Thursday, November 19, 2020

People in lockdown thought significantly less often about missing their freedom than did first-time prisoners, were significantly less engaged in a range of daily activities, & reported feeling more hopeless than them

Are People Experiencing the ‘Pains of Imprisonment’ During the COVID-19 Lockdown? Mandeep K. Dhami, Leonardo Weiss-Cohen and Peter Ayton. Front. Psychol., 19 November 2020 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.578430

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329296379857006592

Abstract

Background: By the end of March 2020, more than a fifth of the world’s population was in various degrees of “lockdown” in order to slow the spread of COVID-19. This enforced confinement led some to liken lockdown to imprisonment. We directly compared individual’s experiences of lockdown with prisoners’ experiences of imprisonment in order to determine whether psychological parallels can be drawn between these two forms of confinement.

Methods: Online surveys of adults in lockdown in the UK (N = 300) and California (N = 450) were conducted 4 and 5 weeks into lockdown in each region, respectively. The UK data was then compared to Souza and Dhami’s (2010) sample of 267 medium security prisoners in England, and the Californian data was compared to Dhami et al.’s (2007) sample of 307 medium security Federal prisoners in California. We measured the effects of Group (Lockdown v. Prison) on five categories of dependent variables (i.e., activity, social contact, thoughts, feelings, and rule-breaking), controlling for demographic differences between the groups.

Results: In both regions, people in lockdown thought significantly less often about missing their freedom, as well as missing their family and friends living elsewhere than did first-time prisoners. However, people in lockdown in both regions were also significantly less engaged in a range of daily activities than were first-time prisoners. Additionally, in both regions, people in lockdown reported feeling more hopeless than first-time prisoners.

Conclusion: Although Governments introducing lockdown policies do not intend to punish their citizens as courts do when sending convicted offenders to prison, such policies can have unintended adverse consequences. Psychological parallels can be drawn between the two forms of confinement.

Discussion

The COVID-19 lockdown resulted in the removal of individual freedoms and restrictions on movement and physical contact with family and friends who live elsewhere, as well as reduced access to potential sexual relations, some previously enjoyed goods and services, and, for some people, a sense of threat to personal safety. These are the sorts of deprivations suffered by prisoners that have been long identified in the literature on imprisonment (e.g., Sykes, 1958Sykes and Messinger, 1960Goffman, 1961). It is perhaps no surprise therefore, that some have likened the lockdown to imprisonment (e.g., Ali et al., 2020O’Donnell, 2020Toon, 2020Wheatcroft, 2020).

In the present research, we directly compared individuals’ experiences of the COVID-19 lockdown with first-time prisoners’ experiences of imprisonment on a range of measures. We found that although people in lockdown (who had never been in prison before) did not necessarily liken lockdown to imprisonment, their subjective experiences of lockdown were comparable to those of first-time prisoners. The pattern of findings was generally consistent when comparing first-time male prisoners with males in lockdown and with females in lockdown. In addition, the findings were fairly similar across the two regions studied (i.e., UK and California). Below, we discuss the main findings, and highlight the strengths and limitations of our approach to understanding psychological experiences of the COVID-19 lockdown, before identifying potential directions for future research.

Are Experiences of the COVID-19 Lockdown Comparable to Imprisonment?

In some respects, individuals in lockdown demonstrated more positive adjustments to their confinement compared to first-time prisoners, although most of these findings do not necessarily paint a positive psychological picture of lockdown. For instance, it is unsurprising that, unlike prisoners who share a living space with unknown others, some groups in lockdown had more interaction with those they live with (i.e., their family and/or friends). Similarly, although some groups in lockdown felt less unhappy relative to before lockdown than did first-time prisoners before they entered prison, both groups were, nevertheless, less happy than before. Finally, although we found that people in lockdown thought less often about missing their family/friends than did first-time prisoners, some groups in lockdown had a similar frequency of contact with family/friends living elsewhere as did first-time prisoners. Other studies have similarly noted a disruption to social ties during lockdown (e.g., Roy et al., 2020Sharma and Subramanyam, 2020).

Perhaps the only indicator we found of the COVID-19 lockdown being psychologically better than imprisonment is that, compared to first-time prisoners, people in lockdown thought less often about missing their freedom and some groups in lockdown also thought less often about needing control over their life. Aymerich-Franch (2020) reported that 70.2% of adults in lockdown in Spain felt less free, but did not use a comparison group. The present findings suggest that even if people in lockdown do feel less free, the sense of freedom is still greater than that enjoyed by prisoners. Unlike prisoners, people in lockdown can, for the most part, plan their own daily regime and venture outside their properties for limited exercise and/or essential purposes.

In other respects, however, the experience of lockdown was either similar to, or even worse than, being in prison for the first-time. Females in lockdown in both the UK and California thought about being attacked/beaten up as equally often as did first-time prisoners. Prisons are notoriously violent places (e.g., Blevins et al., 2010), and the COVID-19 lockdown has not only shone a light on the violence that occurs within the home, but also on the rise of such domestic abuse during lockdown (e.g., ABC News, 2020BBC News, 2020).

We also found that people in lockdown participated in a lesser variety of daily activities than did first-time prisoners. A closer examination of the data showed that whereas over half of first-time prisoners in both regions worked, studied, exercised regularly, and attended a self-help program, the main activities performed by more than half of those in lockdown in these regions were work and exercise. Although we cannot say here whether people in lockdown simply did not engage in other activities such as household chores (Aymerich-Franch, 2020Chirombe et al., 2020), it is clear that the sorts of activities believed to enrich prisoners’ lives and help them cope with their confinement (e.g., education and self-help programs) were less prevalent in lockdown. The psychological effects of limited engagement in activities during lockdown remain to be seen, although other evidence of people in quarantine has documented feelings of boredom (Brooks et al., 2020).

Finally, and perhaps most concerning, is the finding that people in lockdown felt more hopeless relative to before lockdown compared to first-time prisoners before they went to prison. This supports Ali et al.’s (2020) finding as well as that of Sibley et al. (2020), and is compatible with the growing body of research reporting the mental distress suffered by people in lockdown (Aymerich-Franch, 2020Odriozola-Gonzalez et al., 2020Rossi et al., 2020Srilakshmidevi and Suseela, 2020White and Van der Boor, 2020). Feelings of hopelessness are predictive of suicide ideation, attempted suicide, and death by suicide (Ribeiro et al., 2018). Calderon-Anyosa and Kaufman (2020) recently found evidence of increased suicides among men in Peru during lockdown, and Caballero-Domínguez et al. (2020) reported increased suicide risk for people in lockdown in Columbia. Others have similarly forecasted increased suicides worldwide (e.g., Sher, 2020Weems et al., 2020). Thus, the COVID-19 lockdown may have had potentially psychologically devastating effects during the first wave of the pandemic.

Beyond the aforementioned comparison between those in the COVID-19 lockdown and those in prison for the first-time, the present research also found a significant independent effect of age among those in confinement in the UK. On the one hand, older individuals participated in fewer activities and had less social contact with family and friends living elsewhere than their younger counterparts. On the other hand, older individuals were less likely to have negative thoughts pertaining to needing control over their life and missing sex, and were less likely to be accused of (or be charged with) rule-breaking than younger individuals. These latter findings are compatible with studies of adults in lockdown in Italy, India, and Spain which also report that younger people demonstrate more adverse or negative psychological outcomes (Aymerich-Franch, 2020Rossi et al., 2020Singhal and Vijayaraghavan, 2020). Later, we consider the psychological trajectory that older people in lockdown may find themselves on.

Strengths and Limitations

There have been calls for research on the psychological impact of the Covid-19 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic (e.g., Verger et al., 2020). By directly comparing individuals in lockdown with first-time prisoners on a wide variety of responses (including behavioral, social, thoughts and emotions), and after controlling for demographic differences between the two groups, the present research provides a way of contextualizing and interpreting a range of psychological effects of lockdown. It is reasonable to assume that, as a form of confinement, imprisonment is (and should be) worse than lockdown, thus demonstrating that people in lockdown feel the same or worse than first-time prisoners is insightful. The fact that these findings were observed in two different regions emphasizes their generalizability and robustness.

