The history of arms 'control' isn't good

Naïveté Invites Aggression. By David Lewis Schaefer
The history of arms 'control' isn't good.
WSJ, Apr 09, 2009

In response to North Korea's rocket launch, President Barack Obama has committed the U.S. to reducing our supply of nuclear weapons, urged the passage of a ban on nuclear weapons testing, and through Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, proposed scaling back our missile-defense program. In short, Mr. Obama apparently believes that the chief lesson to be learned from Pyongyang's missile launch is the need for more arms-control initiatives.

As a means of reducing the dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear war, this makes no sense. Once a country passes a minimal threshold, there is no reason to suppose that increasing its nuclear arsenal heightens the likelihood of its use. The only means of deterring rogue states from using (or more likely, threatening to use) nuclear weapons once they have acquired them are first, the capacity to threaten a much more massive response, and second, an effective program of missile defense.

Reducing our nuclear arsenal only gives outlaw states (including China) the incentive to increase theirs, to try to rival ours. And eliminating nuclear-weapons testing reduces the reliability of our arms and hence their effectiveness as a deterrent.

Mr. Obama's flight to arms control demonstrates the persistence of a dangerous illusion of the 20th century -- the notion that reducing a democratic nation's armaments is a means of mitigating the threat of war. Here's some of the history:

• Beginning in 1906, Britain cut back an ambitious program of naval construction, begun under a previous administration, in the hope of thereby avoiding an "arms race" with Germany. But the change in British policy actually encouraged Germany's Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz to redouble his efforts to build a navy that would rival Britain's. This perception of British weakness may well have buttressed the confidence that led the Germans to launch World War I.
• The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 set limits on battleship construction by the U.S., Japan, Britain, France and Italy. But as a result, Japan instead focused on building other kinds of warships, paving the way for Pearl Harbor.
• Britain's policy of restraint in military production during the 1930s -- combined with the refusal of British and French governments to send forces to turn back Hitler's then weak army when it violated the Versailles Treaty by remilitarizing the Rhineland in 1936 -- did not placate Hitler. It only whetted the dictator's appetite, generating what Winston Churchill called the "unnecessary war," World War II, which might never have occurred had the Western allies maintained their armaments and a firm policy during the years that led up to it.
• The U.S. signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks antiballistic missile treaties with the Soviet Union in 1972, expecting they would produce a "stable" balance and ultimately a reduction in nuclear armaments. Instead the Soviets continued their race for nuclear superiority, as summed up in congressional testimony by Jimmy Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown in 1979: "[W]hen we build, they build. When we cut, they build." As President Ronald Reagan observed in a 1985 radio address on the Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense program the Soviets never accepted the "innocent" American notion "that being mutually vulnerable to attack was in our common interest."
• As soon as the Soviets signed the 1972 convention banning the manufacture of biological weapons, they immediately (secretly) ramped up their production of such weapons.
• The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire were brought about not by arms reductions, but by Reagan's unwillingness to give up work on SDI. Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the Soviets simply lacked the means to compete.

The likelihood that reducing America's strategic forces is going to elicit reciprocal behavior from our antagonists is nil. Nor will anything short of forceful sanctions (such as the George W. Bush administration applied, but then withdrew, against North Korean financial assets), have any effect in halting their march towards nuclear status.

In the words of the Joan Baez antiwar song from the 1960s: When will they ever learn?

Mr. Schaefer is professor of political science at College of the Holy Cross.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nuclear threat from Tehran

Warnings on Iran. WSJ Editorial
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nuclear threat from Tehran.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009

Benjamin Netanyahu formally became Israel's Prime Minister last week, and he could not have been blunter about the strategic challenge ahead: "It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust the world's response to the calls by Iran's leader to destroy the state of Israel is weak, there is no condemnation and decisive measures -- almost as if dismissed as routine." He added, "We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants who threaten to annihilate us."

Americans in key positions have noticed this Israeli message. In a meeting Thursday at the Journal, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told us that "there is a leadership in Israel that is not going to tolerate" a nuclear Iran. Tehran's atomic designs, he said, were a matter of "life or death" for the Jewish state. "The operative word is 'existential.'" When we asked him whether Israel was capable of inflicting meaningful damage to Iran's nuclear installations, his answer was a simple "Yes."

The Admiral was also clear about Iran's challenge to the U.S. "I think we've got a problem now. . . . I think the Iranians are on a path to building nuclear weapons." For the time being his counsel is diplomacy, noting that "Even in the darkest days of the Cold War we talked to the Soviets." But, he added, "we don't have a lot of time."

If Israel decides to strike Iran the consequences -- intended and unintended -- will be felt far and wide, including in Iraq where, Admiral Mullen says, Iran's ability to cause mayhem "has not maxed out at all." We thought readers might like to know how the Chairman sees the threat, and how well he appreciates Israel's peril.

Ukraine Powers Chinese Carriers

Ukraine Powers Chinese Carriers
Strategy Page, April 6, 2009

China is working closely with Ukraine to supply key components for the aircraft carriers China is building. Ukraine supplied many components for Russian carriers back in the days of the Soviet Union (which Ukraine was a part of). Now independent, Ukraine is eager to find customers for local manufacturers that can produce carrier components. Russia is no longer building carriers, despite talk of restarting that program.

Last year, Chinese officials visited Ukraine and inspected the naval aviation training facilities that were built there before the Soviet Union dissolved. Ukraine wants to use those facilities to establish an international center for training carrier aviators.

A major Ukrainian product the Chinese are interested in are ship engines, especially the large ones a carrier would require. Chinese gas turbines are not all that efficient and reliable. The Ukrainian UGT-16000 and UGT-25000 turbines, developed from the DT-59 they have been making since 1975, are major competitors for General Electric models used in large ships. Ukrainian firms build a number of other world class components for large ships, and China is looking to acquire equipment, and technology. Ukraine is aware of the fact that the Chinese steal technology, but right now Ukraine needs the business, and China needs the turbines.

WSJ Editorial Page on North Korea's Launch: The condemnations will probably soon become concessions

The Song of Kim Jong Il. WSJ Editorial
The condemnations will probably soon become concessions.
WSJ, Apr 06, 2009

A few hours after the launch Sunday of a long-range multistage rocket, North Korea's state media proclaimed that a communications satellite was in orbit and transmitting "immortal revolutionary paeans" back to Earth. The U.S. military, which apparently had trouble tuning in the "Song of General Kim Il Sung," announced that the satellite had fallen into the Pacific somewhere between Japan and Hawaii.

The technology may have failed to put a satellite into space, but North Korea's launch has succeeded in getting the world's attention. Most of the civilized world spent yesterday denouncing dictator Kim Jong Il's latest provocation, which violated a United Nations Security Council resolution barring the North from testing ballistic missile technology. However, if the international response keeps with past practice, the condemnations will soon give way to concessions. No wonder Kim keeps launching missiles.

The launch was a success, too, as a global advertisement to those in the market for vehicles to deliver weapons of mass destruction. That includes the North's No. 1 customer, Iran, which in February launched a small satellite thanks in part to North Korean missile technology. Iranian observers were reportedly on hand over the weekend at the launch site.

Sunday's fizzle doesn't mean the North didn't learn anything useful for the future of its long-range ballistic missile program. As learning tools, failures can be more instructive than successes, and the Taepodong-2 missile under development has the potential to reach the U.S. West Coast.
Pyongyang's action ought to prompt the Obama Administration to advance the fledgling missile defense system started by President Bush. Instead, the White House reportedly has told the Pentagon to cut spending on missile defense by $2 billion, or about 20%. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is expected to announce these and other budget cuts today.

Programs in jeopardy include the Airborne Laser, a modified 747 designed to take out ballistic missiles seconds after liftoff; expansion of the ground-based interceptor program in Alaska and California; and space-based missile surveillance and tracking. All three are part of the vision for a layered defense, in which the U.S. has several chances to destroy incoming missiles. The Obama Administration has already indicated it wants to go slow in building the "third site," the Europe-based radar and interceptors that would provide another layer of defense from Iranian missiles for the U.S. East Coast.

In 2006, Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice squandered the moment after the North's nuclear test when China was ready to apply serious pressure. Instead, they bought Kim's promise to give up his weapons, then let him delay and renegotiate the terms as he went, including agreeing to Kim's demand to take North Korea off the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring nations. Now he's playing the same brinksmanship with the Obama Administration.

This is Mr. Obama's chance to do better. But based on his comments during the campaign, as well as his statement yesterday urging renewed efforts through the Six Party Talks, the President seems unlikely to change course. Kim has every reason to expect that he will eventually get what he wants -- more recognition, more money and energy supplies from the U.S., China and South Korea, and a high likelihood that he'll get to keep his nukes and missiles too.

