Rolf Degen summarizing... Almost 60% of the population succumb, at least occasionally, to the "strange face illusion," where their own face can take on strange or even uncanny features

Strange face illusions: A systematic review and quality analysis. Joanna Mash et al. Consciousness and Cognition. Volume 109, March 2023, 103480. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2023.103480

Highlights

• Strange face illusions are commonly experienced when fixating on face stimuli for prolonged periods under low light levels.

• Strange face illusions involve either the perception of distorting facial features on the actual face being observed or the perception of completely new strange faces.

• Illusions of new faces show a mean prevalence rate of 58% in healthy participants.

• Age and gender are positively related to prevalence rates, with more new faces reported by samples of older individuals and those with more female participants.

• Some key areas of methodological concern were apparent in the studies, relating to small unjustified sample sizes, a lack of preregistration and providing conclusions and interpretations that do not seem to be justified by results.

• Future research should aim to examine how the behavioural and environmental components of this paradigm combine to result in illusory faces and explain why illusions are more prevalent when gazing at others compared to self-reflections.

Abstract

Background: Strange face illusions describe a range of visual apparitions that occur when an observer gazes at their image reflected in a mirror or at another person’s face in a dimly lit room. The illusory effects range from mild alterations in colour, or contrast, to the perception of distorted facial features, or new strange faces. The current review critically evaluates studies investigating strange face illusions, their methodological quality, and existing interpretations.

Method: Searches conducted using Scopus, PubMed, ScienceDirect and the grey literature until June 2022 identified 21 studies (N = 1,132; healthy participants n = 1,042; clinical participants n = 90) meeting the inclusion criteria (i.e., providing new empirical evidence relating to strange face illusions). The total sample had a mean age of 28.3 years (SD = 10.31) and two thirds (67 %) of participants tested to date are female. Results are reported using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The review was preregistered at the Open Science Framework (OSF: https://osf.io/ek48d).

Results: Pooling data across studies, illusory new strange faces are experienced by 58% (95%CI 48 to 68) of nonclinical participants. Study quality as assessed by the Appraisal Tool for Cross-Sectional Studies (AXIS) revealed that 3/21 (14.28%) studies were rated as high, 9/21 (42.86%) as moderate and 9/21 (42.86%) as low quality. Whilst the items relating specifically to reporting quality scored quite highly, those relating to study design and possible biases were lower and more variable. Overall, study quality accounted for 87% of the variance in reporting rates for strange faces, with higher quality being associated with lower illusion rates. The prevalence of illusions was also significantly greater in samples that were older, had higher proportions of female participants and for the interpersonal dyad (IGDT) compared to the mirror gaze paradigm (MGT). The moderating impact of study quality persisted in a multiple meta-regression involving participant age, paradigm type (IGDT vs MGT) and level of feature distortion. Our review point to the importance of reduced light levels, face stimuli and prolonged eye fixation for strange face illusions to emerge.

Conclusion: Strange face illusions reliably occur in both mirror-gazing and interpersonal gazing dyad paradigms. Further research of higher quality is required to establish the prevalence and particularly, the mechanisms underpinning strange face illusions.

Keywords: IllusionsAnomalous subjective experiencesDissociationMirror gazingPerceptual distortion

4. Discussion

The present systematic review and meta-analysis provides a comprehensive synthesis and evaluation of the strange face illusion literature, the methodological quality of studies, and existing interpretations of strange face illusions. Our searches identified 21 studies (N = 1,132) involving non-clinical and clinical samples conducted over the past 12 years. Based on 17 datasets derived from non-clinical participants, we estimate the prevalence of illusions of new strange faces to be reported by almost 60 % of individuals.

Assessment of study quality using the AXIS revealed that overall quality for most studies (85 %) was in the low-to-moderate range. At a more specific level, while AXIS items relating to reporting quality were good, issues arose concerning study design and possible biases. Key areas of methodological concern are the often-small sample sizes, the lack of a priori power analysis, providing conclusions and interpretations that are not justified by the results, and a lack of discussion of limitations. Discussion of limitations is a key part of both scientific discourse and scientific progress, allowing readers to assess the validity of scientific work and to contextualise research findings (see Ioannidis, 2007), and has been viewed by some as partly a failure of the peer review process (Horton, 2002). Although not part of the AXIS, we also note that to-date, no published studies have been preregistered.

Meta-regression analyses identified two participant-based variables with higher rates of strange face reporting in samples that are older and with a higher proportion of female participants. Whilst exploratory, these findings are intriguing and not previously documented. The finding that strange face illusion reports were higher in samples with more female participants requires further investigation. The finding on age contrasts with work showing that both auditory and visual hallucinatory-type experiences in the general population tend to be more common in younger rather than older individuals (e.g., Larøi et al., 2019; Maijer et al., 2018). This suggests perhaps that strange face illusions may be different in kind from other hallucinatory-type experiences reported in the general population. Another possibility is that older individuals are more reticent to report spontaneous hallucinatory experiences, but the strange face paradigm provides a less threatening context to explore the emergence of unusual visual experiences. At a pragmatic level, poorer low-light vision in older individuals may also play a role in their higher rates of strange face illusions (see Beck & Harris, 1994). Despite this emphasis on age, most samples assessed within the strange face paradigm have been quite young (overall mean age of 28.3 years). Future research is required samples to determine if the age effect persists across a broader age range. Closer examination of age effects in future studies may also help reveal the mechanisms underlying SFIs, in the same way that studies of age effects in other visual, auditory, and multisensory illusions have provided unique insights into their cause (Billino et al., 2009, Campos et al., 2018, Doherty et al., 2010, Hirst et al., 2019, Mullin et al., 2021). Finally, we note that the recent Rasch analysis of SFQ items by Lange et al. (2022) did not find any evidence of significant differential item bias relating to either age or sex. This suggests that the moderating impact of both sex and gender reported in our meta-analysis are probably not a reflection of SFQ item bias.

