These results suggest that 2-year-old children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional, strategic motivation to improve their reputation by helping

Evidence for a developmental shift in the motivation underlying helping in early childhood. Robert Hepach, Jan M. Engelmann, Esther Herrmann, Stella Gerdemann, Michael Tomasello. Developmental Science, February 21 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.13253

Abstract: We investigated children's positive emotions as an indicator of their underlying prosocial motivation. In Study 1, 2- and 5-year-old children (N = 64) could either help an individual or watch as another person provided help. Following the helping event and using depth sensor imaging, we measured children's positive emotions through changes in postural elevation. For 2-year-olds, helping the individual and watching another person help was equally rewarding; 5-year-olds showed greater postural elevation after actively helping. In Study 2, 5-year-olds’ (N = 59) positive emotions following helping were greater when an audience was watching. Together, these results suggest that 2-year-old children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional, strategic motivation to improve their reputation by helping.

A higher level of economic development is strongly associated with a greater incidence of love in narrative fiction; these authors think the relationship is causal

The cultural evolution of love in literary history. Nicolas Baumard, Elise Huillery, Alexandre Hyafil & Lou Safra. Nature Human Behaviour, Mar 7 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-022-01292-z

Abstract: Since the late nineteenth century, cultural historians have noted that the importance of love increased during the Medieval and Early Modern European period (a phenomenon that was once referred to as the emergence of ‘courtly love’). However, more recent works have shown a similar increase in Chinese, Arabic, Persian, Indian and Japanese cultures. Why such a convergent evolution in very different cultures? Using qualitative and quantitative approaches, we leverage literary history and build a database of ancient literary fiction for 19 geographical areas and 77 historical periods covering 3,800 years, from the Middle Bronze Age to the Early Modern period. We first confirm that romantic elements have increased in Eurasian literary fiction over the past millennium, and that similar increases also occurred earlier, in Ancient Greece, Rome and Classical India. We then explore the ecological determinants of this increase. Consistent with hypotheses from cultural history and behavioural ecology, we show that a higher level of economic development is strongly associated with a greater incidence of love in narrative fiction (our proxy for the importance of love in a culture). To further test the causal role of economic development, we used a difference-in-difference method that exploits exogenous regional variations in economic development resulting from the adoption of the heavy plough in medieval Europe. Finally, we used probabilistic generative models to reconstruct the latent evolution of love and to assess the respective role of cultural diffusion and economic development.

We Don't Know When We Are Good at Spotting Liars

Said, Nadia, Sarah Volz, Marc-André Reinhard, Patrick Müller, and Markus Huff. 2022. “Do People Know When They Are Good at Spotting Liars? – Metacognitive Efficiency in Lie Detection.” PsyArXiv. March 8. doi:10.31234/osf.io/v6nbd

Abstract

We investigated whether the confidence in lie detection judgments is a signal for the accuracy of judgments. We argue that previous methods in tackling this question are inadequate as the assessment of judgment accuracy and confidence is confounded with response bias and lie detection performance. We addressed this confidence-accuracy puzzle by applying a hierarchical Bayesian approach based on Signal-Detection Theory to estimate metacognitive efficiency.

Metacognitive efficiency describes individuals' insight into the accuracy of their judgments about truth and deception, but unlike previous measures, it is free of bias and independent of lie detection performance. In re-analyses of 12 studies (N=2817 participants in total), metacognitive efficiency was on average only about 23% of what would have been expected given participants’ discrimination performance. Hence, individuals largely lack metacognitive insight into the quality of their judgments, which is particularly problematic because they cannot reliably discriminate between lies and truths.

Affective polarization increases over time, but also as people age; age-related increases in affective polarization occur as a function of increases in partisan strength, and for Republicans, social sorting

Affective Polarization: Over Time, Through the Generations, and During the Lifespan. Joseph Phillips. Political Behavior, Mar 7 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-022-09784-4

Abstract: The continual rise of affective polarization in the United States harms trust in democratic institutions. Scholars cite processes of ideological and social sorting of the partisan coalitions in the electorate as contributing to the rise of affective polarization, but how do these processes relate to one another? Most scholarship implicitly assumes period effects—that people change their feelings toward the parties uniformly and contemporaneously as they sort. However, it is also possible that sorting and affective polarization link with one another as a function of age or cohort effects. In this paper, I estimate age, period and cohort effects on affective polarization, partisan strength, and ideological sorting. I find that affective polarization increases over time, but also as people age. Age-related increases in affective polarization occur as a function of increases in partisan strength, and for Republicans, social sorting. Meanwhile, sorting only partially explains period effects. These effects combine such that each cohort enters the electorate more affectively polarized than the last.

Conclusion

The study of affective polarization has long recognized the weight of historical forces in shaping contemporary attitudes toward the opposing party. However, the way researchers have modeled these historical effects implicitly assume that partisans’ attitudes reflect the immediate political environment. This paper provides strong evidence that such an understanding is incomplete.

To be clear, there are strong period effects. Net of other considerations, affective polarization increases over time, and with important implications. People enter the electorate not as blank slates but as increasingly polarized products of their pre-adult environment. This increase is only slightly explained by over-time increases in ideological and social sorting in the electorate. Furthermore, least some of what we may have considered period effects are actually the result of aging-related increases in affective polarization. These aging effects, in turn, can be contextualized as increases in in-party warmth concomitant with increases in partisan strength over the lifespan.

