Saturday, February 25, 2023

So-called "positive psychology" has a negative track record in scientific soudness

The critiques and criticisms of positive psychology: A systematic review. Llewellyn E. van Zyl et al. The Journal of Positive Psychology, Feb 23 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2023.2178956

Abstract: The purpose of this systematic literature review was to explore the current critiques and criticisms of positive psychology and to provide a consolidated view of the main challenges facing the third wave of research. The review identified 32 records that posed 117 unique criticisms and critiques of various areas of the discipline. These could be grouped into 21 categories through conventional content analysis, culminating in six overarching themes or ‘broad criticisms/critiques’. The findings suggested that positive psychology (a) lacked proper theorizing and conceptual thinking, (b) was problematic as far as measurement and methodologies were concerned, (c) was seen as a pseudoscience that lacked evidence and had poor replication, (d) lacked novelty and self-isolated itself from mainstream psychology, (e) was a decontextualized neoliberalist ideology that caused harm, and (f) was a capitalistic venture. We briefly reflect on the findings and highlight the opportunities these criticisms and critiques present.

Keywords: Criticisms of positive psychologycritiqueschallengesopportunitiespositive psychologyThird Wave Positive Psychology

Discussion and future directions

This systematic literature review aimed to explore the contemporary critiques and criticisms posed of the discipline and to provide a consolidated view of the main challenges facing the third wave of positive psychology. The review identified 32 records that posed 117 unique criticisms and critiques of various areas of the discipline. These could be grouped into 21 categories through conventional content analysis, culminating in six overarching themes or ‘broad criticisms/critiques’. The findings discussed in the previous section suggested that positive psychology (a) lacked proper theorizing and conceptual thinking, (b) was problematic as far as measurement and methodologies were concerned, (c) was seen as a pseudoscience that lacked evidence and had poor replication, (d) lacked novelty and self-isolated from mainstream psychology, (e) was a decontextualized neo-liberalist ideology that caused harm, and (f) was a capitalistic venture (cf., Figure 2). We briefly reflect on the findings and highlight future directions in the discussion below.

Getting to the root(s) of the problem: improper theorizing and poor measurement/methods

Although the relative importance of the six broad criticisms/critiques was difficult to determine, each of the 32 records highlighted problems relating to improper theorizing and conceptual thinking within positive psychology and issues with its measurement and (research) methodologies. It can be argued that these two issues are the proverbial root cause of problems in positive psychology.

Our first finding showed that most critics believed that positive psychology lacked proper theorizing and conceptual thinking. According to them, positive psychology lacked a unified metatheory that grounded the philosophy underpinning the science and failed to provide a clear set of ideas or criteria regarding how positive psychological phenomena had to be conceptualized, examined, and approached. These criticisms and the limitations to theory development are neither new nor neglected by positive psychologists (Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022; Wissing, Citation2021). Positive psychological scientists have had widespread debates on the epistemological, ontological, and axiological beliefs driving the discipline (cf., Diener, Citation2012; Lomas & Ivtzan, Citation2016; M. Seligman, Citation2018; Waterman, Citation2013; Wissing, Citation2021). These philosophical debates have aimed to create widespread consensus on the world views of positive psychology to determine the most appropriate methods, terminologies, and types of theories required to move the discipline forward (cf., Wissing, Citation2021). Over time, these philosophical debates about the view of positive psychology of human nature and the real world (ontology), beliefs regarding how knowledge is generated/validated (epistemology), and views of what it values or what is considered desirable/undesirable (axiology) have become more ‘tangible’ (Wissing, Citation2021). Recently, Ciarrochi et al. (Citation2022), Wissing (Citation2021), Lomas et al. (Citation2021), and M. Seligman (Citation2018), and others started to clarify the philosophical position of positive psychology, presented clearer guidelines for theory development, highlighted the methods/approaches required to advance the field, and set guidelines on how to address paradigmatic issues.

For example, Seligman’s (Citation2011, p. 13) PERMA framework of well-being (Positive emotions, Engagement, positive Relationships, Meaning, and Accomplishments) received widespread criticism from scholars. Critics argued that PERMA was not a theory of well-being, but rather just a listing of factors that had been shown to be related to well-being (Wong & Roy, Citation2018), that there was no theoretical justification for why these factors related/had to be included (Donaldson et al., Citation2022), that PERMA did not attribute any unique variance in general well-being frameworks, and that it was redundant (Goodman et al., Citation2018). In response, M. Seligman (Citation2018) contended that PERMA was not a framework of what well-being was, but rather a set of elements required to facilitate well-being. He, furthermore, indicated that PERMA was not an exhaustive framework and that it could be expanded. In line with the propositions of Kuhn (Citation1970) and Wallis (2000) on theory development, M. Seligman (Citation2018) proposed six criteria required for expanding the PERMA framework: (a) new elements had to directly relate to well-being, (b) an element had to be pursued in its own right and not as a means to pursue another, (c) new elements had to lead to developmental interventions, (d) all factors had to be parsimonious, (e) PERMA had to be open and flexible to new developments, and (f) each new element had to be independently defined and measured. M. Seligman’s (Citation2018) response and criteria, thus, provided a basis for scientific advancement, as they ‘addressed a number of the criteria underpinning the creation of robust theories: clarifying the purpose of the theory (through highlighting that it’s an approach to rather than of well-being), highlighting what additional types of approaches/elements are needed for its expansion, setting specific criteria for theory development and evaluation and inviting further theorizing’ (Donaldson et al., Citation2022, p. 5).

