Larg scale study, 11 European countries: The Unexpected Decline in Feelings of Depression among Adults Ages 50 and Older in 11 European Countries amid the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Unexpected Decline in Feelings of Depression among Adults Ages 50 and Older in 11 European Countries amid the COVID-19 Pandemic. Zachary Van Winkle, Emanuele Ferragina, Ettore Recchi. Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, August 10, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/23780231211032741

Abstract: Findings on the mental health impact of the first wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in Europe are mixed and lack a comparative and longitudinal perspective. The authors used the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe and fixed-effects regressions to estimate within-individual change in the probability to report feelings of depression between 2005 and 2017 and directly following the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in 11 European countries for adults ages 50 and older. The authors found an unprecedented decline in feelings of depression between 2017 and 2020 in all countries that was larger than any previous observed change. The probability to report feelings of depression decreased by 14.5 percentage points on average, ranging from 7 to 19 percentage points in Spain and Switzerland, respectively. Moreover, there were no systematic within-country differences by socioeconomic characteristics, chronic health conditions, virus exposure, or change in activities. These findings challenge conventional wisdom about the mental health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Keywords: COVID-19, mental health, comparative, longitudinal

The first wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic forced most European countries to implement wide-reaching restrictions on private and public life. Scholars immediately voiced their concern, suggesting that heightened economic insecurity and social isolation stemming from nonpharmaceutical interventions could lead to a sharp increase in mental health issues (Holmes et al. 2020). Research on the relationship between the COVID-19 pandemic and numerous aspects of mental health, such as psychological distress, feelings of depression and anxiety, and general subjective well-being, has grown rapidly. By the end of 2020, systematic reviews counted more than 2,000 studies in the field (Aknin et al. 2021; Prati and Mancini 2021). The plethora of research results has shown that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on subjective well-being is more complex than originally expected.

The majority of studies assume that the pandemic and governments’ containment measures have a negative effect on mental health (e.g., Fiorillo and Gorwood 2020). For example, government-imposed lockdowns as well as quarantine, social distancing, and self-isolation measures reduced social interactions and increased loneliness, both of which are associated with depression (Killgore et al. 2020). Moreover, concerns about one’s own health or the health of loved ones as well as a feeling of uncertainty about the current situation and the future may engender fear and increase feelings of depression. Those feelings of fear and uncertainty may be reinforced by the rapid spread of disinformation, especially on internet platforms. Both of these arguments linking the pandemic to decreased mental health—reduced social interactions and feelings of worry and uncertainty—may be heightened among older adults ages 50 and older.¹ Older adults are more likely than younger or middle-aged adults to become severely ill and be hospitalized following a COVID-19 infection. Therefore, it is likely that older adults did not increase their social interactions after lockdowns were lifted and that the elderly are more concerned about health issues.

In contrast, some studies have argued that the pandemic is associated with increased subjective well-being and mental health, which has been coined the “eye of the hurricane” paradox (Recchi et al. 2020). Perceptions of subjective well-being and mental health may be relative or positional. Individuals comparing themselves with those suffering the most during the pandemic may declare higher levels of well-being than they would have otherwise. In addition, numerous studies have documented astounding resilience and prosocial behavior in the aftermath of natural disasters and other dramatic events, resulting in psychological gains from adversity (Mancini 2019; Quarantelli 1985; Uchida, Takahashi, and Kawahara 2014). Older adults may also be more likely to experience gains in mental health following the pandemic. For example, retired adults were protected from labor market and income uncertainty, which may lead them to perceive a higher degree of well-being relative to adults still active in the labor market.

In this study, we concentrate on adults ages 50 and older, who are medically more vulnerable to COVID-19 than younger segments of the population. Within the group of older adults, there are subgroups that may be more or less vulnerable to the mental health consequences of the pandemic. For example, older adults become increasingly susceptible to the virus with age. Those without a partner, because of never partnering, divorce, or widowhood, may be at an especially heightened risk of social isolation. Older adults who have not yet entered retirement may be put under stress by employment and income uncertainty. Finally, those who either tested positive for COVID-19 or know someone who tested positive may suffer under the effects of social stigma associated with proximity to infection.

In addition to subgroup variation among older adults, there are likely cross-national differences across European countries. Not only were there large country differences in the timing and incidence of COVID-19 during the first wave, but countries also differed in terms of the strictness of measures taken to limit the spread of the virus (Aidukaite et al. 2021; Béland et al. 2021; Cantillon, Seeleib-Kaiser, and Veen 2021; Greve et al. 2021; Moreira et al. 2021). For example, the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic was especially pronounced in Italy, Spain, and France. In contrast, countries in Central Europe and Eastern Europe, such as Germany and Poland, were left relatively untouched by the first wave. Therefore, if the pandemic does affect mental health negatively, then the association would be expected to be strongest in countries such as Italy and Spain compared with countries such as Germany and Poland. In addition, prepandemic differences in national labor market and social policy institutions increased the ability of certain countries to limit the economic impact of the pandemic for both individuals and society (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; Ferragina, Seeleib-Kaiser, and Tomlinson 2013).

The use of cross-sectional and nonharmonized data sources limits the ability of researchers to assess whether cross-national differences are substantive or a methodological artifact. Sources of methodological differences include the measurement of mental health, target population, survey design, and analytical approach. For example, the foci and measurement instruments of studies range from anxiety, sadness, and depression to inclinations to self-harm, insomnia, and suicide. Most of these are measured through ad hoc questionnaire items or established psychological scales. The target populations of these studies vary across both contexts and selected groups, such as specific occupational or age groups, to local communities and nationally representative samples. The results of numerous studies are based on cross-sectional surveys, most of which rely on convenience and unsystematic sampling (Prati and Mancini 2021). Repeated cross-sectional surveys have enabled researchers to compare the prevalence of mental health issues in pre- and postpandemic periods found in different samples. Other cross-sectional surveys fielded during the pandemic have asked respondents to assess the impact of the COVID-19 on their own mental health. However, the latter cross-sectional approach likely exacerbates the impact of the pandemic because of social desirability bias and lack of a prepandemic baseline estimate of mental health.