To date, studies have rarely systematically assessed how the manipulation of study design features impact the reporting of strange face illusions. Our exploratory meta-regression analyses identified the importance of overall study quality (AXIS ratings), while sub-group analyses showed reporting rates are also significantly impacted by the paradigm employed (being greater for IGDT than MGT) and whether lux was measured at the face (greater when lux measured than not). The level of strange face illusions was also highly related to the level of feature distortions reported across studies. Most striking however, was the finding that study quality accounted for 87 % of the variance in prevalence rates, which crucially remained the only significant predictor of SFIs when all variables were entered into a multiple meta-regression. With current evidence, it is difficult to completely unpack this finding, as some of the mentioned variables may be confounded or interact e.g., lower quality studies have tended to also examine samples with more women and who are older. So, while demographic variables (age and gender), procedural variables (paradigm type, whether lux is measured at the face) and the levels of reported feature distortions are important to assess, study quality remains the best predictor of strange face illusion prevalence – being higher in studies with lower rated quality.

The influence of the direct environment is a key factor in this paradigm because dimmed light only allows the observer to perceive a vague view of the face. Only one study has examined manipulating light levels (Caputo, 2010b) - using two levels (0.8 vs 5 lx) with a small sample (n = 8) in the MGT. In this counterbalanced within-subject design, all eight participants reported apparitions of a new face in both conditions, but significantly more in the lower light condition. Caputo also reported a significantly quicker time-to-onset of illusions in lower-light levels (34.75 s vs 62.57 s). Generally, researchers have advocated that 0.8 lx measured at the face is the optimal level for illusion induction. In this context, we note that measuring the lux-value at the face has been inconsistent across studies. Our analyses show that reporting of strange faces is more common when lux value is established within the suggested range compared to when lux value is not assessed at all (74 % vs 41 % respectively). However, this finding is limited by the fact that all studies that measuring lux levels at the face were conducted by the same author (G Caputo).

Studies show that different forms of facial configuration can induce strange face illusions, including self-face reflections, the faces of others and even face masks. By contrast, non-face stimuli such as the torso of the body (Jenkinson & Preston, 2017) or a simple dot (Caputo, 2013) fail to elicit illusions. It remains unclear however if it is faces per se, stimulus complexity, expertise, or familiarity with the task (i.e., face-gazing) that drives the illusion. Moreover, since masks induce the effect (Caputo, 2011), the face does not need to be human or show mobility – suggesting that a face-like configuration is sufficient to induce illusions.

While faces in various formats induce illusions, it is also notable that the reporting of new faces is significantly greater for interpersonal gazing than for mirror gazing (76 % vs 50 %). Although the IGDT and MGT paradigms share common experimental components necessary to induce face-related illusions (i.e., prolonged gaze fixation, low light levels and facial stimuli), the greater prevalence for the IGDT suggests that additional paradigm-specific factors may also be relevant. The IGDT clearly differs in terms of its social context – involving the presence of strangers in a potentially awkward or unusual social situation, where participants are required to stare intently at each other. The IGDT has also been associated with greater levels of dissociation, with CADSS scores of around 27 (Caputo, 2015, Caputo, 2019) while the MGT has lower CADSS scores, ranging from 7.8 (Nisticò et al., 2020) to 18.72 (Brewin et al., 2013). Whether dissociation is a precursor, a consequence or coincidental with the illusion remains to be established. Nonetheless, links between prolonged fixation and dissociation are well-documented and occurs irrespective of the stimulus type (object, dot, own face in the mirror, photographed face: see Möllmann et al., 2019). Mild dissociation and very mild dysmorphic effects, such as an increase in perceived unattractiveness (Mollman et al., 2019) often co-occur to a minor degree during any mirror-gazing. Prolonged fixation may well underpin the emergence of feature distortions. Indeed, Caputo proposed that the fixation triggered Troxler effect “can explain the merging of facial features into a uniform silhouette of the facial contour” (Caputo, 2014, p5). Troxler fading (Troxler, 1804) typically occurs when fixation is maintained on a particular point on an unchanging stimulus, and even after short durations the peripheries (i.e., away from the fixation point) will fade away and disappear. Troxler fading however can only account for the disappearance of features surrounding the point of fixation on the face, which is a commonly reported illusory effect in this paradigm, but not for the merging or blending of features. These illusory effects likely result from other perceptual processes such as, for example, perceptual (textural) filling-in (Komatsu, 2006, Hsieh and Tse, 2009). Such perceptual processes may be employed to deal with a paucity of sensory data arising from the combination of prolonged gaze fixation (i.e., impairing our ability to selectively harvest higher acuity visual information) and low light levels (i.e., impairing one's ability to discriminate fine details of the face, attenuating colour perception etc.).