Similarly, Lomas et al. (Citation2021) presented more explicit criteria for the types of theories, methods, and approaches needed to facilitate scientific advancement in the third wave of positive psychology. They argued that positive psychology had to broaden its scope by developing more contextually relevant theories and employing more systems-informed and cultural/linguistic approaches to theory development (and creating ethical guidelines) and had to expand its methods by employing more qualitative/mixed-method methodologies, using implicit assessment tools, and using more advanced computational approaches to analyze data. Expanding on this narrative, Wissing (Citation2021) postulated the types of holistic perspectives that were required in positive psychology and how contextually specific approaches to positive phenomena had to be approached, as well as highlighting the value of interdisciplinary work. She also highlighted the importance of embedding the theories and methods of positive psychology within its meta-assumptions. Wissing (Citation2021), additionally, laid the foundation for creating more clarity in the world views of positive psychology (ontology, epistemology, and axiology), proposed criteria for expanding its empirical context, identified the types of measurements required, and highlighted the importance of investing in emerging focus domains. Similarly, Pawelski (Citation2016) attempted to provide a descriptive overview of what constituted ‘positive’ in positive psychology and highlighted the six discrete meanings underpinning this from prior research.

Taken together, it was clear that positive psychology researchers had taken heed of prior critiques and had made active attempts to clarify the metatheoretical assumptions of positive psychology. Despite the progress, there are still a number of matters requiring clarity. Positive psychology should attempt to clarify its metaphysical perspective of reality, present a consolidated view of ontological/epistemological/axiological beliefs, clarify and create consensus as to what is considered ‘positive’, address consistencies in and between theories, and develop its own theory of human development. Furthermore, the field should move beyond the positivist paradigm and the accompanying reductionist way of thinking. There is value in adopting either a postpositivist or constructive-interpretivist perspective when exploring/explaining positive psychological phenomena (Wong, Citation2011). Multiple realities exist, and researchers/practitioners cannot be entirely objective or void of bias. Therefore, acknowledging this limitation and appreciating the presence of multiple perspectives and how one’s own biases affect the interpretation of the world may lead to more robust theories and methods (Friedman & Brown, Citation2018). Moreover, specific attention needs to be given to creating ethical decision-making models that inform and evaluate judgements about the values and future priorities of the discipline (Friedman & Brown, Citation2018). Positive psychology should also refrain from reporting and exaggerating sensationalist claims and should acknowledge limitations of important findings (especially when communicated in the public domain).

In addition, positive psychology can apply what has been learnt in other areas, such as the psychology of religion and spirituality, where these problems have largely been resolved. Scholars in the psychology of religion and spirituality present vastly different philosophical world views; yet the field has begun to coalesce around a ‘multi-level interdisciplinary paradigm’ of spirituality (Emmons & Paloutzian, Citation2003; Paloutzian & Park, Citation2005). Here, the aim is to appreciate the unique value each different approach toward spirituality and religion brings to explaining psychological phenomena and allowing for researchers from other domains to operationalize their concepts within this broader framework. This approach will recognize that positive psychology is indeed a ‘psychology’, but will encourage researchers to explore their constructs at different levels of abstraction. It will also allow researchers to compare their findings to, and collaborate more actively with, those from adjacent fields (e.g., anthropology, historical sciences, neurosciences, evolutionary biology, sociology, theology). These adjacent fields have specialized knowledge that explains human flourishing in different ways, and more holistic views can be developed through active collaboration. For positive psychology, this approach will allow for positive psychology researchers’ contributions to be valued (most notably at the individual level) and yet urge researchers to take a broader view of where their work fits into the wider efforts to understand human flourishing better. Therefore, this approach will be non-reductive and will recognize that explaining a phenomenon at one level does not explain it away from others.

Despite these opportunities to develop the philosophy and theorizing underpinning positive psychology, it is unreasonable of critics to assume that complete consensus on all philosophical issues within the discipline can be reached. Critics should consider how fields such as personality psychology operate with theoretical perspectives built on vastly different philosophical foundations. There are fundamental differences in how Freud, Rogers, Skinner, Klein, and others viewed human nature and, thus, presented vastly different approaches to understanding personality development (Allen, Citation2000). Despite these vast differences, scholars do not argue that personality psychology is ‘fundamentally flawed due to a lack of consensus or irreconcilable differences’ in the approaches. Most personality psychologists seem to appreciate ideological pluralism and build on the findings and limitations of other approaches (Cloninger, Citation2009; Strack, Citation2005). For example, the emphasis of behaviorism on overt behavior emerged partially in response to the psychoanalytic view of people as only driven by unobservable unconscious processes (Strack, Citation2005). Similarly, humanistic perspectives partly emerged in response to the behaviorist view of people as merely stimulus-response organisms. These different approaches drew from, and built on, elements of their predecessors.