Repeated cross-sectional designs have their merits in estimating change in population health across time (Yee and Niemeier 1996). For example, repeated sampling accounts for population change (e.g., compositional differences in the target population). However, longitudinal studies, despite problems with panel attrition and target population definition, are needed to assess within-individual change across time. This is especially important if compositional change masks changes in the underlying population. Some studies have adopted longitudinal designs, taking as a starting point the early months of the pandemic (Fancourt, Steptoe, and Bu 2021; Varga et al. 2021). Varga et al. (2021), for example, tracked respondents’ self-assessed COVID-19-related anxiety in four European countries (the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France) and found large similarities and a common trend of slight decline in anxiety from March to July 2020. However, an accurate estimate of how the pandemic influenced subjective well-being should ideally cover a longer longitudinal window of observation and include comparable information from the same respondents before and during the pandemic.²

A few studies have used longitudinal data sources based on representative samples from single countries. The results of these studies indicate considerable within- and cross-national heterogeneity. In the United Kingdom, an increase in psychological distress from 2017 to April 2020 and a substantial decrease from April to June 2020 were found (Niedzwiedz et al. 2021). Yet the level of distress remains above prepandemic levels (Daly, Sutin, and Robinson forthcoming). Another study showed that anxiety rose in comparison with prepandemic levels, but not depression (Kwong et al. 2020). Still another showed that young respondents drove the overall increase in depression levels in the United Kingdom (Pierce et al. 2020). Evidence from the Netherlands shows stability in anxiety and depression in the overall population (van der Velden et al. 2020) and among a subsample of individuals diagnosed with depression prior to the pandemic (Pan et al. 2021). A Swedish panel study did not reveal significant changes in indicators of well-being and even demonstrated an increase in self-rated health (Kivi, Hansson, and Bjälkebring 2021). Similarly, a longitudinal study in France found evidence for a rise in average levels of subjective well-being compared with the period from 2017 to 2019 (Recchi et al. 2020). In sum, a lack of comparability among studies hinders substantive insight on how cross-national differences in the exposure and government response might translate into country variation in the relationship between the COVID-19 pandemic and mental health.

We contribute to this debate, providing a unique longitudinal and comparative assessment of the pandemic impact on subjective feelings of depression—one of the most studied outcomes to assess people’s mental health—in a segment of the population that has a higher risk for severe infection and social isolation. Using seven waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and individual fixed-effects regression models, we investigate within-individual changes in feelings of depression across 15 years and 11 countries on a sample of older adults.

Our approach has at least four advantages compared with previous literature in the field. First, our long observation period allows us to assess the amount of change in depression levels at seven points in time before the pandemic (2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017) and in the months directly following the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe (May to August 2020). Second, we are able to use a comparable measure of mental health to investigate the existence of common or dissimilar trends in depression levels across 11 European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, the Czech Republic, and Poland). The countries in our study differ both in terms of prepandemic economic performance and institutional arrangements but also in their exposure and response to the pandemic. Third, we provide a stress-test measurement of depression trends with a focus on an epidemiologically vulnerable population. Specifically, our target population of men and women ages 50 and older compose a segment of the population in which we would expect to find a growth in feelings of depression due to the pandemic. Fourth, we are able to assess heterogeneity in pandemic’s effect on mental health across a wide array of socioeconomic characteristics as well as individuals’ exposure to the virus, their vulnerability, and the impact of the pandemic on their everyday lives.

In crows... These behavioral and neuronal data suggests that the conception of the empty set as a cognitive precursor of a zero-like number concept is not an exclusive property of the cerebral cortex of primates

Behavioral and Neuronal Representation of Numerosity Zero in the Crow. Maximilian E. Kirschhock, Helen M. Ditz and Andreas Nieder. Journal of Neuroscience, June 2 2021, 41 (22) 4889-4896; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0090-21.2021

Abstract: Different species of animals can discriminate numerosity, the countable number of objects in a set. The representations of countable numerosities have been deciphered down to the level of single neurons. However, despite its importance for human number theory, a special numerical quantity, the empty set (numerosity zero), has remained largely unexplored. We explored the behavioral and neuronal representation of the empty set in carrion crows. Crows were trained to discriminate small numerosities including the empty set. Performance data showed a numerical distance effect for the empty set in one crow, suggesting that the empty set and countable numerosities are represented along the crows' “mental number line.” Single-cell recordings in the endbrain region nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) showed a considerable proportion of NCL neurons tuned to the preferred numerosity zero. As evidenced by neuronal distance and size effects, NCL neurons integrated the empty set in the neural number line. A subsequent neuronal population analysis using a statistical classifier approach showed that the neuronal numerical representations were predictive of the crows' success in the task. These behavioral and neuronal data suggests that the conception of the empty set as a cognitive precursor of a zero-like number concept is not an exclusive property of the cerebral cortex of primates. Zero as a quantitative category cannot only be implemented in the layered neocortex of primates, but also in the anatomically distinct endbrain circuitries of birds that evolved based on convergent evolution.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The conception of “nothing” as number “zero” is celebrated as one of the greatest achievements in mathematics. To explore whether precursors of zero-like concepts can be found in vertebrates with a cerebrum that anatomically differs starkly from our primate brain, we investigated this in carrion crows. We show that crows can grasp the empty set as a null numerical quantity that is mentally represented next to number one. Moreover, we show that single neurons in an associative avian cerebral region specifically respond to the empty set and show the same physiological characteristics as for countable quantities. This suggests that zero as a quantitative category can also be implemented in the anatomically distinct endbrain circuitries of birds that evolved based on convergent evolution.

Keywords: corvid songbirdsingle-neuron recordingsnidopallium caudolateralenumbersempty set

Popular version: Animals Can Count and Use Zero. How Far Does Their Number Sense Go? Jordana Cepelewicz. Quanta Magazine, Aug 9 2021. https://www.quantamagazine.org/animals-can-count-and-use-zero-how-far-does-their-number-sense-go-20210809/

Openness to Experience is by far the strongest (negative) correlate of conservatism, but that there is little evidence to suggest that this association is causal

Osborne, Danny, Nicole Satherley, and Chris G. Sibley. 2021. “Personality and Ideology: A Meta-analysis of the Reliable, but Non-causal, Association Between Openness and Conservatism.” PsyArXiv. August 10. doi:10.31234/osf.io/esrku

Abstract: Research over the last three decades reveals that Openness to Experience—a personality trait that captures interest in novelty, creativity, unconventionalism, and open-mindedness—correlates negatively with political conservatism. Here, we summarise this vast literature by meta-analysing 232 unique samples (N = 575,691) that examine the relationship between the Big Five and conservatism. Results reveal that the negative relationship between Openness to Experience and conservatism is nearly twice as big as the next strongest correlation between personality and ideology (namely, Conscientiousness and conservatism; rs = −.145 and .076, respectively). The associations between traits and conservatism were, however, substantively smaller in non-WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic) countries. We conclude by reviewing recent longitudinal work demonstrating that Openness to Experience and conservatism are non-causally related. Collectively, our chapter shows that Openness to Experience is by far the strongest (negative) correlate of conservatism, but that there is little evidence to suggest that this association is causal.

