Tuesday, August 3, 2021

Why women historically & cross-culturally have tended to be under-represented as leaders within human groups and organizations, given that we lack evidence that women leaders consistently perform worse than men?

An Evolutionary Explanation for the Female Leadership Paradox. Jennifer E. Smith et al. Front. Ecol. Evol., July 30 2021. https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2021.676805

Abstract: Social influence is distributed unequally between males and females in many mammalian societies. In human societies, gender inequality is particularly evident in access to leadership positions. Understanding why women historically and cross-culturally have tended to be under-represented as leaders within human groups and organizations represents a paradox because we lack evidence that women leaders consistently perform worse than men. We also know that women exercise overt influence in collective group-decisions within small-scale human societies, and that female leadership is pervasive in particular contexts across non-human mammalian societies. Here, we offer a transdisciplinary perspective on this female leadership paradox. Synthesis of social science and biological literatures suggests that females and males, on average, differ in why and how they compete for access to political leadership in mixed-gender groups. These differences are influenced by sexual selection and are moderated by socioecological variation across development and, particularly in human societies, by culturally transmitted norms and institutions. The interplay of these forces contributes to the emergence of female leaders within and across species. Furthermore, females may regularly exercise influence on group decisions in less conspicuous ways and different domains than males, and these underappreciated forms of leadership require more study. We offer a comprehensive framework for studying inequality between females and males in access to leadership positions, and we discuss the implications of this approach for understanding the female leadership paradox and for redressing gender inequality in leadership in humans.

Developmental Origins of Sex Differences in Leadership

A developmental perspective will help us to understand the ways that leadership roles are shaped across the lifespan by sexually selected motivations and by cultural transmission of norms and institutions. In general, juvenile mammals tend to initiate collective movements less often and are less often involved in leading intergroup conflicts than adults (Fichtel et al., 2011Majolo et al., 2020). In fish, followers are most likely to use social information from large (female) rather than small (male) demonstrators when making collective foraging decisions (Duffy et al., 2009). However, despite increased documentation that animals are selective in what, when and whom they copy (Kendal et al., 2018), we know little about how leadership and followership emerge across ontogeny in non-human animals.

Because individuals with high social rank in the dominance hierarchy may also impose a disproportionate influence in collective decision-making in some mammalian species (Van Vugt and Smith, 2019), understanding the mechanisms of dominance rank acquisition is also relevant and informative in this context. In many Old World monkeys, female dominance rank is determined by maternal rank inheritance, whereby daughters adopt the ranks below their mother in an age-reversed order (Harcourt and de Waal, 1992), but virtually all adult males, who acquire their rank based on size and strength, dominate all females (Pereira, 1995). In spotted hyenas, maternal rank inheritance is also implemented via this same associative learning of repeated social support from others (Holekamp and Smale, 1991Vullioud et al., 2019), and high-ranking adult females emerge most often as leaders in resolving within-group conflicts, collective movements, and initiating intergroup conflicts (Boydston et al., 2001Smith et al., 2010). In ring-tailed lemurs, female dominance over all males emerges spontaneously around puberty via male submission (Pereira, 1995). Thus, there exists great inter-specific diversity across mammals in the ways that socially powerful positions such as high dominance rank can be achieved. Similar patterns may apply to leadership emergence but will require explicit study.

In studies of children in WEIRD human societies, gender differences in social network attributes and group size preferences emerge early and perpetuate into adulthood (Rose and Rudolph, 2006Benenson and Abadzi, 2020). For example, girls have been observed to have smaller same-gender play groups (Ladd, 1983Ladd and Profilet, 1996) and less dense social networks than boys (Benenson, 19901993). However, these trends can be strongly shaped by the preferences of a few popular youth who strongly favor boy companions; preferences for friends based on gender can be weak or absent for unpopular youth (Ladd, 1983). Furthermore, gender differences in social network size vary with age. A study of Europeans found that men have more social contacts than women, particularly in young adulthood, but then this gender difference reverses in middle age as the numbers of contacts for both genders precipitously decline and as reproductive priorities shift (Bhattacharya et al., 2016). In smaller-scale societies with higher fertility levels, women may tend to engage in more broad social networking as they approach middle age, perhaps because they have fewer dependent offspring in the household (Werner, 1984Brown, 1985von Rueden et al., 2018). In small-scale societies, children can be more likely to socialize in mixed-gender groups, which can weaken gender differences in behavior (Lew-Levy et al., 2019). A study of BaYaka and Hadza hunter-gatherer children finds that play within mixed-gender groups increases as the available pool of playmates decreases, and mixed-gender socialization may explain smaller gender differences in rough-and-tumble and other forms of play compared to WEIRD samples (Lew-Levy et al., 2019). Much more cross-cultural work is needed to determine variability in social networking and leadership emergence within networks by gender across the lifespan.

