Saturday, April 8, 2023

Higher Intelligence was positively related to the ability to lie, but only in spoken, not written, statements

Are Intelligent People Better Liars? Relationships between Cognitive Abilities and Credible Lying. Justyna Sarzyńska-Wawer, Krzysztof Hanusz, Aleksandra Pawlak, Julia Szymanowska and Aleksander Wawer. J. Intell. 2023, 11(4), 69; April 3 2023. https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11040069

Abstract: Lying is essential to social communication. Despite years of research, its detection still poses many challenges. This is partly because some individuals are perceived as truthful and reliable, even when lying. However, relatively little is known about these effective liars. In our study, we focused on the cognitive functioning of effective liars. We tested 400 participants who completed tasks measuring executive functions, verbal fluency, and fluid intelligence, and also made four statements (two true and two false, half of them written and half oral). The reliability of the statements was then assessed. Only fluid intelligence was found to be relevant for reliable lying. This relationship was only evident for oral statements, suggesting that the importance of intelligence is highlighted when statements are made spontaneously without prior preparation.


Keywords: deception; deception detection; cognitive functions; intelligence


A new mode of reproduction in animals: In the yellow crazy ant, Anoplolepis gracilipes, the males are all chimeras, a collection of haploid cells with only maternal or paternal genetic material

Obligate chimerism in male yellow crazy ants. H. Darras et al. Science, Apr 6 2023, Vol 380, Issue 6640, pp. 55-58. DOI: 10.1126/science.adf0419

A new mode of reproduction in animals: Multicellular organisms typically develop from a single cell into a collection of cells that all have the same genetic material. Darras et al. discovered a deviation from this developmental hallmark in the yellow crazy ant, Anoplolepis gracilipes. Males of this species are all chimeras, a collection of haploid cells with only maternal or paternal genetic material (see the Perspective by Kronauer). These chimeras develop from fertilized eggs in which parental nuclei divide independently. Genetic analyses show that this unusual mode of reproduction is probably the result of a genetic conflict between two co-occurring lineages. —DJ

Abstract: Multicellular organisms typically develop from a single fertilized egg and therefore consist of clonal cells. We report an extraordinary reproductive system in the yellow crazy ant. Males are chimeras of haploid cells from two divergent lineages: R and W. R cells are overrepresented in the males’ somatic tissues, whereas W cells are overrepresented in their sperm. Chimerism occurs when parental nuclei bypass syngamy and divide separately within the same egg. When syngamy takes place, the diploid offspring either develops into a queen when the oocyte is fertilized by an R sperm or into a worker when fertilized by a W sperm. This study reveals a mode of reproduction that may be associated with a conflict between lineages to preferentially enter the germ line.


Incels (and non-incel single men) significantly overestimated the importance of physical-attractiveness & financial prospects to women, &underestimated the importance of intelligence, kindness & understanding, loyalty/dependability, & humor

Costello, William, Vania Rolon, Andrew G. Thomas, and David P. Schmitt. 2023. “The Mating Psychology of Incels (involuntary Celibates): Misfortunes, Misperceptions and Misrepresentations.” OSF Preprints. April 3. doi:10.31219/osf.io/tb5ky

Abstract: Finding and retaining a mate are recurring and fundamental adaptive problems for humans. Yet there is a growing community of men, called incels (involuntary celibates) who have forged a sense of identity around their perceived inability to solve these problems. Despite significant mainstream media speculation about the potential sexual/mating psychology of incels, this has yet to be formally investigated in the scientific literature, partly due to the “hard-to-reach” nature of this group. In the first formal investigation of incel mating psychology, we compared a sample (n = 151) of self-identified male incels with non-incel males who were single (n = 150) across a range of measures. We found that, compared to non-incels, incel men have a lower sense of self-perceived mate-value and a greater external locus of control regarding their singlehood. Contrary to mainstream media narratives, incels also reported lower minimum standards for mate-preferences than non-incels. Incels (and non-incel single men) significantly overestimated the importance of physical-attractiveness and financial prospects to women, and underestimated the importance of intelligence, kindness and understanding, loyalty and dependability, and humor. Furthermore, incels underestimated women’s overall minimum mate preference standards more generally. Further exploratory analyses showed that incels are significantly shorter in height than non-incels, which could act as a barrier to selection in the mating market. We also found that incels who use forums believe that participating in the forums made their opinion of women worse. Taken together, these factors could have a deleterious effect on their mating prospects. These findings suggest that incels represent a newly identified group to target for evolutionary-psychology-informed interventions. Such interventions could help challenge cognitive distortions around female mate preferences and improve their mating intelligence and overall well-being. Other implications and directions for future research are discussed.


Friday, April 7, 2023

People felt most authentic when they exaggerated their strengths and overlooked their shortcomings

The Authentic Self Is the Self-Enhancing Self: A Self-Enhancement Framework of Authenticity. Corey L. Guenther, Yiyue Zhang, and Constantine Sedikides. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, March 31, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231160653

Abstract: Authenticity refers to behaving in a manner that aligns with one’s true self. The true self, though, is positive. From a self-enhancement standpoint, people exaggerate their strengths and overlook their shortcomings, forming positively-distorted views of themselves. We propose a self-enhancement framework of authenticity, advocating a reciprocal relation between the two constructs. Trait self-enhancement was associated with higher trait authenticity (Study 1), and day-to-day fluctuations in self-enhancement predicted corresponding variations in state authenticity (Study 2). Furthermore, manipulating self-enhancement elevated state authenticity (Studies 3–4), which was associated with meaning in life (Study 4), and manipulating authenticity augmented self-enhancement, which was associated with meaning in life and thriving (Study 5). The authentic self is largely the self-enhancing self.


People, especially those with high cognitive ability, falsely perceive others as more vulnerable to deepfakes’ impact than themselves

Examining public perception and cognitive biases in the presumed influence of deepfakes threat: empirical evidence of third person perception from three studies. Saifuddin Ahmed. Asian Journal of Communication, Mar 27 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2023.2194886

Abstract: Deepfakes have a pernicious realism advantage over other common forms of disinformation, yet little is known about how citizens perceive deepfakes. Using the third-person effects framework, this study is one of the first attempts to examine public perceptions of deepfakes. Evidence across three studies in the US and Singapore supports the third-person perception (TPP) bias, such that individuals perceived deepfakes to influence others more than themselves (Study 1–3). The same subjects also show a bias in perceiving themselves as better at discerning deepfakes than others (Study 1–3). However, a deepfakes detection test suggests that the third-person perceptual gaps are not predictive of the real ability to distinguish fake from real (Study 3). Furthermore, the biases in TPP and self-perceptions about their own ability to identify deepfakes are more intensified among those with high cognitive ability (Study 2-3). The findings contribute to third-person perception literature and our current understanding of citizen engagement with deepfakes.

Keywords: Deepfakesdeep fakesthird-person perceptionfirst-person perceptioncognitive ability


Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision; a theory of degenerate autocracy

Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy. Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin. University of Chicago, April 5, 2023. https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/BFI_WP_2023-52.pdf

Abstract: Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s government launching a war against the United States, or Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for the regime such as Mao’s Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot’s collectivization drive, they typically involve both a monumental miscalculation and an institutional environment in which better-informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. We offer a dynamic model of non-democratic politics, in which repression and bad decision-making are self-reinforcing. Repressions reduce the threat, yet raise the stakes for the incumbent; with higher stakes, the incumbent puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence. Our theory sheds light on the mechanism of disastrous individual decisions in highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes.


