Authors say: Regulation must not result in censorship; however, freedom of speech does not include the right to amplification of that speech (!?)

The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction. Ullrich K. H. Ecker, Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Philipp Schmid, Lisa K. Fazio, Nadia Brashier, Panayiota Kendeou, Emily K. Vraga & Michelle A. Amazeen. Nature Reviews Psychology volume 1, pages 13–29, Jan 12 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s44159-021-00006-y

Abstract: Misinformation has been identified as a major contributor to various contentious contemporary events ranging from elections and referenda to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only can belief in misinformation lead to poor judgements and decision-making, it also exerts a lingering influence on people’s reasoning after it has been corrected — an effect known as the continued influence effect. In this Review, we describe the cognitive, social and affective factors that lead people to form or endorse misinformed views, and the psychological barriers to knowledge revision after misinformation has been corrected, including theories of continued influence. We discuss the effectiveness of both pre-emptive (‘prebunking’) and reactive (‘debunking’) interventions to reduce the effects of misinformation, as well as implications for information consumers and practitioners in various areas including journalism, public health, policymaking and education.

 

---

Summary and future directions

Psychological research has built solid foundational knowledge of how people decide what is true and false, form beliefs, process corrections, and might continue to be influenced by misinformation even after it has been corrected. However, much work remains to fully understand the psychology of misinformation.

First, in line with general trends in psychology and elsewhere, research methods in the field of misinformation should be improved. Researchers should rely less on small-scale studies conducted in the laboratory or a small number of online platforms, often on non-representative (and primarily US-based) participants255. Researchers should also avoid relying on one-item questions with relatively low reliability256. Given the well-known attitude–behaviour gap — that attitude change does not readily translate into behavioural effects — researchers should also attempt to use more behavioural measures, such as information-sharing measures, rather than relying exclusively on self-report questionnaires93,94,95. Although existing research has yielded valuable insights into how people generally process misinformation (many of which will translate across different contexts and cultures), an increased focus on diversification of samples and more robust methods is likely to provide a better appreciation of important contextual factors and nuanced cultural differences7,82,205,257,258,259,260,261,262,263.

Second, most existing work has focused on explicit misinformation and text-based materials. Thus, the cognitive impacts of other types of misinformation, including subtler types of misdirection such as paltering (misleading while technically saying the truth)95,264,265,266, doctored images267, deepfake videos268 and extreme patterns of misinformation bombardment223, are currently not well understood. Non-text-based corrections, such as videos or cartoons, also deserve more exploration269,270.

Third, additional translational research is needed to explore questions about causality, including the causal impacts of misinformation and corrections on beliefs and behaviours. This research should also employ non-experimental methods230,231,271, such as observational causal inference (research aiming to establish causality in observed real-world data)272, and test the impact of interventions in the real world145,174,181,207. These studies are especially needed over the long term — weeks to months, or even years — and should test a range of outcome measures, for example those that relate to health and political behaviours, in a range of contexts. Ultimately, the success of psychological research into misinformation should be linked not only to theoretical progress but also to societal impact273.

Finally, even though the field has a reasonable understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and social determinants of misinformation processing, knowledge of the complex interplay between cognitive and social dynamics is still limited, as is insight into the role of emotion. Future empirical and theoretical work would benefit from development of an overarching theoretical model that aims to integrate cognitive, social and affective factors, for example by utilizing agent-based modelling approaches. This approach might also offer opportunities for more interdisciplinary work257 at the intersection of psychology, political science274 and social network analysis275, and the development of a more sophisticated psychology of misinformation.