Gender differences in individual competitive behavior can also emerge early in development. Among young children, studies in WEIRD contexts find that boys tend to engage in more self-referencing behavior and are typically more likely to recognize and respect decision-making hierarchies within their groups, whereas girls are more likely to use indirect strategies, like ignoring, to compete for leadership positions (Hold-Cavell, 1996Benenson and Abadzi, 2020). At older ages, the most popular children (both boys and girls) are the ones who apply tactics consistent with a combination of prestige and dominance leadership styles, though boys in general are more likely to pursue more purely coercive and aggressive tactics (Hawley, 2014). Gender differences in physical aggression and risk-taking may peak in late adolescence and young adulthood, when young men are most intensely competing to establish mate value (Wilson and Daly, 1985). Young women tend to compete more than men by emphasizing aspects of their physical appearance that signal residual reproductive value to potential mates (Cashdan, 1998Campbell, 2013b).

Importantly, gender differences in social network building and in competition for leadership positions are shaped by norms of expected behavior (e.g., greater encouragement of boys to engage in team sports or girls to assist in childcare). Cross-culturally, manhood more than womanhood is described as something to be earned, and which can be gained or lost depending on display of competitive ability, skill, generosity, and leadership (Vandello et al., 2008). Societies that experience greater intergroup conflict are more likely to portray manhood as precarious in this way, and to impose costly initiation rites of passage on young men to test their manhood (Sosis et al., 2007) due to benefits to male coalition building in the context of war (Rodseth, 2012). These norms may also reflect evolved, gender-specific motivations, but, obviously, they are not determined by them (Henrich, 2015). For example, the more that prestigious political positions in society are monopolized by men, the more they may be likely to promote norms and build institutions that exacerbate and canalize average gender differences in competition, coalition-building, or even desire for political leadership.

Follower preferences in leaders also emerge early and can change over the lifespan. Even infants possess the ability to distinguish between bullies and leaders (Margoni et al., 2018). Harsh childhood conditions may favor long-lasting preferences for dominant-style leaders that rely upon the threat of punishment (Safra et al., 2017). Follower preferences may have effects on gender disparity in leadership well before aspiring leaders reach adulthood. In the United States, one study found that adolescent girls showed less ambition as political leaders than adolescent boys, likely in part because boys were more likely to be groomed and described as prospective leaders, by their family members, teachers, coaches, and other role models (Lawless and Fox, 2013). A recent study found no gender difference in interest in being a leader among 3- to 7-year-old children, but girls were less likely than boys to pick a same-gender peer as a leader (Mandalaywala and Rhodes, 2021). Like any social phenomenon, such favoritism toward boys is unlikely to be purely a social construction, but rather shaped by a complex interplay over evolutionary and historical timescales of evolved motivations with cultural transmission of institutions and norms, particularly a gendered division of labor.