These aging effects have important implications for the study of affective polarization. The finding that affective polarization changes throughout the lifespan suggests that interventions designed to reduce affective polarization may work among partisans in a variety of age groups. However, given their disproportionately high turnout rates (Leighley & Nagler, 2013) and increasing share of the population, making sure interventions to reduce affective polarization work among older partisans is crucial to reducing affective polarization in the American partisan population.

Sorting-based theories of affective polarization are meant to explain the rise of affective polarization among the electorate over time. However, the inclusion of individual-level measures of sorting, despite predicting individual-level affective polarization, largely fails to account for period effects among Democrats. This suggests that sorting-based theories of affective polarization need to be adjusted in scope. One possibility is that individual-level sorting does not explain aggregate patterns of affective polarization, but is still able to condition individual identity centrality and feelings towards partisan outgroups (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Hence, sorting can still explain age-related changes in affective polarization among Republicans. This leaves aggregate-level features of the party system related to sorting (e.g. ideological polarization and demographic distinctiveness) as viable. Another possibility is that similar types of citizens (e.g. political sophisticates) are both well-sorted into parties and affectively polarized. Future work should tease apart these possibilities.

There are important limitations to this type of analysis. Intra-cohort trajectories are no substitute for intrapersonal variation. One cannot definitively conclude from this analysis that individuals are uniformly susceptible to age- and period-related changes in affective polarization, though individual-level panel data are consistent with what the APC models find. APC models can simulate the life span, but ultimately do so from aggregate data. Additionally, though mediation is useful to explain effects found in age-period-cohort analyses, mediation analyses using repeated cross-sectional data should be treated with caution. While reverse causality is not a threat to inferences (i.e. partisan strength cannot cause people to become 50 years old), one cannot make a definitive claim that that aging causes increases in affective polarization because it causes increases in partisan strength.

Despite these limitations, these analyses have important implications for understandings of affective polarization. Partisan prejudice is just as important to examine through the lens of the life-span as it is through history. Both are intertwined—age-related changes in attitudes occur contextually, through the social roles people inhabit, through the people they interact with, and through the historical events that unfold during their lives. Similarly, historical changes give shape to aggregate-level changes in the aggregate through affecting the attitudes of at least a subset of partisans. Future work would profit greatly from incorporating the lifespan in more nuanced ways, and with greater use of panel data.

Furthermore, despite a lack of robust cohort differences in affective polarization, aging and period effects have combined to produce a trend where citizens enter the electorate more and more affectively polarized over time. These results are consistent with Boxell et al. (2017), who, despite finding that younger cohorts are rising less quickly in affective polarization over time, find nonetheless younger people are more polarized than in the past. In other words, younger cohorts are experiencing higher levels of affective polarization in their impressionable years. Growing up in a more polarized landscape can leave an as-yet-unknown imprint on younger generations in the future such that cohort effects emerge in the future. This suggests that there is still a potential impressionable years effect with polarization among younger cohorts. These findings also suggest a need for studying political group attitudes in adolescence or earlier. National election studies only observe people over the voting age, but youth panels can be a powerful supplemental tool.

These results also draw attention to the often-overlooked role of age in public opinion beyond its use as a demographic covariate. Historically, isolating the role of age in public opinion has been difficult due to the difficulty of separating the effect of age from period and cohort. Nevertheless, it is important work. Changes in cognition and social role are widely-experienced, meaning their effects on political life are wide-ranging. Furthermore, estimating and explaining the effect of age can be done with more confidence than in the past. The social sciences have accumulated a number of high-quality repeated cross-sectional datasets that can leverage unprecedented temporal variation, which increases precision in estimates of period and cohort effects (Yang et al., 2004, 2008). Additionally, innovations in APC analysis continue to accumulate that researchers can leverage for more robust conclusions on the role of age in politics. 

One in three men believe feminism does more harm than good: Global survey

Ipsos Poll... One in three men believe feminism does more harm than good: Global survey. Mar 4 2022. https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/international-womens-day-2022-us-release

A new global study conducted by Ipsos in collaboration with the Global Institute for Women’s Leadership at King’s College London for International Women’s Day shows that, on average, across 30 countries:

.  Only two in 10 adults deny the existence of gender inequality, but views are split on the benefits of feminism;

.  Concerns about online abuse remain, with nearly one in 10 men saying it’s acceptable to send someone unrequested explicit images;

.  Four in 10 adults have experienced online abuse or seen sexist content but one in three believe many women overreact; and

.  Victim-blaming attitudes are found in a minority across the countries asked.

A majority of adults both globally (55% on average across the various countries surveyed) and in the United States (57%) disagree gender inequality doesn’t really exist. However, despite evidence that gender inequality globally has only increased since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic[1], just under one-fifth agree, both globally (18%) and in the U.S. (17%).

Men are more likely to agree that gender inequality doesn’t really exist than women (21% vs. 14% globally, 22% vs. 13% in the U.S.). In several countries, the proportion of men who agree is double the proportion of women (including Australia, 30% vs. 14%; Romania, 27% vs. 13%; and Russia, 30% vs. 12%).

Men are also more likely to be skeptical about the benefits of feminism and to question the existence of gender inequality today:

.  On average globally, one-third of men agree feminism does more harm than good (32%) and that traditional masculinity is under threat (33%).