When appraising the role of prolonged fixation, the evidence assessing SFIs in various clinical groups could prove particularly informative. Whilst increased rates of illusions have been documented in individuals with anorexia nervosa (Demartini et al., 2020), hospitalised, depressed patients tended only to perceive mild feature distortions, with almost two-thirds not seeing any illusions at all (Caputo et al., 2014). Given that prolonged fixation seems crucial to the generation of strange face illusions, some of the variation between clinical groups may derive from differences in ability to maintain fixation and the fact that atypical eye-movement accompanies some disorders. For instance, compared to healthy controls, patients with depressive disorder show significantly abnormal eye-movement indices. For example, patients with depressive disorder exhibit shorter fixation durations (Li et al., 2016) and this may potentially account for their reduced susceptibility to illusions in this paradigm. By contrast, people diagnosed with schizophrenia and non-clinical participants have remarkably similar fixation performance in terms of number and duration of fixations (Kissler and Clementz, 1998, Manor et al., 1999) and so, might be as prone to the illusion as healthy controls. We note however that the findings in clinical groups have yet to be replicated and currently comprise analyses of relatively small samples. Furthermore, it would be crucial to investigate if any links between proneness to strange face illusions and transdiagnostic fixation issues reflect state or trait aspects of such disorders.

The loss of actual face-recognition has frequently been interpreted in this literature as a loss in self-identity (Brewin and Mersaditabari, 2013, Brewin et al., 2013, Caputo, 2010a, Caputo, 2011, Caputo, 2013, Caputo, 2015, Caputo, 2016, Caputo, 2019, Caputo, 2021, Caputo et al., 2012, 2014). Although MGT studies might lend themselves towards such an interpretation, a loss of self-identity cannot account for strange face illusions in the IGDT paradigm where self-recognition is not a factor, but where the illusion is more frequently reported. Our finding that illusions are reported by significantly more individuals in the IGDT than MGT paradigm does however accord with Caputo’s (2013) speculation that “If empathy is involved, then one should expect a higher frequency of illusions in inter-subjective gazing than in mirror-gazing” (p. 327). Empathy has been seen as central to increased dissociation and illusion formation in both the MGT (Caputo, 2016) and in IGDT (Caputo, 2013) paradigms, although dyad inducement has been linked loosely to Jungian notions of synchronicity. Nonetheless, only four studies to-date have employed the IGDT paradigm (Caputo, 2013, Caputo, 2015, Caputo, 2017, Caputo, 2019) and further research is required to address the converging and diverging mechanisms and moderators across the two paradigms.

A key conceptual notion concerns whether SFIs are akin to the depersonalisation-like symptoms of “not recognising oneself in the mirror” (Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2015, Caputo et al., 2020, Derome et al., 2018, 2022) or even “out of body” experiences (Caputo, 2014). In this context, Caputo’s (2019) factor-analysis of Strange Face Questionnaire (SFQ) and Clinically Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS) data, from 90 healthy participants who participated in the IGDT, identified three factors. Feature distortions and most types of SFQ responses (8 items) loaded onto a derealisation factor (anomalous experiences of external reality, including faces). A further 7 items loaded onto a dissociative identity factor (anomalous experiences of identity/self) - although this factor was independent of any sub-type of dissociation as measured by the CADSS). Only four out of 19 items loaded onto the final factor identified as depersonalisation. More recently, Lange et al. (2022) re-assessed the same SFQ data from Caputo (2019) using a Rasch approach. Although the sample size (N = 90) is quite small for Rasch analysis (as it is for factor analysis), the authors identified potential problems with almost half of all SFQ items. For the depersonalisation factor, three of the four items displayed significant ‘extremity’ bias (i.e., these items were disproportionately easier to endorse for high than low SFQ scorers) suggesting that the depersonalisation factor is confounded by item difficulty bias. Most importantly, both the exploratory factor structure and the Rasch analysis require replication in a larger sample, with an age range that is broader (mean age = 22; range 19–36) and crucially, as Lange et al. (2022) acknowledge, should be extended to see if a comparable factor structure exists for data derived from the far more frequently examined MGT. This latter point is important given that we have shown that the IGDT paradigm induces a significantly greater prevalence of strange face illusions than the MGT.

Hallucinatory and complex illusory experiences are notoriously hard to introspect, assess and measure (see Rogers et al., 2021). Some issues relating to the assessment of strange face illusions stem from the identifying and capturing the fleeting experiences themselves, but others relate to how the measures used might frame the experience. The Strange Face Questionnaire (SFQ), which provides the main formal assessment of the illusions, is directive insofar as it requires participants to interpret their illusions by choosing pre-selected (often Jungian) narratives that may embellish participant responses e.g. Did you see the face of a hero or heroine? Did you see the face of a spiritual person? Did you see the face of a sexually undefined person or an androgyne? Additionally, the SFQ is administered after the experimental task and so participants are reporting on their recollections of their experiences. Given that the MGT has been used to induce dissociation (Brewin and Mersaditabari, 2013, Brewin et al., 2013, Pick et al., 2020, Rugens and Terhune, 2013, Shin et al., 2019) and that dissociation induced by the MGT has been shown to immediately impact memory, including visual memory (Brewin and Mersaditabari, 2013, Brewin et al., 2013) the reliance on memory, coupled with the requirement to choose a descriptive/narrative approximation, is likely to create significant demand characteristics. Nevertheless, making verbal reports ‘in-the-moment’ may be highly disruptive to both the process and the experience. It is also worth noting that while most studies have recruited participants who are naïve to the tasks (though see Caputo, 2011), priming and expectation effects remain a possible influence. Some evidence suggests that even those who are naïve to sensory-deprivation type paradigms are still able to predict the experience of visual hallucinations in such circumstances (see Jackson Jr & Pollard, 1966). Future studies should therefore examine the possible influence of priming, expectation, and demand characteristics within both the IGDT and the MGT paradigms.