Integrating Evolutionary and Social Science Perspectives

There are many benefits to viewing female leadership within a transdisciplinary perspective that integrates evolutionary and social science perspectives (Kappeler et al., 2019Smith et al., 2020). Social role theories of gender (Eagly and Karau, 2002) are often contrasted with sexual selection approaches to gender differences, but we argue that these perspectives are not incompatible. More specifically, we focused on two outcomes of the mutual influence of evolutionary, ecological, and cultural factors, which often act to constrain female political leadership. That is, female competition and cooperation in pursuit of leadership can differ on average from that by males, and followers often demonstrate preferences for male over female leaders. As discussed above, evolved trait differences in humans can help explain the emergence and persistence of institutions and cultural norms, which enforce greater behavioral similarity within genders, affect opportunities for leadership by gender, and shape stereotypical conceptions of leadership. Emergence of particular gender norms and gender differences in leadership are further contingent on historical and cross-society variation, in subsistence, in inheritance systems, and in other factors. Studies in more egalitarian hunter-gatherers and other small-scale societies often report women exercising considerable leadership via inter-individual conflict resolution and criticism of non-normative behavior, though women can be less likely than men to coordinate community-wide activities and men’s voices can be more numerous during community political discussions (Collier and Rosaldo, 1981von Rueden et al., 2018Garfield et al., 2019). The agricultural revolution was a principal influence on historical increases in political inequality and exacerbation of patriarchy (Kaplan et al., 2009Mattison et al., 2016Van Vugt and Smith, 2019von Rueden, 2020). This is partly due to the effects of agricultural innovation on gendered divisions of labor that further privileged men’s social networking and access to wealth (Coontz and Henderson, 1986Alesina et al., 2011) and to increased incentives for male coalition-building in the face of more frequent warfare (Hayden et al., 1986Rodseth, 2012). While women were more likely to hold formal political positions in those agricultural societies with matrilineal descent (Low, 1992), women’s leadership positions tended to be less numerous or less powerful than their male counterparts (Whyte, 1978). Men continue to hold more top positions of formal leadership in large-scale, industrialized societies, but this gender gap has decreased in recent decades where ecological and economic conditions promoted declines in fertility and shifts in norms concerning women’s education and labor force participation (Konner, 2015). There is evidence in WEIRD societies of large decreases in stereotypical associations of masculinity with competence and with leadership (Koenig et al., 2011Eagly et al., 2019) and a decrease in preference for male over female bosses (Brenan, 2017). The balance of political power between women and men is shaped by the interplay of evolved gender differences, socio-ecology, and changing cultural institutions and norms (Low, 2005).

Our comparative perspective elucidates that overt forms of political decision-making are only one way in which individuals exert leadership in collective group decisions. In many mammalian species, females often emerge as leaders in the context of group movement for foraging or danger avoidance, less via active communication than by moving first (Smith et al., 2020). In small-scale human societies, men’s politics may tend to be more public and aggrandizing but women frequently exert influence at the community level via less conspicuous means (Rosaldo, 1974). In a study of Tamil communities in south India, women were less likely than men to be identified as politically influential, partly because of less access to formal employment or material wealth. However, Tamil women may yield influence that is less visible through the more numerous support relationships they foster between community members (Power and Ready, 2018). In many human societies, men’s historical monopolization of formal political leadership has contributed to associations of “appropriate” leader qualities with forms of competition more often preferred by men (Rudman and Phelan, 2008Hoyt and Burnette, 2013). In addition to calling attention to gender inequality in overt forms of political leadership, scholars should devote more attention to more subtle forms of leadership displayed by women (and men) that can be as or more relevant to collective decision-making in human societies.

Slippery slope arguments, that small actions have severe consequences, are common; they predicted intolerance of outgroup freedoms; also, those beliefs predict intolerance of debated behaviors

On a Slippery Slope to Intolerance: Individual difference in slippery slope beliefs predict outgroup negativity. Levi Adelman et al. Journal of Research in Personality, August 3 2021, 104141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2021.104141

Highlights

• Slippery slope arguments, that small actions have severe consequences, are common.

• The likelihood of believing these arguments reflects an individual difference.

• A measure of slippery slope beliefs predicts negative intergroup attitudes.

• Slippery slope beliefs predict agreement with real-world slippery slope arguments.

Abstract: Slippery slope beliefs capture the idea that a non-problematic action will lead to unpreventable and harmful outcomes. While this idea has been examined in legal and philosophical literatures, there has been no psychological research into the individual propensity to hold slippery slope beliefs. Across five studies and six samples (combined N = 5,974), we developed and tested an individual difference measure of slippery slope beliefs, finding that it predicted intolerance of outgroup freedoms above and beyond key demographic and psychological predictors (Studies 1-2 and 5). We also found that slippery slope beliefs predict intolerance of debated behaviors in two countries (Study 3), and that it predicted agreement with real-world slippery slope examples across the political spectrum (Studies 4-5).

Keywords: Slippery SlopeToleranceOutgroupIndividual difference

Check also Perpetrator Religion and Perceiver’s Political Ideology Affect Processing and Communication of Media Reports of Violence. Samia Habib, Levi Adelman, Bernhard Leidner, Shaheen Pasha, and Razvan Sibii. Social Psychology, July 1, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/07/interpretation-of-reports-about-crimes.html


1. Slippery Slope Beliefs

The academic literature has primarily focused on slippery slope reasoning as a logical and philosophical investigation of (flawed) argumentations in which a first action is considered to lead to unacceptable consequences, such as by distinguishing the logical, empirical and apocalyptic types of slippery slope argumentation (e.g., Collins and Hahn, 2018; Schauer, 1998; van der Burg, 1998Volokh, 2003; Walton, 2015). In psychology, very little research has been conducted on slippery slope beliefs or argumentation. In one article, Corner and colleagues (2011) investigated the psychological underpinning of this form of thinking, and found that people’s agreement with slippery slope arguments rests on how similar they consider the first (innocuous) action and the proposed (unacceptable) final consequence. Other empirical research (Haigh et al., 2016) suggests that people who hear slippery slope arguments make inferences about what the person making the argument believes about the initial action, and that these inferences can affect the persuasiveness of the slippery slope message.

