Desired personality traits in politicians: The ideal politician is more stable, extravert, conscientious, open, honest than voter

Desired personality traits in politicians: Similar to me but more of a leader. ulian Aichholzer, Johanna Willmann. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 88, October 2020, 103990. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103990

Highlights
• Provides insights into citizens’ personality trait preferences for politicians.
• Ideal politician is more stable, extravert, conscientious, open, honest than voter.
• Citizens seek personality similarity in basic value-related traits.
• Personality similarity is mediated by core ideological views.
• Similarity may ensure affective closeness and ideological representation.

Abstract: What makes voters prefer a certain type of politician? First, we argue that voters’ trait preferences follow a “desired leadership” principle. We show that citizens want the ideal-type politician to be more emotionally stable, extravert-assertive, more deliberate-conscientious and open, more honest, but also somewhat more disagreeable than the average citizen. Second, we argue that voters prefer a model candidate with similar basic value-related personality traits. Importantly, we show that trait congruence is partly mediated by core ideological preferences and thus ensures democratic representation. The study’s findings have implications for personalization of politics and democratic representation, because personality traits can be vital cues for voters deciding whether candidates will act in their interest and represent them well.

Keywords: Congruency modelAssumed similarityLeader personalityIdeological attitudesPolitician

6. Summary and conclusion

If candidates are taking over as figureheads in electoral campaigns, the question naturally arises, what makes voters prefer a certain type of politician? We start from the assumption that a politician’s personality is a powerful anchoring cue and heuristic in that regard. Such a heuristic might become even more decisive in a world where candidates use personalized communication and campaigning through various social media channels. In doing so, candidates themselves serve as the faces of their parties, which allows and forces candidates to constantly create images of themselves. From such images, voters can infer the personality traits of candidates that are—in analogy to parties’ ideological leanings—relatively stable individual differences in behaviors that allow voters to extrapolate the what and how of politicians’ likely future behavior.

This leads us to develop two principles that guide voters’ preferences for personality traits in politicians. First, we contend that voters expect politicians to be more capable or “better” than themselves on traits associated with leadership (the “desired leadership traits” principle). Our results show that, when compared to the general population, voters want politicians to be more emotionally stable, extravert-assertive, more deliberate-conscientious and open, more honest, but also somewhat more disagreeable—many of the traits associated with leadership, political ambition, and higher media visibility.

Second, we contend that voters seek representation by candidates who exhibit personality congruence with their own personality (the “voter-politician congruence” principle). This is partly due to the sheer emotional liking of likeness that allows for identification with the candidate. However, as we were able to show, to some degree, homophily is also due to ideological reasons and permits voters to determine what candidates would do once they are in office. We have demonstrated that greater SDO partly explains (mediates) a preference for politicians who score low on agreeableness, while greater RWA partly explains a preference for politicians low on openness and high on conscientiousness.

6.1. Implications

Our research has several important implications. First, one could be tempted to conclude that political campaign content is taking a backseat as individual personalities are increasingly superseding parties as cues and targets in political elections. We argue that, on the contrary, people’s vote choice is not necessarily becoming less political when voters shift from choosing between parties to choosing between candidates, since personality is not void of ideologically relevant content. As we have shown, ideological leanings shape preferences for politicians’ personalities.

Second, we put forward an explanation for why the general public will demand certain traits from their leaders, who are expected to accomplish certain tasks and navigate the country into a stable and prosperous future.

Third, we further develop the theory on personality trait matching and provide a bridge between the two—at times mutually exclusive—concepts, namely, desired similarity (representation) between the targets and desired exceptionality (need for a leader). In the literature on personal relationships and mating, for instance, there exist two approaches: people look for partners who are similar to themselves (assortative mating), and there are absolute preferences (aspirational assortative preference), i.e., traits that are more generally endorsed (Liu et al., 2018). We argue that even in an asymmetrical relationship like the one between voters and politicians, similarity plays an important role and limits aspirational considerations. Voters generally want to be represented by their politicians, i.e., seek similarity, but on traits that are conventionally associated with good leadership, they expect politicians to be more capable than themselves.

Fourth, and of crucial importance, we provide for an account of why voters might seek trait similarity with politicians. The congruency model, as outlined by Caprara and Zimbardo (2004), demonstrates voter-politician similarity in traits but leaves room for speculation about the mechanism and the function of the similarity principle (see Caprara et al., 2007). We try to close this gap and suggest that similarity serves two functions. First, a preference for similarity might stem from a mere liking of likeness, which allows for affective closeness to the politician in question. Second, however, we introduce a new way of looking at personality trait similarity and argue that it also serves a political function, namely, ideological representation. We demonstrate that similarity on openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness is partially explained—and thus partially mediated—by ideological beliefs (SDO, RWA). This lends support to several theories arguing that our personality is an organizing system that translates into motivational goals or values, including SDO and RWA, which eventually guide ideological orientations and political behavior (Caprara and Vecchione, 2017, Duckitt and Sibley, 2010, Jost et al., 2009).

6.2. Limitations and future avenues

Finally, we want to discuss some limitations of the current study and propose avenues for future research. Our studies lack a standardized personality inventory tailored to the job of politicians. This is because we used a personality inventory that would lend itself to a bipolar rating scale format without creating (huge) social desirability. A contextualized measure with item content applicable to the job of politicians is, however, missing thus far. A suitable and more extensive measurement of personality would also allow for delving deeper into personality facets or “dark” or “socially malevolent” traits, such as narcissism and machiavellianism. Hence, future studies might investigate whether and which of the more specific traits and socially malevolent traits are preferred/accepted by voters, who does so, and under what circumstances (context).

Further, we asked respondents to rate what their ideal politician would look like (see also Kinder et al., 1980, Roets and Van Hiel, 2009), although with somewhat different question framing (“lead the country and ensure that the population is doing well”/”which of the following character traits make a good politician”). However, with this format, we cannot assess whether respondents thought of one or several abstract model politicians or whether they had a concrete man or a concrete woman in mind (see Kinder et al., 1980). Nevertheless, we think that this does not interfere with our conclusions about an idealized picture of aspired traits and the congruence with them. We did not ask respondents whether they would indeed vote for particular politicians that exhibit these traits (and that carry other confounding variables such as a party). Future research might want to address this and examine more closely whether desired traits by voters are indeed decisive as vote determinants.

The two samples investigated in the present work are, of course, limited in their generalizability. While Study 1 allowed us to make inferences about expectations regarding more specific personality facets, Study 2 does only measure perceptions about broad personality domains. In addition, although the Austrian sample (Study 2) was based on a random population sample, the German sample (Study 1) was not representative of the general population. It thus remains to be determined to what extent the reported findings can be generalized to other samples, for instance, outside Europe.

Another avenue to follow up on the present research is the homophily (or similarity) principle between voters and politicians more generally and its significance for political representation. In the political science literature, the homophily principle is not at all new. For example, it is well established that voters tend to support candidates with similar sociodemographic characteristics (Campbell et al., 1960, Cutler, 2002). Additionally, similarity in physical traits, such as facial similarity between voters and candidates, seems to create liking (e.g., Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2008). More recently, Bankert (2016) found that even nonpolitical social similarity with the party prototype (e.g., hobbies, lifestyle) intensifies feelings of partisan identity. With candidates becoming more important voting cues, future research might want to further investigate voter-politician similarity as well as which specific traits make the “ideal” politician.