Keywords: nondemocratic politics, authoritarianism, dictatorship.

JEL Classification: P16, C73, D72, D83.


Most aspiring vegans and vegetarians return to eating meat: Dissatisfaction with veg*n food is the most common struggle

Faunalytics. 2023. “Bringing Back Former Vegans and Vegetarians: An Obstacle Analysis.” PsyArXiv. March 31. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8a2k9

Abstract: This Faunalytics analysis looks at the obstacles faced by people who once pursued a veg*n diet, and what they would need to resume being veg*n, in their own words.


Thursday, April 6, 2023

Comments that criticize or correct a published study are 20-40% less likely than regular papers that have a female author; in life sciences pre-prints women are missing by 20-40% in failed replications compared to regular papers

Voicing Disagreement in Science: Missing Women. David Klinowski. The Review of Economics and Statistics, March 15 2023. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01322

Abstract: This paper examines the authorship of post-publication criticisms in the scientific literature, with a focus on gender differences. Bibliometrics from journals in the natural and social sciences show that comments that criticize or correct a published study are 20-40% less likely than regular papers to have a female author. In preprints in the life sciences, prior to peer review, women are missing by 20-40% in failed replications compared to regular papers, but are not missing in successful replications. In an experiment, I then find large gender differences in willingness to point out and penalize a mistake in someone's work.

I23, J16, D91


Catholic and Protestant cities had shared comparable numbers of scientists per capita prior to the Counter-Reformation, but Catholic cities experienced a cataclysmic relative decline at C-R implementation

Cabello, Matias, The Counter-Reformation, Science, and Long-Term Growth: A Black Legend? (March 15, 2023). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4389708

Abstract: To identify effects of science on growth in the long-term, we need a shock to science which is sufficiently persistent. Was the Counter-Reformation—the Catholic reaction to Protestantism—such a shock? Did it harm science, unintentionally but enduringly, and thereby depress economic growth, as some historians have claimed? This paper presents vast evidence in favor of this contested narrative. It finds that, across Europe, Catholic and Protestant cities had shared comparable numbers of scientists per capita prior to the Counter-Reformation, but Catholic cities experienced a cataclysmic relative decline precisely when the Counter-Reformation was implemented, especially among more heavily treated units. It then shows that the shock persisted in the long term, largely thanks to the reactivation of Counter-Reformation-rooted policies centuries later. Finally, it exploits this persistence to estimate long-term growth effects and confirms them using alternative variance unrelated to the Counter-Reformation. Overall, the Counter-Reformation appears to be one of the largest shocks to science in human history.


Keywords: Science, long-term economic growth, Catholicism, Counter-Reformation, Inquisition, Spanish Empire, censorship, dictatorships, conservatism, political economy, causes of persistence

JEL Classification: N00, P00, N10, O11, O10, O30, O43, Z12, F50


Wednesday, April 5, 2023

American Infrastructure Costs: We find that spending per mile increased more than threefold from the 1960s to the 1980s

Leah Brooks & Zachary Liscow, 2023. "Infrastructure Costs," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 1-30, April. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejapp/v15y2023i2p1-30.html

Abstract: Despite infrastructure's importance to the US economy, evidence on its cost trajectory over time is sparse. We document real spending per new mile over the history of the Interstate Highway System. We find that spending per mile increased more than threefold from the 1960s to the 1980s. This increase persists even conditional on pre-existing observable geographic cost determinants. We then provide suggestive evidence on why. Input prices explain little of the increase. Statistically, changes in income and housing prices explain about half of the increase. We find suggestive evidence that the rise of "citizen voice" in government decision-making increased spending per mile.


Tuesday, April 4, 2023

He hypothesizes & empirically establishes that statehood experience, accumulated over a period of up to six millennia, lies at the deep roots of the spatial distribution of political instability across non-European countries

State history and political instability: The disadvantage of early state development. Trung V. Vu. Kyklos, March 15 2023. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12331

Abstract: This article hypothesizes and empirically establishes that statehood experience, accumulated over a period of up to six millennia, lies at the deep roots of the spatial distribution of political instability across non-European countries. Using the state history index measured between 3,500 BCE and 2000 CE, I consistently obtain precise estimates that long-standing states outside Europe, relative to their newly established counterparts, are characterized by greater political uncertainty. I postulate that a very long duration of state experience impeded the transplantation of inclusive political institutions by European colonizers, which would eventually become central to shaping countries' ability to establish politically stable regimes outside Europe. The core findings place emphasis on the long-term legacy of early state development for contemporary political instability.

5.3.2 Robustness to controlling for population diversity

It has been established that population diversity plays a central role in explaining the prevalence of social and political unrest worldwide. The underlying intuition is that countries characterized by higher degrees of population diversity, captured by ethnolinguistic fractionalization or polarization, are more likely to suffer from mistrust and the under-provision of public goods, thus increasing political uncertainty (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). A recent study by Arbatlı et al. (2020) finds that historically determined population diversity, measured by heterogeneity in the composition of genetic traits within populations, is a fundamental determinant of civil conflicts around the world. Accordingly, population diversity is positively associated with heterogeneity in preferences for public goods provision; it is therefore more difficult for the governments of highly diverse societies to reconcile such large heterogeneity and resolve collective action problems (Arbatlı et al., 2020). This line of argument suggests that my findings can be confounded by population diversity. This motivates the inclusion of three measures of population diversity in the regression. More specifically, I account for the variation in ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003), ethnolinguistic polarization (Desmet et al., 2012), and predicted genetic diversity (Ashraf & Galor, 2013) across non-European countries. As shown in Table 6, the main results retain their signs and statistical significance, suggesting that the inclusion of population heterogeneity in the regression fails to explain away the long-term influence of state history on political instability outside Europe.

Rolf Degen summarizing... Liberals view police more negatively than conservatives, in part because they imagine them doing worse things to slightly better people

Collett, Jessica L., and Kayla D. R. Pierce. 2023. “Interpreting Events Involving Police: Liberals, Conservatives, and Moderates in the Face of Ambiguity.” SocArXiv. March 31. doi:10.31235/osf.io/f2ckz

Abstract: We show political divisions in perceptions of police officers even before the divisive political and social events of 2016. We do so using 517 MTurk respondents’ interpretations of surprising and ambiguous headlines involving police officers (e.g., assumptions about what happened or who was involved). We constructed the headlines using affect control theory’s ABO event structure and derivations of this structure. The headlines describe ostensibly good people (A) doing bad things (B) to other good people (O) or are ambiguous on one or more of these components. We find that police headlines generate interest among readers. When interpreting events, respondents are less likely to modify or redefine police officers compared to other actors However, assumptions related to ambiguous events involving police differ by political orientation. Liberals view police more negatively than conservatives, in part because they imagine them doing worse things to slightly better people. Qualitative analyses support and shed light on the mechanisms underlying this and other partisan effects.