In contrast to this focus on reasoning processes, the aim of the current research is to investigate individual differences in general slippery slope beliefs: the tendency to think that small or unobjectionable actions or events will inevitably lead to negative consequences. To our knowledge, no research has considered slippery slope beliefs as a general individual difference variable and investigated how these beliefs may relate to outgroup intolerance. Yet, individuals are likely to differ in their general propensity to see social events in terms of a slippery slope (Volokh, 2003; Walton, 2015). For example, when presented with a proposal regarding government spying on suspected terrorists or criminals, some individuals might be more likely to believe that if the government is permitted to spy on known criminals or terror suspects (unobjectionable action), it will end up using that power in an authoritarian manner to spy on ordinary citizens or political opponents (harmful consequence). These individuals will be inclined to perceive this as a likely chain of events because they in general tend to believe that an unobjectionable or a small action is a first step on an inevitable road to disaster (e.g., Corner et al., 2011Volokh, 2003; Walton, 2015). Furthermore, the belief in this tendency for unobjectionable or small actions to lead to harmful outcomes goes beyond mistrust of other individuals in that it reflects how the world tends to work, beyond malevolent actors. It is the individual difference in general slippery slope beliefs that is examined here.

In introducing the concept of slippery slope beliefs, it is important to consider theoretically meaningful criterion measures. Specifically, as slippery slope beliefs involve the fear that any ground given up will result in the loss of a lot more, this may relate with the well-established concept of generalized trust for others (e.g., Delhey et al., 2011). Further, slippery slope beliefs reflect a feeling of the inability to control the consequences of small decisions and believing that they will inevitably lead to uncontrollable consequences, and therefore might reflect a weak sense of personal control (Lachman and Weaver, 1998). Alternatively, it might be that slippery slope beliefs, which usually involve believing in a catastrophic outcome, reflects the same irrationality of conspiratorial thinking (Brotherton et al., 2013Van Prooijen et al., 2015). We also considered whether slippery slope beliefs might reflect a propensity to be less focused on the immediate present (and more focused on the future), by having a pessimistic outlook on life (optimism versus pessimism; Chang, 2001), or by thinking of all the potential (negative) consequences of present actions rather than the current unproblematic nature of these actions (Zhang et al., (2013)/). Based on our expectation that the slippery slope construct is a distinct individual belief, we predicted that slippery slope beliefs are empirically distinct from these other constructs. Using six large scale data sets from two countries, we tested this expectation by examining various measurement models in confirmatory factor analyses, by investigating the correlations between similar but distinct concepts, and by assessing the unique predictive value of slippery slope beliefs on intolerance.

1.1. Outgroup Intolerance

As illustrated in the quotes opening this article, one relevant risk of slippery slope beliefs is the reduced willingness to tolerate differences. This may be because slippery slope reflects a sense of threat to the status quo, which drives outgroup negativity and intolerance. Research on intergroup threat has demonstrated that various forms of threat predict prejudice toward many different outgroups and across different cultural contexts (e.g., Riek et al., 2006Stephan et al., 2009). Given the importance of perceived threat in generating outgroup negativity, the risk of slippery slope beliefs become apparent. Individuals who are more susceptible to slippery slope thinking are more likely to consider a cascade of dangers as reasonably arising from accepting relatively benign outgroup practices and cultural expressions. As such, even these benign practices and cultural expressions can raise the specter of threatening outcomes leading to intolerance toward other groups.