Nonetheless, there are some potential limitations of our approach. First, there is a large time gap between the two sources of data (i.e., prison and lockdown). In order to avoid the confounding effect of the COVID-19 outbreak in the prison system, we opted to use data that had been collected from prisoners before the pandemic. Our search for such data focused on studies that included a range of quantitative measures of prisoner adaptation. There is mixed evidence as to whether prison environments have improved or deteriorated over the intervening years (see Prison Reform Trust, 2020), and it is unclear if, and how, such changes would affect first-time prisoners’ subjective experiences.

Second, we compared females in lockdown to first-time, male prisoners. It is therefore, unclear if females in lockdown fare better or worse than first-time, female prisoners. According to Kruttschnitt and Gartner’s (2003) review of research on women’s imprisonment, female responses to imprisonment are similar to those found in male prisoners, although women tend to be more active in choosing their patterns of adjustment.

Third, we found that whereas people in lockdown thought less often about missing sex than did first-time prisoners, who are deprived of heterosexual relations, our study does not capture the longing for homosexual relations that have been identified in some recent research on the COVID-19 lockdown (Sharma and Subramanyam, 2020).

Fourth, at the time of data collection, the lockdown sample had spent considerably less time in confinement than the prison sample, and so they may not have had sufficient time to adapt to their situation. However, Dhami et al.’s (2007) survey of 712 adult, male US federally sentenced prisoners in three prisons (high, medium and low security), found that after controlling for sentence length and prison security level, time spent in prison was only predictive of some of the variables measured in the present research. Specifically, time spent in prison was negatively associated with disciplinary infractions and positively associated with feelings of hopelessness and thoughts about needing control over one’s life. This suggests that over time, people in lockdown may continue to feel more hopeless than before, and their frequency of thoughts about needing control over their life (which are currently less than first-time prisoners) may increase.

Directions for Future Research

Since conducting the present research, most Governments, including those in the UK and US have begun to ease lockdown restrictions. However, it is widely believed that there will be other waves of COVID-19 (Wise, 2020). If strict lockdown policies are re-imposed, then future research could explore whether people are better able to cope with lockdown. This could be done by comparing their responses to those of prisoners who have prior prison experience. Recurrent prisoners differ in their adjustment to confinement compared to first-time prisoners. For instance, whereas recurrent prisoners may demonstrate some positive adjustments such as greater psychological wellbeing and more participation in self-help programs (e.g., Souza and Dhami, 2010), they may also demonstrate some negative behaviors such as rule-breaking (e.g., Bosma et al., 2020). In the present study, people in lockdown were either more or equally compliant with the rules of lockdown as were first-time prisoners with the rules of prison, however, there may be less compliance during future lockdowns.

The fact that the isolation or shielding of those particularly vulnerable to the more severe consequences of COVID-19 such as the elderly is likely continue after any lockdown ends and perhaps until a vaccine is available, makes it imperative to understand the psychological trajectory that such individuals may find themselves on. Future research could examine if older people respond to lockdown in the same ways as older prisoners do. For instance, Maschi et al. (2015) reported that a lack of social contact can be a major source of stress and trauma for prisoners over the age of 50. In the present study, older individuals had less social contact with family and friends living elsewhere than their younger counterparts, and over time, this could serve to reduce their psychological well-being.

Finally, future research on the COVID-19 lockdown could explore factors that may predict individual’s patterns of adjustment. Prison researchers have examined the independent, relative and interactive effects of a range of pre-prison and in-prison factors in predicting adaptations to imprisonment (e.g., Dhami et al., 2007Dye, 2010DeLisi et al., 2011). In the context of the COVID-19 lockdown, this would mean, for example, measuring the extent to which factors such as quality of life before and current living conditions predict adjustment to lockdown. Patterns of adjustment can have implications for how well individuals readjust to life after lockdown restrictions end, and so the findings of such research can identify those who may require support to help them readjust.

You’ve Lost That Loving Feeling: Using the 1980 to 2016 American National Election Studies, we find that women are more affectively polarized than men, working indirectly through political identities and issue positions

You’ve Lost That Loving Feeling: How Gender Shapes Affective Polarization. Heather Louise Ondercin, Mary Kate Lizotte. American Politics Research, November 18, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X20972103

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329315564041494530

Abstract: We examine variation in levels of affective polarization for men and women. Using the 1980 to 2016 American National Election Studies, we find that women are more affectively polarized than men. The effect of sex partially works indirectly through political identities and issue positions. Moreover, sex acts as a moderator, with political identities and issues positions have different effects on men’s and women’s level of affective polarization. Three factors create women’s higher levels of affective polarization: women are more likely to be partisans, strength in abortion attitudes, and partisanship has a more substantial influence on women’s attitudes compared to men’s attitudes. Breaking the analysis apart into three time periods: (1) gender gap emergence 1980 to 1988, (2) elite polarization 1990 to 1998, and (3) hyper-partisanship 2000 to 2016 reinforces that partisan strength is central to understanding affective polarization. Additionally, during the 1990s when elite polarization is intensifying the strength of issue attitudes and ideology.

Keywords: affective polarization, gender gap


Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Disinformation can covertly modify the unconscious behavior of individuals; fake news can target implicit attitudes and emotions; current mitigation methods do not prevent behavior modification

Would you notice if fake news changed your behavior? An experiment on the unconscious effects of disinformation. Zach Bastick. Computers in Human Behavior, November 18 2020, 106633. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106633

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1329088264184086534

Highlights

• Disinformation can covertly modify the behavior of individuals.

• Fake news can target implicit attitudes and emotions.

• Current mitigation methods do not prevent behavior modification.

• Wider, normative definitions are needed as disinformation is inherently evasive.

• Democracy and individual autonomy require urgent investigation of this threat.

Abstract: A growing literature is emerging on the believability and spread of disinformation, such as fake news, over social networks. However, little is known about the degree to which malicious actors can use social media to covertly affect behavior with disinformation. A lab-based randomized controlled experiment was conducted with 233 undergraduate students to investigate the behavioral effects of fake news. It was found that even short (under 5-minute) exposure to fake news was able to significantly modify the unconscious behavior of individuals. This paper provides initial evidence that fake news can be used to covertly modify behavior, it argues that current approaches to mitigating fake news, and disinformation in general, are insufficient to protect social media users from this threat, and it highlights the implications of this for democracy. It raises the need for an urgent cross-sectoral effort to investigate, protect against, and mitigate the risks of covert, widespread and decentralized behavior modification over online social networks.

Keywords: Fake newsdisinformationmisinformationbehaviorfinger tappingemotions


Behavior when matches are held on closed doors: Decisions of fouls, yellow cards, red cards & penalties that tend to favor home teams in normal matches, are much more balanced without the crowd pressing on referees

Social Pressure in the Stadiums: Do Agents Change Behavior without Crowd Support? Vincenzo Scoppa. Journal of Economic Psychology, November 18 2020, 102344, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2020.102344

Abstract: Social pressure may have relevant consequences in many contexts but it is hard to evaluate it empirically. In this paper we exploit a natural experiment in soccer to provide clear evidence of its effects. We aim to study how social pressure from the crowd in a stadium affects both players and referees. While in normal matches crowd support may be correlated to a host of variables affecting the outcome of interest, we exploit the fact that after the health emergency for the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, soccer matches in top European Leagues have been allowed only behind closed doors, that is, without spectators in the stadiums. We use data of first and second division of five major European Leagues (Germany, Spain, England, Italy and Portugal) for the last 10 seasons and compare – using a differences-in-differences analysis – several outcomes (determined by players’ performance and referees’ decisions) of matches played with crowd support to the same outcomes when matches were played without crowd. We find considerable effects of the pressure from the crowd: while with the support of the crowd a considerable home advantage emerges in various measures of performance (points, goals, shots, etc.), this advantage is almost halved when matches are played behind closed doors. Similar effects are found for the behavior of referees: decisions of fouls, yellow cards, red cards and penalties that tend to favor home teams in normal matches, are much more balanced without the crowd pressing on referees. The evidence we provide strongly supports the idea that social pressure has intense effects on agents’ behavior.

