of situations not involving the self as in our Experiment 4) it is the prospective negative situation (do a bad deed – get punished) that is endorsed the most. In line with previous studies showing increased cognitive processing and significance of negative events ( HYPERLINK \l "bib6" Baumeister et al., 2001 ), the negative statements in Experiment 4 would thus appear more representative of the way participants perceive the world (i.e. as harbouring an increased probability for negative events).
Interestingly, the above asymmetries are represented in folk psychology by the notion of “karma” (that appears to have a predominantly negative connotation) and prospectively formulated proverbs (also appearing predominantly negative): he who digs a pit will fall into it; old sins cast long shadows; you reap what you sow; before you begin the journey of revenge, dig two graves; every man's sin falls on his own head; harm set, harm get; what goes around comes around; etc. It is unclear whether participants’ responses in our surveys were driven by the exposure frequency to such sayings, resulting in higher endorsement of similarly phrased prospective statements, or whether a common mechanism explains the preference for prospective moral representations. Importantly, although previous research shows that karma beliefs and BJW are distinct phenomena, it has also been reported that karma beliefs were specifically associated with perceived causality for negative events following bad behaviour ( HYPERLINK \l "bib74" White, Norenzayan & Schaller, 2019 ), i.e. our prospective condition. Although we did not explicitly measure karma beliefs in our participants, this could explain why in this experiment they scored the highest on this prospective condition.
Finally, the asymmetry for BJW between self and other is difficult to interpret based on our results. Previous work shows a pronounced asymmetry between self and other BJW, which relate to different aspects of behaviour and personality (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019Lipkusa et al., 1996Schindler et al., 2019Wenzel et al., 2017). As mentioned above, Experiment 3 might not be considered as solely representing judgements for other people, but also includes implicit judgement about the self. Comparing Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, we find that participants scored higher in Experiment 3 (other) in the deservingness survey for positive prospective, retrospective and baseline questions. Interestingly, Experiment 4, which we consider to be a “cleaner” other condition, yielded the lowest endorsement rates for all the questions, as compared to the other three experiments. This is consistent with previous work that shows that participants report higher scores for self BJW than for general BJW (reviewed in Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019Lipkusa et al., 1996Wenzel et al., 2017), meaning that self-relevant questions are endorsed to a higher degree than questions concerning others.
In accordance with previous research, our results indicate an association between BJW and religiosity (Dalbert & Katona-Sallay, 1996Kunst, Bjorck & Tan, 2000Szmajke, 1991White et al., 2019): most questions in our surveys positively correlated with the belief in God. Disentangling the relationship between BJW and religiosity was not the primary aim of the present research; however, it confirms the previously reported association between the two.
Our results yield several implications. First, the assumed symmetry of the BJW, reported since Lerner first introduced the phenomenon, and up to the most recent papers in 2019 (Armstrong, 2019Schindler et al., 2019Westfall et al., 2019), does not hold. Participants appear to endorse the prospective BJW “do -> get” more than the retrospective “got -> did” BJW. It would be of interest to examine what influences this asymmetry, and how it interacts with other domains, affected by the BJW, for example, life satisfaction (Ucar, Hasta & Malatyali, 2019), antisocial behaviour (Schindler et al., 2019Wenzel et al., 2017) or social judgements of value (Alves, Pereira, Sutton & Correia, 2019).
Specifically, the finding that the retrospective negative condition was endorsed the lowest among the other target conditions may have some hope for the adverse effects of BJW, such as victim blaming. Making people's retrospective BJW explicit might help reduce their perceptions that someone else's apparently arbitrary misfortunes are caused by some previous misdeeds (Landström et al., 2016Vonderhaar & Carmody, 2015).
Second, the above has larger implications for the information processing theories, which invoke implicational molecules (Kruglanski, 2013Loken & Weyer, 1983Wyer, 2019Wyer & Carlston, 2018Wyer, 2006). Our direct survey approach shows that beliefs bound together by psychological implication are not necessarily all endorsed to the same degree, thus calling for a refinement of the theory.
Third, BJW seems to be asymmetrically affected by religiosity and the belief in karma (i.e. the prospective negative condition is more endorsed than others). Future research could test whether the asymmetries we observed are present across different cultures that endorse the karma belief to a different extent.
Finally, BJW is a complex belief that interacts with other cognitive biases and personality traits. Previous research in the latter domains has used computational modelling to identify the circumstances under which participants’ behaviour departs from optimality (Eil & Rao, 2011Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus & Rosenblat, 2011). A similar normative approach could be beneficial to represent the complexity of BJW, an approach that surprisingly has not been applied in this field. Hierarchical Bayesian models could be used to formalise participants’ predictions about future events based on their prior knowledge, and how new information (confirming or disconfirming the priors) is integrated. Such an approach will shed new light on the debate about whether belief formation and change in neurotypical individuals follows the rules of Bayesian optimality (Tappin & Gadsby, 2019).