Inferring Organizational Trust From the Presence of Women: The processes & practices of male-dominated organizational culture can leave a residue of mistrust, but viewing women in leadership is one beacon illuminating paths upward

My Fair Lady? Inferring Organizational Trust From the Mere Presence of Women in Leadership Roles. Mansi P. Joshi, Amanda B. Diekman. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, August 5, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211035957

Abstract: The history of male dominance in organizational hierarchy can leave a residue of mistrust in which women in particular do not expect fair treatment. The mere presence of a female leader relative to a male leader led perceivers to anticipate fairer treatment in that organization (Study 1) and greater projected salary and status (Study 2). This mere presence effect occurred uniquely through communal and not agentic affordances; these patterns emerged especially or only for women. Female leaders cued organizational trust in both male- and female-dominated industries (Study 3) and when they occupied different levels of the organizational hierarchy (Study 4). When information about organizational communal affordances is directly communicated, both female and male leaders signal trust (Study 5). The processes and practices of male-dominated organizational culture can leave a residue of mistrust, but viewing women in leadership is one beacon illuminating paths forward and upward.

Keywords: organizational trust, leadership, gender, communal affordances

Top, Bottom, and Versatile Orientations among Adolescent Sexual Minority Men: Data from our study supports sexual self-labeling occurring before adulthood, during adolescence for sexual minority men

Top, Bottom, and Versatile Orientations among Adolescent Sexual Minority Men. David A. Moskowitz et al. The Journal of Sex Research, Jul 26 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2021.1954583

Abstract: Sexual role preference or self-label (i.e., top, versatile, or bottom) has been well studied in samples of sexual minority men (SMM) but lacks research among adolescent sexual minority men (ASMM). In response, data were collected from 302 ASMM (15–18 years old), measuring sexual self-label, relationship and sexual experience, sexually explicit media use, use of geosocial networking applications, penis size satisfaction, and gender atypicality. Results showed there was no significant difference in the distribution of sexual position self-identity in ASMM when compared with data from published, adult samples. A model that associated sexual socialization factors with adopting any self-label was significant, with greater number of partners, previous geosocial networking app use, and more relationship experience being positive predictors of having a label. Additionally, a model that tested the convergent validity between self-label and enacted sexual behaviors was significant. Both receptive and insertive sex enactments were highly correlated with corresponding labels. Lastly, gender atypicality and penis size satisfaction were significant predictors of sexual position self-identity. Data from our study supports sexual self-labeling occurring before adulthood, during adolescence for SMM. Furthermore, it shows that socialization factors (e.g., partner frequency, using apps) are important in the development of sexual position self-identity in this population.

Female relationship & sexual satisfaction were related to male psychopathic traits: Male meanness & disinhibition were negative predictors of female satisfaction; male boldness & social status were positive predictors

When your beloved is a psychopath. Psychopathic traits and social status of men and women's relationship and sexual satisfaction. Irena Pilch, Justyna Lipka, Julia Gnielczyk. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 184, January 2022, 111175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111175

Highlights

• Female relationship and sexual satisfaction were related to male psychopathic traits.

• Male meanness and disinhibition were negative predictors of female satisfaction.

• Male boldness and social status were positive predictors of female satisfaction.

• Boldness attenuated the negative effect of disinhibition on relationship satisfaction.

• Boldness attenuated the negative effect of meanness on relationship satisfaction.

Abstract: The triarchic psychopathy model was used to investigate the effects of male psychopathy on female satisfaction in a female community sample (N = 1945). We examined the associations of the psychopathic traits of a male romantic partner (in the perception of his female partner) with relationship satisfaction and sexual satisfaction assessed by the female partner. Negative relationships were observed between men's disinhibition and meanness and women's relationship and sexual satisfaction. Men's boldness was positively associated with perceived men's social status, and it predicted higher satisfaction of female partners. Quantile regression confirmed the unique relationships between satisfaction, psychopathic traits, and social status. These associations were stronger when the levels of satisfaction were low. Interaction analysis showed that meanness potentiated the effects of disinhibition, and boldness attenuated the effects of disinhibition and meanness on relationship satisfaction. The results confirmed the specificity of disinhibition, meanness, and boldness as three distinct psychopathic traits with potentially different impacts on romantic relationships.

Keywords: PersonalityPsychopathic traitsTriarchic psychopathy modelRomantic relationship satisfactionSexual satisfactionBoldnessMeannessDisinhibition

The Big Five Personality Traits and Earnings: These authors find weak associations between earnings and Extraversion and Agreeableness; or, if you are nice, you earn less

The Big Five Personality Traits and Earnings: A Meta-Analysis. Alderotti, Giammarco, Rapallini, Chiara, Traverso, Silvio. Global Labor Organization Discussion Paper No. 902. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/236201

Abstract: The past two decades have witnessed an increasing interest in the relationship between personality and labor market outcomes, as well as the emergence of the Five-Factor Model as the reference framework for the study of personality. In this paper, we provide the first meta-analytical review of the empirical literature on the association between personal earnings and the Big Five personality traits. The analysis combines the results of 65 peer-reviewed articles published between 2001-2020, from which we retrieved 936 partial effect sizes. Overall, the primary literature provides robust support for a positive association between personal earnings and the traits of Openness, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion, while simultaneously revealing a negative and significant association between earnings and the traits of Agreeableness and Neuroticism. We find no evidence of a substantial publication bias. Meta-regression estimates suggest that Openness and Conscientiousness are positively associated with earnings even when primary researchers control for individual cognitive abilities and educational attainments. Similarly, the studies that includes labor market control variables exhibit weaker associations between earnings and Extraversion and Agreeableness. The results of the primary studies seem unaffected by the time at which the Big Five are measured, as well as by the scale and number of inventory items. Meta-regression estimates suggest that the results of the primary literature are not stable across cultures and gender, and that the ranking and academic field of the journal matter.