Our second finding showed that critics highlighted issues with the measurement of positive psychological constructs and with the research methodologies the discipline favored. From the literature, it was clear that critics argued that positive psychology showed poor operationalization and measurement of its constructs, employed flawed research methodologies, over relied on empiricism/positivism, and failed to employ more robust research approaches. These critiques are not unfounded and have been widely acknowledged by positive psychological scientists (e.g., Disabato et al., Citation2019; Donaldson et al., Citation2022; Lomas et al., Citation2021; Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022; Wissing, Citation2021). It is well established that popular positive psychological measuring instruments tend to produce different factorial models, with varying internal consistency ranges between studies and contexts (cf., Disabato et al., Citation2019; Van Zyl & Ten Klooster, Citation2022). For example, the Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (Keyes, Citation2002) and the Grit-O Scale (Duckworth et al., Citation2007) have produced at least 10 different factorial structures, inconsistent findings regarding the factorial equivalence between groups, and reliability indicators ranging from poor to acceptable in different contexts. Furthermore, to ensure acceptable levels of model-data fit, authors have been required to make significant modifications to the factorial structures (e.g., item parceling; Van Zyl & Ten Klooster, Citation2022). Positive psychological researchers have also acknowledged that not all popular psychometric instruments employed robust psychometric test construction principles during their initial development (Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022; Wissing, Citation2021). For example, Van Zyl et al. (Citation2022) highlighted that Govindji and Linley’s (Citation2007) popular strength use and strengths knowledge scales were comprised of a set of self-generated items that had not been pilot-tested, that no evidence as to their face validity was presented, that they only used a single sample and sample population (university students) that were used to ‘validate’ the instrument, and that the items were only subjected to simple principal component analysis. Similarly, Lomas et al. (Citation2021) and Wissing (Citation2021) acknowledged that the discipline favored quantitative research and positivist approaches and relied heavily on self-report measures and cross-sectional over longitudinal designs to investigate claims.

Although the validity of these claims is not disputed, it is important to note that (a) positive psychology is still a relatively new field and (b) these problems plague the entire psychological discipline. First, it is normal for research into new areas or domains to employ ‘quick and dirty’ measures and cross-sectional studies during the first wave of research on novel topics. This practice serves to provide an initial glimpse into previously unstudied or unexplored phenomena. Journal editors are interested in novel work and will tend to overlook methodological simplicity if a study offers new insights or ‘fresh’ ideas. However, as more scientific research on the novel topic starts accumulating, more nuanced research questions emerge. Here, the same simple methodologies and ‘quick and dirty’ measures will not suffice. For this reason, more sophisticated measures and methods will be employed and, eventually, preferred by the scientific community. Over time, methodological standards will progressively be raised. Therefore, the criticisms in this regard do not highlight a fundamental flaw unique to positive psychology, but rather highlight the discourse of the normal scientific enterprise in the early stages. Second, these methods and approaches are not unique to positive psychology. Recent systematic literature reviews regarding the methods and approaches employed in psychology showed that over 90% of publications in psychology were quantitative, most favoring the positivistic approach (Scholtz et al., Citation2020Citation2021; Wilhelmy & Köhler, Citation2022). In their review, Scholtz et al. (Citation2020) showed that only 4.7% of the publications employed a qualitative design and even fewer mixed- or multi-methods. Furthermore, they showed that most publications used cross-sectional and non-experimental research designs, with only 3.9% being longitudinal. These authors also reported that most studies in psychology employed some form of self-report questionnaire (76.8%) to measure psychological phenomena. Similar trends were found in all subdisciplines of psychology, ranging from organizational and social psychology to educational psychology (Coetzee & Van Zyl, Citation2013; McCrudden et al., Citation2019; Sassenberg & Ditrich, Citation2019; Scholtz et al., Citation2021; Wilhelmy & Köhler, Citation2022). Similarly, Reynolds and Livingston (Citation2021) noted that poor test construction processes and practices were apparent in all subdisciplines of psychology, exacerbated by the rapid development of new assessment technologies and analytical approaches.

Given that measurement and methodology are crucial elements for advancing a discipline, positive psychological researchers should be more rigorous in developing and validating new psychometric instruments. There is a need to develop stricter guidelines for developing and validating new instruments and adapting and validating existing methods for new contexts. All positive psychological assessment measures should comply with the International Test Commission (Citation2017) and the European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations (European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations, Citation2013) guidelines on test construction, adaption, and validation, as well as the ISO standards for assessment methods and procedures (International Organization for Standardization, Citation2011). In addition, newly developed psychometric instruments should be subjected to more scrutiny by reviewers and editors, as these are key to addressing issues in the field. Multi-study designs should be favored by following conventional standards in psychometric test development. Separate studies should be used to explore the factorial structure, confirm its factorial validity, explore its factorial equivalence, and establish its predictive validity. Besides this, more attention should be paid to establishing face, discriminant, predictive, and incremental validity of new measures. Given that positive psychology suffers from the ‘jingle-jangle’ fallacy, both researchers and reviewers should be more critical of the unique contribution each new construct or assessment measure makes. As Goodman et al. (Citation2018) point out, there is a significant overlap in psychological constructs, and new constructs do not necessarily explain any new variance in well-being. Furthermore, new psychometric tests should show evidence of their cross-cultural fairness and be developed in line with local traditions and values. Similarly, more innovative analytical approaches should be considered, which compensate for the limitations of current assessment practices (Van Zyl & Ten Klooster, Citation2022). These can include exploratory structural equation modelling (which compensates and controls for differences in the interpretation of items), Bayesian confirmatory factor analysis, machine learning approaches, and the like. There is also an opportunity to develop more objective positive psychological assessment measures to assess positive states/traits/behaviors through kinetic measures, motion capture systems, accelerometers, eye trackers, speech analysis, hormonal endocrinal responses (e.g., cortisol, alpha-amylase), central brain activity (e.g., through electroencephalograms, neuroimaging, electric/magnetic stimulation, connectomes), contextual/attentional measures (e.g., electromagnetic articulography indexing, motion capture systems), and arousal systems (e.g., galvanic skin response, facial electromyography; Cipresso & Immekus, Citation2017). There should additionally be greater focus on incorporating new developments in natural language processing, meta-data mining (e.g., web scraping), and machine learning as methods to assess positive characteristics.