.  Compared with their brethren across the world, American men are slightly less likely to agree feminism does more harm than good (28%), but they are significantly more likely to view traditional masculinity as being under threat (45% do so, the second-highest percentage across all countries surveyed, trailing only Hungary).

Women are less likely to share these views:

.  One in five (20% globally, 22% in the U.S.) agree feminism does more harm than good and about one in four (25% globally, 28% in the U.S.) agree traditional masculinity is under threat today.

.  One-fifth of all adults think that feminism has resulted in men losing out in terms of economic or political power or socially (19% globally, 17% in the U.S.)

           Again, men are more likely to agree than are women (23% vs. 15% globally, 20% vs. 15% in the U.S.).

Adolescents born in the year 2000 reported lower levels of political efficacy and volunteering than those born in 1991

Cohort differences in the development of civic engagement during adolescence. Jeanine Grütter,Marlis Buchmann. Child Development, February 26 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13743

Abstract

Investigating whether changing societal circumstances have altered the development of civic engagement, this study compared developmental changes from mid- to late adolescence (i.e., age 15–18) across two cohorts of representative Swiss samples (born in1991, N = 1258, Mage T1 = 15.30, 54% female, 33% migration background representing diverse ethnicities; born in 2000, N = 930, Mage T1 = 15.32, 51% female; 33% migration background).

Findings from latent multigroup models revealed similar levels in attitudes about social justice in both cohorts, remaining stable over time. Adolescents reported lower levels of political efficacy and informal helping in the cohort born in 2000. Both aspects slightly increased during adolescence. Informal helping had a steeper increase in the 1991 compared to the 2000 cohort, suggesting developmental differences between cohorts.

DISCUSSION

The findings of this study contribute to developmental theory of civic engagement by disentangling developmental changes in various components of civic engagement from changes across historical time. The study not only provides further evidence to the limited longitudinal work on civic development during adolescence, but also allowed for a comparison of development in civic engagement from mid- to late adolescence in two cohorts. It thus contributes to the scarce body of longitudinal cohort studies in this field. Finally, this study was conducted for Switzerland, thus providing rare evidence of cohort differences in the development of civic engagement components during adolescence for a societal context other than the United States.

Cross-cohort consistence in the conceptualization of civic engagement

Based on previous work that included some of the civic components used here (e.g., Grütter & Buchmann, 2021; Metzger et al., 2018; Wray-Lake et al., 2017a), this study assumed that the three components, attitudes toward social justice, informal helping, and political efficacy beliefs, would form a multifaceted construct of civic engagement. Extending this prior work, the findings suggest that civic engagement can be assessed reliably as a multidimensional construct during mid- and late adolescence, even across two cohorts born nearly 10 years apart. The aim was to provide a systematic comparison across multiple components, acknowledging that adolescents born in different time periods might not have the same opportunities to become civically active. Being one of the first studies comparing civic developmental change between different cohorts of adolescents, it was essential to have a measure that captures aspects relevant to adolescents growing up in different time periods (Barber & Ross, 2018). The study established measurement invariance for all components of the multidimensional model of civic engagement, not only across development (i.e., from age 15 to 18) but also across cohorts (i.e., historical time). Thus, observed differences in mean-levels were unlikely to emerge because of changes in how specific items related to the underlying construct, nor because of a different understanding of the item content, nor due to assigning different meaning to the rating scale. Importantly, this allowed for a fine-grained analysis of differences in civic engagement between mid- and late adolescence, between adolescents who experienced different historical times, and between developmental change from mid-to late adolescence in two cohorts born 10 years apart.

Although such a multidimensional approach has the advantage of studying different developmental trends in different components of adolescents’ civic engagement, it must be noted that the conceptualization of civic engagement of this study is limited to the three components. To date, there is not yet a consensus for the specific components of civic engagement (e.g., Amnå, 2012; Wray-Lake et al., 2017a) and for each study, there would be more ways to express civic engagement that a single study could capture. Hence, the current findings must be interpreted with regard to the three components under investigation.

Differences in the development of civic engagement: the role of social change and normative developmental change

This study longitudinally examined two adolescent cohorts of the same age range in Switzerland, arguing that they were exposed to different societal environments (i.e., historical time; Twenge et al., 2012). This design helps disentangle developmental change from changes due to cohort effects (i.e., social change). When age is held constant, differences can be ascribed to differences between cohorts (Neundorf & Niemi, 2014). Our findings attest to both, the role of social change and normative developmental trends in the development of civic engagement from mid- to late adolescence.

Normative developmental change in civic engagement

The normative growth hypothesis (Wray-Lake et al., 2014) assumes that, as adolescents show gains in abstract thinking, reasoning skills, perspective taking, autonomy, and identity exploration when growing older, adolescent civic engagement and their precursors exhibit continuous, gradual upward change. Based on this assumption and limited previous findings of a normative developmental increase in civic engagement (e.g., Grütter & Buchmann, 2021; Wray-Lake et al., 2014, 2017a; Zaff et al., 2011), we expected growth in all three components of civic engagement. The results only partially supported this assumption: While informal helping and political efficacy beliefs significantly increased in both cohorts from age 15 to 18, there was no developmental increase in attitudes about social justice. For informal helping and political efficacy beliefs, our findings provide additional evidence from a new context (i.e., Switzerland) that increases in these two components of civic engagement may increase in concert with normative developmental changes in other areas (see above) across adolescence. Concerning such normative precursors, more longitudinal research capturing a wider age range and focusing on specific developmental competencies of civic engagement could provide additional insights.

