Dictator game: Aversion to taking is strong, and dictators are willing to sacrifice 31% of endowment to avoid taking

Taking Aversion. Oleg Korenoka, Edward L. Millnera, Laura Razzolinib. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.021

Highlights
•    New experiment to measure whether dictators prefer a giving game to a taking game with identical payoff possibilities.
•    Most dictators prefer the giving game
•    Aversion to taking is strong: dictators are willing to sacrifice 31% of endowment to avoid taking.
•    Consistent with Levitt and List's model of social preferences: moral cost of taking exceeds the moral cost of not giving.

Abstract: We determine whether the moral cost of taking exceeds the moral cost of not giving. We design and conduct an experiment to determine whether a dictator prefers a giving game over a taking game when the payoff possibilities are identical and to measure the strength of the preference. We find that aversion to taking is prevalent and strong. Over 85% of the dictators in our experiment choose to play a giving game over a taking game when the payoff possibilities are identical and, on average, dictators are willing to sacrifice over 31% of their endowment to avoid taking.

Keywords: Taking; Dictator Game; Impure Altruism; Equivalent Variation