Unfortunate outcomes may provide a justification for acting dishonestly

Can misfortune lead to dishonesty? Claire Mouminoux. Rationality and Society, March 30, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231167738

Abstract: This article focuses on why people may become dishonest when they are unfortunate. Studies have shown that dishonesty increases in unfortunate or unfair situations, suggesting that misfortune could be used as a self-serving justification. I investigate this effect by analyzing the effect of luck on participant dishonesty in a laboratory experiment. I also control for participants’ belief about others’ honesty in fortunate and unfortunate situations. Participants were more dishonest when they were unfortunate and expected other participants to be more dishonest in similarly unfortunate situations. The similarity of the effects of fortune on expected and actual behaviors suggests that this norm can facilitate self-serving justification. The frequency of dishonest behavior was associated with higher individuals’ beliefs in others’ dishonesty. This effect was particularly important for participants who believed that others would have been dishonest even in fortunate situations. It therefore appears that the justification depends both on being unfortunate and the fact that some people assume others do not behave honestly even when they are fortunate.


5000 Norwegian twin pairs study: Sociological theories explaining class outcomes in terms of social origins have little explanatory power, and should be reformulated to consider genetics

Van Hootegem, Arno, Adrian F. Rogne, and Torkild H. Lyngstad. 2023. “Heritability of Class: Implications for Theory and Research on Social Mobility.” SocArXiv. March 29. doi:10.31235/osf.io/mncet

Abstract: Most individual-level outcomes of interest to sociologists are influenced by genetics. Yet, we know very little about how much genetics contribute to the attainment of class positions; which is central to stratification and mobility research. We estimate how much variation in class positions can be attributed to genetic and environmental factors in roughly 5000 Norwegian twin pairs. We show that class attainment is strongly influenced by genetics. Shared environmental factors play a modest role. Our study suggests that sociological theories explaining class outcomes in terms of social origins have little explanatory power, and should be reformulated to consider genetics.


Monday, April 3, 2023

Peltzman Revisited: Quantifying 21st-Century Opportunity Costs of Food and Drug Administration Regulation

Peltzman Revisited: Quantifying 21st-Century Opportunity Costs of Food and Drug Administration Regulation. Casey B. Mulligan. The Journal of Law & Economics, Volume 65, Number S2, November 2022. Peltzman Revisited: Quantifying 21st-Century Opportunity Costs of Food and Drug Administration

Abstract: Peltzman’s work is revisited in light of two recent opportunities to quantitatively assess trade-offs in drug regulation. First, reduced regulatory barriers to drug manufacturing associated with the 2017 reauthorization of generic-drug user fee amendments were followed by more entry and lower prices for prescription drugs. A simple, versatile industry model and historical data on entry indicate that easing restrictions on generics discourages innovation, but this cost is more than offset by benefits from enhanced competition, especially after 2016. Second, accelerated vaccine approval in 2020 had unprecedented net benefits as it improved health and changed the trajectory of the wider economy. Evidence suggests that cost-benefit analysis of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation is incomplete without accounting for substitution toward potentially unsafe and ineffective treatments that are outside FDA jurisdiction and heavily utilized before FDA approval. Moreover, the policy processes initiating the regulatory changes show an influence of Peltzman’s findings.

Consumer losses from purchases of ineffective drugs or hastily marketed unsafe drugs appear to have been trivial compared to gains from innovation. (Peltzman 1974, p. 82)


News snacking on digital media platforms does not enrich political knowledge (we learn substantially less) and at best feeds the impression of being informed

News snacking and political learning: changing opportunity structures of digital platform news use and political knowledge. Jakob Ohme & Cornelia Mothes. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, Mar 28 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2023.2193579


Abstract: The increasing prevalence of news snacking – that is, the brief, intermittent attendance to news in mainly digital and mobile media contexts – has been discussed as a problematic behavior potentially leading to a less informed public. Empirical research, however, that investigates the relationship between news snacking and political knowledge is sparse. Against the background of changed opportunity structures in increasingly digital and mobile media environments, this study investigates how news snacking relates to the breadth and depth of political knowledge in society. Based on an online survey of the German population (N = 558), we examine how snacking news affects political event and background knowledge gains using different digital news platforms. Results show that users who exhibit high levels of news snacking learn substantially less from news use across different types of digital platforms.


Keywords: News snackingpolitical knowledgepolitical learningsocial mediasmartphonesknowledge gaps

Discussion

News snacking, the habitual behavior of quickly checking and skimming through news on smartphones and digital media platforms, is a prime example of how digital media environments enable new ways of using the news. Digital media channels such as mobile devices, platforms such as social media, and an increased acceleration of the pace of life impact the opportunity structures of news usage – and, thereby, how people attend to news. Accordingly, almost 40% of our sample of German Internet users indicated agreement with statements that suggest strong news snacking behavior.2 This corroborates earlier findings that the quick checking of news items as a pastime activity and intermittent engagement with news on the go is a prevalent phenomenon in digital societies (Costera Meijer & Kormelink, Citation2015; Forgette, Citation2018; Sveningsson, Citation2015). Our study specifically asked how news snacking is related to political knowledge gains in society and utilizes a design suited to investigate learning about current affairs via news exposure. Our findings have three important implications.

First, higher levels of news snacking are conditioning the direct relationship between news use on digital platforms and political knowledge about political events and political backgrounds in a negative manner. While the difference is clear and visible across almost all platforms, it is of moderate amplitude and does not reach statistical significance in all cases. Nevertheless, it must be noted that if a more substantial body of knowledge is considered than what was possible in this study, news snacking can result in significant knowledge gaps.

Second, our study could not establish the predicted pattern that news snacking would lead to greater breadth but not depth of political knowledge (see Prior, Citation2007). Rather, we find that with increased use of most digital platforms, users that “snack” news more than others gain little from their high levels of exposure. This suggests that the short skimming of headlines when being on the go does not contribute to the promotion of informed citizenry. In extreme cases, respondents who said to mostly snack news and who attend news seven days a week (for instance, on a news website) knew as little about political current affairs as respondents who did not use news on such websites at all. Our study, hence, suggests that news snacking might indeed leave people with the impression of being informed rather than being knowledgeable, as suggested by Costera Meijer (Citation2007).

Third, we find notable differences between digital media platforms and types of knowledge. Interestingly, strong news-snacking behavior has been shown to be detrimental to learning from social media platforms with their newsfeed character and their combined function of information and entertainment. Given the high levels of social media news use in society nowadays, news snacking may be one answer to the question of why studies consistently find rather low learning outcomes of social media news use (Boukes, Citation2019; Cacciatore et al., Citation2018; Dimitrova, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Nord, Citation2014; Lee & Xenos, Citation2019; Shehata & Strömbäck, Citation2018; van Erkel & Van Aelst, Citation2020). However, we find the same pattern across almost all digital platforms for news exposure. Lower knowledge gains for “news snackers” seem to be a more universal outcome and less dependent on the platform. This suggests that users can learn from different digital platforms but that political learning outcomes depend on how, not if they use it.

Although not in the focus of the study, users of video platforms and other websites to get political information show marginal knowledge about current affairs. We can only speculate about reasons, but recent research about the usage of video platforms for news indicates that these platforms are primarily used for exposure to special interest news, often in a polarized news environment (Lopezosa, Orduna-Malea, & Pérez-Montoro, Citation2020). Furthermore, the usage of “other websites” may refer to non-journalistic actors that contribute to alternative media content. In line with the alternative nature of these sources (see Holt, Ustad Figenschou, & Frischlich Citation2019), they seem to convey little information about major political events and their backgrounds.