The other commonly used method to assess strange face illusions has been the response-button. Some variability in frequency, duration of illusions and time-to-onset may reflect individual differences in thresholds for decision-making. Equally important is that the single response button is used to subsume a variety of illusory experiences into a single response and so, confounds estimates for feature distortions and new strange faces. In this context, one study (Caputo, 2010b) conducted separate experiments in which two separate participant samples were instructed either in experiment 1 to report “perceptual changes of their own face in the mirror” (p. 1127), (which would include both feature distortions and new strange faces) or in experiment 2 “to respond to new face apparitions“ (p. 1130). Caputo reported that frequency, duration, and time of first apparition did not differ across experiment 1 and 2. However, given that we cannot assess the relative proportions of feature distortions to strange faces that were captured by this single phenomenological measure in experiment 1, we cannot eliminate the possibility that the two experiments are comparing two similar sets of face-related illusion experiences. Future studies should aim to potentially characterise feature distortions versus new face illusions using independent response measures.

Turning to limitations of the current systematic review and meta-analysis. Our assessment of study quality using the AXIS has certain limitations as far as total summed quality scores should be regarded with some caution as individual items are not weighted (Greenland and O'rourke, 2001 Dec 1, Greenland and Robins, 1994 Apr 15, Jüni et al., 1999 Sep 15). This means that any two studies with the same total AXIS score, but derived from different items, may not be directly comparable as some items may be assessing more vital aspects of quality than other items. We therefore also examined the relative strengths or weaknesses across studies on domains of quality. Another factor that may have impacted the prevalence rates for strange face illusions reported here is that in three studies (e.g., Caputo, 2015, Caputo, 2017, Caputo, 2019), we relied upon estimates derived from a single item on the Strange Face Questionnaire - using the SFQ “yes” answers to item 5 (Did you see the face of a stranger or unknown person?). Similarly, for feature distortions, we used data derived from SFQ item 1 (Did you see that some facial traits were deformed?). While single items may over-simplify the reported experience, we preferred the use of a single item over multiple items to avoid double counting. For example, a single strange face experience can be registered multiple times on the SFQ (e.g., the illusion was an old person, who looked spiritual, but they had a similar nose to me, and they were of a different ethnicity).

Our review highlights the need to call for external validity given that the reporting rates of new faces (see Fig. 4.) show considerable variability across studies, with a downward trend over time from 100 % (Caputo, 2010a) to 32 % (Derome et al., 2022). Overall, one author (Caputo, who originated the illusion) is an author in almost three-quarters (15 /21) of the studies reported here. Caputo is, to date, the only author who has recorded lux values at the face and also the sole author to employ the IGDT paradigm, both of which are associated with significantly higher reporting of illusions. An important aim of the current review is to encourage wider investigation of the strange face illusion, which we believe has relevance for researchers interested in understanding broader questions relating to perceptual instability, illusions, and hallucinations. Reviewing a decade of primarily phenomenological studies, it would seem pertinent now to move more toward experimentally assessing how environmental and behavioural manipulations impact the phenomenology within this paradigm and even the psychophysics of this complex illusion. Several new findings emerged from our systematic review and meta-analysis. The reporting rate for the illusion was related to demographic (age and gender) and methodological variables (paradigm type, whether lux was measured at the face, IGDT versus MGT paradigms), with overall study quality being the strongest predictor of strange face illusion prevalence. To date, studies have focussed on relatively young, predominantly female samples. These findings indicate that future high-quality studies assessing a wider sampling of participants to include older, more gender-balanced, samples would aid examination of the illusion and its implications. Examining susceptibility to the illusion in older individuals should be contextualised by the fact that poorer low light vision in older individuals may also play a role in increasing rates of strange face illusions. An important new finding from the current review has been that the rates at which the illusion is reported differs significantly across the two paradigms. To date only four studies have employed the IGDT (Caputo, 2013, Caputo, 2015, Caputo, 2017, Caputo, 2019) and so, requires further examination. In this context, the exploratory factor structure (Caputo, 2019) of the SFI questionnaire has been examined only in relation to data derived from the IGDT, and should be extended to see if a comparable factor structure exists for data derived from the far more frequently examined MGT. Finally, it is important to develop a robust method to capture and characterise both the temporal and phenomenological dynamics in such a way that will allow independent assessment of illusory phenomena that appear to be mechanistically distinct (i.e., feature distortions vs new strange faces).

Missing Discussions: Institutional Constraints in the Islamic Political Tradition

Missing Discussions: Institutional Constraints in the Islamic Political Tradition. A. Arda Gitmez, James A. Robinson & Mehdi Shadmehr. NBER Working Paper 30916, February 2023. DOI 10.3386/w30916

Abstract: Institutional constraints to counter potential abuses in the use of political power have been viewed as essential to well functioning political institutions and good public policy outcomes in the Western World since the time of ancient Greece. A sophisticated intellectual tradition emerged to justify the need for such constraints. In this paper we identify a new puzzle: such an intellectual tradition did not exist in the Islamic world, even if the potential for abuse was recognized. We develop a model to explain why such ideas might not have emerged. We argue that this is due to the nature of Islamic law (the Sharia) being far more encompassing than Western law, making it easier for citizens to identify abuses of power and use collective action to discipline them. We study how the relative homogeneity and solidarity of Islamic society fortified this logic.