Keeping a smartphone in hand and frequent checking is linked to extraversion and poorer performance on tests of sustained attention and general intelligence, particularly semantic reasoning

Pluck, Graham. 2020. “Cognitive Ability, Reward Processing and Personality Associated with Different Aspects of Smartphone Use.” PsyArXiv. March 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/sqfu2

Abstract: Smartphone use has become ubiquitous. Keeping smartphones close and always on, with alerts for new messages, etc., means that users experience unprecedented levels of distracting and reinforcing stimulation, with wide-ranging psychological implications. We interviewed 121 students to record aspects of smartphone use, personality, psychological distress (depression/anxiety), cognitive, social-cognitive, and reward processing. We found that questionnaire-measured problematic phone use is linked to poorer academic performance and to higher psychological distress, neuroticism, psychometric impulsivity and image management. Social media use is linked to neuroticism. Keeping a smartphone in hand and frequent checking is associated with extraversion and poorer performance on tests of sustained attention and general intelligence, particularly semantic reasoning. The number of messenger services used is associated with sensitivity to financial rewards and responses to social reinforcement in an instrumental/operant conditioning task. However, the later result links messenger use to resistance to reinforcement, implying a goal-directed association driven by demand characteristics. Overall, the current results, and review of extant literature, suggest that there are generally negative impacts of smartphone use on psychological health, including cognitive function. Furthermore, variation in responses to reward and reinforcement is an important individual differences factor linked particularly to social communication with instant messaging services.


Los Angeles & SARS-CoV-2 restrictions: Significant decrease in robberies (-23%/-24%), shoplifting (-14%/-15%), thefts (-9.1%/-9.6%), and overall trend of crimes (-5.4%/-5.6%)

Campedelli, Gian M., Alberto Aziani, and Serena Favarin. 2020. “Exploring the Effect of 2019-ncov Containment Policies on Crime: The Case of Los Angeles.” OSF Preprints. March 23. doi:10.31219/osf.io/gcpq8

Abstract: The global spread of 2019-nCoV, a new virus belonging to the coronavirus family, forced national and local governments to apply different sets of measures aimed at containing the outbreak. Los Angeles has been one of the first cities in the United States to declare the state of emergency on March 4th, progressively issuing stronger policies involving (among the others) social distancing, the prohibition of crowded private and public gatherings and closure of leisure premises. These interventions highly disrupt and modify daily activities and habits, urban mobility and micro-level interactions between citizens. One of the many social phenomena that could be influenced by such measures is crime. Exploiting public data on crime in Los Angeles, and relying on routine activity and pattern theories of crime, this work investigates whether and how new coronavirus containment policies have an impact on crime trends in a metropolis. The article specifically focuses on eight urban crime categories, daily monitored from January 1st 2017 to March 16th 2020. The analyses will be updated bi-weekly to dynamically assess the shortand medium-term effects of these interventions to shed light on how crime adapts to such structural modification of the environment. Finally, policy implications are also discussed.