In terms of research methodologies, we echo the calls of Lomas et al. (Citation2021) and Wissing (Citation2021), who state that positive psychology should employ more robust designs (e.g., longitudinal or experimental designs) and approaches such as qualitative, mixed-method, and experimental research. Although these methods and approaches are not entirely absent from the field, they are vastly overshadowed by cross-sectional studies and quantitative research. The overreliance on cross-sectional designs likely feeds the perception that causal inferences are too often inappropriately made within positive psychology. This is a fair concern, even if it applies less to the science itself and more to the exaggerated interpretations of research results often made within the popular psychology literature.

Positive psychologists should, therefore, move away from the reductionist way of thinking by engaging in more phenomenological work as a means of understanding, rather than explaining, psychological experiences. Mixed-method approaches can help explain how and why (or why not) certain factors relate and provide a means to self-correct theories. Here, journals should attempt to showcase these designs and highlight their value to the discipline by calling for more special issues on the topic. Finally, more robust research designs should be utilized. Cross-sectional designs should be limited to exploring ideas, or multiple cross-sectional studies should be published in the same paper to confirm hypotheses. The value of cross-sectional research can be enhanced by using multiple measurement methods and especially by developing and deploying more objective measures to assess positive states, traits, and behaviors.

Growing concerns: a pseudoscience lacking novelty, and self-isolation from general psychology

Stemming from the two roots of the problem, critics had growing concern regarding the status of positive psychology as a science and its relevance to the broader nomological psychological network.

Our third finding showed that positive psychology was seen as a pseudoscience that lacked evidence and showed poor replicability. Critics argued that positive psychology presented (false) claims that were not supported by empirical evidence and that its benefits were vastly exaggerated. Positive psychology was said to be rife with confirmation bias and not self-correcting (i.e., continued adherence to theories that had been empirically discredited rather than updating theoretical assumptions and moving forward). Academic research was focused on generating superficial knowledge, which presented obvious conclusions. The findings also highlighted critics’ belief that positive psychological research findings could not be replicated.

Although some of these critiques have merit, the overarching idea that positive psychology is a pseudoscience is questionable. Curd and Psillos (Citation2014) define a pseudoscience as a set of beliefs, assumptions, statements, or practices about a particular phenomenon that is claimed to be factual and scientific, yet incompatible with the scientific method. According to Curd and Psillos (Citation2014), positive psychology can only be considered a pseudoscience if it meets eight criteria:

  1. It is unfalsifiable (i.e., employing vague, exaggerated, or untestable claims; unable to prove it wrong). Although there are inconsistencies in terminology and theories (as discussed above), positive psychological constructs are, for the most part, clearly defined, with specific indicators/components. Given the ‘over reliance on empiricism’ noted by the critics, mentioned in the previous section, it is clear that hypotheses can be tested and accepted/not accepted.

  2. Collection of evidence is improper (i.e., relying heavily on testimonials; cherry-picking confirming evidence/ignoring disconfirming results). The progress of positive psychology has relied heavily on empiricism and scientism. Although this has resulted in other issues as discussed above, it does support the idea that findings and assumptions are based on scientific evidence that attempts to confirm/disconfirm results. Furthermore, several journals are focused explicitly on collating scientific evidence on positive psychology, along with various societies aimed at disseminating information.

  3. It lacks openness to scrutiny by others. Several authors from adjacent or even unrelated fields (e.g., physics) have scrutinized positive psychological research, processes, and practices. For example, N. J. L. Brown et al. (Citation2013) criticized the analytical strategy used to establish the critical positivity ratio. This, in turn, led to Fredrickson (Citation2013) partially retracting the original paper and responding to the critique. Furthermore, journals such as Frontiers in Psychology (Positive Psychology) invite reviewers from different paradigmatic perspectives to evaluate positive psychological research.

  4. Theory progression is absent (i.e., not self-correcting). This element can, however, not entirely be refuted. Positive psychology does not easily self-correct. For example, despite the paper on the critical positivity ratio being partially retracted, authors are still debating the relevance of the ratio. The original paper continues to garner citations, and the original claims are still positioned as fact in new studies (Friedman and Brown, Citation2018). Van Zyl and Rothmann (Citation2022) argue that researchers rely heavily on ‘contextual factors’ to justify or explain negative results and, therefore, do not self-correct or update existing theories.

  5. Confirmation bias exists (i.e., favoring findings that confirm one’s prior beliefs/assumptions). Confirmation bias is present in all fields of psychology and, therefore, also present in positive psychology. Fairly few studies have been published that show negative results, and there is evidence of data being interpreted to favor inherent beliefs.

  6. It makes exaggerated or extraordinary claims. This element was heavily present during the first decade of the existence of positive psychology and was criticized by both academics and society (cf., Coyne et al., Citation2010). However, during the last decade, scientists have become more cautious about the presentation and interpretation of their results. Yet the problem is quite prolific in the popular psychological press, where findings are taken out of context or over exaggerated, and where causation is often inferred or implied when reporting on correlational research. The problem, therefore, seems to be related to the dissemination of findings to a broader audience rather than the science itself.