Subjects: Big Five personality traits, earnings, meta-analysis

JEL: J24 D91

Strengthened partisan feelings extend to economic perceptions—The gap in perceptions approximately doubled between 1999 & 2020, and partisan economic perceptions no longer seem to converge during economic crises

Cognitive Political Economy: A Growing Partisan Divide in Economic Perceptions. David W. Brady, John A. Ferejohn, Brett Parker. American Politics Research, August 4, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211032107

Abstract: Research suggests that American partisans are increasingly distinct in their beliefs. These strengthened partisan feelings extend to economic perceptions—as numerous scholars have shown, there is a substantial gap between the proportion of Democrats and the proportion of Republicans that believe the economy is improving. Here, we examine the extent to which these perceptions have polarized over the past two decades and the degree to which they still respond to objective economic indicators. Exploiting a Gallup time-series, we show that the gap in economic perceptions approximately doubled between 1999 and 2020, and that partisan economic perceptions no longer seem to converge during economic crises. We further demonstrate that the economic perceptions of Democrats and Republicans have polarized relative to Independents and that this polarization is not asymmetric in magnitude. Collectively, these results document the extraordinary rise of perceptual polarization and illustrate that neither Democrats nor Republicans are immune to its effects.

Keywords: polarization, public opinion, economic perceptions, perceptual bias, economic crises

Banks that implemented antigun or progun policies experienced substantial reductions in deposit growth due to politically polarized depositors

Jeung, Jinoug, Politically Polarized Depositors (July 30, 2021). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3896745

Abstract: Exploiting a shock drawing public attention to banks’ financial relationships with the firearms industry – Antigun activism following the 2018 Parkland shooting – this paper demonstrates that political values shape depositor behavior. I find that, following the 2018 Parkland shooting, banks that financed firearms manufacturers experienced significant decreases in deposit growth. These antigun depositor movements were stronger in counties with higher Democrat shares and for more Republican-leaning banks. Banks that implemented antigun policies also experienced substantial reductions in deposit growth, but these pro-gun depositor movements were stronger in counties with higher Republican shares. These divergent depositor movements suggest that conflicting political values between banks and depositors lead to depositor movements. Furthermore, this paper presents the implications of antigun depositor movements for the deposit market and the firearms industry. I find that antigun depositor movements deteriorated the market competitiveness of targeted banks, thus leading them to decrease deposit spreads in favor of depositors. The targeted banks’ increased costs of funding by the sluggish deposit growth and the decreased deposit spreads imposed higher financial constraints on the firearms industry, thus contracting their business.

Keywords: Depositor behavior, Political values, Social activism, CSR

JEL Classification: G21, G41, M14

Changes in labor market returns explain 36 pct of the measured increase in reasoning skill (the Flynn effect), & can also explain decline in knowledge; we show evidence of increasing emphasis on reasoning as compared to knowledge

Labor Market Returns and the Evolution of Cognitive Skills: Theory and Evidence. Santiago Hermo, Miika M. Päällysaho, David G. Seim & Jesse M. Shapiro. NBER Working Paper 29135. August 2021. DOI 10.3386/w29135

Abstract: A large literature in cognitive science studies the puzzling "Flynn effect" of rising fluid intelligence (reasoning skill) in rich countries. We develop an economic model in which a cohort's mix of skills is determined by different skills' relative returns in the labor market and by the technology for producing skills. We estimate the model using administrative data from Sweden. Combining data from exams taken at military enlistment with earnings records from the tax register, we document an increase in the relative labor market return to logical reasoning skill as compared to vocabulary knowledge. The estimated model implies that changes in labor market returns explain 36 percent of the measured increase in reasoning skill, and can also explain the decline in knowledge. An original survey of parents, an analysis of trends in school curricula, and an analysis of occupational characteristics show evidence of increasing emphasis on reasoning as compared to knowledge.

Among women with lower relationship quality, "trying" to get pregnant was associated with higher sexual satisfaction, and among those with higher relationship quality, with lower sexual satisfaction

Is Reproductive Orientation Associated with Sexual Satisfaction Among Partnered U.S. Women? Karina M Shreffler et al. Arch Sex Behav, Aug 3 2021. DOI: 10.1007/s10508-021-01984-z

Abstract: Little is known about how "reproductive orientation" (i.e., trying to get pregnant, ambivalent about pregnancy, trying to avoid pregnancy, or having had a sterilization surgery) is associated with sexual satisfaction among women of childbearing age. Using data from the National Survey of Fertility Barriers (N = 2811), we examined the association of reproductive orientation with sexual satisfaction, adjusting for relationship characteristics including union type (cohabitation versus marriage), quality, and length; infertility history; and demographic characteristics including age, parity, and race/ethnicity. Results indicated that women who were ambivalent or trying to get pregnant reported significantly higher levels of sexual satisfaction than women who were sterile in the unadjusted model, but not in the models that included relationship quality. The association of reproductive orientation and sexual satisfaction depended upon relationship quality; among women with lower relationship quality, "trying" was associated with higher, and among those with higher relationship quality, with lower sexual satisfaction.

Keywords: Conception; Couple relationship; Infertility; Sexual satisfaction; Sterilization.

Despite Leftists' belief in the power of learning and environmental factors to shape human development, no association between core measures of political worldviews and people's view of heritability of intelligence is found

Worldview-motivated rejection of science and the norms of science. Stephan Lewandowsky, Klaus Oberauer. Cognition, Volume 215, October 2021, 104820. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104820

Abstract: Some scientific propositions are so well established that they are no longer debated by the relevant scientific community, such as the fact that greenhouse gas emissions are altering the Earth's climate. In many cases, such scientifically settled issues are nonetheless rejected by segments of the public. U.S. surveys have repeatedly shown that the rejection of scientific evidence across a broad range of domains is preferentially associated with rightwing or libertarian worldviews, with little evidence for rejection of scientific evidence by people on the political left. We report two preregistered representative surveys (each N > 1000) that (1) sought to explain this apparent political asymmetry and (2) continued the search for the rejection of scientific evidence on the political left. To address the first question, we focused on Merton's classic analysis of the norms of science, such as communism and universalism, which continue to be internalized by the scientific community but which are not readily reconciled with conservative values. Both studies show that people's political worldviews are associated with their attitudes towards those scientific norms, and that those attitudes predict people's acceptance of vaccinations and climate science. The norms of science may thus be in latent conflict with the worldviews of a substantial segment of the public. To address the second question, we examined people's views on the role of inheritance in determining people's intelligence, given that the belief in the power of learning and environmental factors to shape human development is a guiding principle of leftwing thought. We find no association between core measures of political worldviews and people's view of heritability of intelligence, although two subordinate constructs, nationalism and social dominance orientation, were associated with belief in heritability.