Monday, March 23, 2020

The Emotional Path to Action: Empathy Promotes Physical Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Pfattheicher, Stefan, Laila Nockur, Robert Böhm, Claudia Sassenrath, and Michael Bang Petersen. 2020. “The Emotional Path to Action: Empathy Promotes Physical Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/y2cg5

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic presents a major challenge to societies all over the globe. To curb the spread of the disease, one measure implemented in many countries is minimizing close contact between people (“physical distancing”). Engaging in physical distancing is a prosocial act in the sense that it helps protecting other individuals, especially those most vulnerable to the virus. Building on this notion, we tested the idea that physical distancing can be the result of a genuine prosocial motivation—empathy for those most vulnerable to the virus. In three pre-registered studies that include samples from the US, the UK, and Germany (total N = 2,192‬) collected at the beginning of the outbreak, we show that (i) empathy is indeed a basic motivation for physical distancing, and (ii) inducing empathy for those most vulnerable to the virus promotes the motivation to adhere to physical distancing. In sum, the present research provides a better understanding of the basic motivation underlying the willingness to follow one important measure during the COVID-19 pandemic. We further point to the potential for policymakers to use empathy to promote physical distancing – in this way to increase the chance of saving lives.

Money does not stink: Analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money

Money does not stink: Using unpleasant odors as stimulus material changes risky decision making. Bettina von Helversen  Géraldine Coppin  Benjamin Scheibehenne. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, March 23 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2178

Abstract: Odors are strong elicitors of affect, and they play an important role in guiding human behavior, such as avoiding fire or spoiled food. However, little is known about how risky decision making changes when stimuli are olfactory. We investigated this question in an experimental study of risky decision making with unpleasant odors and monetary losses in a fully incentivized task with real outcomes. Odor and monetary decisions were matched so that monetary losses corresponded to the amount of money participants were willing to pay to avoid smelling an odor. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money. These results highlight the importance of taking the sensory modality into account when studying risky decision making.