Limitations

Our study faces a number of limitations. First, we relied on a single-country sample and our findings are thereby limited in their explanatory power to German Internet users. Additionally, the news media exposure was measured aimed at reducing respondents’ recall bias by asking specifically about the last week. However, our data is still based on self-reports and can thus not rule out social desirability inaccuracies (e.g., Slater, Citation2004). Future research should test the relationship between news exposure and learning on an empirical basis less susceptible to perceptual distortion (e.g., Karnowski, Kümpel, Leonhard, & Leiner, Citation2017; Mothes, Knobloch-Westerwick, & Pearson Citation2019) and/or on a more fine-grained level of analysis, for example using media diary studies, data donations, or tracking data (Ohme et al., Citation2023; Araujo et al., Citation2022; Mangold, Stier, Breuer, & Scharkow Citation2021). Second, assessing the level of political knowledge is a tricky task (Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, & Rainey, Citation2014). We tried to improve previous measures by timing the current affairs questions closely with the field time of the survey for a valid assessment of learning through media use. However, the distinction between background and event knowledge may be imperfect because although some information is less likely than others to be found in headlines and teasers, we cannot be entirely certain that our distinction holds for all news coverage in the given time framesince we did not analyze news content in this study.Third, as for the explicit aim of this study to investigate the role of news snacking for political learning, it was necessary to develop a specific measure for this concept. The index that we have developed shows good internal consistency and succinct scale conformance. However, future research should put this measure to test, especially in terms of social desirability biases. Although we assess the behavioral component of media exposure with this measure, it is fair to ask how strongly this measure assesses the state of how people attend to media, rather than self-perceptions of news users (see Ohme, Araujo, Zarouali, & de Vreese Citation2022b) for a similar discussion on news avoidance behavior. The small increase in R-square in our models is another indication that news snacking only explains a small fraction of the variance in political knowledge among respondents. Future research should use more precise measures of news encounters and session length, ideally across different spatial conditions, to include the behavioral component of news snacking more strongly. Fourth, the study tested for relationships of exposure to news on different, higher-order platforms but did not distinguish between specific social media or other news platforms (e.g., different news apps or social media brands). We, therefore, suggest that future research more specifically investigates differences in political learning from using, for example, different social media and messaging platforms (e.g., Boukes, Citation2019), as it is possible that certain platform affordances and digital architectures attenuate the conditional effect of news snacking on learning (see Bossetta, Citation2018). Lastly, we rely on cross-sectional data, and although results point in the direction that people with high levels of news-snacking behavior learn less from digital news exposure, we cannot rule out the opposite interpretation, namely that people with low political knowledge show higher levels of news snacking.

New platforms in digital media environments provide new opportunity structures for accessing public affairs news, but at the same time, urge people to find new ways of navigating through the plethora of information offered to them. Intermittent, short-term attendance to headlines or teasers – as one of these strategies – seems to leave society less well-informed about political issues. In our study, people who used more superficial ways of attending to the news were less likely to know about scandals in the Federal Intelligence Agency, the latest law passed by the European Parliament, or developments that affect the environment in their own country. It is always debatable which topics are of political relevance. However, ultimately, a functioning society needs a common base of knowledge to discuss and act on. The study proposes the possibility that news snacking indeed leads to lower levels of knowledge in some digital contexts, especially in cases of high news use frequency, where people may think they attend to news a lot but still learn very little. This begs the question of how news media can secure a healthy diet of political knowledge among citizens when the formerly full meal of news exposure more and more becomes a snack.

Sunday, April 2, 2023

For male winners, wealth increases marriage formation and reduces divorce risk, suggesting wealth increases men’s attractiveness as prospective and current partners

Fortunate Families? The Effects of Wealth on Marriage and Fertility. David Cesarini, Erik Lindqvist, Robert Östling & Anastasia Terskaya. NBER Working Paper 31039, March 2023. DOI 10.3386/w31039


Abstract: We estimate the effects of large, positive wealth shocks on marriage and fertility in a sample of Swedish lottery players. For male winners, wealth increases marriage formation and reduces divorce risk, suggesting wealth increases men’s attractiveness as prospective and current partners. Wealth also increases male fertility. The only discernible effect on female winners is that wealth increases their short-run (but not long-run) divorce risk. Our results for divorce are consistent with a model where the wealthier spouse retains most of his/her wealth in divorce. In support of this assumption, we show divorce settlements in Sweden often favor the richer spouse.


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My comment... "[W]e show divorce settlements in Sweden often favor the richer spouse." What was this supposed to mean? Are we implying here that divorce should be confiscatory of wealth? Divorce courts as the great redistributors? Or was this printed to balance the main message, that men that increase wealth have less contentious spouses, and this reflects, from a traditional viewpoint, badly in the spouses?


Exposure to insecticide baits that contain glucose has messed up the cockroaches' love game, forcing males to de-sweet their nuptial gifts and to hasten copulation

Gustatory polymorphism mediates a new adaptive courtship strategy. Ayako Wada-Katsumata, Eduardo Hatano and Coby Schal. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Mar 29 2023. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2022.2337


Abstract: Human-imposed selection can lead to adaptive changes in sensory traits. However, rapid evolution of the sensory system can interfere with other behaviours, and animals must overcome such sensory conflicts. In response to intense selection by insecticide baits that contain glucose, German cockroaches evolved glucose-aversion (GA), which confers behavioural resistance against baits. During courtship the male offers the female a nuptial gift that contains maltose, which expediates copulation. However, the female's saliva rapidly hydrolyses maltose into glucose, which causes GA females to dismount the courting male, thus reducing their mating success. Comparative analysis revealed two adaptive traits in GA males. They produce more maltotriose, which is more resilient to salivary glucosidases, and they initiate copulation faster than wild-type males, before GA females interrupt their nuptial feeding and dismount the male. Recombinant lines of the two strains showed that the two emergent traits of GA males were not genetically associated with the GA trait. Results suggest that the two courtship traits emerged in response to the altered sexual behaviour of GA females and independently of the male's GA trait. Although rapid adaptive evolution generates sexual mismatches that lower fitness, compensatory behavioural evolution can correct these sensory discrepancies.


Moral licensing, taking the liberty of acting reprehensibly when one has done something good, only occurs when the good deed had been observed

Rotella, Amanda, Jisoo Jung, Christopher Chinn, and Pat Barclay. 2023. “Observation Moderates the Moral Licensing Effect: A Meta-analytic Test of Interpersonal and Intrapsychic Mechanisms.” PsyArXiv. March 28. doi:10.31234/osf.io/tmhe9

Abstract: Moral licensing occurs when someone who initially behaved morally subsequently acts less morally. We apply reputation-based theories to predict when and why moral licensing would occur. Specifically, our pre-registered predictions were that (1) participants observed during the licensing manipulation would have larger licensing effects, and (2) unambiguous dependent variables would have smaller licensing effects. In a pre-registered multi-level meta-analysis of 111 experiments (N = 19,335), we found a larger licensing effect when participants were observed (Hedge’s g = 0.61) compared to unobserved (Hedge’s g = 0.14). Ambiguity did not moderate the effect. The overall moral licensing effect was small (Hedge’s g = 0.18). We replicated these analyses using robust Bayesian meta-analysis and found strong support for the moral licensing effect only when participants are observed. These results suggest that the moral licensing effect is predominantly an interpersonal effect based on reputation, rather than an intrapsychic effect based on self-image.