  7. It lacks peer review. The vast majority of the journals publishing positive psychological research subject claims to extensive peer review.

  8. Replication of results is poor. The entire discipline of psychology is faced with a replication crisis, and positive psychology is not immune (cf., Efendic & Van Zyl, Citation2019; Maxwell et al., Citation2015). For example, it has been a struggle to replicate findings on the effectiveness of popular positive psychological intervention studies such as the gratitude visit, as well as the three good things exercise, in contexts outside of the USA (Wong & Roy, Citation2018). A number of issues underpin the poor replication of positive psychology: (a) reliance on small, underpowered samples, (b) publication bias, (c) questionable research practices such as p-hacking, (d) a lack of transparency in research practices, and (e) publication pressure and poor funding (Efendic & Van Zyl, Citation2019).

Although there is some justification for the claims made by critics, positive psychology does not seem to conform to the definition of a pseudoscience. There are, however, several areas that warrant further exploration and development. In respect of the lack of replicability and managing confirmation bias, positive psychological journals should actively drive the implementation of open science practices (cf., Van Zyl, Citation2019). Positive psychological journals should consider implementing the transparency and open science promotion guidelines (cf., Nosek et al., Citation2015). These guidelines provide journals with minimum standards for (a) citations plans, (b) data transparency, (c) analytical methods transparency, (d) research materials transparency, (e) research design transparency, (f) pre-registration of studies, (g) pre-registration of analysis plans, and (h) information on how to encourage replication studies (Nosek et al., Citation2015). At a minimum, journals should require authors to submit their raw data and their statistical codes as part of the review process as well as encourage the submission of null results/replication studies. This will allow for more transparency in the theory building and testing process. In addition, journals and editors should encourage pre-registration of studies to reduce ‘analytical flexibility’ and other systematic biases. Pre-registering study protocols may reduce the occurrence of questionable research practices such as HARKing, p-hacking, data fabrication, and the like (Nosek et al., Citation2015; Van Zyl, Citation2019; Van Zyl & Junker, Citation2019). Furthermore, to enhance the quality of peer review, positive psychology journals should consider experimenting with open or collaborative peer review processes. According to Efendic and Van Zyl (Citation2019), collaborative peer review facilitates an open and active dialogue between stakeholders (reviewers/editors/authors) from the original design of a study through to the final submitted manuscript. A collaborative review allows authors to actively engage with reviewers/editors to clarify expectations and discuss content in a meaningful fashion. This reduces reviewer biases, provides opportunities for professional development, ensures transparent feedback, and enhances the quality of the overall manuscript (Dobele, Citation2015; Miller, Citation2006). It is also suggested that the editorial boards of the various top positive psychology journals meet annually to discuss publication trends, share best-practice guidelines, and develop shared strategies to enhance the quality of positive psychological research for the coming year.

Our fourth finding showed that positive psychology lacked novelty and self-isolated from mainstream psychology. Critics contended that positive psychology brought nothing new to the proverbial table and that it willfully created a divide between ‘negative’ psychology and the study of ‘optimal human functioning’ to justify the reason for its existence. In response to these claims, Seligman (Citation2011) confirmed that studying human strengths and virtues was not new and acknowledged the historical origins of the discipline. Seligman (Citation2011) maintained that the origins of ‘positive psychology’ could be traced back to the contributions of William James, Abraham Maslow, Albert Bandura, Carl Rogers, and Victor Frankl (to name a few). The call for a new science with regard to positive experiences, characteristics, and institutions did not disregard these contributions, but rather brought them to the fore and emphasized the need for further development (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, Citation2000). This renewed focus on studying what was right, rather than wrong, led to significant contributions to our understanding of well-being and the factors facilitating/undermining it (Seligman, Citation2019). Seligman (Citation2019) argued that positive psychology had produced several unique insights such as that (a) optimists lived longer and healthier lives than pessimists and were less likely to die from cardiovascular disease, (b) women who showed genuine smiles at 18 reported higher levels of marital satisfaction later in life, (c) environmental factors only contributed around 15% of the variance in well-being/happiness, (d) self-discipline and grit were stronger predictors of academic performance than IQ, (e) happy teenagers earned substantially more income 15 years later than their unhappy peers, (f) those who pursued meaningful life experiences had a distinctive genetic profile, and (g) mindfulness interventions could lead to increased resilience. Therefore, positive psychology had played an essential role in advancing our understanding of the human condition.

However, as rightfully stated by critics, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s (Citation2000) call did create a fictitious divide between traditional psychological approaches and positive psychology. This led to several adverse outcomes, as discussed above. This criticism was acknowledged by Seligman (Citation2011Citation2019), who stated that the intent was not to create a divide, but rather to focus more on understanding positive states, traits, behaviors, and institutions. Nevertheless, the discipline has moved beyond this fictitious divide during the last decade. According to Wong (Citation2011), Lomas et al. (Citation2021), and Wissing (Citation2021), positive psychology has started to recognize the value of ‘the negative’ as a means of facilitating positive experiences and that suffering is essential for the development of strengths, happiness, and well-being; consequently, there is a better alignment with mainstream psychological approaches. More recent theoretical frameworks, such as Bohlmeijer and Westerhof’s (Citation2021) model for sustainable mental health, actively incorporate mental illness, dysfunctional cognitions, emotions, and behaviors as part of its ‘positive framework’.