Regarding developmental changes in attitudes about social justice, findings have been inconsistent and may differ depending on the specific aspect under consideration, such as adolescents’ understanding or reasoning about social inequalities. Across adolescence, individuals increasingly consider structural obstacles as barriers to social justice and develop a more complex understanding of poverty (Flanagan et al., 2014); however, important developmental steps may already occur at earlier phases of adolescence. For example, recent research shows that early adolescents perceived lower social inequalities and were less likely to prefer egalitarian societies as compared to mid- and late adolescents (Barreiro et al., 2019). As the current study was limited to adolescents’ perceived importance of social justice, future work would benefit from a more systematic investigation of adolescents’ developing understanding and evaluation of social justice from early to late adolescence.

Cohort differences in civic engagement in mid-adolescence

Based on an extensive literature review on changes in the social context from the 1990s to 2018, we derived specific assumptions on how these changes might be reflected in cohort differences in civic engagement. Regarding mid-adolescence, we assumed higher levels of attitudes about social justice, lower levels of informal helping, and either lower or higher levels of political efficacy beliefs in the more recent as compared to the earlier cohort.

Contrary to our expectations, there were no cohort differences with regard to attitudes about social justice. Youth were equally concerned with issues of social justice in 1991 and 2000, whereby this finding is in line with previous work pointing to stable political attitudes across generations of young adults (Jennings & Stoker, 2004). However, it contrasts recent work, showing that adolescents in Switzerland increased their support for racial and ethnic diversity (Barber & Ross, 2018). It must be noted that, although the measure of the current study included fair and equal treatment of others, it also focused on a fair distribution of wealth. As previously explained, attitudes about social justice are itself a multifaceted construct (e.g., Ruck et al., 2019), whereby different aspects may show different patterns of change (Barber & Ross, 2018). Moreover, on the basis of low general inequality in Switzerland, recent changes in income distributions may be less salient to youth and may not result in changes of perceived inequality. Compared to other European countries, Swiss adults were less skeptical of inequalities (Niehues, 2014).

For informal helping, the mean levels were significantly lower in the more recent cohort. This finding aligned with our assumptions that social change toward postponement of adult roles and an increasingly individualized culture may have deflected adolescents in the more recent cohort from communal values, such as helping others (Golder et al., 2020). The changing developmental context for civic engagement in Switzerland has been pronounced in the realm of the changing structure of the life course with the postponement of adult roles in the private sphere of life in particular (i.e., marriage and childbirth) (Federal Statistical Office, 2020; Rausa, 2016).

Lastly, the significantly lower mean level of political efficacy beliefs in the more recent cohort supports the competing hypothesis stating that online disinformation due to the strong increase in social media consumption and concomitant decrease in information gathering from the classic and more credible media would undercut political transparency and thus erode political efficacy beliefs. Findings for media consumption trends (2010 to 2020) among 12- to 19-year-old adolescents in Switzerland confirm this pattern of media usage (Bernath et al., 2020). The alternative hypothesis that growing opportunities for participatory politics empowered by social media would give a boost to political efficacy beliefs of adolescents in the recent cohort is thus eclipsed.

Social change in the development of civic engagement during adolescence

A key element of the present study was to test whether developmental change in the three components of civic engagement from mid- to late adolescence was significantly different across cohorts. Thus, an important contribution of this study was to investigate whether social change would be associated with change patterns across later adolescence. Importantly, we assumed that the increase for attitudes about social justice would be steeper in the more recent cohort, while it would be flatter for informal helping. Concerning political efficacy beliefs, the competing hypotheses assumed either steeper or flatter increase. While there were no significant differences for attitudes about social justice and not enough evidence for significant developmental differences in political efficacy beliefs, the findings supported the assumption of a flatter increase in informal helping in the more recent cohort.

Previous cohort comparisons on similar components like informal helping focused on the transition to adulthood, studying historical changes in the development of community service (Wray-Lake et al., 2017b) or membership in voluntary organizations and volunteer work (Jennings & Stoker, 2004). The findings of these two studies showed developmental declines for all cohorts from late adolescence to early adulthood, explaining this decline by opportunity structures provided by educational institutions, which no longer hold after completing education (Jennings & Stoker, 2004). Additionally, the findings were embedded in explanations of delayed transition into adulthood (Wray-Lake et al., 2017b).

The current study extends these scarce previous findings by focusing on an earlier developmental phase and by examining a form of volunteering more readily available to adolescents (i.e., informal helping). Focusing on adolescents, we assumed that anticipated changes in the timing of adult life roles would be associated with developmental changes in civic engagement. A potential explanation for the flatter increase in informal helping in the more recent cohort may thus stem from adolescents’ anticipation of the prolonged period of adolescence when issues related to educational attainment or romantic relationships could be more salient in the more recent compared to the earlier cohort. In addition, a more individualized culture may promote increasing concern for the self, likely to manifest itself in a propensity toward self-centeredness. Such a shift may have lowered the importance of communal engagement during adolescence, thus resulting in a flatter increase in informal helping from mid- to late adolescence in the more recent cohort.