Both Democrats and Republicans discriminate against applicants with a political orientation that does not match their own, with Democrats doing even more discriminating

Judging Job Applicants by Their Politics: Effects of Target–Rater Political Dissimilarity on Discrimination, Cooperation, and Stereotyping. Samantha Sinclair, Artur Nilsson, Jens Agerström. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, Volume 11 (1), Mar 2023. https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/9855


Abstract: Despite well-known problems associated with political prejudice, research that examines effects of political dissimilarity in organizational contexts is scarce. We present findings from a pre-registered experiment (N = 973, currently employed) which suggest that both Democrats and Republicans negatively stereotype and discriminate against job applicants with a political orientation that is dissimilar to their own. The effects were small for competence perceptions, moderate for hiring judgments, and large for warmth ratings and willingness to cooperate and socialize with the applicant. The effects of political orientation on hiring judgments and willingness to cooperate and socialize were mediated by stereotype content, particularly warmth. Furthermore, for all outcomes except competence judgments, Democrats discriminated and stereotyped applicants to a larger extent than Republicans did. These findings shed light on the consequences of applicants revealing their political orientation and have implications for the promotion of diversity in organizations.


I observed line performance actually dropping when lines were actively supervised, a result I began calling a reverse Hawthorne effect

Bernstein, E. 2012 The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organizational Learning and Operational Control. Administrative Science Quarterly 57(2): 181-216. 2012. TransparencyParadox-ASQ-June2012


Hiding in broad daylight.

During this first phase of the research, it became clear almost immediately  that operators were hiding their most innovative techniques from management so as not to “bear the cost of explaining better ways of doing things to others” or alternatively “get in trouble” for doing things differently. One of the first rules in which my researchers were trained by peers was how to act whenever a customer, manager, line leader, or any other outsider came in sight of the line. First the embeds were quietly shown “better ways” of accomplishing tasks by their peers—a “ton of little tricks” that “kept production going” or enabled “faster, easier, and/or safer production.” Then they were told “whenever the [customers/managers/leaders] come around, don’t do that, because they’ll get mad.” Instead, when under observation, embeds were trained in the art of appearing to perform the task the way it was “meant” to be done according to the codified process rules posted for each task. Because many of these performances were not as productive as the “little tricks,” I observed line performance actually dropping when lines were actively supervised, a result I began calling a reverse Hawthorne effect because productivity fell, not rose, as a result of an observer. My embeds’ privileged role as participant-observers, along with the substantial hours of research time on the lines, allowed me to collect numerous examples of these productively deviant behaviors, the performances that were used to hide them, and their antecedents, across categories of tasks. Table 1 provides some selected examples, and Online Appendix A provides even more. Meanwhile, suggestion boxes on every line remained empty.

...

...In most cases, the hidden behavior involved doing something “better” or “faster” or to “keep production going,” often by engaging in activities that operators claimed were “not hard” and had been learned by “watching [others] do it,” a form of tribal knowledge on the factory floor. What operators described as “their” [management’s] way of doing things often involved “more procedures” and was “a lot slower,” whereas the improved, more “fluid” methods were necessary to avoid complaints from management about the line “being so slow.” In an operator’s words, the deviance doesn’t “cause any [quality or safety] problems and it keeps production moving."

Such private deviance in workplaces is common and well documented (Roy, 1952; Burawoy, 1979; Mars, 1982; Anteby, 2008). What made the deviance in this context so interesting is that so much of it appeared to be productive for line performance—and that such productive deviance existed even though the workers, who were paid a flat rate by shift and not piece rate, had no financial incentive to enhance performance. A shift’s quota was set by production managers for clusters of similar lines based on demand for the products being produced, and performance expectations (e.g., the number of defectfree devices produced per hour) were based on a combination of engineers’ pilot testing of lines during the initial ramp-up of that product’s production and an assumption of learning over time, based on previous PrecisionMobile experience with similar products and tasks. Exceeding expectations resulted in waiting time, standing at the stations, at the end of a shift, but there was little more positive incentive than that. Nor did negative incentives, such as disciplinary methods or penalties, explain the productive deviance. When lines failed to meet performance expectations, traditional Toyota Production System or TQM methods—poka-yoke, in-station quality control, jidoka, five why’s, kaizen, small group activities (SGA), Ishikawa fishbone diagrams, among others—were employed to find the root cause and correct the error. Discipline of individual operators could range from simple warnings to removal, but though the embeds witnessed a few warnings, they witnessed nothing more significant than that. In contrast to several other large contract manufacturers in the region, PrecisionMobile had a reputation among the workers for being one of the best local places to work, and at least one operator cited fairness in discipline as part of the reason. Nothing we witnessed about the incentive structure explained the workers’ motivation to be productively deviant. Although the factory was located in China, its management systems and approach were quite standard globally or what the company called best practice. On visits to similar PrecisionMobile facilities elsewhere in the world, I found that the systems were nearly identical.


Discussion [of study 1]

Privacy and the reverse Hawthorne effect.

The participant-observers’ experiences at Precision were not consistent with prior theory that transparency enables performance. Instead, transparency appeared to keep operators from getting their best work done. The operators’ choice of the word “privacy” went to the core of my observations of these behavioral responses to transparent factory design. Mechanisms for achieving transparency not only improved the vision of the observer but also of the observed, and increased awareness of being observed in this setting had a negative impact on performance, generating a reverse Hawthorne effect. 

This unanticipated outcome may, in part, be explained by Zajonc’s (1965) finding that mere exposure to others affects individual behavior by activating dominant, practiced responses over experimental, riskier, learning responses, possibly more so in an evaluative context (Cottrell, 1972), and has been found to encourage a number of other social facilitation dysfunctions (Hackman, 1976; Bond and Titus, 1983). Similarly, at the group level, increased observability can lead to less effective brainstorming (Paulus, Larey, and Ortega, 1995), blind conformity (Asch, 1951, 1956), and groupthink (Janis, 1982). But qualitative data collected at Precision suggests that the reverse Hawthorne effect went beyond passive social facilitation effects to something more intentional and strategic, thus necessitating a look at the full implications of what the operators referred to as the need for and value of “privacy” on the factory floor. 

A vast interdisciplinary body of theory, located primarily outside of the management sciences, argues for the existence of an instrumental human need for transparency’s opposite, privacy—what Burgoon et al. (1989: 132) defined as “the ability to control and limit physical, interactional, psychological, and informational access to the self or to one’s group” (see also Westin, 1967; Altman, 1975; Parent, 1983; Schoeman, 1984; Solove, 2008). The need for privacy exists at both individual and group levels. Simmel (1957: 1) stated that normal human behavior involves cycles of engagement and withdrawal from others—“directly as well as symbolically, bodily as well as spiritually, we are continually separating our bonds and binding our separations.” Boundaries providing freedom from transparency, creating a state of privacy, have been found to enable the authenticity required for meaningful experimentation (Simmel, 1950), the generation of new ideas (Eysenck, 1995; Hargadon, 2003; Simonton, 2003; cf. Sutton and Kelley, 1997), the maintenance of expertise attached to professional identity (Anteby, 2008), the capacity to trust others (Scheler, 1957), and the maintenance of long-term meaningful relationships and group associations (Mill, 1859; Simmel, 1950; Schwarz, 1968; Ingham, 1978; Kanter and Khurana, 2009), all behaviors associated with effective knowledge sharing (Edmondson, 2002) and “enabling” operational control (Hackman and Wageman, 1995; Adler and Borys, 1996). In this body of literature, privacy is the solution for those who identify a panopticon-like awareness of being visible (Foucault, 1977: 201–203) to be a problem. 