Keywords: Social PressureCrowd SupportEmotional FactorsSocial ApprovalHome AdvantageReferee’s Favoritism

JEL: D91M50L83Z2


Randomized Controlled Trial of Bt Eggplant in Bangla: Bt brinjal raises yields by 51%, reduces pesticide costs by 37.5%, increases 128% net revenues, reduces pesticides toxicity above 70%

The Impacts of GM Foods: Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial of Bt Eggplant in Bangladesh. Akhter U. Ahmed  John Hoddinott  Naveen Abedin  Nusrat Hossain. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12162

Abstract: We implemented a cluster randomized controlled trial to assess the impact of genetically modified eggplant (Bt brinjal) in Bangladesh. Our two primary outcomes were changes in yield and in pesticide costs. Cultivation of Bt brinjal raises yields by 3,564 kg/ha. This statistically significant impact is equivalent to a 51% increase relative to the control group. There is a statistically significant fall in pesticide costs, 7,175 Taka per hectare (85 USD per ha), a 37.5% reduction. Yield increases arise because Bt farmers harvest more eggplant and because fewer fruits are discarded because they are damaged. Bt brinjal farmers sell more eggplant and receive a higher price for the output they sell while incurring lower input costs, resulting in a 128% increase in net revenues. Bt brinjal farmers used smaller quantities of pesticides and sprayed less frequently. Bt brinjal reduced the toxicity of pesticides as much as 76%. Farmers growing Bt brinjal and who had pre‐existing chronic conditions consistent with pesticide poisoning were 11.5% points less likely to report a symptom of pesticide poisoning and were less likely to incur cash medical expenses to treat these symptoms. Our results are robust to changes in model specification and adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing. We did not find evidence of heterogeneous effects by farmer age, schooling, or land cultivated. Bt brinjal is a publicly developed genetically modified organism that conveys significant productivity and income benefits while reducing the use of pesticides damaging to human and ecological health.

Limitations

We note three limitations associated with our analysis. First, our intervention consisted of a package of activities (most notably, training and a stipend) as well as the provision of seedlings, the latter randomized to be either Bt brinjal or the control variety, ISD‐006. Specifically, we note that farmers growing Bt brinjal received extensive training and support; the increase in yield relative to the control group might have been smaller in the absence of this support. That said, both the treatment and control groups received training on IPM; absent that training, the control group might have experienced even greater production losses due to pest infestations and might have spent even more money on pesticides. If this the case, our results underestimate the impact of Bt brinjal. Second, data on production, sales, and inputs as well as symptoms relating to pesticide poisoning are self‐reported. If respondents in the treatment group felt some social desirability bias to exaggerate their production success, or reductions in illness, this would upwardly bias our impact estimates. Third, we do not have direct measures of pesticide residues in soils; such information would provide a useful complement to our findings about the environmental benefits of Bt brinjal.

Summary and Conclusions

In Bangladesh, we implemented a cluster randomized controlled trial to assess the impact of Bt brinjal. Households in both treatment and control villages received a bundle of interventions including training, extension, an input package, and seedlings. Control villages received a conventional variety, ISD‐006. Treatment villages received Bt brinjal‐4, a variety that was genetically identical to ISD‐006 except for the addition of one gene (cry1Ac) that conveyed protection against the fruit and shoot borer pest.

Our two primary outcomes were changes in yield and in pesticide costs. We find that cultivation of Bt brinjal raises yields by 51% relative to the control group while reducing pesticide costs by 37.5%. These results are consistent with observational studies of yield and pesticide use summarized in Klümper and Qaim (2014), Zilberman, Holland, and Trilnick (2018), and other reviews noted in our introduction. Yield increases arise because Bt farmers harvest more eggplant and because less fruit is discarded post harvest. Compared to control farmers, Bt brinjal farmers both sell more eggplant and receive a higher price for the output. They incur lower input costs, resulting in a 128% increase in net revenues. Bt brinjal farmers used smaller quantities of pesticides and sprayed less frequently, and Bt brinjal reduced the toxicity of pesticides that were applied. Farmers growing Bt brinjal and who had pre‐existing chronic conditions were 11.5% points less likely to report a symptom of pesticide poisoning. Our results are robust to changes in model specification and adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing. We did not find evidence of heterogeneous effects by farmer age, schooling, or land cultivated.

We note three policy implications that follow from these results. They support the view that GMOs can contribute to the goal of increasing yields while reducing environmental stressors. They provide further justification for releasing Bt brinjal in countries such as India and the Philippines, where these varieties have been developed but not approved for cultivation due to public reservations about GMO foods. They point to the valuable role that public agencies can play in the dissemination of GMOs. The involvement of BARI and the Bangladesh Department of Agriculture in the development and support of Bt brinjal cultivation alleviates concerns raised by anti‐GMO activists regarding farmer sovereignty.

We have noted several limitations to our study. The most significant is the fact that Bt brinjal was provided as part of a package. Doing so allows us to better isolate the impact of Bt brinjal but raises concerns regarding external validity. Additional RCTs with a slimmer package would make it possible to assess whether this is a concern. Clinical measures of health and chemical measures of pesticide residues would strengthen our ability to assess impacts on health and the environment. Finally, our finding that consumers are willing to pay more for a GM crop is striking; further work understanding why would be of value. Such future work would further strengthen the results found here—that Bt brinjal, a publicly developed GMO, conveys significant productivity and income benefits to farmers while reducing the use of pesticides damaging to human and ecological health.

Overall, Democrats perceived more risk associated with COVID-19 than Republicans, including for getting infected, being hospitalized and dying if infected, as well as running out of money

Political polarization in US residents’ COVID-19 risk perceptions, policy preferences, and protective behaviors. Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Htay-Wah Saw & Dana P. Goldman. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Nov 18 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11166-020-09336-3

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328978916397240321

Abstract: When the novel coronavirus entered the US, most US states implemented lockdown measures. In April–May 2020, state governments started political discussions about whether it would be worth the risk to reduce protective measures. In a highly politicized environment, risk perceptions and preferences for risk mitigation may vary by political inclinations. In April–May 2020, we surveyed a nationally representative sample of 5517 members of the University of Southern California’s Understanding America Study. Of those, 37% identified as Democrats, 32% as Republican, and 31% as Third Party/Independent. Overall, Democrats perceived more risk associated with COVID-19 than Republicans, including for getting infected, being hospitalized and dying if infected, as well as running out of money as a result of the pandemic. Democrats were also more likely than Republicans to express concerns that states would lift economic restrictions too quickly, and to report mask use and social distancing. Generally, participants who identified as Third Party/Independent fell in between. Democrats were more likely to report watching MSNBC or CNN (vs. not), while Republicans were more likely to report watching Fox News (vs. not), and Third Party/Independents tended to watch neither. However, political inclinations predicted reported policy preferences, mask use, and social distancing, in analyses that accounted for differences in use of media sources, risk perceptions, and demographic background. In these analyses, participants’ reported media use added to the partisan divide in preferences for the timing of lifting economic restrictions and reported protective behaviors. Implications for risk communication are discussed.


Discussion

In an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19 in the United States, school closures and bans of large gatherings were announced in March 2020 (Yeung et al. 2020), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020a) recommended protective behaviors such as practicing hand hygiene and social distancing, as well as wearing face masks. However, Republican politicians started calling for re-opening of the US economy as early as April–May 2020 (New York Times 2020a). In a highly politicized environment, individuals who differ in political inclinations may disagree about the risks, policy support, and need for protective behaviors (van Bavel et al. 2020). Moreover, such political polarization may be exacerbated by the different news sources being used by individuals with different political inclinations (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009).

Indeed, in a nationally representative survey with US residents conducted in April–May 2020, we found political polarization on every question about risk perception and risk mitigation that we assessed. Although mean risk perceptions were relatively high for both Democrats and Republicans, Democrats tended to perceive greater risks than Republicans, for getting infected with COVID-19 in the next three months, getting hospitalized or dying if infected, and running out of money in the next three months. These differences in risk perceptions held after accounting for differences in media use and demographic characteristics, suggesting that other political disagreements may have informed the political divide in risk perceptions. Possibly, the political discourse about COVID-19 in the United States, and Republicans’ initial comparisons of COVID-19 risk to seasonal flu risk (National Public Radio 2020) may have played a role.

Democrats were also more likely than Republicans to express concern that their own state and states in general would lift restrictions too quickly. Political differences in the policy preferences remained after controlling for risk perceptions, media use, and demographic differences. These differences may reflect other important political disagreements. For example, even before COVID-19, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to support collective strategies (as opposed to individual efforts) for societal change to promote better health outcomes (Gollust et al. 2009; Robert and Booske 2011).