Feeling emotions for others that they don’t feel: Agency appraisals and vicarious anger

Feeling emotions for others that they don’t feel: Agency appraisals and vicarious anger. Joshua Daniel Wondra. PsyArXiv, Aug 24, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/M4BXZ

Abstract: How do people feel emotions for someone else? This has been studied as empathy—feeling the same emotion that someone else feels. But people also feel emotions for someone else that the other person doesn’t feel, such as feeling angry for someone who is sad. We use appraisal theories to predict that people feel an emotion for someone else when they appraise that person’s situation differently. According to appraisal theories, people react to misfortunes with anger if they are caused by another person, but not if the cause is impersonal, and we predicted that this would also be true in feeling emotions for another person, regardless of what the other person feels. In two studies, subjects learned about a disadvantaged high school student who applied to college and was rejected from every school. Subjects felt angrier when they learned that the student’s friend caused the bad outcome than when the student made a well-intentioned mistake, but they did not think the student felt angry. The difference in subjects’ anger was mediated by changes in appraisals of agency. The student believed the rejections were caused by bad circumstances and felt sad in both conditions. The results extend research on empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences by supporting appraisal as a process that is involved in feeling emotions for other people.

Is it obligatory to donate effectively? Judgments about the wrongness of donating ineffectively

Is it obligatory to donate effectively? Judgments about the wrongness of donating ineffectively. Lucius Caviola, Stefan Schubert. PsyArXiv, Aug 24, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/J2H4R

Abstract: Most donations end up with relatively ineffective charities. In this paper, we present five preliminary studies on the hypothesis that people don’t find it obligatory to donate effectively. We find that people typically do not find it obligatory to donate to highly effective charities. We explore the conditions under which people ​do ​consider it obligatory to help effectively. For example, we find that people consider effectiveness more important when they are the only person who can help, or when the ineffective option is Pareto dominated by a more effective option. We also find that judgments of how obligatory it is to donate effectively are correlated with judgments of how obligatory it is to donate in the first place.

Check also Donors vastly underestimate differences in charities’ effectiveness. Lucius Caviola et al. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 4, July 2020, pp. 509–516. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/07/some-charities-are-much-more-cost.html

Comparing the morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten by Americans (pig) & one that is not (dog) shifted participants’ moral beliefs about eating meat

Horne, Zachary, Josh Rottman, and Caroline Lawrence. 2018. “Can Coherence-based Interventions Change Dogged Moral Beliefs?.” PsyArXiv. December 31. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jx6fd

Abstract: Coherence-based interventions can change people’s moral beliefs about abstract moral principles, but it is unclear whether these interventions would be similarly effective for everyday moral beliefs that can impact routine behavior. In the present research, we examined whether coherence-based “memes” highlighting the moral similarities of pigs and dogs can likewise shift moral beliefs about consuming meat. Across three experiments, we found beliefs about the permissibility of eating some animals can be subtly shifted by brief coherence-based interventions which highlight moral similarity. Comparing the morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten by Americans (pig) and an animal that is typically considered forbidden to eat by Americans (dog) shifted participants’ moral beliefs. We discuss the implications of these findings for psychological and ethical theory.

Charter schools increase quality of available teachers: Educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs

Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools. Jesse Bruhn, Scott Imberman & Marcus Winters. NBER Working Paper 27607, July 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w27607

Abstract: We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers.

Supporting previous evidence, it was found that individuals were more prosocial when gossip (both positive and negative) was possible, compared to when their behavior was completely anonymous

Imada, H., Hopthrow, T., & Abrams, D. (2020). The role of positive and negative gossip in promoting prosocial behavior. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Aug 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000218

Abstract: Gossip can promote cooperation via reputational concern. However, the relative effectiveness of positive and negative gossip in fostering prosociality has not been examined. The present study explored the influence of positive and negative gossip on prosocial behavior, using an economic game. Supporting previous evidence, it was found that individuals were more prosocial when gossip of any kind was possible, compared to when their behavior was completely anonymous. However, there was no significant difference in the efficiency in promoting cooperation between positive and negative gossip, suggesting that it is reputational concern elicited by gossip per se, rather than its valence, that stimulates prosociality

While partisanship influenced the extent to which participants relied on the misinformation overall, retractions were equally effective across all conditions; no impact of political worldview on retraction effectiveness

Ecker, Ullrich K. H., Brandon Sze, and Matthew Andreotta. 2020. “No Effect of Partisan Worldview on Corrections of Political Misinformation.” PsyArXiv. August 20. doi:10.31234/osf.io/bszm4

Abstract: Misinformation often has a continuing effect on people’s reasoning despite clear correction. One factor assumed to affect post-correction reliance on misinformation is worldview-driven motivated reasoning. For example, a recent study with an Australian undergraduate sample found that when politically-situated misinformation was retracted, political partisanship influenced the effectiveness of the retraction. This worldview effect was asymmetrical, that is, particularly pronounced in politically-conservative participants. However, the evidence regarding such worldview effects (and their symmetry) has been inconsistent. Thus, the present study aimed to extend previous findings by examining a sample of 429 pre-screened U.S. participants supporting either the Democratic or Republican Party. Participants received misinformation suggesting that politicians of either party were more likely to commit embezzlement; this was or was not subsequently retracted, and participants’ inferential reasoning was measured. While political worldview (i.e., partisanship) influenced the extent to which participants relied on the misinformation overall, retractions were equally effective across all conditions. There was no impact of political worldview on retraction effectiveness, let alone evidence of a backfire effect, and thus we did not replicate the asymmetry observed in the Australian-based study. This pattern emerged despite some evidence that Republicans showed a stronger emotional response than Democrats to worldview-incongruent misinformation.

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In sum, our results are in line with the notion that potentially-irrational rejection of
evidence is equally likely on both ends of the political-worldview spectrum, and that part of
the reason that evidence rejection has been predominantly demonstrated in conservatives is
that researchers have predominantly looked at rejection of evidence that is consistent with
conservative worldviews. However, this presents future research with a conundrum, because
a number of studies have now aimed but failed to find rejection of scientific evidence on the
left (e.g., Baumgaertner, Carlisle, & Justwan, 2018; Hamilton, Hartter, & Saito, 2015;
Lewandowsky, Woike, & Oberauer, 2020). For example, Lewandowsky et al. (2020)
reported that vaccine-hesitancy and endorsement of alternative medicine—both anecdotally
associated with a liberal worldview—were in fact more prevalent in right-wing libertarians
and conservatives. Based on additional evidence from a task that required reasoning about
scientific evidence “dilemmas” that featured both worldview-consistent and inconsistent
aspects, Lewandowsky et al. concluded that partisans on both ends of the spectrum show
biased processing of evidence, but that science denial was nevertheless a mainstay of the
political right. Future research therefore needs to shed light on the catalysts that turn
omnipresent information-processing biases into actual evidence rejection and science denial.

The Dark Triad Predicted by Belief in Determinism, which may be a belief that allows some to abrogate moral responsibility, which may facilitate other antisocial tendencies like objectification

Boros, Rachel, "The Dark Triad Predicted by Belief in Determinism and Objectification" (2020). Theses and Dissertations. 1239. Apr 2020. https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/1239

Abstract: While philosophers and psychologists continue to debate the existence of free will without reaching any consensus, recent attention has shifted to the matter of the consequences of belief in free will, or belief in the alternative, determinism. Proponents of the latter position argue that human behavior is the result of causal forces, which implies a lack of autonomy in decision-making and inevitability (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Recent research has found consequences of belief in determinism that include the promotion of undesirable behavior and undermining of moral behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), impulsive and selfish responses demonstrated through aggression (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009), and a diminished ability to learn from negative emotions (Stillman & Baumeister, 2010). Belief in determinism may be a belief that allows some to abrogate moral responsibility, which may facilitate other antisocial tendencies. Objectification (i.e., seeing and ultimately treating a person as an object in a manner that dismisses that persons’ humanity) may be one such tendency. To my knowledge, no research has examined the association between belief in determinism, interpersonal objectification, and the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). In the present research, four questionnaires measured participants’ belief in free will, determinism, propensity to objectify others, narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. Results indicated a statistically significant link between belief in determinism, interpersonal objectification, and the Dark Triad personality traits. A general mediation model demonstrated that interpersonal objectification mediated the relation between belief in determinism and the Dark Triad personality traits. These findings suggest that maladaptive ideologies and maladaptive personality traits share a common theme of objectifying others. Implications, limitations, and future directions are discussed.