While use of the term “privacy” has not diffused broadly from the jurisprudential and philosophical literatures into the management sciences, a number of pivotal studies in organizational behavior have touched on the value of privacy without using the term itself. Rich discussions of the value of boundaries in both the sociological and networks literatures (for reviews, see Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Lazer and Friedman, 2007, respectively) suggest that forming productive individual and group identity requires four components, the first of which is “a boundary separating me from you or us from them” (Tilly, 2003) or what the PrecisionMobile operators called the “privacy we need to get our work done” (emphasis added). Although a highly productive literature has emerged on the management of knowledge across such boundaries (e.g., Carlile, 2004; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008), few management scholars have focused on the strategic placement or creation of the boundaries themselves.  Yet if privacy breeds authenticity, and authenticity enables engaging in hidden yet beneficial behavior, the creation of organizational boundaries should be of great strategic importance. “Boundary objects” are required for defining different social worlds (Star and Griesemer, 1989), can take the form of “material objects, organizational forms, conceptual spaces or procedures” (Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 180), and have been found to be important for supporting coordinated action and common knowledge at the group level (Chwe, 2001). There are, of course, group and individual boundary objects that do not involve physical perimeters or “borders” (e.g., race, gender, status), but those that do rely on some degree of visibility-based privacy (e.g., a wall, fence, cubicle) to demarcate “us” from “them” (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). Where such boundaries are permitted, and how permeable they are, has profound implications for one’s feeling of privacy and, therefore, behavior. Where such boundaries are prohibited, at least in the case of Precision, the implication appears to be rampant, creative, and costly hiding of deviant behavior, precisely the kind of hiding that transparency is theorized to avoid.


Saturday, April 1, 2023

Demography Leads to More Conservative European Societies

Fieder, Martin and Huber, Susanne, Demography Leads to More Conservative European Societies. Mar 20233. SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4384438

Abstract: On basis of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (in total 66,188 participants from 14 European countries) and the European Gender and Generation Survey (in total 121,248 participants from 11 countries), we investigated i) whether differences in political attitude and attitudes on family values (i.e. attitude towards homosexual couples, attitude towards female reproduction) are associated with differences in the average number of children, and ii) whether such an association between fertility and attitudes affects the population share of those attitudes in the following generations.We found that in most analyzed countries, right-wing/conservative individuals have, on average, more children and grandchildren than left-wing/liberal individuals. We further found that the proportion of right-wing/conservative individuals increases from generation to generation. These findings suggest that differential demography may lead to a shift of prevailing political attitudes.


Keywords: political attitude, family attitudes, fertility, Europe


Examining the Sexual Double Standards and Hypocrisy in Partner Suitability Appraisals Within a Norwegian Sample

Examining the Sexual Double Standards and Hypocrisy in Partner Suitability Appraisals Within a Norwegian Sample. Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair et al. Evolutionary Psychology, March 27, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/14747049231165687

Abstract: Sexual double standards are social norms that impose greater social opprobrium on women versus men or that permit one sex greater sexual freedom than the other. This study examined sexual double standards when choosing a mate based on their sexual history. Using a novel approach, participants (N = 923, 64% women) were randomly assigned to make evaluations in long-term or short-term mating contexts and asked how a prospective partner's sexual history would influence their own likelihood of having sex (short-term) or entering a relationship (long-term) with them. They were then asked how the same factors would influence the appraisal they would make of male and female friends in a similar position. We found no evidence of traditional sexual double standards for promiscuous or sexually undesirable behavior. There was some evidence for small sexual double standard for self-stimulation, but this was in the opposite direction to that predicted. There was greater evidence for sexual hypocrisy as sexual history tended to have a greater negative impact on suitor assessments for the self rather than for same-sex friends. Sexual hypocrisy effects were more prominent in women, though the direction of the effects was the same for both sexes. Overall, men were more positive about women's self-stimulation than women were, particularly in short-term contexts. Socially undesirable sexual behavior (unfaithfulness, mate poaching, and jealous/controlling) had a large negative impact on appraisals of a potential suitor across all contexts and for both sexes. Effects of religiosity, disgust, sociosexuality, and question order effects are considered.

Discussion

The study of SDS has yielded several important results. First, we found a lack of evidence for SDS effects in the traditional direction. Second, we found that people were more discerning of a prospective mate's sexual history in long-term versus short-term contexts and that women were more discerning than men. Third, we found that participants showed some level of hypocrisy—being more cautious when making appraisals for themselves compared to a same-sex friend. Fourth, we found that sexual histories could be reduced to three factors: self-stimulation, promiscuity, and cheating & controlling, and that these factors affected appraisals and were the subjects of SDS and hypocrisy effects in different ways. Finally, we found little evidence that covariates affected the pattern of the results in a meaningful way. We now discuss these key findings in turn.

A Lack of SDS at the Personal Level

Generally, when people are asked what norms, they believe exist in society, they tend to confirm traditional SDS (the societal level). However, when people are asked what attitudes they themselves hold (appraisals at the personal level), the pattern can disappear (Crawford & Popp, 2003). Overall, and in line with our predictions, we found a lack of evidence for traditional SDS, and we actually found a reversed sexual double standard in the case of self-stimulation and promiscuous behavior. Rather than women being judged harshly for engaging in porn use, masturbation, and sex toy ownership, they were actually judged to be a slightly more suitable partner for a male friend in short-term contexts, regardless of participant gender, while this aspect of their history had little influence on their suitability as a long-term one. Men in contrast were judged as negatively on the basis of their self-stimulating behavior—more so by women than men and particularly in long-term contexts. Notably, promiscuous women were not evaluated more negatively than promiscuous men in long-term MCs. This pattern was found regardless of perspective (first or third person) and largely generalized to self-stimulating targets and targets with cheating & controlling behavior (unfaithful, jealous, or mate poaching).

Mating Context and Participant Sex Moderate Appraisals of Sexual History

In this study, we were able to address the fact that little research has considered the role of short-term versus long-term contexts when studying SDS, taking for granted differences in sexual mating psychology that varies both by sex and mating strategy (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). We found that context matters—people rated potential suitors with a sexual history of promiscuity, self-stimulation, and cheating or controlling more harshly if they were considering them as a long-term mate than a short-term one. This difference likely comes from the fact that one of the adaptive problems of those following a short-term mating strategy is identifying opportunities for casual sex. Promiscuity and self-stimulation may act as cues for access and so are tolerated more than in long-term contexts where immediate sexual access becomes less important. Cheating & controlling may have been considered less relevant within short-term contexts for the same reason that kindness is seen as less important in short-term contexts (Li & Kenrick, 2006). Short-term relationships by their very definition make these attributes less relevant—cheating & controlling dynamics tend to happen within ongoing relationships rather than one-night stands.
Another moderator was the sex of the participant. In line with our second prediction, facts about a prospective partner's sexual history generally led to women toward more negative appraisals of than men, regardless of whether they were making judgments for themselves or for same-sex friends. This sex difference was particularly evident for self-stimulating behavior. These sex differences likely reflect the historical asymmetries in the risks associated with sex for men and women. In terms of their reproductive health, having somatic resources “tided up,” and social reputation, the risks of poor sexual decisions for men have historically been much lower than those for women, causing them to evolve to be more cautious about how, when, and with whom they procreate (Buss & Schmitt, 1993).

Is Sexual Hypocrisy a Specific Form of Sexual Double Standard?