Taken together, these results suggest that developmental change in civic components across cohorts may be partly related to social change. However, developmental differences between cohorts applied to informal helping only. Future research may thus compare longer periods between cohorts to provide an integral picture on social change in civic development that contributes to developmental changes above and beyond normative age effects.

Demographic differences in civic engagement between cohorts

The covariates revealed some interesting differences between the two cohorts. First, while boys at age 15 expressed lower levels of informal helping in the earlier cohort than girls, there was no such difference in the more recent cohort. Previous work (e.g., van der Graaff et al., 2018) pointed to gender differences in prosocial behavior and discussed gender-specific socialization processes that may foster prosocial development in girls (e.g., showing nurturance and caring). Thus, prosocial actions may be more consistent with gender stereotypes for girls than for boys. With regard to differences between cohorts, this trend may have become weaker as a consequence of increasing considerations for gender equality in European countries, including Switzerland (Barber & Ross, 2018).

In addition, adolescents with a migration background expressed higher levels in attitudes about social justice in the more recent cohort at age 15, while this was not the case for the earlier cohort. As these attitudes reflected desire for egalitarian treatment in this study, this finding aligns with recent work on critical consciousness, assuming that this component may be higher for marginalized adolescents (Heberle et al., 2020). As some groups with migration background face higher educational disadvantages in Switzerland (OECD, 2019a) and as the discourse on social justice has become more salient in Swiss schools (Biedermann et al., 2009), these adolescents’ desire for social justice may have become more salient. Future research may shed more light on specific mechanisms that could explain these findings.

Limitations

As noted, this study cannot make any causal assumptions about how differences in the three civic engagement components relate to facets of social change; instead, we describe changes that might correlate with these differences. To pinpoint the role of social change aspects for cohort differences in the development of civic engagement across adolescence, future studies could travel the challenging avenue of cross-national comparison. This requires cross-country availability of reliable and valid measures of the social change features of interest. Selecting countries differing in these features and including appropriate controls for confounders, such studies would help understand how societal circumstances are related to civic engagement development in adolescence. They would be demanding, as comparable measures of civic engagement components across countries were required as well.

In addition to the macro-level changes, there may also be more proximal influences on adolescent civic development, not discussed in this work (e.g., peers, parents, teachers; e.g., Wray-Lake & Sloper, 2016). Thus, future work could investigate whether societal changes would be reflected in changes in the more proximal social context, ultimately affecting civic development. For example, changes in the political discourse and parent initiatives could influence whether schools adopt more democratic and participatory school climates, positively predicting civic engagement (Torney-Purta et al., 2008). As outlined in the ecological theory by Bronfenbrenner (2005) and the relational developmental systems metatheory (Lerner et al., 2014), adolescents are not simply exposed to their social context, but also seek different contexts and contribute to their changes. To analyze such complex dynamic systems and generalize findings across contexts, longitudinal data on civic development from multiple social contexts and cohorts are needed with assumptions on broad indicators of civic engagement in order to capture specific developments and changes.

Regarding the developmental change investigated, we only focused on mean-differences and thus cannot make assumptions about variation in civic development, whereby recent work highlighted different trajectories in civic development during adolescence (e.g., Wray-Lake & Shubert, 2019; Zaff et al., 2011). For testing such assumptions, we would need more than two measurements in each cohort, which would also enable us to look at different patterns of change in different cohorts. Relatedly, more cohorts would help control for potential confounders between cohort and period effects (i.e., specific events that may have transpired in these particular years and shaped adolescents’ civic engagement). Lastly, our measure of informal helping only consisted of two items that were based on adolescents’ self-reports. Here, our findings would need to be replicated with a more comprehensive measure, which ideally also included additional assessments from peers, parents, or teachers.

Men with premature ejaculation during partnered sex show significantly reduced PE during masturbation, but the reasons for this disparity are not clear

Premature Ejaculation Measures During Partnered Sex and Masturbation: What These Findings Tell Us About the Nature and Rigidity of Premature Ejaculation. David L. Rowland, Lijana G. Teague & Krisztina Hevesi. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, Mar 6 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/0092623X.2022.2042442

Abstract: Men with premature ejaculation (PE) during partnered sex (as defined by poor ejaculatory control) show significantly reduced PE symptomology during masturbation, but the reasons for this disparity are not clear. This study investigated the other two PE-related diagnostic criteria, namely ejaculatory latency (EL) and bother/distress, in order to explore possible explanations for this disparity between types of sexual activity. Specifically, 1,447 men with either normal or poor ejaculatory control were compared on EL parameters, bother/distress, and sexual satisfaction/pleasure during both partnered sex and masturbation. Results indicated that men with PE reported longer ELs during masturbation than partnered sex, in contrast with men without PE who reported shorter ELs during masturbation. Bother/distress was lower for both groups during masturbation, but bother/distress in men with PE during masturbation was comparable to that of men without PE during partnered sex. Minimal difference in these patterns was found across lifelong and acquired PE subtypes, whereas men with PE with comorbid erectile dysfunction appeared to represent a distinct group. These findings have implications for PE management or treatment as well as for the overall conceptualization of PE as a pathophysiological condition.