Ideological Responses to the Breaking of COVID-19 Social Distancing Recommendations: Both liberals and conservatives condemn outgroup guidance flouting more than ingroup flouting

Harper, Craig A., and Darren Rhodes. 2020. “Ideological Responses to the Breaking of COVID-19 Social Distancing Recommendations.” PsyArXiv. August 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dkqj6

Abstract: COVID-19 has plagued the globe since January 2020, infecting millions and claiming the lives of several hundreds of thousands (at the time of writing). Despite this, many individuals have ignored public health guidance and continued to socialize in groups. Emergent work has highlighted the potential role that ideology plays in such behavior, and judgements of it. In response to this contemporary cultural phenomenon, we tested whether judgements of those allegedly flouting the guidance on social distancing were influenced by an interaction between the ideologies of those providing judgements, and those allegedly breaking the rules. Our data suggest that judgements of those flouting social distancing guidance are influenced by ideology in a symmetrical way. That is, both liberals and conservatives condemn outgroup flouting more than ingroup flouting. We discuss this finding in the context of theoretical work into ideological symmetries, and the implications of growing ideological polarization in contemporary Western democracies.

Moral grandstanding is related to endorsing more extreme ideological positions; motivation by a desire to seek prestige is related to ideological extremism

Moral Grandstanding and Political Polarization: A Multi-Study Consideration. Joshua B. Grubbs et al. Journal of Research in Personality, August 24 2020, 104009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104009

Highlights
• Americans are increasingly polarized in their political ideology and reactions to political others.
• Moral grandstanding is related to endorsing more extreme ideological positions.
• Moral grandstanding motivated by a desire to seek prestige is related to ideological extremism.
• Moral grandstanding motivated by a desire to seek prestige is related to more polarized emotional reactions to political others.
• Moral grandstanding motivated by a desire to seek dominance is generally unrelated to extreme ideology or affect.

Abstract: The present work posits that social motives, particularly status seeking in the form of moral grandstanding, are likely at least partially to blame for elevated levels of affective polarization and ideological extremism in the U.S. In Study 1, results from both undergraduates (N=981; Mean age =19.4; SD=2.1; 69.7% women) and a cross-section of U.S. adults matched to 2010 census norms (N=1,063; Mean age =48.20, SD=16.38; 49.8% women) indicated that prestige-motived grandstanding was consistently and robustly related to more extreme ideological views on a variety of issues. In Study 2, results from a weighted, nationally-representative cross-section of U.S. adults (N=2,519; Mean age =47.5, SD=17.8; 51.4% women) found that prestige motivated grandstanding was reliably related to both ideological extremism and affective polarization.

Does the Dark Triad predict self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners both in men and women?

Does the Dark Triad predict self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners both in men and women? Javier I. Borráz-León, Markus J. Rantala. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 168, January 1 2021, 110341. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110341

Highlights
• Narcissism and psychopathy were positively correlated to number of sexual partners.
• Narcissism was positively correlated to self-perceived attractiveness and mate value.
• Higher self-perceived attractiveness and mate value were predicted by narcissism.

Abstract: Previous literature has shown associations between the Dark Triad (i.e., narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy), other-perceived attractiveness, and personality. Nevertheless, the study of the Dark Triad as predictor of traits related to sociosexual dynamics (i.e., self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners) still remain unknown. Hence, we aimed to fill this gap by assessing the relationship between these variables in a mixed-sex sample of young-adults. The results showed that: 1) narcissism and psychopathy, but not Machiavellianism, were positively correlated to number of sexual partners for the group of men and the group of women separately. 2) only narcissism was positively correlated to self-perceived attractiveness and mate value in both sexes. 3) narcissism successfully predicted higher self-perceived attractiveness and mate value both in men and women; whereas narcissism, psychopathy, and sex significantly contributed to the prediction of number of sexual partners. We discuss our results in the light of the interaction between evolutionary thinking and socioenvironmental factors.

Keywords: The dark triadAttractivenessMate valueSexual partnersNarcissismMachiavellianismPsychopathy

4. Discussion

During the last decade, the study about the evolutionary meaning of the relationships between the DT of personality and traits associated with human mate choice has increased (e.g., Carter et al., 2014; Lyons et al., 2015; Lyons & Simeonov, 2016; Marcinkowska et al., 2015). However, very little is known about the predictive power of the DT and sex on these traits. Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the relationships between each component of the DT of personality, self-perceptions of attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners in a sample of young men and women. The results of this study are in line with previous literature and with our predictions (with the exception of sex as a strong predictor).

First, as expected, we found that number of sexual partners was positively related to every component of the DT (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) for the whole sample, whereas only narcissism and psychopathy were positively correlated to every DT trait when men and women were analyzed separately. These results support previous literature about the exploitative nature of the DT; for example, Visser et al. (2010) observed that men with higher scores of psychopathy reported higher number of sexual partners; similar results have been also found for men with higher scores of Machiavellianism (McHoskey, 2001). Even though it has not been previously reported, there is evidence that suggests that narcissists also could have higher number of sexual partners (e.g., McNulty & Widman, 2014). To our knowledge, the present study is the first one in reporting positive associations between the number of sexual partners and each component of the DT in a sample of men and women.

Secondly, we found that narcissism, but not Machiavellianism or psychopathy, was positively related to self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and number of sexual partners in both sexes. This result supports previous studies where it has been stated that narcissistic people are characterized by inflated self-concepts associated with grandiosity, intelligence, social power, and physical attractiveness (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004; Campbell et al., 2002) which probably increases the mating success of narcissists. Even though these relationships have been mainly reported for men, our study suggests that this could be also true for women. In this context, the socioecological environment of our population might explain this result. For example, the literature has proposed that narcissism is positively associated with preferences for exploitative short-term relationships and that this effect is stronger for men than for women (Jonason et al., 2012) due to the lower fitness costs paid by men (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). However, Finnish society is characterized by having a high educational level, high life quality, and very high equality between men and women (Borchorst et al., 2012; Miettinen et al., 2011; Salmi, 2006). Thus, it could be possible that the sex-differences previously reported in other studies regarding the number of sexual partners, could be less strong in societies where women do not have to pay very high costs related to short-term relationships. In support of this hypothesis, there is evidence showing variability in personality traits and mate preferences according to several indicators of the condition of a society (e.g., Borras-Guevara et al., 2017; DeBruine et al., 2010; Marcinkowska et al., 2019). For example, in the study of Marcinkowska et al. (2019), the authors found that women's preferences for masculine looking men (a trait associated with some components of the DT, Lyons et al., 2015), are stronger in countries with higher sociosexuality –Finland included– and where national health indices and development indices are higher. Thus, since masculinity is associated with promiscuousness and a preference for short-term relationships, this could explain the similar pattern regarding the positive relationships between narcissism, psychopathy, and number of sexual partners in our sample of Finnish men and women.