Robbing the Pentagon to Pay Foggy Bottom

Robbing the Pentagon to Pay Foggy Bottom, by Jamie Fly
The Weekly Standard Blog, March 23, 2009 12:16 PM

After initially falling for the administration’s rhetoric that the $533 billion they were allocating for the Defense Department in the Fiscal Year 2010 budget represented an increase over the Bush administration’s final budget (an argument skillfully deconstructed by Tom Donnelly), the press now seems to have woken up to the fact that the administration has something different in mind. Recent press reports provide a rather disturbing preview of the administration’s plans for the defense budget and preparations to use Secretary Gates as a human shield of sorts to counter expected criticism from defense contractors and Republicans in Congress. It seems Gates’ role in the ongoing Pentagon review is so key that he has decided to skip the NATO summit in early April so he can devote himself to his “efforts to strategically rebalance the department’s budget.”

The administration’s plan to get us to European levels of defense spending by 2016 comes at the same time as reports that the Chinese government stated that its official defense budget will jump by 14.9 percent this year (who knows how high the actual amounts are) and an announcement by Russian President Medvedev that Russia will undertake a “large-scale rearming” by 2011 given that “there are a range of regions where there remains serious potential for conflicts.”

There are a multitude of reasons that cutting defense at this juncture is a bad idea. The systems reportedly on the chopping block include a new Navy destroyer, the Air Force’s F-22, Army ground-combat vehicles, and possibly aircraft carriers, all integral elements of our ability to project power and defend our allies. Missile defense, now out of favor because it is unpopular in Moscow, is expected to take a significant hit as well. One can debate the merits of each of these systems or programs, but these cuts will result in thousands of job losses -- an inconvenient fact that may wake up some Democratic members of Congress who seem willing to throw money at failing banks and insurance companies but not at the Pentagon.

But beyond the programs and systems, the administration’s budget offers insight into its mentality about national security. Listen to some Democratic budget experts and you hear phrases like a “return to normalcy” used to describe the administration’s plans for defense spending. In this “normal” world, there is no mention of 9/11, or of the fact that countries such as Russia and China still threaten our allies and our interests. Military commitments in the Middle East or South Asia 5-10 years from now, what military commitments?

The difficulty for Republicans who wish to oppose these cuts is that for the last four years, key figures in the Bush administration helped set the stage for the Obama defense budget we now have in front of us. It became a fad during the second Bush term to deliver speeches in front of the foreign policy establishment or delivery testimony and warn about the “militarization” of U.S. foreign policy. Secretaries Rice and Gates and eventually Chairman Mullen all participated in this group therapy session played out in public. Many on the left pounced on these comments and today use them to justify cuts to defense to help pay for an increase in funding for a supposedly struggling State Department.

It is true that in recent years the U.S. military has all too often been asked to conduct missions they have not been trained for and probably should not be doing, but that is not a reason to cut defense spending. Nor is it a reason to expand the Foreign Service at the cost of the F-22 or missile defense. Our allies in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia want American boots on the ground as a sign of our commitment to their defense, not more diplomats in pinstripes and wingtips.

While Secretary Gates is meeting with the green eyeshade crowd at the Pentagon in early April instead of enjoying a glass of Riesling in Strasbourg-Kehl at the NATO Summit, he may want to think long and hard about whether he wants to become the chief advocate for a defense budget that will undermine, not strengthen our long term security.

Obama administration's defense budget

Indefensible. By Thomas Donnelly
AEI, Monday, March 2, 2009

The Obama administration's defense budget figures are not what they seem. While the baseline defense budget appears to have grown, the increase is very likely the result of funds migrated from the wartime supplemental spending package, which itself has shrunk markedly, and is projected to decrease precipitously after next year. If these numbers remain steady for the foreseeable future, as the Obama administration has indicated they will, the United States will be hard-pressed to maintain its defense commitments abroad.

The era of big government is back. But conservatives ought not simply to worry about the size of government or the federal deficit--although a $1.7 trillion deficit is an eye-popper. They should worry, too, about the shape of American government. Barack Obama may be running up World War II levels of debt, but he'll be running down the U.S. military.

Of course, that's not what the headlines on administration press releases or in the actual newspapers say. Even the leading defense industry paper, Defense News, trumpeted "Obama Budget to Boost Spending" for 2010. But a closer reading of even the sketchy budget charts provided by the administration this week paints a very different picture.

Take first the question of the current budget, the fiscal year 2010 spending that Congress will approve this year. As during the Bush years, there are two critical accounts to track: the normal or "baseline" defense budget and the "emergency supplemental" appropriations to cover wartime costs. In order to understand what's really happening, it's crucial to try to keep these distinctions clear. To make an everyday analogy, it's the difference between the sticker price of your car--what it costs to bring it home from the dealer--and the expenses of filling it with gasoline and keeping it running.

In 2009, the Bush administration's baseline budget was $513 billion, and the plan was to spend $523 billion in 2010. The Obama administration announced this week that it would "boost" the 2010 figure to $533 billion. So the Obama budget is bigger than the Bush budget, right?

The reality, though, is something quite different. Here's where the question of wartime supplementals comes into the picture. The Bush administration's last supplemental requests were for $188 billion in 2008--at the height of the Iraq surge--and a $65 billion installment on the war costs of 2009. The Obama budget adds another $75 billion in war costs for 2009, for a yearly total of about $140 billion. What accounts for the whopping difference between the 2008 spending of $188 billion and the $140 billion to be spent in 2009? It's not, unfortunately, that the success of the Iraq surge or the drawdown now beginning in Iraq are saving much money. Indeed the immediate costs of a safe withdrawal are no different from those of staying on. And, with a second surge--really, a long-term ramping up--of forces in Afghanistan about to begin, the supplemental cost of those operations is going way up.

What's happening is probably that what previously has been counted as "war costs" is migrating from the supplemental appropriations to the baseline budget. This is what reformers, good-government types, and the folks in the Obama Pentagon mean when they talk about "honest budgeting."

Particularly in the 2007 and 2008 supplementals, tens of billions of dollars were spent to "reset" the Army, which has seen its equipment stocks decimated by the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to buy needed gear like the heavy Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle--the Big Wheel-like carrier that is being used in convoys and for patrols instead of the thin-skinned Humvees. The Washington Post reported, too, that the costs of countering improvised explosive devices, the increasingly sophisticated "IEDs" that account for a disproportionate share of American casualties, are now to be paid for out of the baseline budget. The bottom line is this: The Obama defense budget isn't "boosting" anything. As should become apparent over the next two months as the administration prepares detailed defense budget proposals, this actually is the beginning of significant cuts in defense programs. What the president really means when he talks about "hard choices" is a less capable U.S. military.

The Obama budget is an especially stark and in-your-face announcement of a new direction for the country. Indeed, budgets are the most concrete expression of a government's prejudices and ambitions.

Consider how, per the budget, Obama imagines the America of 2016. The economy has recovered in fine style. The stimulus produced a spurt of growth and the economy is expanding permanently at about 2.5 percent per year. Inflation remains low, about 2 percent, the annual federal deficit is "only" $500 billion, and total GDP is a touch more than $20 trillion. These are the assumptions enshrined in the Obama budget.

But the government itself looks more like the government of France than what American governments have looked like in the past. We'll be spending $4.5 trillion on social entitlements--Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid--debt servicing, and other mandatory programs. That's about 22 percent of GDP. Discretionary domestic programs--the prime source of congressional pork--have grown to nearly $700 billion, another 3.5 percent of GDP. Defense spending will be smaller. The baseline defense budget will be $594 billion, less than 3 percent of GDP. That's half the 50-year Cold War average.

The United States cannot remain the sole superpower, the guarantor of the international system, if it chooses to spend just 3 cents of every dollar on defense. The Obama administration loves to talk about "soft power" and "smart power," but the fact is that "hard power" is still real power. The Obama budget is a plan for steady American decline.

It also plans on a rapid retreat from current commitments. Announcing his Iraq withdrawal plan in a speech at the Marine base at Camp Lejeune, N.C., on Friday, Obama said--"as plainly as I can"--that U.S. combat forces would be out of Iraq by August 31, 2010, and that the "residual" force of advisers and trainers would be gone by the end of 2011. The budget codifies this timetable in dollars: The projected wartime supplemental for 2010 drops to $130 billion. The largest slice of that pie will pay for the withdrawal of 12 combat brigades from Iraq, while it's likely that the costs of fighting in Afghanistan--where commanders see 2009 as a holding of the line in preparation for more effective operations in 2010--will begin to equal Iraq costs. But the big drop is planned for 2011, the year that the Iraq status-of-forces agreement takes full effect. In that year, the Obama budget has a "placeholder" for wartime costs of just $50 billion. Based on the numbers, by 2011 Obama plans to be fighting the "Long War" at less than one-third the cost of the effort of 2008. He's fulfilling his end-the-war campaign pledges, but almost certainly at the sacrifice of any lasting victory.