Compared to preferences for opening the US economy, political differences were less pronounced for protective behaviors, suggesting that Democrats and Republicans were somewhat less divided about their own individual initiatives to protect personal health than about government policies. Although the majority of Democrats and Republicans indicated engaging in each protective behavior, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to report using masks and avoiding public spaces or crowds. This difference remained significant after acounting for differences in risk perceptions, media use and demographics. These two behaviors, mask use and social distancing, may be the most politicized, because their requirement by states may go against Republicans’ preferences (Gollust et al. 2009; Robert and Booske 2011).

Differences by political inclinations tended to be more pronounced than differences by media preferences. Yet, participants’ reported media use did seem to add to the partisan divide in policy preferences and protective behaviors. Watching Fox News (vs. not) was associated with being less likely to express concern about states opening too quickly, while watching MSNBC or CNN (vs. not) was associated with being more likely to do so—even when political inclinations and other characteristics were accounted for. Watching MSNBC or CNN was also systematically associated with increased likelihood of implementing protective behaviors before and after accounting for political inclinations, while watching Fox News was not.

Like any study, ours had limitations. Because we reported on a cross-sectional survey, causal conclusions are unwarranted. Moreover, April–May 2020 may have been a time of particular political polarization, because information about the risks associated with COVID-19 was still uncertain and rapidly changing—perhaps leaving more room for (political) interpretation.

The political divide in COVID-19 risk perceptions, policy preferences, and preferences for protective behaviors pose a potential challenge for practitioners and policy makers tasked with reducing the spread of COVID-19. However, actionable steps have been suggested for reducing political polarization (van Bavel et al. 2020). First, highlighting shared challenges could provide a sense of shared identity (van Bavel et al. 2020). Second, providing consistent and accurate messages should reduce partisan-motivated reasoning and inaccurate beliefs (Ahler and Sood 2018). Finally, political polarization in people’s beliefs may be reduced when there is bipartisan support for COVID-19-related measures (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook 2014). Indeed, research about risk and crisis communication has indicated that prevention efforts are more effective when different sources provide consistent and accurate messaging (Glik 2007; Reynolds 2006). Thus, effectively combating health crises such as COVID-19 requires political leadership that aims to unite rather than divide, and to reach across the aisles.

Matriliny reverses gender disparities in inflammation and hypertension among the Mosuo of China

Matriliny reverses gender disparities in inflammation and hypertension among the Mosuo of China. Adam Z. Reynolds et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, November 16, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014403117

Significance: Greater autonomy afforded to women in matrilineal societies has been hypothesized to benefit women’s health. Among the Mosuo, a society with both matrilineal and patrilineal subpopulations, we found that gender disparities in chronic disease are not only ameliorated but reversed in matriliny compared with patriliny. Gender disparities in health and chronic disease can thus be tied directly to cultural influences on health, including inequalities in autonomy and resource access between men and women.

Abstract: Women experience higher morbidity than men, despite living longer. This is often attributed to biological differences between the sexes; however, the majority of societies in which these disparities are observed exhibit gender norms that favor men. We tested the hypothesis that female-biased gender norms ameliorate gender disparities in health by comparing gender differences in inflammation and hypertension among the matrilineal and patrilineal Mosuo of China. Widely reported gender disparities in health were reversed among matrilineal Mosuo compared with patrilineal Mosuo, due to substantial improvements in women’s health, with no concomitant detrimental effects on men. These findings offer evidence that gender norms limiting women’s autonomy and biasing inheritance toward men adversely affect the health of women, increasing women’s risk for chronic diseases with tremendous global health impact.

Keywords: gender normshealthchronic diseasematrilineal societies


Examining 60 measures of sociopolitical attitudes: Sexual minorities are significantly more liberal than their heterosexual counterparts across both sexual & non-sexual (civil liberties, environmentalism) domains

Grollman, Eric. 2020. “Does Sexuality Matter? A Comparison of Heterosexuals’ and Sexual Minorities’ Sociopolitical Attitudes.” SocArXiv. November 17. doi:10.31235/osf.io/atnxb

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328939984271921155

Abstract: Few researchers have examined the influence of sexuality on individuals’ sociopolitical attitudes. Using data from the 1991-2012 General Social Surveys (GSS) and 2008 American National Election Survey (ANES), I compare the social and political attitudes of heterosexuals and sexual minorities across a wide array of domains. Examining sixty measures of sociopolitical attitudes in the GSS, I find evidence that sexual minorities are significantly more liberal than their heterosexual counterparts across both sexual (e.g., sexual morality) and non-sexual (e.g., civil liberties, environmentalism) domains. In comparing the effect of sexuality on attitudes to the effects of gender, race, and education, I find that the influence of sexuality is comparable to these other well-documented sociodemographic predictors of attitudes. However, unlike these other sociodemographic characteristics, sexuality consistently predicts more liberal attitudes among sexual minorities compared to heterosexuals. Expanded analyses using 278 attitudinal items in the GSS and 64 in the ANES yield similar results. My findings provide evidence for the necessity to incorporate sexuality in future assessments of sociodemographic predictors of sociopolitical attitudes.


Not Why, But How... "Why We Learn Less from Observing Outgroups"

Why We Learn Less from Observing Outgroups. Pyungwon Kang, Christopher J. Burke, Philippe N. Tobler and Grit Hein. Journal of Neuroscience November 17 2020, JN-RM-0926-20. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0926-20.2020

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328936960497479682

Abstract: Humans are less likely to learn from individuals belonging to a different group (outgroup) than from individuals of their own group (ingroup), yet the source of this societally relevant deficit has remained unclear. Here we used neuroimaging and computational modeling to investigate how people learn from observing the actions and outcomes of ingroup and outgroup demonstrators. Politically left-wing male and female participants performed worse when observing computer-simulated actions they believed were from a right-wing outgroup member compared with those from a left-wing ingroup member. A control experiment in which participants observed choices from a nonhuman agent confirmed that this performance difference reflected an outgroup deficit, rather than an ingroup gain. Accounting for the outgroup deficit, a computational model showed that participants relied less on information from outgroup actions compared with ingroup actions, while learning from outgroup outcomes was not impaired. At the neural level, the differences in observational ingroup versus outgroup learning were reflected in lateral prefrontal activity. The stronger the activity in this region, the more strongly participants weighed ingroup compared with outgroup learning signals (action prediction errors), which formally captured deficits in outgroup learning. Together, our work provides a computational and neural account of why people learn less from observing outgroups.


SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

Learning from observing others is an efficient way to acquire knowledge. In our globalized world, “the others” often are people from a different social group (outgroup). There is evidence that people learn less from observing outgroup individuals compared with individuals from their own group (ingroup). However, the source of this outgroup deficit in observational learning remained unknown, which limits our chances to improve intergroup learning. Our results showed that participants rely less on observed outgroup actions compared with ingroup actions, while learning from outgroup outcomes is not impaired. On the neural level, this outgroup deficit was reflected in the activation of the inferior frontal gyrus. These findings imply that intergroup learning should rely on observing outcomes, rather than actions.


Check also The tribal nature of the human mind leads people to value party dogma over truth; those with political sophistication, science literacy, numeracy abilities, and cognitive reflection are more affected

The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Feb 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004


Tuesday, November 17, 2020

Straight men showed significantly stronger preferences for feminized female faces than did gay men; gay men showed significantly stronger preferences for masculinized versions of male faces than did straight men

Shiramizu V, Docherty C, DeBruine LM, Jones BC (2020) Sexual orientation predicts men’s preferences for sexually dimorphic face-shape characteristics: A replication study. PLoS ONE 15(11): e0242262. No 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0242262

Abstract: Many researchers have proposed that straight men prefer women’s faces displaying feminine shape characteristics at least partly because mating with such women will produce healthier offspring. Although a prediction of this adaptation-for-mate-choice hypothesis is that straight men will show stronger preferences for feminized versus masculinized versions of women’s faces than will gay men, only one previous study has directly tested this prediction. Here we directly replicated that study by comparing 623 gay and 3163 straight men’s preferences for feminized versus masculinized versions of faces. Consistent with the adaptation-for-mate-choice hypothesis of straight men’s femininity preferences, we found that straight men showed significantly stronger preferences for feminized female faces than did gay men. Consistent with previous research suggesting that gay men place a premium on masculinity in potential romantic partners, we also found that gay men showed significantly stronger preferences for masculinized versions of male faces than did straight men. Together, these findings indicate the sexual orientation contributes to individual differences in men’s face preferences.