5 DISCUSSION

To reach a better understanding of how decision making changes when outcomes are affect rich, unpleasant, olfactory stimuli compared with monetary losses, we asked participants in a laboratory experiment to make a series of decisions involving real consequences (monetary losses or smelling unpleasant odors) that were matched in subjective value. On a behavioral level, participants were more likely to choose the more risky option in the monetary gambles than in the odor gambles, suggesting that participants were less sensitive to differences in probabilities with odor gambles. In line with these findings, modeling participants' choices with CPT using a Bayesian hierarchical approach showed a more strongly curved probability weighting function for odors than for monetary gambles. These results correspond to the literature on the changes in decision processes when outcomes are affect rich (e.g., Lejarraga et al., 2016; Pachur et al., 2014; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Suter et al., 2016). They suggest that in decisions involving affect‐rich odors, participants' decision processes are less sensitive to probabilities. This result extends previous findings by Stancak et al. (2015) that unpleasant odors can increase loss aversion by showing that olfactory outcomes can also affect the subjective weighting or perception of probabilities. These insights are of direct importance for situations in which outcomes are olfactory. Furthermore, they support the initial findings by Ditto et al. (2006) showing a change in decision making when outcomes included an olfactory dimension. This suggests that odors will also affect risky decision making in situations in which odors are an integral and important feature of the outcomes, as in partner or food choice, for instance, when deciding whether food is still edible past its expiration date.
Moreover, our study provides clear evidence that affect‐rich outcomes change sensitivity to probabilities even when outcomes are real and decisions consequential. By using choices with real consequences, we were able to investigate whether the choices participants made with money and odors differed in “quality” in the sense that they affected the likelihood of losing. Participants chose the gamble with the higher expected value less frequently in the odor gambles than in the monetary gambles. Furthermore, participants for whom the payout gamble was an odor gamble were more likely to incur a loss than participants for whom the payout gamble was a monetary gamble. Thus, participants may be less able to choose options that maximize their earnings when decision outcomes contain affect‐rich outcomes such as unpleasant odors.
Although our results dovetail with those of previous studies using affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), there were some noteworthy differences from studies that used real affect‐rich outcomes: Specifically, Krawczyk (2015) and Berns et al. (20072008) did not find a decrease in sensitivity for the probabilities of affect‐rich outcomes. Krawczyk used vouchers in his study and measured affect richness with how excited participants were about receiving the voucher. Possibly, the observed differences between affect‐rich and affect‐poor vouchers in this study reflected differences not only in affect but also in perceived utility.
For the differences from the studies by Berns et al. (20072008), there are at least two possible explanations. First, Berns et al. investigated risky decisions using real affect‐rich outcomes (i.e., electric shocks) but did not have a monetary control group and thus compared their findings with parameter estimates for gamma parameters within CPT reported in the literature (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In our study, we found differences in probability weighting, but the average probability weighting function estimated for the odor gambles actually resembled the parameter estimates reported in the above‐mentioned studies more closely than the probability weighting function in the monetary gambles. 7 Thus, it is possible that in the studies by Berns et al., differences in probability weighting would have appeared if the same gambles had been presented with matched monetary outcomes. Second, in Berns et al.'s studies, participants received immediate feedback after each choice, whereas in our task, participants experienced the odor at the beginning but then did not receive feedback until the payout gamble selected at the end of the experiment. Perhaps differences in probability weighting diminish over time when participants experience real affect‐rich outcomes repeatedly.
In addition, there are some limitations of our study. First, we had to exclude 20% of our participants because they did not perceive the odors as unpleasant enough to be willing to spend money to avoid smelling them again. Although we tried to include only participants with a normal sense of smell, we used a self‐report measure. Thus, it is possible that these (or some of these) participants had a reduced sensitivity to odors that they were not aware of or not willing to disclose. Regarding the generalizability of our results, it could mean that the overall influence of odors on decisions is less strong than our results indicate. Second, we equated monetary losses and unpleasant odors based on participants' WTP judgments. This relies on the assumption that participants are able to accurately price smelling an unpleasant odor. Difficulties in setting a price for smelling an unpleasant odor might have driven the differences in choices, suggesting an alternative explanation for why odors or affect‐rich outcomes in general lead to different choices than monetary outcomes (see also McGraw et al., 2010). What speaks against this explanation is that people's evaluations of unpleasant odors do not seem to change much over time and are not affected by familiarity (Delplanque et al., 2008; Delplanque, Coppin, Bloesch, Cayeux, & Sander, 2015), and participants' WTPs in our study were highly correlated with their odor ratings. Third, we used a combination of choice data and mathematical modeling to understand the changes in risky taking. However, to fully understand the cognitive processes underlying the observed changes in choices, we would need to use process‐tracing methods, such as eye tracking or mouse tracking, which would allow us to investigate whether the observed differences in risky decision making can be traced to information processing, such as the attention allocated to outcomes (e.g., Lejarraga, Schulte‐Mecklenbeck, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2019; Pachur, Schulte‐Mecklenbeck, Murphy, & Hertwig, 2018). Finally, in our study, outcomes were odors, whereas in many decisions such as when evaluating food items, a new car, or clothes that still smell of the chemicals used for dying, odors will be just one attribute of the outcome. Here, it will be important in the future to test whether odors still affect the sensitivity to probabilities when other attributes also influence the overall utility of an option.
In conclusion, our study shows a qualitative change in decision processes for affect‐rich olfactory outcomes, leading to a reduced sensitivity to probabilities. These results highlight the importance of taking olfactory stimulus dimensions into account when studying risky decision making. Furthermore, by using consequential decisions with real outcomes, the present study provides solid evidence that the affective intensity of outcomes is an important factor in risky decision making that should be taken into account to better understand the underlying cognitive processes.

Individual Differences in Accepting Personal Restrictions to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic: Results from a Danish Adult Sample

Zettler, Ingo, Christoph Schild, Lau Lilleholt, and Robert Böhm. 2020. “Individual Differences in Accepting Personal Restrictions to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic: Results from a Danish Adult Sample.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pkm2a

Abstract: Political authorities are working hard on fighting the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Corresponding interventions often address cooperative behavior, because they pose restrictions on the individual level (e.g., limiting one’s physical contacts) with the aim to serve the greater good (e.g., not overtaxing the health systems). In a sample of Danish adults (N = 799) randomly drawn from a representative sample, we link different personality characteristics to people’s willingness in accepting personal restrictions for fighting COVID-19. When simultaneously considering all characteristics including the basic traits from the HEXACO personality model, we find that, next to people’s age, Emotionality as well as the Dark Factor of Personality (D) explain who is more willing to accept restrictions. D further explains acceptance based on whether restrictions aim to protect oneself rather than others. The results show the importance of individual differences for following large-scale interventions that should serve the greater good.