We further consider the role of slippery slope beliefs for outgroup intolerance in relation to political orientation. Forms of slippery slope reasoning might be more common among conservatives than liberals because conservatives tend to score higher on measures of personal needs for structure and order, rigidity and cognitive closure, and focus more on respect for tradition and retaining the status quo (e.g., Jost et al., 2003Jost, 2017). However, general slippery slope beliefs do not only have to characterize the psychology of the right, but might have a broader meaning and be used both by the political left and right (see opening quotes), in line with the ideological-conflict hypothesis (Brandt et al., 2014Crawford and Brandt, 2020) and research on bipartisan bias (Ditto et al., 2019). We examine in all six samples the relation between slippery slope beliefs and political orientation, and then test whether these beliefs are uniquely associated with outgroup intolerance over and above other psychological constructs. Additionally, we examine the relevance of individual differences in general slippery slope beliefs for evaluating the possible negative implications of various real-world scenarios that either the political right or the political left is particularly concerned about. By testing whether slippery slope beliefs are associated with societal developments that align with or against ideological worldviews, we are able to examine whether these beliefs are a general phenomenon that occurs across the political spectrum, or rather whether it is specific to the political right.

1.2. Current Research

The goal of our research was to investigate the concept of general slope beliefs and to understand how these beliefs relate to outgroup intolerance. To accomplish this, we first focused on developing a brief scale that allows for assessing general slippery slope beliefs in various contexts.

We used a three-step procedure for developing such a scale (Hahn et al., 2015Hinkin, 1998). First, based on the theoretical literature and our conceptualization of slippery slope beliefs, we developed a pool of twelve possible items and, through consultation with peers both individually and in groups, selected six that had high face validity. In a second step, we conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) across the six large-scale national samples to examine the clustering of the items, evaluating the fit of different factor solutions and testing for measurement equivalence across Germany and the Netherlands. Furthermore, we examined different measurement models to determine whether a slippery slope beliefs construct empirically differs from measures of generalized trust, sense of control, conspiratorial thinking, present-oriented focus, pessimism, optimism, authoritarianism, open-mindedness, and close-mindedness. Additionally, we examine whether the slippery slope measure is distinct, but related to, these constructs.

In addition to establishing the psychometric properties and empirical distinctiveness of the measure, we tested the expectation that slippery slope beliefs predict unique variance in intolerance towards cultural diversity and Muslim minorities, and with real-world examples of slippery slope arguments. Specifically, we examined whether slippery slope beliefs predicted intolerance toward minorities, above and beyond additional measures (Study 2), including political orientation (Studies 1-5), as well as status-quo conservatism and normative conformity (Study 3) as two key predispositions underlying political orientation (Jost et al., 2003). We also examined whether individual difference in general slippery slope beliefs is related to the acceptance of slippery slope reasoning about concrete societal developments that are mainly of concern for conservatives or rather for liberals (Studies 4 and 5). This allows us to examine whether slippery slope beliefs are specifically relevant for the political right or rather is used across the political spectrum.


Misinformed beliefs to be broadly, but thinly, spread among the population; individuals who adopt one misinformed belief are not more likely to engage in pseudo-scientific or conspiratorial thinking across the board (no “slippery slope”)

Martí, Louis, and Celeste Kidd. 2021. “Fringe” Beliefs Aren’t Fringe. PsyArXiv. August 2. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8u5jn

Abstract: COVID-19 and the 2021 U.S. Capitol attacks have highlighted the potential dangers of pseudoscientific and conspiratorial belief adoption. Approaches to combating misinformed beliefs have tried to “pre-bunk” or “inoculate” people against misinformation adoption and have yielded only modest results. These approaches presume that some citizens may be more gullible than others and thus susceptible to multiple misinformed beliefs. We provide evidence of an alternative account it’s simply too hard for all people to be accurate in all domains of belief, but most individuals are trying. We collected data on a constellation of human beliefs across domains from more than 1,700 people on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We find misinformed beliefs to be broadly, but thinly, spread among the population. Further, we do not find that individuals who adopt one misinformed belief are more likely to engage in pseudo-scientific or conspiratorial thinking across the board, in opposition to “slippery slope” notions of misinformation adoption.


Higher Ukrainian famine mortality was an outcome of policy: Ukrainian ethnicity, rather than the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian republic, mattered for famine mortality

The Political-Economic Causes of the Soviet Great Famine, 1932–33. Andrei Markevich, Natalya Naumenko & Nancy Qian. NBER Working Paper 29089, July 2021. DOI 10.3386/w29089

Abstract: This study constructs a large new dataset to investigate whether state policy led to ethnic Ukrainians experiencing higher mortality during the 1932–33 Soviet Great Famine. All else equal, famine (excess) mortality rates were positively associated with ethnic Ukrainian population share across provinces, as well as across districts within provinces. Ukrainian ethnicity, rather than the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian republic, mattered for famine mortality. These and many additional results provide strong evidence that higher Ukrainian famine mortality was an outcome of policy, and suggestive evidence on the political-economic drivers of repression. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that bias against Ukrainians explains up to 77% of famine deaths in the three republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and up to 92% in Ukraine.