The results confirmed an exaggeration of eye width and height, lip width, and pupil width in artistic profiles, and the eyes shape was “frontalized”; theory links supernormal stimuli to aesthetic perception

Costa, M., & Bonetti, L. (2020). Eye and lips in artistic profiles. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, Nov 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000360


Abstract: Distortions related to eye and lip morphometry were investigated in two studies comparing photographic versus artistic profiles. In the first study, 298 artistic profiles encompassing the whole art history were compared to 300 photographic profiles. The 2 groups were compared for shape with Procrustes analysis and for size by using 8 indexes. Estimated age was inserted as covariate. The results showed that artists exaggerated eye height and width, pupil width, lip height, and width. The triangular shape of the eye view from side perspective was modified toward a more ellipsoidal shape, depicting the eye from a three-quarter and more frontal perspective. In Study 2, 13 students from the College of the Arts–School of Art were requested to draw a profile portrait of a male or female model. The eye and lip morphometric indexes of the model were compared with those extrapolated from the drawings. The results confirmed an exaggeration of eye width and height, lip width, and pupil width in artistic profiles. Additionally, the eyes shape was “frontalized.” The exaggeration of eye and lip size and the distortion in shape are interpreted and discussed according to the theory linking supernormal stimuli to aesthetic perception.


Quantifying Economic Reasoning in Court: I find that judge economics sophistication is positively correlated with a higher frequency of pro-business decisions even after controlling for political ideology & a rich set of other covariates

Quantifying Economic Reasoning in Court: Judge Economics Sophistication and Pro-business Orientation. Siying Cao. November 13, 2020. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U5tFHXqrcmNbCWOw5t7MqAcZ8BDMlMIN/view

Abstract: By applying computational linguistics tools to the analysis of US federal district courts’ decisions from 1932 to 2016, this paper quantifies the rise of economic reasoning in court cases that range from securities regulation to antitrust law. I then relate judges’ level of economic reasoning to their training. I find that significant judge heterogeneity in economics sophistication can be explained by attendance at law schools that have a large presence of the law and economics faculty. Finally, for all regulatory cases from 1970 to 2016, I hand code whether the judge ruled in favor of the business or the government. I find that judge economics sophistication is positively correlated with a higher frequency of pro-business decisions even after controlling for political ideology and a rich set of other judge covariates.

Keywords: law and economics, judicial decision making, text as data

JEL Classification: K0, L5, Z1


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This research can be extended in several ways. First, we can look at whether economically sophisticated judges tend to rule in a certain direction along an issue66 in tort, property, and commercial contracts. These are subject areas that have been significantly influenced by the law and economics approach. Second, the hypothesis proposed and analysis conducted in this paper can also be applied to circuit court judges. There we expect to find an even greater impact of economics knowledge because the ideological stakes are typically higher than in lower courts. Furthermore, my results suggest that economics sophistication as a shifter of decision outcome during the first stage can be used as an instrumental variable to investigate the causal effect of such decision on subsequent individual/household/firm outcomes. Finally, I hope my measure of judge economics sophistication will spur future efforts to causally identify the effects of judge knowledge through exogenously generated variation in it. 

This chapter outlines how Robert Trivers’ Parental Investment Theory has progressed from its original publication in Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man through its expansive application to research in evolutionary psychology

Parental Investment Theory. Justin K Mogilski. In The Sage Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. SAGE, November 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345346708_Parental_Investment_Theory

Abstract: This chapter outlines how Robert Trivers’ Parental Investment Theory (PIT) has progressed from its original publication in Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man through its expansive application to research in the evolutionary psychological sciences. I begin with an abridged redux of the theory’s claims and predictions as they appeared within the original 1972 publication. After, I review groundbreaking research inspired by PIT and evaluate how well the theory has been empirically supported in the past 50 or so years. I then note several major theoretical advancements and address conflicts with other prominent theories of mating and parenting behavior. The chapter closes with several future directions that may help PIT remain a robust and relevant framework for studying human psychology within an increasingly technologically and socially complex world.



Economically successful participants overweight the role of effort in their success, perceiving high income as more deserved than unsuccessful participants; successful liberals are as meritocratic as conservatives are

Misperceiving Economic Success: Experimental Evidence on Meritocratic Beliefs and Inequality Acceptance. Fehr, Dietmar; Vollmann, Martin. Working paper, Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Volume 695. Nov 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00029071

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1328579040144449536

Abstract: Most people tend to equate success with merit, a tendency that is particularly pronounced among conservatives. However, in practice it is exceedingly difficult to discern the relative impact of luck and effort to economic success. Based on a large-scale online study that samples the general US population, we investigate whether individuals misperceive the importance of luck for success, and how this mediates their meritocratic beliefs and acceptance of inequality. We randomly assign participants in pairs to compete in an easy or hard work assignment. The tasks are structured such that working on the easy work assignment almost certainly results in better performance and economic success. We show that economically successful participants overweight the role of effort in their success, perceiving high income as more deserved than unsuccessful participants. Subsequently, they demand less redistributive taxation, and they also show little interest in receiving information about the true determinants of their success. These general findings hold true regardless of political orientation. Successful liberals are as meritocratic as conservatives are, sharing the same beliefs in deservingness and preferences for low redistributive taxes.

Keywords: inequality, deservedness, political views, cognitive dissonance


Monday, November 16, 2020

Austria's 60 years of policy experimentation: Our results show that the enormous expansions of parental leave and child care subsidies have had virtually no impact on gender convergence

Do Family Policies Reduce Gender Inequality? Evidence from 60 Years of Policy Experimentation. Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, Johanna Posch, Andreas Steinhauer & Josef Zweimüller. NBER WP 28082, November 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w28082

Abstract: Do family policies reduce gender inequality in the labor market? We contribute to this debate by investigating the joint impact of parental leave and child care, using administrative data covering the labor market and birth histories of Austrian workers over more than half a century. We start by quasi-experimentally identifying the causal effects of all family policy reforms since the 1950s on the full dynamics of male and female earnings. We then map these causal estimates into a decomposition framework a la Kleven, Landais and Søgaard (2019) to compute counterfactual gender gaps. Our results show that the enormous expansions of parental leave and child care subsidies have had virtually no impact on gender convergence.


Paying attention to alternative partners seems associated with engaging in behaviors that undermine relationship fidelity or stability: Monitoring was higher for those who broke up and for those who reported infidelity

Romantic alternative monitoring increases ahead of infidelity and break-up. Lane L. Ritchie et al. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, November 15, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407520968633

Abstract: Monitoring alternative partners may be associated with engaging in behaviors that undermine relationship fidelity and/or stability. For example, paying attention to romantic alternatives has been shown to be associated with lower relationship quality. Studies have investigated the association between alternative monitoring and relationship outcomes, but with significant methodological limitations. This study aims to longitudinally explore whether and how alternative monitoring is associated with infidelity and break-up. Participants were 779 individuals drawn from a longitudinal sample of individuals in unmarried different-sex relationships. As hypothesized, alternative monitoring was higher for those who broke up and for those who reported infidelity, compared to those who remained together without infidelity. Additionally, consistent with predictions, increases in alternative monitoring preceded break-up, and particularly large increases in alternative monitoring preceded infidelity, compared to trajectories for those who remained together and did not report infidelity. Results highlight the importance of measuring change in alternative monitoring over time, rather than only considering mean differences at a single timepoint. Clinical implications and future directions are discussed.

Keywords: Alternative monitoring, break-up, commitment, infidelity, psychology



Sunday, November 15, 2020

First impressions are commonly assumed to be particularly important; instead, judgments of the targets in later situations were more strongly associated with overall impressions, indicating an acquaintance effect

There Is No Primacy Effect in Interpersonal Perception: A Series of Preregistered Analyses Using Judgments of Actual Behavior. Anne Wiedenroth, Nele M. Wessels, Daniel Leising. Social Psychological and Personality Science, November 13, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620969279

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1327527434909065217

Abstract: First impressions are commonly assumed to be particularly important: Information about a person that we obtain early on may shape our overall impression of that person more strongly than information obtained later. In contrast to previous research, the present series of preregistered analyses uses actual person judgment data to investigate this so-called primacy effect: Perceivers (N = 1,395) judged the videotaped behavior of target persons (N = 200) in 10 different situations. Separate subsamples of about 200 perceivers each were used in moving from exploratory to increasingly confirmatory analyses. Contrary to our expectations, no primacy effect was found. Instead, judgments of the targets in later situations were more strongly associated with overall impressions, indicating an acquaintance effect. Relying on early information seems unreasonable when more comprehensive information is readily available. Early information may, however, affect perceivers’ behavioral reactions to the targets and thus their future interactions, if such interactions are possible.