Regarding the predictive power of the DT traits, we found that narcissism predicted self-perceived attractiveness and mate value in both sexes; whereas narcissism, psychopathy and sex had significant effects on the prediction of number sexual partners. In this sense, it has been suggested that narcissism (more than Machiavellianism or psychopathy) can be successfully explained in terms of evolutionary adaptations. For example, Holtzman & Strube (2010) suggested that narcissism could have emerged to solve problems related to sexual selection processes, allowing men to adopt short-term mating strategies. However, our results suggest that narcissism might work in a similar way for women as well, but it may depend on several socioenvironmental factors. Further studies are needed in order to give ecological validity to this hypothesis.

But why narcissism more than Machiavellianism or psychopathy? according to Holtzman & Donnellan (2015), narcissism can be distinguished from Machiavellianism because Machiavellians are less extroverted and prefer to act “behind the scenes” whereas narcissists prefer to be histrionic and get social attention. Likewise, psychopathy differs from narcissism because psychopaths tend to be violent and antisocial whereas narcissists tend to be assertive and to use non-violent dominance. Thus, it is possible that individuals do not like manipulative, cynical, manipulative, aggressive, remorseless, and duplicitous people such as Machiavellians and psychopaths (Rauthmann & Kolar, 2013). However, it is important to notice that whereas narcissism is positively correlated to the number of sexual partners both in men and women, narcissism, psychopathy, and sex play a significant role in the prediction of higher number of sexual partners. In this case, based on the differences in the average number of sexual partners and psychopathy scores between men and women, the effect would be stronger for men than for women. As it has been previously suggested, it is possible that this sex difference might be still associated with the social costs imposed to women (e.g., bad reputation, lower attractiveness as a long-term mate) (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Nevertheless, in the vast majority of our results, sex did not play a significant role.

Overall, the literature regarding narcissism have agreed on the possible benefits associated with this personality trait. For example, narcissists tend to increase their social status by displaying wealth and material goods (Piff, 2014), and pursuing leadership positions (Grijalva et al., 2015). Moreover, it has been observed that narcissists from both sexes have lower facial fluctuating asymmetry -an honest indicator of developmental stability and genetic quality- probably making them more desirable sexual partners by increasing their mate value (Borráz-León et al., 2019). Therefore, it is feasible to suggest that from the three components of the DT of personality, narcissism, more than Machiavellianism or psychopathy, is strongly associated with self-perceived attractiveness, mate value, and the acquisition of sexual partners both in men and women, which probably is regulating social and sexual selection processes. Further studies will have to take into account socioenvironmental factors related to the condition of the society where the study is being done, in order to investigate how the condition of a society could affect perceptions of mate value, mating success, and personality dynamics both in men and women.

4.1. Limitation of the study

A limitation emerged from this study since the high homogeneity of our sample limits generalizability. Therefore, the results of this research might not be representative of other populations. This limitation will be taken into account for future research.

We find that the relationship between racial resentment and opposition to redistribution is weaker for lower income whites than for whites with higher incomes

The color of class politics: Economic position, racial resentment, and attitudes about redistribution. Andrew Bloeser & Tarah Williams. Politics, Groups, and Identities, Jun 17 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2020.1773279

Abstract: Racial resentment has been linked to opposition towards welfare programs for the poor and other redistributive policies. Theoretical work implies that because redistributive polices have been rhetorically linked to negative racial stereotypes, racially resentful whites will oppose redistributive policies, even when they might benefit from them. However, this proposition has not been empirically tested. Using the 2016 American National Election Study, we examine whether the relationship between racial resentment and a variety of economic policy attitudes is conditional by individuals' income level. We find that the relationship between racial resentment and opposition to redistribution is weaker for lower income whites than for whites with higher incomes. When it comes to redistributive preferences, economic self-interest tempers the influence of racial resentment for lower income whites. For whites with higher incomes, however, the influence of racial resentment on redistributive preferences is significantly larger. This indicates that in the absence of directly benefiting from a redistributive policy, whites will oppose it if they harbor racial antipathy. We exploit the time series design of the ANES to demonstrate that these patterns hold across multiple election cycles (2004-2016).

KEYWORDS: Racial resentment, redistribution, social welfare, economic self-interest, principled conservatism

As economic inequality grows, more people stand to benefit from wealth redistribution; yet in many countries, increasing inequality has not produced growing support for redistribution

Cognitive Barriers to Reducing Income Inequality. Joshua Conrad Jackson, Keith Payne. Social Psychological and Personality Science, June 26, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620934597

Abstract: As economic inequality grows, more people stand to benefit from wealth redistribution. Yet in many countries, increasing inequality has not produced growing support for redistribution, and people often appear to vote against their economic interest. Here we suggest that two cognitive tendencies contribute to these paradoxical voting patterns. First, people gauge their income through social comparison, and those comparisons are usually made to similar others. Second, people are insensitive to large numbers, which leads them to underestimate the gap between themselves and the very wealthy. These two tendencies can help explain why subjective income is normally distributed (therefore most people think they are middle class) and partly explain why many people who would benefit from redistribution oppose it. We support our model’s assumptions using survey data, a controlled experiment, and agent-based modeling. Our model sheds light on the cognitive barriers to reducing inequality.

Keywords: behavioral economics, decision making, social comparison


Check also Women’s demand for redistribution is higher; the gender difference appears only when the source of inequality is based on relative abilities, but not when it is based on luck; men are more overconfident on their abilities:

Overconfidence and gender gaps in redistributive preferences: Cross-Country experimental evidence. Thomas Buser et al. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 178, October 2020, Pages 267-286. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/08/womens-demand-for-redistribution-is.html

And Due to patriotic indoctrination, the Chinese self-sacrifice for national interest and demand less redistribution:

Why is welfare provision unpopular in China? Alex C. H. Chang. Democratization, Jul 22 2020. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/08/why-is-welfare-provision-unpopular-in.html

Individuals with higher status were more motivated to have high status than were individuals with low status; this in part happens because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) such status

The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive. Cameron Anderson, John Angus Hildreth & Daron Sharps. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Jul 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220937544

Abstract: The current research tested whether the possession of high status, compared with the possession of low status, makes individuals desire having high status even more. Five studies (total N = 6,426), four of which were preregistered, supported this hypothesis. Individuals with higher status in their social groups or who were randomly assigned to a high-status condition were more motivated to have high status than were individuals with low status. Furthermore, upper-class individuals had a stronger status motive than working-class individuals, in part, due to their high status. High-status individuals had a stronger status motive, in part, because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) high status, but not because of other possible mechanisms (e.g., task self-efficacy). These findings provide a possible explanation for why status hierarchies are so stable and why inequality rises in social collectives over time.

Learning of the others' success in investing leads to a significant increase in risk taking of subjects; even more true with copy trading (getting info on the other agents in financial markets and to directly copy their trades)

Copy Trading. Jose Apesteguia, Jörg Oechssler, Simon Weidenholzer. Management Science, Jul 14 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3508

Abstract: Copy trading allows traders in social networks to receive information on the success of other agents in financial markets and to directly copy their trades. Internet platforms like eToro, ZuluTrade, and Tradeo have attracted millions of users in recent years. The present paper studies the implications of copy trading for the risk taking of investors. Implementing a novel experimental financial asset market, we show that providing information on the success of others leads to a significant increase in risk taking of subjects. This increase in risk taking is even larger when subjects are provided with the option to directly copy others. We conclude that copy trading leads to excessive risk taking.