An American retreat that leads to a longer-term American decline will make for a very different world. Obama's budget is a signal to friend and foe alike that the United States is turning inward, will be a less certain ally and a less powerful adversary. It's there in the numbers. Indeed, these numbers almost perfectly reprise the Clinton "peace dividend" of the 1990s--minus the peace. How the world will respond to the combination of a deep and long-lasting economic contraction and a shrinking of American power is difficult to say. The historical precedents are not encouraging: These are the conditions that preceded World War II.

There is nothing inevitable in any of this. President Obama is presenting one path forward. Other political leaders--especially those who understand America's role in the world--can present an alternative way forward.

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI.

Obama Makes Overtures to Russia on Missile Defense

Obama Makes Overtures to Russia on Missile Defense. By Michael A. Fletcher
The Washington Post, Tuesday, March 3, 2009; A02

President Obama has sent a letter to his Russian counterpart that raises the prospect of the United States halting development of its missile defense program in Eastern Europe if Russia helps resolve the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program, senior administration officials said last night.

Obama's letter, delivered to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in mid-February, "covered a number of topics" of mutual interest to the two countries, "including the issue of missile defense and how it relates to the Iranian threat," a senior administration official said. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the matter.

This official and others said the letter repeated an assertion Obama administration officials have voiced in recent weeks: The missile defense system would not be necessary if the threat posed by Iran's long-range missiles and its nuclear program was eliminated.

Russia has cooperated with Tehran on a range of issues and has often resisted Washington's tough stance toward Iran, which insists that its nuclear program is aimed at developing only cheap energy, not weapons.

Meanwhile, Russian leaders have been infuriated by U.S. plans for a missile base in Poland and radar deployment in the Czech Republic, saying that U.S.-run weapons installations so close to its border represent a threat to its national security. The Bush administration, which initiated the plans, had waved off the Russian displeasure, saying the system would protect Russia as well as NATO allies from the threat posed by Iranian missiles.

The Obama administration, however, sent signals that it intends to smooth relations with Russia. Speaking at a defense conference in Munich last month, Vice President Biden said the administration wants to "press the reset button" with Russia.

During a visit to Russia two weeks later, Undersecretary of State William J. Burns suggested that Moscow's cooperation in eliminating the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program could result in the idea of missile defense being shelved.

"If, through strong diplomacy with Russia and our other partners, we can reduce or eliminate that threat, it obviously shapes the way at which we look at missile defense. We are also open to the possibility of cooperation with Russia and with our NATO partners on new missile defense configurations which can take advantage of assets which each of us have," Burns said in an interview with the Russian news agency Interfax.

And Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said last month in Krakow, Poland, "I told the Russians a year ago that if there were no Iranian missile program, there would be no need for the missile sites."

Administration officials said Russia has not responded to the letter on missile defense, details of which were first reported yesterday by the Russian newspaper Kommersant. But Obama is scheduled to meet with Medvedev early next month in London, on the sidelines of a summit of the Group of 20 industrialized and developing nations.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is scheduled to meet Saturday with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in Geneva.

Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried noted last week that, in advance of the meeting, "There have been letters between the leaders, between the foreign ministers, outlining a way forward and a positive agenda, and it is on that that we want to build."

The U.S. overtures seem to be well received by Medvedev, who told Spanish reporters on Sunday that he expected the new administration to approach the issue of missile defense "in a more inventive and partnership-like" manner.

"We have already received such messages from our American colleagues," Medvedev was quoted as saying. "I expect those messages to take the form of specific proposals. I hope that during my first meeting with Mr. Obama, President of the United States, we shall be able to discuss" the issue.

Obama and Medvedev have exchanged several letters and phone calls over the past month. Kommersant reported that the letter that outlined possible cooperation on missile defense also raised other opportunities for cooperation, including on the Middle East, Afghanistan and arms control.

Correspondent Philip P. Pan in Moscow contributed to this report.

Why Acquisition Reform Fails

Why Acquisition Reform Fails, by Benjamin H. Friedman
Cato at Liberty, Feb 27, 2009

Senators Carl Levin and John McCain this week introduced legislation to improve how the Pentagon buys things — defense acquisition reform. The President is on the same page. So chances are the Pentagon’s acquisition workforce will have a new set of rules to learn some time this year.

Here’s the bill. Highlights: a series of new reporting requirements about systems analysis of new programs, a new official to come up with cost estimates of weapons systems, another official to oversee developmental testing, a requirement for competitive prototyping of new weapons, which can be waived, and an effort to make waiving Nunn-McCurty breaches a little more onerous (the idea was that you cancel weapons systems that experience excessive cost growth, but it never happens), plus some other minor bureaucratic changes. McCain claims that the legislation will cut back on cost plus contracts in favor of the fixed price variety, but the legislation does not address that.

At best this bill will create some marginal improvements in defense acquisition. More likely it will simply add hassle.

Acquisition reform is practically seasonal at the Pentagon, as this PowerPoint slide show comically demonstrates. And things have only gotten worse — more programs over budget and behind schedule over time. (Read this recent testimony from a Congressional Research Service expert for details.) According to another expert, former Pentagon weapons testing chief Tom Christie, the trouble is not the existing acquisition rules but the failure to use them to control costs. He says so in a chapter for the book America’s Defense Meltdown, which we will be discussing here at a forum on March 13.

The reasons for the failure of acquisition reform are complicated, but one surely is that these are technocratic solutions to political problems. The trouble is what we want, which is several technological miracles in each new platform, not how we buy it, as my professor and sometimes co-author Harvey Sapolsky explains in a recent Defense News op-ed:

The truth is you can’t fix the acquisition system. All the insiders know this…We can’t fix it because we want crazy things. We want a system that can fire missiles from a submarine hiding beneath the surface of the sea and hit a target thousands of miles away. Or we want a tank that can survive a shaped charge round, pack its own lethal punch and is airlifted by a C-130.

Systems have to perform reliably in the snow, in the mud, in the sand. They have to communicate with every friend and not reveal themselves to any foe. And we want them soon, not later.

Worse, we already have a lot of first-class ships, aircraft, missiles and tanks; proposed new weapon systems have to be a lot better than them or any obvious modification we can make. To be worthy of our approval, the advocates of the new system have to dazzle us with expectations of what will soon be in our arsenal, something no enemy can match. It will likely cost billions, but it will be great.

With that gleam in their eye, the services seek bids for the weapons that will define their futures. Only a few contractors can qualify to make offers. After all, only a few firms know the acquisition regulations well enough and have sufficient engineering talent to manage complex projects.

Moreover, government-encouraged mergers have further thinned the ranks of eligible firms. Given that new starts in most weapon lines are once-in-a-decade-or-more events, project awards are survival tests. Not surprisingly, false optimism abounds.

For more, read his recently co-authored book.

What about using more fixed price contracts and less cost-plus contracts, as McCain suggests? Isn’t it obvious that unless you pay someone a set price rather than whatever he says it costs, he will rip you off? Actually, no, not in defense contracting. Chris Preble and I addressed this in an oped last October:

In a cost-plus contract, the contractor gets paid whatever it costs to make a good, plus a profit. McCain claims that these agreements encourage contractors to spend as much possible and send the government the bill. This argument is confused. Defense contractors have essentially one customer: the Pentagon. Repeatedly gouging your only customer, one with a small army of auditors, is likely to lead to bankruptcy.

New technology is hard to price. If we used fixed price contracts— as McCain proposes—for new complex projects, like the next-generation bomber the air force will soon build, the contractors would simply ask for more money up front to limit their risks. If we force a low price on them, they will likely blow through what is allocated and ask for a new contract. Because military services badly want the weapons they contract for—and starting over would take years—Pentagon officials would then be forced to rewrite the deal.

What acquisition reform would work? It might help to increase the number of civilian acquisition overseers and pay them more, given that their workload has expanded, and to allow them more flexibility in their work, not less, as this legislation would. But these are still minor fixes. You can’t fix acquisition until you change the incentive structure that produces its outcomes. Until the services and their Congressional backers start to accept platforms that push the technological envelop less, the problems will persist.

Conservative views: The Dangerous Allure of Arms Control

The Dangerous Allure of Arms Control. By John R. Bolton
Washington Times, February 27, 2009

The Ringwraiths of arms control are again with us, returned from well-deserved obscurity, and back in the saddle in Washington. Through public statements and private preparations the Obama administration is signaling clearly that its approach to Russia will center on Cold War-era arms control precepts and objectives.