Keywords: primacy effect, order effects, impression formation, behavior observation, personality judgment


Rolf Degen summarizing... Although dopamine boost the anticipation of rewards in humans, it has little or no effect on felt pleasure during the fulfillment of needs

Using pharmacological manipulations to study the role of dopamine in human reward functioning: A review of studies in healthy adults. Heather E. Webber et al. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, November 14 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.11.004

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1327628962697252864

Highlights

• The role of dopamine in human reward functioning is highly researched.

• Drug challenge studies are translational and have good experimental control.

• Dopamine drug challenge studies in healthy adults were summarized by reward phase.

• Dopamine drugs have differing effects on various reward phases.

• Drug effects are likely nonlinear and behavioral effects depend on outcome measure.

Abstract: Dopamine (DA) plays a key role in reward processing and is implicated in psychological disorders such as depression, substance use, and schizophrenia. The role of DA in reward processing is an area of highly active research. One approach to this question is drug challenge studies with drugs known to alter DA function. These studies provide good experimental control and can be performed in parallel in laboratory animals and humans. This review aimed to summarize results of studies using pharmacological manipulations of DA in healthy adults. ‘Reward’ is a complex process, so we separated ‘phases’ of reward, including anticipation, evaluation of cost and benefits of upcoming reward, execution of actions to obtain reward, pleasure in response to receiving a reward, and reward learning. Results indicated that i) DAergic drugs have different effects on different phases of reward; ii) the relationship between DA and reward functioning appears unlikely to be linear; iii) our ability to detect the effects of DAergic drugs varies depending on whether subjective, behavioral, imaging measures are used.

Keywords: dopaminereward functioningpharmacological challengeanticipationexecutioninvigorationevaluation of costsmotivationeffortlearningpleasure


Saturday, November 14, 2020

We find that sunlight strongly protects against getting influenza: A 10% increase in relative sunlight decreases the influenza index in September or October by 1.1 points on a 10-point scale

Sunlight and Protection Against Influenza. David J.G. Slusky, Richard J. Zeckhauser. Economics & Human Biology, November 14 2020, 100942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2020.100942

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1327622311172837376

Highlights

• Medical literature suggests vitamin D protects against respiratory infections.

• Humans exposed to sunlight produce vitamin D directly.

• A 10% increase in relative sunlight decreases fall influenza by 1.1 out of 10.

• This relationship is driven by almost entirely by the H1N1 epidemic in fall 2009.

Abstract: Recent medical literature suggests that vitamin D supplementation protects against acute respiratory tract infection. Humans exposed to sunlight produce vitamin D directly. This paper investigates how differences in sunlight, as measured over several years across states and during the same calendar week, affect influenza incidence. We find that sunlight strongly protects against getting influenza. This relationship is driven almost entirely by the severe H1N1 epidemic in fall 2009. A 10% increase in relative sunlight decreases the influenza index in September or October by 1.1 points on a 10-point scale. A second, complementary study employs a separate data set to study flu incidence in counties in New York State. The results are strongly in accord.

JEL codes: I10I12I18Q5N32

Keywords: Seasonal InfluenzaSunlightVitamin DNatural ExperimentH1N1

Mixed-gender threesomes (MGTs): Sexual minority individuals reported more positive outcomes than did heterosexual individuals; there is a lot of interaction with sexual minority individuals in MGTs

Exploring Variations in North American Adults’ Attitudes, Interest, Experience, and Outcomes Related to Mixed-Gender Threesomes: A Replication and Extension. Ashley E. Thompson, Allison E. Cipriano, Kimberley M. Kirkeby, Delaney Wilder & Justin J. Lehmiller. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Nov 11 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-020-01829-1

Abstract: Mixed-gender threesomes (MGTs) are a type of consensually nonmonogamous sexual encounter involving three people of more than one gender. Little research has been conducted on MGTs, and what little work does exist is limited to college students, who may actually be less experienced with MGTs than older adults. The present study investigated attitudes toward, interest in, experiences with, and outcomes of MGTs in two samples (college N = 231; online N = 1342), comprised of 907 heterosexual and 666 sexual minority participants in total. Results indicated that participants reported neutral-to-positive attitudes toward and moderate-to-high levels of interest in MGTs (81% indicated some degree of interest). MGTs involving familiar others were preferred to those involving strangers. Men, sexual minority individuals, and participants from the online sample reported more favorable attitudes toward and greater interest in MGTs as compared to women, heterosexual individuals, and participants from the student sample. In addition, 30% of participants indicated having experience with a MGT. Sexual minority individuals reported more experience with MGTs and more positive outcomes than did heterosexual individuals. In addition, on average, participants reported that their MGT experiences “met expectations.” Overall, these results indicate that MGTs are a common sexual behavior that often results in positive outcomes, especially among sexual minority individuals. Additional research on this understudied topic is needed, particularly as it relates to outcomes and the role of MGTs in consensually nonmonogamous relationships.


According to Harden, the more fundamental reason why progressives should embrace social genomics is that it can help to transform how we, as a society, think about public policy altogether

The genes we’re dealt. Erik Parens. Aeon, Nov 10 2020. https://aeon.co/essays/social-genomics-can-combat-inequality-or-be-used-to-justify-it

The new field of social genomics can be used by progressives to combat racial inequality or by conservatives to excuse it

Long before anyone understood why some twins look nearly identical and others look no more similar than other pairs of siblings, and even before anyone understood the molecular structure of genes, psychologists and social scientists such as Francis Galton turned to inherited differences to explain why human beings behave in different ways and come to occupy different positions in society. It was Galton who, in 1883, coined the term ‘eugenics’ to name the idea that healthy societies should encourage those of ‘good stock’ to breed, and should prevent those of bad stock from doing the same.

Not until the 1960s, however, did a group of psychologists and geneticists, engaged in a field they called ‘behaviour genetics’, begin to systematically exploit basic facts about genetic inheritance to try to explain why human beings behave differently. They used simple study designs that compared identical and fraternal twins, or children raised by their biological parents versus those raised by adoptive parents, and demonstrated that genetic differences offered part of the explanation for observed differences.

One of the most significant achievements here was to overturn the psychoanalytic idea that conditions such as schizophrenia were caused by adverse environments – in particular, by withholding and cold mothers. These researchers put insights from genetics to the thoroughly salutary purpose of showing that it was not only cruel, but scientifically unjustified to blame mothers (and fathers) for their children’s conditions.

However, those same insights and methods were used to explore other traits, including performance on standardised intelligence tests. Among the champions of this research were the political scientist Charles Murray and the psychologist Richard Herrnstein, who wrote The Bell Curve (1994) under the influence of one of the stupidest and most racist of assumptions: that, with the passage of the civil rights laws in the 1960s, the environments of Black and white Americans were about as equal as they could be. Based on that assumption, Murray and Herrnstein suggested that genetic differences could explain why the median test score for white test-takers was higher than for Black ones.

It’s important, however, to distinguish between Murray and Herrnstein’s racist assumption, on the one hand, and their Right-leaning political beliefs, on the other. When we do, it becomes clear that cleansing such research of racism doesn’t cleanse it of its potential to be used by people who hold basic Right-leaning political beliefs. Think what you will of such beliefs, it would be an intellectual and tactical mistake to dismiss them as incoherent or inherently racist.

People who lean Right are fiercely committed to the idea of what Murray’s current employer, the American Enterprise Institute, calls ‘free enterprise’. In accordance with this idea – which has been around since the American founding, and which enjoyed renewed devotion in the US with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 – individuals are entitled to what they achieve with their natural or ‘God-given’ talents. Inequalities in outcomes might be unfortunate, but they aren’t unfair. In the Right-leaning view, the way to improve lives is to get the government out of the way, and to let individuals exert their own wills, playing the genetic hand they were dealt.