TV content shapes attitudes and value orientations conducive to entrepreneurship; there is an intergenerational transmission of an entrepreneurial mindset; a self-sustained entrepreneurial culture can emerge & cause long-lasting effects

The effects of TV content on entrepreneurship: Evidence from German unification. Viktor Slavtchev, Michael Wyrwich. Journal of Comparative Economics, February 8 2023. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2023.01.008

Highlights

• TV content affects individuals' decisions to start businesses.

• TV content shapes attitudes and value orientations conducive to entrepreneurship.

• There is an intergenerational transmission of an entrepreneurial mindset.

• A self-sustained entrepreneurial culture can emerge and cause long-lasting effects.

Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes whether television (TV) can influence individuals’ decisions to start businesses. To identify TV's effects, we rely on a unique quasi-natural experiment related to the division of Germany after WWII until 1990 into West Germany with a free market economy and the socialist East Germany where starting one's own business was not permitted. Despite this division, Western TV was exogeneously available since the 1960s in some, but not all East German regions and conveyed images and attitudes conducive to entrepreneurship. We use both regional-level and geo-referenced individual-level data and show that since starting a business in East Germany became possible thanks to the reunification in 1990, entrepreneurship incidence is higher in East German regions that had Western TV signal. This indicates a first-order effect on directly exposed individuals. We show that this is due to the effects of Western TV on attitudes and value orientations associated with entrepreneurship, particularly independence. We find no indication that the differences in the entrpreneurship incidence of East German regions with and without Western TV disappear. Instead, we find that successive cohorts and descendants of directly exposed individuals who were not directly exposed themselves more frequently wish to become entrepreneurs. The latter findings are consistent with second-order effects due to intergenerational transmission of an entrepreneurial mindset and suggest that a self-sustaining entrepreneurial culture can be formed. This can cause long-lasting differences between treated and non-treated population groups or regions.

Keywords: EntrepreneurshipTVCultureOccupational choice

JEL: L26J24M13P20P30O30D02D03Z10

Men were more inclined than women to remain friends with rejected suitors; ultimately, women have to deal with rejecting advances at an early age & this early onset has consequences for future dating

Repercussions of Rejecting Unwanted Advances: Gender Differences in Experience and Concern. James B. Moran & Rebecca L. Burch. International Journal of Sexual Health, Feb 7 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/19317611.2023.2175098

Abstract: Here we investigated how a history of experiencing unwanted advances—both sexual and romantic—impact a person’s stress and strategies when rejecting future advances. In this study (N = 465; 71% women), women reported experiencing unwanted advances earlier in life compared to men, and these women were more likely to have greater worry over such advances. Additionally, women tended to worry more than men about the repercussions of rejecting these advances (e.g., being hit, being yelled at). Lastly, women were more likely to employ a myriad of strategies (e.g., run away, call a friend) to ensure their safety when rejecting an advance. In contrast, men were more likely to remain friends with the rejected person. Ultimately, women have to deal with rejecting advances at an early age and this early onset has consequences for future dating.

What Drives Sex Toy Popularity? A Morphological Examination of Vaginally-Insertable Products Sold by the World’s Largest Sexual Wellness Company

What Drives Sex Toy Popularity? A Morphological Examination of Vaginally-Insertable Products Sold by the World’s Largest Sexual Wellness Company. Sarah E. Johns & Nerys Bushnell. The Journal of Sex Research, Feb 7 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2023.2175193

Abstract: There is limited research into the morphology of sex toys, and specifically into (the often phallic-shaped) vibrators and dildos and what they may represent in terms of user preferences for male genital morphology. This study provides insight into consumer preference around vaginally insertable sex toys, their features, and what contributes to their popularity. Using a data set compiling information from the world’s largest online sexual wellness retailer Lovehoney, we examined the dimensions, price, and morphological features of 265 sex toys designed for vaginal insertion to determine what contributes to item popularity. Using regression models, we found that realistic features did not predict item popularity, whereas price (p < .001) and circumference (p = .01) significantly predicted the overall popularity of a toy. It appears that consumers show a preference for insertable sex toys that are not direct replicas of the male penis, which suggests they are not seeking a realistic partner substitute. Further, we found that the length of the toy did not significantly predict popularity which is consistent with other work showing that women do not place considerable emphasis on large phallus size. Our results can contribute to future product design and marketing, as well as reveal preferences toward particular characteristics of the phallus (whether real or toy).

Discussion

Contrary to what we expected (and contrary to Döring et al., Citation2022), we found no preference for products with realistic morphological features, other than the presence of veiny texture, when not controlling for price. This may be a consequence of levels of stigma and taboo still associated with specifically insertive (thus penis substitute) sex toy use by women (Fahs & Swank, Citation2013; Minge & Zimmerman, Citation2009; Waskul & Anklan, Citation2020), and recent research has concluded that “perceived stigma” among users is higher when erotic technology being engaged with was more human-like (Dubé et al., Citation2022). Highly realistic products may make women (and potentially their partners (Ronen, Citation2021)) feel less comfortable given they are truly “penis substitutes” rather than being a fun, vaginally insertable toy; women have reported that they most often chose sex toys which were specifically intended to not resemble a penis (Fahs & Swank, Citation2013). There has been a move away from the marketing of such toys since the ensuing popularity of the (more abstract and less “obscene”) “Rabbit” during the 1990s (Devlin, Citation2018). A nonrealistic phallus might also be more acceptable and less threatening for men wanting to integrate a toy into their sex lives (Ronen, Citation2021), possibly related to the prevalent media narrative that only sad, lonely men would have sex with an “artificial partner” (Dubé et al., Citation2022), and also the concept of “dildo-envy” (Reich, Citation1992), whereby the dildo is viewed as superior to the “flawed organic penis” (Hamming, Citation2001, p. 331). However, the variable stigma between types of erotic technology and the relation of this to gender has yet to be empirically quantified (Dubé et al., Citation2022).