By asking participants to make appraisals for themselves, we were in the unique position to examine sexual hypocrisy. Generally, we found that the participants were less willing to pursue an opposite-sex target following sexual history information but were less cautious when appraising same-sex friends in the same situation. This was also true for men in the short-term context, although these men made relatively fewer negative appraisals for self versus male friend compared to women in both MCs and men in a long-term MC. The reason for this difference we suspect lies with the relative risk to the participant associated with the choice. It would pay to be particularly cautious when making decisions for oneself because one must bear the consequences of that decision. The consequences for even the most beloved friend will always have less of an effect on the self. If this explanation holds then further research should find that appraisals of others’ behavior and choices should track the extent to which negative consequences would impact the decision maker—such as degree of genetic relatedness and interdependence (Apostolou, 2017Biegler & Kennair, 2016Perilloux et al., 2008). The traditional double standard is mainly expected to be present in assessment of daughters’, sisters’, mothers’, and wives’ behaviors, not the behavior of sexually available women one is not related to.
Further, appraisals differed for the three behaviors, suggesting that SDS and sexual hypocrisy was not similar for promiscuity, self-stimulation, and cheating & controlling behaviors. The (reversed) SDS effect was more evident for self-stimulation, and more evident in the short-term context, and the sexual hypocrisy effect was stronger for women than for men albeit less pronounced for self-stimulation. Evidently, sexual history is not necessarily best conceptualized as negative information, sometimes sexual history is clearly negative (cheating & controlling behavior), however, self-stimulation is generally not considered negative behavior. The SST perspective highlights the importance of how both sex of actor and MC will influence appraisals of sexual history, for example a woman's sexual availability cues will be assessed more positive for men in a short-term setting than men's sexual availability will be assessed by women. There is more insight to be garnered about further specific sex acts.

Effects of Individual Differences

During our analyses, we included several covariates that one might expect to influence how people use information about sexual history including religiosity, sexual disgust, and sociosexuality. Our third prediction regarding the effect of these individual differences was supported on an overall level. Higher levels of religiosity and sexual disgust, and more restricted sociosexuality were all associated with more negative appraisals of targets with a sexual history. Contrary to our expectation however, the effect of religiosity was not limited to short-term sexual relationships. Overall, while there was evidence that these individual differences affect how sexual history information is used more broadly, these did not seem to enhance or reduce SDS or sexual hypocrisy effects.
Overall, these findings, although original, dovetail neatly with the general finding in the literature that people rarely express the traditional double standard when they judge sexually active others. Further, considering both sexes in both MCs reveals predictable sex differences, where especially men are less negative toward sexually active women in a short-term context. Sexual availability is considered attractive and signaling this is an effective way for women to self-promote or flirt in short-term contexts (Bendixen & Kennair, 2015Kennair et al., 2022).
The most interesting aspect of these findings may be that so many expect to find the traditional pattern expressed in modern society. An implicit negative attitude toward short-term sexual relations might be part of the explanation of why people continue to believe in the traditional sexual double standard. Intrasexual competition between women is probably also a driving mechanism, attempting to downregulate inflation for sexual access. However, the narrative might be leftover norm expectations from an era when there actually was more sexual control over women than men, for example because of religiosity. There are two aspects of the current findings that suggest that this explanation may be too simple. First, while the participants in the current study are from a highly secularized society, egalitarian and sexually liberal society compared to the United States (Bendixen et al., 2017), there are similar findings of reversed double standards or single standards in US samples, too (Crawford & Popp, 2003). Also, religiosity did generally influence the pattern of results for the SDS (although for own pursuit, religiosity was a robust covariate), although religious men were more critical of women for the socially undesirable behaviors factor. This question probably needs resolving with data from even less egalitarian, more religious, and less sexually societies. In the meantime, taking double sexual standards for granted and telling young women about the existence of such double standards, when indeed they might not exist, is probably more limiting for people's sexual liberty than other people's actual attitudes. Displaying a more sex-positive attitude, especially toward short-term sex, may be a better approach, than spreading the myths of traditional double standards and that primarily males are negative to an active female sexuality and agency.

Limitations

The main limitation of the current work is that it was conducted on a convenience sample from a secular country which is high in sexual liberalism and has high gender egality. It is entirely possible that SDS are reduced in such countries and would reveal themselves more in countries which are more conservative and religious. Thus, a key future direction would be to replicate these findings in other countries to test for cross-cultural consistency, though often such research demonstrates that mating psychology is remarkably canalized (Thomas et al., 2020). Further, one variable that was not controlled for in the current study was degree of relatedness between friends and participants. Future studies might consider more social dimensions by including different degrees of genetic relatedness and social relations.
Despite sample characteristics, the random assignment procedure into short-term or long-term MCs and question-order manipulation ensures comparability of these factors. Another possible limitation is the comparison for testing hypocrisy; self-suitor versus same-sex friend appraisals that are not directly comparable regarding content. In the self-suitor appraisal, we asked the respondent to consider to what extent the target's sexual behavior reduced or increased the likelihood of pursuing ONS/relationship, while in the same-sex friend appraisal we asked the respondent to report the degree that their friend should pursue an ONS/relationship. The latter might appear more moralistic than the former.

Although daughters and their parents rated ambition and intelligence as the most important qualities of a husband for daughters, in the concrete case, both parties chose the more attractive man

Fugère, M. A., Ciccarelli, N. C., & Cousins, A. J. (2023). The importance of physical attractiveness and ambition/intelligence to the mate choices of women and their parents. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Mar 2023. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000325

Abstract: When women make mate choices, they face potential conflict with their parents. Evolutionary theory predicts, and prior research confirms, that daughters value physical attractiveness (as a signal of genetic quality) more than their parents do when considering a partner for their daughters. However, prior research also shows that daughters and their parents value the most important traits of a mate for daughters similarly (e.g., mutual love, intelligence, etc.). We assessed self-reported mate preferences and responses to an experimental manipulation among 150 daughter–parent pairs. We varied men's physical attractiveness (more vs. less attractive) and ascribed personality characteristics (ambitious/intelligent vs. disorganized/physically fit) in a 2 × 2 independent groups design, testing 8 hypotheses evaluating the relative importance of physical attractiveness and personality traits. Self-reported ratings by both women and their parents indicated that the traits ambition and intelligence were significantly more important than physical attractiveness for a long-term mate for daughters. And, across conditions, both daughters and parents rated the ambitious and intelligent man as a more desirable dating partner than the more attractive man. However, when asked to choose the best mate for daughters, both daughters (68.7%) and their parents (63.3%) chose the more attractive man as the best long-term dating partner for daughters, regardless of his ascribed traits. Furthermore, daughters’ and parents’ choices corresponded 79% of the time. Physical attractiveness may be more important to both daughters and parents than self-reported responses suggest and actual daughter–parent conflict over physical attractiveness in chosen partnerships may be less prevalent than perceived conflict. 