Left-leaning thinkers such as Lyndon B Johnson, whose ‘war on poverty’ Reagan was reacting against, of course hold a radically different set of beliefs. In their view, justice requires that the government take steps to reduce social inequalities. The Left-leaning vision emphasises the extent to which where we end up in the social hierarchy is the result of our social histories and our draws in the genetic lottery – and thus the extent to which we are not entitled to where we end up. In this view, inequalities in social outcomes are not only unfortunate, but also unfair.

A cornerstone of social genomics research is the creation of what are called ‘polygenic scores’. Although the amount of computational power needed to pool and analyse the relevant genomic data is unfathomably large, the basic idea is easy to fathom. First, social scientists and geneticists collaborate to identify hundreds or thousands of genetic variants, across the genome, correlated with a given trait, behaviour or outcome. Although the inferred effect of each of those genetic variants is miniscule by itself, the second step is for researchers to add up those many tiny effects to create a polygenic score. This strategy for making predictions about future traits or outcomes is also the cornerstone of ‘precision medicine’, which aspires to tailor medical treatments to individuals’ genomes.

Some well-informed observers think that this new strategy is just the latest in the history of efforts to analyse complex phenomena at the wrong level. To paraphrase the psychologist Eric Turkheimer, looking to genetic variants for insight about complex behaviours and social outcomes is like looking to the chemical composition of rocks to understand plate tectonics. And even those who are most enthusiastic about the eventual utility of these scores are acutely aware that previous efforts to use insights from molecular genetics have been hugely disappointing.

Time will tell whether the sceptics or enthusiasts will be closer to the truth

To their credit, social genomicists have taken the unprecedented and time-intensive step of creating Frequently Asked Questions documents, which accompany their publications and explain, with remarkable frankness, what they have and have not discovered, and what their findings do and do not mean. They are unfailingly clear about the fact that, when they add up the tiny genetic effects, the aggregate is small compared with, say, the total effect of the environment. They are relentless in their rejection of genetic determinism, and vigorous in their reiteration that environments play a huge role in explaining the outcomes they study.

Time will tell whether the sceptics or enthusiasts will be closer to the truth in their estimation of the scientific value of these scores. For this essay, though, I am focused on how such findings could be used, if they became as useful as the enthusiasts envision.

No social genomicist seems more optimistic about the Left-leaning political potential of this work than the psychologist Kathryn Paige Harden. In a New York Times opinion piece, ‘Why Progressives Should Embrace the Genetics of Education’ (2018), Harden described the largest-yet social genomics study, by James Lee and his colleagues, which analysed DNA samples from 1.1 million people of European ancestries. More specifically, the researchers analysed correlations between individuals’ genomic differences and how many years of school they finished. Based on those analyses, the researchers could assign to each individual’s DNA sample a polygenic score.

Those researchers reported that, whereas just more than 10 per cent of people with a low polygenic score completed college, 55 per cent of people with a high polygenic score did. Like other social genomicists, Harden grasps the racist and classist history and implications of such work. But she is also distressed by what she sees as the pervasive and mistaken view on the political Left that social genomics is ‘inimical to the goal of social equality’.

Harden specifies two reasons why people with a Left-leaning political agenda should embrace social genomics. One is that controlling for genetic differences will throw into sharper focus ‘the causal effects of the environment’. She is pained by the human and economic costs when, in their efforts to improve environmental interventions, traditional social scientists fail to control for genetic differences. And she is hopeful that, specifically in the context of education, factoring genes into their analyses will enable social scientists to better alter environments to enable all students to flourish, in accordance with their genetic endowments. In the grandest version of this vision, offered by the psychologist Kathryn Asbury and the behavioural geneticist Robert Plomin in their book G Is for Genes (2013), we would have ‘precision education’, where educational interventions are tailored to children’s genomes.

Given that we currently fail to provide huge numbers of children with anything close to adequate educational settings, much less with interventions tailored to their genetic endowments, it’s not obvious where the political will would come from to implement such environmental changes. But we have to grant that, if such programmes were in principle possible, progressives would have reason to get on board with them. After all, in this vision, polygenic scores would be just a new way to achieve the familiar goal of tailoring educational interventions to fit the unique needs and strengths of each child.

Recognising that none of us merits our genes is perfectly compatible with both Left- and Right-leaning agendas

According to Harden, the more fundamental reason why progressives should embrace social genomics is that it can help to transform how we, as a society, think about public policy altogether. Specifically, Harden suggests that, insofar as this research shows that genes help to explain educational success, and insofar as none of us merits or deserves our genes, we can see more vividly than ever the extent to which none of us merits our success.

So, from the fact that genes help to explain unmerited differences in observed outcomes, Harden makes the generous-hearted but large leap to an ethical and political conclusion. She refers to the Lee study on educational attainment to make her point:

By showing us the links between genes and educational success, this new study reminds us that everyone should share in our national prosperity, regardless of which genetic variants he or she happens to inherit.

The authors of the European Commission report that I mentioned at the start make the nearly identical point (and cite Harden’s article) when they write: ‘the realisation that success in life partly depends on a random draw from the genetic lottery can strengthen arguments in favour of solidarity and redistribution.’

The problem is that recognising that none of us merits or deserves our genes ­– or, for that matter, our families or neighbourhoods or the time we live in – is perfectly compatible with both Left- and Right-leaning political agendas. Yes, people who lean Left contemplate the fact that none of us merits our genes and thus, in an important respect, is not entitled to what we accumulate. They believe that the resulting unequal distribution of goods calls for solidarity and redistribution.

But someone who leans Right also understands perfectly well the sense in which the unequal distribution of goods depends on unmerited, natural or God-given talents. In his recent book Human Diversity (2020), Murray, who avers that ‘life is an IQ test’, says explicitly that ‘merit [has] nothing to do with’ how much ‘general intelligence’ one has. Rather, he says, how much one has of what it takes to perform well in life ‘is a matter of luck’. Those who lean Right think that we’re entitled to what we win when we play the genetic hand we were dealt, and thus deserve the space we end up occupying in the social hierarchy. They are at peace with the thought that, while unequal outcomes might be unfortunate, they are not unfair.

To see how the same set of findings can be recruited to advance a Left- and Right-leaning political agenda, it’s helpful to consider a paper that draws on the same data set as Lee and his colleagues in the educational-attainment study. In this paper, Daniel Belsky and his colleagues investigated correlations between genomic differences and levels of socioeconomic success. One of their innovations was to separate participants from the original educational-attainment study into three groups: those who started out with low socioeconomic status (SES), those who started out with middle SES, and those who started out with high SES.

The figure below represents the central finding of this analysis. (The title of the figure ‘Add Health’ refers to one of the five studies they drew on for their analysis.) The three panels of the figure refer to analyses for those who started out at low, middle and high SES. Each dot represents 50 people. The vertical axis is an index of how much socioeconomic success those people achieved, and the horizontal axis is an index of their polygenic score.

According to the team’s analysis of the data, higher polygenic scores appear to contribute to explaining socioeconomic success across all three groups. But what the figure makes equally obvious is that success achieved by those with the same polygenic score depends on their environments. People with low polygenic scores who grow up in high SES environments enjoy greater socioeconomic success than people with the very same scores who grow up in low SES environments. News flash: in our society, wealthy people with low ‘genetic potential’ for success often do better than poor people with high ‘genetic potential’. (I put the term ‘genetic potential’ in scare quotes because its meaning is contested. There is, however, no concise way for Left- or Right-leaning observers to discuss the data without using that term or a synonym, such as ‘genetic talent’ or ‘natural talent’.)

Left-leaning social genomicists focus on the talent-wasted message. Right-leaning ones focus on the talent-rewarded message

So, these data are wholly compatible with the Left-leaning assumption that impoverished environments make it impossible for huge numbers of people to fulfil their ‘genetic potential’. Or, as two members of the new cohort of social genomicists Nicholas Papageorge and Kevin Thom put it, these data show that huge amounts of genetic talent is being ‘wasted’.

Here’s the rub. People with a Right-leaning political agenda can focus on a different feature of the same set of data. Specifically, they can focus on the dark-blue diamonds on the horizontal axes of those panels, which represent the median polygenic score for each SES group. If you look carefully, you’ll see that the median of the distribution for the scores of the three groups is slightly different. The median polygenic score of people in the low-SES group is slightly lower than (to the left of) the median score of people in the middle-SES group, which is lower than the median score of people in the high-SES group.