7  Discussion
In this paper we have experimentally shown that providing investors with information on previous investment decisions and the success of other traders may lead to an increase in risk taking. This effect may be further exacerbated when investors are allowed to directly copy other traders. Imitation through either of these channels may lead to a reduction of investors’ welfare, as judged from the elicitation of risk preferences and as manifested in counterfactual investment decisions where imitation is not possible. Our results, thus, suggest that social trading (with or without the option to directly copy others) may be detrimental to consumer welfare. Moreover, even outside of the domain of copy trading, information on the success of others may lead to excessive risk taking and reduced welfare.
We hope this paper will trigger more research in the near future in order to better understand behavior in copy trading platforms. For example, future research should be conducted in order to understand what are the reasons that lead to copy trading, or to more risk taking behavior in the INFO and COPY treatments. One possibility is that copiers attribute higher skills to copied investors. Although the design of our experiment made the role of luck very salient, future work should systematically study this possibility. Also, it has been shown that cognitive abilities or personality traits are related to risk taking behavior (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2010; Eisenbach and Schmalz, 2016; Harbaugh, 2006). In this respect it seems relevant to explore whether these characteristics may prompt some subjects to copy others, or to be more affected by the performance of others. Moreover, while we have recruited our participants from a student subject pool, investors on copy trading platforms likely join these platforms with the explicit intent to engage in copy trading. Whether the welfare consequences of investors on copy trading platforms are larger or lower than in the student population is another open question that should be addressed in future research.
One should of course be very cautious at extrapolating conclusions from the lab to the field, in particular before a good deal of lab and field research has been conducted on the subject matter. However, there are reason to believe that the implications of copy trading on risk taking may be even stronger on real world copy trading platforms. For example, in the real world, investors’ beliefs on the skills and information of leaders might be even more optimistic than in our laboratory setting. In addition, whereas our experimental setup, by way of the simulator, allowed subjects to easily assess how risky previous investments of other investors were, such an assessment is much more difficult in the real world. Finally, from a social perspective, imitation encourages traders to follow similar investment strategies and could, thus, lead to financial risk through resulting herding and contribute to the formation of financial bubbles.

The depressive realism hypothesis states that mild forms of depression improve judgment tasks because of higher attention to detail and slower information processing

Depressive Realism and Analyst Forecast Accuracy. Sima Jannati, Sarah Khalaf & Du Nguyen
University of Missouri Working Paper, July 1 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3640794

Abstract: Whether a bad mood enhances or hinders problem-solving and financial decision making is an open question. Using the Gallup Analytics survey, we test the depressive realism hypothesis in the earnings forecasts provided by Estimize users. The depressive realism hypothesis states that mild forms of depression improve judgment tasks because of higher attention to detail and slower information processing. We find that a 1-standard-deviation increase in the segment of the U.S. population with depression leads to a 0.25% increase in future forecast accuracy, supporting the hypothesis. This influence is comparable to other determinants of Estimize users' accuracy, like the geographic proximity of users to firms, users' experience, and their professional status. Our result is robust to using an IV analysis, different measures of forecast accuracy and mood, as well as alternative explanations.

We show that molecular variation in DNA related to cognition, personality, health, & body shape, predicts an individual’s equity market participation & risk aversion; also predict individuals’ return perceptions (which are mostly biased)

Molecular Genetics, Risk Aversion, Return Perceptions, and Stock Market Participation. Richard Sias, Laura Starks & Harry Turtle. NBER Working Paper #27638, August 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w27638

Abstract: We show that molecular variation in DNA related to cognition, personality, health, and body shape, predicts an individual’s equity market participation and risk aversion. Moreover, the molecular genetic endowments predict individuals’ return perceptions, most of which we find to be strikingly biased. The genetic endowments also strongly associate with many of the investor characteristics (e.g., trust, sociability, wealth) shown to explain heterogeneity in equity market participation. Our analysis helps elucidate why financial choices are heritable and how genetic endowments can help explain the links between financial choices, risk aversion, beliefs, and other variables known to explain stock market participation.

Physicians actively sort along political lines: A Democratic physician in a predominantly Republican area is twice as likely to relocate as a Republican counterpart living there; same for Republicans in Democratic areas

Ideological Sorting of Physicians in Both Geography and the Workplace. Adam Bonica; Howard Rosenthal; Kristy Blackwood; David J. Rothman. J Health Polit Policy Law 8641555. May 28 2020. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-8641555

Abstract
Context: The distribution of physicians across geography and employers has important implications for the delivery of medical services. This study examines how the political beliefs of physicians influence their decisions about where to live and work.

Methods: Physician relocation and employment patterns are analyzed using a panel constructed from the National Provider Information (NPI) directory. Data on political donations are used to measure the political preferences of physicians.

Findings: The “ideological fit” between a physician and his or her community is a key predictor of both relocation and employment decisions. A Democratic physician in a predominantly Republican area is twice as likely to relocate as a Republican counterpart living there; the reverse is also true for Republicans living in Democratic areas. Physicians who do not share the political orientation of their colleagues are more likely to change workplaces within the same geographic area.

Conclusions: Physicians are actively sorting along political lines. Younger physicians have trended sharply to the left and are increasingly drawn to urban areas with physician surpluses and away from rural areas suffering from physician shortages. The findings also help explain why physician shortages are more prevalent among left-leaning specialties, such as psychiatry.

Keywords: Physician politics, partisan sorting, geography, labor market, health care access

It is likely that a large proportion of people who purport to believe fake news really do, but this proportion might be significantly smaller than thought; assertion of belief is inflated, we suggest, by insincere report

Levy, Neil L., and Robert M. Ross. 2020. “The Cognitive Science of Fake News.” PsyArXiv. August 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/3nuzj. Forthcoming book chapter to appear in:
Hannon, M. & de Ridder, J. (2021). Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology.

Abstract: In this chapter, we provide a necessarily brief and partial survey of recent work in the cognitive sciences directly on or closely related to the psychology of fake news, in particular fake news in the political domain. We focus on whether and why people believe fake news. While we argue that it is likely that a large proportion of people who purport to believe fake news really do, we provide evidence that this proportion might be significantly smaller than is usually thought (and smaller than is suggested by surveys). Assertion of belief is inflated, we suggest, by insincere report, whether to express support for one side of political debate or simply for fun. It is also inflated by the use of motivated inference of one sort or another, which lead respondents to report believing things about which they had no opinion prior to being probed. We then turn to rival accounts that aim to explain why people believe in fake news when they do. While partisan explanations, turning on motivated reasoning, are probably best known, we show they face serious challenges from accounts that explain belief by reference to analytic thinking.

Check also Echo Chambers Exist! (But They're Full of Opposing Views). Jonathan Bright, Nahema Marchal, Bharath Ganesh, Stevan Rudinac. arXiv Jan 30 2020. arXiv:2001.11461. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/02/echo-chambers-exist-but-theyre-full-of.html

And: The rise in the political polarization in recent decades is not accounted for by the dramatic rise in internet use; claims that partisans inhabit wildly segregated echo chambers/filter bubbles are largely overstated:

Deri, Sebastian. 2019. “Internet Use and Political Polarization: A Review.” PsyArXiv. November 6. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/the-rise-in-political-polarization-in.html

And Testing popular news discourse on the “echo chamber” effect: Does political polarisation occur among those relying on social media as their primary politics news source? Nguyen, A. and Vu, H.T. First Monday, 24 (5), 6. Jun 4 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/testing-popular-news-discourse-on-echo.html

Check also
Why Smart People Are Vulnerable to Putting Tribe Before Truth. Dan M Kahan. Scientific American, Dec 03 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/why-smart-people-are-vulnerable-to.html