Monday, August 2, 2021

Decent living standards for all while reducing energy use: Per capita, 9 lbs/4 kg of new clothing/year, 177lbs/80 kg of washing/year, 20 washes per year; & 1 phone; per household, a cooker, a fridge, a laptop

Securing decent living standards for all while reducing global energy use. Leeds Univ press release, Jun 2021. https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/512764

Fundamental changes in our economies are required to secure decent living standards for all in the struggle against climate breakdown, according to new research.

[...]

Lead author Jefim Vogel, PhD researcher at Leeds' Sustainability Research Institute, explained: "Decent living standards are crucial for human well-being, and reducing global energy use is crucial for averting catastrophic climate changes. Truly sustainable development would mean providing decent living standards for everyone at much lower, sustainable levels of energy and resource use.

"But in the current economic system, no country in the world accomplishes that - not even close. It appears that our economic system is fundamentally misaligned with the aspirations of sustainable development: it is unfit for the challenges of the 21st century."

Co-author Professor Julia Steinberger, from the University of Leeds and the University of Lausanne in Switzerland, added: "The problem is that in our current economic system, all countries that achieve decent living standards use much more energy than what can be sustained if we are to avert dangerous climate breakdown."

By 2050, global energy use needs to be as low as 27 gigajoules (GJ) of final energy per person to reach the aspirations of the Paris Agreement of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C without relying on speculative future technologies, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. That means current global average energy use (55 GJ per person) needs to be cut in half, while affluent countries like the UK (81 GJ per person) or Spain (77 GJ per person) need to reduce their average energy use by as much as 65%, France (95 GJ per person) by more than 70%, and the most energy-hungry countries like the USA (204 GJ per person) or Canada (232 GJ per person) need to cut by as much as 90%.

A major concern, however, is that such profound reductions in energy use might undermine living standards, as currently only countries with high energy use accomplish decent living standards.

Even the energy-lightest of the countries that achieve decent living standards - spearheaded by Argentina (53 GJ per person), Cyprus (55 GJ per person), and Greece (63 GJ per person) - use at least double the 'sustainable' level of 27 GJ per person, and many countries use even much more.

On the other hand, in all countries with energy use levels below 27 GJ per person, large parts of the population currently suffer from precarious living standards - for example, in India (19 GJ per person) and Zambia (23 GJ per person), where at least half the population is deprived of fundamental needs.

It appears that in the current economic system, reducing energy use in affluent countries could undermine living standards, while improving living standards in less affluent countries would require large increases in energy use and thus further exacerbate climate breakdown.

But this is not inevitable, the research team show: fundamental changes in economic and social priorities could resolve this dilemma of sustainable development.

Co-author Dr Daniel O'Neill, from Leeds' School of earth and Environment, explained: "Our findings suggest that improving public services could enable countries to provide decent living standards at lower levels of energy use. Governments should offer free and high-quality public services in areas such as health, education, and public transport.

"We also found that a fairer income distribution is crucial for achieving decent living standards at low energy use. To reduce existing income disparities, governments could raise minimum wages, provide a Universal Basic Income, and introduce a maximum income level. We also need much higher taxes on high incomes, and lower taxes on low incomes."

Another essential factor, the research team found, is affordable and reliable access to electricity and modern fuels. While this is already near-universal in affluent countries, it is still lacking for billions of people in lower-income countries, highlighting important infrastructure needs.

Perhaps the most crucial and perhaps the most surprising finding is that economic growth beyond moderate levels of affluence is detrimental for aspirations of sustainable development.

Professor Steinberger explained: "In contrast with wide-spread assumptions, the evidence suggests that decent living standards require neither perpetual economic growth nor high levels of affluence.

"In fact, economic growth in affluent or even moderately affluent countries is detrimental for living standards. And it is also fundamentally unsustainable: economic growth is tied to increases in energy use, and thus makes the energy savings that are required for tackling climate breakdown virtually impossible."

"Another detrimental factor is the extraction of natural resources such as coal, oil, gas or minerals - these industries need to be scaled back rapidly."

Lead-author Jefim Vogel concluded: "In short, we need to abandon economic growth in affluent countries, scale back resource extraction, and prioritise public services, basic infrastructures and fair income distributions everywhere.