Keywords: Rejection of scienceAttitudes towards scienceWorldviewsNorms of science

Utilitarian agents, described as opting to sacrifice a single individual for the greater good, were perceived as less predictable and less moral than deontological agents whose inaction resulted in five people being harmed

The search for predictable moral partners: Predictability and moral (character) preferences. Martin HarrycTurpin et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 97, November 2021, 104196. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104196

Abstract: Across six studies (N = 1988 US residents and 81 traditional people of Papua), participants judged agents acting in sacrificial moral dilemmas. Utilitarian agents, described as opting to sacrifice a single individual for the greater good, were perceived as less predictable and less moral than deontological agents whose inaction resulted in five people being harmed. These effects generalize to a non-Western sample of the Dani people, a traditional indigenous society of Papua, and persist when controlling for homophily and notions of behavioral typicality. Notably, deontological agents are no longer morally preferred when the actions of utilitarian agents are made to seem more predictable. Lastly, we find that peoples' lay theory of predictability is flexible and multi-faceted, but nevertheless understood and used holistically in assessing the moral character of others. On the basis of our findings, we propose that assessments of predictability play an important role when judging the morality of others.

Keywords: PredictabilityMoral impressionsCooperationUtilitarianDeontology

No consistent correlation between baseline pupil diameter and cognitive abilities after controlling for confounds—A comment on Tsukahara and Engle (2021)

No consistent correlation between baseline pupil diameter and cognitive abilities after controlling for confounds—A comment on Tsukahara and Engle (2021). Nash Unsworth, Ashley L. Miller, Matthew K. Robison. Cognition, Volume 215, October 2021, 104825. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104825

There has been a recent surge of studies examining whether variation  in baseline pupil diameter is related to various cognitive abilities such as working memory capacity (WMC), fluid intelligence (Gf), and attention control (AC) to name a few (e.g., Aminihajibashi, Hagen, Foldal, Laeng, & Espeseth, 2019; Bornemann et al., 2010; Heitz, Schrock, Payne, & Engle, 2008; Ralph, Gibson, & Gondoli, 2020; Robison & Brewer, 2020, 2021, in press; Sibley, Foroughi, Brown, & Coyne, 2018; Tsukahara, Harrison, & Engle, 2016; Tsukahara & Engle, 2021; Unsworth & Robison, 2015, 2017a; Unsworth, Miller, & Robison, 2021; Unsworth, Robison, & Miller, 2019; van der Meer et al., 2010). These studies are based, in part, on the idea that baseline pupil diameter is related to functioning of the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system, which is thought to be important for regulating arousal and alertness (AstonJones & Cohen, 2005; Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016; Szabadi, 2013; Unsworth & Robison, 2017b). Despite a number of studies examining potential relations, it is still unclear whether baseline pupil diameter is related to cognitive abilities. That is, many prior studies find near zero correlations between baseline pupil diameter and cognitive abilities (e.g., Aminihajibashi et al., 2019; Ralph et al., 2020; Robison & Brewer, 2020, 2021, in press; Sibley et al., 2018; Unsworth & Robison, 2015, 2017a; Unsworth et al., 2019; see Unsworth et al., 2021 for a meta-analysis of the relation between WMC and baseline pupil diameter), whereas some studies do find a relation (e.g., Bornemann et al., 2010; Heitz et al., 2008; Tsukahara et al., 2016; Tsukahara & Engle, 2021; van der Meer et al., 2010). In a recent attempt to examine discrepancies across studies, Tsukahara and Engle (2021) suggested that differences in luminance (both overall room lighting and screen brightness) influence the correlations between baseline pupil diameter and cognitive abilities such that the correlations seem to arise under dark conditions allowing for more variability between participants. Thus, Tsukahara and Engle (2021) concluded that baseline pupil diameter is related to cognitive abilities under proper lighting conditions. 

While the Tsukahara and Engle (2021) results are interesting and important in terms of providing information on how luminance can potentially impact correlations with pupil diameter, it is not clear how robust these results are and whether confounding variables account for the relations. In particular, in a prior study Tsukahara et al. (2016) noted that it was important to account for possible confounding variables such as age and race/ethnicity when examining correlations between baseline pupil dimeter and cognitive abilities. Tsukahara et al. found that there were race/ethnicity and age differences in baseline pupil diameter. 

Importantly, Gf still correlated with baseline pupil diameter after controlling for these confounding variables (along with others such as nicotine use, medication use, and whether the participant was a college student). Tsukahara et al. (2016) concluded that these analyses provided strong evidence suggesting that the relation between Gf and baseline pupil diameter (note that they did not report the corresponding analyses for WMC) was not due to confounding variables.

Max Planck Institut's MPI-M Earth System Model v1.2: To prevent a sensitivity of 7C in average temperature instead of the right value (2.77C), an atmospheric parameter had to be tuned by a factor of 10 (!)

Mauritsen, T., Bader, J., Becker, T., Behrens, J., Bittner, M., Brokopf, R., et al. (2019). Developments in the MPI-M Earth System Model version 1.2 (MPI-ESM1.2) and its response to increasing CO2. Journal of Advances in Modeling Earth Systems, 11, 998–1038. https://doi.org/10.1029/2018MS001400

Abstract: A new release of the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology Earth System Model version 1.2 (MPI ESM1.2) is presented. The development focused on correcting errors in and improving the physical processes representation, as well as improving the computational performance, versatility, and overall user friendliness. In addition to new radiation and aerosol parameterizations of the atmosphere, several relatively large, but partly compensating, coding errors in the model's cloud, convection, and turbulence parameterizations were corrected. The representation of land processes was refined by introducing a multilayer soil hydrology scheme, extending the land biogeochemistry to include the nitrogen cycle, replacing the soil and litter decomposition model and improving the representation of wildfires. The ocean biogeochemistry now represents cyanobacteria prognostically in order to capture the response of nitrogen fixation to changing climate conditions and further includes improved detritus settling and numerous other refinements. As something new, in addition to limiting drift and minimizing certain biases, the instrumental record warming was explicitly taken into account during the tuning process. To this end, a very high climate sensitivity of around 7 K caused by low-level clouds in the tropics as found in an intermediate model version was addressed, as it was not deemed possible to match observed warming otherwise. As a result, the model has a climate sensitivity to a doubling of CO2 over preindustrial conditions of 2.77 K, maintaining the previously identified highly nonlinear global mean response to increasing CO2 forcing, which nonetheless can be represented by a simple two-layer model.