We devote disproportionate attention to already-known positive information about the performance of individual stocks within our portfolios

Attention Utility: Evidence from Individual Investors. Edika Quispe-Torreblanca, John Gathergood, George Loewenstein, Neil Stewart. CESifo Working Paper No. 8091, Feb 2020. https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8091.pdf

Abstract: Attention utility is the hedonic pleasure or pain derived purely from paying attention to information. Using data on brokerage account logins by individual investors, we show that individuals devote disproportionate attention to already-known positive information about the performance of individual stocks within their portfolios. This aversion to paying attention to unfavorable information, through its effect on logins, has consequences for trading activity; it reduces trading after recent losses and increases trading after recent gains. Attention utility is distinct from models of belief-based utility and information aversion (in which information not sought is not fully known), and implies that the pleasure and pain of attending to known information may be important for individual behavior.

JEL-Codes: G400, G410, D140.
Keywords: information utility, attention, login, investor behavior.


Psychological Correlates of News Monitoring, Social Distancing, Disinfecting, and Hoarding Behaviors Among US Adolescents During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Oosterhoff, Benjamin, and Cara palmer. 2020. “Psychological Correlates of News Monitoring, Social Distancing, Disinfecting, and Hoarding Behaviors Among US Adolescents During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/rpcy4

Abstract
Importance: As COVID-19 spreads across the globe, it is critical to understand the psychological factors that influence pandemic-related behaviors (i.e., news monitoring, social distancing, hygiene/disinfecting, hoarding). This may be especially important to study among youth, who are less likely to experience severe symptoms but contribute to the spread of the virus.

Objective: To examine psychological correlates of adolescents’ behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Design: Self-report survey conducted between March 20th and March 22nd, 2020.

Setting: This is an online survey study of youth from the United States.
Participants: A population-based sample of adolescents were recruited via social media to complete an anonymous survey. Youth were eligible if they had internet access, lived in the United States, and were between the ages of 13 and 18.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Outcomes included COVID-19 news monitoring, social distancing, disinfecting, and hoarding behaviors over the 7 days after the US declared a national emergency. The correlates measured were attitudes about COVID-19 severity, values related to social responsibility, social trust, and self-interest. The a priori hypotheses were that attitudes about the severity of COVID-19, along with greater social responsibility and social trust, would be associated with greater news monitoring, social distancing, and disinfecting, whereas greater self-interest would be associated with more hoarding.

Results: The final analytic sample included 770 adolescents (Mage = 16.34, 72% female). The majority of teens reported not engaging in pure social distancing (70%), but were monitoring the news (75%) and engaging in at least one disinfecting behavior multiple times per day (88%). Some teens reported engaging in hoarding behavior (19%). Greater attitudes about the severity of COVID-19 were associated with more social distancing, disinfecting, and news monitoring, but also more hoarding. Greater social responsibility was associated with more disinfecting and news monitoring, and less hoarding. Participants who reported valuing their own self-interest over others reported less social distancing and more hoarding. Greater social trust was associated with less hoarding.

Conclusions and Relevance: Emphasizing the severity of COVID-19 and the social implications of pandemic-related behaviors may be important for teens, particularly for those who are not following recommended preventative health behaviors or who are engaging in hoarding.

In 2012, two independent groups demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God; replication failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample

Does intuitive mindset influence belief in God? A registered replication of Shenhav, Rand and Greene (2012). S. Adil Saribay, Onurcan Yilmaz, Gülay Gözde Körpe. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 2, March 2020, pp. 193–202. http://journal.sjdm.org/18/18412/jdm18412.pdf

Abstract: In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies.