Product popularity was also significantly predicted by price. More expensive items were found to be less popular when accounting for a range of other morphological features. Realistic features of a product (a natural skin color) were related to its price, with this feature increasing cost. The sex toy industry is part of capitalist consumer culture (Döring, Citation2021), so it perhaps comes as little surprise that price is influential in consumer choice. It appears that customer choice is not based on morphological attributes alone and that item cost is a considerable factor. If realistic features on models predict a higher price, this may further deter customer purchase of anatomically realistic toys.

As described in a study by Gallup et al. (Citation2003), sex toys have been previously used in research into the evolution of human sexual anatomy, where they were employed as a proxy for human male genitals in an experimental condition to test whether the presence of a coronal ridge contributes to efficient removal of (a purported rival) semen from the vagina (Gallup et al., Citation2003). Interestingly, in our study, the presence of the penile glans or a coronal ridge was not a feature which significantly predicted sex toy popularity, suggesting that users are not concerned in matching their sex toy to certain aspects of the penis which could play a role in sperm competition. Our results may suggest that penile glans/coronal ridge does not appear to have an influential role in sexual satisfaction or preference as it was not a favorable morphological feature. Such a feature also increases product realism, which again, might be less desirable for women wanting an insertable fun toy rather than a realistic partner substitute.

Our results further highlight that women may not be simply seeking a large phallus size as could be assumed given the sociocultural influences around this being a desirable trait (Sharp & Oates, Citation2019). Certainly, men often feel anxiety around, and dissatisfaction with their penis, citing societal pressures around the idea that bigger is better (Francken et al., Citation2002). This has led some men to consider or use surgical processes to enhance penis size (Mondaini et al., Citation2002). However, we found that for toys at least, although circumference was influential in predicting product popularity, insertable toys of a larger girth in our sample were less popular, while length was non-significant. There appears to be an emphasis on offering slightly larger than average phallus products, and yet products with larger circumferences were not as popular as less girthy models. In our sample, the 5 most popular products had a mean circumference of 4.85 inches which is just above the average circumference for real penises. Our findings are very similar to results reported by Herbenick et al. (Citation2015) who noted that insertable sex toys replicated, on average, real penile dimensions. It may be the case that consumers prefer a slightly larger than average phallus circumference when purchasing an insertable sex toy online but there is a cutoff point where extremely large models are more niche than the average user desires. The findings of this study suggest that online sex shops could consider offering a greater selection of insertable sex toys in average, to slightly above average, sizes given that larger toy circumference predicted reduced item popularity. Research on female attitudes to penis dimensions support this: when asked whether penis length and girth was important, only 20.6% of women believed it to be, with the remainder considering it unimportant (Francken et al., Citation2002), while another study found that 85% of the women they asked were satisfied with the size of their partner’s penis (Lever et al., Citation2006). Generally, it appears that women do not place considerable emphasis on very large penis size, with women preferring penises to be only slightly larger than average (Prause et al., Citation2015).

We were also surprised that an additional vibrating functionality did not predict item popularity. Women who use vibrating toys are able to incorporate direct clitoral stimulation into their sexual activity to help them to achieve orgasm (Döring, Citation2021). Vibrator use is also positively linked with improving sexual function by increasing lubrication, arousal, orgasm and can help with pain reduction (Herbenick et al., Citation2009). Given vibrators (sensu latu) are the most commonly used sex toy, have a long history, and are frequently publicly endorsed given the known orgasm gap (Mahar et al., Citation2020) and the difficulty of many women to achieve orgasm through vaginal penetration alone (Lloyd, Citation2005), they are perhaps more socially acceptable than dildos solely designed for insertion. It is possible that purchasers of penetrative toys preferred items with straightforward insertable functionality rather than a combined insertable phallic-shaped vibrator, given that there are specific vibrating products designed only for clitoral stimulation but that can be used in conjunction, if desired, with insertable phallus-shaped models.

Overall, our results show that consumers prefer sex toys which, although suitable for vaginal insertion, are not a direct proxy of a penis. This supports previously reported feminist views of phallic-shaped sex toy use – women can simultaneously reclaim penetrative sex without having this suggested symbol of patriarchal power in their possession (e.g., Fahs & Swank, Citation2013). These results are also potentially supported by the emergence of the “personified” sex toy market (which incorporates sex dolls and sex robots) which may give users a more emotional and expansive masturbatory experience compared to a disembodied phallus, although most research in this area has focused on a narrow demographic of consumers (Hanson & Locatelli, Citation2022).

We also must acknowledge, in light of our framing and results, that sex toy manufacturers might not be truly interested in women’s anatomy or true preferences. Manufacturers could be using outdated and stereotyped aspects of the female body to inform the design and marketing of products. This may shape what is available to purchase, or indeed the purchases themselves, with women thinking they “ought” to like something (for example, a toy to stimulate the G Spot – which may not exist as a defined anatomical structure (Hines, Citation2001)). However, given our robust method of considering three different, consumer-led measures, we would argue that item popularity in this study is a measure of “true” enjoyment from use, albeit from items that are currently commercially available. That said, the range of insertable products (both realistic and not) available through the Lovehoney UK website is quite varied and unrestricted. We would, however, urge caution and consideration here for any similar research conducted outside of Europe, in more restricted markets, as location will likely impact the availability of some toys, and thus influence, or indeed mask, preference.