Japanese-Americans interned in 1942: Increased mobility due to re-optimization of occupation and location choices, possibly facilitated by camps’ high economic diversity

Displacement, Diversity, and Mobility: Career Impacts of Japanese American Internment. Jaime Arellano-Bover. The Journal of Economic History, Volume 82, Issue 1, March 2022, pp. 126 - 174. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050721000565

Abstract: In 1942 more than 110,000 persons of Japanese origin living on the U.S. West Coast were forcibly sent away to ten internment camps for one to three years. This paper studies how internees’ careers were affected in the long run. Combining Census data, camp records, and survey data, I develop a predictor of a person’s internment status based on Census observables. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that internment had long-run positive effects on earnings. The evidence is consistent with mechanisms related to increased mobility due to re-optimization of occupation and location choices, possibly facilitated by camps’ high economic diversity.

Psychopaths have a larger reward system in the brain: Results are consistent with the notion that striatal abnormalities in individuals with psychopathy partly reflect increased sensation-seeking and impulsivity

Larger striatal volume is associated with increased adult psychopathy. Olivia Choy, Adrian Raine, Robert Schug. Journal of Psychiatric Research, March 6 2022. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2022.03.006

Highlights

• The increase in striatal volume in psychopathic individuals is not an artefact of psychiatric comorbidity.

• In this first investigation of the striatum and psychopathy in a female sample, increased striatal volumes were associated with greater psychopathic traits.

• The need for stimulation and impulsivity partly account for the striatal-psychopathy relationship.

Abstract: Prior studies have inconsistently reported increased volumes of the striatum in adults with psychopathy. A meta-analysis presented here indicates an overall effect size of d = 0.44. Nevertheless, variability in findings exist, and questions remain on confounding clinical conditions and generalizability to females. This study tests the hypothesis that striatal volumes are increased in adults with psychopathic traits, and that this relationship is mediated by stimulation seeking and impulsivity. Striatal volume was assessed using magnetic resonance imaging in 108 adult community-dwelling males alongside psychopathy using the Psychopathy Checklist – Revised. Subsidiary, exploratory analyses were conducted on a small sample of females. Correlational analyses showed that increased striatal volumes were associated with more psychopathic traits (p = .001). Effects were observed for all striatal regions, controlling for age, substance dependence and abuse, antisocial personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, social adversity, and total brain volume. An analysis of 18 psychopathic individuals showed that striatal volumes were increased 9.4% compared with 18 matched controls (p = .01). Psychopathy in females was also significantly associated with increased striatal volume (p = .02). Stimulation-seeking and impulsivity partly mediated the striatal - psychopathy relationship, accounting for 49.4% of this association. Findings from these two samples replicate and build on initial studies indicating striatal enlargement in adults with psychopathy, yielding an updated effect size of d = 0.48. Results are consistent with the notion that striatal abnormalities in individuals with psychopathy partly reflect increased sensation-seeking and impulsivity, and support the hypothesis of abnormal reward processing in psychopathy.

Keywords: StriatumPsychopathyNeuroimagingStructural MRIAntisocial

Brain development from 0 to 80 years old, based on >120k brain scans from >100k people

Brain charts for the human lifespan. R.A.I. Bethlehem et al. bioRxiv Jan 13, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.06.08.447489

Abstract: Over the past few decades, neuroimaging has become a ubiquitous tool in basic research and clinical studies of the human brain. However, no reference standards currently exist to quantify individual differences in neuroimaging metrics over time, in contrast to growth charts for anthropometric traits such as height and weight1. Here, we built an interactive resource to benchmark brain morphology, www.brainchart.io, derived from any current or future sample of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data. With the goal of basing these reference charts on the largest and most inclusive dataset available, we aggregated 123,984 MRI scans from 101,457 participants aged from 115 days post-conception through 100 postnatal years, across more than 100 primary research studies. Cerebrum tissue volumes and other global or regional MRI metrics were quantified by centile scores, relative to non-linear trajectories2 of brain structural changes, and rates of change, over the lifespan. Brain charts identified previously unreported neurodevelopmental milestones3; showed high stability of individual centile scores over longitudinal assessments; and demonstrated robustness to technical and methodological differences between primary studies. Centile scores showed increased heritability compared to non-centiled MRI phenotypes, and provided a standardised measure of atypical brain structure that revealed patterns of neuroanatomical variation across neurological and psychiatric disorders. In sum, brain charts are an essential first step towards robust quantification of individual deviations from normative trajectories in multiple, commonly-used neuroimaging phenotypes. Our collaborative study proves the principle that brain charts are achievable on a global scale over the entire lifespan, and applicable to analysis of diverse developmental and clinical effects on human brain structure. Furthermore, we provide open resources to support future advances towards adoption of brain charts as standards for quantitative benchmarking of typical or atypical brain MRI scans.

Morality Beyond the WEIRD: How the Nomological Network of Morality Varies Across Cultures (25 populations examined)

Atari, Mohammad, Jonathan Haidt, Jesse Graham, Sena Koleva, Sean T. Stevens, and Morteza Dehghani. 2022. “Morality Beyond the WEIRD: How the Nomological Network of Morality Varies Across Cultures.” PsyArXiv. March 4. doi:10.31234/osf.io/q6c9r

