Men more than women report regret passing up short-term sexual opportunities, while women regret having had sexual encounters; no evidence of mating strategy changes following sexual regret

The Function of Casual Sex Action and Inaction Regret: A Longitudinal Investigation. Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair, Trond Viggo Grøntvedt, Mons Bendixen. Evolutionary Psychology, February 25, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704921998333

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1364901633872846849

Abstract: In several recent papers the sex difference in regret predicted by sexual strategies theory has been supported: men more than women report regret passing up short-term sexual opportunities (inaction regret), while women regret having had sexual encounters (action regret). However, the adaptive function of regret, to improve future behavioral choices, has not been tested. In this first longitudinal test of behavioral change following regret, we consider whether regret actually results in adaptive shifts of behavior: will men who regret passing up sex engage in more short-term sex following regret? Will women who regret short-term encounters either choose better quality partners, reduce number of one-night stands or shift their strategy to long-term relationships? Across two waves (NT1 = 399, 65.4% women and NT2 = 222, 66.2% women) students responded to questions about casual sex action regret and inaction regret, along with possible outcomes, intrapersonal traits, and concurrent contextual predictors. There was no clear evidence for the proposed functional shifts in sexual behavior. Casual sex regret was associated with respondent sex and stable individual differences, such as sociosexual attitudes, regret processing and metacognitions, but the effect of these predictors were not consistent across the two waves. Among the tested concurrent contextual predictors, sexual disgust was the most consistent across waves. Regret is considered a gauge of the value and quality of the short-term sexual encounter. However, tentatively we conclude that after this first test of function using longitudinal data, we find no evidence of a mating strategy shifting effect following sexual regret.

Keywords: sexual strategies theory, inaction regret, action regret, casual sex, sociosexuality, sexual disgust, sex differences, adaptive function, longitudinal

Discussion

Many emotions have evolved, including fear (Cannon, 1915; Kennair, 2007; Marks & Nesse, 1994) and disgust (Al-Shawaf et al., 2018; Tybur et al., 2009). Galperin et al. (2013) suggested an adaptive function of men’s sexual inaction regret and women’s sexual action regret, where both sexes should make more adaptive future sexual behavior choices, based upon the aversive emotional component of their regret. In general, action and inaction regret should result in more adaptive behavior, less regrettable behavior and thus less regret. This is the first empirical test of this functional hypothesis of regret.

We found no support for the hypothesis that inaction regret should increase short-term sexual activity, as inaction regret at T1 did not increase number of one-night stands or the likelihood of having a new one-night stand for either men or women between T1 and T2. We neither found support for the hypothesis that action regret at T1 would result in fewer short-term sexual partners at T2, especially for women. In addition, and contrary to the functional hypothesis, level of casual sex regret at T1 reduced the odds of entering a committed relationship at T2. Furthermore, the level of regret about having had casual sex was not associated with changes in perceived partner short-term attractiveness between T1 and T2 for those reporting a new casual sex partner (Hypothesis 3). This was also true for perceived partner long-term attractiveness (post-hoc, explorative analysis). Finally, there was no clear-cut conclusion based on the analysis that regret is a manifest functional mechanism that results in reduced future regret. Women reported lower levels of action regret at T2 relative to T1, while men reported more. Still, those who regretted more at T1 reported lower levels of regret at T2, but this may also be an effect of regression toward the mean as those who reported being ‘glad’ they had casual sex (or passed up having casual sex) reported more regret at T2.

The competing hypotheses that regret is non-functional and maintained by stable, intrapersonal factors or a result of concurrent, contextual factors were supported. The first of these suggests that sociosexuality, metacognitions and regret processing, independent of behavioral change, would predict regret. However, these predictors were not consistent across waves. Action regret showed moderate association with sociosexual attitudes at T1, but weak at T2. Regret processing was moderately associated with action regret across both waves, while positive and negative metacognitions were less consistently associated. The newly developed measure of regret processing is probably closely related to the personality trait neuroticism. As such, it is possible that these more stable traits and individual differences explain who will regret having had sex: more neurotic individuals will process negative aspects more and less restricted individuals will experience less reason to regret a physical encounter.