Limitations and Future Directions

There were a few limitations to this study. Firstly, our average penis size comparison measurement relied only on one source (Veale et al., Citation2015), and we recognize that this study itself might not be accurate given the many methodological difficulties in determining average penis size (e.g., no standardization across studies, possible inaccuracy in self-reports) so some caution is perhaps warranted when considering presented results comparing our sample to “reality.” Future studies in this area could be made more informative by collating data from multiple websites, so that the results could be applied globally; as the data were collected from a UK-based domain, we were likely only seeing the preferences of a British population (although, as mentioned above, the UK sex toy market is highly unrestricted). We also cannot be sure that all consumers contributing to the popularity rating were women (and indeed women with an attraction to penises), as men are also able to purchase and review dildos. However, women are the primary consumer focus and Ronen (Citation2021) reported that men are rarely users of sex toys. A scan of the first 3 pages of user comments below the 5 most popular items suggested that women were the primary reviewers. A textual analysis of such reviews on Lovehoney (similar to that carried out by Döring et al., Citation2022) could be an interesting follow-up study. The consumer demographic is also unknown so factors such as age, sexual orientation and background were not accounted for and may be influential to customer choice. Therefore, we have made some heteronormative assumptions about users that may not be entirely inclusive or accurate given lesbian women and men are also insertable sex toy users and consumers.

Large array of triangulating evidence from 12 studies & over 8,000 participants from the U.S. and over 66,000 participants world-wide strongly suggests that left-wing authoritarianism is much closer to a reality than a myth

Is the myth of left-wing authoritarianism itself a myth? Lucian Gideon Conway III, Alivia Zubrod, Linus Chan, James D. McFarland and Evert Van de Vliert. Front. Psychol., February 8 2023, Volume 13 - 2022. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1041391

Abstract: Is left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) closer to a myth or a reality? Twelve studies test the empirical existence and theoretical relevance of LWA. Study 1 reveals that both conservative and liberal Americans identify a large number of left-wing authoritarians in their lives. In Study 2, participants explicitly rate items from a recently-developed LWA measure as valid measurements of authoritarianism. Studies 3–11 show that persons who score high on this same LWA scale possess the traits associated with models of authoritarianism: LWA is positively related to threat sensitivity across multiple areas, including general ecological threats (Study 3), COVID disease threat (Study 4), Belief in a Dangerous World (Study 5), and Trump threat (Study 6). Further, high-LWA persons show more support for restrictive political correctness norms (Study 7), rate African-Americans and Jews more negatively (Studies 8–9), and show more cognitive rigidity (Studies 10 and 11). These effects hold when controlling for political ideology and when looking only within liberals, and further are similar in magnitude to comparable effects for right-wing authoritarianism. Study 12 uses the World Values Survey to provide cross-cultural evidence of Left-Wing Authoritarianism around the globe. Taken in total, this large array of triangulating evidence from 12 studies comprised of over 8,000 participants from the U.S. and over 66,000 participants world-wide strongly suggests that left-wing authoritarianism is much closer to a reality than a myth.

8. General discussion

Is left-wing authoritarianism a viable construct that predicts important real-world phenomena? Across 12 studies spanning over 8,000 participants in the U.S. and over 66,000 participants worldwide, our data consistently reveal the answer is yes. These data reveal that (1) both liberal and conservative American participants identify a large number of left-wing authoritarians in their everyday lives (Study 1), and (2) both liberal and conservative participants rate a common Left-Wing Authoritarianism scale as measuring authoritarianism (Study 2). Further, this same LWA scale (3) consistently predicts key phenomena that major authoritarianism theories suggest it should predict, including (3a) threat sensitivity (Studies 3–6), (3b) restrictive communication norms (Study 7), (3c) negative ratings of minority groups (Studies 8–10), and (3d) dogmatism (Studies 10 and 11). Further, we used multiple methods to help overcome the double-barreled measurement problem inherent in any authoritarianism measurement, including controlling directly for ideology (Studies 3–11) and performing analyses only on liberals (Studies 3–11). Finally, we (4) found evidence of left-wing authoritarianism in an expansive world-wide sample (Study 12). Each of these approaches has offsetting strengths and weaknesses, and yet they all point to the same conclusion: This wide array of triangulating evidence provides consistent support for the idea that left-wing authoritarianism is indeed a widespread everyday reality.

Below, we place this array of evidence into the existing literature on authoritarianism and ideology, discuss limitations of our work, and offer a brief set of concluding thoughts.

8.1. The authoritarianism debate

The present studies have multiple implications for the ongoing debate about the nature of authoritarianism. Nilsson and Jost (2020) have argued that prior evidence based on Conway et al.’s (2018) LWA scale was due to its overlap with liberal ideology, and thus it did not provide empirical evidence of liberal authoritarianism. The issue raised by this critique is important. What do more focused empirical tests – tests based in long-accepted scientific practice – reveal? Our multi-method evidence here suggests that, in fact, the scale is measuring something beyond mere liberalism. Almost all key effects across Studies 3–11 remain when controlling for political ideology. Further, in a similar fashion, almost all key effects remain within-liberals: Thus, when comparing liberal authoritarians to liberal non-authoritarians, high-LWA persons show conceptually-expected correlations. As a result, the scale differentiates one kind of liberal from another kind, and thus cannot be reduced to mere ideology.