3.6 Atmospheric Model Tuning

A major retuning of the model was required because all modifications taken together caused a decrease of the global top-of-atmosphere radiation budget by about 10 W/m2 due mainly to the corrected cloud fraction scheme (section 3.1) and also because the model climate sensitivity had roughly doubled to around 7 K, which would have prevented a reasonable match to the instrumental record warming. If the latter had not been addressed, the model's historical warming would have roughly exceeded that observed by a factor of 2. When reducing the historical warming in a model there are essentially three options: reduce forcing, increase deep ocean heat uptake efficiency, or reduce the climate sensitivity. The forcing can be reduced by increasing aerosol cooling by enhancing the indirect effect, but at the time (2014–2015) we did not have such a parameterization in the model, which was developed after that (section 3.3). Further, ocean heat uptake already exceed that observed (Giorgetta et al., 2013), and so we were left with reducing the climate sensitivity. Since the predecessor MPI-ESM model warmed slightly more than observed, and it had a sensitivity of 3.5 K, we decided to aim at an equilibrium climate sensitivity of around 3 K. The reduction of the model's sensitivity was primarily achieved by increasing the entrainment rate for shallow convection by a factor of 10, from 3 × 10−4 m−1 in ECHAM6.1 to 3 × 10−3 m−1 in ECHAM6.3, with the purpose to reduce tropical low-level cloud feedback. But also other convective cloud parameters, mixed-phase cloud processes, and the representation of stratocumulus were found to be important.

Women learn while men talk?: Women appear to need a sense of higher levels of competence in order to engage with online political content, especially for sharing and commenting

Women learn while men talk?: revisiting gender differences in political engagement in online environments. Darren Lilleker et al. Information, Communication & Society, Aug 7 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1961005

Abstract: There is an inconclusive debate on whether male and female users of social media platforms engage with political content differently. While some highlight minimal differences, others evidence an engagement gap where male are more visible within online environments. Drawing on data from a representative survey of citizens in France, the UK and USA, we explore the engagement gap in more granular detail. Our data show minimal gender differences for most forms of online political engagement, but there remain some indications of a gendered divide. While the feeling of external efficacy is crucial to engage online regardless gender, women appear to need a sense of higher levels of competence in order to engage with online political content, especially for sharing and commenting. The study confirms interest in politics, extreme political ideological views and large social media network as prompt for more eager political engagement, but we do not find any substantial gender differentiation. Our findings suggest some minimal country differences on women engagement in commenting. Overall, our data indicate that while women may be as likely as men to participate in online political expression, through sharing and commenting, and may have an equal overall share of voice, the voices of many women are at least more muted in open public political discussions environment.

KEYWORDS: Gender gapsocial mediapolitical engagementpolitical activity

News Avoidance during the Covid-19 Crisis: Understanding Information Overload—News avoidance indeed has a positive effect on perceived well-being

News Avoidance during the Covid-19 Crisis: Understanding Information Overload. Kiki de Bruin et al. Digital Journalism, Aug 6 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2021.1957967

Abstract: This study investigates the degree of news avoidance during the first months of the Covid-19 pandemic in the Netherlands. Based on two panel surveys conducted in the period April–June 2020, this study shows that the increased presence of this behavior, can be explained by negative emotions and feelings the news causes by citizens. Moreover, news avoidance indeed has a positive effect on perceived well-being. These findings point to an acting balance for individual news consumers. In a pandemic such as Covid-19 news consumers need to be informed, but avoiding news is sometimes necessary to stay mentally healthy.

Keywords: Covid-19 crisisinformation overloadinfodemicnews avoidancenews consumptionwell-being

Check also COVID-19: 91pct of stories by US major media outlets are negative in tone vs 65pct for scientific journals; stories of increasing cases are 5.5x stories of decreasing cases even when new cases are declining

Why Is All COVID-19 News Bad News? Sacerdote, Bruce and Sehgal, Ranjan and Cook, Molly. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 28110, Nov 2020. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/11/covid-19-91pct-of-stories-by-us-major.html

Squirrel parkour

Acrobatic squirrels learn to leap and land on tree branches without falling. Nathaniel H. Hunt et al. Science  Aug 6 2021:Vol. 373, Issue 6555, pp. 697-700. DOI: 10.1126/science.abe5753

Squirrel parkour

Every day, there are acrobatic extravaganzas going on above our heads. Squirrels navigate remarkably complex and unpredictable environments as they leap from branch to branch, and mistakes can be fatal. These feats require a complex combination of evolved biomechanical adaptations and learned behaviors. Hunt et al. characterized the integration of these features in a series of experiments with free-living fox squirrels (see the Perspective by Adolph and Young). They found that the squirrels' remarkable and consistent success was due to a combination of learned impulse generation when assessing the balance between distance and branch flexibility and the addition of innovative leaps and landings in the face of increasingly difficult challenges.

Abstract: Arboreal animals often leap through complex canopies to travel and avoid predators. Their success at making split-second, potentially life-threatening decisions of biomechanical capability depends on their skillful use of acrobatic maneuvers and learning from past efforts. Here, we found that free-ranging fox squirrels (Sciurus niger) leaping across unfamiliar, simulated branches decided where to launch by balancing a trade-off between gap distance and branch-bending compliance. Squirrels quickly learned to modify impulse generation upon repeated leaps from unfamiliar, compliant beams. A repertoire of agile landing maneuvers enabled targeted leaping without falling. Unanticipated adaptive landing and leaping “parkour” behavior revealed an innovative solution for particularly challenging leaps. Squirrels deciding and learning how to launch and land demonstrates the synergistic roles of biomechanics and cognition in robust gap-crossing strategies.