Baum, J., Rabovsky, M., Rose, S. B., & Abdel Rahman, R. (2018). Clear judgments based on unclear evidence: Person evaluation is strongly influenced by untrustworthy gossip. Emotion, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/clear-judgments-based-on-unclear.html

The key mechanism that generates scientific polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own:

Scientific polarization. Cailin O’Connor, James Owen Weatherall. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. October 2018, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 855–875. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/the-key-mechanism-that-generates.html

Polarized Mass or Polarized Few? Assessing the Parallel Rise of Survey Nonresponse and Measures of Polarization. Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman. The Journal of Politics, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/polarized-mass-or-polarized-few.html

Tappin, Ben M., and Ryan McKay. 2018. “Moral Polarization and Out-party Hate in the US Political Context.” PsyArXiv. November 2. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/moral-polarization-and-out-party-hate.html

Forecasting tournaments, epistemic humility and attitude depolarization. Barbara Mellers, PhilipTetlock, Hal R. Arkes. Cognition, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/forecasting-tournaments-epistemic.html

Does residential sorting explain geographic polarization? Gregory J. Martin & Steven W. Webster. Political Science Research and Methods, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/voters-appear-to-be-sorting-on-non.html

Liberals and conservatives have mainly moved further apart on a wide variety of policy issues; the divergence is substantial quantitatively and in its plausible political impact: intra party moderation has become increasingly unlikely:

Peltzman, Sam, Polarizing Currents within Purple America (August 20, 2018). SSRN: https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/liberals-and-conservatives-have-mainly.html

Does Having a Political Discussion Help or Hurt Intergroup Perceptions? Drawing Guidance From Social Identity Theory and the Contact Hypothesis. Robert M. Bond, Hillary C. Shulman, Michael Gilbert. Bond Vol 12 (2018), https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/having-political-discussion-with-out.html


All the interactions took the form of subjects rating stories offering ‘ammunition’ for their own side of the controversial issue as possessing greater intrinsic news importance:

Perceptions of newsworthiness are contaminated by a political usefulness bias. Harold Pashler, Gail Heriot. Royal Society Open Science, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/08/all-interactions-took-form-of-subjects.html

When do we care about political neutrality? The hypocritical nature of reaction to political bias. Omer Yair, Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. PLOS, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/05/when-do-we-care-about-political.html

Democrats & Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group; Republicans were more likely to believe & want to share apolitical fake news:

Pereira, Andrea, and Jay Van Bavel. 2018. “Identity Concerns Drive Belief in Fake News.” PsyArXiv. September 11. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/democrats-republicans-were-both-more.html

In self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own): The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/in-self-judgment-best-option-illusion.html

People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html

Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html

Summary: A simple test taken by millions of people reveals that virtually everybody has implicit biases that they are unaware of and that may clash with their explicit beliefs. From policing to scientific publishing, all activities that deal with people are at risk of making wrong decisions due to bias. Raising awareness is the first step towards improving the outcomes.

People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:

The Belief in a Favorable Future. Todd Rogers, Don Moore and Michael Norton. Psychological Science, Volume 28, issue 9, page(s): 1290-1301, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/people-believe-that-future-others.html

Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803

Abstract: This paper describes evidence suggesting that science curiosity counteracts politically biased information processing. This finding is in tension with two bodies of research. The first casts doubt on the existence of “curiosity” as a measurable disposition. The other suggests that individual differences in cognition related to science comprehension - of which science curiosity, if it exists, would presumably be one - do not mitigate politically biased information processing but instead aggravate it. The paper describes the scale-development strategy employed to overcome the problems associated with measuring science curiosity. It also reports data, observational and experimental, showing that science curiosity promotes open-minded engagement with information that is contrary to individuals’ political predispositions. We conclude by identifying a series of concrete research questions posed by these results.

Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html

The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html

The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html

The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html

Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802

Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html

Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html

Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html

Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html

Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html

Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html

Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html

Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html

The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html

Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html

Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html

Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html

Twitter: While partisan opinion leaders are certainly polarized, centrist/non-political voices are much more likely to produce the most visible information; & there is little evidence of echo-chambers in consumption

Mukerjee, Subhayan, Kokil Jaidka, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2020. “The Ideological Landscape of Twitter: Comparing the Production Versus Consumption of Information on the Platform.” OSF Preprints. June 23. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/06/twitter-while-partisan-opinion-leaders.html

Contrary to this prediction, we found that moderate and uncertain participants showed a nonreciprocal attraction towards extreme and confident individuals:

Zimmerman, Federico, Gerry Garbulsky, Dan Ariely, Mariano Sigman, and Joaquin Navajas. 2020. “The Nonreciprocal and Polarizing Nature of Interpersonal Attraction in Political Discussions.” PsyArXiv. August 21. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/08/contrary-to-this-prediction-we-found.html

Updated after July 5 2021 with old papers not printed above, or papers newer than the original post here:

Politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them; the continued popularity of mainstream outlets often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers:

How Many People Live in Politically Partisan Online News Echo Chambers in Different Countries? Richard Fletcher, Craig T. Robertson, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media, Vol. 1 (2021). Aug 4 2021. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/08/politically-partisan-left-right-online.html

Cross-Partisan Discussions on YouTube: Conservatives Talk to Liberals but Liberals Don't Talk to Conservatives. Siqi Wu, Paul Resnick. arXiv Apr 12 2021. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/04/cross-partisan-discussions-on-youtube.html

Auditing Partisan Audience Bias within Google Search. Ronald E. Robertson et al. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction - CSCW archive. Volume 2 Issue CSCW, November 2018, Article No. 148, doi: 10.1145/3274417. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/to-quantify-partisan-audience-bias-we.html

Few people are actually trapped in filter bubbles. Why do they like to say that they are? Plus: Are your Google results really that different from your neighbor’s? Laura Hazard Owen. NiemanLab, Dec 07 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/few-people-are-actually-trapped-in.html

Overall, research indicates that the risk of getting stuck in a filter bubble on intermediaries such as Google News, Apple News, Facebook, or Twitter is low and often exaggerated:

News recommender systems: a programmatic research review. Eliza Mitova et al. Annals of the International Communication Association, Nov 11 2022. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2022/11/overall-research-indicates-that-risk-of.html

Echo chambers and filter bubble are largely just a figment of the minds of political pundits:

Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review. Amy Ross Arguedas et al. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Jan 19 2022. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2022/12/echo-chambers-and-filter-bubble-are.html

 

In the self-experienced (vs. other-experienced) jealousy condition, activity was greater, inter alia, in the fronto-striato-thalamo-frontal circuit, a network implicated in habit formation & obsessive-compulsive disorder

From 2019... The obsessions of the green-eyed monster: jealousy and the female brain. Nadine Steis et al. Sexual and Relationship Therapy, May 21 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/14681994.2019.1615047

Abstract: The present brain-imaging study assessed neural correlates of romantic jealousy in women who had suffered real infidelity by their partner. We predicted to find activation across different brain structures associated with the processing of negative emotions and cognitive processes as well as obsessive-compulsive behavior. FMRI scans were administered while participants listened to descriptions of their own or another person’s experience of infidelity and jealousy, or to nonsense words. In the self-experienced (vs. other-experienced) jealousy condition, activity was greater in areas commonly associated with the interaction between different negative emotions (i.e., insula, anterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex) such as fear, anger, sadness and cognitive processes like rumination. Enhanced activity was also found in the fronto-striato-thalamo-frontal circuit, a network implicated in habit formation and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Activation in the above networks was not enhanced when participants listened to other-experienced infidelity reports, as indicated by comparisons with the neutral condition. We discuss implications for the understanding and treatment of jealousy.