Although the Washington-Moscow relationship has, at Moscow's behest, become increasingly contentious and unpleasant, arms control is an odd and backward-looking way to try to improve relations and ameliorate Russia's objectionable international conduct. A long Cold War history demonstrates that arms control tends to make the relationship even more adversarial than it needs to be, concentrates attention on peripheral issues, and fails to deliver the security that supposedly is its central objective.

The Obama arms control agenda reflects the longstanding, attractive and woefully simplistic notion that ever-lower numbers of Russian and American nuclear weapons will create a more stable strategic relationship, diminishing the threat of nuclear war. Arms controllers, relying on this superficial analysis for decades, argued that reducing weapons levels would not harm U.S. security because nuclear war was so destructive it was simply unthinkable, a concept known as "automatic deterrence." Later, they adopted a slightly more nuanced position, acknowledging the need for a small nuclear force that could survive a first strike, thus providing a "second strike" capability. These flawed theories are back from the dead.

Accordingly, we now see suggestions for U.S. weapons levels that have more to do with numerology than national security. Moreover, the Obama approach appears to ignore the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, which represented a substantial change in managing strategic relations between America and Russia, a change also reflected in U.S. development of strategic missile defense capabilities. Ironically, the treaty actually reflected the reduced role of nuclear weapons in American strategy and enhanced roles for long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons that the Obama administration now risks reversing by returning to the arms-control approach of the SALT (strategic arms limitations) and START (strategic arms reduction) models.

What should we do instead, and on what should Congress insist before the negotiations proceed beyond the point of no return?

First, we must understand that agreed-upon levels of nuclear weapons address only the most visible areas of military competition, not others that actually may be more important. This has been a central fallacy of arms control since the post-World War I naval arms negotiations, ignoring as it does wide and important variances between the United States and Russia, such as weapons production capabilities, levels of tactical nuclear weapons, intelligence assets, and total national economic strength.

Moreover, U.S. nuclear capabilities provide a deterrence umbrella for its allied countries, whereas Russia plays no such positive role.

Thus, the two countries are simply not "symmetrical," but treaties with specific warhead limits gave the illusion they are.

Second, the United States should decide what levels of nuclear forces we actually need, and make that our objective, not pursuing an arbitrary number and then trying to find national security justification for it. The latter approach is not only dangerous but opens us to manipulation by our negotiating adversaries, since under this approach one number has no greater intrinsic security value than another.

This is especially true when we understand that no current or prior arms control treaty has ever actually required destruction of existing warheads, nor do we have any known verification methodology that could actually demonstrate compliance even if we could reach agreement on warhead destruction as an objective.

Third, how we "count" nuclear capabilities is important. This is not a merely technical issue, but carries profound implications for both our nuclear and conventional capabilities. Under START counting rules, weapons levels were imputed based on the capabilities of delivery systems, rather than actual warhead levels. Thus, for example, each Soviet SS-18, capable of carrying 10 nuclear warheads was imputed to do so no matter how many were actually under the nosecones.

Counting actual numbers is far more accurate. In the Treaty of Moscow, we did so by counting only operationally deployed strategic warheads rather than using imputed levels derived from artificial counting rules. Not only was this more accurate, it freed up large numbers of delivery systems for conventional warheads, making them more useful against the non-nuclear threats we increasingly face.

Abandoning Treaty of Moscow concepts and retreating to the START approach would severely impede U.S. conventional capabilities well into the future without in any way improving the U.S. strategic nuclear posture.

Arms control is one area where there will be substantial "change" between the Bush and Obama administrations, one fraught with considerable risks, especially if future negotiations embrace, as Russia wants, missile defense and space-based capabilities.

The real arms control debate is not between those relaxed about nuclear war and those seeking to avoid it, but between those who approach the problem realistically and empirically, and those who approach it as a matter of dogma. Unfortunately, the Ringwraiths now have the upper hand.

John R. Bolton is a senior fellow at AEI.

Social networks and the military

. . . and Connections, by Fred Schwarz
The Tank/NRO, Friday, February 20, 2009

In the Digital Age, military forces are struggling, as they have since the Bronze Age, to circulate information efficiently among themselves without cluing the enemy in as well. Strategy Page reports that, ostensibly for security reasons, the British Army recently tried to bar its soldiers from blogging, posting comments on websites, using social-networking sites, and playing on-line games. The Brit brass quickly learned that this particular horse left the barn long ago, as a virtual mutiny among the troops led to a quick withdrawal of the order.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army is finding ways to take advantage of modern information technology while addressing legitimate secrecy concerns:

The military got into the act by establishing official message boards, for military personnel only, where useful information could be discussed and exchanged. All this rapid information sharing has had an enormous impact on the effectiveness of the troops, something that has largely gone unnoticed by the mass media.

. . . Most junior officers grew up with the Internet, and many of the older ones were using the Internet before it became popularized in the 1990s. Even the generals of today, have experience with PCs when they were young, so have no trouble getting into this new form of communication. The military is eagerly building a "battlefield Internet" for use during combat, and parts of this are up and running and heavily used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So information technology, properly used, can promote intra-military communication and keep it from going extra-military. At Counterterrorism Blog, Roderick Jones discusses another part of the communications revolution: Twitter, and how it promotes communication between the military and the public, with benefits for both.

Twitter emerged as a powerful networked communications platform during the Mumbai terrorist attacks, when a stream of tweets marked #Mumbai (# being the global tagging system Twitter employs) gave a seemingly real-time commentary on events as they unfolded in Mumbai. Similarly, Twitter has been used to communicate the message and activity surrounding the riots in Greece using the #Griot tag. These are examples of the network effect working with a rapid communications platform and developing a powerful narrative from many different observation points. The style is anarchic but increasingly compelling. . . . Twitter in conjunction with other tools, continues the trend of making ordinary citizens active producers of potentially actionable intelligence.

While the potential remains for accidental disclosures of sensitive information, on the whole, Jones writes, Twitter has already shown itself to be a valuable tool “in the National Security space.”

02/20 05:13 PM

Persistance of Somali Piracy, U.S. Navy and other Responses

Persistance of Somali Piracy, U.S. Navy and other Responses. By J. Peter Pham
The Tank/NRO, Thursday, February 19, 2009

This week my “Strategic Interests” column for the World Defense Review provides an updated analysis of the piracy phenomenon off the coast of Somalia and international responses to it, warning that the challenge “is not just ongoing, but incidents of attempted hijackings may actually increase” despite the efforts to counter them.

After reviewing the unprecedented level of international political and security cooperation—including United Nations resolutions and other efforts, multilateral and bilateral agreements, the stand-up United States-led Combined Task Force 151, the extension of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe/U.S. Naval Forces Africa “Africa Partnership Station” to Africa’s eastern littoral, and the deployment of other naval forces to the region—my article turns its attention to the “less promising indicators” among the Somali, including the internal contradictions within the ineffectual “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) of Somalia, the rise of nefarious influence of piracy in the institutions of the semi-autonomous Puntland region, the continuing resurgence of the Islamist extremism spearheaded by al-Shabaab, and the pressure that Somaliland is increasingly under. Thus I conclude:

No doubt considerable progress has been made in recent months in the
international community’s appreciation of the challenge represented by the
Somali pirates. However, much more remains to be done before the threat can be
diminished. Ultimately . . . the problem of Somali lawlessness at sea
will only be definitively resolved when the international community summons up
the political will to adequately address the underlying pathology of Somali
statelessness onshore. Absent a minimal framework of legitimate and effective
governance in what was formerly the territory of the unitary Somali state—and I
would include as an essential attribute of such governance some sort of coast
guard capability, probably externally supported, perhaps with its resources
divided between Somaliland (assuming the upcoming elections are held, their
conduct legitimate, and the aftermath stable) and Somalia proper (under United
Nations, African Union, or subregional tutelage until the TFG or whatever
alternative interim arrangement might emerge in its stead proves itself
effective and capable of handling such responsibilities)—the specter of piracy
will always be looming just over the horizon.

U.S. Ahead of Moscow Treaty Schedule in Reducing Its Nuclear Arsenal

U.S. Ahead of Moscow Treaty Schedule in Reducing Its Nuclear Arsenal. By Walter Pincus
Washington Post, Friday, February 13, 2009; Page A03

The United States is more than two years ahead of the schedule set under the Moscow Treaty in reducing the number of its nuclear warheads operationally deployed on strategic missiles and bombers, according to congressional and administration sources.

There are fewer than 2,200 deployed warheads, the goal originally set to be reached by Dec. 31, 2012.

"The reduction was initially planned to be met in 2012, then 2010, but was achieved a few days ago," said Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project of the Federation of American Scientists, who first disclosed the information on his Web site.

While not giving the exact number of deployed warheads, Rep. Ellen O. Tauscher (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, said Wednesday, "We are in compliance with the Moscow Treaty." She said reaching that goal early could support an effort by the Obama administration to get the Russians to go to even lower levels.