Across the world, adoption of the internet was associated with greater life satisfaction and social well-being

Vuorre, Matti, and Andrew K. Przybylski. 2023. “A Multiverse Analysis of the Associations Between Internet Use and Well-being.” PsyArXiv. March 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jp5nd

Abstract: Internet technologies’ and platforms’ potential psychological consequences remain debated. While these technologies have spurred new forms of commerce, education, and leisure, many are worried that they might negatively affect individuals by, for example, displacing time spent on other healthy activities. Relevant findings to date have been inconclusive and of limited geographic and demographic scope. We examined whether having (mobile) internet access or actively using the internet predicted eight well-being outcomes from 2006 to 2021 among 2,414,294 individuals across 168 countries. We first queried the extent to which well-being varied as a function of internet connectivity. Then, we examined these associations’ robustness in a multiverse of 33,792 analysis specifications. 84.9% of these resulted in positive and statistically significant associations between internet connectivity and well-being. These results indicate that internet access and use predict well-being positively and independently from a set of plausible alternatives.


Friday, March 31, 2023

Understand what people desire most in a work of art... "In nearly every country all people really wanted was a landscape with a few figures around, animals in the foreground, mainly blue"

The age of average. Alex Murrell. Mar 20 2023. https://www.alexmurrell.co.uk/articles/the-age-of-average

In the early 1990s, two Russian artists named Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid took the unusual step of hiring a market research firm. Their brief was simple. Understand what Americans desire most in a work of art.

Over 11 days the researchers at Marttila & Kiley Inc. asked 1,001 US citizens a series of survey questions.

What’s your favourite colour? Do you prefer sharp angles or soft curves? Do you like smooth canvases or thick brushstrokes? Would you rather figures that are nude or clothed? Should they be at leisure or working? Indoors or outside? In what kind of landscape? 

Komar and Melamid then set about painting a piece that reflected the results. The pair repeated this process in a number of countries including Russia, China, France and Kenya.

Each piece in the series, titled “People’s Choice”, was intended to be a unique a collaboration with the people of a different country and culture.

But it didn’t quite go to plan.

Describing the work in his book Playing to the Gallery, the artist Grayson Perry said:

“In nearly every country all people really wanted was a landscape with a few figures around, animals in the foreground, mainly blue.”

Despite soliciting the opinions of over 11,000 people, from 11 different countries, each of the paintings looked almost exactly the same. 

[Komar and Melamid, People’s Choice]


After completing the work, Komar quipped:

“We have been travelling to different countries, engaging in dull negotiations with representatives of polling companies, raising money for further polls, receiving more or less the same results, and painting more or less the same blue landscapes. Looking for freedom, we found slavery.”

[full piece at the link above]

Thursday, March 30, 2023

Women consistently reported less inequality for themselves than they reported for their group, and for both sexes, political leanings predicted support for gender equality more strongly than perceived personal and societal inequality

Political Ideology Outdoes Personal Experience in Predicting Support for Gender Equality. A. Timur Sevincer, Cindy Galinsky, Lena Martensen, Gabriele Oettingen. Political Psychology, March 27 2023. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12887

Abstract: Indices of gender equality provide an inconsistent picture of current gender inequality in countries with relatively high equality. We examined women's and men's subjectively perceived gender inequality and their support for gender equality in the general population and in politicians, respectively, in three countries with relatively high gender equality: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (total N = 1,612). In both women's and men's perceptions, women were treated more unequally than men. However, the inequality that women perceived was larger than the inequality men perceived. Additionally, women reported they personally experience less inequality than women as a group (person-group discrepancy). Finally, women's and men's left/liberal (vs. right/conservative) political ideology turned out to be a relatively more powerful predictor of support for gender equality than perceived personal and societal inequality. We discuss reasons for why political ideology emerged as the strongest predictor of equality support and sketch out implications for policy efforts toward promoting gender equality.

Inconsistent Indices of Gender Equality

The indices estimate gender inequality by looking at indicators for inequality from various life domains to calculate an overall inequality index. Inconsistencies arise because the indices may focus on different domains and use different indicators, scale formats, and calculation formulas.

Global Gender Gap Index

The GGGI focuses on four domains: economy, politics, education, and health. It uses indicators such as income, women in ministerial positions, literacy rate, and sex ratio at birth, among others. The GGGI calculates women's disadvantage compared to men and can take values between 1 (complete disadvantage for women) and 0 (no disadvantage for women). Advantages for women on some indicators (more women holding degrees than men) do not cancel out disadvantages on others.

Gender Inequality Index

The GII focuses on the same four domains as the GGGI: economy, politics, education, and health. It uses different indicators however: women in the workforce, women in parliament, academic degrees, maternal mortality, among others. Like the GGGI, the GII calculates women's disadvantage compared to men and can take values between 0 (complete disadvantage for women) and 1 (no disadvantage for women). As with the GGGI, advantages for women on some indicators do not cancel out disadvantages on others.

Basic Index of Gender Inequality

The BIGI focuses on three domains. As the GGGI and GII, it focuses on education and health. It also focuses on life satisfaction. And it uses different indicators than the GGGI and GI: years of secondary education, life expectancy, and self-reported well-being, among others. Unlike the GGGI and GII, the BIGI calculates women's and men's disadvantage compared to each other. It can take values between −1 (complete disadvantage for men) and 1 (complete disadvantage for women), with 0 being equality (no advantage/ disadvantage for women or men). With the BIGI, advantages for one gender on some indicators can cancel out disadvantages on others.

Actively Supporting Gender Equality

Gender equality involves not only equal rights but also equal access to resources and opportunities. Arguments for improving gender equality involve moral reasons (both genders1 should be treated equally fairly) and economic reasons (the economy benefits when both genders are treated equally fairly). In principle, both genders may benefit from more equality (when social norms allow both men and women to take on whichever role they prefer).

As for what leads people to actively support equality, the starting point may be some objective disadvantage (e.g., fewer rights for one gender). Support for equality may also be instigated, however, by people subjectively perceiving inequality, disadvantage, or injustice (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Several mediating mechanisms have been proposed for the link between inequality perceptions and equality support. These involve shared identity or fate with the disadvantaged (Jenkins et al., 2021), political involvement (Castle et al., 2020), and efficacy to bring about change (van Zomeren et al., 2008), among others.

Perceived Personal Versus Societal Inequality

Research on how people perceive inequality distinguishes between inequality people personally experience and inequality people believe their group experiences. The inequality people personally experience is how they perceive themselves treated compared to a member of another group. This perceived personal inequality is also known as personal discrimination or egoistic relative deprivation. The inequality people believe their group experiences is how they perceive their group is treated compared to another group. This perceived societal inequality is also known as group discrimination or collective relative deprivation (Foster & Matheson, 1995; Moghaddam et al., 1997).

People often report the inequality they themselves experience as being different from the inequality their group experiences. For example, members of historically disadvantaged groups (women) reported experiencing less discrimination personally than they reported their group experiences, even though they were objectively discriminated against (Crosby, 19821984). The literature identified four reasons for this person-group discrepancy: First, people deny personal disadvantage to avoid discomfort and maintain a sense of control (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995). Second, they exaggerate their group's disadvantage to promote change (Taylor et al., 1990). Third, they overestimate their group's disadvantage because examples of the group's disadvantage come easier to mind (availability heuristic; Moghaddam et al., 1997). Fourth, they compare themselves to a different reference group when estimating personal disadvantage (themselves to other group members) versus group disadvantage (their group to another group; Kessler et al., 2000). Because many societies have achieved more gender equality in the last decades and respective studies are now at least 25 years old (Crosby, 19821984, Moghaddam et al., 1997), we were interested in how much gender inequality women and men would perceive in present time and whether there would still be a person-group discrepancy. Moreover, both perceived personal inequality and perceived societal inequality should promote readiness to reduce the inequality (Kessler et al., 2000).