Of the concurrent, contextual factors included in the study (sexual disgust, sexual gratification, intoxication when having had sex, sexual initiative, and partner’s short-term mate value), only sexual disgust consistently predicted action regret across both waves, while sexual gratification was stronger associated with less regret at T1 relative to T2. We also found that higher partner short-term mate value and taking the initiative reduced regret at T1. Again, this replicates the gist of previous research into proximate mechanisms (Kennair et al., 2016, 2018). However, without any identified behavioral change above, we are left with the conclusion that in addition to some effect of personality, what we find is that regret largely is a dynamic gauge of whether the casual sex being evaluated was good or bad.

An important aspect of a functional emotion is that it should produce change in behavior, and thus reduce the necessity of experiencing the emotion. Pain due to a stone in one’s shoe should motivate removing said stone, and thereby discontinuing the pain. Fear of a venomous spider should motivate avoidance and reduce the present level of fear. Without behavioral change as a result of an internal state there is no interaction with reality, and thus nothing for selection to work on. It was therefore surprising, from a functional perspective, that regret as counterfactual cognitive-emotional process was both continuous and relatively stable across different one-night stands for the same participants. There was further little evidence of behavioral change, which of course may be because we have not managed to define or operationalize this well enough. However, in sum, the tentative conclusion after the current investigation is that regret is to some degree maintained by individual differences and a result of concurrent, contextual factors, rather than a process that changes behavior in any predictable, functional direction.

It seems that men do not change their mating strategy after regretting having passed up casual sex opportunities some months earlier. Future research is therefore needed to further investigate men’s strategy shifts as a function of regret. However, while the preliminary conclusion needs to be tentative, there is no evidence in current data to suggest a function of inaction regret. For women there is more evidence in the literature that a maintained short-term strategy (more short-term sex) is associated with increased emotional discomfort (Townsend et al., 1995; Townsend & Wasserman, 2011). Thus, the conclusion that negative emotions do not necessarily motivate a change in sexual strategy might be considered more robust. However, that begs the question of why regret exists, given that it shows evidence of sex specific responses, as predicted by sexual strategies theory (Buss, 1998; Buss & Schmitt, 1993, 2017). One possible explanation is that different mental adaptations have different and uncoordinated effects on different behaviors: Tendencies toward regret and engaging in short-term mating are influenced different individual differences in both neuroticism and emotional lability as well as sociosexuality and other mental mechanisms that motivate sexual behavior within different domains (Kennair et al., 2015; Meston & Buss, 2007, 2009). All of these will not increase personal happiness (Buss, 2000). Another explanation may be that modern mating scene is evolutionary mismatched (Goetz et al., 2019). Finally, many mental and emotional responses exist despite not being functional. For example, rumination probably does not solve problems (Kennair et al., 2017), while discontinuing rumination seems to actually increase adaptive behavior as measured by increased quality of life and improved workforce participation or study activity 3 years after treatment (Solem et al., 2019). Panic disorder exists, but in different countries how patients misinterpret, in a positive feedback loop, bodily sensations of anxiety such that in some Arabic countries they will perceive a Djinn sitting on their chest while in Western countries people may fear a heart attack. Since neither perception is correct, despite systematic symptoms, panic disorder is primarily merely a misinterpretation disorder (Clark, 1986; Kennair, 2007). While worry might be a good anti-confirmation bias program at low levels, the worry involved in Generalized Anxiety Disorder is debilitating, not functional, and discontinuing worry provides efficient treatment (Kennair et al., 2020; Nordahl et al., 2018). Any functional explanation of the disorder will therefore be incorrect, although many of the underlying mental mechanisms involved may be adaptations (Nesse, 2018). However, we need to consider that despite the current findings, there may be other explanations and functional aspects of short-term sexual regret that may be discovered through more thorough and formal analysis of the design feature and behavioral outcome of a functional regret program. We suggest that two recent theoretical papers—Lukaszewski et al. (2020) and Al-Shawaf et al. (2016)—might aid this conceptual functional analysis.