The total U.S. nuclear stockpile remains above 5,000 warheads, with the majority held in strategic reserve but available for deployment if necessary. There are probably 3,000 to 4,000 more warheads in storage awaiting dismantling, according to Kristensen.

Tauscher noted that the weakness of the 2002 Moscow Treaty was that while it limited the number of operationally deployed warheads, it left out those not connected to delivery systems and in storage. She said she expects the United States to push for improvements in the Moscow agreement. "We need to broaden the definitions and work with the Russians to account for everything," she said.

Kristensen said modest reductions in deployed warheads that began during the Clinton administration were expanded under President George W. Bush. "In the past four years, they have overhauled the strategic war plan," he said. "Strategic Command believes it can adequately meet the White House guidance with far less weapons."

Some experts think the Bush administration does not get enough credit for the reductions it has made in nuclear weapons. Robert S. Norris, a senior research associate at the Natural Resources Defense Fund, said yesterday, "It is little appreciated or known that the two Bush presidencies have gotten rid of three-quarters of the U.S. nuclear stockpile."

According to Norris, the United States had about 22,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads at the end of the Cold War. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush ordered the withdrawal of all tactical weapons and signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), cutting the total to approximately 11,000. "His son cut it in half again by the end of his administration," Norris said, "and this will be the baseline for further reductions during the Obama administration."

As the Bush administration was reducing deployed warheads, it was pressing Congress to approve funding for development of a new warhead under the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. The RRW was to be based on an old, tested design with no new testing needed before being deployed. It was to be more secure and reliable over the next decade than today's aging Cold War nuclear warheads, even those that had been refurbished. Congress, however, eliminated funding for the RRW in fiscal 2009, with members saying they would await results of the Obama administration's nuclear posture review.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration has proposed an aggressive arms-control agenda that includes reductions in nuclear weapons, Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and renewal of the verification procedures of START, which run out at the end of the year.

Building a Modern Military: The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Building a Modern Military: The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. By Kristen Gunness
The Brookings Institution, Feb 12, 2009

February 2009 — Over the past year there has been much speculation as to the impact of the global economic crisis on China. Debates range from concerns over domestic stability and the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to rule, to what China’s role should be in helping the international community to “solve” the crisis. However, little attention has been given to the impact of the economic crisis on China’s national defense, or to its potential impact on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to continue to reach its lofty, and costly, modernization goals.

The recently issued White Paper on “China’s National Defense in 2008” describes some of these modernization goals, aimed at producing a force capable of fighting “local wars under informatized conditions.” They include improving military training, continued emphasis on personnel development, particularly in the officer corps, more cost-effective logistics support, improved integrated equipment support, and greater emphasis on information technology and building of military information systems.[1] In addition, China has entered an era in which its expanding role in the international community, as both a regional and global leader, is forcing the PLA out of its traditional comfort zones and into increasingly complex and challenging activities at home and abroad. The most recent of these activities is the deployment of Chinese navy ships to the Horn of Africa, to participate in a multinational counter-piracy effort.[2] The PLA has also sent troops abroad on various peacekeeping operations in Africa. On the domestic front, the PLA has been called to the aid of the Chinese people in times of disaster and emergency, as with the March 2007 snowstorms and the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008.[3]

The stakes are high for these missions: the international and domestic spotlight is squarely on the PLA. However, success for these and other operations depends on the PLA’s ability to man, train, and equip the military with what it needs to accomplish the mission, as well as on its ability to sustain operations and mobilize national assets in support of emergency relief and military contingencies. All of this presumes a certain level of domestic stability, funding, and access to resources.

What are the potential impacts of China’s changing economic environment on the PLA, and in particular on its ability to continue along a path of successful military modernization? While a truly complete answer to this question would require a longer article, there are three areas in particular where the economic crisis has the potential to affect the PLA: the defense budget, domestic unrest, and civil-military relations.

The Economic Crisis and China’s Defense Budget

China’s economic situation appears to be worsening as the global crisis deepens. According to recent estimates, China’s real GDP growth from January-September 2008 was 9.9%, 2.3% lower than the same period in 2007, and predictions for the results of 2008 show GDP growth slowing from 11.9% in 2007 to 9.8%. Analysts also predict that in 2009 GDP growth could drop further, to 8.4%.[4] China’s export sector has also suffered, with China’s official Xinhua News Agency reporting that Chinese exports had fallen sharply in the first half of 2008, and that half of China’s toy exporters had closed their doors.[5] In November 2008 the Chinese government announced a whopping $586 billion stimulus package focused on a host of domestic issues such as infrastructure construction, the public health system, education, welfare benefits, and subsidized housing.[6]

China’s slowing GDP growth and spending on stimulus packages—not to mention the money the CCP must increasingly put toward other daunting socioeconomic issues such as environmental pollution, poverty, and pension programs—begs the question of whether China can continue to maintain double digit increases in defense spending as it has over the past several years. The current economic crisis raises the prospect of the PLA becoming the victim of a “guns versus butter” debate.

In March 2008 the PRC announced a 17.6% increase in its defense budget and now spends, according to official figures, $59 billion a year. This followed an average annual increase of 15.8% from 2003 to 2007. The defense budget is only 1.4% of China’s GDP, again according to official figures. [7] U.S. estimates, published in the 2007 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, place China’s military spending at the higher figure of between $97 billion and $125 billion. China has stated that the budgetary increases are primarily for costs associated with raising military personnel’s standard of living, and that only a small amount of the money goes toward procurement of new technology and weapons. The PLA has certainly had to absorb the cost of overhauling its personnel system as it implemented the policies necessary to get rid of the “dead weight” in the PLA and attract, retain, and train the types of soldiers it needs to man the high-tech force it wishes to become.[8] However, there are also examples of the PLA recently investing in costly technological ventures, particularly in the space arena.

From a purely numeric point of view, some experts contend that in spite of an economic slowdown, China will be able to continue to maintain or even increase its military spending. A RAND report published in 2005 estimated that by 2025 China’s defense spending will be $185 billion, even with a lower average annual economic growth rate of 5%.[9] That said, the PRC government is already feeling increased pressure to put more money into social services, and there are certainly many domestic social woes that could limit or drive government spending away from defense. These social challenges—such as the costs associated with an aging population, a widening urban-rural income gap, and health costs from pollution—will only be exacerbated by the economic crisis. In spite of this, best estimates are that the PLA will receive the funding it needs and will likely not have to substantially cut military programs in the future.

The Economic Crisis and Increase in Domestic Unrest

Beyond the defense budget, the PLA depends on a host of other factors to continue on a path of successful military modernization. The Party mandates that the PLA has a responsibility to help maintain domestic stability, and therefore the issue has the potential to divert PLA attention and resources. In part, the PLA’s success hinges on its ability to deal with the external security challenges brought about by China’s global presence, while at the same time fulfilling its role as the Party’s guarantor of internal stability. And it must do both of these while it is still struggling to professionalize.

There are signs that the economic crisis has brought increasing unrest to China. Although the PRC government has not published official figures on mass incidents since 2004, experienced foreign analysts, drawing on Chinese sources, estimate the official figure at 80,000-90,000 incidents a year.[10] Exacerbating the prospects for domestic protest, analysts estimate that slower GDP growth, specifically growth below 8%, will not allow the government to create the jobs necessary to employ China’s 20 million new job seekers each year.[11]

In November Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu stated that police, “should be fully aware of the challenge brought by the global financial crisis and try their best to maintain social stability.” On January 5 Hu Jintao cautioned the People’s Armed Police (PAP), stating that challenges in 2009 would be “hard and complicated.”[12] Although the Party has put resources into better training for the PAP and other domestic security forces, the lackluster performance of these organizations in some cases has called their competency into question. A recent example is the March 2008 pre-Olympic riots in Tibet, during which the Public Security and PAP forces apparently lost control of parts of Lhasa and the PLA were forced to become involved. In addition, the Party recently issued new PLA training materials for handling unrest and other domestic stability issues, further indicating that the Chinese military could potentially have a more robust role in this area.[13]

While the PLA has thus far largely avoided involvement in suppressing domestic unrest, the Tibet incident does raise the question of whether the military will be able to keep its distance from the rising numbers of protests and riots. If the PAP and other domestic security forces do not prove up to the task, the PLA might very well find itself more involved in China’s domestic security, which could impact its ability to focus on broader modernization plans. The degree to which this would be the case is of course dependent on the level of domestic unrest and how much attention the PLA needs to devote to internal security missions; something to watch for as the impact of the economic crisis in China becomes more apparent.