Keywords: Jealousy, brain imaging, fMRI, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), infidelity

Fear of receiving compassion from others, and related fears, are potentially important factors in the persistence of depression, stress disorders, and eating disorders; they may play a role in anxiety and related difficulties

Scared of compassion: Fear of compassion in anxiety, mood, and non‐clinical groups. Olivia A. Merritt, Christine L. Purdon. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, Volume 59 Issue 3 (September 2020), Pages i-iv, 277-460. https://psychsource.bps.org.uk/details/journalArticle/11256977/Scared-of-compassion-Fear-of-compassion-in-anxiety-mood-and-nonclinical-groups.html

Objectives: Fear of receiving compassion from others, expressing compassion to others, and being compassionate towards oneself have been identified as potentially important factors in the persistence of depression, stress disorders, and eating disorders. There is good reason to expect that these fears may play a role in anxiety and related difficulties, but there is little available information on the extent to which they are present and associated with symptom severity.
Methods: This study compared the severity of the three fears of compassion (receiving, expressing to others, and showing to oneself) in those with a principal diagnosis of depression (n = 34), obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 27), social anxiety disorder (SAD; n = 91), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD, n = 43), and a control sample with no mental health difficulties (n = 212).
Results: Those with depression, OCD, SAD, and GAD exhibited greater fear of receiving compassion and fear of self‐compassion than controls, and the differences between anxious and control groups remained significant even when controlling for depressed mood. Whereas fears of compassion did not predict symptom severity over and above depressed mood in people with GAD, fear of receiving compassion uniquely predicted SAD symptom severity, and fear of expressing compassion for others uniquely predicted OCD symptom severity in those high on fear of self‐compassion.
Conclusions: Fear of compassion is higher in those with anxiety and related disorders than non‐anxious controls. Although further research is needed, clinicians may benefit from assessing fear of compassion and addressing it in treatment.
Practitioner points: Those with anxiety and related disorders may fear receiving compassion from others or expressing compassion for themselves, even when controlling for depression. It may be informative to assess for fear of compassion and incorporate discussions about these fears into treatment, as these fears may interfere with treatment progress.

Seeing the Whole Picture? Avoided Negative Affect and Processing of Others’ Suffering

Seeing the Whole Picture? Avoided Negative Affect and Processing of Others’ Suffering. Birgit Koopmann-Holm et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, February 11, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220903905

Abstract: Noticing someone’s pain is the first step to a compassionate response. While past research suggests that the degree to which people want to avoid feeling negative (“avoided negative affect”; ANA) shapes how people respond to someone’s suffering, the present research investigates whether ANA also predicts how people process others’ suffering. In two studies, using complex photographs containing negative aspects (i.e., suffering), we found that the higher people’s ANA, the fewer details of negative aspects they correctly recognized, and the fewer negative words they used in their image descriptions. However, when asked to process negative content, the higher people’s ANA, the more negatively they rated that content. In Study 3, we report cultural differences in people’s sensitivity to notice suffering in an ambiguous image. ANA mediated these cultural differences. Implications for research on compassion are discussed.

Keywords: emotion, avoided negative affect, information processing, suffering, culture

(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions

(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions. Jacob Goldstein-Greenwood et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, January 28, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219897662

Abstract: Sacrificial moral dilemmas, in which opting to kill one person will save multiple others, are definitionally suboptimal: Someone dies either way. Decision-makers, then, may experience regret about these decisions. Past research distinguishes affective regret, negative feelings about a decision, from cognitive regret, thoughts about how a decision might have gone differently. Classic dual-process models of moral judgment suggest that affective processing drives characteristically deontological decisions to reject outcome-maximizing harm, whereas cognitive deliberation drives characteristically utilitarian decisions to endorse outcome-maximizing harm. Consistent with this model, we found that people who made or imagined making sacrificial utilitarian judgments reliably expressed relatively more affective regret and sometimes expressed relatively less cognitive regret than those who made or imagined making deontological dilemma judgments. In other words, people who endorsed causing harm to save lives generally felt more distressed about their decision, yet less inclined to change it, than people who rejected outcome-maximizing harm.

Keywords: moral dilemmas, regret, affective regret, cognitive regret, dual-process model

In cognitive diagnosis models, the condensation rule reflects how latent attributes influence individuals’ observed item responses; in practice, multiple condensation rules may be involved in an item simultaneously

Zhan, Peida. 2020. “Deterministic-inputs, Noisy Mixed Modeling for Identifying Coexisting Condensation Rules.” PsyArXiv. February 12. doi:10.31234/osf.io/qwx2m

Abstract: In cognitive diagnosis models (CDMs), the condensation rule reflects how latent attributes influence individuals’ observed item responses. In practice, multiple condensation rules may be involved in an item simultaneously, which indicates that the contribution of required attributes to the correct item response probability follows multiple condensation rules with different proportions. To consider the coexisting condensation rules while keeping the interpretability of model parameters, this study proposed the deterministic-inputs, noisy mixed (DINMix) model. Two simulation studies were conducted to evaluate the psychometric properties of the proposed model. The results indicate that the model parameters for the DINMix model can be well recovered, and the DINMix model can accurately identify coexisting condensation rules. An empirical example was also analyzed to illustrate the applicability and advantages of the proposed model.

6. Summary and Discussion
The condensation rule describes the logical relationship between the required attributes and the item response. When an item contains coexisting condensation rules, it means that the contribution of required attributes to the correct item response probability follows multiple condensation rules with different proportions. Coexisting condensation rules reflect the complexity of cognitive processes in problem-solving. To take into account coexisting condensation rules while keeping the interpretability of model parameters, this study proposed the DINMix model. Two simulation studies were conducted to evaluate the psychometric properties of the proposed model. The simulation results indicate that (a) the model parameters for the DINMix model can be well recovered, especially in the conditions with a larger sample, longer test length, and higher item quality; (b) the DINMix model can adaptively and accurately identify coexisting condensation rules, either existing simultaneously in an item or existing separately in multiple items. An empirical example was also analyzed to illustrate the applicability and advantages of the proposed model.

As aforementioned, the DINMix model can be viewed as a constraint model from the GDINA model after some parameter transformations. Thus, the number of item parameters of the DINMix model is larger than that of the reduced models but smaller than that of the general models. For example, in the simulated condition in simulation Study 2, there were 60, 60, 60, 100, and 140 items parameters for the DINA, DINO, DINR, DINMix, and GDINA models, respectively. To explore the differences between the performance of the DINMix and GDINA models, we also used the GDINA model to conduct a simple analysis of the data in simulation Study 2, based on the GDINA package (Ma & de la Torre, 2020) in R software. The results (see Tables S4 and S5 in online supplements) indicate that the performance of the DINMix and GDINA models was almost identical in the recovery of attributes and item parameters. Specifically, the DINMix and GDINA models have almost the same diagnostic capabilities, but the former is more concise and easier to be interpreted.

The work represented in this article is an initial attempt to simultaneously consider multiple condensation rules in a single CDM. Despite promising results, some limitations still exist. First, the utilized model framework (see Equations 1 and 5) models the aberrant responses at the item level. However, in practice, such aberrant responses may occur at the attribute rather than item level, such as the noisy inputs, deterministic, ‘and’ gate model (Junker & Sijtsma, 2001). Ways to incorporate attribute-level aberrant responses into the proposed model are worthy of further research, as Equation 11 in de la Torre (2011) seems to give us a reference. Second, within-item characteristic dependency (Zhan, Jiao, Liao et al., 2019), which means that the dependency exists between the guessing and slip parameters within an item, was not considered in the proposed model. It can be incorporated into the proposed model to increase the estimation accuracy of the item parameters in a future study. Third, only the dichotomous scoring item and dichotomous attribute were modeled in the proposed model. It would be meaningful and practical to extend the current model to consider polytomous scoring items (e.g., Ma & de la Torre, 2016) and polytomous attributes (e.g., Zhan et al., 2020). Fourth, in recent years, some studies have focused on the Q-matrix validation or estimation (Chen et al., 2018; de la Torre & Chiu, 2016) and the multiple strategies for problem-solving (Ma & Guo, 2019), which are not covered in current study. Fifth, notably, the generalizability of the findings of this study is dependent upon the limitations of the design of the simulation studies, such as a fixed number of attributes and assuming the Q-matrix is correct. To further generalize these findings, a wider range of simulated conditions should be considered in future studies.

