Bullshitting frequency was positively associated with overclaiming and negatively associated with sincere self-presentation, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, & self-regard

Littrell, Shane, Evan Risko, and Jonathan A. Fugelsang. 2019. “The Bullshitting Frequency Scale: Development and Psychometric Properties.” PsyArXiv. September 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dxzqh

Abstract: Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo-profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act), leaving several important theoretical questions thus far unanswered. Here, we present results from three studies focusing on the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in bullshitting in everyday situations. Overall, bullshitting frequency was positively associated with overclaiming and negatively associated with sincere self-presentation, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard. These results represent an important step forward by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in everyday bullshitting.

Introduction

“One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share.” – Harry Frankfurt (1986)

Given the increasing prevalence of misleading information and “fake news” on the internet and society at large (Lewandosky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017), a growing body of work has emerged that focuses on better understanding the nature of bullshit and bullshitting. Some has been more descriptive, highlighting the use of bullshit in politics (Kristansen & Kaussler, 2018), business organizations (Martin & Wilson, 2011; Spicer, 2013), academic settings (Cohen, 2012), and everyday life (Frankfurt, 1986). Other research, in psychology, has taken a more empirical approach, examining individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit and the production of bullshit (i.e., bullshitting). For instance, multiple studies have linked bullshit receptivity (i.e., the propensity to rate vacuous, randomly-generated statements as profound) to factors such as decreased engagement in analytic thinking (Pennycook, Cheyene, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) and biased pattern perception (Walker, Turpin, Stolz, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2019). Other work has examined the functions of bullshit production (i.e., bullshitting) as a strategy for managing impressions and attitude change in areas from simple social interactions to assessments of abstract art (Petrocelli, 2018; Turpin et al., 2019).


Bullshitting, broadly defined

Philosopher Harry Frankfurt (1986) is perhaps best known for his seminal piece, On Bullshit, in which he described a “bullshitter” as a person who deliberately conveys a false/phony impression of himself or his intentions in a way that is unconcerned with the truth. In other words, the veracity of what the bullshitter is saying does not matter, as his or her primary concern is whether others are persuaded by it. Frankfurt contrasts this from lying in that the liar is deliberately attempting to get others to believe a falsehood. A key distinction is in the motivation; a liar’s goal is to deceive whereas a bullshitter’s goal is often to impress.

Though this explication of bullshitting is generally well-regarded, some have critiqued it as capturing “just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit” (Cohen, 2012). Indeed, several have modified or expanded on his definitions to provide a more comprehensive view of bullshitting in daily life. For instance, Cohen (2012) highlighted that the aim of some bullshitters is to impress using discourse constructed with “unclarifiable unclarity”; that is, relying on vacuous, confusing buzzwords which obscure the fact that the statements, while superficially impressive, contain no discernible meaning. An example cited is the arguably impenetrable, jargon-heavy writing found in some academic publications. For Cohen, this type of bullshit is distinct from Frankfurtian bullshit in that the Cohen-bullshitter is unconcerned with the lucidity of what he says, rather than unconcerned with its truth-value (Cohen, 2012).

Another proposed type of bullshit/bullshitting is evasive bullshitting, which involves speech aimed at avoiding answering questions one does not want to answer, as giving direct answers may be harmful to oneself or others (Carson, 2016). For instance, a politician may be motivated to use evasive bullshitting when questioned by a member of the press if, for instance, a direct answer could potentially cost votes (harm to self) or jeopardize national security (harm to others). An equally common example might be one’s romantic partner asking if their new haircut or outfit makes them look unattractive. In some cases, a frank response might result in undesirable social costs for either party (or both).

Finally, some have attempted to refine Frankfurt’s assertion that bullshitting, by definition, is unconnected to a concern for the truth (Frankfurt, 1986, p. 90). For instance, Stokke and Fallis (2017) characterize bullshitting as speech that is unconcerned with the truthful advancement of an honest discourse, rather than unconcerned with the veracity of individual statements. Put another way, the bullshitter is not indifferent toward the truth-value of the content of each thing he says. Rather, he is indifferent toward whether his statements create an impression that the overall discourse leads to an honest representation of the truth. Meibauer (2018) describes bullshitting as having a “misrepresentational intent” that is based on “a loose concern for the truth” (p. 366). That is, the bullshitter may not know the truth-value of his statements, yet he is often aware of his unawareness, and asserts himself with a sense of certainty that his statements are true regardless. Indeed, the bullshitter’s goal is not to communicate an objective truth, but to instill a particular belief or impression in another person – regardless of whether the bullshitter also believes it – and can be accomplished through misleading exaggeration or implicature (Stokke & Fallis, 2017; Webber, 2013).