When the Belsky paper that included that figure was published, Stephen Hsu, the former senior vice president for research and innovation at Michigan State University, gleefully Tweeted: ‘Game over! … Higher SES families have higher polygenic scores on average.’ Different from the Left-leaning social genomicists who focused on the feature of the data that supports their talent-wasted message, Hsu focused on the feature of the data that is compatible with what we might call the talent-rewarded message. Findings from the Belsky study are consistent with the idea that, on average, people with more ‘genetic potential’ or ‘natural talent’ are entitled to more socioeconomic success. And those facts are wholly consistent with the Right-leaning political belief that although the unequal distribution of genetic potential might be unfortunate for those with poor draws in the genetic lottery, it’s not unfair.

Beyond being compatible with a Right-leaning agenda that accepts social inequalities, findings from social genomics are, more specifically, compatible with a Right-leaning interpretation of what it means to, in the language of the European Commission report, ‘embrace diversity’.

To see how such data are thoroughly compatible with a Right-leaning conception of embracing diversity, there’s no better place to look than Murray’s recent book Human Diversity. In his final chapter, Murray exhorts readers to recognise that all human beings have equal moral worth, and to accept that we all have unequal genetic potential or natural talent. Ignoring differences in genetic potential, he argues, harms those forced to take on social roles that don’t suit them. Doing astrophysics will suit the potential of some but not others, and the same goes for digging ditches. In his view, requiring people with different potentials to receive the same education would be wasteful and inhumane. Instead of ignoring or denying those natural differences, he argues, we need to celebrate them.

Some of what he says actually resembles closely what we Left-leaning advocates for the rights of people with disabilities have been saying for at least 40 years: all of us are thrown into the world with different forms of embodiment and with different natural talents. To paraphrase the disability studies pioneer and bioethicist Rosemarie Garland-Thomson in a recent essay, people can flourish in all sorts of bodies. Or, as she could have put it, people can flourish with all sorts of genomes. And in the philosopher Eva Feder Kittay’s essay ‘We Have Seen the Mutants – and They Are Us’ (2020), she gets at that same idea: we are all genetic ‘mutants’, but given the right environments, we can all flourish in our own way. Surely, to recognise this one important similarity doesn’t reduce the profound difference between Murray’s version of embracing diversity and a Left-leaning version.

To understand Murray, it’s useful to distinguish between two elements in his new book: the racist assumption that the contemporary environment doesn’t hurt people of colour, and the coherent, Right-leaning belief that governments are impotent to address social outcomes. (When I say that Murray brings a racist assumption to his analysis, I am referring to his wantonly benighted interpretation of the history of the US, which maintains his social privilege and disadvantages others – Black people in particular. Please notice that I am calling Murray’s assumption racist; I am not calling him a racist. Too often, calling other people racist is a way to indulge in the fantasy that we – any of us – have escaped being racists. As Ibram X Kendi points out in How to Be an Antiracist (2019), that fantasy is counterproductive and can be dangerous.)

For Murray, embracing diversity includes entertaining the hypothesis that Black people have less ‘genetic potential’

Murray’s racist assumption about the nature of the social environment was on display in his and Herrnstein’s book, The Bell Curve. As I mentioned above, in that book they sought to explain why there was an educational-attainment gap between Black and white Americans. Back in 1994, he and Herrnstein allowed that racism was ‘still a factor in American life’. But they suggested that ‘[after] more than a generation of preferential social policies’, and federal legislation such as the Civil Rights Act (1964) and Voting Rights Act (1965), the environments of Black and white Americans were sufficiently equal that, if one wanted to explain the Black-white education gap, intellectual integrity drove one to consider genetic differences as the explanation. The policy implication in The Bell Curve was that governments needed to stop investing equal amounts of money in giving the same education to people with diverse genetic potentials.

In his new book, Murray grants, for example, that the Jim Crow laws created barriers to the success of former enslaved people and their descendants. And he allows that, after the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, extralegal means of enforcing segregation – what he calls ‘hard custom’ – continued to create barriers ‘to some degree’. And he even allows that what he calls ‘soft custom’ – such as hostility in the workplace – can be a barrier to success. The good news, according to Murray, is that once explicitly racist laws were removed, and once hard custom surrounding legal segregation was removed, it wouldn’t take long for the hostility of soft custom to die. He suggests that ‘the half-life of [soft custom] is often a matter of years, sometimes a decade or so, but seldom many decades’.

Perhaps you are asking: has Murray considered the possibility that the contemporary environment for Black people is affected by more than the ‘soft’ hostility in the workplace that he grants might still exist in some places? Has he considered the environment that was created by the sinful catastrophe of nearly 250 years of slavery, by what the journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones calls ‘the 100-year period of racial apartheid and racial terrorism known as Jim Crow’, and by what the writer Michelle Alexander calls ‘the New Jim Crow’ of mass incarceration? Is he familiar with the idea of structural racism?

Yes, he’s familiar with the idea that the environments of Black and white Americans are unequal. He’s familiar with what he calls the ‘background radiation hypothesis’. But he rejects it as implausible. As he puts it: ‘Everyday experience suggests that the environment confronting blacks in different sectors of American life is not uniformly hostile.’ Actually, when it comes to hostility, what appears to worry him is that it’s increasingly directed against people with socioeconomic privilege. He writes: ‘I am generally sceptical of claims about the power of privilege. Growing up in an upper-middle-class or wealthy home has a variety of potential downsides.’ For Murray, embracing diversity includes entertaining the hypothesis that, on average, Black people have less ‘genetic potential’ for educational attainment than white people.

Left-leaning social genomicists might seek some comfort in noticing that when Murray uses their findings to invoke his version of embracing diversity, he is relying on a fundamental and racist mistake about the facts. After all, mistaken facts can be exposed and, presumably, gotten past. Such comfort, however, would be illusory. That’s because, apart from racism and factual mistakes about the past or present, findings from social genomics can be recruited by people who have the Right-leaning belief that humans are entitled to what they get, and the equally deep belief that governments are largely unable to shape those lives for the better.

Murray’s personal experience and empirical research have persuaded him that the impacts of most government programmes are small and/or transient, at best. And, alas, most government social programmes – including what was to be one of the most powerful weapons in the war on poverty, Head Start for children – don’t seem to have impacts as large or long-lasting as their creators envision. For we who take unjust structures or systems to be at the root of inequalities, the failure of individual programmes to make impacts as large or long-lasting as we would hope is deeply disappointing, but not shocking. Individual programmes alone can’t make structural changes.

Genes alone will never tell us why we are the way that we are, or why we end up where we do

But for people who lean Right, the same facts fit hand-in-glove with their foundational belief that instead of investing our hopes in the federal government, we should invest them in families and local communities. Moreover, those facts fit perfectly with the foundational Right-leaning belief that it’s how individuals choose to play the genetic hands they’re dealt that mostly explains differences in social outcomes. Murray takes that belief to racist and classist places, but others don’t. It isn’t inherently racist or classist to emphasise the idea that human beings can and should aspire to take charge of their own lives, or that they’re entitled to what they win with the genetic hand they’re dealt.

Which political agenda one uses such findings to advance will depend to a large extent on prior philosophical and political beliefs. If we haven’t already noticed the strategic ways that we ourselves use facts and reasons to advance whatever conclusions we have already reached, there’s a vast social psychology literature that documents just that.

Social genomicists are the first to acknowledge that, because genes operate in infinitely complex biopsychosocial systems, genes alone will never tell us why we are the way that we are, or why we end up where we do. But for those who have the privilege to seek to understand such things, studying the role of genes in that mindbogglingly complex story can be deeply interesting. A commitment to scientific freedom means that, in the absence of clear and present social danger, social genomicists have the legal right to pursue ideas that they find inherently interesting.

It’s important, however, to distinguish between the inherent interest of social genomics and its instrumental value. It would be wonderful if, as Left-leaning social genomicists such as Harden hope, their research could enable social scientists to control for genetic differences and thereby do better social science research, leading to more effective social programmes. But even if that vision materialises, Left-leaning social genomicists must face the fact that their big politically relevant insight – that what we achieve is due in part to our draw in the genetic lottery – can readily be recruited by those leaning Right. Today, more than ever, it’s a mistake to soft-pedal that danger, and more important than ever to curb optimism about the political benefits this research will yield.