The Economic Crisis and Civil-Military Relations

Another potential impact of the economic crisis on the PLA’s modernization plans is increased frictions in civil-military relations, particularly those at the local level, brought about by greater resource constraints and other socioeconomic changes in China’s society. There are some areas where economic realities are presenting challenges to the PLA in civil-military relations:

First, the PLA is challenged in attracting and retaining the types of well educated youth it needs for its modern officer corps. China’s civilian college graduates are increasingly turning to the private sector for more lucrative jobs, and while the slowing economy has made the PLA a more attractive option for out of work college graduates, the number of recruits is still small. This has forced the military to put more money toward financial incentives to recruit these college graduates.[14] At the same time, the economic crunch is making the military an increasingly attractive option for China’s less educated rural youth, which are less desirable to the PLA. The PLA’s difficulty in recruiting China’s middle-class, educated, tech-savvy youth could potentially undermine its ability to build the modern, technology-centric officer corps it is aiming for.

A second area in which the PLA is challenged is the increasing difficulty of persuading local officials to bear the costs of providing the PLA with the materiel and support it needs for training and large scale exercises. Evidence suggests that this tension between the PLA and local officials has grown in recent years, and that local officials have increasingly grumbled about providing resources to the PLA and losing money for themselves, even when China’s economy was growing at a double-digit rate. A worsening economic situation could potentially make local civil-military relations even more challenging, which has implications for China’s national defense mobilization system and readiness.[15]

The PLA’s ability to adapt to rapidly changing domestic circumstances also hinges on the state of its relationship with the Party. For the moment, the Party appears to support the PLA in its modernization goals and seems to be providing it with the resources and funding required, but this may not always be the case depending on the economic or domestic situation. One could imagine that Party-PLA tensions could arise if, for example, the internal stability situation worsens and the PLA is called in to suppress mass incidents, bringing it closer to the level of involvement in domestic politics in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Additionally, changes in China’s external security situation could drive future “guns vs. butter” debates between the Party and the PLA, particularly as the Party faces mounting social pressures and tighter budgets. For example, with Ma Ying-jeou’s election and reduced tensions between the Mainland and Taiwan, one could argue that the PLA has less immediate reason for the continued fast-paced acquisition of advanced equipment. If China’s domestic problems become bad enough, it could provide impetus for the Party to decide that now is the time to cut back on expensive defense spending and invest in social services instead.

In closing, China’s changing economic and domestic situation is affecting the PLA in various ways, some of which are likely to be further exacerbated by the current economic crisis. The PLA has proven adept at taking advantage of opportunities provided by the changing socioeconomic environment where it can, and has already made headway in addressing some of the domestic challenges it faces. However, it is clear that these challenges are likely to exist for some time to come, and as China is changing so must the PLA.

This commentary reflects the author’s personal views and does not reflect any view or opinion of the U.S. Government.


References

[1] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2008.”
[2] For a summary of PLA Navy counter-piracy operations in Somalia, see the PLA Daily’s website, “China’s Navy Fights Pirates,” http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008hjdjhd/indexg.htm.
[3] For information on peacekeeping operations see: Information Office of the State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” December 29, 2006. In addition, the PLA’s increased focus on non-traditional security missions were announced by Hu Jintao in 2004, in his speech, “Historic Missions for Our Military in the New Period and the New Century.”
[4] CRS Report for Congress: “China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for the United States,” Wayne M. Morrison, updated November 17, 2008.
[5] China Xinhua News Agency, November 4, 2008.[6] Zhiwu Chen, “Economic Crisis Could Push Reform in China,” published by Yale University in YaleGlobal Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=11596.
[7] BBC News, “Q&A: China’s Military Budget,” published on March 3, 2008.
[8] For more explanation on the PLA’s personnel policies, see Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, Travis Tanner (eds.) The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education, published by the National Bureau of Asian Studies, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008.
[9] RAND Project Air Force Research Brief, “Forecasting China’s Military Spending Through 2025,” http://www.rand.org/.
[10] I am grateful to Murray Scot Tanner for his help and excellent comments on protests and mass unrest in China.
[11] Morrison, “China and the Global Financial Crisis…” Op. cit.
[12] Reuters, “China Seeks to Curb Unrest Amid Global Financial Crisis,” November 19, 2008. South China Morning Post, “Hu Rallies Police Unit,” January 5, 2009, in Hong Kong South China Morning Post Online in English, http://www.scmp.com/.
[13] For an in-depth look at the PLA’s involvement in domestic unrest, see Murray Scot Tanner, CNA, “How China Manages Internal Security Challenges and its Impact on PLA Missions,” forthcoming publication from the National Bureau of Asian Research
[14] One example of these incentives is the National Defense Scholarship Program, which helps pay for the cost of attending college in return for service in the PLA
[15] For a detailed discussion of this and other civil-military issues, see David Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds), Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea, ME Sharpe, 2007.

Conservative views: The U.S. and U.K. Must Oppose French Plans to Weaken NATO

The U.S. and U.K. Must Oppose French Plans to Weaken NATO. By Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., and Sally McNamara
Heritage, Feb 10, 2009

Full article w/references here.

The Obama Administration has announced it will back the full reintegration of France into the NATO command structure, with French officers reportedly in line to take two senior Alliance command positions: Allied Command Transformation (one of NATO's two supreme commands, based in Norfolk, Virginia) and Joint Command Lisbon (one of NATO's three main operations headquarters, which also commands the NATO Rapid Reaction Force).[1]

This is a highly significant development that would put France at the heart of NATO military planning and reform proposals and represents an ill-thought-out and risky concession by Washington to the Sarkozy administration.

In a major speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 7,[2] Vice President Joe Biden welcomed France's decision "to fully participate in NATO structures" and also made it clear that the United States will "support the further strengthening of European defense, an increased role for the European Union in preserving peace and security, [and] a fundamentally stronger NATO-EU partnership." Biden's remarks echoed the views of British Defence Secretary John Hutton, who recklessly backed French plans for a European Union army last October.[3]

Both the United States and Great Britain must take a step back and launch a fundamental, wide-ranging review of the long-term implications of French demands for the future of NATO. The U.S. Congress should hold hearings to assess the new Administration's strategy with regard to French reintegration in order to highlight any dangers posed to U.S. interests.
It would be a huge strategic error of judgment by the new U.S. Administration and the British government to continue supporting French ambitions for restructuring Europe's security architecture. Such acquiescence would hand Paris an extraordinary degree of power and influence within NATO--power and influence well out of proportion to France's actual military role in Alliance operations.

Providing France with such influence would also ultimately weaken the Anglo-American Special Relationship, shifting power away from Washington and London and toward continental Europe while paving the way for the development of a separate European Union defense identity--all of which will undermine NATO.

French Reintegration into NATO

When President Sarkozy first floated the idea of French reintegration into NATO's military command in June 2007, he outlined two preconditions: guaranteed senior command posts for French officers within the Alliance, and American endorsement of an increased EU defense identity (the latter of which he emphasized as the more important of the two).[4] To formally establish the principle of reintegration, Sarkozy commissioned an influential "White Paper on Defense and National Security," which was published in March 2008.

Designed to promote an independent European defense identity, the French White Paper on Defense and National Security clearly states:

The European ambition stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our security policy. France wants Europe to be equipped with the corresponding military and civilian capability.[5]

The paper endorses several key principles:

• Redefinition of responsibility-sharing between America and Europe;
• An explicit rejection of the idea that the EU act as a civilian complement to NATO; and
• A strong preference for buying European defense technologies.

In June 2008, President Sarkozy circulated an additional document outlining Paris's policy initiatives for European military integration. It presents the major elements of what an EU defense identity will entail, including:

• A permanent operation headquarters in Brussels;
• Common EU funding for military operations; and
• European exchange programs for military personnel.[6]

America Has Little to Gain--and a Lot to Lose

It is likely that the Obama Administration will regard France's reintegration into NATO as a diplomatic masterstroke. The Administration will claim that it has rebuilt the Franco-American relationship in a mutually beneficial way, and Sarkozy will in turn claim that it tangibly demonstrates France's commitment to standing alongside America.

However, the Administration must ask itself what the U.S. actually gains from such a quid pro quo. Such reintegration may extract a few hundred additional French troops for eastern Afghanistan and generate stronger French public support for the Afghan mission. But President Obama will find that he has rescued the furniture only to give away the house. Not only is France already able to commit as many troops as it wishes to NATO missions (as it proved last year when 700 additional French troops were sent to Afghanistan), but 10 years of EU security initiatives have actually seen a decrease in European defense spending.

Washington continues to argue that supporting the European Security and Defense Policy is a means toward improving European defense spending and military capabilities. But after 10 years, such improvement has yet to occur and is not reflected in the projected defense budgets of any major European power. Since the EU and NATO operate in the same areas both militarily and geographically, the competition for resources will become fiercer, and Washington is likely to see its requests for military help increasingly rebuffed as France demands European commitments to EU missions.[7] Once the United States gives its blessing to the creation of a separate European defense structure, it will have no grounds to compel Europe to choose NATO over EU requests in the future.