Keywords: intuitive thinking, belief in God, replication, analytic cognitive style, reflection, intuition


Sunday, March 22, 2020

The Macroeconomics of Epidemics: there is an inevitable trade-off between the severity of the short-run recession caused by the epidemic and the health consequences of that epidemic

The Macroeconomics of Epidemics. Martin S. Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebeloy, Mathias Trabandtz. March 20, 2020. https://fb8280a8-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/mathiastrabandt/home/downloads/EichenbaumRebeloTrabandt_EpidemicsMacro.pdf

Abstract: We extend the canonical epidemiology model to study the interaction between economic decisions and epidemics. Our model implies that people ís decision to cut back on consumption and work reduces the severity of the epidemic, as measured by total deaths. These decisions exacerbate the size of the recession caused by the epidemic. The competitive equilibrium is not socially optimal because infected people do not fully internalize the effect of their economic decisions on the spread of the virus. In our benchmark scenario, the optimal containment policy increases the severity of the recession but saves roughly 0.6 million lives in the U.S.

JEL Classiffication: E1, I1, H0
Keywords: Epidemic, COVID-19, recessions, containment policies

6 Conclusion

We extend the canonical epidemiology model to study the interaction between economic decisions and epidemics. In our model, the epidemic generates both supply and demand effects on economic activity. These effects work in tandem to generate a large, persistent recession.

We abstract from many important real-world complications to highlight the basic economic forces at work during an epidemic. The central message of our analysis should be robust to allowing for those complications: there is an inevitable trade-off between the severity of the short-run recession caused by the epidemic and the health consequences of that epidemic. Dealing with this trade-off is a key challenge confronting policy makers.

Finally, we note that our model abstracts from various forces that might affect the long-run performance of the economy. These forces include bankruptcy costs, hysteresis effects from unemployment, and the destruction of supply-side chains. It is important to embody these forces in macroeconomic models of epidemics and study their positive and normative implications.

Saturday, March 21, 2020

The spatial concentration of cutting-edge technologies has increased since 1850, suggesting a reinforcing cycle between the increase in the complexity of activities and urbanization

Complex economic activities concentrate in large cities. Pierre-Alexandre Balland, Cristian Jara-Figueroa, Sergio G. Petralia, Mathieu P. A. Steijn, David L. Rigby & César A. Hidalgo. Nature Human Behaviour volume 4, pages 248–254. January 13 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0803-3

Abstract: Human activities, such as research, innovation and industry, concentrate disproportionately in large cities. The ten most innovative cities in the United States account for 23% of the national population, but for 48% of its patents and 33% of its gross domestic product. But why has human activity become increasingly concentrated? Here we use data on scientific papers, patents, employment and gross domestic product, for 353 metropolitan areas in the United States, to show that the spatial concentration of productive activities increases with their complexity. Complex economic activities, such as biotechnology, neurobiology and semiconductors, concentrate disproportionately in a few large cities compared to less--complex activities, such as apparel or paper manufacturing. We use multiple proxies to measure the complexity of activities, finding that complexity explains from 40% to 80% of the variance in urban concentration of occupations, industries, scientific fields and technologies. Using historical patent data, we show that the spatial concentration of cutting-edge technologies has increased since 1850, suggesting a reinforcing cycle between the increase in the complexity of activities and urbanization. These findings suggest that the growth of spatial inequality may be connected to the increasing complexity of the economy.



Universal Sex Differences in Mate Preferences Are Robust: Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects

Sex Differences in Mate Preferences Across 45 Countries: A Large-Scale Replication. Kathryn V. Walter et al. Psychological Science, March 20, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620904154

Abstract: Considerable research has examined human mate preferences across cultures, finding universal sex differences in preferences for attractiveness and resources as well as sources of systematic cultural variation. Two competing perspectives—an evolutionary psychological perspective and a biosocial role perspective—offer alternative explanations for these findings. However, the original data on which each perspective relies are decades old, and the literature is fraught with conflicting methods, analyses, results, and conclusions. Using a new 45-country sample (N = 14,399), we attempted to replicate classic studies and test both the evolutionary and biosocial role perspectives. Support for universal sex differences in preferences remains robust: Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects. Cross-culturally, both sexes have mates closer to their own ages as gender equality increases. Beyond age of partner, neither pathogen prevalence nor gender equality robustly predicted sex differences or preferences across countries.

Keywords: mate preferences, sex differences, cross-cultural studies, evolutionary psychology, biosocial role theory, open data, preregistered