This array of evidence overwhelmingly suggests that, contrary to critics’ claims, there is something beyond mere ideology captured by the LWA scale. What is that something beyond? Consistent with a long line of research on RWA, by far the most parsimonious answer to that question is that the something beyond is authoritarianism. And indeed, using standard content validity approaches also used in other authoritarianism work (e.g., Funke, 2005; Dunwoody and Funke, 2016), Study 2 showed that participants evaluate the items in Conway’s LWA scale as measurements of authoritarianism. This strong empirical evidence is echoed in the judgments of researchers Fasce and Avendaño (2020, p. 3), who commented that the items on Conway et al.’s LWA scale “are not merely statements of liberal ideology; they univocally reflect an extremely authoritarian attitude, opposed to liberal commitments such as equality among citizens, freedom of expression, and tolerance toward political and cultural diversity.”

Taken together, this array of triangulating evidence points to the conclusion that – as is the case for the scientific consensus on the Altemeyer RWA scale on which it was based – Conway et al.’s LWA scale is a valid measurement of authoritarianism.

8.2. Limitations

Like all studies, the present study has limitations. First, although employing much larger and more diverse samples than most previous work on authoritarianism, Studies 1–11 (like much prior authoritarianism research) are nonetheless limited to the United States and should not be taken to generalize beyond that region.

Further, as other researchers have noted (Nilsson and Jost, 2020), the Conway et al. (2018) scale on which Studies 2–11 are based is not perfect. However, essentially all critiques of individual items on the scale hinge on the argument that these items do not measure anything beyond left-wing ideology.12 As such, all these smaller critiques are best addressed with triangulating empirical evidence that the whole collection of items – used in the way originally intended by the authors of the scale, as a total summative measure – is in fact capturing something beyond mere ideology. Evidence that the whole scale is valid suggests at a minimum that the collection of items as a whole is valid – and thus directly suggests there is no systemic problem with items interfering with the validity of the scale. It is just that kind of whole-scale validity evidence that has been supplied across multiple studies in the present package. This empirical approach mirrors the approach in other domains when critiques arise of the empirical validity of particular theoretical constructs (e.g., Banaji et al., 2004).

However, we acknowledge that Conway et al.’s (2018) LWA scale, like all scales, is not perfect and thus does of course have room for improvement (Conway, 2020). But saying a scale is imperfect is not the same as saying a scale is invalid. All measurements contain imperfections and all studies contain messiness, and yet that should not deter us from bigger-picture research conclusions (Cooper, 2016). Thus, we acknowledge the facts that (a) like virtually every scale, the LWA scale could be improved, and (b) as a scale designed to parallel the most widely-used RWA scale, it inherited some of that scale’s weaknesses. However, this lack of perfection should not be confused with the larger, big-picture issue of the degree that it can be construed as a valid measurement of left-wing authoritarianism. The overwhelming amount of evidence across multiple studies speaks clearly: It can be accurately viewed as a measurement of left-wing authoritarianism.

Adolescents today are just as politically polarized as adults; & they are much more likely to share their parents' political orientation than they were 4 decades ago

Learning to Dislike Your Opponents: Political Socialization in the Era of Polarization. Matthew Tyler, Shanto Iyengar. American Political Science Review, Volume 117, Issue 1, February 2023, online May 4 2022, pp. 347 - 354. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305542200048X

Abstract: Early socialization research dating to the 1960s showed that children could have a partisan identity without expressing polarized evaluations of political leaders and institutions. We provide an update to the socialization literature by showing that adolescents today are just as polarized as adults. We compare our findings to a landmark 1980 socialization study and show that distrust in the opposing party has risen sharply among adolescents. We go on to show that the onset of polarization in childhood is predicted by parental influence; adolescents who share their parents’ identity and whose parents are more polarized are apt to voice polarized views.

CONCLUSION

We have shown that the onset of partisan polarization occurs early in the life cycle. Today, high levels of in-group favoritism and out-group distrust are in place well before early adulthood. In fact, the absence of age differences in our 2019 results suggests that the learning curve for polarization plateaus by the age of 11. This is very unlike the developmental pattern that held in the 1970s and 1980s, when early childhood was characterized by blanket positivity toward political leaders and partisanship gradually intruded into the political attitudes of adolescents before peaking in adulthood.

When we considered the antecedents of children’s trust in the parties, our findings confirm the earlier literature documenting the primacy of the family as an agent of socialization (Jennings and Niemi Reference Jennings and Niemi1968; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers Reference Jennings, Stoker and Bowers2009; Tedin Reference Tedin1974). Polarized parents seem to transmit not only their partisanship but also their animus toward opponents. It is striking that the least-polarized youth respondents in 2019 are those who have not adopted their parental partisan loyalty.

In closing, our findings have important implications for the study of political socialization. Fifty years ago, political socialization was thought to play a stabilizing role important to the perpetuation of democratic norms and institutions. In particular, children’s adoption of uncritical attitudes toward political leaders helped to legitimize the entire democratic regime. Indeed, researchers cited this “functional” role of socialization in justifying the study of political attitudes in childhood (Kinder and Sears Reference Kinder, Sears, Lindzey and Aronson1985; van Deth, Abendschön, and Vollmar Reference van Deth, Abendschön and Vollmar2011).

In the current era, it seems questionable whether the early acquisition of out-party animus fosters democratic norms and civic attitudes. Extreme polarization is now associated with rampant misinformation (Peterson and Iyengar Reference Peterson and Iyengar2021) and, as indicated by the events that occurred in the aftermath of the 2020 election, with willingness to reject the outcome of free and fair electoral procedures. The question for future research is how to transmit party attachments, as occurred in the prepolarization era, without the accompanying distrust and disdain for political opponents.