One of the most surprising findings is that action regret reduces the likelihood of entering a long-term relationship. This was in the opposite direction of our functional prediction. It is possible that some of the more successful one-night-stands resulted in long-term relationships over time, or that regret was increased when one at some level desired a long-term relationship from the short-term encounter, but this did not happen, although it is not possible to discern these processes from the available data. Another possibility is that underlying personality factors cause those who are happier with their short-term experiences to be more positive toward other romantic relationships. Neuroticism decreases long-term relationship satisfaction (Gerlach et al., 2018), and might conceptually, given our current finding of the effect of regret processing, also, be associated with dissatisfaction after short-term encounters.

Recent studies of proximate predictors of the sex difference in action and inaction casual sex regret have suggested that a high degree of disgust is associated with higher levels of regret (Kennair et al., 2018). Within each sex there is an effect of sexual gratification (Kennair et al., 2016), and particularly among women who take the initiative to have casual sex (Kennair et al., 2018). In the current findings these factors were not as robust, however, for some analyses we had few participants. Despite this, given the current findings, bad sex will increase regret, good sex or a sexy partner will decrease regret—which thus may act as an online emotional and cognitive gauge of one’s experience. Evolved sexual psychology, as predicted by SST, will influence that process and evaluation based on sex specific likelihoods and thresholds for what is considered desirable or what is adaptive. However, much as our ability to track our relationship satisfaction in long-term relationships dynamically and online (Conroy-Beam et al., 2015, 2016), also based upon our evolved sexual psychology, we might track discrete sexual encounters more with emotional-cognitive processing akin to regret or rumination. We might use terms like satisfaction or dissatisfaction about long-term or ongoing processes, and regret about discrete choices and events, such as short-term sexual encounters. However, as in our relationships, we do not necessarily always make decisions based directly on this gauge of satisfaction, and other personality features, including or level of satisfaction may decide whether we stay or leave a long-term relationship or change our behavior within the relationship. Actually, reasons why we think we stay or leave and what we actually do are probably not as closely connected as people believe (Machia & Ogolsky, 2020).

Limitations and Future Research

While this is the first longitudinal investigation of behavioral changes following regret, there are some limitations that need to be addressed. First, the time lapse between the first and the second measurement was only 4.5 months on average. Although two-third of the single participants reported at least one new one-night stand during this period, this may be too short a time, or involve too few encounters for any adaptive mechanism to be activated. Despite the longitudinal design of the study, the reports on the most recent sexual encounters are retrospective in nature, and therefore subject to possible response biases. Second, there seems to be some self-selection and selective dropout at follow up. Relative to those reporting at T1 only, those with complete data at both T1 and T2 reported having had more casual sex, and less regret and regret processing at T1. Still, this selective dropout did not affect the relative sex differences in action and inaction regret at T1. However, the overall lower level of regret for those with complete data most likely have constrained the variance in regret in the longitudinal analyses increasing the risk of false negatives. This is sustained by the relatively low number of cases eligible for analysis. Finally, one important limitation is that we did not measure ambivalent feelings for action regret or passing up opportunities for having sex. By following the Galperin et al. (2013) measurement approach, we forced people to either be happy with their decision, neutral (neither happy or regret), regret somewhat or regret strongly. Most people may be more ambivalent, though, and may therefore describe their regret best along two dimensions: (1) degree of satisfaction with their choice, and (2) degree of regret/dissatisfaction for making the same choice. Future studies on sexual regret may want to include measures capturing this ambivalence to examine changes in either or in both these aspects of choice to have a one-night stand or to pass up.

As the first investigation of the function of inaction and action regret, hypothesized by Galperin and colleagues, we need to be cautious: as we note above, there may be other functions or other operationalizations of Galperin et al.’s ideas. These need to be considered both in depth theoretically and in future empirical investigations.

Finally, we have presented a new measure of regret processing, which needs to be tested further in future studies. The scale measures ones’ processing of negative past choices and counterfactual processing of more desirable behaviors. The scale was highly internally consistent and moderately stable across waves with different partners. This scale may provide a better measure of regret after discrete experiences. We expect that the scale to large degree correlates with trait neuroticism and recommend also measuring this trait specifically in future research.