"With these policies in place, rich countries could slash their energy use and emissions whilst maintaining or even improving living standards; and less affluent countries could achieve decent living standards and end material poverty without needing vast amounts of energy. That's good news for climate justice, good news for human well-being, good news for poverty eradication, and good news for energy security.

[...] In my view, the most promising and integral vision for the required transformation is the idea of degrowth - it is an idea whose time has come."

Paper: Socio-economic conditions for satisfying human needs at low energy use: An international analysis of social provisioning. Jefim Vogel et al. Global Environmental Change, June 29 2021, 102287. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102287

Highlights

• No country sufficiently meets human needs within sustainable levels of energy use.

• Need satisfaction and associated energy requirements depend on socio-economic setups.

• Public services are linked to higher need satisfaction and lower energy requirements.

• Economic growth is linked to lower need satisfaction and higher energy requirements.

• Countries with good socio-economic setups could likely meet needs at low energy use.

Abstract

Meeting human needs at sustainable levels of energy use is fundamental for avoiding catastrophic climate change and securing the well-being of all people. In the current political-economic regime, no country does so. Here, we assess which socio-economic conditions might enable societies to satisfy human needs at low energy use, to reconcile human well-being with climate mitigation.

Using a novel analytical framework alongside a novel multivariate regression-based moderation approach and data for 106 countries, we analyse how the relationship between energy use and six dimensions of human need satisfaction varies with a wide range of socio-economic factors relevant to the provisioning of goods and services ('provisioning factors'). We find that factors such as public service quality, income equality, democracy, and electricity access are associated with higher need satisfaction and lower energy requirements (‘beneficial provisioning factors’). Conversely, extractivism and economic growth beyond moderate levels of affluence are associated with lower need satisfaction and greater energy requirements (‘detrimental provisioning factors’). Our results suggest that improving beneficial provisioning factors and abandoning detrimental ones could enable countries to provide sufficient need satisfaction at much lower, ecologically sustainable levels of energy use.

However, as key pillars of the required changes in provisioning run contrary to the dominant political-economic regime, a broader transformation of the economic system may be required to prioritise, and organise provisioning for, the satisfaction of human needs at low energy use.

Check also Providing decent living with minimum energy: A global scenario. Joel Millward-Hopkins, Julia K. Steinberger, Narasimha D. Rao, Yannick Oswald. Global Environmental Change, Volume 65, November 2020, 102168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102168

Highlights

• Providing Decent Living with Minimum Energy: A Global Scenario.

• As ecological breakdown looms, the basic material needs of billions remain unmet.

• We estimate the minimal energy for providing decent living globally & universally.

• Despite population growth, 2050 global energy use could be reduced to 1960 levels.

• This requires advanced technologies & reductions in demand to sufficiency levels.

• But ‘sufficiency’ is far more materially generous than many opponents often assume.

Abstract: It is increasingly clear that averting ecological breakdown will require drastic changes to contemporary human society and the global economy embedded within it. On the other hand, the basic material needs of billions of people across the planet remain unmet. Here, we develop a simple, bottom-up model to estimate a practical minimal threshold for the final energy consumption required to provide decent material livings to the entire global population. We find that global final energy consumption in 2050 could be reduced to the levels of the 1960s, despite a population three times larger. However, such a world requires a massive rollout of advanced technologies across all sectors, as well as radical demand-side changes to reduce consumption – regardless of income – to levels of sufficiency. Sufficiency is, however, far more materially generous in our model than what those opposed to strong reductions in consumption often assume.

Keywords: Basic needsClimate changeDemandEnergyInequalitySufficiency


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In order to save the planet from catastrophic climate change, Americans will have to cut their energy use by more than 90 percent and families of four should live in housing no larger than 640 square feet. That's at least according to a team of European researchers led by University of Leeds sustainability researcher Jefim Vogel. In their new study, "Socio-economic conditions for satisfying human needs at low energy use," in Global Environmental Change, they calculate that public transportation should account for most travel. Travel should, in any case, be limited to between 3,000 to 10,000 miles per person annually.

Vogel and his colleagues set themselves the goal of figuring out how to "provide sufficient need satisfaction at much lower, ecologically sustainable levels of energy use." Referencing earlier sustainability studies they argue that human needs are sufficiently satisfied when each person has access to the energy equivalent of 7,500 kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity per capita. That is about how much energy the average Bolivian uses. Currently, Americans use about 80,000 kWh annually per capita. With respect to transportation and physical mobility, the average person would be limited to using the energy equivalent of 16–40 gallons of gasoline per year. People are assumed to take one short- to medium-haul airplane trip every three years or so.