Despite these advancements, there are still some challenges to consider. According to Joseph (Citation2021), despite two decades of debate, there is still no clarity or consensus on the relationship between humanistic psychology and positive psychology. Although various attempts have been made to consolidate the differences and facilitate a more integrative perspective, humanistic psychologists remain critical of positive psychology, and vice versa. Furthermore, most positive psychological interventions and therapy models are built on principles of cognitive-behavioral therapy; yet the discipline does not actively acknowledge this. It, thus, gains value through incorporating approaches that ‘work well’ in other domains in terms of its own theoretical and intervention frameworks. Positive psychology can be further enriched by incorporating more of what can be learnt from other psychological approaches or domains such as systems sciences (M’Pherson, Citation1974), depth psychology (Staude, Citation1976), and evolutionary psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, Citation2013). Moreover, positive psychology should attempt to explore opportunities to incorporate developments from adjacent domains such as the neurosciences, decision sciences, environmental studies, economic sciences, and computer sciences.

Branching out: a harmful decontextualized neo-liberal ideology and capitalistic venture

The criticisms and critiques branched out into two additional areas. Our fifth and sixth findings showed that positive psychology was a decontextualized neo-liberal ideology that caused harm and that it was presented as little more than a capitalistic venture. Positive psychology is classified as a neo-liberalist ideology, where optimal functioning and success are seen as an individual enterprise and a consequence of one’s own life choices. This neo-liberal ideology positions Western values as ‘universal’ and superimposes these onto other cultures. It neglects the role of culture, social context, and the environment in understanding positive phenomena. This, in turn, pathologizes normal human behavior, marginalizes groups, reinforces (gender/cultural) stereotypes, creates stigma, and causes harm.

Clearly not all of positive psychology is fairly captured in these critiques, yet it is a substantial enough problem within the field that these concerns are often raised, and by multiple voices. Marecek and Cristopher (Citation2018) stated that positive psychology had positioned itself as an ‘indigenous psychology’, where positive experiences, characteristics, and phenomena were deemed to be universally relevant and applicable. However, it failed to incorporate indigenous knowledge, social contexts, or cultural perspectives in the pursuit of explaining positive experiences or phenomena (Hendriks et al., Citation2019; Wissing, Citation2021). There are significant differences in how collectivistic and individualistic cultures view mental health and well-being (cf., Hendriks et al., Citation2019); yet the Western model is positioned to be universally applicable (Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022). For example, in African and Eastern cultures, well-being is approached as a function of social contexts (e.g., family functioning, community well-being), whereas in individualistic cultures, the pursuit of well-being is placed solely on the individual (Hendriks et al., Citation2019). Therefore, positive psychological theories, psychometric instruments, and interventions may not be applicable to non-Western cultures (Hendriks et al., Citation2019; Lomas et al., Citation2021; Wissing, Citation2021). This may reinforce cultural stereotypes and create unrealistic expectations about mental health and well-being, which, in turn, may cause significant harm, create stigma, and marginalize certain groups (Hendriks et al., Citation2019; Thompson, Citation2018; Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022).

This critique highlights the need for more culturally relevant or ‘indigenous’ perspectives on positive psychological phenomena that incorporate local traditions, values, and perspectives and present an opportunity for more cross-cultural and cross-national studies in positive psychological phenomena. Echoing the calls of Lomas et al. (Citation2021) and Wissing (Citation2021), there is, thus, a need to further develop a positive cross-cultural psychology, where the specific focus should be on creating more holistic indigenous positive psychological theories, methods, and interventions. Specific attention should also be given to investigating the unique experiences of marginalized or under-represented societal groups (e.g., expatriates and the LGBTQ community) and developing tailored solutions to their unique problems. Here, more participatory action-research-based approaches can be used to allow members of these marginalized communities to co-construct theories, approaches, measures, and solutions alongside academic researchers. Creating a more inclusive culture, where participants are seen as ‘co-developers’ of theories/methods/solutions, can generate unique perspectives on the problems marginalized communities face. Similarly, it is also imperative for positive psychology to create its own ethical research and intervention guidelines to mitigate the potential harm that its theories, methods, and interventions can cause (cf., Jarden et al., Citation2021).

Finally, our results showed that positive psychology was also seen as a capitalistic venture that aimed to commercialize ‘positivity’ as a means to further facilitate individualism, consumerism, and the medicalization of positive experiences. Critics argued that positive psychology created a market of ‘impossible dreams’ that set unrealistic expectations of what a ‘good life’ entailed. It facilitated the medicalization of positive phenomena and, thus, created a market for test developers, consultants, and practitioners to capitalize on people’s ‘pathological unhappiness’.

Although the commercialization of positive psychology cannot be disputed, it is important to reflect on the nature of its intent. No economic, social, or political system, whether it be socialism, capitalism, or communism, is ‘good’ or ‘evil’ by design (Hoppe, Citation1989). The intent driving the system and its implications for society define whether economic, social, or political policies are harmful or beneficial to its constituents (Hoppe, Citation1989). The commercialization of positive psychological tools and techniques indicates their popularity in practice and usefulness to society. Commercial drivers around positive psychological tools and techniques seem to be centered on scalability, with the intent to increase access to valuable resources that can facilitate ‘the good life’ (cf., Richter et al., Citation2021). Scalability requires innovation, physical resources (e.g., information technology (IT) infrastructure), the automation of processes/practices, and people to design content/systems/services. The scalability of a product or service increases accessibility, limits barriers to access, and decreases costs for consumers (Jabłoński & Jabłoński, Citation2020). However, these come at a cost, as the physical resources driving them are finite. So the commercialization of positive psychological tools and techniques helps to facilitate the development of positive states, traits, and behaviors cost-effectively.