Does language change what we perceive? Does speaking different languages cause us to perceive things differently?

Lupyan, Gary, Rasha Abdel Rahman, Lera Boroditsky, and Andy Clark. 2020. “Effects of Language on Visual Perception.” PsyArXiv. April 28. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pztmc

Abstract: Does language change what we perceive? Does speaking different languages cause us to perceive things differently? We review the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for the influence of language on perception, with an emphasis on the visual modality. Effects of language on perception can be observed both in higher-level processes such as recognition, and in lower-level processes such as discrimination and detection. A consistent finding is that language causes us to perceive in a more categorical way. Rather than being fringe or exotic, as they are sometimes portrayed, we discuss how effects of language on perception naturally arise from the interactive and predictive nature of perception.

The higher individuals are in trait ambivalence, the smaller their bias towards attributing behavior to a person’s disposition; we find the same for self-serving bias

Schneider, Iris, Sheida Novin, Frenk van Harreveld, and Oliver Genschow. 2020. “Benefits of Being Ambivalent: The Relationship Between Trait Ambivalence and Attribution Biases.” PsyArXiv. August 22. doi:10.1111/bjso.12417

Abstract: Ambivalence refers to the experience of having both positive and negative thoughts and feelings at the same time about the same object, person, or issue. Although ambivalence research has focused extensively on negative consequences, recently, scholars turned their lens to the positive effects of ambivalence, demonstrating beneficial effects on judgments and decision-making processes. So far, this work has focused on state ambivalence, which is ambivalence as a direct response to a specific stimulus. However, there are substantial individual differences in ambivalence: some people are just more ambivalent than others. Taking a first step in understanding how these individual differences relate to judgment and decision-making, we examine the relationship between trait ambivalence and cognitive bias in social judgments tasks. Specifically, we look at two of the most pervasive and consequential attribution biases in person perception: correspondence bias and self-serving bias. We find a negative relationship between trait ambivalence and correspondence bias. The higher individuals are in trait ambivalence, the smaller their bias towards attributing behavior to a person’s disposition (Study 1A and B). We find the same for self-serving bias (Study 2A and B). In sum, we show that trait ambivalence is negatively related to cognitive bias in person perception.

We primarily rely on personal cost rather than social benefit when evaluating prosocial actors; this occurs because sacrifice, but not benefit, is taken as a signal of moral character & an input to reputational judgments

Johnson, Samuel G. B. 2020. “Dimensions of Altruism: Do Evaluations of Prosocial Behavior Track Social Good or Personal Sacrifice?.” PsyArXiv. August 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/r85jv

Abstract: Do we praise prosocial acts because they produce social benefits or because they entail a personal sacrifice? Six studies demonstrate that consumers primarily rely on personal cost rather than social benefit when evaluating prosocial actors. This occurs because sacrifice, but not benefit, is taken as a signal of moral character and an input to reputational judgments (Studies 1 and 2), reflecting a “character = sacrifice” heuristic predicted by costly signaling theory. The studies test four possible boundary conditions, finding that the effects are similar for actions that benefit one’s own country versus foreigners (Study 3), but differ for donations of time (Study 4), when information about personal sacrifice is unavailable (Study 5), and when high-cost but ineffective acts are pitted directly against low-cost but effective acts in joint evaluation (Study 6). These results help to account for the ineffectiveness of many charitable activities but also suggest directions for incentivizing effective charity.

Check also Johnson, Samuel G. B., and Seo Y. Park. 2019. “Moral Signaling Through Donations of Money and Time.” PsyArXiv. September 23. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/09/consumers-view-time-donations-as.html

Depersonalization is common in anxiety disorders; on a trait level, anxiety & depersonalization more frequently co-occur when people catastrophically misinterpret their symptoms or have lower emotional distress tolerance

French, Noah J., Jeremy W. Eberle, and Bethany Teachman. 2020. “Moderators of the Relationships Between State and Trait Anxiety and Depersonalization.” PsyArXiv. July 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/63zrj

Abstract: Depersonalization is common in anxiety disorders, but little is known about the factors that influence co-occurring anxiety and depersonalization. We investigated trait moderators of the relationships between state and trait anxiety and depersonalization to better understand their co-occurrence and to identify potential points of intervention. Adults recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 303) completed two computer tasks designed to increase variability in state anxiety and depersonalization as well as several self-report questionnaires. As hypothesized (preregistration: https://osf.io/xgazd/?view_only=56eba3dfb2b8454a97d3f66eb5217f7a), anxiety positively predicted depersonalization at both a state level, β = 0.43, 95% CI [0.39, 0.47], and a trait level, β = 0.60, 95% CI [0.51, 0.70]. Moreover, as hypothesized, the trait anxiety-trait depersonalization relationship was strengthened by greater anxiety sensitivity, β = 0.25, 95% CI [0.17, 0.34]; distress intolerance, β = 0.15, 95% CI [0.05, 0.25]; and negative interpretation bias for anxiety sensations (inverse transformed), β = -0.21, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.13], and for depersonalization sensations (inverse transformed), β = -0.27, 95% CI [-0.35, -0.19]. None of these hypothesized trait moderators significantly strengthened the state anxiety-state depersonalization relationship. These findings suggest that on a trait level, anxiety and depersonalization more frequently co-occur when people catastrophically misinterpret their symptoms or have lower emotional distress tolerance.

Low Base Rates and a High IQ Selection Threshold Prevented Terman from Identifying Future Nobelists

Low Base Rates and a High IQ Selection Threshold Prevented Terman from Identifying Future Nobelists. Russell T. WarneRoss LarsenJonathan Clark. Aug 22, 2020. http://psyarxiv.com/g4x6r/

Although the accomplishments of the 1,528 subjects of the Genetic Studies of Genius are impressive, they do not represent the pinnacle of human achievement. Since the early 1990s, commentators have criticized the study because two future Nobelists—William Shockley and Luis Alvarez—were among the candidates screened for the study; but they were rejected because their IQ scores were too low. Critics see this as a flaw of Terman’s methodology and/or intelligence testing. This study simulates the Terman’s sampling procedure to estimate the probability that Terman would have selected one or both future Nobelists from a population of 168,000 candidates. Using simulations, we created a model that reflected the reliability of the IQ scores used to select individuals for the Genetic Studies of Genius and the relationship between IQ and Nobelist status. Results showed that it was unlikely for Terman to identify children who would later earn Nobel prizes, mostly because of the low base rate of earning a Nobel and the high minimum IQ needed to be selected for Terman’s study. Changes to the methodology that would have been required to select one or both Nobelists were not practical. Therefore, future Nobelists’ absence from the Genetic Studies of Genius sample is not a fatal flaw of intelligence testing or Terman’s study. Instead, predicting high levels of eminence requires measuring a variety of relevant cognitive and non-cognitive variables. Simulation code and results and reliability generalization information are available at https://osf.io/3xfe8/.