Abstract: We propose an alternative account to the theory of belief homophily--that people have an intrinsic distaste for encountering differences in beliefs. We argue that when people face others who hold beliefs different from their own, they do not find these encounters disturbing because others hold different beliefs per se, but because they are convinced that others hold false beliefs. In three preregistered studies (N = 1408) featuring self-recalled personal experiences and vignette scenarios, we demonstrate that participants are more disturbed when others hold false beliefs, compared to cases in which others' beliefs are different, even when participants' objective knowledge about the validity of beliefs is held constant. This effect is robust across contexts and types of social interactions, and is present among all ages and both sexes. We also show that higher confidence that others hold wrong beliefs, but not different beliefs, evokes stronger negative emotions.
Sunday, February 2, 2020
When facing others who hold beliefs different from our own, we do not find these encounters disturbing because of the different beliefs per se, but because we are convinced that others hold false beliefs
The Othello Effect: People are more disturbed by others' wrong beliefs than by different beliefs. Andras Molnar, George Loewenstein. Carnegie Mellon University, PA, January 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338828490
Abstract: We propose an alternative account to the theory of belief homophily--that people have an intrinsic distaste for encountering differences in beliefs. We argue that when people face others who hold beliefs different from their own, they do not find these encounters disturbing because others hold different beliefs per se, but because they are convinced that others hold false beliefs. In three preregistered studies (N = 1408) featuring self-recalled personal experiences and vignette scenarios, we demonstrate that participants are more disturbed when others hold false beliefs, compared to cases in which others' beliefs are different, even when participants' objective knowledge about the validity of beliefs is held constant. This effect is robust across contexts and types of social interactions, and is present among all ages and both sexes. We also show that higher confidence that others hold wrong beliefs, but not different beliefs, evokes stronger negative emotions.
Abstract: We propose an alternative account to the theory of belief homophily--that people have an intrinsic distaste for encountering differences in beliefs. We argue that when people face others who hold beliefs different from their own, they do not find these encounters disturbing because others hold different beliefs per se, but because they are convinced that others hold false beliefs. In three preregistered studies (N = 1408) featuring self-recalled personal experiences and vignette scenarios, we demonstrate that participants are more disturbed when others hold false beliefs, compared to cases in which others' beliefs are different, even when participants' objective knowledge about the validity of beliefs is held constant. This effect is robust across contexts and types of social interactions, and is present among all ages and both sexes. We also show that higher confidence that others hold wrong beliefs, but not different beliefs, evokes stronger negative emotions.
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