Humans resist unequal distributions of goods in their social interactions, even if it requires foregoing personal gains—Study Finds A Causal Role of the Insula in Aversion to Social Inequity Via Lesion Evidence

Lesion Evidence for a Causal Role of the Insula in Aversion to Social Inequity. Felix Jan Nitsch, Hannah Strenger, Stefan Knecht, Bettina Studer. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, nsab098, August 6 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsab098

Abstract: Humans resist unequal distributions of goods in their social interactions, even if it requires foregoing personal gains. Functional neuroimaging studies implicate the insula in this aversion to social inequity and in fairness-related decisions, but a causal contribution has not yet been established. We compared the responses of 30 patients with lesions to the insula on a multiple-trial version of the one-shot Ultimatum Game, a neuroeconomic social exchange paradigm where a sum of money is split between two players, to those of 30 matched patients with brain injuries sparing the insula. Insula lesion patients accepted offers of an unequal disadvantageous split significantly more often than comparison lesion patients. Computational modeling confirmed that this difference in choice behavior was due to decreased aversion to disadvantageous inequity following insula damage, rather than due to increased decision noise or non-consideration of inequity. Our results provide novel evidence that the insula is causally involved in aversion to inequity and in value-based choices in the context of social interactions.

Keywords: inequity aversion, insula, computational modeling, social decision-making, value-based choices

Politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them; the continued popularity of mainstream outlets often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers

How Many People Live in Politically Partisan Online News Echo Chambers in Different Countries? Richard Fletcher, Craig T. Robertson, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media, Vol. 1 (2021). Aug 4 2021. https://doi.org/10.51685/jqd.2021.020

Abstract: Concern over online news echo chambers has been a consistent theme in recent debates on how people get news and information. Yet, we lack a basic descriptive understanding of how many people occupy bounded online news spaces in different countries. Using online survey data from seven countries we find that (i) politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them, (ii) in every country covered, more people consume no online news at all than occupy partisan online echo chambers, and (iii) except for the US, decisions over the inclusion or exclusion of particular news outlets make little difference to echo chamber estimates. Differences within and between media systems mean we should be very cautious about direct comparisons between different echo chambers, but underlying patterns of audience overlap, and the continued popularity of mainstream outlets, often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers.

Keywords: echo chambers, selective exposure, algorithmic selection, news audiences, polarization

Check also  Users do not universally interpret high numbers of “likes” for messages congruent to their own attitudes as valid evidence for the public agreeing with them, especially if their interest in a topic is high:

Luzsa, R., & Mayr, S. (2021). False consensus in the echo chamber: Exposure to favorably biased social media news feeds leads to increased perception of public support for own opinions. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace, 15(1), Article 3. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/02/users-do-not-universally-interpret-high.html

And: Humans in specific instances are psychologically prepared to prioritize misinformation over truth to, inter alia, mobilize the ingroup against the outgroup & signal commitment to the group to fellow ingroup members

Petersen, Michael Bang, Mathias Osmundsen, and John Tooby. 2020. “The Evolutionary Psychology of Conflict and the Functions of Falsehood.” PsyArXiv. August 29. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/08/humans-in-specific-instances-are.html

And: Echo Chambers Exist! (But They're Full of Opposing Views). Jonathan Bright, Nahema Marchal, Bharath Ganesh, Stevan Rudinac. arXiv Jan 30 2020. arXiv:2001.11461. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/02/echo-chambers-exist-but-theyre-full-of.html

And: The rise in the political polarization in recent decades is not accounted for by the dramatic rise in internet use; claims that partisans inhabit wildly segregated echo chambers/filter bubbles are largely overstated:

Deri, Sebastian. 2019. “Internet Use and Political Polarization: A Review.” PsyArXiv. November 6. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/the-rise-in-political-polarization-in.html

And Testing popular news discourse on the “echo chamber” effect: Does political polarisation occur among those relying on social media as their primary politics news source? Nguyen, A. and Vu, H.T. First Monday, 24 (5), 6. Jun 4 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/testing-popular-news-discourse-on-echo.html

Check also
Why Smart People Are Vulnerable to Putting Tribe Before Truth. Dan M Kahan. Scientific American, Dec 03 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/why-smart-people-are-vulnerable-to.html

Baum, J., Rabovsky, M., Rose, S. B., & Abdel Rahman, R. (2018). Clear judgments based on unclear evidence: Person evaluation is strongly influenced by untrustworthy gossip. Emotion, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/clear-judgments-based-on-unclear.html

The key mechanism that generates scientific polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own:

Scientific polarization. Cailin O’Connor, James Owen Weatherall. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. October 2018, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 855–875. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/the-key-mechanism-that-generates.html

Polarized Mass or Polarized Few? Assessing the Parallel Rise of Survey Nonresponse and Measures of Polarization. Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman. The Journal of Politics, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/polarized-mass-or-polarized-few.html

Tappin, Ben M., and Ryan McKay. 2018. “Moral Polarization and Out-party Hate in the US Political Context.” PsyArXiv. November 2. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/moral-polarization-and-out-party-hate.html

Forecasting tournaments, epistemic humility and attitude depolarization. Barbara Mellers, PhilipTetlock, Hal R. Arkes. Cognition, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/forecasting-tournaments-epistemic.html

Does residential sorting explain geographic polarization? Gregory J. Martin & Steven W. Webster. Political Science Research and Methods, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/voters-appear-to-be-sorting-on-non.html

Liberals and conservatives have mainly moved further apart on a wide variety of policy issues; the divergence is substantial quantitatively and in its plausible political impact: intra party moderation has become increasingly unlikely:

Peltzman, Sam, Polarizing Currents within Purple America (August 20, 2018). SSRN: https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/liberals-and-conservatives-have-mainly.html

Does Having a Political Discussion Help or Hurt Intergroup Perceptions? Drawing Guidance From Social Identity Theory and the Contact Hypothesis. Robert M. Bond, Hillary C. Shulman, Michael Gilbert. Bond Vol 12 (2018), https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/having-political-discussion-with-out.html

All the interactions took the form of subjects rating stories offering ‘ammunition’ for their own side of the controversial issue as possessing greater intrinsic news importance:

Perceptions of newsworthiness are contaminated by a political usefulness bias. Harold Pashler, Gail Heriot. Royal Society Open Science, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/08/all-interactions-took-form-of-subjects.html

When do we care about political neutrality? The hypocritical nature of reaction to political bias. Omer Yair, Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. PLOS, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/05/when-do-we-care-about-political.html

Democrats & Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group; Republicans were more likely to believe & want to share apolitical fake news:

Pereira, Andrea, and Jay Van Bavel. 2018. “Identity Concerns Drive Belief in Fake News.” PsyArXiv. September 11. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/democrats-republicans-were-both-more.html

In self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own): The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/in-self-judgment-best-option-illusion.html

People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html

Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html

Summary: A simple test taken by millions of people reveals that virtually everybody has implicit biases that they are unaware of and that may clash with their explicit beliefs. From policing to scientific publishing, all activities that deal with people are at risk of making wrong decisions due to bias. Raising awareness is the first step towards improving the outcomes.