It should also be noted that the access to, and the scalability of, positive psychological tools and techniques are not just facilitated by practitioners and industry. Various non-profit organizations, professional societies, and academic institutions provide access to positive psychological tools and techniques at no charge. For example, the Greater Good Science Center aims to provide individuals with easily useable tools and self-development activities to facilitate the development of positive states, traits, and behaviors. Similarly, the University of Pennsylvania provides free access to many positive psychological assessment measures (such as the VIA Signature Strengths Inventory) to help individuals identify their strengths and positive experiences. There are also a number of free (or partially free) apps such as Headspace, Happify, ThinkUp, Happy Habits, and the like that have been developed along with academic institutions to facilitate positive states and behaviors (Feldman, Citation2017). Research entities such as the Optentia in South Africa and the University of Pennsylvania provide free lectures/webinars/workshops, tools, and techniques to upskill practitioners and empower individuals to facilitate their personal growth. There is, thus, a balance between the ‘paid’ and ‘free’ services that aim to increase accessibility to positive psychological tools and techniques.

However, as long as there is a high demand for positive psychological tools, techniques, and interventions, there will always be a gap between what science supports and what practitioners are designing/communicating/implementing (Jarden et al., Citation2021). The challenge for the discipline is, consequently, to (a) work to close the gap by continuing to develop and test interventions, (b) educate practitioners on science/practice integration using the scientist/practitioner or clinical/scholar models of training, (c) urge adherence to the relevant ethical codes (American Psychological Association, American Educational Research Association, etc.) that govern the practice/application of psychology, and (d) educate the public to help them tell the difference between evidence-based practice and quackery.

Limitations and recommendations

Despite attempts to ensure a relevant and rigorous systematic review, there are still a number of limitations to consider. First, confirmation bias may be present, given the nature of this project and that all the authors self-identify as ‘positive psychologists’. To reduce bias, a clear search protocol was established, and specific strategies were implemented (e.g., multiple evaluators/raters were used, inter-rater reliability was calculated, multiple searches were conducted, etc.). Second, no ‘grey literature’ was included in the search protocol. Future research could employ artificial-intelligence-assisted systematic literature review tools to help manage potential biases (cf., Van De Schoot et al., Citation2021). Third, only including academic literature that had been subjected to traditional quality standards and peer review may have led to the exclusion of popular psychology press books/chapters/texts and dissertations/theses that may have presented alternative critiques from different perspectives. Therefore, excluding grey literature may have presented a biased (only academic) view of the criticisms/critiques of positive psychology. Future research could consider conducting a systematic review of grey literature to determine practitioners’ perspectives on the issues within positive psychology. In the fourth place, although the best-practice guidelines for systematic reviews were followed and numerous strategies were considered to ensure that all possible relevant texts were included, there is a possibility that several important manuscripts may have been excluded. For example, Joseph’s (Citation2021) paper was not originally included, as our search and key terms were not present in the title, keywords, or abstract. Finally, the relative importance of the six themes was not established. Although a deductive, theory-driven approach was used to position issues with theory and measurement as the root cause of the other problems, their relative importance was not established. Future research could employ a heuristic iterative classification process with a number of academics and practitioners to determine the relative importance of these criticisms and to generate more holistic solutions to these problems.

One of the weird things about Britain, despite its being the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, is that its financial infrastructure was for a long time remarkably backward; the Dutch did it better

How the Dutch Did it Better. Anton Howes. Age of Invention Blog, Feb 17 2023. https://antonhowes.substack.com/p/age-of-invention-how-the-dutch-did

Excerpts:

One of the weird things about Britain, despite its being the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, is that its financial infrastructure was for a long time remarkably backward. Its “Financial Revolution”, by which both people and the state began to borrow at ever lower interest rates, only really took off in the early eighteenth century — long after London’s extraordinary growth in 1550-1650, when it had suddenly expanded eightfold to become one of Europe’s most important commercial hubs. Indeed, even for much of the late seventeenth century, England lacked many of the most basic financial institutions that had been used for decades and decades by their most important rival and trading partner, the Dutch Republic.

I was especially intrigued when I stumbled across a discussion of Dutch policies and customs, written up in around 1665 by the young merchant Josiah Child, and published a few years later: a kind of wishlist of many of the things that made the Dutch so wealthy, and which the English continually failed to emulate:1

- The Dutch councils of state and war always included merchants who had experience of trading and living abroad — Child was perhaps just angling for some influence here, but for all that merchants were getting more influential, in England they were not actually in charge.

- Gavel-kind succession laws, whereby all children got an equal share of their parents’ estates, rather than it all going to the eldest. English primogeniture, by contrast, apparently left a lot of gentlemen’s younger sons having to become apprenticed to merchants.

- High regulatory standards for goods. A barrel of Dutch-packed herring or cod would apparently be accepted by buyers just by viewing the marks, without having to open them up to check. English-packed goods, by contrast, were rarely trusted because the fish would turn out to be rotten or even missing — the English regulators’ stamps of approval were reputedly given to anyone who would pay.

- Encouragement for inventors of new products, techniques, and import trades, who received rewards from the state, and not just temporary monopoly patents.