In addition, food consumption per capita would vary depending on age and other conditions, but the average would be 2,100 calories per day. While just over 10 percent of the world's people are unfortunately still undernourished, the Food and Agriculture Organization reports that the daily global average food supply now stands at just under 3,000 calories per person. Each individual is allocated a new clothing allowance of nine pounds per year, and clothes may be washed 20 times annually. The good news is that everyone over age 10 is permitted a mobile phone and each household can have a laptop.

[...]

To achieve [Paris Agreement goals], the researchers focus on what they call provisioning factors, which are intermediary institutions that people use to satisfy their needs. Provisioning factors that affect the amount of energy a society uses include public service, public health coverage, access to electricity and clean fuels, democratic quality, income equality, economic growth, and extractivism. These provisioning factors are the basis for providing sufficient human needs such as nourishment, drinking water, sanitation access, basic education, and a minimum income, all of which help secure the basic need of healthy life expectancy.

In order to stay below the 1.5°C temperature increase threshold, they cite earlier research that calculated that the average person should be limited to using annually as little as 18 gigajoules (equivalent to 136 gallons of gasoline or 5,000 kWh) of total energy, but allocated more generously for their study a cap of 27 gigajoules (equivalent to 204 gallons of gasoline or 7,500 kWh) annually. They then checked to see if any country in the world had met their definition of decent living standards using that amount of energy per capita. "No country in the world accomplishes that—not even close," admitted Vogel in an accompanying press release.

[...]

[...] So they proceed to jigger the various provisioning factors until they find that what is really needed is a "more fundamental transformation of the political-economic regime." That fundamental transformation includes free government-provided high-quality public services in areas such as health, education, and public transport.

"We also found that a fairer income distribution is crucial for achieving decent living standards at low energy use," said co-author Daniel O'Neill, from Leeds' School of Earth and Environment. "To reduce existing income disparities, governments could raise minimum wages, provide a Universal Basic Income, and introduce a maximum income level. We also need much higher taxes on high incomes, and lower taxes on low incomes."

[...]

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Per capita: 9 lbs/4 kg of new clothing/year, 177lbs/80 kg of washing/year, 20 washes per year; 1 phone.

Per household: a cooker, a fridge, a laptop.


From the Millward-Hopkins paper above:
Food2000–2150 kcal/cap/day15%3 KJ/kilocalorie30%
 Cooking appliances1 cooker/household0.8 KJ/kilocalorie1 GJ/app+50%
 Cold Storage1 fridge-freezer/household0.44 GJ/app+/yr4 GJ/app+

Shelter & living conditions
 Household size4 persons/household−25%
 Sufficient space15 meters2 floor-space/cap*80%2–4 GJ/m2100%
 Thermal comfort15 meters2 floor-space/cap*80%20–60 MJ/m2/yr300%
 Illumination2500 lm/house; 6 hrs/day100%150 lm/W14 MJ/house/yr

Hygiene
 Water supply50 Litres/cap/day100%5–17 KJ/L
 Water heating20 Litres/cap/day100%96–220 KJ/L50%
 Waste managementProvided to all households**180 MJ/cap/yr200%

Clothing
 Clothes4 kg of new clothing/year33%100 MJ/kg
Washing facilities80 kg of washing/year33%2.4 MJ/kg2 GJ/app+
 Healthcare Hospitals200 meters2 floor-space/bed50%410–560 MJ/m2/yr14–23 GJ/m2130%
 Education Schools10 meters2 floor-space/pupil50%100–130 MJ/m2/yr4.5–7.5 GJ/m2150%

Communication & information
 Phones1 phone/person over 10yrs old28 MJ/phone/yr110 MJ/phone30%
 Computers1 laptop/household220 MJ/laptop/yr3 GJ/laptop30%
Networks & dataHigh**100%~0.4 GJ/cap/yr

Mobility
 Vehicle productionConsistent with pkm travelled**0.1–0.3 MJ/pkm50%
 Vehicle propulsion5000–15,000 pkm/cap/year3–10%0.2–1.9 MJ/pkm++100%
 InfrastructureConsistent with pkm travelled**0.1–0.3 MJ/pkm
* Assuming 10 m2 of living space/capita plus 20 m2 of communal space/house; with the latter divided by four, we get 15 m2/capita overall.
** Activity levels here are not straightforward to define.
+ ’App’ refers to ‘appliance’.
++ Large range as this covers different modes (public transport to passenger flights).