Abstract: Moral Foundations Theory has been a generative framework in moral psychology in the last two decades. Here, we revisit the theory and develop a new measurement tool, the Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2 (MFQ-2), based on data from 25 populations. We demonstrate empirically that Equality and Proportionality are distinct moral foundations while retaining the other four existing foundations of Care, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity. Three studies were conducted to develop the MFQ-2 and to examine how the nomological network of moral foundations varies across 25 populations. Study 1 (N = 3,360, five nations) specified a refined top-down approach for measurement of moral foundations. Study 2 (N = 3,902, 19 populations) used a variety of methods (e.g., factor analysis, exploratory structural equations model, network psychometrics, alignment measurement equivalence) to provide evidence that the MFQ-2 fares well in terms of reliability and validity across cultural contexts. We also examined population-level, religious, ideological, and gender differences using the new measure. Study 3 (N = 1,410, three populations) provided evidence for convergent validity of the MFQ-2 scores, expanded the nomological network of the six moral foundations, and demonstrated the improved predictive power of the measure compared with the original MFQ. Importantly, our results showed how the nomological network of moral foundations varied across cultural contexts: consistent with a pluralistic view on morality, different foundations were influential in the network of moral foundations depending on cultural context. These studies sharpen the theoretical and methodological resolution of Moral Foundations Theory and provide the field of moral psychology a more accurate instrument for investigating the many ways that moral conflicts and divisions are shaping the modern world.

Rolf Degen summarizing... Independents were less likely than partisans to end a friendship over a political dispute, while young Democrats were the group most likely to end a friendship over a political dispute

Social networks of independents and partisans: Are independents a moderating force? Thom Reilly,E. C. Hedberg. Politics & Policy, March 1 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12460

Abstract: While scholars have long recognized that social networks impact political engagement for partisans, comparatively little work has examined the role of networks for independent voters. In this article, we contribute to existing research on social networks and politics by surveying Arizona registered voters about their political persuasion, personal networks, and media consumption habits. Our findings show that independents have networks that are structurally different from partisans. Specifically, we found that both Democrat and Republican respondents were more likely to frequently talk about politics with independents than with members of the opposing party. Independents were also less likely than partisans to end a friendship over a political dispute. Taken together these findings show that independents may be frequent and reliable discussion partners for partisans and may be able to moderate political views. We find evidence for the moderating force of independents is especially apparent in the media consumption habits of Republican respondents.

When we are highly satisfied with our intimate relationships, we are happy with our lives regardless of friendship quality; when we are unhappy with intimate relationships, we're only happy with our lives if we got good friends

Unique Ways in Which the Quality of Friendships Matter for Life Satisfaction. Victor Kaufman, Anthony Rodriguez, Lisa C. Walsh, Edward Shafranske & Shelly P. Harrell. Journal of Happiness Studies, Mar 5 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-022-00502-9

Abstract: The quality of individuals’ social relationships consistently predicts greater well-being. But little is known about the relative importance of different relationship types for life satisfaction, including the relative importance of friendships compared to other types of relationships. Some have theorized that one intimate relationship is all you need. However, romantic partners, family, and friends may contribute uniquely or interactively to well-being. The current study assessed life satisfaction and relationship satisfaction in survey data collected from a large, diverse sample of respondents. Satisfaction with each type of relationship was significantly and independently associated with life satisfaction, over and above other variables in the model. Friendship (not family) interacted with intimate relationships: when respondents were highly satisfied with their intimate relationships, they were happy with their lives regardless of friendship quality. But when they were unhappy with their intimate relationships, they were only happy with their lives if they had good friends.

Discussion

Social relationships matter, especially our relationships with our intimate partners, family members, and friends (Argyle, 2001; Caunt et al., 2013; Myers, 1999). However, only a few studies have examined the independent associations between the quality of each of these relationships and overall well-being (Chopik, 2017; Thomas, 2016). We sought to elaborate on these associations in a number of ways.

Simultaneous Assessment of Relationship Types

First, we wanted to know whether the three primary relationship types—romantic, family, and friend relationships—were each significantly associated with life satisfaction, over and above the main effects of each other. We found that, controlling for age and income, each did account for significant, unique variance in well-being over each other, confirming Hypothesis 1. This refutes the argument that romantic love is the only thing that matters for well-being and replicates the finding in Ratelle et al. (2012). Our finding also builds on Ratelle by broadening the sample (in terms of age and gender, among other factors) and using more refined measures of life satisfaction (i.e., both overall life satisfaction and domain satisfaction) and relationship satisfaction (i.e., with romantic partners, friends, and family).

Two Types of Analysis

If an intimate relationship is not sufficient to be happy, then what other relationships do people need to be satisfied with their lives? Are quality relationships with two relationship types adequate to achieve happiness? If so, does it matter which ones? Or, does a person need high-quality relationships with all three relationship types to be happy? We assessed these questions using both a variable-centric and a person-centric approach, following techniques utilized in Ratelle et al. (2012). Our variable-centric approach used regression models that included interactions, while our person-centric approach used a cluster analysis that identified groups of individuals who shared identified characteristics.

With our variable-centric approach, we tested the interactions between our three variables. Only the interaction between intimate relationship satisfaction and quality of friendships was significant. When intimate relationship satisfaction is high, level of friendship satisfaction does not predict life satisfaction. If intimate relationship satisfaction is low, however, people were only happy with their lives if they had good quality friends. This suggests that people can be happy in their lives even if they are not completely satisfied with their intimate relationships, as long as they have good friends, confirming Hypothesis 2.