A Parisian Power Play

Rather than genuinely attempting to increase Europe's contribution to defense on the international stage, France is seeking to expand both Paris's and the EU's power base. Sarkozy's proposal is largely political, not military. In practice, France is already involved with almost all of NATO's structures and operations, including all political bodies and the NATO Response Force. It also partakes in joint training exercises.

French reintegration into NATO command structures offers little additional value to Washington but gives immense momentum to French ambitions for an autonomous EU foreign and defense policy. When French presidents talk about European foreign policy, they more often than not mean French foreign policy. Equally, when Sarkozy talks about increasing European security capabilities, he means decreasing American involvement in Europe.

For instance, in January 2007 the EU established a military operations center in Brussels, which later that year conducted "a nine-day exercise involving the virtual deployment of 2,000 European soldiers to deal with a crisis in the fictional country of Alisia."[8] The operational center is without doubt a fledgling EU military headquarters that duplicates and will eventually compete with the NATO command.

The French proposal for an independent European defense structure will build upon the foundations laid by this new EU military headquarters. If the United States agrees to the French plan, it will represent yet another reversal of the Berlin Plus arrangements and a further erosion of the supremacy of NATO in Europe.

No Quid Pro Quo with France

If the Obama Administration agrees to support an independent EU defense structure as part of the French plan for rejoining NATO's command, such backing would represent a major transformation in U.S. strategic thinking that would have a dramatic, negative impact on the future of the alliance. It would shift the political balance of power within NATO away from Washington and London toward the main centers of power within the European Union: Paris, Berlin, and Brussels. Far from encouraging European countries to spend more on defense, it would foster an even greater dependency culture within continental Europe upon NATO resources. Such a shift would also lead to a duplication of the NATO command structure without a doubling of manpower or materiel.

It is vital that both the U.S. and U.K. reject any French proposal predicated on American and British support for an independent European defense organization. Paris should be welcomed back into NATO's leadership club only on terms that are acceptable to all NATO members, and without the doling out of powerful command positions to a country that is at best a half-hearted member of the alliance.

Simply Unacceptable

It is difficult to see how a greater EU defense capability will actually strengthen the NATO mission or the broader transatlantic alliance. Indeed, encouraging a bigger military role for the EU can only make NATO's task more complicated.

NATO has been the most successful post-war multilateral organization precisely because it is a truly transatlantic defense and security alliance of independent nation-states with a single command. The French proposal to build up a separate EU defense structure--i.e., a competitor to NATO sucking up valuable NATO resources--is simply unacceptable and should be firmly rejected.

Nile Gardiner Ph.D. is the Director of, and Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in, the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation. Erica Munkwitz assisted with research for this paper.

State Sec: The Czech Republic and the United States Share a Strong Commitment to Defense, Development, and Human Rights

The Czech Republic and the United States Share a Strong Commitment to Defense, Development, and Human Rights. By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State
Remarks With Czech Republic Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg After Their Meeting
Treaty room, Washington, DC, February 10, 2009

SECRETARY CLINTON: I am delighted today to welcome Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg to the Department of State. The minister and I just had a wide-ranging, good discussion about global, European, and bilateral issues. The Czech Republic is an important ally of the United States and, of course, our two nations share a strong commitment to defense, development, and human rights. And we are dedicated to strengthening our transatlantic alliance.

I also welcomed the foreign minister in his current European Union presidency role. The U.S. and Europe have great responsibilities in the world, especially at this time of global challenges and opportunities. And the United States appreciates Czech leadership on such key issues as Afghanistan, energy security, and the Middle East.

It was also a pleasure for me to particularly thank the Czech Republic for being at the forefront of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, with a commitment of 500 troops and leadership of the Logar Provincial Reconstruction Team. Europe and the United States, the Czech Republic and the United States, we have a big, important agenda before us. And I’m confident, as I told the minister, that our shared values, our common objectives, our commitment to freedom will continue to strengthen and deepen our partnership. So it’s a great personal pleasure for me to welcome the foreign minister here today.

FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: Well, I would like to say that this is, for me, great honor and pleasure to be one of the first visits to Secretary Clinton. I do think we have a certain luck because it coincides that the new Administration started vigorously its work, and the Czech presidency of the European Union is at its beginning.

And the fact that at one side, the Czech Republic is probably the country that Americans have the most sympathies in all of Europe, and we are staunch allies of the United States on one side, as is American – your Administration changed not only America, but the world. It is an important start – motivation to work together to rejuvenate the process of (inaudible), which, after all – I mean, there are – NATO becomes 60 years old, we all became older, and we sometimes stuck too much to the routine. And now, there’s a change, a chance to make a real change, to rejuvenate the relation, to invigorate it, and to start together to tackle the enormous problems we have in the world. Some were mentioned by Secretary Clinton.

And of one thing – I’m sure that if we stick together, if the cooperation between the United States and the European Union goes with a new attitude (inaudible), we can really achieve something in the world to make it and to change it to the better. Thank you so much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you, Minister.

QUESTION: Thank you, Madame Secretary, and Mr. Minister, if you want to jump in as well. On the Israeli elections, you’ve said you’re looking forward to working with the new government, but certainly some of the candidates would make it easier to advance some of the goals that you’ve been talking about on a deal with Israeli and Palestinians. Could you talk about what’s at stake at this election, in terms of U.S. and European foreign policy?

And on Iran, there does – there definitely seems to be an interesting dance going on between the U.S. and Iran. Last night, after President Obama’s comments about engaging Iran, President Ahmadinejad said that Iran would hold talks based on mutual respect. Your review notwithstanding, what do you think is going on here, and are you heartened by the Iranian messages that they’ve been trying to send to the U.S.?

Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as to the Israeli elections, I’m going to wait to find out what the people of Israel have decided.

As to Iran, we have been very clear that, as the Vice President discussed in Munich over the weekend, as the President said again last night, there is an opportunity for the Iranian Government to demonstrate a willingness to unclench their fist and to begin a serious and responsible discussion about a range of matters.

We still persist in our view that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons, that it would be a very unfortunate course for them to pursue. And we hope that there will be opportunities in the future for us to develop a better understanding of one another and to work out a way of talking that would produce positive results for the people of Iran.

QUESTION: Czech television. Madame Secretary, this is a question about missile defense. Does your Administration have a, kind of like, plan to be presented – a clear plan, including timeframe, to be presented at NATO summit?

And on both of you, is there still an option to abandon this project if there would be a kind of diplomatic agreement with Iran or with Russia?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as the Vice President also said in Munich, we are first and foremost very grateful to the Czech Republic, to the government and the people, for working with us to try to deter the threat from Iran. If we are able to deter that threat, it will be, in some measure, due to the courage of the Czech people in stepping up and being a partner to provide a strong defense in Europe against Iranian aggression that would certainly be present were they to obtain nuclear weapons.

There are technical issues concerning missile defense that you – that you know well. We had a very good discussion about our hopes to work together – the European Union and the United States – in dissuading the Iranians from pursuing nuclear weapons. But if the Iranians continue on this path, certainly one of the options for free countries like the Czech Republic, other Europeans, and the United States, is to defend ourselves. So this is one of those issues that really will rest with the decisions made by the Iranian Government.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, there is a prospect looming on the Korean Peninsula of possible military clashes between the two Koreas, as a result of some actions that the North has taken in the past couple of weeks. And there are some reports that Chinese fishing boats are being pulled out of the area in case something happens. You’re going to Asia next week.

Can you tell us what can you do to make sure that such a situation doesn’t occur? And more broadly, what is your expectation on that trip? What do you hope to – what message do you hope to convey to not only the government, but the people of Asia?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I am going to Asia to reassert our commitment to our allies and partners in Asia, to work on a range of issues with Japan and South Korea, China, and Indonesia, as well as reaching out to the rest of East Asia.

And clearly, with respect to North Korea, our position remains the same. We intend to pursue the Six-Party Talks. We expect that -- with our partners in those talks to continue a policy that would lead to the denuclearization of North Korea and the end of any proliferating activities by North Korea.

We are hopeful that some of the behavior that we have seen coming from North Korea in the last few weeks is, you know, not a precursor of any action that would up the ante, or threaten the stability and peace and security of the neighbors in the region.

But again, North Korea has to understand that all of the countries in East Asia have made it clear that its behavior is viewed as unacceptable. And there are opportunities for the government and people of North Korea were they to begin, once again, to engage through the Six-Party Talks, through other bilateral and multilateral forums. And we’re hopeful that we’ll see that in the weeks and months ahead. But I know of the continuing concern on the part of the other members of the Six-Party Talks with respect to North Korea’s attitude in the last weeks, and I’ll be talking with our counterparts to determine the most effective way forward. Thank you.
Last question?