- Ships, called fluyt, which were cheaper to build, required fewer sailors, and were easier to handle. Despite being only very lightly armed, they sailed in fleets for protection, when necessary being convoyed by ships of war. English trading ships, by contrast, were each heavily armed, but with those cannon taking up room and weight that could have been used for carrying merchandise.

- Education of all children, even girls, in arithmetic and keeping accounts. As Child put it, this infused in the Dutch “a strong aptitude, love, and delight” for commerce. It also meant that husbands and wives were real partners in many businesses — something that impressed almost all foreign visitors to the Netherlands.

- Low customs duties, but high consumption taxes. Very low customs duties, on both imports and exports, meant that it was often very profitable to trade with the Netherlands. The Dutch were famed for their many ships, and for their granaries bursting with grain, despite growing hardly any trees or crops themselves. To fund their state, they instead overwhelmingly relied on the gemene middelen — taxes on the sale of wine, beer, meat, fuel, candles, salt, soap, flour, cloth, and a host of other goods, with many of the higher rates reserved for expensive luxuries. Much like modern value-added taxes, these taxes on consumption raised revenue while preserving the all-important incentive to save and invest.

- Thrifty living — which, come to think of it, was probably related to the high consumption taxes, although Childs doesn’t seem to have noticed the connection. Dutch thrift was thought by the English to be especially useful because it allowed wage costs to be kept low — essential for maintaining competitiveness in international markets — while preventing the country having a trade deficit. The English always worried they were sending too much of their silver abroad to pay for French wines and other luxuries, but the Dutch appeared to have prevented this without resorting to import tariffs that might annoy trading partners and prompt retaliation.

- Religious toleration, which attracted all sorts of industrious immigrants to bring their families and wealth. (Incidentally, as I’ve mentioned before, this was also one of the key attractions of Livorno, set up by the Medici Dukes of Tuscany to be a major trading hub.)

- The use of the Law-Merchant, which meant that all controversies between merchants and tradesmen were decided in just 3 or 4 days’ time. England, rather strangely for such an increasingly commercial nation, did not develop merchant courts with a specific jurisdiction or a distinct body of merchant law — disputes instead had to be resolved in the royal common-law or equity courts, in the Admiralty court, or else abroad. The English courts, however, were often slow. Child complained that cases often took half a year, and often much longer. (Incidentally, slow and rotten justice in the Court of Chancery, the key equity court used by merchants in England, was one of the reasons Francis Bacon was impeached by Parliament and sacked as Lord Chancellor.)

- Transferrable bills of exchange — in other words, the circulation of credit notes as a currency. These were not properly supported by English laws, but allowed Dutch merchants to trade a lot more frequently. English merchants often had to wait some six months to a year before receiving all the coin from selling their foreign goods in London, so as to purchase goods again to make fresh trades. They spent much of their time chasing shopkeepers for payment. But the Dutch, by being able to easily buy and sell their credit notes, could “turn their stocks twice or thrice in trade”, immediately settling their accounts and making fresh purchases. (I intend to look into this in a lot more detail soon, as finding a way to bills of exchange transferrable in England appears to have been a major project for many of the mid-seventeenth-century inventors and improvers — after just a cursory glance, transferability was only secured in law as late as 1704.)

- Banks. Or rather, as Child actually put it, “BANKS”. In England many of the functions of banks gradually evolved from the practices of individual goldsmiths and the scriveners — legal clerks who specialised in property transfers and mortgages. There was certainly nothing so secure as the municipal Wisselbank of Amsterdam, established in 1609, which had various monopoly powers as a clearing-house for bills of exchange and was backed by a vault full of bullion. Nor the municipal Bank van Lening, established in 1614, which was a pawnbroker modelled on the Italian Monte di Pietà, or mounts of piety, designed to make small and low-cost loans to the poor.

- “PUBLIC REGISTERS” — again capitalised by Child — of all lands and houses sold or mortgaged. This item on the policy wishlist would not be ticked off for England until two centuries later, but the key advantage was to prevent lawsuits over land titles — still cited as a major problem even in the 1690s — and so make land more genuinely secure for mortgages.


Much more at the link above.

Friday, February 24, 2023

Comparing oneself on social media with those who are better off than oneself is a turn-off in every way, for men, women and people of all ages

A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Social Media Exposure to Upward Comparison Targets on Self-Evaluations and Emotions. Carly A. McComb,Eric J. Vanman &Stephanie J. Tobin. Media Psychology, Feb 23 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2023.2180647

Abstract: Social media have become a pervasive part of contemporary culture and are an essential part of the daily lives of an increasing number of people. Its popularity has brought unlimited opportunities to compare oneself with other people. This meta-analysis combined and summarized the findings of previous experimental research, with the aim of generating causal conclusions regarding the effects of exposure to upward comparison targets on self-evaluations and emotions in a social media context. We identified 48 articles involving 7679 participants through a systematic search and entered 118 effect sizes into a multilevel, random-effects meta-analysis. Analyses revealed an overall negative effect of upward social comparison relative to downward comparison and controls on social media users’ self-evaluations and emotions (g = −0.24, p < .001). Specifically, there were significant negative effects of upward comparison on each outcome variable: body image (g = −0.31, p < .001), subjective well-being (g = −0.19, p < .001), mental health (g = −0.21, p < .001) and self-esteem (g = −0.21, p < .001). This meta-analysis indicates that contrast is the dominant response to upward comparison on social media, which results in negative self-evaluations and emotions.