People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:

The Belief in a Favorable Future. Todd Rogers, Don Moore and Michael Norton. Psychological Science, Volume 28, issue 9, page(s): 1290-1301, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/people-believe-that-future-others.html

Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803

Abstract: This paper describes evidence suggesting that science curiosity counteracts politically biased information processing. This finding is in tension with two bodies of research. The first casts doubt on the existence of “curiosity” as a measurable disposition. The other suggests that individual differences in cognition related to science comprehension - of which science curiosity, if it exists, would presumably be one - do not mitigate politically biased information processing but instead aggravate it. The paper describes the scale-development strategy employed to overcome the problems associated with measuring science curiosity. It also reports data, observational and experimental, showing that science curiosity promotes open-minded engagement with information that is contrary to individuals’ political predispositions. We conclude by identifying a series of concrete research questions posed by these results.

Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html

The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html

The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html

The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html

Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802

Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html

Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html

Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html

Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html

Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html

Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html

Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html

Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html

The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html

Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html

Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html

Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html

Fake News & Ideological (a)symmetries in Perceptions of Media Legitimacy: Partisans are motivated to believe fake news & dismiss true news that contradicts their position as fake news

Harper, Craig A., and Thom Baguley. 2019. ““You Are Fake News”: Ideological (a)symmetries in Perceptions of Media Legitimacy” PsyArXiv. January 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/ym6t5. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/01/fake-news-ideological-asymmetries-in.html

Twitter: While partisan opinion leaders are certainly polarized, centrist/non-political voices are much more likely to produce the most visible information; & there is little evidence of echo-chambers in consumption

Mukerjee, Subhayan, Kokil Jaidka, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2020. “The Ideological Landscape of Twitter: Comparing the Production Versus Consumption of Information on the Platform.” OSF Preprints. June 23. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/06/twitter-while-partisan-opinion-leaders.html

Contrary to this prediction, we found that moderate and uncertain participants showed a nonreciprocal attraction towards extreme and confident individuals:

Zimmerman, Federico, Gerry Garbulsky, Dan Ariely, Mariano Sigman, and Joaquin Navajas. 2020. “The Nonreciprocal and Polarizing Nature of Interpersonal Attraction in Political Discussions.” PsyArXiv. August 21. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/08/contrary-to-this-prediction-we-found.html

Cross-Partisan Discussions on YouTube: Conservatives Talk to Liberals but Liberals Don't Talk to Conservatives. Siqi Wu, Paul Resnick. arXiv Apr 12 2021. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/04/cross-partisan-discussions-on-youtube.html

To quantify partisan audience bias, we developed a domain-level score by leveraging the sharing propensities of registered voters on a large Twitter panel; we found little evidence for the "filter bubble'' hypothesis 

Auditing Partisan Audience Bias within Google Search. Ronald E. Robertson et al. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction - CSCW archive. Volume 2 Issue CSCW, November 2018, Article No. 148, doi: 10.1145/3274417. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/to-quantify-partisan-audience-bias-we.html

Few people are actually trapped in filter bubbles. Why do they like to say that they are? Plus: Are your Google results really that different from your neighbor’s? Laura Hazard Owen. NiemanLab, Dec 07 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/few-people-are-actually-trapped-in.html

UPDATED with later information

Young, Dannagal G. 2021. “Young and Miller, Political Communication in Oxford Handbook of Poli Psych 3rd Ed.” OSF Preprints. August 27. doi:10.31219/osf.io/mwdtu, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/08/this-chapter-argues-that-conventional.html

Exposure to partisan and centrist news websites – no matter if it is congenial or cross-cutting – does not enhance polarization; null effects are found among strong & weak partisans, & for Democrats & Republicans alike:

Wojcieszak, Magdalena, Sjifra E. de Leeuw, Ericka Menchen-Trevino, Seungsu Lee, Ke M. Huang-Isherwood, and Brian Weeks. 2021. “Wojcieszak Et Al No Polarization from Partisan News IJPP Forthcoming.” OSF Preprints. September 1 2021. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/09/exposure-to-partisan-and-centrist-news.html

No support was found for the hypothesis that social media use contributed to the level of affective polarization; instead, it was the level of affective polarization that affected subsequent use of social media:

Affective polarization in the digital age: Testing the direction of the relationship between social media and users’ feelings for out-group parties. Maria Nordbrandt. New Media & Society, September 19, 2021. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/09/no-support-was-found-for-hypothesis.html

The population is widely exposed to online false news; however, echo chambers are minimal, and the most avid readers of false news content regularly expose themselves to mainstream news sources

Zhang, Jiding and Moon, Ken and Veeraraghavan, Senthil K., Does Fake News Create Echo Chambers? (June 23, 2022). SSRN. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2022/08/the-population-is-widely-exposed-to.html

The impact of social media on beliefs or actual outcomes has been either non-existent or inconclusive; people who believe in conspiracies gravitate toward groups that espouse these

Processes of Persuasion and Social Influence in Conspiracy Beliefs. Dolores Albarracin. Current Opinion in Psychology, September 5 2022, 101463. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2022/09/the-impact-of-social-media-on-beliefs.html

Abstract: If conspiracy beliefs were an individual process, no conspiracy theory would be alike. Instead, these beliefs are promoted by individuals or social groups through the media or informal channels of communication, leading to identical beliefs being espoused by different people and social groups. This paper reviews the role of the social influence as a basis for conspiracy beliefs and describes the role of legacy media, discussions with others, and social media, as well as the underlying informational and normative mechanisms. The role of trust is also considered, including how trust in science can increase vulnerability to conspiracy theories by opening audiences up to the influence of pseudo-scientists. Mitigating the impact of these influences will require research attention to processes that go beyond correction, elucidating the interpersonal consequences of corrections within contemporary information wars.