QUESTION: Czech daily newspaper. Madame Secretary, do you think that the current financial crisis could anyhow delay the plans for development and deployment of the missile defense systems?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, our concerns about missile defense are primarily technical. There may be some economic factors. But we’ve always seen this as primarily a technical challenge. Obviously, we expect any system that we deploy to be able to operate effectively to achieve the goals that are set. And as I have said earlier, our concern, the concern of other nations within the broad geographic area that could be affected by an Iranian missile, you know, are looking for ways to deter and end that behavior.

But you know, we have to be realistic, you know. Our slogan can be “hope for the best, but plan for the worst.” I think that’s a realistic approach that we should be taking, and that’s why I admire the Czech Government. I know that that was a difficult decision. I understand that. But the Czech people won their freedom and do not want to be intimidated by the specter of, you know, nuclear weapons in the hands of unfriendly regimes. So I think that what the Czech Government and the Polish Government did in saying, you know, we want to be prepared in the event that we are unable to persuade, dissuade, deter, the Iranians from pursuing nuclear weapons makes a great deal of sense.

Now, the timing and the, you know, actual deployment, those are largely technical matters. And as the Vice President said, which I underscore, if we are able to see a change in behavior on the part of the Iranians with respect to what we believe to be their pursuit of nuclear weapons, you know, then – you know, we will reconsider where we stand. But we are a long, long way from seeing such evidence of any behavior change.

Mr. Minister, do you want to add anything?

FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: No. I’d have to agree with what you have said. And I think the most necessary thing is that as with Iran, as to other dangers in this world, we need to stick together and we can rely on each other.

And just I would like to add one thing. It was a special pleasure for me – the meeting today with Secretary Clinton, whom I had the honor and pleasure to meet before already in Prague when she visit my former chief, President Havel. And I already was impressed by her great energy. Now to see her as Secretary of State of the United States is a special pleasure.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you. Thank you all very much. Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER SCHWARZENBERG: Thank you so much.

Air Force fails new nuclear reviews

Air Force fails new nuclear reviews. By Bill Gertz
Washington Times, Feb 05, 2009

Air Force nuclear units have failed two inspections in the past three months, providing fresh evidence that the military service that jarred the world in 2007 by mistakenly transporting live nuclear weapons across the United States continues to suffer lapses in its management of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Jennifer Thibault, a spokeswoman for the Air Force Space Command, said the failed "surety" inspections at Wyoming and Montana bases in November and December involved "administrative and paperwork issues." In all, three Air Force nuclear-missile units and two strategic-bomber units failed such inspections in 2008.

Despite the problems, the Air Force said it is making progress addressing issues with the security and handling of nuclear-tipped missiles that came to light after two embarrassing episodes in 2006 and 2007 prompted a widespread review and management changes.

"While we missed the mark in certain areas during the last three inspections of our ICBM wings, overall, we've seen that our airmen are highly capable of operating, maintaining and securing our nuclear forces," Miss Thibault told The Washington Times.

James Schlesinger, the former defense secretary who headed a recent task force on nuclear-weapons management, said Tuesday the continuing problems affect U.S. credibility worldwide - both in deterring attacks and assuring allies of protection - but he said he thinks the Air Force is committed to fixing the problems.

"Whatever the size of the nuclear force is, it has to be run with zero defects," Mr. Schlesinger said in an interview. "We've got to get back to that if we want to have any credibility in the international scene."

The most recent surety-inspection failure took place at the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming from Dec. 2 to Dec. 17. The base is in charge of 150 Minuteman III missiles that are on alert 24 hours a day.

Air Force officials said the 90th was given failing grades by inspectors from the Space Command and the Defense Technology Security Administration for not properly documenting tests on missiles, which require strict monitoring.

The Wyoming base was at the center of one of the two prior nuclear mishaps that cast embarrassment on the Air Force. Nuclear-missile units at F.E. Warren mistakenly transported four Minuteman III forward sections containing sensitive components to Taiwan on two occasions, in October and November 2006. The components were recovered, but the mistake exposed larger security shortfalls.

A subsequent security breakdown allowed live nuclear weapons to be flown improperly from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana in August 2007.

The incidents prompted Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to form an eight-member Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management that produced two reports critical of the Air Force's handling of nuclear missiles. On-site inspections were made stricter and have divulged additional problems, officials confirm.

The two other nuclear-surety-inspection failures took place last year at the 341st Missile Wing at Malstrom Air Force Base, Montana, from Oct. 26 to Nov. 10, and at the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., from Jan. 22 to Jan. 30, 2008. Both wings also handle 150 nuclear-tipped Minuteman IIIs deployed in underground silos.

Miss Thibault declined to provide details of the inspection failures because of the sensitivity of the information.

Surety inspections are held every 18 months and measure whether troops are prepared to fire missiles during a two-week testing period.

"Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI) are extremely detailed and demand the absolute highest standards of compliance and accountability [to pass]," Miss Thibault said.

The Air Force defines nuclear-surety inspections as reviews of all nuclear-weapons-related material, people and procedures that "contribute to the security, safety, and reliability of nuclear weapons and to the assurance that there will be no nuclear-weapon accidents, incidents, unauthorized weapon detonations, or degradation in performance at the target."

Last year, the tests were made more rigorous, Miss Thibault said, following the critical report by the task force on nuclear weapons.

"These inspections are tools that our commanders use to determine the readiness of their units to perform the mission to the standard we demand - perfection," she said. "We're seeing progress in ICBM nuclear surety."

As for the test failures, "unsatisfactory inspection results, in the sense of identifying discrepancies, are part of the fix and should not be interpreted as suggesting that the ultimate security or safety of the American people or our allies has been put at risk," Miss Thibault said.

The Defense Department task force report issued in October warned that the Air Force was not doing its job of securing and maintaining nuclear-missile forces. The report identified a "serious erosion of senior-level attention, focus, expertise, mission readiness, resources, and discipline in the nuclear weapons mission."

The Air Force responded by initiating 100 steps to improve nuclear-weapons problems.

Data from the report show that the Air Force failed on five of its 22 surety inspections in 2008. It was the fourth time since 1992 that at least five failing grades were issued, the report stated.
According to the report and the Air Force, the five inspections failures during 2008 included the three at the missile wings and two at strategic nuclear bomber wings.

By contrast, in 2006 and 2007, there were a total of 18 surety inspections, and all received passing grades.

"Over the past 10 years, inspection pass rates point to anomalies that indicate a systemic problem in the inspection regime," the report said. "Something is clearly wrong."

A second task force report, made public Jan. 9, stated that rigorous nuclear surety inspections are "critical to maintaining a credible U.S. deterrent."

"However, the task force believes a significant shortfall exists in the DoD nuclear surety inspection process," the report said.

Mr. Schlesinger, who headed the task force, stated in the October report that the Air Force in recent years focused too much on conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. "Both inattention and conscious budget decisions have led to the atrophy of the Air Force´s nuclear mission," he stated. "But the balance must be restored. Though reduced in scope, the nuclear mission remains essential."

The U.S. nuclear arsenal is still needed despite the demise of the Cold War for deterring nuclear threats to the United States and its allies, he said. The weapons must be maintained as a credible deterrent against nuclear powers such as China and Russia that are in the process of building up their nuclear forces, Mr. Schlesinger said.

The January task force report stated that one of the problems for the Air Force's nuclear weapons mission is that troops do not clearly understand the deterrence mission of the expensive and extremely powerful strategic weapons.

Unlike the Air Force, which has numerous problems with its nuclear mission, the Navy has sustained its commitment to nuclear forces but still is "fraying at the edges," the report said.

The task force "did not find in the Navy the kind of deterioration in morale that characterized Air Force nuclear units," the report said.

"The attitude in the Air Force was: 'We know that the president and secretary of defense don´t give a damn about what we do,' " the report stated.

By contrast, a Navy ballistic missile submarine crew told task force investigators that while senior Navy leaders are disinterested in the strategic nuclear deterrence forces, the ballistic missile submariners remain highly motivated.

"The attitude in the Navy was: 'We know that the president and secretary of defense don´t care - but we do,' " the report stated.

However, the final report also contained the conclusion that the problem of "the lack of interest in and attention to the nuclear mission and nuclear deterrence ... go well beyond the Air Force."

"This lack of interest and attention have been widespread throughout DoD and contributed to the decline of attention in the Air Force," the final report stated.

The report called for creating the position of assistant secretary of defense for nuclear deterrence, which would elevate nuclear issues that have been separated and downgraded as the result of a Pentagon reorganization during the Bush administration.