Do such people exist? To address that question, we used a person-centric approach through a cluster analysis, identifying three groups of people with significantly different configurations (high, moderate, or low) of satisfaction with their intimate relationships, family, and friend relationships. We measured each groups’ level of life satisfaction and confirmed Hypothesis 3: average levels of satisfaction were significantly different within each cluster. Our findings were consistent with the negative interaction between intimate relationship satisfaction and friendship satisfaction. One group (representing 43% of our sample) reported high mean levels of satisfaction with each relationship type and high levels of life satisfaction. Another group (representing 25% of our participants) reported moderate levels of satisfaction for intimate relationships and low levels of satisfaction for family and friends, with friends at a particularly low level (i.e. more than 1 standard deviation below the mean). The third group, i.e. Cluster 2 (representing 32% of our participants), was the most interesting. This group was comprised of people who had high quality satisfaction with friends significantly above the mean, moderate satisfaction with family at the mean, and low satisfaction with intimate relationships significantly below the mean. For this group, life satisfaction was significantly below the life satisfaction of our first group, but significantly higher than the life satisfaction of our second group. This illustrates that a person can still be relatively happy in life, even if their intimate relationship satisfaction is poor. It is relevant that friendship satisfaction is the lowest in the group that has the lowest mean level of life satisfaction.

Since our cluster analysis is only exploratory, the question exists whether there might be other possible clusters. We think that they might exist; however, in all likelihood, they would be variations on the three themes of the clusters we have discovered. For example, we think that (while it is the case that friendship satisfaction does not add to a person’s happiness if they are extremely happy in their romantic relationship), this may not be true when relationship satisfaction is just moderately strong. In such cases, strong friendship satisfaction may contribute in a meaningful way to marriage stability and thereby enhance well-being, over-an-above the satisfaction from the marriage. On the other hand, as is suggested in (Birditt & Antonucci, 2007), there may be a cluster of people who have relatively weak relationship satisfaction, but strong friendship and family satisfaction that acts as an offset to such marital satisfaction, such that well-being might be at least moderately strong. These other clusters if they exist, would provide greater evidence that the quality of friendships may be key when assessing life satisfaction of intimate relationship partners. Further, the attributes of friendships may be especially important for such relationship partners. For example, VanderDrift et al. (2012) equated enhanced friendship between a dyad to love, broadly defined. Specifically, they found that the more people were willing to invest in their friendship with their romantic partners, the greater the rewards they reaped in their romantic relationships. More research is needed to test these premises, as well as to consider other possible clusters of relationship satisfaction.

Strengths and Limitations

Confidence in our findings is heightened by several strengths of our research methods and design. First, we used a sample that mirrored the U.S. population, which enabled us to ascertain whether our results generalize across individuals who vary demographically. Second, our sample was large—almost 1,000 participants, which enhanced our power to identify differences between groups. Third, we used broad and reliable measures of life satisfaction. Finally, our pattern of findings was robust across both person-centric and variable-centric models.

On the other hand, generalizations from these results are constrained by several limitations of this research. First, our study assessed data obtained through a self-report survey; these surveys contain measures that are often susceptible to positive reporting bias. Second, we based our intimate relationship satisfaction variable on a single item, which is not as reliable as a multi-item scale. Third, we did not collect information on participants’ marital/romantic relationship duration, which could impact results. Future studies should examine how relationship duration moderates the association between relationship satisfaction and life satisfaction (e.g., Anderson et al., 2010). Fourth, since we administered our survey at one point in time, our findings are cross-sectional; therefore, we are unable to draw any causal conclusions. Happier people tend to have better social relationships (Diener & Seligman, 2002), so the possibility of an inverse causal relationship (high life satisfaction leading to greater relationship satisfaction) cannot be excluded. Further, relationship satisfaction and life satisfaction could form a bi-directional relationship that initiates upward spirals of enhanced well-being (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002), whereby stronger relationships lead to higher life satisfaction, which in turn leads to even stronger relationships, and so forth. Finally, replication studies are needed to determine the reliability of effects described here.

Some argued that expertise in emotion is based on a certain kind or amount of knowledge, whereas others argued that the structure (e.g., complexity) of knowledge is more important

From 2021... Hoemann, K., Nielson, C., Yuen, A., Gurera, J. W., Quigley, K. S., & Barrett, L. F. (2021). Expertise in emotion: A scoping review and unifying framework for individual differences in the mental representation of emotional experience. Psychological Bulletin, 147(11), 1159–1183. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000327

Expertise refers to outstanding skill or ability in a particular domain. In the domain of emotion, expertise refers to the observation that some people are better at a range of competencies related to understanding and experiencing emotions, and these competencies may help them lead healthier lives. These individual differences are represented by multiple constructs including emotional awareness, emotional clarity, emotional complexity, emotional granularity, and emotional intelligence. These constructs derive from different theoretical perspectives, highlight different competencies, and are operationalized and measured in different ways. The full set of relationships between these constructs has not yet been considered, hindering scientific progress and the translation of findings to aid mental and physical well-being. In this article, we use a scoping review procedure to integrate these constructs within a shared conceptual space. Scoping reviews provide a principled means of synthesizing large and diverse literature in a transparent fashion, enabling the identification of similarities as well as gaps and inconsistencies across constructs. Using domain-general accounts of expertise as a guide, we build a unifying framework for expertise in emotion and apply this to constructs that describe how people understand and experience their own emotions. Our approach offers opportunities to identify potential mechanisms of expertise in emotion, encouraging future research on those mechanisms and on educational or clinical interventions.